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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO**

ALEXANDER DAVIS, individually and on behalf
of similarly situated individuals and members of the
general public,

Plaintiff,

vs.

JAJ ROOFING DBA CITADEL ROOFING
AND SOLAR, a California corporation; and
DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 23CV011004

Honorable Lauri A. Damrell
Department 22

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
APPROVAL OF PAGA SETTLEMENT,
PAGA COUNSEL FEES PAYMENT, PAGA
COUNSEL LITIGATION EXPENSES
PAYMENT, PAGA REPRESENTATIVE
SERVICE AWARD, AND
ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES
PAYMENT**

Reservation No.: A-11004-001
Date: July 11, 2025
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Department: 22

Complaint Filed: November 2, 2023
FAC Filed: December 27, 2023
Trial Date: Not Set

1 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

2 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT** on July 11, 2025 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 22 of the
3 above-captioned Court located at the Gordon D. Schaber Sacramento County Courthouse, 720 9th
4 Street, Sacramento, California 95814, Plaintiff Alexander Davis (“Plaintiff”) will and hereby does
5 move the Court for an Order granting approval of the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General
6 Act of 2004, California Labor Code sections 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”) settlement. Specifically, Plaintiff
7 requests that the Court enter an Order:

- 8 1. Granting approval pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(1)(2) of the PAGA
9 Settlement Agreement (“Settlement,” “Agreement,” or “Settlement Agreement”) attached
10 as **Exhibit 2** to the Declaration of Alexandra Rose in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
11 Approval of PAGA Settlement, PAGA Counsel Fees Payment, PAGA Counsel Litigation
12 Expenses Payment, PAGA Representative Service Award, and Administration Expenses
13 Payment (“Rose Decl.”);
- 14 2. Directing the distribution of the Gross Settlement Amount of Nine Hundred Ninety-Five
15 Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$995,000.00) pursuant to the terms of the Agreement;
- 16 3. Approving the Net Settlement Amount, estimated to be Six Hundred Four Thousand Three
17 Hundred Seventy-Eight Dollars and Fifty-Seven Cents (\$604,378.57), of which seventy-
18 five percent (75%) will be distributed to the California Labor and Workforce
19 Development Agency (“LWDA”) and twenty-five percent (25%) of which will be
20 distributed to the Aggrieved Employees;
- 21 4. Approving an award of reasonable PAGA Counsel Fees Payment of thirty-five percent
22 (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., \$348,250.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount
23 is \$995,000.00) to PAGA Counsel;
- 24 5. Approving the amount of Twenty-Seven Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-One Dollars
25 and Forty-Three Cents (\$27,371.43) to PAGA Counsel for reimbursement of actual
26 litigation expenses payment pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(g)(1);
- 27 6. Approving the award of Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$5,000.00) to Plaintiff as
28 a PAGA Representative Service Award;

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Pursuant to the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code
4 sections 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”), Plaintiff Alexander Davis (“Plaintiff”) seeks approval of the PAGA
5 Settlement Agreement (“Settlement,” “Agreement,” or “Settlement Agreement”) entered into with
6 Defendant JAJ Roofing dba Citadel Roofing and Solar (“Defendant”) (together, with Plaintiff, the
7 “Parties”), which is attached as Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of Alexandra Rose in Support of Plaintiff’s
8 Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement, PAGA Counsel Fees Payment, PAGA Counsel Litigation
9 Expenses Payment, PAGA Representative Service Award, and Administration Expenses Payment
10 (“Rose Decl.”). The Agreement terms are outlined as follows:

- 11 • Gross Settlement Amount: Nine Hundred Ninety-Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
12 (\$995,000.00).
- 13 • PAGA Counsel Fees Payment: Thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount
14 (i.e., \$348,250.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$995,000.00), to be paid from the
15 Gross Settlement Amount.
- 16 • PAGA Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment: Twenty-Seven Thousand Three Hundred
17 Seventy-One Dollars and Forty-Three Cents (\$27,371.43), to be paid from the Gross
18 Settlement Amount.
- 19 • PAGA Representative Service Award: Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$5,000.00)
20 to Plaintiff, to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
- 21 • Administration Expenses Payment: Up to Ten Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
22 (\$10,000.00), to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
- 23 • Estimated Net Settlement Amount: Six Hundred Four Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-
24 Eight Dollars and Fifty-Seven Cents (\$604,378.57), of which 75% (\$453,283.93) will be
25 paid to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and the
26 remaining 25% (\$151,094.64) will be paid to the Aggrieved Employees.

27 As set forth herein, the Settlement Agreement is the product of informed discovery, arms-
28 length negotiations, and provides a fair, adequate, and reasonable recovery for the State of California
and Aggrieved Employees. Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests that the Court grant approval of

the proposed Settlement Agreement, among other requested relief.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant is a one-stop, full-service local solar and roofing contractor that designs, installs, maintains, and repairs roofs, solar energy systems, and energy storage systems, providing service throughout Central, Northern, and Southern California, including Vacaville, Sacramento, Davis, Santa Rosa, Fresno, and Santa Clarita. (Rose Decl., ¶ 2). Defendant employed Plaintiff as an hourly-paid, non-exempt Interconnection Specialist from approximately March 2022 to October 2022. (Rose Decl., ¶ 2; Declaration of Alexander Davis in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement, PAGA Counsel Fees Payment, PAGA Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, PAGA Representative Service Award, and Administration Expenses Payment [“Davis Decl.”], ¶ 2).

On October 20, 2023, Plaintiff provided written notice by electronic submission to the LWDA and by U.S. Certified Mail to Defendant, pursuant to California Labor Code § 2699.3, of the specific provisions of the California Labor Code alleged to have been violated by Defendant (“PAGA Notice”). (Rose Decl., ¶ 3 & Exh. 1).

On November 2, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint for Damages in the action entitled *Alexander Davis v. JAJ Roofing dba Citadel Roofing and Solar*, Sacramento County Superior Court Case No. 23CV011004 (“Action”), thereby commencing a putative class action against Defendant. (*Id.*, ¶ 4).

On December 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Class and Representative Action Complaint (“Operative Complaint”) in the Action realleging the same claims and adding a cause of action against Defendant seeking civil penalties under PAGA for purported failure to pay overtime wages, failure to pay minimum wages, failure to provide legally-required meal periods, failure to pay required meal period premiums, failure to provide legally-required rest periods, failure to pay required rest period premiums, failure to timely pay wages during employment, failure to pay all wages at time of discharge from employment, failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to keep complete and accurate payroll records, and failure to reimburse for necessary business-related expenses. (*Id.*, ¶ 5).

///

1 On October 17, 2024, the Parties participated in a formal mediation conducted by Steven J.
2 Rottman, Esq, a neutral and respected mediator with extensive experience in complex wage and hour
3 matters, during which the Parties were able to reach an agreement to resolve the Action in its entirety.
4 (*Id.*, ¶ 6). For the avoidance of doubt, after the Operative Complaint was filed, it was discovered that
5 Plaintiff signed a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement which waived his right to bring a class
6 action. (*Ibid*). Accordingly, the scope of the settlement is limited to PAGA claims. (*Ibid*).

7 On March 27, 2025, the Parties executed the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, ¶ 7 & Exh. 2).

8 During the course of informal discovery in the Action, PAGA Counsel conducted an intense
9 investigation into the facts of the Action. (*Id.*, ¶ 8). This included obtaining data, information, and
10 documents relating to the underlying alleged violations, including, but not limited to, Plaintiff's
11 employee file, a sampling of Aggrieved Employees' time and payroll records, relevant wage and hour
12 policies, and Aggrieved Employees' data points so that Plaintiff could assess the number of alleged
13 potential violations and value of the recoverable penalties, as well as evaluate the strengths and
14 weaknesses of his claims. (*Ibid*).

15 Based on the data, information, and documents received, as well as thorough discussions with
16 Defendant's counsel, PAGA Counsel was able to (i) determine the total number of distinct individuals
17 falling within the definition of "Aggrieved Employees" for the relevant statutory period, (ii) the
18 number of affected pay periods at issue among them, and (iii) construct a damages model that
19 calculated the maximum realistic amount of PAGA penalties that could be levied against Defendant
20 within the relevant statutory period. (*Id.*, ¶ 9). Defendant, however, disputed Plaintiff's claims and
21 disputed both the existence of and extent of liability as alleged by Plaintiff, which allowed PAGA
22 Counsel to further assess the strength of Plaintiff's claims. (*Ibid*). PAGA Counsel's experience in
23 litigating similar representative wage and hour claims, the degree of investigation that was conducted
24 here, and the amount of data, information, and documents that was obtained, was sufficient to
25 determine the potential value of the PAGA claims, and to evaluate the strength of these claims for
26 purposes of settlement. (*Ibid*).

27 ///

28 ///

1 The Parties believe the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (*Id.*, ¶ 10).
2 The Parties understand, acknowledge, and agree that the Settlement Agreement constitutes a
3 compromise of Plaintiff's PAGA claims, and that it is the desire and intention of the Parties to affect
4 a final and complete resolution of the Action. (*Ibid.*).

5 Defendant denies all of the claims in the Action, and does not waive, but rather expressly
6 reserves, all rights to challenge all such claims and allegations upon all legal, procedural, and factual
7 grounds should the Settlement Agreement not become final. (*Id.*, ¶ 11). The Settlement Agreement
8 reflects a compromise reached to end litigation in the Action. (*Ibid.*). Following significant
9 investigation and extensive settlement negotiations, Plaintiff now seeks approval of the proposed
10 Settlement Agreement, which will resolve all representative claims alleged in the Action. (*Ibid.*).

11 **III. THE SETTLEMENT TERMS**

12 **A. Definition of the Aggrieved Employees**

13 For purposes of settlement only, the Parties have agreed that the "Aggrieved Employees" shall
14 be defined as "all current and former hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employees who worked for
15 Defendant in the State of California at any time during the PAGA Period." (Rose Decl., ¶ 13;
16 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 1.4). The "PAGA Period" is the period from October 20, 2022 until
17 December 16, 2024. (Rose Decl., ¶ 13; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 1.19). There are approximately one
18 thousand two hundred fifty-one (1,251) Aggrieved Employees. (Rose Decl., ¶ 13).

19 **B. Amount of Settlement**

20 The Parties have agreed to settle the PAGA claims at issue in the Action for a non-reversionary
21 Gross Settlement Amount of Nine Hundred Ninety-Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
22 (\$995,000.00). (Rose Decl., ¶ 14; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3.1).

23 **C. Allocation and Funding of the Gross Settlement Amount**

24 The Gross Settlement Amount is a common fund and therefore includes all requested costs,
25 fees, and other allocations. (Rose Decl., ¶ 14). The Gross Settlement Amount includes: (1) PAGA
26 Counsel Fees Payment in the amount of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount
27 (i.e., \$348,250.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$995,000.00); (2) PAGA Counsel Litigation
28 Expenses Payment in the amount of Twenty-Seven Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-One Dollars

1 and Forty-Three Cents (\$27,371.43); (3) PAGA Representative Service Award in the amount of Five
2 Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$5,000.00) to Plaintiff; and (4) Administration Expenses Payment,
3 not to exceed Ten Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$10,000.00). (Rose Decl., ¶ 14; Settlement
4 Agreement, ¶¶ 3.2.11-3.2.3).

5 After the above-estimated amounts are deducted from the Gross Settlement Amount, the Net
6 Settlement Amount will amount to approximately Six Hundred Four Thousand Three Hundred
7 Seventy-Eight Dollars and Fifty-Seven Cents (\$604,378.57), of which 75% (\$453,283.93) will be paid
8 to the LWDA (“LWDA PAGA Payment”) and the remaining 25% (\$151,094.64), will be distributed
9 and paid to Aggrieved Employees on a *pro rata* basis based on the number of pay periods they each
10 worked for Defendant while classified as a non-exempt and/or hourly-paid employee for at least one
11 day during the PAGA Period (“PAGA Pay Periods”). (Rose Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement ¶¶
12 1.14, 1.18, and 3.2.4). The average pro rata share of the twenty-five percent (25%) of the Net
13 Settlement Amount (“Individual PAGA Payment”) is estimated to be approximately One Hundred
14 Twenty Dollars and Seventy-Eight Cents (\$120.78). (Rose Decl., ¶ 15).

15 Within thirty (30) calendar days after the Court’s order granting approval of the Settlement,
16 Defendant will deliver the Aggrieved Employee Data to the Administrator in the form of a Microsoft
17 Excel spreadsheet, containing each Aggrieved Employee’s full name, last-known mailing address,
18 Social Security number, and any other information as is necessary for the Administrator to calculate
19 PAGA Pay Periods (collectively, “Aggrieved Employee Data”). (Rose Decl., ¶ 16; Settlement
20 Agreement, ¶ 1.5).

21 Within thirty (30) calendar days after the Effective Date or within seven (7) calendar days after
22 the Administrator provides Defendant’s counsel with all information needed for funding the Gross
23 Settlement Amount, including complete payment instructions, whichever is later, Defendant will fully
24 fund the Gross Settlement Amount by transmitting the funds to the Administrator. (Rose Decl., ¶ 17;
25 Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 4.3)

26 Within fourteen (14) calendar days after Defendant funds the Gross Settlement Amount, the
27 Administrator will distribute the Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, the PAGA
28 Representative Service Award, the Administration Expenses Payment, the PAGA Counsel Fees

1 Payment, and the PAGA Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment. (Rose Decl., ¶ 18; Settlement
2 Agreement, ¶ 4.4).

3 Each Individual PAGA Payment check will be valid and negotiable for one hundred
4 and eighty (180) calendar days from the date the checks are issued, and thereafter, will be canceled.
5 (Rose Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 4.4.1). Any funds associated with such canceled checks
6 will be distributed by the Administrator to Interdisciplinary Center for Healthy Workplaces at the
7 University of California, Berkeley. (Rose Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 4.4.3). The Parties
8 and their counsel have represented that they have no interest in, relationship, financial, or otherwise,
9 with the proposed *cy pres* recipient. (Rose Decl., ¶ 19 and Exh. 4; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 4.4.3).

10 Defendant estimated there were 1,149 Aggrieved Employees who worked a total of 57,345
11 PAGA Pay Periods as of September 23, 2024. (Rose Decl., ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 4.1). If
12 the actual number of PAGA Pay Periods worked by the Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA
13 Period actually exceeds 57,345 by more than 12.5% (i.e., by more than 7,168 PAGA Pay Periods),
14 then the Gross Settlement Amount will be increased on a pro rata basis equal to the percentage increase
15 in the number of PAGA Pay Periods worked by the Aggrieved Employees above 12.5%. (Rose Decl.,
16 ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 4.1).

17 **IV. STANDARD FOR APPROVAL OF PAGA SETTLEMENT**

18 The settlement of a PAGA claim requires court approval. (California Labor Code (“Lab.
19 Code”) § 2699(l)). The Court must be mindful that a “[s]ettlement is a compromise, which balances
20 the possible recovery against the risks inherent in litigating further.” (*In re TD Ameritrade Account*
21 *Holder Litig.*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103222 at *24 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 12, 2011)). “[T]he very essence
22 of a settlement is ... ‘a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes,’” as “it is the very
23 uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of wasteful and expensive litigation that induce
24 consensual settlements.” (*Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com.*, 688 F.2d 615, 624-26 (9th Cir.
25 1982)). As such, “the settlement or fairness hearing is not to be turned into a trial or rehearsal for trial
26 on the merits,” or “judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been
27 achieved.” (Ibid).

28 ///

1 Although the California Labor Code does not set forth the criteria by which a PAGA settlement
2 is to be evaluated, it is presumed that a reviewing court may take into consideration some of the factors
3 that courts use when reviewing a class action settlement. However, “a PAGA claim asserted on a non-
4 class representative basis...is not considered a class action but a law enforcement action, and therefore
5 does not have to meet the requirements of [a class action].” (*Casida v. Sears Holdings Corp.*, 2012
6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9302 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2012)).

7 A court’s review of a PAGA settlement necessarily implicates the following unique features
8 that render the approval process distinct from approval of a class action settlement under Code of Civil
9 Procedure Section 382 and California Rules of Court Rule 3.769. First, in evaluating the adequacy of
10 the settlement amount, the Court’s focus is not concerned with the amount aggrieved employees are
11 to receive, but rather, must focus on the total settlement amount in achieving PAGA’s objective.
12 Indeed, “[t]he remedy sought in a PAGA suit consists of civil penalties, not individual or class
13 damages,” and while a “[PAGA] action is ... designed to protect the public and penalize the employer
14 for past illegal conduct,” a reviewing court must be mindful of the fact that settlement of a PAGA
15 claim involves a compromise. (*Mendez v. Tween Brands, Inc.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66454 at *11
16 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2010)). “Unlike class actions, these civil penalties are not meant to compensate
17 unnamed employees because the action is fundamentally a law enforcement action.” (*Ochoa-
18 Hernandez v. Cjaders Foods, Inc.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32774 at *12 (Apr. 2, 2010)). The Court
19 should not lose sight of the fact that, “[u]nlike a class action seeking damages or injunctive relief for
20 injured employees, the purpose of PAGA is to incentivize private parties to recover civil penalties for
21 the government that otherwise may not have been assessed and collected by overburdened state
22 enforcement agencies.” (*Ibid*).

23 Second, consistent with the fact that unnamed employees have no property interest in a PAGA
24 claim, “[u]nnamed employees need not be given notice of the PAGA claim, nor do they have the
25 ability to opt-out of the representative PAGA claim.” (*Ochoa-Hernandez*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26 32774 at *13). Indeed, “[PAGA] does not create property rights or any other substantive rights” as
27 “[i]t is simply a procedural statute allowing an aggrieved employees to recover civil penalties – for
28 Labor Code violations – that otherwise would be sought by state labor law enforcement agencies.”

1 (*Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Sup. Ct.*, 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003 (2009)). This
2 renders the approval process of a PAGA settlement distinct from a class action settlement, as there is
3 no need for the Court to employ the “two-step approval process” required under California Rules of
4 Court Rule 3.769.

5 Finally, unlike class action settlements, the scope of release permitted in a PAGA settlement
6 is limited. While “judgment in [a PAGA] action is binding not only on the named employee plaintiff
7 but also on government agencies and any aggrieved employee not a party to the proceeding...the
8 nonparty employees, because they were not given notice of the action or afforded any opportunity to
9 be heard, would not be bound by the judgment as to remedies other than civil penalties.” (*Arias v.*
10 *Sup. Ct.*, 46 Cal.4th 969, 985-87 (2009)). Thus, the scope of a release in a PAGA settlement is
11 confined to the PAGA penalties alleged in the complaint and/or the plaintiff’s notice to the LWDA
12 and to the claims that were, or could have been, alleged pursuant to PAGA based on the factual
13 allegations in the complaint and/or the plaintiff’s notice to the LWDA. In the case at hand, as the only
14 claims at issue are PAGA claims, those will be the only claims extinguished through the Settlement.

15 V. THE AGREEMENT IS FAIR AND SHOULD BE APPROVED

16 A. The Agreement is Presumed to Be Fair

17 California courts recognize that “a presumption of fairness exists where . . . [a] settlement is
18 reached through arm’s-length bargaining.” (*Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224,
19 245 (2001); *see also Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC*, 175 Cal. App. 4th 785, 799 (2009)). Here,
20 the Agreement is presumptively fair because: (1) it occurred after counsel for the Parties engaged in
21 significant investigation to evaluate the strength and potential value of the PAGA claims, and the risks
22 of litigating these claims through trial; and (2) it was negotiated at great length and effort by counsel
23 with significant experience in similar complex labor and employment matters. (Rose Decl., ¶ 21).

24 B. The Agreement is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’ Respective 25 Legal Positions and Recovery Risks

26 In deciding whether to approve a proposed settlement, a trial court has broad powers to
27 determine if it is fair given the circumstances of the case. (*Mallick v. Sup. Ct.*, 89 Cal.App.3d 434,
28 438 (1979)). In exercising these powers, the overriding concern is to ensure that a proposed settlement

1 is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801 (internal quotations omitted)). A
2 settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at trial, nor
3 does the settlement have to obtain one hundred percent of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
4 (*Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 246, 250). In evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement, a trial court
5 must consider “the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of
6 further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in
7 settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and
8 views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to
9 the proposed settlement.”¹ (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008)).
10 Even though a *Kullar* analysis is not required for approval of a PAGA settlement, a brief analysis is
11 included to support approval of the Settlement Agreement. (*See* Rose Decl., ¶¶ 28-41).

12 These factors require balancing and are non-exhaustive. Trial courts should therefore tailor
13 the factors to each case and give due regard to “what is otherwise a private consensual agreement
14 between the parties.” (*Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1801).

15 1. Strength of Plaintiff’s Cases

16 In order to prevail at trial, Plaintiff would have to prove violations of the California Labor
17 Code underlying his PAGA claims, demonstrate that Aggrieved Employees suffered, and demonstrate
18 that Defendant’s conduct gives rise to penalties. (*See Elliot v. Spherion Pac. Work, LLC*, 572
19 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1181-82 (C.D. Cal. 2008) [“Plaintiff’s claim under [PAGA] is wholly dependent
20 upon her other claims. Because all of Plaintiff’s other claims fail as a matter of law, so does her PAGA
21 claim.”]).

22 Here, Plaintiff’s core allegations are that Defendant systematically violated the California
23 Labor Code by, *inter alia*, failing to properly pay wages for all hours worked, failing to pay overtime
24 at the correct rate, failing to provide compliant meal and rest periods, failing to pay premiums at the
25 correct rate of pay, failing to timely pay wages during employment and upon termination, failing to
26 maintain accurate payroll records, failing to provide accurate wage statements, and failing to reimburse

28 ¹ As this is not a class action, the *Kullar* factors pertaining to the risk of maintaining class action status through trial and the reaction of class members to the proposed settlement are inapplicable.

1 necessary business expenses. (Rose Decl., ¶ 22).

2 Defendant maintained several defenses to Plaintiff’s theories of liability, which, if successfully
3 argued and proven, had the potential to eliminate or substantially reduce recovery. (*Id.*, ¶ 23).
4 Throughout this litigation, Defendant maintained, and continues to maintain, that it had, and continues
5 to have, compliant employment policies and practices throughout the time period at issue. (*Ibid.*).
6 Defendant denies that it ever violated any provision of the California Labor Code, including, but not
7 limited to, those sections for which Plaintiff seeks penalties under PAGA. (*Ibid.*). Defendant further
8 denied, and continues to deny, that the lawsuit is appropriate for representative treatment for any
9 purpose other than settlement. (*Ibid.*). Defendant also challenged Plaintiff’s standing as an aggrieved
10 employee and denied that any of Defendant’s other employees whom Plaintiff seeks to represent are
11 aggrieved. (*Ibid.*).

12 Defendant also argued that an important feature of PAGA is that the Court retains discretion
13 to lower the penalties if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise
14 would result in an award that is “unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.” (*Ibid.*; Lab. Code
15 § 2699(e)(2); *see also Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.*, 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1136
16 (2012) [holding that a court may reduce the amount of PAGA penalties awarded to an employee based
17 upon discretionary factors]).

18 Even if violations of the California Labor Code occurred, which Defendant denies, Defendant
19 contended that said violations would only be considered “initial violations” and thus heightened
20 “subsequent violation” penalties were not warranted. (Rose Decl., ¶ 24; Lab. Code § 2699(f)(2); *see*
21 *also Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2*, 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1208-09 (2008) [“Until the employer has
22 been notified that it is violating a Labor Code provision [...], the employer cannot be presumed to be
23 aware that its continuing underpayment of employees is a ‘violation’ subject to penalties.”]).

24 Defendant also contended that, with respect to PAGA claims, the Court was unlikely to assess
25 cumulative penalties for the maximum number of possible, separate California Labor Code violations,
26 because it would be unjust, arbitrary, oppressive, and/or confiscatory, especially where certain conduct
27 may be regulated by multiple provisions of the California Labor Code that are interrelated and work
28 in tandem. (Rose Decl., ¶ 25). While the PAGA does provide the potential for a heightened penalty

1 for subsequent violations, courts are often hesitant to award a heightened penalty where there is no
2 prior citation by the Labor Commissioner, as is the case here. (*See Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc.*, 3
3 F.4th 1127, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding no heightened penalty where defendant was not notified by
4 Labor Commissioner or any court that it was subject to the California Labor Code)). The Ninth
5 Circuit’s holding in *Bernstein* also supports that a settlement valuation that does not “stack” penalties.
6 (Ibid).

7 While Plaintiff maintains that his PAGA claims have merit, in reaching the Agreement,
8 Plaintiff and his counsel took into account the strengths and weaknesses of each side’s position, and
9 the uncertainty of how the case might have concluded as litigation continued, at trial, and/or upon
10 appeal. (Rose Decl., ¶ 26). Based on these disputes, which had the potential to completely eliminate
11 Plaintiff’s recovery, the range of realistic “litigation outcomes” on Plaintiff’s PAGA claims was
12 defined by a “maximum possible liability” amount of approximately \$5,734,500 and a “risk-adjusted
13 realistic value” amount of approximately \$1,146,900. (*Id.*, ¶ 41). In light thereof, the Gross Settlement
14 Amount of \$995,000 is a significant settlement. (Ibid).

15 2. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

16 Approval of the Settlement Agreement is also appropriate in light of the risk, expense, and
17 complexity of further litigation. As discussed above, the Settlement Agreement takes into
18 consideration the specific factual and legal hurdles faced by Plaintiff in establishing Defendant’s
19 penalty-liability in this case, which may have resulted in a net-zero recovery. Any recovery on these
20 claims is not certain. And even when liability is found, PAGA claims are discretionary, such that the
21 Court could decline to award their full value. Some of Plaintiff’s claims are also derivative, and as
22 such, Plaintiff must prevail on his underlying California Labor Code claims in order to prevail on the
23 derivative claims. These risks – when balanced with the fact that the Agreement achieved a very
24 significant recovery (as demonstrated below), and that further litigation posed a risk of diminishing
25 such recovery by increasing litigation expenses – weigh strongly in favor of settlement approval.

26 3. The Benefits Conferred by the Agreement Balance in Favor of Approval

27 The Settlement Agreement provides a *significant* monetary benefit that falls well within the
28 range of an acceptable settlement under the circumstances, which is the standard on which the instant

1 Agreement must be judged. As held by the Ninth Circuit: “The proposed settlement is not to be judged
2 against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved by the negotiators.”
3 (*Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n*, 688 F.2d at 625 (emphasis in original)). As the Second
4 Circuit has pointed out: “The fact that a proposed settlement may only amount to a fraction of the
5 potential recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate
6 and should be disapproved.” (*City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.*, 495 F.2d 448, 455 & n.2 (2nd Cir.
7 1974)).

8 The Net Settlement Amount is currently estimated to be Six Hundred Four Thousand Three
9 Hundred Seventy-Eight Dollars and Fifty-Seven Cents (\$604,378.57). After all deductions are made
10 from the Gross Settlement Amount for the PAGA Counsel Fees Payment, PAGA Counsel Litigation
11 Expenses Payment, PAGA Representative Service Award, and Administration Expenses Payment,
12 Four Hundred Fifty-Three Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars and Ninety-Three Cents
13 (\$453,283.93) (i.e. 75% of the Net Settlement Amount) will go to the LWDA, and One Hundred Fifty-
14 One Thousand Ninety-Four Dollars and Sixty-Four Cents (\$151,094.64) (i.e. 25% of the Net
15 Settlement Amount) will go to the Aggrieved Employees, as required by California Labor Code §
16 2699(i) in effect at the time of this matter (“civil penalties recovered by aggrieved employees shall be
17 distributed as follows: 75 percent to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency . . . and 25 percent
18 to the aggrieved employees.”). (Rose Decl., ¶ 42). There is no reason to doubt the fairness of the
19 proposed plan of allocation of the Net Settlement Amount as it fully complies with California Labor
20 Code section 2699(i). (Ibid).

21 The Settlement Agreement is a compromise of highly disputed claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 43). Plaintiff
22 and his counsel recognize the expense and length of continued proceedings necessary to litigate the
23 matter through trial and any possible appeals. (Ibid). Plaintiff and his counsel have also taken into
24 account the uncertainty and risk of the outcome of further litigation, and the difficulties and delays
25 inherent in such litigation. (Ibid). Plaintiff and his counsel are also aware of the burdens of proof
26 necessary to establish liability, both generally and in response to Defendant’s defenses thereto, and
27 the difficulties in establishing Defendant’s liability for, and the right to recover, penalties on behalf of
28 Plaintiff, the State of California, and other Aggrieved Employees. (Ibid). Plaintiff and his counsel

1 have also taken into account Defendant’s agreement to enter into a settlement that confers significant
2 relief upon the Aggrieved Employees and the State of California. (Ibid). Considering all of the facts
3 in this case, Plaintiff and his counsel have determined that the Agreement represents a fair, adequate,
4 and reasonable resolution of the PAGA claims, and that it is in the best interests of the Aggrieved
5 Employees and the State of California. (Ibid).

6 The result achieved in this case is well within the range of what is considered an acceptable
7 settlement under the circumstances, especially when compared to the settlement of PAGA claims in
8 other cases. (*Id.*, ¶ 44). (*See, e.g., DCH Auto Wage and Hour Cases*, Los Angeles Superior Court,
9 Case No. JCCP4833 (May 2017) [approving \$15,000 out of \$4 million toward settlement of PAGA
10 claims]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160052, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29,
11 2012) [approving \$10,000 out of \$3.7 million toward settlement of PAGA claims]; *Schiller v. David’s*
12 *Bridal, Inc.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80776, at *40 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2012) [approving \$7,500 out of
13 \$518,245 toward settlement of PAGA claims]; *Chu v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC*, 2011 U.S. Dist.
14 LEXIS 15821, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011) (approving \$10,000 out of \$6.9 million toward
15 settlement of PAGA claims]; *Franco v. Ruiz Food Prods.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169057, at *14
16 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2021) [approving \$10,000 out of \$2.5 million toward settlement of PAGA
17 claims]). Here, the value obtained for settlement of the PAGA claims is significant, and it will be
18 distributed in accordance with and in fulfillment of the objectives of the PAGA statute.

19 4. The Scope of the Release is Narrowly Tailored

20 As discussed above, the California Supreme Court has concluded that in the context of PAGA
21 “the nonparty employees, because they were not given notice of the action or afforded any opportunity
22 to be heard, would not be bound by the judgment as to remedies other than civil penalties.” (*See Arias*,
23 46 Cal. 4th, at 987). Thus, the scope of the limited release provided in exchange for the foregoing
24 consideration is limited to the civil penalties asserted in the Operative Complaint and the PAGA
25 Notice, under California Labor Code §§ 2698 *et seq.* (*See Settlement Agreement*, at ¶ 5.2).

26 As such, this factor balances strongly in favor of approval of the Agreement.

27 ///

28 ///

1 5. Experience and Views of Counsel Favor Approval

2 PAGA Counsel is experienced in complex representative and class action wage-and-hour
3 litigation. (Rose Decl., ¶ 50). In the view of PAGA Counsel, the benefits conferred by the Agreement
4 are eminently fair and reasonable, and in the best interests of the State of California and the Aggrieved
5 Employees in light of the risk, delay, and uncertainty of continued litigation and the substantial
6 monetary benefits provided for by the Agreement. (*Id.*, ¶ 45). Furthermore, courts have acknowledged
7 that “the interests of a plaintiff, counsel, and other potentially aggrieved employees are largely aligned.
8 All stand to gain from proving as convincingly as possible as many Labor Code violations as the
9 evidence will sustain[.]” (*Williams v. Superior Court*, 3 Cal. 5th 531, 548 (2017) [citing Labor Code
10 § 2699(g)(1)(i)]).

11 6. The Extent of Discovery and Stage of Proceedings Favor Approval

12 In evaluating this element, the Court should be mindful that “‘formal discovery is not a
13 necessary ticket to the bargaining table’” [*Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship*, 151 F.3d 1234, 1239], as
14 the relevant consideration is “whether ‘the parties have sufficient information to make an informed
15 decision about settlement.’” (*See Sandoval v. Roadlink United States Pac., Inc.*, 2011 U.S. Dist.
16 LEXIS 130378, at 26 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011)).

17 Here, the extent of informal discovery conducted was sufficient to enable PAGA Counsel to
18 evaluate the strength and value of the PAGA claims for purposes of settlement. (Rose Decl., ¶ 46).
19 Prior to mediation, Defendant provided Plaintiff with data, information, and documents relating to the
20 underlying alleged violations, including, but not limited to, Plaintiff’s employee file, a sampling of
21 Aggrieved Employees’ time and payroll records, relevant wage and hour policies, and Aggrieved
22 Employees’ data points. (*Id.*, ¶ 8). As discussed above, PAGA Counsel’s investigation was sufficient
23 to, among other things, tabulate with precision the total number of alleged California Labor Code
24 violations at issue during the relevant statutory period and identify the total number of individuals
25 falling within the definition of “Aggrieved Employees” for the relevant statutory period. (*Id.*, ¶ 9).

26 Based on PAGA Counsel’s experience litigating wage and hour claims, such investigation was
27 sufficient to determine the potential value of the PAGA claims, and to evaluate the strength of these
28 claims for purposes of settlement. (*Ibid.*).

1 **VI. THE REQUESTED PAGA COUNSEL FEES PAYMENT IS FAIR AND**
2 **REASONABLE**

3 As the prevailing party in settlement, Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys' fees for bringing
4 his PAGA claims. (Lab. Code § 2699(k) ["Any employee who prevails in any action shall be entitled
5 to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs."]). PAGA Counsel is also entitled to attorneys'
6 fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5(a), as the instant action has resulted in the
7 enforcement of important rights benefitting the public and secures monetary recovery for the State of
8 California as well as the Aggrieved Employees. A fee award is justified where the legal action has
9 produced its benefits by way of a voluntary settlement. (*See, e.g., Maria P. v. Riles*, 43 Cal.3d 1281,
10 1290-91 (1987); *Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo*, 33 Cal.3d 348, 352-53
11 (1983); *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 34 (1977) ["when a number of persons are entitled in common
12 to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff ... for the benefit of all results in the creation or
13 preservation of that fund, such plaintiff ... may be awarded attorney's fees out of the fund.])).

14 In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc.*, 1 Cal.5th 480, 506 (2016), the California Supreme Court
15 confirmed that "[t]he percentage of fund method survives in California class action cases."
16 Specifically, the *Laffitte* Court held:

17 The recognized advantages of the percentage method-including relative ease of calculation,
18 alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better approximation of market
19 conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early
20 settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation-convince us the percentage
21 method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.
22 (*Id.*, at 503 [internal citation omitted]).

23 While trial courts have discretion to apply either a lodestar method or percentage-of-the-fund
24 method, the California Supreme Court has taken the position that trial courts also "retain the discretion
25 to forgo a lodestar cross-check and use other means to evaluate the reasonableness of a requested
26 percentage fee." (*Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th at 506; *see also Wershba*, 91 Cal.App. 4th at 253). Courts award
27 fees to serve as an economic incentive for lawyers to undertake litigation, and thereby enhance and
28 facilitate access to the judicial system for adjudication of meritorious claims, and to deter wrongdoing.

1 This is especially true in situations where multiple similar alleged wrongs would not be economically
2 feasible to pursue individually, such as here. Trial courts have “wide latitude” in assessing the value
3 of attorneys’ fees and their decisions will “not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of
4 discretion.” (*Lealao v. Beneficial Cal., Inc.*, 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 41 (2000); *see also Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th
5 at 506 [holding that “trial court did not abuse its discretion in using [the percentage of fund method],
6 in part to approve the fee request”]). Indeed, it is long settled that the “experienced trial judge is the
7 best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (*Ketchum v. Moses*, 24 Cal.4th
8 1122, 1132 (2001)).

9 The percentage method is particularly appropriate where a monetary settlement has been
10 recovered and “the benefit [recovered can be] easily quantified.” (*In re Bluetooth Headset Prods.*
11 *Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011)). Where the amount of a settlement is a “certain or
12 easily calculable sum of money,” California courts may calculate attorneys’ fees as a reasonable
13 percentage of the settlement created. (Weil and Brown, California Practice Guide, *Civil Procedure*
14 *Before Trial*, Chapter 14, section 14:145; *Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1808). The percentage fee
15 method is preferred in representative actions because “it better approximates the workings of the
16 marketplace than the lodestar approach.” (*Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 49). California law
17 provides that the award for attorneys’ fees should be equivalent to fees freely negotiated in the legal
18 marketplace and paid in comparable litigation based on the result achieved and risk incurred. (*See*
19 *Lealao*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 47-50; *Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th 480 at 503). In cases where the settlement
20 agreement provides that the defendant will pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys a percentage of the fund created
21 by the settlement, use of that percentage method is appropriate. (*Lealao*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 32). Fee
22 awards that are too small will “chill the private enforcement essential to the vindication of many legal
23 rights and obstruct the representative actions that often relieve the courts of the need to separately
24 adjudicate numerous claims.” (*Id.* at 53). Therefore, fees in representative actions should approximate
25 the probable terms of a contingent fee contract negotiated by a sophisticated attorney and client in
26 comparable litigation. (*Id.* at 48). “The ultimate goal ... is the award of a ‘reasonable’ fee to
27 compensate counsel for their efforts, irrespective of the method of calculation.” (*Consumer Privacy*
28 *Cases*, 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557-58 (2009) [quoting *Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra*,

1 126 Cal.App.4th at 1270]).

2 PAGA Counsel's application for attorneys' fees in light of the facts and circumstances
3 surrounding the case is within the range of reasonableness. Historically, courts have awarded fees as
4 high as fifty percent (50%) of the settlement in complex actions, depending on the circumstances of
5 the case. (*See In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig.*, 526 F.Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1981) [awarding attorneys'
6 fees in the amount of 45% of the \$7.3 million total settlement amount]; *Beech Cinema, Inc. v.*
7 *Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp.* 480 F.Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) [awarding approximately 53%
8 of the settlement as attorneys' fees]).

9 Here, PAGA Counsel's request of thirty-percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e.,
10 \$348,250.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$995,000.00) is fair and reasonable based on the
11 percentage of the recovery method. PAGA Counsel has vigorously litigated this case since it was
12 commenced, with the very real possibility of an unsuccessful outcome and no fee recovery of any
13 kind. (Rose Decl., ¶ 47). Counsel for Plaintiff undertook significant investigation and invested a
14 significant amount of time analyzing relevant documents and data to evaluate the nature and extent of
15 the alleged underlying California Labor Code violations and calculation of the potential monetary
16 recovery as they relate to Plaintiff's PAGA claims under PAGA. (Rose Decl., ¶ 51). PAGA Counsel
17 possesses combined extensive experience litigating wage and hour and other complex litigation
18 matters, and the attorneys who worked on this matter have been approved as class counsel and/or have
19 had their billable rates approved in the settlement of other class and PAGA actions, numerous times.
20 (*Id.*, ¶ 50).

21 Even when courts have opted to award fees in settlement fund cases based on time reasonably
22 expended on the action, courts frequently apply multipliers to enhance the lodestar to reflect the risks
23 involved, the complexity of the litigation, and the other relevant facts. (*Vizcaino v. Microsoft* (9th Cir.
24 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051; *Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 579 ("One of
25 the most common fee enhancers [...] is for contingency risk."). Such an enhancement "mirrors the
26 established practice in the private legal market of rewarding attorneys for taking the risk of
27 nonpayment by paying them a premium over their normal hourly rates for winning contingency cases."
28 (*Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1051). A risk multiplier also serves to bring the financial incentives for

1 enforcing important rights “into line with incentives [attorneys] have to undertake claims for which
2 they are paid on a fee-for-services basis.” (*Ketchum* at 1132).

3 In determining whether or not to enhance the lodestar, California courts take into account
4 multiple factors. (*Cates v. Chiang* (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 791, 822-823). Multiple factors warrant
5 enhancement in this case, including the following: the time and labor required; the skill requisite to
6 perform the legal services properly; the preclusion of other employment by the attorneys due to the
7 acceptance of the case; the contingent nature of the fee; the amount involved and results obtained; the
8 experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; and awards in similar cases. (*Ketchum* at 1134).

9 Based on the reasonable hourly rates of PAGA Counsel, the requested fee award would
10 represent a multiplier of about 1.38 in which the total enhanced lodestar fees are \$349,682.34. PAGA
11 Counsel seeks an attorneys’ fee award of \$348,250.00 (35% of the Gross Settlement Amount). Far
12 greater multipliers have been awarded in similar cases, and the total amount of fees sought by PAGA
13 Counsel is also reasonable compared to fees awarded in similar cases. Courts routinely enhance
14 lodestar amounts based on multipliers that “range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*Wershba* 91
15 Cal.App.4th at 224, 255; see also, e.g., *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66
16 (approving multiplier of 2.5); *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1051 (approving multiplier of 3.65); *Wal-Mart*
17 *Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.* (2d Cir. 2005) 396 F.3d 96, 123 (approving multiplier of 3.5); *Craft v.*
18 *County of San Bernardino* (C.D. Cal. 2006) 624 F.Supp.2d 1113, 1125 (awarding multiplier of 5.2
19 and referring to other cases with cross-check multipliers ranging from 4.5 to 19.6)).

20 Therefore, application of a modest multiplier of 1.38 is warranted, and the lodestar as a cross-
21 check to the percentage figure sought herein, strongly supports the reasonableness of the requested
22 attorneys’ fees award.

23 In the present case, PAGA Counsel has borne all of the risks and costs of litigation and will
24 not receive any compensation until recovery is obtained. (Rose Decl., ¶ 48). PAGA Counsel is
25 experienced in complex wage-and-hour litigation and used that experience to obtain a favorable result
26 for Plaintiff, the Aggrieved Employees, and the State of California. (Ibid). Considering the amount
27 of fees requested, work performed, risks incurred, and experience of PAGA Counsel in handling
28 similar matters, Plaintiff maintains that the requested attorneys’ fees of thirty-five percent (35%) of

1 the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., \$348,250.00) are reasonable and should be awarded. (Ibid).

2 **VII. THE REQUESTED PAGA COUNSEL LITIGATION EXPENSES PAYMENT**
3 **IS FAIR AND REASONABLE**

4 The Agreement provides for reimbursement of the PAGA Counsel Litigation Expenses
5 Payment up to the amount of Thirty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$30,000.00). (Rose Decl., ¶
6 53; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3.2.2). However, PAGA Counsel only seeks reimbursement of a total of
7 Twenty-Seven Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-One Dollars and Forty-Three Cents (\$27,371.43) in
8 litigation costs and expenses. (Rose Decl., ¶ 53 & Exh. 6). Accordingly, PAGA Counsel respectfully
9 requests that the Court reimburse it for actual litigation costs and expenses in the amount of Twenty-
10 Seven Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-One Dollars and Forty-Three Cents (\$27,371.43).

11 **VIII. THE ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES PAYMENT IS FAIR AND**
12 **REASONABLE**

13 As set forth in the Settlement Agreement, the Parties have agreed to retain, subject to approval
14 by the Court, ILYM Group, Inc., to handle the administration of the Agreement. (Rose Decl., ¶ 54;
15 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 1.2). The fees and expenses of the Administrator are estimated not to exceed
16 Ten Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$10,000.00). (Rose Decl., ¶ 54; Settlement Agreement, ¶
17 3.2.3). These costs include, but are not limited to, expenses for preparing, printing, and mailing the
18 Cover Letter and Individual PAGA Payment checks to the Aggrieved Employees, re-mailing the
19 returned Individual PAGA Payment checks to any new addresses obtained, and handling inquiries
20 from Aggrieved Employees regarding the Agreement, among other things. (Rose Decl., ¶ 54).
21 Accordingly, the Court should grant approval of the Administration Expenses Payment in the amount
22 of *up to* Ten Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$10,000.00) to ILYM Group, Inc., a necessary third-
23 party for handling the settlement process. (Ibid).

24 **IX. THE REQUESTED PAGA REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE AWARD IS FAIR**
25 **AND REASONABLE**

26 The purpose of an enhancement award is to incentivize aggrieved employees to step into the
27 shoes of the state labor agency and undertake the responsibilities associated with initiating a lawsuit
28 and serving in a representative capacity. (*See, e.g., Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 115 Cal.App.4th 715,

1 726 (2004) (upholding “service payments” to named plaintiffs for their efforts in bringing the action);
2 *Clark v. Am. Residential Servs., LLC*, 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804 (2009) (“an incentive award is
3 appropriate ‘if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit’”). Plaintiff initiated
4 this litigation on behalf of the State of California and his former co-workers who will now be entitled
5 to receive payment from the Agreement. By initiating and pursuing the Action, Plaintiff stepped into
6 the shoes of the State of California and undertook the responsibilities of serving in a representative
7 capacity. (Rose Decl., ¶ 56; *See generally* Davis Decl.). Plaintiff was available whenever PAGA
8 Counsel needed him and actively tried to obtain information that would benefit the prosecution of the
9 Action. (Rose Decl., ¶ 56; Davis Decl., ¶¶ 4-5). The PAGA Representative Service Award for
10 Plaintiff is eminently reasonable given the time and effort Plaintiff spent on this matter, his services
11 on behalf of the State of California and the Aggrieved Employees, and his broader, general release of
12 claims. (Rose Decl., ¶ 55).

13 Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully submits that it is appropriate and just for Plaintiff to receive
14 a PAGA Representative Service Award in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
15 (\$5,000.00) in addition to the Individual PAGA Payment he will receive as an Aggrieved Employee,
16 for his services on behalf of the State of California and the other Aggrieved Employees, as well as for
17 the broader, general release of claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 57).

18 X. CONCLUSION

19 For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant Plaintiff’s
20 Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement, PAGA Counsel Fees Payment, PAGA Counsel Litigation
21 Expenses Payment, PAGA Representative Service Award, and Administration Expenses Payment and
22 grant the relief requested herein.

23 Respectfully submitted,

24 Dated: May 20, 2025

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

25 By: 

Alexandra Rose

Attorneys for Plaintiff ALEXANDER DAVIS