

Barbara DuVan-Clarke (State Bar No. 259268)
BDC@blackstonepc.com
Danielle L. GruppChang (State Bar No. 313881)
dgruppchang@blackstonepc.com
P.J. Van Ert (State Bar No. 234858)
pjvanert@blackstonepc.com
Annabel F. Blanchard (State Bar No. 258135)
ablanchard@blackstonepc.com
BLACKSTONE LAW, APC
8383 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 745
Beverly Hills, California 90211
Tel: (310) 622-4278 / Fax: (855) 786-6356

Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Amira Fakira
and Fredonna Johnson

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

AMIRA FAKIRA, FREDONNA JOHNSON
individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated and on behalf of Aggrieved Employees
pursuant to the California Private Attorneys
General Act,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CSL PLASMA INC.; and DOES 1 through 25,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 23CV057131
[*consolidated with* Case No. 24CV062485]

Honorable Michael Markman
Department 23

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF**

Reservation ID: 448276774788

Date: July 31, 2025
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Dept.: 23

Complaint Filed: December 18, 2023
FAC Filed: January 22, 2025

1 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

2 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT** on July 31, 2025 at 10:00 a.m. in Department 23 of the above-
3 captioned Court located at 1225 Fallon Street Oakland, California 94612 at Rene C. Davidson
4 Courthouse, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and Rule 3.769 of the California
5 Rules of Court, Plaintiffs Amira Fakira and Fredonna Johnson (“Plaintiffs”) will and hereby do move the
6 Court for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action and PAGA settlement
7 between Plaintiffs and Defendant CSL Plasma Inc. (“Defendant”).

8 Plaintiffs request that the Court enter an Order:

9 1. Preliminarily approving the Joint Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement
10 (“Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”) attached as Exhibit 3 to the Declaration of Annabel Blanchard
11 in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement
12 (“Blanchard Decl.”);

13 2. Certifying the Class for Settlement purposes;

14 3. Appointing Plaintiffs Amira Fakira and Fredonna Johnson as the Class Representative for
15 Settlement purposes;

16 4. Appointing Jonathan M. Genish, Barbara DuVan-Clarke, Danielle GruppChang, P.J. Van
17 Ert, and Annabel Blanchard of Blackstone Law, APC, as Class Counsel for Settlement purposes;

18 5. Approving the proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement (“Class Notice”), attached as
19 Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement, to be mailed to the Class;

20 6. Approving the opt-out and objection procedures provided in the Settlement Agreement
21 and set forth in the Class Notice;

22 7. For each Class Member, directing Defendant to furnish their full name, last known mailing
23 address, Social Security number, the total number of Workweeks in which the Class Member performed
24 work for Defendant in California during the Class Period; and the total number of Pay Periods in which
25 the PAGA Employee performed work for Defendant in California during the PAGA Period (if applicable)
26 to the Settlement Administrator within twenty-one (21) calendar days after entry of the order granting
27 preliminary approval of the Settlement;

28 8. Approving the proposed deadlines for the settlement administration process; and

9. Setting a Final Approval Hearing.

Pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(1)(2), on June 9, 2025, a copy of the Settlement was submitted to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) via online submission through the LWDA’s website. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 48 and Exh. 4).

This Motion is based upon this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Annabel Blanchard, the Declaration of Plaintiff Amira Fakira, Declaration of Plaintiff Fredonna Johnson, the Declaration of the Settlement Administrator (Sean Hartranft of Apex Class Action Administrators, LLC), the pleadings and other records on file with the Court in this matter, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: July 7, 2025

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

By: A. Blanchard
Annabel Blanchard
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Amira Fakira and
Fredonna Johnson

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND	2
III.	THE SETTLEMENT TERMS	3
	A. Class Definition	3
	B. Amount of Settlement	3
	C. Allocation and Funding of the Gross Settlement Amount	3
	D. Released Claims	6
IV.	STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL	7
V.	THE SETTLEMENT IS PRESUMED FAIR.....	8
	A. The Settlement Was Reached as a Result of Arm’s-Length Bargaining	8
	B. Sufficient Investigation and Discovery by Experienced Class Counsel	8
	C. The Settlement is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’ Respective Legal Positions and Recovery Risks	9
	1. Class Counsel’s Analysis of the Maximum Available Liability and Damages	9
VI.	CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED	14
	A. An Ascertainable Class Exists Which is So Numerous That Joinder of All Members is Impracticable.....	14
	B. The Class Shares a Well-Defined Community of Interest	15
	C. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation.....	16
VII.	THE REQUESTED ENHANCEMENT PAYMENT IS REASONABLE	17
VIII.	THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS ARE REASONABLE	17
IX.	THE CLASS NOTICE AND THE OPT-OUT AND OBJECTION PROCESS MEETS DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS.....	18
X.	CONCLUSION	21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

<i>Aguirre v. Genesis Logistics</i> , 2013 WL 10936035 (C.D. Cal. 2013)	13
<i>Armstrong v. Board of School Directors of City of Milwaukee</i> , 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980).....	7
<i>B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.</i> , 191 Cal.App.3d 1341 (1987)	15
<i>Bradley v. Networkers Int’l, LLC</i> , 211 Cal.App.4th 1129 (2012)	10
<i>Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court</i> , 53 Cal.4th 1051 (2012);	10
<i>Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.</i> 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 529 (2018)	13
<i>Castillo v. ADT, LLC</i> , 2017 WL 363108 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2017)	13
<i>Choate v. Celite Corp.</i> , 215 Cal App. 4th 1460, 1468 (2013)	12
<i>Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC</i> , 175 Cal. App. 4th 785 (2009)	8
<i>Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.</i> , 191 Cal.App.3d 605 (1987)	15
<i>Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.</i> , 193 F.Supp.3d 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2016).....	13
<i>Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.</i> , 67 Cal. 2d 695 (1967).....	15
<i>Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn.</i> , 59 Cal.4th 1 (2014).....	10
<i>Elliot v. Spherion Pac. Work, LLC</i> , 572 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1181-82 (C.D. Cal. 2008).....	13
<i>Gaudin v. Saxon Mortgage Servs., Inc.</i> , 2015 WL 7454183 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2015)	17
<i>Hebbard v. Colgrove</i> , 28 Cal.App.3d 1017, 1030 (1972).....	14
<i>In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases</i> , 186 Cal.App.4th 1380 (2010).....	19
<i>In re Online DVD Rental</i> , 779 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2014)	17
<i>Jaimez v. DAIOHS USA, Inc.</i> , 181 Cal.App.4th 1286 (2010).....	12
<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i> (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116.....	9
<i>Lealao v. Beneficial Cal, Inc.</i> , 82 Cal.App.4th 19 (2000)	17
<i>Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.</i> , 23 Cal.4th 429 (2000)	16
<i>McGee v. Bank of America</i> , 60 Cal.App.3d 442 (1976)	16
<i>Miller v. Woods</i> , 148 Cal.App.3d 862 (1983).....	14
<i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co.</i> , 186 Cal.App.4th 399 (2010)	17
<i>Naranjo v. Specturm Security Services, Inc.</i> , 40 Cal.App.5th 444 (2019).....	11

1	<i>Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Commission of City and County of San Francisco</i> , 688 F.2d 615 (1982).....	8
2	<i>Price v. Starbucks Corp.</i> , 192 Cal.App.4th 1136 (2011).....	12
3	<i>Rose v. City of Hayward</i> , 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934 (1981)	14
4	<i>Sanchez v. McDonalds Restaurants of California, Inc.</i> , 2017 WL 4620746 (LA Super. Ct. July 6, 2017)	13
5		
6	<i>Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.</i> , 149 Cal.App. 4th 1496 (2007)	16
7	<i>See In re Microsoft I-V Cases</i> , 135 Cal.App.4th 706 (2006).....	7
8	<i>Smith v. Lux Retail North America, Inc.</i> , 2013 WL 2932243 at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2013).....	13
9	<i>Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.</i> , 203 Cal.App.4th 1112,1131 (2012)	13
10	<i>Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.</i> , 91 Cal.App.4th 224 (2001).....	7, 8, 9
11	<i>Wesson v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC</i> , 68 Cal.App.5th 746 (2021).....	13
12	Statutes	
13	Code of Civil Procedure Section 382.....	14
14	Labor Code section 203	11
15	Other Authorities	
16	<i>Findings of the Study of California Class Action Litigation</i> , 2000-2006, available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/class-action-lit-study.pdf	10
17		
18	Rules	
19	Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(c)	7
20	Cal. Rules of Court, Rule3.769(g)	7

1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiffs Amira Fakira and Fredonna Johnson (“Plaintiffs”) seek preliminary approval of the Joint
4 Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement (“Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”) entered into
5 between Plaintiffs and Defendant CSL Plasma Inc., (“Defendant”) (together, with Plaintiffs, the
6 “Parties”). (Declaration of Annabel Blanchard in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval
7 of Class Action and PAGA Settlement [“Blanchard Decl.”], Exh. 3). The Settlement terms are outlined
8 as follows:

- 9
- 10 • Class Size: Approximately 741 individuals.
 - 11 • Gross Settlement Amount: One Million Five Hundred Ninety Thousand Dollars (\$1,590,000).
 - 12 • Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: Attorneys’ fees of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross
13 Settlement Amount (\$556,500 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$1,590,000) plus actual
14 litigation costs and expenses not to exceed Twenty Seven Thousand Dollars (\$27,000), to be
15 paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
 - 16 • Enhancement Payments: Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000) *each* to the named plaintiffs, to be
17 paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
 - 18 • Settlement Administration Costs: Not to exceed Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
19 (\$12,500), to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
 - 20 • PAGA Amount: Ninety Thousand Dollars (\$90,000) from the Gross Settlement Amount,
21 75% of which will be paid to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and the remaining 25% to be paid to the PAGA Employees.
 - 22 • Estimated Net Settlement Amount: Eight Hundred Eighty-Four Thousand Dollars (\$884,000)
23 to be distributed to Settlement Class Members.

24 As set forth herein, the Settlement is the product of informed discovery and arms-length
25 negotiations, and provides a fair, adequate, and reasonable recovery for the Class. Plaintiffs therefore
26 respectfully request that the Court grant preliminary approval of the Settlement, conditionally certify the
27 Class, approve the proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement (“Class Notice”), and set a hearing date
28 for final settlement approval, among other requested relief.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant is a biotechnology company. Plaintiff Fakira was employed by Defendant as an hourly-paid, non-exempt lab technician from approximately September 2022 to approximately June 2023. (Declaration of Plaintiff Amira Fakira in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement [“Fakira Decl.”], ¶ 2). Plaintiff Johnson was employed by Defendant as an hourly, non-exempt phlebotomist from approximately February 2022 to present. (Declaration of Plaintiff Fredonna Johnson in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement [“Johnson Decl.”], ¶ 2).

On November 27, 2023, Plaintiff Fakira provided written notice to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) by online submission and to CSL Plasma, Inc. by U.S. Certified Mail, pursuant to California Labor Code Section 2699.3, of the specified provisions of the California Labor Code alleged to have been violated by Defendant. On and May 21, 2024, and January 2, 2025, Plaintiffs Fakira and Johnson submitted an amended written notice to the LWDA and Defendant (together, the written notices are the “PAGA Letters”) (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 10 and Exh. 2).

On December 18, 2023, Plaintiff Fakira filed a Class Action Complaint for Damages in the action entitled *Amira Fakira v. CSL Plasma Inc.*, Alameda County Superior Court Case No. 23CV057131 (“Class Action”), thereby commencing a putative class action against Defendant. (*Id.*, ¶ 11).

On February 2, 2024, Plaintiff Fakira filed a Complaint for Enforcement Action Under the Private Attorneys General Act, Cal. Labor Code §§ 2698 et seq. (“PAGA Complaint”) in the action entitled *Amira Fakira v. CSL Plasma Inc.*, Alameda County Superior Court Case No. 24CV062485, (“PAGA Action”), thereby commencing a putative representative PAGA action against Defendant. (Together, the PAGA Action and Class Action will be referred to herein as the “Actions.”). (*Id.*, ¶ 12).

On January 22, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) Representative Action Complaint (“Operative Complaint”) in the Class Action. (*Id.*, ¶ 13). The Operative Complaint alleges twelve (12) causes of action for violations of the California Labor Code for failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide compliant meal periods and premium payments in lieu thereof, failure to provide compliant rest periods and premiums payments in lieu thereof, failure to timely pay wages during employment, failure to provide accurate

wage statements, failure to timely pay wages upon termination, and failure to reimburse necessary business expenses, for violations of California Business & Professions Code Section 17200, *et seq.* based on the aforementioned California Labor Code violations, unlawful wage deductions, failure to pay vested vacation wages, and for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 pursuant to California Labor Code Section 2698 *et seq.* (“PAGA”) based on the aforementioned California Labor Code violations. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 13).

On October 28, 2024, the Parties participated in a formal mediation conducted by Todd Smith (“Mediator”), a neutral and respected mediator with extensive experience in complex wage and hour matters, and with the assistance of the Mediator’s evaluations, the Parties were able to reach an agreement to resolve this dispute on a class and representative basis. (*Id.*, ¶ 14). The Parties then worked diligently to negotiate and memorialize the terms in a long form settlement agreement. (*Ibid.*).

On April 30, 2025, the Parties executed the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, ¶ 15 and Exh. 3).

III. THE SETTLEMENT TERMS

A. Class Definition

For purposes of settlement only, the Parties have agreed that the Class shall be defined as “all current and former hourly-paid non-exempt employees of Defendant who worked within the State of California at any time during the Class Period” (“Class” or Class Member(s)). (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 18; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 10.b). The Class Period is defined as the period from December 18, 2019 through December 31, 2024. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 18; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 10.f). Based on information provided by Defendant, it is estimated that there are a total of Seven Hundred Forty-One (741) Class Members during the Class Period. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 18).

B. Amount of Settlement

The Parties have agreed to settle the class and PAGA claims at issue in the Operative Complaint for a non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of One Million Five Hundred Ninety Thousand Dollars (\$1,590,000), exclusive of employer-side payroll taxes. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 10.p).

C. Allocation and Funding of the Gross Settlement Amount

The Gross Settlement Amount is a common fund and therefore includes all requested costs, fees,

1 and other allocations. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 10.p). The Gross Settlement
2 Amount includes: (1) Attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross
3 Settlement Amount (i.e., \$556,500 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$1,590,000); (2) Class Counsel’s
4 actual litigation costs and expenses, not to exceed Twenty Seven Thousand Dollars (\$27,000); (3)
5 Settlement Administration Costs, not to exceed Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (\$12,500); (4)
6 Enhancement Payments in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000) *each* to the named Plaintiffs
7 (for a total of \$20,000); and (5) PAGA Amount of Ninety Thousand Dollars (\$90,000). (Blanchard Decl.,
8 ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 10.p, and 15). After the above-estimated amounts are deducted from the
9 Gross Settlement Amount, the Net Settlement Amount that will be available for Class Members is
10 currently estimated to be Eight Hundred Eighty-Four Thousand Dollars (\$884,000). (Blanchard Decl., ¶
11 19). Additionally, 25% of the PAGA Amount (“PAGA Employee Amount”), which is \$22,500 out of
12 \$90,000 will be fully distributed to “all current and former hourly-paid non-exempt employees of
13 Defendant who worked within the State of California at any time during the PAGA Period” (“PAGA
14 Employee(s)”). (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 10.p, 10.x, 10.y, and 15). The “PAGA
15 Period” is defined as the period from November 27, 2022 through December 31, 2024. (Blanchard Decl.,
16 ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 10.z).

17 The Gross Settlement Amount was agreed upon based on Defendant’s representations that there
18 are approximately 703 Class Members who worked a total of 32,477 Workweeks during the period from
19 December 18, 2019 to October 28, 2024 (“Relevant Period”). If it is determined by the Settlement
20 Administrator that the total number of Workweeks worked by the Class Members during the Relevant
21 Period actually exceeds 32,477 by more than 8.75%, then the Gross Settlement Amount will be increased
22 on a proportional basis equal to the percentage increase in the number worked by the Class Members
23 above 8.75%. For example, if the number of Workweeks increases by 10%, then the Gross Settlement
24 Amount will increase by 1.25%. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 17).

25 The Net Settlement Amount will be distributed and paid to all Settlement Class Members who do
26 not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion (“Settlement Class Members”) on a *pro rata* basis
27 based on their number of Workweeks. The Settlement Class Member’s *pro rata* share of the Net
28 Settlement Amount calculated according to the number of Workweeks worked during the Class Period

1 (“Individual Settlement Payment”) will be calculated by the Administrator, in accordance with the
2 Settlement Agreement. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 21; Settlement Agreement, ¶18).

3 Twenty-five percent (25%) of the PAGA Amount will be distributed and paid to all PAGA
4 Employees on a *pro rata* basis based on the total number of Pay Periods worked by each PAGA Employee
5 during the PAGA Period (“Individual PAGA Payments”). The PAGA Employees’ Individual PAGA
6 Payments will be calculated by the Administrator, in accordance with the Settlement Agreement
7 (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 22; Settlement Agreement, ¶19).

8 23. Each Individual Settlement Share will be allocated as twenty percent (20%) wages (the
9 “Wage Portion”) and thirty percent (30%) interest, and fifty percent (50%) penalties and other non-wage
10 damages. (the “Non-Wage Portion”). (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 23; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 20). The Wage
11 Portions will be reported on an IRS Form W-2 and the Non-Wage Portions will be reported on an IRS
12 Form 1099 (if applicable) by the Administrator. The Administrator will withhold the employee’s share
13 of taxes and withholdings with respect to the Wage Portion of the Individual Settlement Shares, and issue
14 checks to Settlement Class Members for their net payment of their Individual Settlement Payment.
15 (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 23; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 20). The employers’ share of taxes and contributions
16 in connection with the Wage Portion of Individual Settlement Shares will be paid by Defendant separately
17 and in addition to the Gross Settlement Amount. Each Individual PAGA Payment will be allocated as
18 one hundred percent (100%) penalties and will be reported on an IRS Form 1099 (if applicable) by the
19 Administrator. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 23; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 10.p and 20).

20 The Settlement Agreement is a non-reversionary and non-claims made settlement. (Blanchard
21 Decl., ¶ 24; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 10.p and 37). The Net Settlement Amount will be fully distributed
22 to Settlement Class Members and the PAGA Amount will be fully distributed to the LWDA and PAGA
23 Employees, in accordance with the Settlement Agreement. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 24; Settlement
24 Agreement, ¶¶ 17 and 18). No money will revert to Defendant. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 24; Settlement
25 Agreement, ¶ 10.p).

26 Each Individual Settlement Payment and Individual PAGA Payment check will be valid and
27 negotiable for one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days from the date the checks are issued, and
28 thereafter, shall be canceled. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 25; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 37). Any funds associated

1 with such canceled checks will be distributed by the Settlement Administrator to the State of California's
2 Unclaimed Property Division in the name of the Settlement Class Member and/or PAGA Employee.
3 (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 25; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 37).

4 **D. Released Claims**

5 Upon the full funding of the Gross Settlement Amount, Plaintiffs and all Settlement Class
6 Members will be deemed to have fully, finally, and forever released, settled, compromised, relinquished,
7 and discharged the Released Parties of all Released Class Claims. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 38).

8 Upon the full funding of the Gross Settlement Amount, Plaintiffs, the State of California with
9 respect to all PAGA Employees, and all PAGA Employees will be deemed to have fully, finally, and
10 forever released, settled, compromised, relinquished, and discharged the Released Parties of all Released
11 PAGA Claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 39).

12 "Released Class Claims" means any and all claims which were alleged or which could have been
13 alleged based on the factual allegations in the Operative Complaint, arising during the Class Period, which
14 specifically includes claims for Defendant's alleged failure to pay overtime and minimum wages, provide
15 compliant meal and rest periods and associated premium payments, timely pay wages during employment
16 and upon termination, provide accurate wage statements, pay vested vacation wages, and reimburse
17 necessary business-related expenses, and engaged in unlawful wage deductions, in violation of California
18 Labor Code Sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 221, 222, 223, 224, 226(a), 226.7, 227.3, 510, 512(a),
19 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2800, and 2802, the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order,
20 and California Business and Professions Code Sections 17200, *et seq.* (*Id.*, ¶ 10.ee).

21 "Released PAGA Claims" means any and all claims arising from any of the factual allegations in
22 the Operative Complaint and PAGA Letter, arising during the PAGA Period, for civil penalties under the
23 Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, California Labor Code sections 2698 *et seq.*, including all claims
24 for attorneys' fees and costs related thereto, for Defendant's alleged failure to pay overtime and minimum
25 wages, provide compliant meal and rest periods and associated premium payments, timely pay wages
26 during employment and upon termination, provide complaint wage statements, pay vested vacation
27 wages, maintain complete and accurate payroll records, and reimburse necessary business-related
28 expenses and engaged in unlawful wage deductions in violation of California Labor Code Sections 201,

202, 203, 204, 226(a), 221, 222, 223, 224, 226.7, 227.3, 510, 512(a), 1174(d), 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2800, and 2802, and the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order. (*Id.*, ¶ 10. ff).

“Released Parties” means Defendant and its current and former officers, directors, members, insurers, shareholders, parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, predecessors, successors, assigns, and employee benefit plans and trusts. (*Id.*, ¶ 10. gg).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL

The settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*See Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794 (1996)). “In general, questions whether a settlement was fair and reasonable, whether notice to the class was adequate, whether certification of the class was proper, and whether the attorney fee award was proper are matters addressed to the trial court’s broad discretion.” (*Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 234-35 (2001) (disapproved on other grounds)).

The review and approval of a proposed class action settlement involves a two-step process. (*See* Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(c)). First, counsel submit the proposed terms of the settlement and the Court makes a preliminary assessment of whether the settlement appears to be sufficiently within the range of a fair settlement to justify providing notice of the proposed settlement to class members. After notice is provided to the class, the Court must conduct a second inquiry into whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (*Ibid.*).

The initial evaluation of the settlement at the preliminary approval step “is not a fairness hearing.” (*Armstrong v. Board of School Directors of City of Milwaukee*, 616 F.2d 305, 314 (7th Cir. 1980)). Rather, the limited purpose of this initial inquiry is to determine, at a threshold level, only whether the proposed settlement is within the range of possible approval and, as a result, “whether there is any reason to notify the class members of the proposed settlement and to proceed with a fairness hearing.” A presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*See In re Microsoft I-V Cases*, 135 Cal. App. 4th 706, 723 (2006)).

Preliminary approval does not require a court to make a final determination that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Rather, that decision is made only at the final approval stage, after notice

1 of the settlement has been given to the class members and they have had an opportunity to object or
2 exclude themselves from the settlement. (*See* Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(g)). In considering a
3 potential class settlement, the court need not reach any ultimate conclusions on the issues of fact and law
4 which underlie the merits of the dispute and need not engage in a trial on the merits. (*See Officers for*
5 *Justice v. Civil Service Commission*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982)).

6 **V. THE SETTLEMENT IS PRESUMED FAIR**

7 **A. The Settlement Was Reached as a Result of Arm's-Length Bargaining**

8 California courts recognize that “a presumption of fairness exists where . . . [a] settlement is
9 reached through arm's-length bargaining.” (*Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245; *see also Clark v. Am.*
10 *Residential Servs. LLC*, 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 799 (2009)). Here, the Parties' settlement negotiations
11 were at all times made at arm's-length and were adversarial. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 26). The Settlement
12 was reached following a full day of mediation with a highly respected mediator with substantial
13 experience mediating wage and hour cases. (*Ibid*). At all times, Plaintiffs were willing and prepared to
14 litigate this matter through class certification and trial if the Parties had been unable to reach a favorable
15 resolution. (*Id.*, ¶ 46).

16 **B. Sufficient Investigation and Discovery by Experienced Class Counsel**

17 Courts typically assess the status of discovery in determining whether a class action settlement
18 agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801). Prior to mediation,
19 Defendant produced a random sampling of putative class members' time and pay records as well as
20 Defendant's relevant wage and hour policies, and information regarding the total number of putative class
21 members, the number of current versus former employees, the total workweeks worked by the putative
22 class members, and the average rate of pay for the putative class members. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 27).

23 This allowed Class Counsel to conduct an informed assessment and analysis of the strengths and
24 weaknesses of the claims and the potential class-wide damages. (*Id.*, ¶ 28). Based on information
25 exchanged, the Parties extensively briefed issues regarding class certification and liability and provided
26 their analyses to the Mediator who helped the Parties debate the strengths and weakness of their respective
27 positions. (*Id.*, ¶ 29). Additionally, settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and
28

1 experienced counsel. (Blanchard Decl., ¶¶ 1-9). Accordingly, Class Counsel had sufficient information
2 and experience to act intelligently in negotiating the Settlement.

3 **C. The Settlement is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties' Respective Legal Positions**
4 **and Recovery Risks**

5 A settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at
6 trial, nor does the settlement have to obtain 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
7 (*Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 246, 250). In evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement, a trial court
8 must consider “the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further
9 litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the
10 extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the
11 presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.”
12 (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008)).

13 Here, the reasonableness of the Settlement is underscored by the fact that Defendant has legal and
14 factual grounds for defending the Actions. Based upon Class Counsel’s experience litigating similar
15 complex matters, Plaintiffs reasonably expected a vigorous and lengthy defense to both class certification
16 and the merits of the Actions absent a settlement.

17 **1. Class Counsel’s Analysis of the Maximum Available Liability and Damages**

18 Class Counsel analyzed all available data and estimated Defendant’s maximum potential exposure
19 to be approximately \$9,983,891, assuming the litigation was successful at trial on all claims at issue and
20 every employee had a violation for each claim on every shift worked. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 30). This
21 maximum potential analysis was then reduced based on the challenges facing the likelihood of obtaining
22 class certification, prevailing at trial, and other attendant risks. (Ibid). This estimate is based off an
23 estimated maximum liability for all claims at issue and the total aggregate workweeks during the relevant
24 time period, less interest, and based on the analysis of the data which was extrapolated out for all class
25 members across the entire putative class period, which included: \$587,226 for meal period violations;
26 \$3,868,466 for rest period violations at a 100% violation rate; \$7,886 for unpaid overtime and sick pay
27 wages at the required regular rate; \$915,527 for unpaid off-the-clock work (1 hour per week); \$253,470
28 for unreimbursed business expenses; \$1,995,466 for waiting time penalties; and \$1,144,550 for wage

1 statement violations. Plaintiffs further estimated that Defendant faced an additional exposure of
2 approximately \$1,211,300 in potential, non-stacked PAGA penalties (i.e., one penalty, per employee, per
3 pay period during the PAGA statutory period) PAGA penalties. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 30). Together with
4 the PAGA penalties, Defendant's maximum potential exposure totaled \$9,983,891 in damages. (Ibid).

5 **2. Class Counsel's Risk-Based Analysis and Risk-Based Adjustments**

6 While Plaintiffs believe that Defendant faced significant exposure, substantial barriers to a
7 recovery existed. Defendant contended that Plaintiffs' claims are not suitable for class certification
8 because individual issues and affirmative defenses would predominate should this case go to trial.
9 (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 33; *See Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal.4th 1004 (2012); *Duran*
10 *v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn.*, 59 Cal.4th 1, 35-36 (2014); *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551
11 (2011)). While Plaintiffs and Class Counsel disagree with Defendant's predictions, they also recognize
12 that there is a significant risk that the Court may deny class certification. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 33; *see*
13 *also, Findings of the Study of California Class Action Litigation*, 2000-2006, available at
14 <http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/class-action-lit-study.pdf> (finding that only 21.4% of all class
15 actions were certified either as part of a settlement or as part of a contested certification motion)).

16 For example, Plaintiffs' meal period claims, which were based on Defendant's alleged failure to
17 provide lawful meal periods, have been increasingly difficult to certify in recent years. (Blanchard Decl.,
18 ¶ 34; *See Brinker*, 53 Cal. 4th at 1034-35). Plaintiffs' theory of liability for meal period violations was
19 based on allegations that Defendant had failed to implement its policies and that its practices failed to
20 allow Class Members to take meal breaks in the manner required under California law. (Blanchard Decl.,
21 ¶ 34; *See Bradley v. Networkers Int'l, LLC*, 211 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1150 (2012) (holding that "the lack
22 of a meal/rest break policy and uniform failure to authorize such breaks are matters of common proof.")).
23 Defendant contended that its policies and practices at all times during the Class Period were lawful.
24 (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 34). Indeed, Plaintiffs' analysis revealed only a 12.3% violation rate for purported
25 unique meal period violations. Defendant further argued that the rate of purported meal period violations
26 reflected in the data would require individualized inquiry and that such inquiry would prohibit a class
27 from being certified. (Ibid). Class Counsel also had to consider the risk that the Court would find validity
28 in an individualized proof defense to certification of Plaintiffs' meal period claim. (Ibid).

1 Additionally, a large portion of Defendant's overall liability lies in Plaintiffs' rest period
2 allegations. (*Id.*, ¶ 35). As with the meal period allegations, Defendant contended that it had a lawful
3 written rest period policy, provided compliant rest breaks, and relieved Class Members of all duties as
4 required under California law. (*Ibid*). Additionally, this claim was even more uncertain given the
5 difficulties associated with proving the alleged rest period violations, as Defendant was not required to
6 record these breaks. (*Ibid*). Given the lack of records demonstrating rest period violations, there were
7 legitimate concerns Plaintiffs would not be able to certify these claims or prove substantial damages with
8 requisite certainty, which made the estimated value of this claim subject to much challenge. (*Ibid*).

9 Plaintiffs also faced challenges certifying and proving liability for their minimum wage and
10 overtime claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 37). These claims were largely based on alleged unrecorded, off-the-clock work
11 performed by the Class Members both before and after their shifts and during purported meal and rest
12 periods. (*Ibid*). However, the individualized nature of why this work was performed and the
13 individualized nature of damages presented substantial concerns regarding the manageability of the case
14 and the risk the Court could find these issues prevented certification, and the estimated damages for this
15 claim were based on an assumption that all Class Members worked off the clock for at least one hour per
16 week. (*Ibid*).

17 Plaintiffs also contended that Defendant failed to reimburse Plaintiffs and the other Class
18 Members for necessary business-related expenses, such as the purchase of personal protective equipment
19 and non-slip shoes necessary for safety during plasma collection and storage. Defendant contended that
20 it had a policy and practice of reimbursing employees for necessary business-related expenses. Defendant
21 further contended that, with respect to the alleged expenses for which Plaintiffs and the other Class
22 Members never requested reimbursement from Defendant, it did not know and had no reason to know
23 that alleged business-related expenses had been incurred. Defendant further contended that the reason
24 why a Class Member undertook certain expenses, while not others, and failed to receive reimbursement
25 for certain expenses while not others, would raise individual issues that could not be certified.

26 There are also substantial risks associated with Plaintiffs' waiting time penalties and wage
27 statement claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 37). First, these claims were derivative of Plaintiffs' claims for unpaid meal
28 period premiums, unpaid rest period premiums, unpaid minimum wages, and unpaid overtime wages,

1 and if certification was denied on those underlying claims, these derivative claims for penalties would
2 also likely fail. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 37). Further, even if Plaintiffs prevailed on their underlying claims,
3 they would still be required to demonstrate that Defendant’s violations of California Labor Code section
4 203 were *willful* violations. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 37; *See, e.g., Choate v. Celite Corp.*, 215 Cal App. 4th
5 1460, 1468 (2013) (holding that “an employer’s reasonable, good faith belief that wages are not owed
6 may negate a finding of willfulness”). Wage statement claims have also seen varying treatment at the
7 appellate level because such claims have an element of discretion attached to them rather than a pure
8 calculation of damages after liability is proven. (Blanchard Decl. ¶ 37; *Jaimez v. DAIOHS USA, Inc.*,
9 181 Cal.App.4th 1286 (2010) *with Price v. Starbucks Corp.*, 192 Cal.App.4th 1136 (2011)). Accordingly,
10 these derivative claims, which comprised a substantial portion of Defendant’s estimated liability, were
11 therefore uncertain. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 37).

12 Class Counsel also recognized that, even if Plaintiffs prevailed at class certification, proving the
13 amount of wages due to Class Members would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain
14 proposition. (*Id.*, ¶ 38). In order to prove liability and damages, Class Counsel will need to request and
15 analyze thousands of pages of documents, obtain the Class Members’ contact information, contact them,
16 and obtain their declarations at great expense. (*Ibid.*). Obtaining the cooperation of current employees
17 would also be difficult, given the likely reluctance to aid prosecution of a lawsuit against a current
18 employer. (*Ibid.*). On the other hand, Defendant would likely be able to obtain the cooperation of its
19 employees. (*Ibid.*). Moreover, even if Plaintiffs prevailed at class certification and trial, possible appeals
20 would substantially delay any recovery by the Class. (*Ibid.*).

21 Therefore, taking into account how each of the above risks potentially effected Plaintiffs’ ability
22 to first obtain class certification, and then prove the underlying violations, plus the cost and delay in
23 recovering the alleged potential damages, Class Counsel discounted Defendant’s estimated liability based
24 on the challenges facing their ability to succeed on class certification by 60% to \$3,993,556.40. (*Id.*, ¶
25 39). The merits-based risk factors further reduced Defendant’s estimated liability by an additional 60%.
26 (*Ibid.*). This resulted in an adjusted estimated liability of \$1,597,422.56. (*Ibid.*). In light thereof, the
27 settlement amount of \$1,590,000 is a significant settlement. (*Ibid.*).

28 Class Counsel also contemplated the risks of proceeding with the PAGA claim and potential

1 liability Defendant could face from this claim as part of the global resolution. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 40).
2 Existing case law makes PAGA claims subject to the same defenses and risks as Plaintiffs' underlying
3 wage claims. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 40; see, *Elliot v. Spherion Pac. Work, LLC*, 572 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1181-
4 82 (C.D. Cal. 2008) ("Plaintiffs' claim under [PAGA] is wholly dependent upon her other claims.
5 Because all of Plaintiffs' other claims fail as a matter of law, so does her PAGA claim")). Class Counsel
6 also anticipated that even if successful on the merits at trial, the imposition of cumulative civil penalties
7 based on the alleged wage and hour violations could be considered unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or
8 confiscatory, and that Defendant would argue that it made a good faith attempt to comply with its legal
9 obligations warranting a reduction in penalties. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 40).¹ Class Counsel also anticipated
10 Defendant would argue that it made a good faith attempt to comply with its legal obligations and that the
11 violations per pay period were low, warranting an additional reduction in civil penalties. (Ibid). Finally,
12 Class Counsel was also mindful of the fact that PAGA is fundamentally not intended to be compensatory
13 in nature but is instead intended to facilitate enforcement of California's labor laws by financing state
14 activities and educating and deterring non-compliance. (Ibid).

15 Therefore, after considering this multitude of factors, Plaintiffs and Class Counsel concluded that
16 it was in the best interest of the State of California and the PAGA Employees to enter into the Settlement,
17 and to allocate Ninety Thousand Dollars (\$90,000) of the Gross Settlement Amount towards the PAGA
18 claim, which represents approximately 5.7% of the Gross Settlement Amount. (*Id.*, ¶ 41). This
19 percentage of the settlement is well within the range of wage and hour settlements regularly approved in
20 both state and federal court for cases that include both a class and PAGA action. (Ibid). Typically, such
21 hybrid cases allocate only 1% of the gross settlement value to resolve PAGA claims, and, indeed,
22 settlements allocations as little as 0.22% of the gross settlement amount have been approved as reasonable
23

24 ¹ See, e.g., *Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.*, 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1131 (2012) (imposition of both statutory
25 and civil penalties for same conduct is impermissible double recovery) (disapproved on other grounds); *Aguirre v. Genesis*
26 *Logistics*, 2013 WL 10936035, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2013) ("duplicative effect" of penalties is a factor in favor of "reducing ...the
27 PAGA penalty"); *Smith v. Lux Retail North America, Inc.*, 2013 WL 2932243, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2013) (declining to
28 stack penalties based on the same conduct); *Castillo v. ADT, LLC*, 2017 WL 363108, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2017); *Sanchez*
v. McDonalds Restaurants of California, Inc., 2017 WL 4620746 (LA Super. Ct. July 6, 2017) (declining to stack penalties
arising out of the same conduct); *Fleming v. Covidien, Inc.*, 2011 WL 756304718, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011) (reducing
PAGA penalties by 80%); *Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.*, 193 F.Supp.3d 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (indicating that a substantial reduction is
warranted where good faith dispute exists in legal obligations); *Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.*, 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 529 (2018)
(approving reduction in penalties from \$50 per pay period to \$5 per pay period based on good faith attempts to comply with
obligations and minimal violations).

1 by courts. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 41). Moreover, the overall relief obtained by the Settlement is significant,
2 not only from a monetary perspective, but also because it fulfills the public policy objectives of PAGA—
3 to promote enforcement of California’s labor laws, provide funds to the state, and deter future non-
4 compliance by the employer. (Ibid).

5 The Settlement is in the best interest of the Class Members, the PAGA Employees, and the State
6 of California and is within the accepted range of recoveries for this type of litigation given the inherent
7 risk of litigation, the risk of obtaining and maintaining class certification, and the costs of further
8 litigation. (*Id.*, ¶ 42).

9 VI. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED

10 Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 provides that three basic requirements must be met in order
11 to sustain any class action: (1) there must be an ascertainable class; (2) there must be a well-defined
12 community of interest in the question of law or fact affecting the parties to be represented; and (3)
13 certification will provide substantial benefits to litigants and the courts, i.e., proceeding as a class action
14 is superior to other methods. (*See Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1806). Plaintiffs contend that the Actions,
15 which is based upon Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices, satisfies the class certification
16 requirements under California Code of Civil Procedure section 382. Defendant denies Plaintiffs’
17 allegations, but for purposes of the Settlement only, Defendant has stipulated to certification of the Class.

18 A. An Ascertainable Class Exists Which is So Numerous That Joinder of All Members is 19 Impracticable

20 Whether an ascertainable class exists turns on three factors: (1) the class definition, (2) the size of
21 the class, and (3) the means of identifying the class members. (*See Miller v. Woods*, 148 Cal.App.3d 862,
22 873 (1983)). In this case, all three considerations strongly favor class certification. Here, the Class is
23 defined as “all current and former hourly-paid non-exempt employees of Defendant who worked within
24 the State of California at any time during the Class Period.” (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 18; Settlement
25 Agreement, ¶ 10.b). This provides a clear and definite scope for the proposed class.

26 Next, the Class is sufficiently numerous. There is no magic number that satisfies the numerosity
27 requirement. Courts have certified classes with as few as ten or twenty-eight class members. (*Rose v.*
28 *City of Hayward*, 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934 (1981); *Bowles v. Superior Court*, 44 Cal. 2d 574 (1995);

1 *Hebbard v. Colgrove*, 28 Cal.App.3d 1017, 1030 (1972)). Here, the estimated Class size of seven hundred
2 and fifty-two (752) individuals meets the numerosity requirement.

3 Finally, the question of whether class members are easily identifiable turns on whether a plaintiff
4 can establish “the existence of an ascertainable class.” (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.*, 67 Cal.2d 695 at 706
5 (1967)). The existence of an ascertainable class in this case can be established through Defendant’s
6 payroll records, and the Class definition is sufficiently specific to enable the Parties, Class Members, and
7 the Court to determine the parameters of the Class. (*See Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.*, 191
8 Cal.App.3d 605, 617 (1987)).

9 **B. The Class Shares a Well-Defined Community of Interest**

10 The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant questions of law
11 and fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives
12 who can adequately represent the class. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1806). Here, all three requirements
13 are easily satisfied.

14 The commonality criterion requires the existence of common question of law or fact and is
15 generally established with the issues of predominance and typicality. (*See Daar*, 67 Cal.2d 695, 706).
16 What is required is that a common question of fact or law exists which predominates over issues unique
17 to individual plaintiffs. The existence of individual issues or facts—generally present in any case arising
18 from employment—is not a bar to class certification as long as they do not render class litigation
19 unmanageable or predominate over the common issues. (*See B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois,*
20 *Inc.*, 191 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1354 (1987)).

21 Here, Plaintiffs’ claims present common issues of law and fact that predominate and warrant class
22 certification. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant denied compliant meal and rest periods to employees,
23 required employees to perform work off-the-clock, and failed to fully compensate employees for all time
24 actually worked. These policies and practices meant that Defendant allegedly failed to pay minimum and
25 overtime wages, and other related claims. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s policies and practices were
26 uniform as to all Class Members. Thus, class treatment is appropriate.

27 To satisfy the typicality requirement, California law does not require that plaintiffs’ claims be
28 identical to the other class members. Rather, the test of typicality for a class representative is whether

1 other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not
2 unique to the named plaintiff, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of
3 conduct. (*See Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.*, 149 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502 (2007)). The typicality requirement
4 for a class representative refers to the nature of the claim or defense of the representative, and not to the
5 specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought. (*See Ibid*).

6 Here, Plaintiffs allege that their claims are similar to that of the other Class Members and that
7 Plaintiffs' claims arise out of the same alleged course of conduct giving rise to the claims of the other
8 Class Members. Because Plaintiffs' claims are based upon the same alleged conduct and business
9 practices as those of Class Members, the typicality requirement has been satisfied.

10 Finally, the question of adequacy of representation "depends on whether the plaintiff's attorney
11 qualifies to conduct the proposed litigation in the plaintiff's interest or not antagonistic to the interests of
12 the class." (*McGee v. Bank of America*, 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450 (1976)). Here, these considerations are
13 satisfied. Class Counsel is well-regarded and is qualified and experienced in employment-related, class-
14 action litigation. (Blanchard Decl., ¶¶ 1-9). Plaintiffs will vigorously, adequately, and fairly represent
15 the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs have, at all times, throughout the course of the litigation considered
16 the interests of the Class and understood that he must take steps to adequately represent the Class and
17 their interests. (Fakira Decl., ¶ 10; Johnson Decl., ¶10). Because Plaintiffs' claims are typical of other
18 Class Members and are not based on unique circumstances, there is no antagonism between the interests
19 of Plaintiffs and the Class.

20 **C. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

21 Under the circumstances, proceeding as a class action is a superior means of resolving this dispute,
22 as the Class Members and the Court will derive substantial benefits. Class certification would serve as
23 the only means to deter and redress the alleged violations. (*See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal.4th 429,
24 434 (2000) (relevant considerations include the probability that each class member will come forward to
25 prove his or her separate claim and whether the class approach would actually serve to deter and redress
26 the alleged wrongdoing)). Further, individual actions arising out of the same operative facts would
27 unduly burden the courts and could result in inconsistent results. Therefore, class action proceedings are
28 superior to individual litigation.

1 **VII. THE REQUESTED ENHANCEMENT PAYMENT IS REASONABLE**

2 Plaintiffs in class action lawsuits are eligible for reasonable incentive payments as compensation
3 “for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Munoz*
4 *v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co.*, 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 412 (2010)). Courts routinely grant approval of
5 class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representative, which are
6 necessary to provide incentive to represent the class and are appropriate given the benefit the class
7 representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See In re Online DVD Rental*, 779 F.3d 934, 947-948
8 (9th Cir. 2014) (approving incentive award 417 times larger than individual payments where incentive
9 award made up a mere .17% of the settlement); *Gaudin v. Saxon Mortgage Servs., Inc.*, 2015 WL
10 7454183, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2015) (finding service award of \$15,000 to be “fair and
11 reasonable”)).

12 Plaintiffs initiated this litigation on behalf of their current and former co-workers who will now
13 be entitled to receive payment from the Settlement. Plaintiffs invested substantial time and effort into
14 litigation, including their own research, reviewing documents, and extensive discussions with Class
15 Counsel. (Fakira Decl., ¶¶ 3-5; Johnson Decl., ¶¶ 3-5). Further, the requested amount for Plaintiffs is
16 also reasonable given the average award and the benefit gained by other Class Members. For these
17 reasons, Plaintiffs request that Enhancement Payments of Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000) to *each*
18 Plaintiff be preliminarily approved by the Court. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 43; Fakira Decl., ¶ 12; Johnson
19 Decl., ¶12).

20 **VIII. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS ARE REASONABLE**

21 Trial courts have “wide latitude” in assessing the value of attorneys’ fees and their decisions will
22 “not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” (*Lealao v. Beneficial Cal, Inc.*, 82
23 Cal.App.4th 19, 41 (2000)). California law provides that attorney fee awards should be equivalent to fees
24 paid in the legal marketplace to compensate for the result achieved and risk incurred. (*Id.* at 46). In cases
25 where class members present claims against a common fund and the defendant agrees to a percentage of
26 the fund as part of the settlement, use of the percentage method is appropriate. (*Id.* at 44).

27 Here, the requested attorneys’ fees of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount
28 (i.e., \$556,500 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$1,590,000) is disclosed to Class Members in the

1 proposed Class Notice. (Settlement Agreement, Exh. A). The requested fee was freely negotiated, is
2 common in the legal marketplace, and is not opposed by Defendant. The Motion for Final Approval will
3 elaborate on the nature of the legal services provided and will also support Class Counsel's request for
4 the reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses not to exceed Twenty Seven Thousand Dollars
5 (\$27,000). (Blanchard Decl., ¶¶ 44 and 46). The Attorneys' Fees and Costs that are not ultimately
6 approved by the Court shall instead be included in the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed to
7 Settlement Class Members. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 13).

8 **IX. THE CLASS NOTICE AND THE OPT-OUT AND OBJECTION PROCESS**
9 **MEETS DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS**

10 The Parties have jointly drafted the Class Notice, which will be mailed to the Class Members.
11 (*Id.*, Exh. A). The Class Notice will include information regarding the nature of the Actions, a summary
12 of the terms of the Settlement, the Class definition, information on how to object to and/or opt-out of the
13 Class Settlement and to dispute Workweeks and/or Pay Periods, and the date of the Final Approval
14 Hearing. (*Ibid.*). The Class Notice will list each Class Member's total Workweeks and their estimated
15 Individual Settlement Share and each PAGA Employee's total Pay Periods and their estimated Individual
16 PAGA Payment. (*Ibid.*).

17 Within twenty-one (21) calendar days after entry of the preliminary approval order, Defendant
18 will provide a list in a formatted readable Microsoft Office Excel spreadsheet to the Settlement
19 Administrator containing the following information for each Class Member: full name, last known
20 mailing address, Social Security number, the total number of Workweeks in which the Class Member
21 performed work for Defendant in California during the Class Period; and the total number of Pay Periods
22 in which the PAGA Employee performed work for Defendant in California during the PAGA Period (if
23 applicable) (collectively referred to as the "Class List"). (*Id.*, ¶¶ 10.d and 27). Within seven (7) calendar
24 days after receiving the Class List from Defendant, the Settlement Administrator will perform a search
25 based on the National Change of Address Database or other similar services available, such as provided
26 by Experian, for information to update and correct for any known or identifiable address changes, and
27 will mail a Class Notice in English and Spanish to all Class Members via First-Class U.S. Mail, using the
28 most current, known mailing addresses identified by the Settlement Administrator. (*Id.*, ¶ 28). The

1 Parties have agreed to use Apex as the Settlement Administrator. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 47; Settlement
2 Agreement, ¶ 10.jj).

3 In determining whether to approve a settlement of a class action, a trial court has virtually
4 complete discretion as to the manner of giving notice to class members, and review on appeal is governed
5 by the abuse of discretion standard. (*See In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases*, 186 Cal.App.4th 1380
6 (2010)). Here, Class Counsel is not aware of an alternative method of providing notice to the Class which
7 would result in a higher likelihood of actual notice. (Blanchard Decl., ¶ 48). The original source of the
8 mailing addresses is from Class Members, who provided the information to Defendant. (Ibid).

9 Class Members will have forty-five (45) calendar days from the initial mailing of the Class Notice
10 by the Settlement Administrator to submit a Request for Exclusion, Notice of Objection, and/or
11 Workweeks Dispute (“Response Deadline”). (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 10.ii).

12 Any Class Notice returned to the Settlement Administrator as undeliverable on or before the
13 Response Deadline will be sent promptly via First-Class U.S. Mail to the forwarding address affixed
14 thereto and the Settlement Administrator will indicate the date of such re-mailing on the Class Notice.
15 (*Id.*, ¶ 28.b). If no forwarding address is provided, the Settlement Administrator will promptly attempt
16 to determine a correct address using a skip-trace or other search, using the name, address, and/or Social
17 Security number of the Class Member, and perform a single re-mailing within five (5) calendar days.
18 (Ibid). In the event that a Class Notice is re-mailed to a Class Member, the Response Deadline for that
19 Class Member shall be extended fifteen (15) calendar days from the original Response Deadline. (*Id.*, ¶
20 10.ii).

21 Class Members will have an opportunity to dispute the number of Workweeks and/or Pay Periods
22 to which they have been credited, as reflected in their respective Class Notices, by submitting a timely
23 and valid letter (“Workweeks Dispute”) to the Settlement Administrator, by mail, postmarked on or
24 before the Response Deadline. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 10.nn and 28). A Workweeks Dispute must: (a) contain the case
25 name and number of the Class Action; (b) contain the Class Member’s full name, signature, address,
26 telephone number, and the last four (4) digits of the Class Member’s Social Security number; (c) clearly
27 state that the Class Member disputes the number of Workweeks and/or Pay Periods credited to that Class
28 Member/PAGA Employee and what the Class Member/PAGA Employee contends is the correct number;

and (d) be returned by mail to the Settlement Administrator at the specified address, postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (*Id.*, ¶ 10.nn).

Any Class Member wishing to be excluded from the Class Settlement must submit a timely and valid letter (“Request for Exclusion”) to the Settlement Administrator, by mail, postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 10.hh & 26). A Request for Exclusion must: (a) contain the case name and number of the Class Action; (b) contain the Class Member’s full name, signature, address, telephone number, and last four (4) digits of the Class Member’s Social Security number; (c) clearly state that the Class Member does not wish to be included in the Class Settlement; and (3) be returned by mail to the Settlement Administrator at the specified address, postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (*Id.*, ¶ 10.hh). Notwithstanding the above, all PAGA Employees will be bound by the PAGA Settlement and will be issued their Individual PAGA Payment, irrespective of whether they submit a Request for Exclusion. (*Id.*, ¶ 30).

To object to the Class Settlement in writing, Settlement Class Members must submit a timely and complete written objection (“Notice of Objection”) to the Settlement Administrator, by mail, postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 10.v & 30). A Notice of Objection must: (a) contain the case name and number of the Class Action; (b) contain the objector’s full name, signature, address, telephone number, and the last four (4) digits of the objector’s Social Security number; (c) contain a written statement of all grounds for the objection accompanied by any legal support for such objection; (d) contain copies of any papers, briefs, or other documents upon which the objection is based; and (e) be returned by mail to the Settlement Administrator at the specified address, postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (*Id.*, 10.v). Settlement Class Members, individually or through counsel, may also present their objection orally at the Final Approval Hearing, regardless of whether they have submitted a Notice of Objection. (*Id.*, ¶ 30).

///

///

///

///

///

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25
- 26
- 27
- 28

Dated: July 7, 2025

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

21



Superior Court of Alameda County Public Portal

Make a Reservation

FAKIRA vs CSL PLASMA INC.

Case Number: 23CV057131 Case Type: Civil Unlimited Category: Other Employment Complaint Case
Date Filed: 2023-12-18 Location: Rene C. Davidson Courthouse - Department 23

Reservation

Case Name: FAKIRA vs CSL PLASMA INC.	Case Number: 23CV057131
Type: Motion re: (Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement)	Status: RESERVED
Filing Party: AMIRA FAKIRA (Plaintiff)	Location: Rene C. Davidson Courthouse - Department 23
Date/Time: 07/31/2025 10:00 AM	Number of Motions: 1
Reservation ID: 448276774788	Confirmation Code: CR-GXAZH7QXMZEWYAZHN

Fees

Description	Fee	Qty	Amount
Motion re: (name extension)	0.00	1	0.00
Court Technology Fee	1.00	1	1.00
TOTAL			\$1.00

Payment

Amount: \$1.00	Type: MasterCard
Account Number: XXXX9913	Authorization: 224116
Payment Date: n/a	

[Print Receipt](#)

[+ Reserve Another Hearing](#)

[View My Reservations](#)