

John G. Yslas (SBN 187324)
john.yslas@wilshirelawfirm.com
Diego Aviles (SBN 315533)
diego.aviles@wilshirelawfirm.com
Harry Erganyan (SBN 333091)
harry.erganyan@wilshirelawfirm.com
Mariam Nazaretyan (SBN 334154)
mariam.nazaretyan@wilshirelawfirm.com
Emily K. Borman (SBN 303180)
emily.borman@wilshirelawfirm.com
Courtney M. Miller (SBN 327850)
courtney.miller@wilshirelawfirm.com
WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC
660 S. Figueroa Street, Sky Lobby
Los Angeles, California 90017
Telephone: (213) 381-9988
Facsimile: (213) 381-9989

Attorneys for Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE

ALBERTO ACOSTA, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROXFORD PRODUCE INTERNATIONAL,
LLC DBA VALLARTA SUPERMARKETS, a
California limited liability company; and DOES
1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 23STCV28669

[Related Case No. 24STCV01103]

*[Assigned for All Purposes to the Hon. Laura
A. Seigle, Dept. 17]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND
PAGA SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

Preliminary Approval Hearing:

Date: May 14, 2026

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Dept: 17

Action Filed: November 21, 2023

1 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

2 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on May 14, 2026, at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as
3 the matter may be heard in Department 17 of the Superior Court of California, County of Los
4 Angeles, Spring Street Courthouse, located at 312 N. Spring Street, Los Angeles, California
5 90012, Plaintiff Alberto Acosta (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) will and hereby does move this Court
6 for an Order:

- 7 1. Granting preliminary approval of the proposed Class Action and PAGA Settlement
8 Agreement (“Settlement”);
- 9 2. Conditionally certifying the proposed Class for settlement purposes only;
- 10 3. Appointing Plaintiff Alberto Acosta as the Class Representative;
- 11 4. Appointing John G. Yslas, Diego Aviles, Harry Erganyan, Mariam Nazaretyan,
12 Emily K. Borman, and Courtney M. Miller of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class
13 Counsel;
- 14 5. Appointing Apex Class Action as the Settlement Administrator;
- 15 6. Setting a final approval hearing date.

16 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.769(d) and (e), this Motion is made on the
17 grounds that the proposed Settlement satisfies all criteria for preliminary approval and falls well
18 within the range of reasonableness. The Settlement was reached through informed, arm’s length
19 bargaining between experienced attorneys with the assistance of an experienced neutral, and
20 Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Class.

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This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of John G. Yslas, the Declaration of Alberto Acosta, the Declaration of Sean Hartranft, and on all records and documents on file, together with such oral and documentary evidence that may be presented at the hearing on this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: April 14, 2026

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: /s/ Courtney M. Miller
Courtney M. Miller
Attorneys for Plaintiff

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.769(d) and (e), Plaintiff Alberto Acosta (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of a class action settlement of wage and hour claims, including representative claims brought under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”), against Defendant Roxford Produce International, LLC (hereinafter “Defendant”). The proposed Class is defined as all current and former hourly, non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in California (“Class Members”) at any time from May 27, 2019, through September 7, 2025 (“Class Period”).¹ The main terms of the Settlement are as follows:

1. A Gross Settlement Amount of \$512,220.00, which will be distributed to approximately 409 Class Members on a pro rata basis according to the total Workweeks worked by each Class Member during the Class Period;
2. Attorneys’ fees of up to one third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently estimated to be \$170,740.00) and up to \$30,000.00 in reimbursement of litigation costs to Plaintiff’s Counsel;
3. A Class Representative Service Payment of up to \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff;
4. Costs of settlement administration of up to \$8,590.00; and
5. Allocation of \$25,000.00 to PAGA penalties, seventy-five percent (75%) of which (\$18,750.00) will be paid to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”), and twenty-five percent (25%) of which (\$6,250.00) will be paid to all current and former hourly, non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in California (“Aggrieved Employees”) at any time during the period from November

¹ The escalator clause of the Settlement Agreement provides Defendant an option to shorten the Class Period and PAGA Period in the event the escalator was triggered. Settlement Agreement at § 8. Before filing this Motion, Plaintiff requested that Defendant confirm whether the escalator clause is triggered and if so, to advise as to Defendant’s election. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 38. Despite Plaintiff making this inquiry over one (1) week ago and sending two (2) follow-ups, Plaintiff is still awaiting Defendant’s reply. *Id.*

12, 2022, through September 7, 2025 (“PAGA Period”).²

The Settlement meets all criteria for preliminary approval and falls within the range of reasonableness given the risks and expenses of further litigation. The Settlement was reached through informed, arm’s length bargaining between experienced attorneys with the assistance of an experienced neutral. As such, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant preliminary approval of the Settlement, conditionally certify the Class for settlement purposes only, appoint Plaintiff as the Class Representative, appoint Plaintiff’s Counsel as Class Counsel, appoint Apex Class Action as the Administrator, authorize the Administrator to administer notice of the Settlement to the Class, and set a final approval hearing date.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 9, 2023, Plaintiff provided written notice to the LWDA and Defendant of the specific provisions the Labor Code alleged to have been violated, including the facts and theories in support. Declaration of John G. Yslas in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement (“MPA”) (“Yslas Decl.”) at ¶ 3, Exhibit 1. The LWDA did not notify Plaintiff that it intended to investigate within 65 days of this written notice. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 3.

On November 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed this putative class action against Defendant alleging: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; (8) failure to produce requested employment records; and (9) unfair business practices (“Class Action”). Yslas Decl. at ¶ 4. On January 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a separate representative action against Defendant for civil penalties under PAGA in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. 24STCV01103 (“PAGA Action”). *Id.* On August 12, 2024, the Court deemed the Class Action and PAGA Action related within the meaning of the California Rules of Court and designated the Class Action as the lead case. *Id.*

² See Footnote 1.

On November 5, 2024, the Court denied Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff’s Individual Claims and to Dismiss Class Claims in the Class Action and denied Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff’s Individual Claim and Stay Representative PAGA Action in the PAGA Action. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 5. On January 21, 2025, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court’s ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff’s Individual Claims and to Dismiss Class Claims in the Class Action, Second Appellate District Case No. B343475 (“Class Appeal”). *Id.* On January 22, 2025, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court’s ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff’s Individual Claim and Stay Representative PAGA Action in the PAGA Action, Second Appellate District Case No. B343490 (“PAGA Appeal”). *Id.*

On July 7, 2025, the Parties participated in a private full-day mediation with mediator, Michael D. Young. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 6. The negotiations were adversarial, conducted at arm’s length, and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interests of their clients. *Id.* The Parties subsequently accepted the mediator’s proposal and agreed upon general settlement terms. *Id.* The Parties memorialized their agreement in a Memorandum of Understanding in November 2025. *Id.*

On January 7, 2026, the Court granted the Parties request to stay the PAGA Appeal. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 7. On February 24, 2026, the Court granted the Parties request to stay the Class Appeal. *Id.*

In March 2026, the Parties fully executed the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 8, Exhibit 2 (“Settlement Agreement”). On April 14, 2026, Plaintiff submitted a copy of the Settlement Agreement to the LWDA. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 8, Exhibit 4.

III. SUMMARY OF THE SETTLEMENT TERMS

A. Terms of the Proposed Settlement

The parties have agreed to settle the claims alleged in this Class Action and PAGA Action for a Gross Settlement Amount of \$512,220.00. Settlement Agreement at § 3.1. Subject to Court approval, the following payments will be deducted from the Gross Settlement Amount: (1) a Class Representative Service Payment of up to \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff; (2) attorneys’ fees of up to one

1 third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently estimated to be \$170,740.00) and
2 reimbursement of litigation costs of up to \$30,000.00 to Plaintiff's Counsel; (3) costs of settlement
3 administration of up to \$8,590.00 to Apex Class Action; (4) individual class payments to Class
4 Members; and (5) PAGA penalties in the amount of \$25,000.00, which will be allocated 75% to
5 the LWDA (\$18,750.00) and 25% to Aggrieved Employees (\$6,250.00). *Id.* at § 3.2. After all
6 requested deductions are made, the remaining Net Settlement Amount is currently estimated to be
7 \$267,890.00. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 21; Declaration of Sean Hartranft of Apex Class Action in Support
8 of Plaintiff's MPA ("Hartranft Decl.") at ¶ 7, Exhibit B.

9 Individual class payments will be calculated based on the number of workweeks worked
10 by each Class Member during the Class Period. Settlement Agreement at § 3.3.3. For tax purposes,
11 the individual class payments will be allocated 10% to wages and 90% to interest, reimbursement,
12 and penalties. *Id.* at § 3.3.3.1. Defendant will separately pay any and all employer payroll taxes
13 owed on the wage positions of the individual class payments separate from the Gross Settlement
14 Amount. *Id.* at 3.1.

15 Individual PAGA Payments to Aggrieved Employees will be calculated based on the
16 number of PAGA Pay Periods worked by each Aggrieved Employee during the PAGA Period. *Id.*
17 at § 3.3.4.1. For tax purposes, the Individual PAGA Payments will be allocated 100% to penalties.
18 *Id.* at § 3.3.4.2.

19 Any deductions not approved by the Court will be retained by the Settlement Administrator
20 in the Net Settlement Amount. *Id.* at §§ 3.3, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.4.2. Funds from any uncashed checks
21 shall be transmitted to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the
22 Class Member thereby leaving no "unpaid residue." *Id.* at § 4.4.3. None of the Gross Settlement
23 Amount will revert to Defendant. *Id.* at § 3.1.

24 **B. Proposed Settlement Administration**

25 The parties' proposed Class Notice complies with the requirements of California Rules of
26 Court, rule 3.766(d). *See* Exhibit A to Settlement Agreement. It provides information regarding
27 the nature of this lawsuit, a summary of the settlement terms, the formula used for calculating
28 individual class and PAGA payments and instructions to dispute the calculations, instructions on

1 how to opt-out of or object to the Settlement, the date, time, and location of the final approval
2 hearing, and the amounts sought for the class representative service payment, attorneys' fees and
3 litigation costs, and settlement administration costs. *See generally, id.* The Class Notice also
4 notifies Class Members that they do not need to submit a claim to participate in the Settlement and
5 receive a payment. *See id.* The Settlement Administrator will mail Class Members the Class Notice
6 by first-class mail with a Spanish translation. Settlement Agreement at § 7.4.2.

7 If a Class Notice is returned as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator will re-mail the
8 Class Notice within five (5) days to the forwarding address provided by the U.S. Postal Service.
9 *Id.* at § 7.4.3. If no forwarding address is provided, the Settlement Administrator will conduct a
10 Class Member Address Search and re-mail the Class Notice to the most current address obtained.
11 *Id.* The deadline to opt-out of the Settlement or to submit an objection or dispute will be extended
12 by 14 days for all Class Members whose Class Notice was remailed. *Id.* at § 7.4.4.

13 **C. Proposed Releases**

14 Effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the Gross Settlement Amount and all
15 employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments, Plaintiff,
16 Class Members, Class Counsel, and Aggrieved Employees will release claims against all Released
17 Parties as follows:

18 Released Class Claims:

19 Plaintiff and all Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves, their heirs,
20 executors, administrators, attorneys, agents, and assigns, will fully and finally release and
21 discharge Released Parties from all state, federal, or local claims, rights, demands,
22 liabilities, damages, penalties, and causes of action, arising from and/or relating to any of
23 the claims alleged in any of the Actions or that could have been alleged based on any of the
24 facts alleged in any of the Actions, including but not limited to: (1) failure to pay minimum
25 and straight time wages (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, 1197 and
26 1197.1); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 510, 1194, and
27 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512);
28 (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.7); (5)
failure to timely pay final wages at termination (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 201-203);
(6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§
226); (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§
2802); (8) failure to produce requested employment records (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code
§§ 226, 432, and 1198.5); and (9) unfair business practices (pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code §§ 17200, *et seq.*), violations of Labor Code Sections 201-204, 218.5, 218.6, 226,
226.7, 227.3, 246, 510, 512, 1174, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1198, 1198.5, 2102, 2103, 2800,
2802, Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5, and applicable Industrial Welfare
Commission Wage Orders, that accrued or existed during the Class Period.

Settlement Agreement at § 5.2.

Released PAGA Claims:

Plaintiff and all Aggrieved Employees, on behalf of themselves, the LWDA, and the State of California will fully and finally release and discharge Released Parties from all claims, rights, demands, liabilities, and causes of action for PAGA civil penalties, arising from and/or relating to any of the claims alleged in any of the Actions or any LWDA notices related to any of the Actions, or that could have been alleged based on any of the facts alleged in any of the Actions or any LWDA notices related to any of the Actions, including but not limited to: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 204, 210, 510, 1194, 1194.2, 1197 and 1197.1); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 510, 1194 and 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 210, 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 210 and 226.7); (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 201 – 203 and 213(d)); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 226 and 226.3); (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code § 2802); (8) failure to produce requested employment records (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 226, 432, and 1198.5); (9) failure to pay all earned wages timely during employment and unlawfully withholding accrued wages (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 204, 210 and 216); (10) failure to maintain accurate records of hours worked and meal periods (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 1174, and 1174.5); (11) recordkeeping requirement violations (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.6, 558.1, 1174, 1174.5, 1198 and 1199); (12) retaliation (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5); and (13) civil penalties for wage and hour violations (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code § 558), violations of Labor Code Sections 201-204, 218.5, 218.6, 226, 226.7, 227.3, 246, 510, 512, 1174, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1198, 1198.5, 2800, and 2802, and applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders, that accrued or existed during the PAGA Period.

Settlement Agreement at § 5.3.

“Released Parties” means “(a) Defendant, and any of its predecessors, successors, or assigns; and (b) each of the respective past, present, or future employees, officers, directors, affiliates, partners, joint venturers, co-venturers, principals, members, managers, managing agents, agents, shareholders, insurers, reinsurers, accountants, attorneys, investment bankers, trusts, trustees, licensors, licensees, payroll companies, staffing agencies, clients, vendors, consultants, partners, independent contractors, representatives, administrators, fiduciaries, heirs, subrogees, and executors of any entities identified in subparagraph (a) herein in his, her, their, or its capacity as such.” Settlement Agreement at § 1.42.

Only Plaintiff will agree to a general release and a waiver of Civil Code § 1542. *Id.* at §§ 5.1, 5.1.1.

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1 **IV. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT MEETS ALL CRITERIA FOR**
2 **PRELIMINARY APPROVAL**

3 **A. Provisional Certification of the Class is Appropriate**

4 Class certification is appropriate when there is: (1) an ascertainable and sufficiently
5 numerous class; (2) a well-defined community of interest among class members; and (3) substantial
6 benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives. *Brinker*
7 *Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021 (2012). Although courts still need to
8 review and consider each element for certification, a lesser standard can be used to provisionally
9 certify a settlement class. *Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court*, 113 Cal.App.4th
10 836, 859 (2003).

11 **1. The Proposed Class is Numerous and Ascertainable**

12 “Ascertainability” is determined by examining the class definition and the size of the class,
13 and may also involve examining the means available to identify class members. *Noel v. Thrifty*
14 *Payless, Inc.*, 7 Cal.5th 955, 980-981, 985-986 (2019). As the settlement eliminates the need for
15 trial, “the case management issues inherent in the ascertainable class determination need not be
16 confronted.” *Global Minerals*, 113 Cal.App.4th at 859. Further, under California law, there is no
17 minimum number of class members for maintenance of a class action. *Hendershot v. Ready to Roll*
18 *Transp., Inc.*, 228 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1222 (2014). Class sizes as small as 10 have been permitted.
19 *Rose v. City of Hayward*, 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934 (1981), disapproved on other grounds by *Noel*,
20 7 Cal.5th at 986.

21 The Class here consists of all current and former hourly non-exempt employees who
22 worked for Defendant in California at any time during the Class Period. *See* Settlement Agreement
23 at § 1.5. The Class is also readily ascertainable from Defendant’s business records, because all
24 Class Members are or were employees of Defendant. *Id.* Defendant’s records show there are
25 approximately 409 Class Members, making joinder of all Class Members impracticable. Yslas
26 Decl. at ¶ 10.

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2. A Well-Defined Community of Interest Exists

The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. *Brinker*, 53 Cal.4th at 1021.

a. Common Questions Predominate

In determining whether common issues “predominate,” courts consider both plaintiff’s legal theories and defendant’s affirmative defenses. *Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n*, 59 Cal.4th 1, 28-29 (2014). The “predominate common questions” factor does not require that all class members have identical claims. *Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc.*, 59 Cal.4th 522, 530 (2014). Rather, the focus is on whether issues shared by the class members are sufficiently uniform to permit class-wide assessment, and whether individual variations in proof on those issues are manageable. *Id.*

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant maintained common employment policies and/or practices that unlawfully deprived Class Members of wages, meal periods, rest periods, reimbursement for business expenses, accurate wage statements, timely payment of wages upon separation of employment, and timely production of employment records. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 11. These allegations present common factual and legal questions of, *inter alia*, whether Defendant applied the same scheduling, timekeeping, pay, meal period, rest period, reimbursement, and employment record production policies to all Class Members, whether these policies and practices resulted in Labor Code violations, whether Defendant’s conduct was intentional, and whether Class Members are entitled to damages and/or penalties. *Id.* These common questions could be resolved using Class Members’ time records, payroll records, testimony from Defendant’s designated representative(s), and Class Members’ testimony. *Id.* Therefore, the Court can and should exercise its discretion to grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes.

b. Plaintiff is Typical of the Class

Typicality does not require that the representative plaintiff’s claims and those of the class members be identical or perfectly aligned. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 228 (2001), disapproved on other grounds by *Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.*, 4 Cal.5th

260, 269-280 (2018). Typicality does not require that a plaintiff's claims be identical to those of other class members, only that their claims and the defenses applicable to them are sufficiently similar to those of other class members that a named plaintiff is able to adequately represent the class and focus on common issues. *Medrazo v. Honda of North Hollywood*, 166 Cal.App.4th 89, 99 (2008).

Plaintiff has alleged that he and Class Members were employed by the same Defendant and injured by Defendant's common wage and hour policies and practices, including Defendant's scheduling, timekeeping, pay, meal period, rest period, reimbursement, and employment record production policies. *See* Yslas Decl. at ¶ 11. Through informal discovery, Plaintiff confirmed that these challenged policies and practices applied to Plaintiff and Class Members alike. *See id.* at ¶ 9. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims and Class Members' claims arise from the same challenged employment policies and practices and are based on the same legal theories.

c. Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Class

Certification requires adequacy of both the proposed class representative and of the proposed class counsel. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 382. "Only a conflict that goes to the very subject matter of the litigation will defeat a party's claim of representative status." *Richmond v. Dart Industries*, 29 Cal.3d 462, 470 (1981). Only conflicts that are "irreconcilable" can defeat adequacy. *Nat'l Solar Equip. Owners' Ass'n v. Grumman Corp.*, 235 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1286 (1991). The proposed representative Plaintiff and proposed Class Counsel present no such conflict.

Plaintiff's interests are coextensive with Class Members' interests. Declaration of Alberto Acosta in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement ("Acosta Decl.") at ¶ 6. Plaintiff has demonstrated an ability to advocate for the interests of Class Members by initiating this lawsuit, providing information to his attorneys, meeting with his attorneys regarding the claims, making himself available the day of mediation to answer questions, and reviewing the proposed Settlement. Acosta Decl. at ¶ 11.

Likewise, Wilshire Law Firm, PLC has expended considerable time and effort on this case and will continue to do so through final approval. *See generally*, Yslas Decl. Therefore, Plaintiff

1 should be appointed Class Representative, and his counsel should be appointed Class Counsel.

2 **3. A Class Action is Superior to a Multitude of Individual Lawsuits**

3 Courts have held that class treatment of wage and hour claims is clearly “superior to the
4 other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” *Dean Witter*
5 *Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 211 Cal.App.3d 758, 772-773 (1989). This is so because “[p]ublic
6 policy has long favored the ‘full and prompt payment of wages due an employee.’” *Sav-On Drug*
7 *Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.4th 319, 340 (2004). Here, a class action is superior to a
8 multitude of individual lawsuits. Given the size and amount of each Class Members’ claim, Class
9 Members have little incentive to litigate their claims on an individual basis because the out-of-
10 pocket expenses and personal commitment necessary to litigate each claim likely outweigh any
11 potential recovery. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 10. Therefore, a class action is the superior method for seeking
12 relief.

13 **B. The Settlement Meets the Standards for Preliminary Approval**

14 The moving party must demonstrate that “the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable.”
15 *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 126 (2008). “In determining whether a
16 class settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors,
17 such as the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further
18 litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement,
19 the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of
20 counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the
21 proposed settlement.” *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 244-245 (internal quotations and citations
22 omitted).

23 **1. The Settlement is Entitled to a Presumption of Fairness**

24 A settlement is entitled to “a presumption of fairness . . . where: (1) the settlement is reached
25 through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel
26 and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the
27 percentage of objectors is small.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996).
28 The Settlement here satisfies the first three factors. Plaintiff will analyze the fourth factor at final

1 approval after Class Members have been notified of the Settlement and provided with an
2 opportunity to object.

3 **a. The Settlement is the Result of Arm's Length Negotiation**

4 Courts have recognized that the involvement of a respected mediator provides a high degree
5 of assurance that the settlement is the result of arm's length bargaining. *See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*,
6 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 52-53 (2008). The Settlement in this matter was the product of a full-day
7 mediation session with a respected mediator. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 6. The negotiations were adversarial,
8 conducted at arm's length, and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interests of their
9 clients. *Id.*

10 **b. Sufficient Investigation and Discovery Have Been Conducted**

11 Prior to attending mediation, Plaintiff's Counsel thoroughly investigated the claims,
12 applicable law, and potential defenses. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 9. Plaintiff's Counsel assessed the value of
13 the class claims using the data and documents Defendant produced in informal discovery. *Id.* The
14 data and documents produced by Defendant included the number of Class Members and Aggrieved
15 Employees, the number of workweeks in the Class Period, and the number of pay periods in the
16 PAGA Period, the average rate of pay, Plaintiff's personnel file, Defendant's written wage-and-
17 hour policies, and a 50% sampling of Class Members' time and payroll records spanning
18 approximately six (6) years. *Id.* Plaintiff's Counsel engaged an expert to quantify the potential
19 exposure using the time and payroll records, and then assessed the risks associated with each claim
20 meriting reductions in the likely success at class certification and likely recovery at trial. *Id.*

21 **c. Plaintiff's Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation**

22 Plaintiff is represented by Wilshire Law Firm, PLC. *Id.* at ¶ 1. Plaintiff's Counsel has
23 extensive experience litigating wage-and-hour class actions on behalf of employees. *See id.* at
24 ¶¶ 22-35. Plaintiff's Counsel has been involved as counsel in numerous class actions that have
25 resulted in millions of dollars in recovery. *See id.*

26 ///

27 ///

28 ///

1 **2. The Settlement is Reasonable Given the Strengths of Plaintiff's**
2 **Claims and the Risks and Expense of Further Litigation**

3 A settlement does not have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be considered fair
4 and reasonable. *See Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1139 (1991). Although
5 the exposure Plaintiff's Counsel calculated is substantial, the various risks at succeeding at class
6 certification and through trial affected the valuation of the claims for settlement purposes. Yslas
7 Decl. at ¶ 12. Based on an analysis of the facts and legal contentions in this case, documents and
8 information from Defendant, Plaintiff's Counsel evaluated Defendant's maximum exposure. *Id.*
9 Plaintiff's Counsel took into account the risk of not having the claims certified and the risk of not
10 having prevailed at trial, even if the claims are certified. *Id.* After using the data Defendant
11 provided, including class member timekeeping and payroll records, as well as class member
12 demographics, with the assistance of a statistics expert, Plaintiff's Counsel created a damages
13 model to evaluate the realistic range of potential recovery for the class. *Id.*

14 Minimum and Overtime Wages: Plaintiffs' unpaid minimum and overtime wage claims
15 were based on the allegation that Defendant required Class Members to perform work duties while
16 off the clock, without compensation. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 13. For example, Plaintiff alleged that
17 Defendant required him and other Class Members to line up and wait in line to clock in for every
18 shift, without compensation. *Id.* Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs' Counsel conservatively
19 estimated that Class Members worked one (1) hour off the clock per week in calculating potential
20 exposure for these claims to be approximately \$782,159.94 (25,611 workweeks x \$20.36 average
21 hourly rate of pay x 1.00 hour/workweek x 1.5 overtime rate of pay). *Id.* Because this claim would
22 have relied heavily on Class Member testimony and would not be evidenced in Defendant's time
23 and payroll records, the risk of succeeding at class certification was substantial. *Id.* Accordingly,
24 Plaintiffs' Counsel applied a risk discount based on a 40% chance of succeeding at class
25 certification and a 40% chance of succeeding at trial on the merits, yielding a realistic damage
26 estimate of approximately \$125,145.59 (\$782,159.94 x 40% x 40%). *Id.*

27 Meal Periods: Plaintiff's meal period claim was based on the allegation that Defendant
28 failed to provide Class Members with legally compliant meal periods or pay meal period premiums

1 in lieu thereof. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 14. Plaintiff's Counsel's expert found a facial violation rate of
2 approximately 8.3% in Defendant's time and payroll records for shifts greater than five (5) hours.
3 *Id.* Therefore, potential liability for the meal period claims is approximately \$191,620.56 (113,393
4 shifts greater than 5 hours x \$20.36 hourly rate x 8.3% violation rate). *Id.* However, Defendant
5 argued that Class Members were covered by meal period waivers. *Id.* Accordingly, Plaintiff's
6 Counsel applied a risk discount based on a 50% chance of succeeding at class certification and a
7 40% chance of succeeding at trial on the merits, yielding a realistic damage estimate of
8 approximately \$38,324.11 (\$191,620.56 x 50% x 40%). *Id.*

9 Rest Periods: Plaintiff's rest period claim was based on the allegation that Defendant failed
10 to provide Class Members with legally compliant rest periods or pay rest period premiums in lieu
11 thereof. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 15. For example, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to provide him
12 and other Class Members with timely uninterrupted rest periods of at least 10 minutes due to heavy
13 workloads and quotas imposed on them by Defendant and constant monitoring by Defendant of
14 their productivity. *Id.* Based on these allegations, Plaintiff's Counsel applied a 100% violation rate
15 to all shifts of 3.5 hours or longer. *Id.* Therefore, potential liability for the rest period claims is
16 approximately \$2,352,577.64 (115,549 shifts of 3.5 hours or longer x \$20.36 hourly rate x 100%
17 violation rate). *Id.* However, Plaintiff's Counsel discounted this figure to account for the difficulty
18 of certifying and proving rest period claims, particularly because rest periods do not have to be
19 recorded, and to account for the possibility of Class Members voluntarily choosing to forego a rest
20 period. *Id.* Because this claim would have relied exclusively on Class Member testimony,
21 Plaintiff's Counsel discounted this claim based on a 30% chance of succeeding at class certification
22 and a 20% chance of succeeding at trial, yielding a realistic damage estimate of approximately
23 \$141,154.66 (\$2,352,577.64 x 30% x 20%). *Id.*

24 Reimbursements: Plaintiff's reimbursement claim was based on the allegation that
25 Defendant failed to indemnify Class Members for expenses incurred as a direct result of performing
26 their job duties for Defendant. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 16. For example, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant
27 required him and other Class Members to launder their mandatory work uniforms to purchase
28 mandatory gear to work at Defendant's warehouse, such as steel toe boots. *Id.* For purposes of

1 calculating Defendant's liability based on a best-case scenario for Plaintiff and the Class,
2 Plaintiff's Counsel estimated that Defendant was liable to each class member for \$30 per month,
3 or \$7.50 per workweek, in unreimbursed expenses, for a total amount of approximately
4 \$192,082.50 ($\$7.50 \times 25,611$ workweeks). *Id.* Plaintiff's Counsel discounted this figure based on
5 an evaluation of a 30% chance of succeeding at class certification and a 30% chance of succeeding
6 at trial to account for the difficulty of certifying and proving expense reimbursement claims,
7 yielding a realistic damage estimate of approximately \$17,287.43 ($\$192,082.50 \times 30\% \times 30\%$). *Id.*

8 In sum, Plaintiff's Counsel estimated that Plaintiff's maximum recovery for the off-the-
9 clock claim, meal period violations, and rest period violations (i.e., the wage claims) is
10 approximately \$3.3 million, but after factoring in the risk and uncertainty of certification and
11 prevailing at trial, Plaintiff's Counsel estimates that Plaintiff's realistic estimated recovery for
12 these non-penalty wage claims is approximately \$304,624.36. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 17.

13 Derivative Penalties: Plaintiff alleged that as a result of Defendant's failure to pay all wages
14 owed, Defendant owed waiting time penalties and wage statement penalties. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 18.
15 With respect to Plaintiff's derivative claims for statutory penalties, Plaintiff's Counsel estimated
16 that Defendant's realistic potential liability is approximately \$106,467.01. *Id.* Defendant's
17 maximum potential liability for waiting time penalties is approximately \$1,030,450.14 ($[207$
18 $\text{employees} \times \$20.36 \text{ hourly rate} \times 8.00 \text{ hours/day} \times 30 \text{ days}] + [207 \text{ employees} \times \20.36 hourly
19 $\text{rate} \times 0.10 \text{ hours of overtime/day} \times 1.5 \text{ overtime rate} \times 30 \text{ days}]$) based on approximately 207
20 formerly employed class members during the 3-year statute of limitations period and an average
21 shift length of 8.10 hours. *Id.* Defendant's maximum potential liability for inaccurate wage
22 statements is approximately \$744,000.00 ($186 \text{ employees} \times \$4,000.00 \text{ statutory maximum}$) based
23 on approximately 186 class members who worked during the 1-year statute of limitations period
24 and approximately 11,410 pay periods in that statutory timeframe. *Id.* In light of the foregoing,
25 Plaintiff's Counsel believes that it would be unrealistic to expect the Court to award the full
26 \$1,774,450.14 in statutory penalties given Defendant's defenses, the contested nature of Plaintiff's
27 claims, the challenges of establishing willfulness as applicable, and the discretionary nature of
28 penalties. *Id.* Considering that the underlying wage claims are realistically estimated to be

1 approximately \$304,624.36, such a disproportionate award would also raise due process concerns.
2 *Id.* As such, Plaintiff's counsel discounted these figures to account for the risk and uncertainty of
3 obtaining class certification and prevailing at trial, resulting in a realistic evaluation of
4 approximately \$61,827.01 for waiting time penalty claims ($\$1,030,450.14 \times 30\% \times 20\%$), and
5 approximately \$44,640.00 for wage statement penalty claims ($\$744,000.00 \times 30\% \times 20\%$), or
6 approximately \$106,467.01 total for statutory penalties. *Id.*

7 PAGA: For the PAGA claim, Plaintiff's Counsel determined that Defendant's potential
8 exposure could potentially reach \$1,151,700.00, assuming the initial \$100 penalty would apply for
9 each of the 11,517 pay periods in the PAGA Period. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 19. However, even assuming
10 success on the merits of each claim, PAGA gives the Court discretion to reduce penalties for a
11 variety of reasons, including where to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary
12 and oppressive, or confiscatory. *Id.* As such, Plaintiff's counsel discounted this figure to account
13 for the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at trial, resulting in a realistic evaluation of approximately
14 \$115,170.00 for PAGA penalties ($\$1,151,700.00 \times 10\%$). *Id.* The settlement allocates \$25,000.00
15 of the Gross Settlement Amount to PAGA, therefore the PAGA allocation amounts to nearly 5%
16 of the Gross Settlement Amount and approximately 22% of the realistic maximum damages for
17 PAGA penalties ($\$25,000.00 / \$115,170.00$). *Id.*

18 Using these estimated figures, Plaintiff's Counsel predicted that the realistic maximum
19 recovery for all claims, including penalties, would be approximately \$543,548.80. Yslas Decl. at
20 ¶ 20. This means that the gross settlement figure represents approximately 94% of the realistic
21 maximum recovery ($\$512,220.00 / \$543,548.80$). *Id.* Considering the risk and uncertainty of
22 prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. *Id.* Indeed,
23 because of the proposed Settlement, Class Members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will
24 avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. *Id.*

25 Based on the figures in the Settlement Agreement, the Net Settlement Amount available for
26 class settlement payments is currently estimated to be \$267,890.00 for approximately 409 Class
27 Members. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 21. As a result, each Settlement Class Member would be eligible to
28 receive an average net benefit of approximately \$654.99. *Id.* Based on the estimated Net Settlement

1 Amount available for individual class payments and there being approximately 25,611 workweeks
2 in the Class Period, the estimated weekly valuation for individual class payments is \$10.46
3 (\$267,890.00 / 25,611 workweeks). *Id.*

4 **C. The Requested Service Payment is Reasonable**

5 Plaintiff seeks a class representative service payment of up to \$10,000.00 for accepting the
6 responsibilities of representing the interests of the Class and potential costs that were not borne by
7 any other Class Members. Settlement Agreement at § 3.3. A named plaintiff is eligible for payment
8 that reasonably compensates him or her for undertaking and fulfilling a fiduciary duty to represent
9 absent class members. *See Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1393 (2010);
10 *Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 115 Cal.App.4th 715, 726 (2004).

11 Throughout this case, Plaintiff assisted counsel in providing information necessary to
12 prosecute the claims, meeting with counsel regarding the claims, maintaining regular contact with
13 counsel, making himself available the day of mediation to answer questions, and reviewing the
14 Settlement to ensure it was fair to the Class. Acosta Decl. at ¶ 11. No action would likely have
15 been taken by Class Members individually and no compensation would have been recovered for
16 them, but for Plaintiff's services on behalf of the Class. By actively pursuing this action, Plaintiff
17 furthered the California public policy goal of enforcing the State's wage and hour laws. *See Sav-*
18 *On*, 34 Cal.4th at 340. The requested class representative service payment is reasonable and should
19 be preliminarily approved. Plaintiff has provided a declaration regarding his work performed to
20 date and will provide additional information as requested or required by the Court at final approval.

21 **D. The Requested Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

22 The purpose of an attorneys' fee award in class action litigation is to reward counsel who
23 invested in a case despite the risk of non-payment and achieved a substantial positive result for the
24 class. California courts routinely award attorneys' fees equaling one third or more of the potential
25 value of the common fund. *See Chavez*, 162 Cal.App.4th at 66, fn. 11 ("Empirical studies show
26 that, regardless of whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in
27 class actions average around one-third of the recovery.").

28 Additionally, courts utilize "multipliers" to account for the risk of taking on cases where

1 there is no guarantee of recovery, uncertainties as the amount that will be recovered, uncertainty
2 as to the cost of litigating the case (both in effort and expenses), and uncertainty about how much
3 time will pass before the recovery is obtained. *Ketchum v. Moses*, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33 (2001);
4 *see also Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 48-49 (1977) (approving the adjustment of the lodestar
5 figure based on factors specific to the case to ensure fair market value for legal services provided
6 on a contingency basis). Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is
7 brought to redress important rights of vulnerable persons. *Ketchum*, 24 Cal.4th at 1133.

8 Generally, “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” *Wershba v. Apple*
9 *Computers, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255 (2001); *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases*,
10 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (2009) (applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class
11 action); *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 60 (2008) (applying a 2.5 multiplier on a
12 lodestar cross-check); *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002)
13 (“most” common fund cases apply a multiplier of 1.0-4.0); *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l*, 231
14 Cal.App.4th 860, 881-82 (2004) (affirming a 2.13 multiplier after finding that “2 to 4” is a
15 reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check). *See also Bronshteyn v. State of California –*
16 *Department of Consumer Affairs*, 114 Cal.App.5th 537 (2025) (court did not abuse its discretion
17 by awarding 1.75 multiplier for fees incurred up to and including the jury verdict and a 1.25
18 enhancement for hours worked after the verdict where hourly rates for plaintiff’s five senior
19 attorneys were \$1,100.00 and \$1,000.00); *Tran v. Golden State FC LLC, et al.* (LASC Case No.
20 BC699931), Fee Order filed April 8, 2022 (approving hourly rate of \$1,300.00 for plaintiff’s 32-
21 year attorney).

22 Plaintiff seeks appointment of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel. The attorneys
23 performed significant work and expended litigation costs in prosecuting this matter with no
24 guarantee of payment. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff’s Counsel seeks preliminary approval of up to
25 one third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount, currently estimated to be \$170,740.00, and up to
26 \$30,000.00 in reimbursement of litigation costs. Given the work performed in this matter, the
27 extensive information exchange, and the substantial recovery obtained on behalf of the Class,
28 Plaintiff’s Counsel achieved a settlement through efficient and diligent work. *See generally*, Yslas

Decl. At final approval, Plaintiff's Counsel will fully brief the merits of its request for the award of attorneys' fees and litigation costs.

E. The Administration Costs are Reasonable

The Parties have agreed upon using Apex Class Action to administer this Settlement Agreement at § 1.2. Plaintiff seeks preliminary approval of \$8,590.00 for Apex Class Action to administer this Settlement pursuant to Apex Class Action's will-not-exceed bid. *See* Hartranft Decl. at ¶ 7, Exhibit B.

V. CONCLUSION

The Parties have negotiated a fair and reasonable settlement of the class claims in light of the risks presented in this case. Plaintiff has presented the materials and information necessary to demonstrate that the requirements for preliminary approval have been met, and therefore respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily approve the Settlement and schedule a date for the final approval hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: April 14, 2026

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: /s/ Courtney M. Miller

Courtney M. Miller
Attorneys for Plaintiff