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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

AMILCAR ALVARADO, and OSWALDO
CORONA, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

URS OPERATIONS, LLC, a limited liability
company; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 23STCV23711

*Assigned for all purposes to:
Hon. William F. Highberger
Dept. 10*

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND
PAGA SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: August 20, 2025

Time: 10:30 a.m.

Dept: 10

Action Filed:

September 29, 2023

Trial Date:

Not set

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 20, 2025 at 10:30 a.m., in Department 10 of the
3 Los Angeles County Superior Court, located at 312 N. Spring St. Los Angeles, CA 90012, pursuant
4 to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769, *et seq.*,
5 Plaintiffs Amilcar Alvarado and Oswaldo Corona (“Plaintiffs”) will move the Court for an Order
6 granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiffs and
7 Defendant URS Operations, LLC (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs further move the Court for an Order:


- 8 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action Settlement Agreement and Release;
9 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
10 3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
11 4. Appointing Plaintiffs Amilcar Alvarado and Oswaldo Corona as Class Representatives
12 for settlement purposes;
13 5. Appointing Plaintiffs’ Counsel, Arrash T. Fattahi, Samantha A. Smith, Lisa B. Iturriaga,
14 and Arman A. Salehi of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement
15 purposes;
16 6. Appointing CPT Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator; and
17 7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

18 The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and
19 authorities, the accompanying declarations, filed concurrently herewith, the records and files in
20 this action, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or
21 before the hearing.

22 Respectfully submitted,

23 Dated: May 27, 2025

24 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM**

25 By: 

26 Arrash T. Fattahi
27 Samantha A. Smith
28 Lisa B. Iturriaga
Arman A. Salehi

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Amilcar Alvarado and Oswaldo Corona (“Plaintiffs”) seek preliminary approval of a proposed \$400,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant URS Operations, LLC (“Defendant,” and together with Plaintiffs, the “Parties”). This motion for preliminary approval is unopposed. The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 119 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, the Monique Ngo-Bonnici, Esq., over the course of a full day of mediation. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a settlement. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiffs’ Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiffs and putative class members worked in California as non-exempt, hourly-paid employees during the class period, (Declaration of Arrash T. Fattahi in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement [“Fattahi Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods, and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert related claims for failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

1 On September 29, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint
2 against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay
3 overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest
4 periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate
5 itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; and (8) violation
6 of California’s Unfair Competition Law, California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200,
7 *et seq.* On November 22, 2023, Plaintiffs sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor &
8 Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant
9 to the PAGA. On February 6, 2024, Plaintiffs a First Amended Class and Representative
10 Complaint adding a claim for civil penalties under the PAGA. (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 4.)

11 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

12 Following the filing of the action, the Parties exchanged documents and information
13 before mediating this action. Defendant produced a 20% sampling of timekeeping and pay
14 records for the class members. Defendant also provided documents of its wage and hour policies
15 and practices during the class period, and information regarding the total number of current and
16 former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

17 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices
18 and analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate
19 the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant’s maximum monetary
20 exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding
21 the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these records
22 and utilized an expert to prepare a damages analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

23 **C. Settlement Negotiations**

24 On June 19, 2024, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced class
25 action mediator, the Monique Ngo-Bonnici, Esq. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were
26 at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. The Parties
27 went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each
28 side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not

1 been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and
2 weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a settlement, the
3 material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8, **Ex. 1** [Class Action
4 Settlement Agreement and Release].)

5 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
6 on the Parties’ informal exchange of documents and information and Class Counsel’s own
7 independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is
8 fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members in
9 light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could
10 be asserted by Defendant both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk.
11 (*Id.* at ¶ 14.)

12 Indeed, the \$400,000.00 Settlement represents approximately **97.4%** of the **realistic**
13 **maximum recovery** of \$410,762.79. (*Id.* at ¶ 23.) Although Class Counsel estimated that
14 Defendant’s maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$3 million, when the
15 risk of prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes
16 that Defendant’s realistic exposure was \$410,762.79, meaning the Settlement achieves a
17 significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 14-27.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class
18 certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 23.) Indeed, because
19 of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid
20 the risk of an unfavorable judgment. (*Id.*)

21 **D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

22 The Settlement’s key terms include:

23 1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification
24 of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “means any employees
25 who, like Plaintiffs, worked for Defendant in California at any time during the Class Period as
26 hourly paid, non-exempt employees, who do not opt out of this Settlement ” (Settlement,
27 DEFINITIONS, ¶ 11.)

28 2. Class Period: “means the period from September 29, 2019 to August 19, 2024.”

(Settlement, DEFINITIONS, ¶ 8.)

3. PAGA Period: “means the period from November 22, 2022 to August 19, 2024.”

(Settlement, DEFINITIONS, ¶ 9.)

4. Gross Settlement Amount: “means maximum settlement amount of Four Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$400,000.00) to be paid by Defendant in full satisfaction of all claims arising from the Action, which will be used to make the following payments, as those terms are defined []: a. Individual Settlement Payments; b. Class Representative Service Payments; c. Settlement Administration Costs; d. PAGA Settlement Amount []; e. Class Counsel’s Fee Payment; and f. Class Counsel’s Litigation Expenses.” (Settlement, DEFINITIONS, ¶ 15.)

5. Uncashed Checks: Any checks issued by the Settlement Administrator to Settlement Class Members will be negotiable for one-hundred eighty (180) calendar days. After one-hundred eighty (180) calendar days from the date of mailing, the checks shall become null and void, and any monies remaining in the distribution account shall be distributed to the Controller of the State of California to be held pursuant to the Unclaimed Property Law[.]” (Settlement, ADMINISTRATION OF SETTLEMENT, ¶ 62.)

6. Class Members’ Release: “Upon the Effective Date, Class Members who do not opt out of the Settlement, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release the Released Parties from (i) all claims that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the Class Period facts stated in the First Amended Class and Representative Action Complaint and ascertained in the course of the action, including without limitation any and all claims based on allegations involving: (a) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (b) failure to pay overtime wages; (c) failure to provide meal periods; (d) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (e) failure to timely pay wages at termination; (f) failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements; (g) failure to indemnify employees for costs and expenditures; and (h) all damages, interest, penalties, attorneys’ fees, and costs, and any other amounts recoverable under said causes of action, to the extent permissible, including the California Labor Code and applicable IWC Wage Order. Except as set forth in Section 29(c) of this Agreement, Class Members who do not opt out

of the Settlement do not release any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers' compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period." (Settlement, DEFINITIONS, ¶ 30(b).)

7. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$10,000.00 allocated to Plaintiffs' claims under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$7,500.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$2,500.00) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS AND RELEASE, ¶ 40.) Once the Settlement Agreement is fully executed, Plaintiffs will submit the Settlement Agreement to the LWDA. (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 9.)

8. Net Settlement Amount: "means the balance of the Gross Settlement Amount remaining after deduction of the following payments, in the amounts approved by the Court: a. Class Representative Service Payments; b. Settlement Administration Costs; c. PAGA Settlement Amount; d. Class Counsel's Fee Payment; and e. Class Counsel's Litigation Expenses." (Settlement, DEFINITIONS, ¶ 16.)

9. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be allocated as 33% wages and 67% to interest, penalties, and reimbursements. (Settlement, SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS AND RELEASE, ¶ 43.)

10. Class Representative Service Payments: Defendant agrees not to oppose Plaintiffs' request for enhancement awards to Plaintiffs of up to \$7,500.00 each. (Settlement, SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS AND RELEASE, ¶ 38.)

11. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose a fee application of up to 35% (\$140,000.00) of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$30,000.00. (Settlement, SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS AND RELEASE, ¶ 35.)

12. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys' fees, costs, and service payments or enhancement awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members will be

1 notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, ADMINISTRATION OF
2 SETTLEMENT, ¶ 52.) CPT Group, Inc., the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake
3 its best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the current addresses of class members,
4 including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated
5 addresses. (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. 2 [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

6 **III. DISCUSSION**

7 To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action
8 requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This
9 Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super.*
10 *Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached
11 through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
12 act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors
13 is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

14 In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant
15 factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely
16 duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount
17 offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the
18 experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of
19 the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168
20 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself
21 that the class settlement is within the "ballpark" of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record need
22 not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola*
23 *Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not
24 require "an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it
25 prevailed on all its claims", but instead, only an "understanding of the amount that is in controversy
26 and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation."].)

27 As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold
28 required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the

proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation

1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed and Non-Collusive Arm's-Length Negotiations

Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.) Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super. Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not to approve the settlement.”].)

The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of mediation with experienced employment mediator, the Monique Ngo-Bonnici, Esq. (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs' claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached an agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.)

Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning the claims set forth in the litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll records, Defendant's policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the

1 litigation. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Thus, Plaintiffs and their counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively
2 in negotiating the proposed Settlement.

3 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
4 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 38-48.) Again, this supports the position that the
5 terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed
6 in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this
7 action.

8 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’** 9 **Respective Legal Positions**

10 A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had he or she prevailed at
11 trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
12 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
13 and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement
14 is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no
15 bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement
16 in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

17 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation. (Fattahi
18 Decl., ¶ 25.) While Plaintiffs are confident in the merits of their claims, a legitimate controversy
19 exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 24.) Plaintiffs also recognize that proving the amount of
20 wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain
21 proposition. (*Id.*)

22 The proposed settlement of \$400,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
23 compared to Plaintiffs’ reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 14-27.) Because of the proposed
24 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
25 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
26 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
27 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$400,000.00 is well
28 within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*)

1 *Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of*
2 *approximately \$1,655.46. (Id. at ¶ 26.)* Notably, the average hourly rate for the class members is
3 \$19.57. (*Id.* at ¶ 15.)

4 **3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

5 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
6 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
7 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 38-48.)
8 Although Plaintiffs and their counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the litigation,
9 they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

10 **B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

11 The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved
12 for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the settlement and of
13 their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members who wish to object
14 to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and
15 be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice meets all the
16 requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

17 **C. The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

18 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, the Parties agreed to allocate
19 reasonable attorneys' fees in amount of \$140,000, and up to \$30,000.00 in costs. These amounts
20 are disclosed to all class members in the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

21 **1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the "Common Fund"** 22 **Method**

23 California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created
24 by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that "when a number
25 of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs
26 for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs
27 may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34,
28 quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

1 Class Counsel seeks an award of attorneys’ fees on the “percentage of recovery/common
2 fund” theory. The purpose of this approach is to “spread litigation costs proportionally among all
3 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone.” (*Vincent v.*
4 *Hughes Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995)
5 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: “[O]ne who expends attorneys’ fees in
6 winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive
7 beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs.” (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and*
8 *County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized
9 that the common fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought
10 by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share.” (*Id.* at p. 110.)

11 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
12 480 that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
13 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
14 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
15 fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized advantages of the percentage
16 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
17 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
18 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
19 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.”
20 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

21 **2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases**

22 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “[n]o general rule can be articulated on
23 what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on
24 a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
25 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
26 are not unprecedented.” (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
27 Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty
28 to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also*

1 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most
2 cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10
3 million].)

4 Here, Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees equal to 35% of the Settlement Amount, which is in
5 line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and
6 is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66,
7 n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar
8 method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].)
9 Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees as negotiated
10 by the Parties and requested herein.

11 **3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code**

12 Labor Code § 1194 (a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime
13 compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this
14 section, Plaintiffs would be permitted to recover their actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were
15 larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in
16 that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing
17 Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by
18 taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class
19 Counsel. (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 36-37.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent
20 basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the
21 Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class
22 ahead of all other concerns.

23 **4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the** 24 **Requested Fee Award**

25 As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers
26 and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Fattahi
27 Decl., ¶¶ 38-48.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class
28 actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class

counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel's requested fee award is supported here.

Class Counsel's experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement. Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

D. The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable

Where settlements negotiate a good faith amount for PAGA penalties and "there is no indication that this amount was the result of self-interest at the expense of other" class members, such amounts are generally considered reasonable. (*Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133 at *1, 9.) Courts have approved amounts for PAGA penalties in the range of zero to two percent of the total maximum amount of the Settlement. (*Id.* [approving a PAGA payment of 0.3%, or \$1,500]; *see also Jack v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.* (S.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) 2011 WL 4899942 at *6 [approving a PAGA payment of 0.25%]; *McKenzie v. Fed. Express Corp.* (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) 2012 WL 12882124 at *5 [acknowledging that courts approve PAGA claim settlements in the range of zero to two percent of the total settlement].) Here, the amount to be paid to the LWDA is larger than many other PAGA settlement amounts approved by the courts where seemingly nominal amounts were allocated for such claims. (*See, e.g., Zubia v. Shamrock Foods Co.* (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) No. CV1603128ABAGRX, 2017 WL 10541431, at *14 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.1%]; *Hopson*, 2008 WL 3385452, at *1 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.3% or \$1,500]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.* (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012) No. 1:10-CV-0324 AWI SKO, 2012 WL 5364575, at *3 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.27%].) Here, the Parties negotiated a good faith amount of \$10,000.00, 75% percent of which (\$7,500.00) will be paid to the LWDA and 25% (\$2,500.00) to be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS AND RELEASE, ¶ 38.) The \$10,000.00

1 settlement amount equates to approximately 2.5% of the Gross Settlement Amount, which far
2 exceeds amounts that are routinely approved. The Parties negotiated to allocate 2.5% of the
3 Settlement to PAGA penalties in good faith and this amount is reasonable considering that the
4 maximum PAGA penalties were estimated at \$247,100.00 (which assumed \$100 per pay period).
5 (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 22.)

6 **E. The Service Awards to Named Plaintiffs Are Reasonable**

7 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
8 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
9 members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval
10 of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which
11 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the
12 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir.
13 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

14 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they
15 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is
16 codified in California Labor Code § 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to vigorously
17 enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to
18 work under substandard unlawful conditions” Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has
19 noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is
20 widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.*
21 (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should be rewarded for
22 assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.*
23 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

24 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay Service
25 Payments in the amount of \$7,500 to each Plaintiff. (Settlement, SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS
26 AND RELEASE, ¶ 40.) This amount is also in exchange for Plaintiffs’ general release of all claims
27 against Defendant. Courts routinely approve a higher enhancement payments for plaintiffs
28 represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6,

2021) 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [“The Court concludes a \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez v. Bank of America, National Association* (N.D. Cal., Jan. 11, 2024, No. 18-CV-01202-LB) 2024 WL 150721, at *4 [“The court approves awards of \$10,000 for each class representative.”].) Class Counsel represent that Plaintiffs devoted a great deal of time and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated with counsel very frequently for litigation and to prepare for mediation, and was frequently in contact with Class Counsel during the mediation. (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 28-32.) This amount is reasonable particularly in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiffs generated for all class members. (*Id.*)

When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a 2006 study examining the average incentive award given to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the “average award per class representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Eisenberg & Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study* (2006) 53 UCLA L.Rev. 1303, 1308.) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081, while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121 and a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED

A. Legal Standard

The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the prerequisites for certification under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more

1 may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to
2 section 382: “(1) There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined
3 community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be
4 represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify
5 these requirements, the California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
6 23 to explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1)
7 predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of
8 the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart*
9 *Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.)

10 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.
11 (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a
12 means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of
13 consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to the
14 appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond, supra*,
15 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

16 **B. Plaintiffs Maintain That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for**
17 **Settlement Purposes.**

18 **1. The Class is Ascertainable and Numerous**

19 The proposed class that Plaintiffs seek to represent is easily ascertainable and includes
20 approximately 119 employees of Defendant.

21 Plaintiffs maintain that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and
22 precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business
23 records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.*
24 (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the
25 subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

26 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a
27 class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981)
28 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action

1 may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable
2 to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a class
3 action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries of a
4 trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d
5 574; *see also Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore,
6 Plaintiffs contend that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

7 **2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate**

8 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the
9 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass predominate over any
10 individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to
11 warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191
12 Cal.App.3d 605.)

13 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant
14 policies and practices for all hours worked, including overtime wages; whether Defendant had
15 legally compliant policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether
16 Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees
17 to take rest periods; whether Defendant reimbursed employees for business expenses; whether final
18 payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages, including meal and rest period
19 premium wages; and whether the wage statements were consequently non-compliant. Plaintiffs
20 contend that the factual and legal issues are the same for all of the identified class members,
21 including Plaintiffs. Further, all class members suffered from, and seek redress for, the same
22 alleged injuries.

23 **3. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

24 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances
25 of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the
26 typicality of the proposed representative’s claims as they relate to the defendant’s conduct and
27 activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 [“[t]he only requirements are that
28 common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly

1 situated” vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class if they
2 arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal
3 theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendant; as
4 such, they allege that they were subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated
5 employees.

6 **4. Plaintiffs and Their Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

7 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a
8 named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second,
9 a named plaintiff’s interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of*
10 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

11 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiffs retained counsel
12 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that
13 previously settled. (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 38-48.) Class Counsel unquestionably is “qualified,
14 experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.” (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148
15 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiffs have no conflicts, and Plaintiffs have, with counsel,
16 litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing their dedication.
17 Plaintiffs’ willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates their serious commitment to
18 bringing about the best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

19 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

20 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class
21 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.
22 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court’s use of the
23 class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of
24 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly
25 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a
26 practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to
27 prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 457-62; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.* (9th
28 Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the superiority concerns are

essentially non-existent.

V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND

A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process

Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.766 (e), (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter, the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class Members . . .” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative

The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the terms of the Settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a combined settlement-certification class notice.

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
1 **VI. CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant preliminary
3 approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing.

4
5 Respectfully submitted,

6 Dated: May 27, 2025

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

7
8 By: 

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PROOF OF SERVICE

Alvarado, et al. v. URS Operations, LLC, et al.
23STCV23711

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I, Ashley Narinyans, state that I am employed in the aforesaid County, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is ashley.narinyans@wilshirelawfirm.com.

On May 27, 2025, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

Gabrielle Wirth (SBN 106492)
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Attorneys for Defendant

(X) **BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE:** Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept electronic service, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic service addresses listed above via third-party cloud service **CASEANYWHERE**.

(X) **BY UPLOAD:** I hereby certify that the documents were uploaded by my office to the State of California Labor & Workforce Development Agency Online Filing Site.

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on May 27, 2025, at Los Angeles, California.



Ashley Narinyans