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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

JOSEPH D. KELLY, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, and the general public, *Plaintiff*, v. HUMASON II, INC., a Nevada corporation; HUMASON + SONS, INC., an entity of unknown form; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.	Case No.: 23CV010746 CLASS ACTION Assigned for All Purposes To: Hon. Jill Talley **PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES** Final Approval Hearing: Date: December 11, 2026 Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept: 8A

TO THE HONORABLE COURT, ALL INTERESTED PARTIES, AND THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 11, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 8A of the Sacramento Superior Court located at 500 G Street, Sacramento CA, 95814 Plaintiffs Joseph D. Kelly, Jeremiah Kelly and Osmar Jared Regalado Espino ("Plaintiffs"), on behalf of themselves and all persons similarly situated, will and hereby do move this Court pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rule of Court, Rule 3.769 for an order of final approval of the class action settlement, which will accomplish the following: certify the Class for settlement purposes only; approve the class action settlement embodied in the Parties' Class Action and PAGA Settlement; confirm Plaintiffs as the Class Representatives; approve the Class Representative Service Awards to the Class Representatives; confirm the appointment of Class Counsel; approve Class Counsel's application for attorney's fees and litigation costs; and enter judgment approving the class action settlement.

Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699.3(b)(4), the Parties also seek approval of the proposed Settlement's allocation of funds to claims made under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ("PAGA").

The grounds for this Motion, as set forth in the attached memorandum of points and authorities and supporting declarations, are that this is a fair and reasonable Settlement that benefits the Class and was the product of informed, non-collusive negotiations by Parties who were represented by experienced and able counsel. *See Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1802 (1996); Manual for Complex Litigation, (Second), § 30.44 (1985).

Plaintiffs base this Motion on this Notice and the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declarations of Enoch J. Kim, Plaintiffs, and William Argueta, the complete pleadings, records and files in the case, and such other further oral and documentary evidence which may be submitted at or before the hearing on this Motion.

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DATED: November 17, 2026

D.LAW, INC.



By:
Enoch J. Kim, Esq.
Matthew Carraher, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 5, 2026, this Court entered an Order Granting Preliminary Approval of the Parties' Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement, entered into by Joseph D. Kelly, Jeremiah Kelly and Osmar Jared Regalado Espino ("Plaintiffs") on behalf of all persons employed by Defendants Humason II, Inc. and Humason + Sons, Inc. ("Defendants") (collectively, "the Parties"), as a non-exempt, hourly employee in California during the Class Period, which is the period from October 26, 2019 to October 17, 2025. ("Class" or "Class Members"). Under the terms of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (the "Settlement Agreement" or "Settlement")[1], the wage and hour claims of 1,119 total Class Members will be resolved for $1,025,000.00.

Notice of the Settlement was distributed in accordance with the Court's Preliminary Approval Order, and the response was excellent. **Zero Class Members objected** to the Settlement, **zero disputed** the number of Workweeks, and **zero opted out** of the Settlement. (Declaration of Enoch J. Kim ("Kim Decl."), ¶ 12-13; Declaration of William Argueta ("Argueta Decl."), ¶ 11-14.) The fact that there was a 100% participation rate indicates that the persons most affected by Defendants' alleged practices and who stand to benefit most from the Settlement agree that this is an outstanding result and a strong indication that the Settlement is fair and adequate. (Kim Decl., ¶ 13.) The average Individual Settlement Payment is estimated to be approximately **$509.29 per Settlement Class Member**, the highest payment is estimated to be approximately **$5,182.88**, and the lowest payment is estimated to be approximately **$16.99**. (Argueta Decl., ¶ 16.) The Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable and will convey a substantial benefit to all Class Members. (Kim Decl., ¶ 9.) Thus, Plaintiffs move this Court for an order granting final approval of the Settlement.

A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. Plaintiffs' Claims

On October 26, 2023, Plaintiff Joseph D. Kelly commenced a Class Action by filing a Complaint alleging ten causes of action against Defendants for (1) Meal Period Liability under

[1] To the extent any capitalized term is not defined in this motion, Plaintiffs intends for the definition in the Parties' Settlement Agreement to be used. To the extent there are any conflict between the definitions in the parties' Settlement Agreement and this motion, the definition in the Settlement Agreement controls.

Labor Code § 226.7, (2) Rest-Break Liability under Labor Code § 226.7, (3) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages and Overtime Wages, (4) Failure to Pay Reporting Time Wages, (5) Failure to Comply with Labor Code § 246, (6) Violation of Labor Code § 226(a), (7) Penalties Pursuant to Labor Code § 201-203, (8) Reimbursement of Necessary Expenditures, (9) Failure to pay Wages Due, Negotiable and Payable in Cash on Demand under Labor Code §§212 and 213, (10) Violation of Business & Professions Code § 17200 *et seq*. (the "Action"). On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff Kelly amended his complaint to add an eleventh cause of action for Civil Penalties under the Private Attorney's General Act of 2004. (Kim Decl., ¶ 4.)

Plaintiff Kelly submitted a PAGA notice (LWDA-CM-934456-23) to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") on October 25, 2023. (*Id.* at ¶ 5) On May 1, 2025, Plaintiff submitted an amended PAGA notice letter which added Plaintiff Jeremiah Kelly as a PAGA representative, and on June 1, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended PAGA Letter, adding Osmar Jared Regalado Espino as a named Plaintiff in the action. On January 14, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint ("Operative Complaint") which formally added Plaintiffs Jeremiah Kelly and Osmar Jared Regalado Espino to the matter and adding a cause of action for Failure to Properly Pay Vacation Wages owed under Labor Code § 227.3. (*Id*.)

2. Plaintiffs' Investigation[2]

Class Counsel conducted a thorough investigation of the facts and claims giving rise to the action, including (1) conducting formal and informal discovery and meeting and conferring with Defense Counsel about same; (2) reviewing and analyzing records and data, as well as employment-related policies; (3) reviewing Plaintiffs' personnel files and other documentation; (4) interviewing Plaintiffs regarding potential Class Members; (5) researching the applicable law and potential defenses; (6) constructing damage models based on the facts and numbers provided by Defendant; and (7) reviewing information provided by Defendants in response to informal discovery and in advance of the mediation. (Keledjian PA Decl., ¶ 7.)

B. MEDIATION

[2] For a full discussion, *see* the Declaration of David Keledjian in support of Plaintiff' Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Parties' Class and PAGA Settlement Agreement ("Keledjian PA Decl."), previously filed herein.

On November 11, 2024, the Parties participated in an all-day mediation with Hon. Steven Denton (Ret.) but were unable to reach a settlement. Subsequently on October 2, 2025, the Parties again met for a full day of mediation with Hon. Steven R. Denton (Ret.). (*Id.* at ¶ 9.) As a result of the mediation, the Parties agreed to settle the lawsuit according to the terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement. (*Id*.)

C. THE TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT

The amount available for distribution to Participating Class Members is the Gross Settlement Amount of $1,025,000.00 less the following deductions: (1) a Class Counsel Fees award of $**341,666.67** to Class Counsel for attorneys' fees; (2) a Class Counsel Litigation Expenses award of $30,471.90 for reimbursement of actual costs incurred; (3) Class Representative Service Payments of $10,000.00 to each Class Representative (for a total of $30,000.00); (4) up to $15,000.00 for the settlement administration ("Settlement Administrator Costs")[3]; and (5) PAGA Penalties of $40,000.00, with 75% or $30,000.00 allocated to the LWDA, and 25% or $10,000.00 allocated to the Aggrieved Employees and distributed on a *pro rata* basis. (Kim Decl., ¶ 8.)

D. NOTICE TO THE CLASS MEMBERS

Following the entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, the Parties directed Apex Class Actions, LLC ("Apex") to send out the court-approved notice form. (*See* Kim Decl., ¶ 10; *see also* Argueta Decl., ¶ 4.**)** Apex sent the Notices to the last-known address of each Class Member after performing a National Change of Address search. (Argueta Decl., ¶¶ 5-7.) Of the 1,119 Class Members who were sent Notices, **Apex** received 474 returned Notices as undeliverable, and 357 Notices were re-mailed, with 117 Notices deemed undeliverable**.** (Argueta Decl., ¶¶ 8-9.**)**

II. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT FINAL APPROVAL OF THE CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Court should grant final approval not only because the settlement is fair but also because public policy favors settlement over continued class-action litigation. *See, e.g., Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 434 ("Courts have long acknowledged the importance of class actions as a means to prevent a failure of justice in our

[3] In this case, the Administrator's exact costs are $12,990. Plaintiffs seek approval of the exact amount.

judicial system."); *State v. Levi Strauss & Co.* (1986) 41 Cal. 3d 460, 471 ("[T]he consumer class action is an essential tool for the protection of consumers against exploitative business practices."); *Class Plaintiffs v. City Of Seattle* (9th Cir. 1992) 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 ("[S]trong judicial policy . . . favors settlements, particularly where complex class action litigation is concerned."); Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (4th ed. 2002) § 11.41.

A. CRITERIA FOR SETTLEMENT APPROVAL

California Rule of Court 3.769 requires court approval of the settlement of class action lawsuits. Preliminary approval is merely the first of three steps that comprise the approval procedure for settlements of class actions. *See* Manual for Complex Litigation, Second §30.44 (1993); *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801. The second approval step is the dissemination of notice of the settlement to all Class Members. *Id*. The third step is a final settlement approval hearing, at which evidence and argument concerning the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the settlement may be presented and Class Members may be heard. *Id.*

The first two stages have been completed here. Now, at the final approval stage, the decision facing the Court is whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal. App 4th 224, 235. Among the relevant considerations in reaching this final determination are (1) the strength of Plaintiffs' case balanced against the benefits of the settlement, and (2) the complexity, expected duration, and expense of further litigation. *Id.; see also Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1802.

In evaluating the fairness of a settlement proposal, courts must give "proper deference to the private consensual decision of the parties," because "the Court's intrusion upon what is otherwise a private consensual agreement negotiated between the parties to a lawsuit must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties." *Hanlon v. Chrysler Inc.* (9th Cir. 1998) 150 F. 3d 1011, 1027; *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th, at 1801 ("Due regard should be given to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.") Accordingly, the Court should take into account the informed recommendations of counsel and the Parties. *See Kirkorian v. Borelli,* (N.D. Cal.1988) 695 F. Supp. 446, 451 (the recommendation of experienced counsel carries

significant weight in the court's determination of the reasonableness of the settlement); *Vulcan So. Of Westchester County, Inc. v. Fire Department of White Plains* (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 505 F.Supp.955, 967 (same). A presumption of fairness exists where (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining, (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently, (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation, and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. *Dunk, supra,* 48 Cal.App.4th at 1794.

B. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT FULFILLS ALL FINAL APPROVAL CRITERIA

1. The Settlement Follows Substantial Investigation and Discovery and Is the Product of Serious, Informed, Non-Collusive Negotiations in Which Parties Were Represented by Experienced Counsel.

The Settlement is the result of extensive negotiations, conducted at arm's length, and informed by substantial factual and legal investigations. (Keledjian PA Decl., ¶ 23.) Throughout this case, Class Members have been represented by experienced counsel. (*Id*. at ¶¶ 79-86.)

Class Counsel have devoted a substantial amount of time to this case, including but not limited to researching various legal issues prior to and after filing this Action; drafting and reviewing pleadings; conducting formal and informal discovery and meeting and conferring with defense counsel; preparing for class certification; reviewing and analyzing the documents produced by Defendant; regularly communicating with Plaintiff; preparing for and attending mediation; negotiating and finalizing the Settlement including several revisions thereof; drafting documents for preliminary and final approval, including documents for the administration of the settlement; briefing for the hearing on the motion for preliminary approval of the class action settlement; and coordinating and overseeing the administration of the settlement. (Kim Decl., ¶ 15, 29-30.)

Among those matters considered during the course of settlement negotiations were the risks, expenses, and length of further litigation, including the appeals process; the present state of the law as it applies to wage and hour class actions; the present value of a settlement versus the long wait occasioned by any potential judgment in favor of the Class; and the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability against Defendants' defenses to the Action. These factors each indicated that the

interests of Class Members are best served by a settlement of this Action as set forth in the Settlement Agreement. Moreover, as experienced litigators in employment class action cases, Class Counsel believes that the Settlement is fair and reasonable and serves the best interests of the Class Members. (Keledjian PA Decl., ¶ 86; Kim Decl., ¶ 27-34.)

2. The Settlement is Reasonable and Therefore Falls within the Range of Approval by this Court.

Defendants contend that the Class would not be able to establish its entitlement to the relief it is seeking and promised to mount a vigorous defense. (Keledjian PA Decl., ¶¶ 29-30.) On the other hand, Plaintiffs believe that there is ample evidence to support the class allegations. (*Id*.) Plaintiffs appreciate that, in addition to the litigation risks of continued proceedings, the proceeding itself would be potentially complicated and expensive, and even if ultimately successful absent the settlement, Class Members might see no recovery until the lengthy appellate process is complete. (Keledjian PA Decl., ¶ 36.) In contrast, the Settlement provides immediate benefits to the Class and falls within the "the range of reasonableness" necessary for final approval.

3. Class Members Received the Best Practicable Notice.

California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate program to provide the best notice practicable.[4] *See Cartt v. Superior Court*, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 973-74 (1975); *In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases*, 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1392 (2010); *Cho v. Seagate Tech. Holdings, Inc.*, 177 Cal.App.4th 734, 745-746 (2009); *Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts*, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985).[5] The content and method of notice should be designed to apprise the class members of the terms of the proposed settlement and of their rights to participate in, object to, or opt out of the settlement. *See Mullane*, 339 U.S. at 314; *In re Vitamin Cases*, 107 Cal. App. 4th 820, 828 (2003).

[4] The California Supreme Court has authorized California's trial courts to use Federal Rule 23 and cases applying it for guidance in considering class issues. *See Vasquez v. Superior Court*, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 821 (1971); *Green v. Obledo*, 29 Cal. 3d 126, 145-46 (1981). Where appropriate, therefore, the parties cite Federal Rule 23 and federal case law in addition to California law.

[5] *See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin*, 417 U.S. 156, 175-75 (1974) (individual notice must be sent to all class members who can be identified through reasonable efforts); *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company*, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (best practicable notice is that which is "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections").

The Notice preliminarily approved by the Court met these requirements: it explained the nature of the litigation, the material terms of the Settlement, the amount of the Class Counsel Award and Class Representative Service Award sought, how a Class Member could participate in, object to, or be excluded from the Settlement, and to whom to direct inquiries.

4. Zero Class Members Have Objected to the Settlement and Zero Class Members Have Opted Out of the Settlement.

A presumption of fairness exists where the percentage of objectors and opt-outs is small.*7-Eleven Owners for Franchising v. Southland Corp.* (2000) 85 Cal. App.4th 224, 244; *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corporation* (9th Cir. 1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1025-1026. Here, the deadline for opting out of or objecting to the Settlement was October 13, 2026. **(**Argueta Decl., ¶¶ 10-14; Kim Decl. ¶ 12.) As of the deadline, no Class Members opted out of or objected to the Settlement. (*Id*.)

5. The Service Award to Plaintiffs is Reasonable and Fair.

Class action settlements typically provide for an incentive or enhancement payment to the named Plaintiffs for bringing and helping to prosecute the action. Courts routinely approve these supplemental payments. *See Newberg on Class Actions* at § 12.46; *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294; *Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.* (E.D. Pa. 1985) 621 F. Supp. 27 (award of $20,000.00 each to two class representatives in antitrust case); *Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (PPG Industries, Inc.)* (W.D. Pa. 1973) 59 F.R.D. 616, 617, *aff'd* 494 F.2d 799 (3d Cir.), *cert. denied* in *Abate v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.* (1974) 419 U.S. 900. As the *Staton* court noted:

> [N]amed plaintiffs . . . are eligible for reasonable incentive payments. The district court must evaluate their awards individually, using relevant factors includ[ing] the actions the Plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class, the degree to which the class has benefited from those actions, . . . the amount of time and effort the Plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation . . . and reasonabl[e] fear[s] of workplace retaliation.

Staton v. Boeing (9th Cir. 2003) 327 F.3d 938, 977 (citation omitted).

The retaliation issue identified in *Staton v. Boeing* extends outside the immediate workplace. It is common knowledge that the modern-day workforce is quite mobile, with employees holding several jobs in a career during their lifetime. Few people want to confront their employers, let alone

sue them. (Kim Decl., ¶ 45.) By suing their former employer, Plaintiffs contend that they increased the risk of retaliation by prospective employers to which they may apply in the future. (*Id*.)

But Plaintiffs did not allow their fear of the potential repercussions of being a Class Representative deter them from acting for the benefit of Class Members. (Kim Decl., ¶ 46.) They devoted a substantial amount of time to helping Class Counsel effectively develop and prosecute this Action at each stage of the litigation. (*Id*.; *see also generally* Declarations of Joseph Kelly, Jeremiah Kelly, and Osmar Jared Regalado Espino filed in support of Motion for Preliminary Approval.) Plaintiffs conferred with Class Counsel to discuss every aspect of this case; provided information about Defendants and its wage-and-hour practices; reviewed and produced documents; spent time with Class Counsel discussing the terms of the Settlement and reviewing and executing the Settlement Agreement. (Kim Decl., ¶ 47.) In the end, Plaintiffs decided to vindicate not only their own rights but also those of their co-workers. (Kim Decl., ¶ 44.)

Plaintiffs have diligently, adequately, and fairly represented Class Members and have not placed their interests above any member of the Class. (Kim Decl., ¶ 47.) Not only have Plaintiffs' efforts been instrumental in generating a substantial benefit for Class Members, but—significantly—not a single Class Member has objected to the requested service award. (Argueta Decl., ¶ 12.) Plaintiffs therefore respectfully request the Class Representative Service Payments in the amount of $10,000.00 to each Plaintiff for their efforts and initiative in bringing and helping prosecute this Action. (Kim Decl., ¶ 47.)

6. <u>The Payment of Attorneys' Fees Is Reasonable and Therefore Falls within the Range of Approval by the Court.</u>

i. <u>The Requested Award of Attorneys' Fees Is Justified Based on the Percentage-of-the-Benefit Method.</u>

The California Supreme Court held that "when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund created." *Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern. Inc.* (Aug. 11, 2016) 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 555, 573. Indeed, courts may use the "percentage method for its primary

calculation of the fee award. The choice of a fee calculation method is generally one within the discretion of the trial court, the goal under either the percentage or lodestar approach being the award of a reasonable fee to compensate counsel for their efforts." *Id.*

The requested Class Counsel Fees award for attorneys' fees in this case consists of one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount. This percentage is **below** Plaintiffs' contingency fee agreement.[6] The requested attorneys' fees are fair and reasonable under California's fee-shifting jurisprudence.[7] And it is consistent with the percentage of the common fund awarded to counsel in cases similar in character and geographical location to this one. (*See* Kim Decl., ¶ 37-40.)

The amount requested here will fairly compensate Class Counsel for their successful prosecution of this case, taking into account the quality, nature, and extent of counsel's efforts, the outstanding results achieved, the fact that no one objected to the fee amount and the fact that the amount of fees for which approval is sought is significantly less than legal precedent. Class Counsel has litigated numerous class actions and submits that this settlement was possible owing to Class Counsel's experience with such cases. (Keledjian PA Decl., ¶¶ 78-86.) Class Counsel's diligent, efficient, and creative pursuit of this matter positioned Plaintiffs to settle this action successfully, affording redress to the entire Class and avoiding the inevitable expense and risk attendant to protracted litigation. In sum, it was through the efforts of Plaintiffs and Class Counsel that the considerable benefits of the Settlement were obtained.

In light of the foregoing, the fee request in an amount equal to one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount is reasonable.

ii. The Requested Award of Attorneys' Fees Is Also Justified Based on the Lodestar Method.

Although *Laffitte* makes it clear that a lodestar cross-check is not necessary, Class Counsel's lodestar calculation nevertheless also supports the requested attorneys' fees. The lodestar

[6] The award of attorneys' fees and costs in this case is intended to reimburse Class Counsel for all of the uncompensated work that they have already performed and for all of the work they will continue to perform in carrying out and overseeing the administration of the Settlement. Plaintiffs in this action signed a contingency-fee agreement stating that Class Counsel could receive a fee under certain scenarios that exceed one-third of the recovery, as much as 40%. (Kim Decl., ¶ 40.)

[7] Moreover, the Labor Code specifically provides for an award of attorneys' fees and costs for some of employees' claims. *See, e.g.*, Lab. Code § 226. Plaintiffs is also entitled to an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5.

calculation typically proceeds in three steps. First, a trial court must determine a baseline guide or "lodestar" figure based on the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation for each attorney involved in the case. *Serrano v. Priest* (1975) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48. The court then sets a reasonable hourly fee to apply to the time expended, with reference to the prevailing rates in the geographical area in which the action is pending. *Bihun v. AT&T Information System* (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 976, 997. Finally, a "multiplier" is selected with reference to the following factors: (1) the novelty and difficulty of issues involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and (4) the contingent nature of the fee award owing to the uncertainty of prevailing on the merits and of establishing eligibility for the award. *Serrano, supra,* 20 Cal.App.3d at 49.

Class Counsel charges rates in line with the prevailing market rates in the Los Angeles area for attorneys of comparable experience and skill handling complex litigation. (Kim Decl., ¶ 17.) Class Counsel's hourly rates are also commensurate with the prevailing market rates in these counties when applying locality adjustments to the Laffey Matrix. (*Id*. at ¶¶ 17-19*.;* Exh. 3 (the "Laffey Matrix"). The Laffey Matrix rates have been held to be reasonable market rates when locally adjusted for inflation. *Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin* (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691.

Moreover, the *Serrano* factors all militate in favor of the requested fee award. (Kim Decl., ¶ 32.) This case raised a number of complex and contested issues, and Class Counsel exhibited skill and creativity in prosecuting and presenting them. (*Id.*) This case was not straightforward. (Kim Decl., ¶ 33.) Class Counsel had to spend time researching and analyzing each of these claims and issues to adequately assess the liability of Defendant. (*Id*.) Class Counsel then had to develop the evidence necessary through informal discovery to establish Defendants' potential liability. (*Id.*) This was done through carefully sifting through hundreds of pages of documents. (*Id.*)

In sum, Class Counsel had to come up with creative approaches to these issues in litigating the case and, ultimately, negotiating and crafting the Settlement. (Kim Decl., ¶ 34.) To this end, Class Counsel has devoted a tremendous amount of time and energy. (*Id*.) This time commitment was necessary in order to research, construct, and prosecute viable legal claims in the face of stiff opposition, but it has come at a cost. (*Id*.) Class Counsel zealously represented Plaintiffs and the

Class and has obtained a favorable result. (*Id*.)

From the foregoing analysis, Class Counsel's requested attorneys' fees are fair and reasonable. Class Counsel conservatively estimates that it invested at least 250 hours of attorney time and $288,838.00 in fees in this matter. (Kim Decl., ¶ 29-30.) As such, Class Counsel's lodestar only requires a multiplier of 1.18 to reach the requested fee amount of $341,666.67..

iii. The Requested Costs Award Is Reasonable

The preliminarily approved settlement provided for the reimbursement of Class Counsel's costs. (Kim Decl., ¶ 43.) As of the date of the filing of this Motion, the actual total costs incurred in litigating this Action for Class Counsel are $30,447.95. (*Id.*) Class Counsel incurred costs including, but not limited to, filing fees (e.g. complaint, stipulation, motions), service of process, mediation fees, and attorney-service costs for court filings, all of which were necessarily and reasonably incurred to prosecute this Action and achieve a settlement that significantly benefits the Class. (*Id.*) Thus, Class Counsel respectfully requests a reimbursement of their costs of $30,447.95. (*Id.*)

III. CERTIFICATION OF THE CLASS FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS APPROPRIATE

A. THE LEGAL STANDARD

Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Code Civ. Proc. § 382. Class certification under § 382 is appropriate when "(1) [t]here [is] . . . an ascertainable class; and (2) there [is] . . . a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented." *Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.*(1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 (citations omitted). The community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: "(1) predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class." *Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.

Any doubt as to the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of class

certification, subject to later modification if necessary. *Id*. at 473-475. The decision to certify a class is a purely procedural one and should be based on the allegations in the operative complaint and not in the perceived factual or legal merit of the class claims. *Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co*. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 439-441.

B. ALL OF THE CRITERIA FOR CERTIFICATION OF THE SETTLEMENT CLASS ARE SATISFIED.

1. The Class Is Ascertainable.

The class is readily ascertainable because all Class Members worked for Defendants within the relevant class period and have already been identified through Defendants' employee and payroll files. (Keledjian PA Decl., ¶16) *See Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 932 (finding that "[c]lass members are 'ascertainable' where they may be readily identified without unreasonable expense or time by reference to official records.").

2. The Numerosity Requirement Is Satisfied.

The numerosity requirement is fulfilled simply when the individual joinder of all class members would be impracticable. A proposed class numbering "as few as 40 class members should raise a presumption that joinder is impracticable," thus satisfying the numerosity requirement. *Newberg on Class Actions* § 3.5. Here, there are 1,119 Class Members. (Argueta Decl. ¶ 14) Therefore, joinder would be impracticable, and a class-wide proceeding is clearly preferable and appropriate.

3. Common Issues of Law and Fact Predominate over Any Individual Issues.

The court should grant class certification when questions of law and fact common to all Class Members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. *Hicks v. Kaufman &Broad Home Corp.* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 908, 916 ("As a general rule, if the Defendant's liability can be determined by facts common to all members of the class, a class will be certified even if the members must individually prove their damages. In order to determine whether common questions of fact predominate, the trial court must examine the issues framed by the pleadings and the law applicable to the causes of action alleged.").

The commonality and predominance requirements are "easily met," because "[when] the

Defendants have engaged in some course of conduct that affects a group of persons and gives rise to a cause of action, one or more of the elements of that cause of action will be common to all of the persons affected." *Gen'l Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon* (1982) 457 U.S. 147, 155. Further, the fact that "calculation of individual damages may at some point be required does not foreclose the possibility of taking common evidence on [liability issues]." *Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*(2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 332 (holding that the legal question of whether the plaintiff-employees were nonexempt and therefore entitled to overtime was a common question that predominated over the individual questions of each employee's duties performed and hours worked); *Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.*(1987) 191 Cal. App.3d 605, 617 ("[T]he necessity for class members to prove their own damages does not mean individual fact questions predominate").

The scope of this case is narrowly focused on a specific class of persons employed by Defendants during a specific period of time. The common questions of law and fact in this case all stem from the claims that Class Members were not paid for all hours worked and did not receive meal and rest periods. Plaintiffs and Class Members allege that they were subject to the same policies and practices and all sought the same remedies. These common issues predominate over individual issues because identical evidence establishes liability as to all Class Members. (Keledjian PA Decl., ¶ 17.) Under such circumstances, the commonality and predominance requirements are satisfied. *Stephens v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.* (1987) 193 Cal. App. 3d 411, 421.

4. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Typical.

A class representative's claims are typical of a class when they arise from the same event, practice, or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other putative class members, and if their claims rest on the same legal theories. *Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47; *B.W.I. Custom Kitchens v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1347 ("[I]t has never been the law in California that the class representative must have identical interests with the class members."). Here, Plaintiffs' claims are typical of Class Members' claims because they arise from the same factual basis and are based on the same legal theories. (Keledjian PA Decl., ¶ 18.) Accordingly, the typicality requirement is satisfied.

5. Plaintiffs and Class Counsel Adequately Represent the Class.

The adequacy requirement is met by fulfilling two conditions: (1) the class representative must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation, and (2) the class representative's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. *McGhee v. Crocker-Citizens Nat. Bank* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.

Both conditions are met here. First, Plaintiffs and the Class are represented by experienced and competent counsel. Class Counsel is qualified and has served as class counsel in numerous class actions. (Keledjian PA Decl., ¶¶ 79-86.) Thus, Class Counsel is "qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation." *Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 875. Second, Plaintiffs have no conflict with the Class, and their interests are aligned with those of the Class. Accordingly, the adequacy requirement is satisfied. (Keledjian PA Decl., ¶ 19.)

6. Class Treatment Is Superior to the Alternatives.

Courts have long recognized that the class-action device often provides the sole procedural mechanism by which many individuals harmed by corporate wrongdoing can band together to achieve justice. Absent class treatment, similarly situated persons with relatively small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort, and expense required to prosecute individual actions. *See Hanlon, supra,* 150 F.3d at 1023. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "the policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. The class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor." *Amchem Prods. v. Windsor* (1997) 521 U.S. 591, 617 (citation and quotation omitted).

Other relevant considerations regarding superiority include the improbability that each class member will come forward to prove his or her separate claim and whether the class approach would serve to deter or redress the alleged wrongdoing. *Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 435. In employment cases, concerns such as fear of the employer, lack of representation, size of claim, and the employee's perception about the difficulty of litigation, increase the likelihood that an employer will not be held accountable. Acknowledging these concerns, courts have noted that

"[t]he risk entailed in suing one's employer are such that the few hardy souls who come forward should be permitted to speak for others when the vocal ones are otherwise fully qualified." *St. Marie v. Eastern RR Ass'n* (S.D.N.Y. 1976) 72 F.R.D. 443, 449 (overruled as to damages and liability but not as to class certification).

Further, where, as here, the individual claims are relatively small and the socio-economic status and sophistication of the class members contrasts with that of the defendants, a class action is particularly appropriate because the size of the individual claims "would prove uneconomic for potential plaintiffs" to pursue individually, as "litigation costs would dwarf potential recovery." *Hanlon, supra,*150 F. 3d at 1023. These issues, from a practical standpoint, generally lead to the unbalanced situation where the employer is represented by counsel, but the employee who seeks redress is not. Each of the above reasons compels the conclusion that a class action is the preferred method of resolution for this case. (Keledjian PA Decl., ¶¶ 20-21.)

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant final approval of this Settlement and enter the companion order.

DATED: November 17, 2026

D.LAW, INC.

By: _____

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