

1 JAMIE SERB, ESQ. (SBN 289601)
jamie@crosnerlegal.com
2 SEPIDEH ARDESTANI, ESQ. (SBN 274259)
sepideh@crosnerlegal.com
3 ZACHARY M. CROSNER, ESQ. (SBN 272295)
zach@crosnerlegal.com
4 **CROSNER LEGAL, PC**
5 9440 Santa Monica Blvd. Suite 301
Beverly Hills, CA 90210
6 Tel: (866) 276-7637
Fax: (310) 510-6429

7 Attorneys for Plaintiffs ERIK SMITH
8 and MELISSA SANCHEZ

9
10 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**
11 **COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO**

12 ERIK SMITH, as an individual on behalf of
himself and on behalf of all others similarly
13 situated,

14 Plaintiff,

15 v.

16 PREMIER PACKING, LLC, a Kentucky
17 limited liability company; and DOES 1-
18 100, inclusive,

19 Defendants.

Case No.: CIVSB2406078

Assigned for All Purposes to:
Hon. Wilfred J. Schneider, Jr.
Dept. S32

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS &
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT**

Date: October 15, 2025

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept.: S32

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Plaintiffs Erik Smith and Melissa Sanchez hereby move the Court for an order granting
3 preliminary approval to a proposed non-reversionary class action settlement to resolve wage and
4 hour claims on behalf of approximately 185 individuals employed by Defendant Premier Packing,
5 LLC (“Premier” or “Defendant”) as non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in California
6 during the Class Period of February 21, 2020 to May 11, 2025. The proposed \$245,000 settlement
7 will provide at least \$96,033 in estimated combined cash payments to the settlement class, plus
8 additional amounts under PAGA. The balance of approximately \$148,967 will cover modest
9 enhancement awards to the named Plaintiffs, reasonable attorney’s fees and actual litigation costs,
10 settlement administration costs, and payment of civil penalties to the State. The settlement is the
11 product of Plaintiffs’ pre- and post-filing investigation, extensive formal and informal discovery,
12 and arms-length and adversarial negotiations overseen by experienced and well-regarded mediator
13 Steve Mehta, Esq.

14 As demonstrated below, the settlement is within the “range of reasonableness” for
15 preliminary approval, and is fair, reasonable and adequate. Plaintiffs’ counsel believe the settlement
16 is a significant result for the class given the substantial risks inherent in this matter. Accordingly,
17 Plaintiffs request the Court enter an order: (1) granting preliminary approval to the proposed class
18 action settlement; (2) conditionally certifying the settlement class as defined below; (3) appointing
19 Crosner Legal, PC, as Class Counsel; (4) appointing plaintiffs Erik Smith and Melissa Sanchez as
20 the Class Representatives; (5) appointing Phoenix Settlement Administrators as the Settlement
21 Administrator; (6) approving the form of notice to the class and the procedure for providing such
22 notice; and (7) scheduling a final fairness hearing.

23 **II. BACKGROUND/LITIGATION HISTORY**

24 Defendant Premier Defendant manufactures, distributes, and designs packaging, and
25 operates four locations in the United States, including one in Santa Fe Springs, California, where
26 Plaintiff worked. Plaintiff Smith was employed by Defendant as a non-exempt Warehouse
27 Associate/Forklift Driver from approximately August 2022 to May 2023. During this period, he
28 typically worked 8 to 12 hours per shift, five days a week, and he was compensated with an hourly

1 wage and received various bonuses, including attendance and productivity bonuses. Plaintiff
2 Sanchez worked for Defendant as an hourly employee from around March to December 2024 out
3 of the Salinas location. [Declaration of Sepideh Ardestani (“Ardestani Decl.”), ¶ 4.]

4 Plaintiffs allege Premier violated California wage and hour law in several respects. First,
5 they allege a failure to pay all minimum wages, and claim class members regularly performed “off
6 the clock” work, both before and after the start of their shifts, for tasks such as waiting in line to
7 clock in, finishing up daily tasks, etc. Plaintiffs further allege Defendant failed to pay for sick pay
8 and meal period premiums at the correct regular rate of pay. Next, Plaintiffs allege Premier also
9 failed to provide compliant meal periods as meal periods frequently were not fully compliant due to
10 various “de facto” violations and that meal breaks regularly were missed, untimely, or cut short.
11 Plaintiffs also allege Defendant failed to provide legally compliant rest periods, and allege rest
12 periods were oftentimes interrupted or late. They further claim Defendant did not reimburse business
13 expenses incurred by Class Members for the use of their personal cellular phones. Lastly, they allege
14 Defendant failed to provide accurate, itemized wage statements and failed to pay all wages owed
15 upon the separation of employment. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 5.]

16 Based on these general allegations, Plaintiff Smith filed a PAGA complaints against Premier
17 on February 20, 2024, after appropriate notice to the LWDA and Defendant and exhausting
18 administrative remedies. He also filed a separate class action complaint against Defendant on
19 February 21, 2025. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 6; Exh. 2.]

20 Premier has at all times denied Plaintiffs’ allegations and maintained its meal and rest break
21 and payroll policies and procedures comply with California law, and that it provided the class
22 members with the opportunity to take all required meal and rest breaks or paid the required
23 premiums when necessary. Additionally, Premier contends its timekeeping and payroll policies
24 accurately track and pay for all hours worked by its employees and at the correct rates of pay.
25 Premier similarly argued that there was no need for employees to use their cell phones for work
26 purposes and accordingly no reimbursement is warranted. It also strongly contends the case cannot
27 be maintained as any kind of class or representative action, arguing for example that to the extent
28 class members missed meal and/or rest breaks, or that such breaks were non-compliant, it was

1 intermittent and infrequent and evidence of such missed breaks would be purely anecdotal, and
2 therefore individualized issues predominate and trial on a representative basis would be
3 unmanageable. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 7.]

4 Since filing of the two complaints, the Parties initiated discovery, and after various meet and
5 confer discussions regarding discovery, potential law and motion, and case management, ultimately
6 agreed to attempt a global mediation. The Parties further agreed to extensive informal discovery to
7 facilitate an exchange of information necessary to engage in a meaningful mediation. Consequently,
8 Plaintiffs' counsel reviewed payroll records, personnel policies/handbooks, meal and rest break
9 policies, personnel files, and paystubs and time records for around 25% of the putative class
10 members. Defendant also provided documents reflecting its wage and hour policies and practices,
11 and data regarding the total number of current and former employees, the estimated total amount of
12 workweeks and pay periods they worked, and average hourly pay rates, among other relevant data.
13 Plaintiffs had that information reviewed and analyzed by Berger Consulting Group to assist with
14 evaluating things such as time allegedly lost to due rounding, meal period violation rates, etc., and
15 to prepare a damages model. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 8.]

16 The Parties then engaged Steve Mehta, Esq., a highly respected mediator with extensive
17 wage and hour class action experience and, in March 2025, participated in a full day global
18 mediation with Mr. Mehta. Throughout the day, the arms-length negotiations were hard-fought and
19 adversarial as the Parties exchanged extensive information on their legal and factual positions, and
20 made numerous offers and counter-offers. After a full day of negotiations, the Parties were able to
21 reach agreement on all major issues, and thereafter jointly prepared the Settlement Agreement now
22 before the Court for approval. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 9.]

23 **III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT TERMS**

24 Under the settlement, Premier will pay the Gross Settlement Amount of \$245,000 into a
25 common fund. Reasonable attorney's fees of up to \$81,666.67 (1/3 of the GSA), litigation costs of
26 up to \$20,000, modest enhancement awards to Plaintiffs of up to \$10,000 each (\$20,000 in total),
27 settlement administration costs of no more than \$7,300, and \$20,000 for civil penalties under PAGA
28 (of which 75%, or \$15,000, will go to the Labor & Workforce Development Agency, and 25%, or

1 \$5,000, will go to the PAGA Members) all will be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount. The
2 remainder of approximately \$96,033 will be allocated among the Participating Class Members based
3 on their total pay periods worked during the Class Period. No portion of the Gross Settlement
4 Amount will revert to Premier. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 10.]

5 **A. Certification of the Settlement Class**

6 The settlement provides for conditional certification of a settlement class including all non-
7 exempt employees who worked for Defendant in California during the Class Period of
8 February 21, 2020 to May 11, 2025. The Settlement Class consists of at least 185 individuals. For
9 purposes of PAGA, the Aggrieved Employees include all non-exempt employees who worked for
10 Defendant in California during the PAGA Period of December 17, 2022 to May 11, 2025. There are
11 about 156 Aggrieved Employees. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 11.]

12 **B. The Benefit Conferred on the Settlement Class**

13 This is a cash settlement that does not require Participating Class Members to submit a claim
14 form to receive their settlement share. Participating Class Members will receive their settlement
15 checks automatically via First Class U.S. Mail. Twenty percent of each settlement share will be
16 allocated to wages and the remaining eighty percent will be allocated to expenses reimbursement,
17 penalties and interest. Premier will pay any and all applicable employer-side payroll taxes separately
18 and in addition to the Gross Settlement Amount. Subject to the Court's approval, any amounts not
19 claimed (because a class member does not cash his or her settlement check) will be forwarded to
20 the State Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 12.]

21 Each Participating Class Member will receive a share of the Net Settlement Amount based
22 on his or her total weeks worked for Premier during the Class Period while employed in a non-
23 exempt position. Thus, each Class Member's Individual Settlement Payment will be calculated
24 using criteria typically used in determining appropriate amounts of alleged unpaid wages, unpaid
25 premium wages for missed meal and rest breaks, unreimbursed expenses, and potential statutory
26 penalties under applicable law. These methods are intended to ensure each Class Member receives
27 a portion of the available settlement funds corresponding to the relative value of his or her potential
28 claims. The proposed allocation provides a reasonable way to compensate Class Members based on

1 the amount of time they worked for Premier and the number of instances they missed a meal break
2 and/or rest break, were not provided compensation in lieu of such missed breaks, or lost pay due to
3 the alleged off the clock work. The average class settlement award will be approximately \$519, and
4 the average PAGA award will be about \$32. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 13.]

5 **C. Settlement Administration**

6 Subject to the Court’s approval the Parties agreed on Simpluris, Inc. (“Simpluris”) as the
7 Settlement Administrator. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 14.] Simpluris is qualified and has significant
8 experience administering class action settlements, including numerous wage and hour matters.
9 Simpluris has agreed to cap its fees and costs at \$7,300. If the Court approves less than the above
10 amount, the difference will remain in the Net Settlement Amount for distribution to the Participating
11 Class Members. [Declaration of Michael Bui, ¶¶ 2-8; Exhs. A-C.]

12 **D. The Class Notice**

13 The proposed Notice (Exhibit 2 to the Ardestani Declaration) sets out information about this
14 case and explains the basic settlement terms in plain language, and meets all requirements under
15 California Rules of Court 3.769(f) and 3.766(d). The Notice also sets forth the individualized
16 information used to calculate Individual Settlement Payments and each Class Member’s estimated
17 settlement award. The Notice likewise details the procedures for Class Members to dispute their
18 individual information, for submitting an objection to the Settlement, and to request exclusion. In
19 sum, the Notice provides the Class Members with the information necessary to evaluate the
20 Settlement and provides fair opportunity to participate in, opt out of, or object to the proposed
21 Settlement. Coupled with the notice procedure, the proposed Notice provides the Class with the best
22 notice practicable. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 15.]

23 **E. Right to Correct Information, Opt Out, or Object**

24 Class Members will have 45 days to dispute the information in their Notice used to calculate
25 their settlement award, and also have 45 days to submit any objections to the settlement or to request
26 exclusion. In the event a Class Member disputes their individual information, the Settlement
27 Administrator will review the Class Member’s records as well as any additional information
28 submitted, and make a final determination. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 16.]

1 **F. Release of Claims**

2 All Participating Class Members will release Premier from all claims alleged in the operative
3 complaint, or that could have been brought based on the factual allegations in the operative
4 complaint during the Class Period. Plaintiffs and the LWDA will release those PAGA claims alleged
5 in the PAGA notice to the extent alleged in the operative complaint. The Class and PAGA releases
6 are limited to the claims that were actually pleaded or could have been pleaded based on the alleged
7 facts in the operative complaint, and PAGA notice for the PAGA claims. Only Plaintiffs are entering
8 into a full general release of all claims and waiver of Civil Code § 1542. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 17.]

9 **G. Attorney's Fees and Costs, and Plaintiffs' Enhancement Awards**

10 The settlement provides Defendant will not oppose a request for attorney's fees not to exceed
11 1/3 of the Gross Settlement Amount, or \$81,666.67, nor will it oppose a request for reimbursement
12 of litigation costs and expenses of up to \$20,000. Defendant also will not oppose a request for an
13 enhancement award to Plaintiffs of not more than \$10,000.00 each (totaling \$20,000) in recognition
14 of their time spent on this matter, the risks they undertook on behalf of the class, the benefit
15 conferred to the class, and their agreement to provide a broad general release of all claims against
16 Defendant, as set forth in their respective declarations filed herewith. Plaintiffs' counsel will provide
17 the Court with appropriate summaries and evidence of their efforts and time records in anticipation
18 of the Final Approval Hearing. If the Court approves less than the above amounts, the difference
19 will remain in the Net Settlement Amount for distribution to the Participating Class Members.
20 [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 18.]

21 **H. PAGA Penalties and Notice to the LWDA**

22 As noted, the Parties allocated \$20,000 from the GSA to resolution of Plaintiffs' alleged
23 claims for PAGA civil penalties, and Plaintiffs submit that amount is fair, reasonable and
24 adequate, and furthers PAGA's underlying purposes. As required by Labor Code section
25 2699(1)(2), Plaintiffs gave notice of the settlement and the preliminary approval hearing to the
26 LWDA via its online portal. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 19; Exh. 3.]

27 ////

28 ////

1 **IV. ARGUMENT**

2 **A. Standard of Review for a Class Action Settlement**

3 The law favors settlement, particularly in class actions where substantial resources can be
4 conserved by avoiding the time, costs and rigors of formal litigation. H. Newberg & A. Conte, 4
5 Newberg on Class Actions (4th ed. 2002) § 11.41; Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle (9th Cir.
6 1992) 955 F.2d 1268, 1276, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953; Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. (1951)
7 37 Cal.2d 592, 602. Nevertheless, to ensure the rights of absent class members are not unjustly
8 compromised, settlement of a class action requires court approval. Cal. Rule of Court. 3.769;
9 Wershba v. Apple Computer (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245; Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48
10 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801. This judicial review protects against fraud or collusion, and ensures
11 fairness to the absent class members. Dunk, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1800-01. Judicial review occurs
12 via a two-step process to determine, under all the circumstances, if the proposed settlement is fair,
13 reasonable and adequate. Id. at 1801; Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245.

14 The first step is a motion for preliminary approval, through which the parties present the
15 court with the proposed settlement and seek a determination if it is sufficiently fair and reasonable
16 to warrant notice to the class and further proceedings as to its fairness and adequacy. Cal. Rule of
17 Court 3.769(c). This preliminary evaluation determines if the proposed settlement is within the
18 “range of reasonableness” and if notice should be provided to the class regarding the settlement’s
19 proposed terms and conditions, and whether a final fairness hearing should be scheduled.
20 Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 234-35; North County Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Touchstone Ins.
21 Servs. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1089-90. Considering the strong judicial policy favoring
22 settlement of class actions, courts generally apply a presumption of fairness to class action
23 settlements when (1) the settlement results from arms-length bargaining, (2) investigation and
24 discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently, (3) counsel is
25 experienced in similar litigation, and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. Dunk, 48
26 Cal.App.4th at 1802; Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245.

27 If the court grants preliminary approval, it then orders the class be given notice in an
28 appropriate manner, establishes a schedule and procedures for class members to request exclusion

1 or object, and sets the matter for a final fairness hearing. Typically, any motion for attorney’s fees
2 and costs, and any enhancement for the class representative(s), is filed subsequent to preliminary
3 approval and heard with the motion for final approval, as part of the second step of the two-step
4 approval process. Dunk, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1800; Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 232.

5 The proposed settlement in this matter warrants preliminary approval under the liberal
6 standard discussed above, as it is fair, reasonable and adequate under all the circumstances, and
7 represents a favorable result for the class.

8 **B. The Proposed Settlement Class Should Be Conditionally Certified**

9 The purpose of conditional class certification for purposes of settlement is to facilitate
10 provision of notice of the proposed settlement’s terms, and the date and time of the final fairness
11 hearing. In this context, courts apply lesser scrutiny than they would otherwise in the context of
12 certifying a class. Dunk, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1807, n.19; Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v.
13 Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 836, 839 (“[I]t is well established that trial courts should
14 use different standards to determine the propriety of a settlement class”).

15 In the present matter, conditional certification is proper since this matter satisfies all
16 requirements for class certification under Code of Civil Procedure section 382. First, the class is
17 both sufficiently numerous, consisting of at least 185 individuals, and ascertainable by reference
18 to Premier’s personnel and payroll records. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 20.]

19 Next, Plaintiffs all are adequate class representatives, as their claims do not conflict with
20 and are not antagonistic to the claims of other class members. For these reasons, Plaintiff contends
21 they are adequate class representatives. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 21; Declaration of Erik Smith, ¶¶ 2-9;
22 Declaration of Melissa Sanchez, ¶¶ 2-9.] Further, their claims are typical given each is a member
23 of the class and their respective claims arise from the same employment practices and course of
24 conduct giving rise to the claims of the other class members. [Id.] Their counsel are experienced
25 and adequate class counsel. [Ardestani Decl., ¶¶ 37-42.]

26 Next, common questions of law and fact predominate – particularly for purposes of a
27 settlement class – as the Class Members all were subject to the alleged failure to pay for sick pay
28 and meal premium pay at the correct “regular rate,” and subject to the same meal and rest break

1 policy that allegedly resulted in “de facto” meal and rest period violations. Since the focus of the
2 claims against Premier concerns the legality of common policies applied uniformly to the entire
3 class, common issues predominate over individualized inquiries concerning liability. For instance,
4 Premier’s policy of paying for sick pay and break premiums at the base hourly rate instead of the
5 regular rate is company-wide policy applied equally and consistently to all class members, and
6 this policy is either compliant with California law or it is not. Regardless of that determination, it
7 will decide liability for the class one way or another. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 22.]

8 By now it is well-settled a theory of recovery asserting the existence of a uniform policy
9 violating California law is sufficient to satisfy the requirements for class certification. Jones v.
10 Farmers Ins. Exch. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 986, 996 (“Claims alleging that a uniform policy
11 consistently applied to a group of employees is in violation of the wage and hour laws are of the
12 sort routinely, and properly, found suitable for class treatment”); Williams v. Superior Court
13 (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1353 (“A company-wide practice can sustain a common question of fact
14 or law that supports commonality for class certification”). Lastly, a class action is superior to
15 other means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 23.]

16 **C. The Proposed Settlement Meets the Dunk Factors and is within the Range of**
17 **Reasonableness**

18 The proposed settlement resulted from serious, arms-length negotiations facilitated by
19 respected mediator Steve Mehta, Esq., who has extensive experience both litigating and mediating
20 wage and hour class actions. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 9.] Plaintiffs’ counsel at Crosner Legal, PC have
21 years of experience litigating wage and hour class actions. Plaintiffs’ counsel is well-qualified to
22 evaluate the risks and benefits of pursuing further litigation or settling the matter. [Ardestani
23 Decl., ¶¶ 37-42.]

24 California law recognizes several factors bearing on the fairness, adequacy, and
25 reasonableness of a proposed class settlement. Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168
26 Cal.App.4th 116, 128. These factors include: 1) the amount offered in settlement 2) the strength of
27 plaintiff’s case; 3) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; 4) the risk
28 of maintaining class action status throughout trial; 5) the experience and views of counsel; and 6)

1 the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. Id. As demonstrated below, the
2 proposed settlement satisfies these requirements.

3 Prior to mediation, the parties engaged in informal discovery to facilitate settlement
4 discussions. As a result, Plaintiffs reviewed documents and information regarding Premier's payroll
5 practices, a sampling of pay stubs and time records, meal and rest break policies, employee
6 handbooks, etc., and information from Defendant regarding class size and breakdown, work weeks,
7 rates of pay, and other information used to formulate a damages model. Plaintiffs' counsel are
8 confident they obtained sufficient information to enable them to understand the law and facts of this
9 case and make an informed decision regarding the proposed settlement and whether it is in the best
10 interests of the class. [Ardestani Decl., ¶¶ 8, 24.]

11 Next, the proposed settlement falls within the range of reasonableness warranting
12 preliminary approval. The proposed settlement involves a significant sum that, when distributed,
13 will confer direct monetary benefits on the class members. As described above, each class member
14 will be entitled to a monetary payment without having to file a claim and each payment will be
15 relative to the value of his or her potential claims. Through the information exchanged and analysis
16 undertaken, Plaintiff weighed the risks of continued litigation against the benefits of the proposed
17 settlement and determined settlement to be the most reasonable option.

18 Using that data, Plaintiffs ran various calculations under different theories of liability and
19 estimated Premier's maximum exposure on the class claims at approximately \$2,281,400,
20 including approximately \$75,055 on the off the clock claims, \$52,670 on the regular rate claim,
21 \$661,520 on the meal break claims, \$678,545 on the rest break claims, \$52,670 on the expense
22 reimbursement claims, \$331,950 on the wage statement claims, and \$376,320 on the waiting time
23 penalty claims. [Ardestani Decl., ¶¶ 25-26.] Plaintiffs substantially discounted the value of these
24 claims, however, in light of the multiple and considerable risks posed by proceeding with the
25 litigation.

26 First, on the unpaid wage claims, Plaintiffs alleged Premier failed to pay employees for all
27 hours worked, particularly because employees frequently were required to work after clocking out
28 if, for example, a truck arrived and needed to be unloaded. Per Plaintiffs this resulted in a modest

1 but regular loss of hours worked due this time spent subject to employer control while “off the
2 clock.” Frlekin v. Apple Inc. (2002) 8 Cal.5th 1038, 1047, reh'g denied (May 13, 2020); Morillion
3 v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575, 583.) As held by the California Supreme Court, even
4 small amounts of unpaid time can add up over time and accordingly should be accounted and paid
5 for. In response, Defendant emphasized its payroll and timekeeping policies accurately recorded
6 and paid for all hours worked, and that its written policies strictly prohibited off the clock work.
7 Thus, per Defendant, if any off the clock work even occurred it was against intermittent and
8 aberrational and against company policy. Defendant also argued that class certification on this
9 issue would be impossible since it would require innumerable individualized inquiries to
10 determine if any off the clock work occurred and the reasons therefore. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 27.]

11 Plaintiffs’ also allege Defendant failed to pay for overtime pay, sick time pay and break
12 premiums at the employees’ “regular rate of pay” as required under California law. Ferra v.
13 Loews Hollywood Hotel, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 858. Likewise, pursuant to Labor Code §
14 246(l)(1), “[p]aid sick time for nonexempt employees shall be calculated in the same manner as
15 the regular rate of pay for the workweek in which the employee uses paid sick time, whether or
16 not the employee actually works overtime in that workweek.” Here, Class Members received
17 various forms of extra remuneration such as bonuses and other incentive pay and, during pay
18 periods where additional compensation was paid and overtime, sick pay and/or meal period
19 premiums were owed, Plaintiffs contend Defendant failed to factor in the non-discretionary
20 remuneration into the regular rate of pay and accordingly underpaid Class Members for their
21 overtime, sick pay or break premium pay. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 28.]

22 Plaintiffs next alleged Premier failed to provide required meal breaks on a fully compliant
23 basis. Here, Plaintiffs argued that Defendant’s meal break policy was non-compliant for at least
24 part of the class period, until Premier issued a “California supplement” to its regular break policies
25 in and around 2024. Regardless, Plaintiffs contend they had to continuously monitor their two-
26 way radios and regularly were called away from breaks to assist with unloading recently arrived
27 trucks even though clocked out for lunch. Plaintiffs further noted that, while Premier did
28 apparently pay some meal period premiums, it was only for a small fraction of the violations

1 evident in the time records (and the premiums were underpaid as addressed above). For rest
2 breaks, Plaintiffs likewise contended regular “de facto” violations where rest breaks were missed
3 completely or otherwise non-compliant, again largely because Plaintiffs remained tethered to their
4 radios and “on call” to work at any moment. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 29.]

5 Defendant denied Plaintiff’s contentions, claiming it made meal and rest breaks available
6 to Class Members in compliance with California law. Defendant contended its meal and rest break
7 policies are lawful, that Class Members were frequently reminded they were required to take all
8 meal and rest breaks and that were able to do so, and that many employees waived their breaks in
9 writing when appropriate. Premier further noted it paid a substantial number of meal premiums, as
10 reflected in the class members’ payroll records. Finally, Defendant argued that Plaintiff’s meal
11 and rest break claims are not susceptible to common proof, as the claims would require
12 individualized inquiry, including whether there was an unlawful companywide policy, whether
13 employees had the opportunity to take meal and rest periods, whether they voluntarily chose to
14 forego their meal and rest periods, and whether Defendant ever prevented them from taking meal
15 and rest periods. Accordingly, Defendant contends these claims are vulnerable to a ruling that
16 class treatment is not appropriate. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 30.]

17 As with meal breaks, Defendant argued the applicable rest break policies complied with
18 California law, and that it authorized and permitted employees to take all required breaks. Further,
19 per Defendant, in light of the fact that it is not required to maintain a record of rest periods, any
20 evidence of failure to authorize rest periods and/or discouragement from taking rest periods would
21 be purely anecdotal and individual issues would predominate on liability. This arguably would
22 once again make a trial unmanageable since each alleged missed rest break would have to be
23 tested on a case by case basis to determine compliance. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 31.]

24 On the expense reimbursement claim, Plaintiffs allege that employees were required to use
25 their personal cell phones in order to communicate with supervisors and other employees during
26 work hours. However, Defendant did not reimburse Plaintiffs and the class members for this
27 expense. Cochran v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 113. On the other hand,
28 Defendant argued there would be no conceivable need for employees to use their phones for work,

1 especially considering they were provided with 2-way radios while on the job, and that any use of
2 employee phones was purely for personal convenience and therefore not reimbursable as a
3 “reasonable and necessary” expense. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 32.]

4 Plaintiff also alleged derivatively that, as a result of the above alleged violations,
5 Defendant failed to provide accurate wage statements and failed to timely pay all wages that were
6 due and owing upon separation of employment. Thus, should the primary claims fail, Plaintiff’s
7 derivative claims would also fail. Defendant also contends it would not be liable for waiting time
8 penalties because a “good faith dispute” exists over the payment of past wages. Amaral v. Cintas
9 Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1201. Further, Defendant contends Plaintiff would
10 have to prove that Defendant “willfully” failed to pay Class Members appropriate wages due upon
11 separation of employment. Defendant contends that any failure to pay wages upon separation was
12 not willful. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 33.]

13 As far as potential PAGA liability, the Aggrieved Employees theoretically are entitled to
14 penalties totaling upwards of \$1.8 million should Plaintiff prevail on all claims and establish
15 violations of the multiple Labor Code sections at issue for every single pay period. [Ardestani Decl.,
16 ¶ 34.] As with the class claims, Plaintiff discounted the potential PAGA penalties since the Court
17 possesses wide discretion to reduce such penalties, or to decline to award penalties at all. Labor
18 Code § 2699(e)(2); Carrington v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504 (trial court awarded
19 penalties of \$5 per pay period after a bench trial, which decision was upheld on appeal); In re Taco
20 Bell Wage and Hour Actions (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016) 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48557 (PAGA
21 penalties denied after trial). Accordingly, the Parties allocated \$20,000 to PAGA penalties, which
22 amount Plaintiff submits is reasonable under the circumstances and in line with comparable
23 settlements in other wage and hour class actions in California. *E.g.*, Van Kempen v. Matheson Tri-
24 Gas, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137182 (granting final approval of
25 \$5,000 PAGA penalty from \$370,000 settlement, or 1.4 percent of total settlement); Slavkov v. First
26 Water Heater Partners I (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116303 (finding a \$7,500
27 PAGA payment reasonable when measured against the overall settlement of \$345,000 and the
28 possible weaknesses in Plaintiffs' case, or 2.2 percent of total settlement). Additionally, the LWDA

1 has been informed of the terms of the PAGA portion of the settlement, and will be able to weigh in
2 as necessary. Jennings v. Open Door Mktg. Inc. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018) 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3 171356, at *27 (approving settlement with PAGA penalties of 0.6% where "[p]laintiffs [have]
4 submitted the settlement agreement to the LWDA, and the LWDA has not objected to the settlement.

5 The settlement obviates the significant risk that this Court may find any kind of class
6 resolution unachievable or might deny certification of all or some of Plaintiff's claims. Furthermore,
7 even if Plaintiff obtained certification of all or some of the claims, continued litigation would be
8 expensive as the parties pursued merits discovery, a probable motion to decertify, as well as trial
9 and possible appeals, and would substantially delay any recovery by the class with no assurance of
10 recovering significantly more than the proposed settlement. While Plaintiff is confident in the merits
11 of his claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. Plaintiff also recognizes
12 proving the amount of wages and penalties due each Class Member would be an expensive and
13 uncertain proposition. [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 35.]

14 Plaintiff and counsel discounted the value of the class claims consistent with the risks
15 discussed above, and carefully weighed the likelihood of the class receiving substantially greater
16 benefit if the litigation continued. Plaintiff and counsel concluded – in light of these very real and
17 substantial risks – settlement on the proposed terms and without prolonged and costly litigation
18 was in the best interests of the class. The overall \$245,000 recovery represents a significant
19 percentage of Defendant's potential exposure and, given the risks addressed above, a total
20 recovery for the class of \$245,000, which will result in average award of some \$519 per class
21 member, is a significant result well within the range of reasonableness considering all potential
22 outcomes, and it will provide direct monetary awards to all Class Members without further delay.
23 [Ardestani Decl., ¶ 36.]

24 Importantly, the mere fact that a settlement does not provide the same recovery as might be
25 achieved at trial is not a proper indicator of whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and
26 adequate. Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 246, 250 ("Compromise is inherent and necessary in the
27 settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially
28 narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class

1 settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which
2 each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation”); Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d
3 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he question whether a settlement is fundamentally fair . . . is
4 different from the question whether the settlement is perfect in the estimation of the reviewing
5 court”); 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135,
6 1150 (“The fact that a proposed settlement may amount to only a fraction of the potential recovery
7 does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate and should be
8 disapproved”); White v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2011) 803 F.Supp.2d
9 1086, 1098 (rejecting contention settlement was not fair and reasonable even though it represented
10 99% discount off the maximum value of the claims). Importantly as well, the proposed settlement
11 is non-reversionary and will provide immediate benefits to the Class Members without a claims
12 process. White, 803 F.Supp.2d at 1098; c.f., Federal Judicial Center, Managing Class Action
13 Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges (3d ed. 2010) at 20, available at [http://](http://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf)
14 www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf (reversionary provisions and/or cumbersome
15 claims process may indicate lack of fairness). Plaintiff and his counsel submit the settlement is
16 within the “range of reasonableness,” and is fair and adequate for the Class.

17 **IV. CONCLUSION**

18 For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant this motion,
19 conditionally certify the settlement class, grant preliminary approval to the proposed class action
20 settlement, and enter the [Proposed] Order filed herewith.

21
22 Dated: August 20, 2025

CROSNER LEGAL, PC

23
24 By: 
25 Jamie Serb, Esq.
26 Sepideh Ardestani, Esq.
27 Zachary M. Crosner, Esq.
28 Attorneys for Plaintiffs ERIK SMITH
and MELISSA SANCHEZ