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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE**

ALICIA ESQUIVEL, individually, and on behalf  
of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

CONRAD EMPLOYER, LLC, a limited liability  
company; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 23STCV27657

**REPRESENTATIVE ACTION**

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION  
AND MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF  
PAGA SETTLEMENT**

[Filed with (1) the Declaration of Kane Moon,  
(2) the Declaration of Plaintiff, (3) the  
Declaration of Jodey Lawrence, (4) [Proposed]  
PAGA Approval Order, and (5) [Proposed]  
Judgment]

**PAGA APPROVAL HEARING:**

Date: July 24, 2026

Time: 10:30 a.m.

Dept.: 1

Judge: Honorable Theresa M. Traber

Action filed: November 9, 2023

FAC filed: March 4, 2024

Trial date: Not set

1 **TO THIS HONORABLE COURT, TO ALL PARTIES, AND TO COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on [TBD], at [TBD] in Department 1 of the Los Angeles  
3 County Superior Court, Spring Street Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles,  
4 California 90012, Plaintiff Alicia Esquivel (“Plaintiff”) will, and hereby does, move the Court  
5 for an Order and Judgment, pursuant to California Labor Code sections 2698, *et seq.*, as follows:

- 6 1. Approving the PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Settlement”) between Plaintiff and  
7 Defendant Conrad Employer, LLC;
- 8 2. Appointing Kane Moon, H. Scott Leviant, and Jaeyoung Lee of Moon Law Group, PC as  
9 PAGA Counsel;
- 10 3. Approving the requested PAGA Counsel Fees Payment of \$140,000.00, subject to  
11 potential increase under an escalator clause;
- 12 4. Approving the requested PAGA Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment of \$43,000.00;
- 13 5. Appointing Plaintiff as the PAGA Representative and approving a \$5,000.00  
14 Enhancement Award to her;
- 15 6. Appointing Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions as the Administrator and  
16 approving up to \$20,000.00 as the Administration Expenses Payment;
- 17 7. Approving the scope of the Released PAGA Claims and Released Parties;
- 18 8. Approving a non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of at least \$420,000.00, subject  
19 to potential increase under an escalator clause;
- 20 9. Approving at least \$212,000.00 for PAGA Penalties as settlement of the Released PAGA  
21 Claims, subject to potential increase pursuant to the escalator clause, to be distributed as  
22 75% (at least \$159,000.00 to the LWDA) and 25% (at least \$53,000.00 to PAGA  
23 Employees);
- 24 10. Directing consummation of the Settlement pursuant to its terms and provisions;
- 25 11. Entering Judgment and dismissing the above-captioned action with prejudice; and
- 26 12. Retaining jurisdiction over the Parties, this action, and this Settlement, including  
27 following any entry of Judgment for purposes of enforcement, interpretation,  
28

1 settlement administration, and any post-Judgment issues that arise.

2 This Motion is based upon this notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities,  
3 the declarations and exhibits filed concurrently herewith, the records and files in this action, and  
4 any other further records or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

5 As this Motion is unopposed, the Parties respectfully request relief from the page limit  
6 requirement set by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113(d).

7 Respectfully submitted,

8 DATED: June 15, 2026

**MOON LAW GROUP, PC**

9 By: \_\_\_\_\_

10 Kane Moon  
11 H. Scott Leviant  
12 Jaeyoung Lee

13 *Attorneys for Plaintiff Alicia Esquivel*  
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1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

2 I. INTRODUCTION

3 Plaintiff Alicia Esquivel (“Plaintiff”) seeks approval of a non-reversionary \$420,000.00 gross  
4 settlement of claims for civil penalties alleged pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act,  
5 Labor Code sections 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”). After two mediations presided over by experienced and  
6 neutral mediator Michael Dickstein, Esq., Plaintiff reached a resolution with Defendant Conrad  
7 Employer, LLC (“Defendant”) (collectively, Plaintiff and Defendant are the “Parties”). The Parties have  
8 executed a PAGA Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement”), a true and correct copy of which is attached  
9 as **Exhibit 1** to the Declaration of Kane Moon in Support of Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement  
10 (“Moon Decl.”) submitted concurrently herewith. Pursuant to Labor Code section 2699(s)(2), Plaintiff  
11 now files this motion seeking an order approving the proposed Settlement.

12 The proposed Settlement seeks to resolve all alleged claims for civil penalties pursuant to the  
13 California Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code sections 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”). (Moon Decl., ¶  
14 3.) Plaintiff brought this PAGA action on behalf of herself and all current and former non-exempt, hourly-  
15 paid employees who were employed by and worked for Defendant in California at any time during the  
16 PAGA Period (“PAGA Employees”). (*Id.* at ¶ 4.) For purposes of settlement, the “PAGA Period” is from  
17 November 9, 2022, to February 1, 2026. (Settlement, ¶ 1.24.) The Parties, Plaintiff’s Counsel, and  
18 Defense Counsel are not aware of any other pending matter or action asserting claims that will be  
19 extinguished or affected by the Settlement. (Moon Decl., ¶ 24.)

20 Settlement of a PAGA claim requires court approval. Pursuant to the operative PAGA statute,  
21 the “court shall review and approve any penalties sought as part of a proposed settlement agreement  
22 pursuant to this part.” (Lab. Code § 2699(s)(2).) In deciding whether to grant approval of a proposed  
23 settlement, the primary issue to be decided is whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.  
24 Specifically, the issue is whether the PAGA penalties to which the parties have agreed provide “genuine  
25 and meaningful” relief that is “consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute to benefit the public,”  
26 and whether the penalties are reasonable in light of the potential verdict value in this case. (*Villalobos v.*  
27 *Calandri Sunrise Farm LP* (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2015) No. CV 12-2615 PSG (JEMx), 2015 WL 12732709,  
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at \*5; *see also O'Connor v. Uber Techn., Inc.* (N.D. Cal. 2016) 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1135.)

As set forth herein, the proposed Settlement embodies all the features of a settlement that is fair, adequate, and reasonable, as (1) it is the product of an arm's-length negotiation, (2) negotiated by attorneys experienced in wage and hour litigation, (3) following sufficient investigation necessary to evaluate the relative strength and value of the PAGA claims, and (4) reflects a reasoned compromise based directly on the relative strength and value of the PAGA claims, as well as the risks, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation.

The meaningful value achieved by the Settlement at issue may be gleaned from the fact that the LWDA and the estimated 597 PAGA Employees will, cumulatively, receive an estimated \$228,508.79 as PAGA Penalties. (Moon Decl., ¶ 21.) This is a significant recovery, not only because further litigation may have resulted in a net-zero recovery based on the facts of the case and defenses asserted by Defendant, but also because an investigation by experienced PAGA counsel and analysis of discovery revealed significant litigation risk arising from the testimony-intensive nature of certain claims, the discretionary nature of awarding PAGA penalties, and the risk of not being able to proceed on a representative basis at all due to the potential manageability issues and current state of the law. For these reasons, as set forth more fully below, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court enter the proposed order and proposed judgment submitted concurrently herewith.

## **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT**

### **A. Plaintiff's Claims and Procedural Background**

Defendant operates the Conrad Hotel Los Angeles, located at 100 South Grand Avenue, Los Angeles, California. (Moon Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff worked for Defendant from approximately September 26, 2022 to December 21, 2022. (*Id.*) Throughout her employment, Plaintiff was classified as non-exempt and paid on an hourly basis. (*Id.*) Plaintiff contends that she and her former coworkers were subjected to the same or similar unlawful labor practices during their employment by Defendant, including failure to pay all wages. (*Id.*)

Plaintiff's claims for unpaid wages stem from allegations of Defendant's failure to pay employees all minimum and overtime wages owed, including due to Defendant's failure to compensate employees

1 for off-the-clock time spent passing through a security checkpoint prior to clocking in for their shifts, and  
2 Defendant's failure to incorporate all remunerations into the regular rate of pay when calculating  
3 overtime, sick pay, and meal break premium rates. (*Id.*) Plaintiff's meal and rest period claims are based  
4 on allegations that due to the nature of their work and Defendant's employment practices, employees  
5 regularly experienced missed, untimely, or interrupted breaks, and that Defendant failed to provide any  
6 premiums for non-compliant meal or rest periods. (*Id.*) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant failed to  
7 reimburse employees for all reasonable and necessary business expenses incurred, including expenses  
8 incurred for the use of their personal cellphone and for the purchase of cleaning materials and tools used  
9 for work purposes. (*Id.*) Plaintiff further alleges she and other employees did not receive all wages owed  
10 at the time of termination nor accurate itemized wage statements due to Defendant's failure to pay all  
11 wages and premiums. (*Id.*) Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges Defendant is liable for civil penalties under  
12 PAGA. (*Id.*)

13 Because of the foregoing alleged violations of the Labor Code, Plaintiff filed a Class Action  
14 Complaint on November 9, 2023, alleging Defendant systematically: (1) failed to pay minimum wages,  
15 (2) failed to pay overtime compensation, (3) failed to provide meal periods, (4) failed to authorize and  
16 permit rest breaks, (5) failed to indemnify necessary business expenses, (6) failed to timely pay final  
17 wages at termination, (7) failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and (8) engaged in unfair  
18 business practices. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.)

19 Pursuant to PAGA, on November 5, 2023, Plaintiff submitted notice of the alleged Labor Code  
20 violations to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (the "LWDA"), with certified  
21 mail service on Defendant, and paid the required filing fee. (*Id.* at ¶ 7, Ex. 2.) The administrative  
22 exhaustion period under PAGA expired without the LWDA indicating any intent to investigate the  
23 allegations. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) On March 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Class and Representative  
24 Action Complaint to allege a ninth cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA (the "FAC"). (*Id.*)  
25 Accordingly, Plaintiff is duly authorized to act as a private attorney general with respect to the  
26 PAGA claims involved in this action. (*Id.*) Pursuant to Labor Code section 2699(s)(1), Plaintiff  
27 subsequently submitted to the LWDA a file-stamped copy of the FAC containing the Court-assigned  
28

1 case number. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) To date, the LWDA has not sought to intervene in this action. (*Id.*)

2 On April 5, 2025, Plaintiff dismissed Plaintiff's class and individual claims from the FAC. (*Id.* at  
3 ¶ 8.) The FAC, as amended on April 5, 2024, is the operative complaint in the Action (the "Operative  
4 Complaint"). (*Id.*)

5 Defendant ardently opposes the merits of this case and denies Plaintiff's factual allegations. (*Id.*  
6 at ¶ 10.) Defendant denies any failure to comply with the applicable laws and denies any and all liability  
7 for the causes of action alleged. (*Id.*) Defendant maintains that all employees were properly paid for all  
8 hours worked and that it did not require or permit employees to work off-the-clock. (*Id.*) As for the regular  
9 rate claim, Defendant argues there was no issue with paying employees the proper regular rate of pay.  
10 (*Id.*) Defendant maintains that all employees were provided with the opportunity to take all their code-  
11 compliant meal and rest breaks and that missed breaks, if any, were solely the result of employees'  
12 voluntary choice. (*Id.*) As for the unreimbursed business expenses, Defendant maintains it did not require  
13 employees to incur any business-related expenses and/or properly reimbursed such expenses. (*Id.*) To the  
14 extent employees received wage statements that were allegedly inaccurate, Defendant argues penalties  
15 are not warranted because the underlying claims lack merit and/or employees suffered no actual damage  
16 or harm. (*Id.*; *see, e.g., Angeles v. U.S. Airways, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2013) No. C 12-05860 CRB,  
17 2013 WL 622032, at \*10 ["A plaintiff must adequately plead an injury arising from an employer's failure  
18 to provide full and accurate wage statements, and the omission of the required information alone is not  
19 sufficient."].) Additionally, Defendant alleges its good-faith belief that it paid all wages precludes the  
20 imposition of waiting time penalties because Plaintiff would be unable to show Defendant's alleged  
21 conduct was done willfully or knowingly and the underlying claims lack merit. (Moon Decl., ¶ 10; *see,*  
22 *e.g., Pedroza v. PetSmart, Inc.* (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2012) No. ED CV 11-298 GHK (DTBx), 2012 WL  
23 9506073, \*5.) For these reasons, Defendant claims it did not engage in any unfair business practices and  
24 denies liability under PAGA. (Moon Decl., ¶ 10.)

25 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

26 Prior to mediation, the Parties engaged in informal discovery exchange. (*Id.* at ¶ 11.) Defendant  
27 produced information and documents that enabled Plaintiff's Counsel to meaningfully investigate  
28

1 Plaintiff's allegations and assess the value of the PAGA claims. (*Id.*) Specifically, Defendant produced  
2 Plaintiff's personnel file and time and payroll records, documents regarding Defendant's written policies  
3 and practices in effect during the relevant period, and time and corresponding payroll records for the  
4 PAGA Employees. (*Id.*) The produced data covered 578 of the estimated 597 PAGA Employees  
5 (approximately 96.8% of all PAGA Employees) and included 160,276 shifts worked. (*Id.*)

6 Prior to mediation, Plaintiff's Counsel reviewed and analyzed all the information that Defendant  
7 produced, including the time/pay records and Defendant's written policies, in conjunction with  
8 information provided by Plaintiff. (*Id.* at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff's Counsel retained an expert, Berger Consulting  
9 Group, to analyze the time/pay records and prepare a damages analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*) The data  
10 sample covered approximately 96.8% of all PAGA Employees, which allowed the expert to prepare an  
11 analysis with a high degree of certainty. (*Id.*) Further, Plaintiff's Counsel investigated the applicable law  
12 regarding the claims and defenses asserted in this action. (*Id.*) Accordingly, Plaintiff's Counsel were able  
13 to evaluate the probability of success on the merits and Defendant's monetary exposure. (*Id.*) In sum,  
14 Plaintiff and her Counsel's familiarity with the facts of the case and the legal issues involved allowed  
15 them to act intelligently in negotiating the Settlement. (*Id.*)

### 16 C. **Settlement Negotiations**

17 On September 15, 2025, the Parties participated in a full day of private mediation facilitated by  
18 Michael Dickstein, Esq., an experienced class and PAGA action mediator. (*Id.* at ¶ 13.) The Parties did  
19 not reach a settlement at the September 15, 2025 mediation. (*Id.*) The Parties agreed to a further half-day  
20 mediation with Mr. Dickstein on November 3, 2025. (*Id.*) The negotiations were at arm's length and  
21 although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) Both sides went into mediation  
22 willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but they were also prepared to litigate their  
23 position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) The Parties were unable to  
24 reach a settlement at the November 3, 2025 mediation, but the Parties agreed to the mediator's proposal  
25 on November 21, 2025, which led to the Settlement at issue. (*Id.*) Following full discussion of the  
26 strengths and weaknesses of the claims and defenses, the Parties ultimately reached a resolution, the  
27 material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.*)

1 In reaching a resolution, the Parties recognized that the issues presented in this action are  
2 likely only to be resolved with extensive and costly pretrial and trial proceedings, and that further  
3 litigation will lead to inconvenience, distraction, disruption, delay, and expense disproportionate to  
4 the potential benefits of litigation. (*Id.* at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff and her Counsel also considered the risk and  
5 uncertainty of the outcome inherent in any litigation when determining whether this Settlement was  
6 the correct option. (*Id.*) In sum, Plaintiff and her Counsel believe the proposed Settlement is in the  
7 best interests of PAGA Employees and the LWDA. (*Id.*) In compliance with Labor Code section  
8 2699(s)(2), notice of settlement and a copy of the proposed Settlement has been submitted to  
9 the LWDA along with a copy of Plaintiff's motion and the hearing date. (*Id.* at ¶ 15, Ex. 3.) To  
10 date, the LWDA has not indicated any objection to the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 15.)

11 **D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

12 The Settlement's key financial and other terms include:

13 1. Gross Settlement Amount, Funding, Disbursement, and Uncashed Checks. The Gross  
14 Settlement Amount ("GSA") is \$420,000.00, subject to potential increase under an Escalator Clause and  
15 entry of the Court's Approval Order and is non-reversionary. (Settlement, ¶ 3.1.) Defendant will fund the  
16 Gross Settlement Amount by transmitting the funds to the Administrator no later than 30 calendar days  
17 after the Effective Date. (*Id.* at ¶ 4.1.) Within fourteen (14) calendar days after Defendant fully funds the  
18 Gross Settlement Amount, the Administrator will mail checks for all Individual PAGA Payments, the  
19 LWDA PAGA Payment, Plaintiff's Enhancement Award, the Administration Expenses Payment, the  
20 PAGA Counsel Fee Payment, and the PAGA Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment. (*Id.* at ¶ 4.2.) For  
21 any PAGA Employee whose Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void  
22 date (not less than 180 calendar days after the date of mailing), the Administrator shall transmit the funds  
23 represented by such checks to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the  
24 PAGA Employee who did not cash the check. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 4.2.1, 4.2.3.)

25 2. Escalator Clause. The Gross Settlement Amount was negotiated based on Defendant's  
26 estimation that there are 24,500 aggregate PAGA Pay Periods worked by approximately 597 PAGA  
27 Employees in the PAGA Period. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) The Settlement includes an Escalator Clause whereby,  
28

1 should the actual number of PAGA Pay Periods exceed 24,500 by more than ten percent (10%) (i.e., if  
2 the actual number of PAGA Pay Periods exceeds 26,950), Defendant shall have the option to either (i)  
3 proportionally increase the GSA by the percentage increase for each additional PAGA Pay Period above  
4 the escalator, or (ii) shorten the end date of the PAGA Period so that the total number of PAGA Pay  
5 Periods does not exceed 26,950. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 8.1–8.3.) Defendant shall confirm the actual pay period count  
6 and make any election within fourteen (14) calendar days after the Effective Date. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.3.)

7 3. Enhancement Award. The Settlement includes an Enhancement Award to Plaintiff in an  
8 amount up to \$5,000.00, payable from the GSA and in addition to the Individual PAGA Payment that  
9 Plaintiff is entitled to receive as an PAGA Employee. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.2.2.) This Enhancement Award is in  
10 recognition of Plaintiff's efforts and risks in assisting with the prosecution of the Action. (*Id.*) In the event  
11 the amount approved by the Court is less, the difference will be allocated to the Net Settlement Amount.  
12 (*Id.*)

13 4. Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The Settlement includes a PAGA Counsel Attorneys' Fees  
14 Payment in an amount not to exceed 33 1/3% of the GSA, which is currently estimated to be \$140,000.00  
15 and is subject to potential increase under the Escalator Clause, and a PAGA Counsel Litigation Expenses  
16 Payment not to exceed \$43,000.00, payable to Plaintiff's Counsel from the GSA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.2.1.) In the  
17 event actual costs are less and/or the amount of fees and costs approved by the Court are less than the  
18 amounts requested, the difference will be allocated to the Net Settlement Amount. (*Id.*)

19 5. Administration Costs. The Settlement provides an Administration Expenses Payment to the  
20 Administrator, payable from the GSA, in an amount up to \$20,000.00, for its fees and expenses in  
21 administering this Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.2.3.) In the event the amount of actual administration costs is  
22 less and/or the amount approved by the Court is less than requested, the difference will be allocated to  
23 the Net Settlement Amount. (Moon Decl., ¶ 19.) Following a competitive selection process, the Parties  
24 jointly selected Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions ("Phoenix") as the neutral entity to  
25 administer the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 1.2; Moon Decl., ¶ 20, Ex. 5; Declaration of Phoenix Class Action  
26 Administration Solutions Re: Qualifications and Costs for Settlement Administration, ¶ 21., Ex. B.)  
27  
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1           16. Net Settlement Amount. After deducting the Enhancement Award, PAGA Counsel Fees  
2 and Litigation Expenses Payments, and Administration Expenses Payment from the GSA, in the amounts  
3 specifically approved by the Court, any difference in the amounts requested and the amounts awarded  
4 will be allocated to the Net Settlement Amount as PAGA Penalties. (*Id.* at ¶ 1.14.) Accordingly, the Net  
5 Settlement Amount is estimated to be **\$228,508.79**,<sup>1</sup> which will be distributed 75% (i.e., no less than 75%  
6 x \$228,508.79 = **\$171,381.59**) to the LWDA and 25% (i.e., no less than 25% x \$228,508.79 =  
7 **\$57,127.20**) to PAGA Employees pursuant to PAGA law governing Plaintiff's claims.<sup>2</sup> (Moon Decl., ¶  
8 21.)

9           6. Individual PAGA Payments. Each PAGA Employee will be entitled to his or her pro rata  
10 share of 25% of the PAGA Penalties calculated according to the number of PAGA Pay Periods the PAGA  
11 Employee worked during the PAGA Period, without the need of submitting any claim as a condition for  
12 payment. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 1.15, 3.2.4.1.) This results in an average Individual PAGA Payment of roughly  
13 **\$95.69** for each of the estimated 597 PAGA Employees (\$53,000.00 / 597), and a PAGA Pay Period  
14 value of approximately **\$2.33** for each of the 24,500 estimated PAGA Pay Periods (\$53,000.00 /  
15 24,500). (Moon Decl., ¶ 22.) Individual PAGA Payments will be reported for tax purposes using IRS  
16 Form 1099. (*See* Settlement, ¶ 3.2.4.2.)

17           7. Released PAGA Claims. Upon entry of the Court's settlement approval order and  
18 Defendant's funding of the Gross Settlement Amount, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the State of  
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20           <sup>1</sup> The estimated Net Settlement Amount was calculated by deducting the following amounts from the  
21 GSA (\$420,000.00): \$5,000.00 for the Plaintiff Enhancement Award, \$40,491.21 for the PAGA Counsel  
22 Litigation Expenses Payment, \$140,000.00 for the PAGA Counsel Fees Payment, and \$6,000.00 for the  
23 Administration Costs. (Moon Decl., ¶ 21, n.1.) The Settlement provides for an estimated Net Settlement  
24 Amount of \$212,000.00 (*See* Settlement, ¶ 3.2.4.) The estimated amount is greater than the estimated  
25 amount provided in the Settlement because it includes the actual costs incurred by PAGA Counsel and  
26 estimated costs based on the Administrator's quote, whereas the Net Settlement Amount estimated under  
27 the Settlement includes the maximum PAGA Litigation Expenses Payment and maximum  
28 Administration Expenses Payment. (Moon Decl., ¶ 21, n.1.)

<sup>2</sup> On July 1, 2024, new legislation was enacted to amend PAGA in several respects, including as to  
the recovery split for civil penalties. (Stats. 2024, ch. 44 (Assem. Bill No. 2288), § 1, eff. Jul. 1, 2024.)  
As amended, PAGA now provides for a 65%-LWDA/35%-PAGA Employee split. (Lab. Code §  
2699(m).) However, PAGA reform only applies to PAGA actions initiated on or after June 19, 2024. (*Id.*  
at § 2699(v)(1).)

California, releases all claims arising under PAGA that were described in Plaintiff's pre-filing PAGA Notice to the LWDA, to the extent alleged in the Operative Complaint, including but not limited to claims for civil penalties under California Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203, 204 *et seq.*, 221, 225.5, 226, 226.7, 510, 512, 1174, 1174.5, 1194, 1194.2, 1195, 1197, 1198, and 2802, and the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order(s). (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5.1, 5.2.) The "Released Parties" are "Defendant Conrad Employer LLC and its present and former parent companies, subsidiaries, divisions, related or affiliated companies, predecessors, insurers, hotel ownership entities, shareholders, successors and assigns, and their current and former officers, directors, employees, agents, and attorneys thereof, both individually and in their business capacities, and their employee benefit plans and programs and the trustees, administrators, fiduciaries and insurers of such plans and programs." (*Id.* at ¶ 1.29.)

8. No Related Cases. To the best of Plaintiff's knowledge, there is no other pending litigation involving similar claims against Defendant that may be impacted by approval of the Settlement at issue, nor has Defendant pointed to any. (Moon Decl., ¶ 24.)

### **III. DISCUSSION**

#### **A. Availability of Civil Penalties**

The LWDA and its constituent departments and divisions are authorized to assess and collect civil penalties for specified violations of the Labor Code committed by an employer. With a stated goal of improving enforcement of existing Labor Code obligations, the California Legislature adopted the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, permitting, as an alternative, an PAGA Employee to initiate a private civil action on behalf of him- or herself and other current or former employees. (Lab. Code § 2699(a).) Before an employee may file an action seeking to recover civil penalties for violations of any of the Labor Code provisions enumerated in Labor Code section 2699.5, he or she must comply with the Act's administrative procedures as set forth in Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (a), which include providing notice to the LWDA and the employer of the alleged Labor Code violations, and then waiting a prescribed period of time to permit the LWDA to investigate and to decide whether to cite the employer for the alleged violations. (*Id.* at §§ 2699.3, 2699.5; *Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 370; *see also Dunlap v. Superior Court* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th

1 330.)

2 Here, in compliance with Labor Code section 2699.3, Plaintiff submitted notice of the  
3 Labor Code violations at issue to the LWDA, and she exhausted administrative remedies without  
4 the LWDA notifying any intent to investigate the claims. (Moon Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. 2.) Accordingly,  
5 Plaintiff is duly authorized to act as a private attorney general pursuant to PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.)

6 **B. The Settlement Merits Approval**

7 Settlement of PAGA claims must be approved by a Court. (Lab. Code § 2699(s)(2).) Here, the  
8 circumstances weigh heavily in favor of approval, as explained below.

9 **1. The Relief Is Genuine, Meaningful, and Consistent with the Dual Statutory Purposes of**  
10 **Deterrence and Punishment under PAGA**

11 The \$420,000.00 GSA amounts to “genuine and meaningful” relief “consistent with the  
12 underlying purpose of the statute to benefit the public.” (Moon Decl., ¶ 34; *see O’Connor*, 201  
13 F.Supp.3d at 1133–35 [denying settlement approval where allocation for PAGA claims was 0.1% of  
14 the estimated full worth].) This is an excellent result, particularly because, under the Settlement,  
15 PAGA Employees and the LWDA will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of not  
16 being able to recover anything at all. (Moon Decl., ¶ 34.)

17 The Settlement is a fair and reasonable resolution that satisfies PAGA’s dual statutory  
18 purposes of deterrence and punishment, on the one hand, and providing PAGA Employees with  
19 genuine and meaningful relief, on the other. (Lab. Code §§ 2698, *et seq.*) As a result of this  
20 litigation, Defendant has had to hire legal counsel, engage in employee-wide discovery, and  
21 participate in mediation. (Moon Decl., ¶ 35.) Assuming approval is granted, Defendant will also have  
22 to pay civil penalties pursuant to PAGA. (*Id.*) Not including its own attorneys’ fees and costs,  
23 Defendant will pay at least \$420,000.00 to resolve this matter, of which approximately  
24 \$228,508.79 is allocated toward PAGA Penalties and will be distributed as 75% to the LWDA and  
25 25% to PAGA Employees, in compliance with PAGA law governing the claims in this Action. (*See*  
26 *Settlement*, ¶ 3.2.4.) Additionally, the release obtained under the Settlement does not preclude  
27 PAGA Employees from pursuing any individual (non-PAGA) claims they may have against  
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1 Defendant or the other Released Parties. (*See id.* at ¶¶ 5.1, 5.2.)

2       **2. The Settlement Amount Provides a Realistic Value for the Claims that is within the**  
3       **“Ballpark” of Reasonableness**

4       There can be no doubt that this Settlement is the result of vigorous, adversarial, non-collusive,  
5 and arm’s-length negotiations between the Parties. (Moon Decl., ¶ 13.) Plaintiff’s Counsel performed an  
6 extensive investigation into the facts, claims, and defenses at issue and Defendant’s potential liability,  
7 including a review of governing law and analysis of informal discovery, including Defendant’s written  
8 policies and time/pay data for a substantial majority of PAGA Employees. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 11–12.) Plaintiff’s  
9 Counsel used the foregoing discovery and investigation to prepare for mediation and, with the assistance  
10 of a statistics expert, assessed the probability of success on the merits and Defendant’s monetary  
11 exposure, discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and defenses in depth at mediation and  
12 during continued negotiations, and ultimately negotiated the resulting Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 11–14.)

13       Based on Plaintiff’s Counsel’s analysis of the arguments and information provided by Defendant,  
14 on an expert analysis of the time and pay records, and on information from Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s Counsel  
15 evaluated Defendant’s both maximum (*optimistic*) and risk-adjusted (*realistic*) potential exposure in  
16 preparation for mediation. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Although the expert’s analysis revealed that the time and pay  
17 records supported several violations by Defendant, those identifiable violations carried significant  
18 limitations. (*Id.*) The records themselves did not provide strong support for the off-the-clock work, rest  
19 period, and expense reimbursement claims, and derivative penalties for those claims, as these claims are  
20 predominantly testimony based. (*Id.*) In other words, Plaintiff’s analysis revealed that certain claims  
21 were not as strong as originally believed. (*Id.*)

22       Because Defendant did not require employees to record rest periods, there are no records to  
23 establish the rest period claim on the merits. (*Id.* at ¶ 26.) Additionally, there are no records to establish  
24 the off-the-clock work claim and reimbursement claim on the merits. (*Id.*) Rather, proof of these claims  
25 would need to be supported by declarations from PAGA Employees regarding missed rest periods, off-  
26 the-clock work, and unreimbursed business expenses, as the records themselves cannot demonstrate  
27 what breaks were missed, when, and why, expenses incurred by PAGA Employees, and they cannot  
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1 demonstrate the time, if any, PAGA Employees spent working off the clock. (*Id.*)

2       Indeed, the maximum exposure figures that were calculated for mediation were based on  
3 assumed high violation rates that would not likely be demonstrated at trial, as they assume either the  
4 participation of all PAGA Employees (which would be difficult given the size of this group), or  
5 alternatively, the use of surveys or statistical data as a surrogate (which would still require the  
6 participation of a majority of PAGA Employees to establish a sound representation of all non-exempt  
7 employees). (*Id.* at ¶ 27.) The reality is that many, if not all, employees would be unwilling to participate  
8 due to fear of retaliation. (*Id.*) However, even assuming those employees would be willing to participate,  
9 obtaining such declarations would potentially reveal that each PAGA Employee had a different  
10 experience. (*Id.*) The individualized nature of their employment experience and the numerosity of  
11 employees affected present significant risk with manageability and proof on the merits. (*Id.*)

12       Even as to the regular rate and meal period claims, our analysis found that Defendant's exposure  
13 is less than initially believed. (*Id.* at ¶ 28.) A review of the time and pay records shows that approximately  
14 23.9% of shifts (net of premiums paid by Defendant) had a potential meal period violation. (*Id.*) The  
15 records also show that Defendant made some meal premium payments and that some potential violations  
16 were accompanied by meal waivers. (*Id.*) Defendant argues that its payment of meal premiums and use  
17 of meal waivers indicate that it did not intentionally fail to provide PAGA Employees with meal breaks.  
18 (*Id.*) Defendant also contends that many meal breaks were taken and, where a potential violation appears,  
19 it was a result of the employee voluntarily choosing to forego a meal period, to start a meal period late,  
20 or to end a meal period early. (*Id.*) As to the regular rate issue, the expert analysis found that overtime  
21 and additional compensation coincided in only approximately 3.6% of pay periods. (*Id.*) To the extent  
22 Defendant failed to incorporate additional remunerations into the regular rate of pay, which Defendant  
23 denies, Defendant also argues any such additional remuneration was discretionary and thus not required  
24 to be included in the regular rate calculation. (*Id.*). (*Id.*)

25       The likelihood that Defendant could assert viable legal defenses would likely further reduce its  
26 overall exposure. (*Id.* at ¶ 29.) For example, the individualized and testimony-intensive nature of the  
27 claims could bar manageability of this representative action or otherwise significantly reduce  
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1 Defendant's overall liability. (*Id.*) Further, a claim-by-claim penalty calculation is overly optimistic as it  
2 presumes Plaintiff would be able to stack the penalties, although penalty stacking is not expressly  
3 permitted by PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 30.) Rather, without either (i) a prior finding by the LWDA or a court within  
4 the past five years that the employer violated PAGA or (ii) evidence that the employer's conduct was  
5 malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive, PAGA only provides for a maximum \$100 penalty for each pay  
6 period. (Lab. Code § 2699(f)(2)(A)–(B).) Moreover, Plaintiff's Counsel believe it would be unrealistic  
7 to expect the Court to award the full (penalty-stacked) exposure given the discretionary nature of  
8 awarding penalties and given Defendant's defenses, including that any failure to pay premiums, regular  
9 rate wages, reimbursements, or for off-the-clock work was not knowingly or willfully done, and  
10 additionally, to the extent employees received wage statements that were allegedly inaccurate, employees  
11 suffered no actual resulting damage or harm. (Moon Decl., ¶ 30.) Moreover, awarding the full penalties  
12 amount would likely raise Due Process concerns. (*Id.*) For the foregoing reasons, the *realistic* exposure  
13 is thus far below the *optimistic* maximum estimate. (*Id.* at ¶ 31.)

14 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Counsel believe it is more reasonable to assess penalties on a  
15 \$100 civil penalty per pay period basis pursuant to Labor Code § 2699(f)(2)(A) for each of the  
16 estimated 24,500 pay periods at issue, as opposed to a claim-by-claim approach. (*Id.* at ¶ 32.)  
17 Accordingly, Plaintiff's Counsel estimate Defendant's maximum PAGA exposure to be **\$2,450,000.00**  
18 (\$100 x 24,500). (*Id.*) However, based on the discovery, Defendant's arguments at mediation and  
19 continued settlement discussions, an understanding that the claims are heavily dependent on the  
20 unlikely participation by PAGA Employees and their varying employment experience, and other  
21 important considerations discussed above, it is reasonable to assume a violation occurred only in at  
22 most one-fourth of all pay periods, which results in a realistic (*risk-adjusted*) exposure of  
23 approximately **\$612,500.00** (\$2,450,000.00 / 4). (*Id.*) As a result, the GSA of \$420,000.00 represents  
24 roughly **69%** of the realistic exposure (\$420,000.00 / \$612,500.00). (*Id.*)

25 The proposed Settlement therefore represents a substantial recovery when compared to the  
26 reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶ 33.) When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties  
27 involved in continued litigation, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, and the probability  
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of appeal, it is clear the GSA of \$420,000.00 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and that settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*; *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 133; *see Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A.* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408–09 [holding that *Kullar* does not require “an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims,” but instead, only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation”].)

### **3. The Settlement Is a Fair and Reasonable Result Following a Thorough Investigation and Accounting of Various Litigation Risks**

Plaintiff’s Counsel have conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of the allegations. (Moon Decl., ¶ 36.) Based on the foregoing discovery and on their own independent investigation and evaluation, Plaintiff’s Counsel are of the opinion that the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (*Id.*) Furthermore, considering all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, trial risk, appellate risk, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant on the merits, the Settlement is in the best interests of the PAGA Employees and the State of California. (*Id.*)

Although Plaintiff’s Counsel believe there is merit to Plaintiff’s allegations, they also acknowledge a legitimate controversy exists as to each allegation. (*Id.* at ¶ 37.) Plaintiff’s Counsel also recognize that proving the amounts of penalties owed to each PAGA Employee would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*) Moreover, Plaintiff’s Counsel are also of the opinion that because the issues here are fairly contested, there is a possibility of the Court not awarding PAGA penalties even if Plaintiff prevailed on the merits due to the largely discretionary nature of awarding PAGA penalties. (*Id.* at ¶ 38.) Indeed, a Court may reduce PAGA penalties “if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.” (Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2).) In other words, were this matter to go to trial, any award granted would be at the discretion of the Court and subject to a substantial reduction. (Moon Decl., ¶ 38.) While Plaintiff’s Counsel believe there would be no persuasive grounds to reduce penalties, they recognize that the Court could determine otherwise and significantly reduce any award of penalties. (*Id.* at ¶ 39.) This wide range of

1 potential recovery and additional delays and risks of trial provide justification to settle for a reasonable  
2 amount of recovery at this point in the litigation. (*Id.*)

3 Plaintiff's Counsel took into account the risk of not being able to proceed on a representative  
4 basis at all due to the potential manageability issues, the risk of not prevailing at trial, and the risk that  
5 even if Plaintiff prevailed at trial, the penalties would be limited due to the largely discretionary nature  
6 of awarding PAGA penalties. (*Id.* at ¶ 40.) The provisions of the Labor Code triggering PAGA  
7 penalties in this case include Labor Code sections 203, 210, 226, 1197.1, and 2802. (*Id.*) However,  
8 PAGA penalties are not mandatory, but rather, permissive. (Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2).) Accordingly,  
9 it is entirely possible that even if Plaintiff would be successful at trial, Plaintiff may still be awarded  
10 substantially less than what was obtained through the Settlement. (Moon Decl., ¶ 40.)

11 The Settlement avoids the significant risks, burdens, and the accompanying expense of further  
12 litigation. (*Id.* at ¶ 41.) Though the Parties have engaged in a significant amount of investigation,  
13 informal discovery, and employee data analysis, they have not participated in formal discovery  
14 procedures, including depositions and expert discovery. (*Id.*) Preparation for trial and the prospect of  
15 appeals in the wake of any summary judgment ruling would remain for the Parties. (*Id.*) As a result,  
16 the Parties would incur considerably more attorneys' fees and costs through trial, a lengthy and  
17 uncertain process that could result in recovering less than was settled for. (*Id.*)

18 **C. The Enhancement Award to Plaintiff Is Reasonable and Should Be Approved**

19 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they  
20 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is codified  
21 in California Labor Code section 90.5, which provides, "[i]t is the policy of this state to vigorously  
22 enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to work  
23 under substandard unlawful conditions . . . ." (Lab. Code § 90.5.) Nonetheless, the California Supreme  
24 Court has noted that "retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code  
25 is widespread," despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.*  
26 (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460–61.) In this context, PAGA representatives should be rewarded for  
27 assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of PAGA Employees.

1 Here, in line with the Settlement and subject to the Court’s approval, Plaintiff requests an  
2 Enhancement Award of \$5,000.00. (Settlement, ¶ 3.2.2.) Plaintiff and her Counsel respectfully submit  
3 that the requested enhancement is reasonable in recognition of Plaintiff’s role as the named Plaintiff  
4 and PAGA Representative, for the risks to future employment inherent in undertaking this role and for  
5 her service and participation in litigation that resulted in a fair settlement under PAGA. (Moon Decl.,  
6 ¶¶ 42–45; Declaration of Plaintiff Alicia Esquivel in Support of Motion for Approval of PAGA  
7 Settlement, ¶¶ 16–19.)

8 **D. The Requested Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable and Should Be Approved**

9 In line with the Settlement, my firm requests an award of attorneys’ fees in an amount  
10 of one-third of the GSA (i.e., \$140,000.00, subject to potential increase under the Escalator  
11 Clause), plus reimbursement for actual litigation costs not to exceed \$43,000.00. (Moon Decl.,  
12 ¶ 60; *see* Settlement, ¶ 3.2.1.)

13 **1. Plaintiff’s Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the Common Fund Method**

14 California courts have long awarded attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the benefit created by  
15 counsel in pursuing claims on behalf of a class. (*See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25.) The  
16 California Supreme Court has held, “when a number of persons are entitled in common to a specific fund,  
17 and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation  
18 of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs may be awarded attorney’s fees out of the fund.” (*Id.* at p. 34.)

19 Here, Plaintiff’s Counsel seek an award of attorneys’ fees on the “percentage of  
20 recovery/common fund” theory. (Moon Decl., ¶ 61.) The purpose of this approach is to “spread litigation  
21 costs proportionately among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire  
22 burden alone.” (*Vincent v. Hughes Air W., Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of*  
23 *Cal.* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated, “one who expends attorneys’ fees in  
24 winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits, may require those passive  
25 beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs.” (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of*  
26 *San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common  
27 fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a  
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1 fund in which other persons[ ] are entitled to share.” (*Id.* at pp. 110–11 [pincite omitted].) The reasons  
2 for applying this doctrine include:

3 fairness to the successful litigant, who might otherwise receive no benefit because his  
4 recovery might be consumed by the expenses; correlative prevention of an unfair  
5 advantage to the others who are entitled to share in the fund and who should bear their  
6 share of the burden of its recovery; encouragement of the attorney for the successful  
7 litigant, who will be more willing to undertake and diligently prosecute proper litigation  
8 for the protection or recovery of the fund if he is assured that he will be properly and  
9 directly compensated should his efforts be successful.

10 (*Id.* at p. 111.)

11 Several courts have expressed frustration with the alternative “lodestar” approach for deciding  
12 fee awards, which usually involves wading through voluminous and often indecipherable time records.  
13 Commenting on the lodestar approach, Chief Judge Marilyn Hall Patel wrote in *In re Activision Securities*  
14 *Litigation* (N.D. Cal. 1989) 723 F.Supp. 1373:

15 **This court is compelled to ask, “Is this process necessary?” Under a cost-benefit**  
16 **analysis, the answer would be a resounding, “No!”** Not only do the *Lindy* and *Kerr–*  
17 *Johnson* analyses consume an undue amount of court time with little resulting advantage to  
18 anyone, but, in fact, it may be to the detriment of the class members.

19 (*Id.* at p. 1375 [emphasis added].) The percentage approach is preferable to the lodestar because: (1) it  
20 aligns the interests of class counsel and absent class members; (2) it encourages efficient resolution of  
21 the litigation by providing an incentive for early, yet reasonable, settlement; and (3) it reduces the  
22 demands on judicial resources. (*Id.* at pp. 1378–79.) California Courts now routinely use the percentage  
23 of the common fund approach to determine the award of attorney’s fees. (*See, e.g., In re Pac. Enter.*  
24 *Sec. Litig.* (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 373, 378–79 [approving attorneys’ fee award of 33%.])

## 25 **2. The Matter Involves a Fee and Cost Shifting Provision under PAGA**

26 Labor Code section 2699 provides for the recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees as well as costs  
27 of suit. (Lab. Code § 2699(k)(1).) Specifically, it states: “Any employee who prevails in any [PAGA]  
28 action shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs . . .” (*Id.*) Under this provision,  
Plaintiff would be permitted to recover her actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were larger than the  
total recovery for the PAGA Employees at the conclusion of this case. (*Id.*) This fee/cost-shifting

1 provision reflects the understanding that Plaintiff's Counsel must accept significant risk of substantial  
2 expenses and consumption of time, energy, and other resources in litigating a PAGA claim, and thus, that  
3 Plaintiff's Counsel is not only permitted, but entitled, to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs if  
4 successful in litigating a PAGA claim.

5 The Settlement at issue is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and  
6 consumption of time, energy, and resources facing Defendant while at the same time rewarding Plaintiff's  
7 Counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action  
8 involved significant financial risk for Plaintiff's Counsel who undertook this matter on a contingent basis,  
9 with no guarantee of recovery. (Moon Decl., ¶¶ 66–69.) Once Plaintiff's Counsel undertook this litigation  
10 on behalf of the PAGA Employees, they committed to pursue it to its conclusion, and were accordingly  
11 precluded from focusing on, or taking on, other cases which could have resulted in a larger, and  
12 less risky, monetary gain. (*Id.* at ¶ 67.)

### 13 **3. Counsel's Experience, Reputation, and Ability Support the Requested Fee Award**

14 As demonstrated by their prior experience in pursuing class and representative actions on behalf  
15 of employees, Plaintiff's Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class action and  
16 representative matters. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 46–57.) Plaintiff's Counsel have been involved as lead counsel or co-  
17 counsel in a multitude of class and representative actions resulting in beneficial results to class members  
18 and PAGA Employees in California. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate Plaintiff's Counsel  
19 commensurate with their skill, reputation, and experience, the requested fee award is supported here.

20 Plaintiff's Counsel's experience in wage-and-hour class and representative actions was integral  
21 in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of this  
22 Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 58.) Practice in the narrow field of wage-and-hour litigation requires skill and  
23 knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural  
24 law of representative action litigation. (*Id.* at ¶ 56.) Based on these and other factors, Plaintiff's Counsel  
25 have frequently received fee awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for PAGA Employees.  
26 (*See id.* at ¶¶ 50, 52, 56, 59.) Thus, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

1           **4. While the Lodestar Method Is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, the Court May**  
2           **Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees**

3           “Despite its primacy, the lodestar method is not necessarily utilized in common fund cases.”  
4           (*Lealao v. Beneficial Cal., Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 27.) Courts have criticized the lodestar  
5           method as a drain on the judicial system and a disincentive on attorneys to take on high-risk, challenging  
6           cases. (*Id.* at p. 29.) Indeed, the lodestar approach: “(1) ‘increases the workload of an already overtaxed  
7           judicial system,’ (2) is ‘insufficiently objective and produce[s] results that are far from homogenous,’ (3)  
8           ‘creates a sense of mathematical precision that is unwarranted in terms of the realities of the practice of  
9           law,’ (4) ‘is subject to manipulation by judges who prefer to calibrate fees in terms of percentages of the  
10          settlement fund or the amounts recovered by the plaintiffs or of an overall dollar amount,’ (5) ‘encourages  
11          lawyers to expend excessive hours, and . . . engage in duplicative and unjustified work,’ (6) ‘creates a  
12          disincentive for the early settlement of cases,’ (7) deprives trial courts of ‘flexibility to reward or deter  
13          lawyers so that desirable objectives, such as early settlement, will be fostered,’ (8) ‘works to the particular  
14          disadvantage of the public interest bar,’ and (9) results in ‘confusion and lack of predictability.’” (*Id.*  
15          [quoting Third Circuit Task Force, *Court Awarded Attorney Fees* (1985) 108 F.R.D. 237, 246–  
16          49].)

17          Although California Courts support the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be used  
18          to cross-check fee awards. “It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit can be  
19          monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to ‘cross-check’ or adjust the lodestar in comparison to  
20          a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and within the range of  
21          fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.” (*In re Consumer Privacy*  
22          *Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557 [quoting *Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th at pp. 49–50].)  
23          Applying the lodestar method is a two-step process. The first step is to multiply the number of hours  
24          reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate, and the second step is to apply a multiplier to the  
25          lodestar to account for various factors. (*Id.* at p. 556.) “The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at  
26          the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the  
27          litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the  
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1 unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (*Id.*) “Under certain  
2 circumstances, a lodestar calculation may be enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit  
3 analysis.” (*Id.* at pp. 556–57.)

4 Further, “California case law permits fee awards in the absence of detailed time sheets.”  
5 (*Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 255.) The Court “should defer to  
6 the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on  
7 the case.” (*Moreno v. City of Sacramento* (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1106, 1112.) Generally, hours  
8 are reasonable if they were “reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved in  
9 the same manner that an attorney traditionally is compensated by a fee-paying client.” (*Hensley*  
10 *v. Eckerhart* (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 431.)

11 Here, Plaintiff’s Counsel current lodestar is *no less than* **\$74,290.00**, which is based on *no less*  
12 *than* **91.2 hours** of attorney time spent to-date at their customary hourly rates. (Moon Decl., ¶ 62.) Thus,  
13 in comparison to this lodestar, the fee request represents a **1.88** multiplier. (*Id.* at ¶ 65.c.) The foregoing  
14 lodestar does not reflect additional work that will be devoted to this litigation, including to obtain and  
15 monitor approval of the Settlement and requested awards, oversee the settlement administration  
16 process and distribution of funds, respond to inquiries, and communicate with Plaintiff  
17 regarding the case. (*Id.* at ¶ 63.) The amount of fees requested under the Settlement is warranted based  
18 on the contingent risk that Plaintiff’s Counsel incurred, the difficulty of the questions involved, the  
19 substantial benefit conferred on the PAGA Employees and State of California as a result of the  
20 Settlement, and the skill displayed by Plaintiff’s Counsel. (*Id.* at ¶ 65.) Plaintiff’s Counsel also bear the  
21 risk of taking whatever actions are necessary if Defendant fails to pay. (*Id.* at ¶ 63.) Thus, the request  
22 for attorneys’ fees is more than reasonable under a lodestar check.

### 23 **5. Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Costs Were Actually and Reasonably Incurred**

24 Winning counsel are entitled to recover the out-of-pocket costs and expenses they  
25 reasonably incurred in investigating, prosecuting, and settling a case. (*Staton v. Boeing Co.* (9th  
26 Cir. 2003) 327 F.3d 938, 974; Lab. Code § 2699(k)(1).) Here, Plaintiff’s Counsel seek  
27 reimbursement for expenses that were actually and reasonably incurred in this litigation, in the  
28

1 amount of \$40,492.21. (Moon Decl., ¶¶ 19, 70, Ex. 4.) This amount is below the maximum  
2 allocation under the Settlement and any remainder will revert to the PAGA Penalties. (*Id.* at ¶  
3 70; Settlement, ¶ 3.2.1.) Thus, costs should be reimbursed in full.

4 **IV. CONCLUSION**

5 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court grant approval of the  
6 Settlement and enter the proposed approval order and proposed judgment submitted herewith.

7 Respectfully submitted,

8 DATED: June 15, 2026

**MOON LAW GROUP, PC**

9 By:

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