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10 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**
11 **FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE**

12 ROBERTO DAVIS and REGINALD BRUCE
13 TYLER, JR., individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, and on behalf of the
14 State of California and other aggrieved persons,

15 *Plaintiffs,*

16 v.

17 EMPIRE CHAUFFEUR SERVICE, LTD., a
California corporation; CLS
18 TRANSPORTATION LOS ANGELES, LLC; a
California corporation; and DOES 1 through 10,
19 inclusive,

20 *Defendants.*

Case No.: 23STCV15371

*[Assigned for All Purposes to the Hon.
Samantha P. Jessner, Dept. 7]*

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND
PAGA SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

Preliminary Approval Hearing:

Date: May 6, 2026

Time: 11:00 a.m.

Dept: 7

Action Filed: June 30, 2023

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 6, 2026, at 11:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department 7 of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Spring Street Courthouse, located at 312 N. Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, Plaintiffs Roberto Davis and Reginald Bruce Tyler, Jr. (collectively “Plaintiffs”) will and hereby do move this Court for an Order:

1. Granting preliminary approval of the proposed Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Settlement”);
2. Conditionally certifying the proposed Class for settlement purposes only;
3. Appointing Plaintiffs Roberto Davis and Reginald Bruce Tyler, Jr. as the Class Representatives;
4. Appointing John G. Yslas, Jeffrey C. Bils, Emily K. Borman, and Courtney M. Miller of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel;
5. Appointing ILYM Group Inc. as the Settlement Administrator; and
6. Setting a final approval hearing date.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(d) and (e), this Motion is made on the grounds that the proposed Settlement satisfies all criteria for preliminary approval and falls well within the range of reasonableness. The Settlement was reached through informed, arm’s length bargaining between experienced attorneys with the assistance of an experienced neutral, and Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ Counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Class.

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This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of John G. Yslas, the Declaration of Roberto Davis, the Declaration of Reginald Bruce Tyler, Jr., the Declaration of Lisa Mullins, and on all records and documents on file, together with such oral and documentary evidence that may be presented at the hearing on this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: January 28, 2026

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: /s/ Courtney M. Miller
Courtney M. Miller
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(d) and (e), Plaintiffs Roberto Davis and Reginald Bruce Tyler, Jr. (collectively “Plaintiffs”) seek preliminary approval of a class action settlement of wage and hour claims, including representative claims brought under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”), against Defendants Empire Chauffeur Service, Ltd. and CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (collectively “Defendants”). The proposed Class is defined as all persons who worked for Defendants in California as non-exempt hourly paid chauffeurs (“Class Members”) at any time from January 3, 2019, through May 30, 2025 (“Class Period”). The main terms of the Settlement are as follows:

1. A Gross Settlement Amount of \$865,000.00, which will be distributed to approximately 334 Class Members on a pro rata basis according to the total Workweeks worked by each Class Member during the Class Period;
2. Attorneys’ fees of up to one third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently estimated to be \$288,333.33) and up to \$30,000.00 in reimbursement of litigation costs to Plaintiffs’ Counsel;
3. A Class Representative Service Payment of up to \$10,000.00 to each Plaintiff (\$20,000.00 total);
4. Costs of settlement administration of up to \$6,950.00; and
5. Allocation of \$40,000.00 to PAGA penalties, seventy-five percent (75%) of which (\$30,000.00) will be paid to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”), and twenty-five percent (25%) of which (\$10,000.00) will be paid to all persons who worked for Defendants in California as non-exempt hourly paid chauffeurs in the State of California (“Aggrieved Employees”) at any time from November 3, 2022, through May 30, 2025 (“PAGA Period”).

The Settlement meets all criteria for preliminary approval and falls within the range of reasonableness given the risks and expenses of further litigation. The Settlement was reached through informed, arm’s length bargaining between experienced attorneys with the assistance of

1 an experienced neutral. As such, Plaintiffs request that the Court grant preliminary approval of the
2 Settlement, conditionally certify the Class for settlement purposes only, appoint Plaintiffs as the
3 Class Representatives, appoint Plaintiffs' Counsel as Class Counsel, appoint ILYM Group Inc. as
4 the Settlement Administrator, authorize the Settlement Administrator to administer notice of the
5 Settlement to the Class, and set a final approval hearing date.

6 **II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

7 On June 30, 2023, Plaintiff Roberto Davis filed this putative class action against Defendants
8 Empire Chauffeur Service, Ltd. and CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (collectively
9 "Defendants") alleging: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay
10 overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods;
11 (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage
12 statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; (8) failure to produce requested
13 employment records; and (9) unfair business practices, in the Superior Court of California, County
14 of Los Angeles, Case No. 23STCV15371 ("Class Action"). Declaration of John G. Yslas in
15 Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement
16 ("Yslas Decl.") at ¶ 3.

17 On November 3, 2023, Plaintiff Roberto Davis provided written notice to the LWDA and
18 Defendants of the specific provisions the Labor Code alleged to have been violated, including the
19 facts and theories in support. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 4, Exhibit 1. The LWDA did not notify Plaintiff
20 Roberto Davis that it intended to investigate within 65 days of this written notice. Yslas Decl. at ¶
21 4. Therefore, on February 15, 2024, Plaintiff Roberto Davis filed a separate action against
22 Defendants for civil penalties under PAGA, in the Superior Court of California, County of Los
23 Angeles, Case No. 24STCV03861 ("PAGA Action"). *Id.* On April 17, 2025, Plaintiffs provided
24 amended written notice to the LWDA and Defendants of the specific provisions the Labor Code
25 alleged to have been violated, including the facts and theories in support. *Id.*, Exhibit 2. On July
26 15, 2024, the Court deemed this Class Action related to the PAGA Action, with the Class Action
27 being the lead case. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 4.

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On September 23, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint in this Class Action, which added a named plaintiff and a cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 5.

On February 26, 2025, the Parties participated in a private full-day mediation with mediator Gig Kyriacou (“Mr. Kyriacou”). Yslas Decl. at ¶ 6. The negotiations were adversarial, conducted at arm’s length, and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interests of their clients. *Id.* With the help of Mr. Kyriacou, the Parties were able to reach an agreement on general settlement terms at the mediation and executed a Memorandum of Understanding thereafter. *Id.* The Parties negotiated the terms of the Settlement over the next few months, which was finalized in December 2025. *Id.* at ¶ 7, Exhibit 3 (“Settlement Agreement”). On January 28, 2026, Plaintiffs submitted a copy of the Settlement Agreement to the LWDA. *Id.* at ¶ 8, Exhibit 5.

III. SUMMARY OF THE SETTLEMENT TERMS

A. Terms of the Proposed Settlement

The parties have agreed to settle the claims alleged in this Class Action and PAGA Action for a Gross Settlement Amount of \$865,000.00. Settlement Agreement at § 3.1. Subject to Court approval, the following payments will be deducted from the Gross Settlement Amount: (1) a Class Representative Service Payment of up to \$10,000.00 to each Plaintiff (\$20,000.00 total); (2) attorneys’ fees of up to one third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently estimated to be \$288,333.33) and reimbursement of litigation costs of up to \$30,000.00 to Plaintiffs’ Counsel; (3) costs of settlement administration of up to \$6,950.00 to ILYM Group Inc.; (4) individual class payments to Class Members; and (5) PAGA penalties in the amount of \$40,000.00, which will be allocated 75% to the LWDA (\$30,000.00) and 25% to Aggrieved Employees (\$10,000.00). *Id.* at § 3.2. After all requested deductions are made, the remaining Net Settlement Amount is currently estimated to be \$479,716.67. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 21.

Individual class payments will be calculated based on the number of workweeks worked by each Class Member during the Class Period. Settlement Agreement at § 3.2.4. For tax purposes, the individual class payments will be allocated 20% to wages and 80% to interest, reimbursement, and penalties. *Id.* at § 3.2.4.1. Defendants will separately pay any and all employer payroll taxes

1 owed on the wage positions of the individual class payments separate from the Gross Settlement
2 Amount. *Id.* at 3.1.

3 Individual PAGA Payments to Aggrieved Employees will be calculated based on the
4 number of PAGA Pay Periods worked by each Aggrieved Employee during the PAGA Period. *Id.*
5 at § 3.2.5.1. For tax purposes, the Individual PAGA Payments will be allocated 100% to penalties.
6 *Id.* at § 3.2.5.2.

7 Any deductions not approved by the Court will be retained by the Settlement Administrator
8 in the Net Settlement Amount. *Id.* at § 3.2. Funds from any uncashed checks will be transmitted
9 by the Settlement Administrator to the California Controller’s Unclaimed Property Fund in the
10 name of the Class Member thereby leaving no “unpaid residue.” *Id.* at § 4.3.3. None of the Gross
11 Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant. *Id.* at § 3.1.

12 **B. Proposed Settlement Administration**

13 The parties’ proposed Class Notice complies with the requirements of California Rules of
14 Court, Rule 3.766(d). *See* Exhibit A to Settlement Agreement. It provides information regarding
15 the nature of this lawsuit, a summary of the settlement terms, the formula used for calculating
16 individual class and PAGA payments and instructions to dispute the calculations, instructions on
17 how to opt-out of or object to the Settlement, the date, time, and location of the final approval
18 hearing, and the amounts sought for the class representative service payment, attorneys’ fees and
19 litigation costs, and settlement administration costs. *See generally, id.* The Class Notice also
20 notifies Class Members that they do not need to submit a claim in order to participate in the
21 Settlement and receive a payment. *See id.* The Settlement Administrator will mail Class Members
22 the Class Notice by first-class mail. Settlement Agreement at § 7.4.2.

23 If a Class Notice is returned as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator will re-mail the
24 Class Notice within five (5) days to the forwarding address provided by the U.S. Postal Service.
25 *Id.* at § 7.4.3. If no forwarding address is provided, the Settlement Administrator will conduct a
26 Class Member Address Search and re-mail the Class Notice to the most current address obtained.
27 *Id.* The deadline to opt-out of the Settlement or to submit an objection or dispute will be extended
28 by 14 days for all Class Members whose Class Notice was remailed. *Id.* at § 7.4.4.

1 **C. Proposed Releases**

2 Effective on the date when Defendants fully funds the Gross Settlement Amount and all
3 employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments, Plaintiffs,
4 Class Members, and Class Counsel will release claims against all Released Parties as follows:

5 Released Class Claims:

6 The Class Released Claims shall encompass the claims set forth in the Operative
7 Complaint, including, but not limited to: (1) Failure to pay wages including
8 minimum and straight time wages; (2) Failure to pay overtime wages; (3) Failure to
9 provide meal periods; (4) Failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) Failure to
10 timely pay final wages at termination; (6) Failure to provide accurate itemized wage
11 statements; (7) Failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; (8) failure to
12 produce requested employment records; and (9) Violation of Business and
13 Professions Code § 17200, *et seq.*, and those claims predicated on the same or
14 similar facts and/or claims alleged in the Action as well as any claims that could
15 have been pled which arise from the same or similar facts concerning the Plaintiffs
16 or the putative class, and claims for interest, penalties (including but not limited to
17 wage statement and waiting time penalties), as well as any claims under the
18 California Labor Code and California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders
19 (specifically for violations of Labor Code sections 98.6, 201, 201.3, 202, 203, 204,
20 210, 216, 223, 226, 226.3, 226.7, 227.3, 232, 232.5, 245-248.5, 432, 432.5, 432.7,
21 510, 512, 558, 558.1, 1024.5, 1102.5, 1197.5, 1527, 1174, 1174.5, 1194, 1194.2,
22 1197 *et seq.*, 1197.1, 1198, 1198.5, 1199, 1527, 2802, 2810.5, 3366, 3457, 6401,
23 8397.4, and applicable IWC Wage Orders, and California Code of Regulations, Title
24 8, section 11000 *et seq.*; or which could have been alleged under the same or similar
25 facts, allegations and/or claims pleaded in the Operative Complaint; (collectively
26 the “Released Class Claims”).

27 Settlement Agreement at § 5.2.

28 Released PAGA Claims:

 The PAGA Released Claims shall encompass the claims set forth in the Operative
Complaint, including all claims alleged in the PAGA Notice sent to the LWDA by
Plaintiffs in or prior to the Action seeking penalties pursuant to the California
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Labor Code §§ 2698, *et seq.*) based on
alleged violations of the California Labor Code, including, but not limited to: (1)
Failure to pay wages including minimum, straight time, and overtime wages; (2)
Failure to provide meal periods; (3) Failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (4)
failure to pay all earned wages twice per month; (5) failure to maintain accurate
records of hours worked and meal periods; (6) Failure to timely pay final wages at
termination; (7) Failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (8) Failure
to indemnify employees for expenditures; (9) failure to produce requested
employment records; and (10) unlawful non-competition and/or non-solicitation
provisions, any claims for violations of Labor Code sections 98.6, 201, 201.3, 202,
203, 204, 210, 216, 223, 226, 226.3, 226.7, 227.3, 232, 232.5, 245-248.5, 432,
432.5, 432.7, 510, 512, 558, 558.1, 1024.5, 1102.5, 1197.5, 1527, 1174, 1174.5,
1194, 1194.2, 1197 *et seq.*, 1197.1, 1198, 1198.5, 1199, 1527, 2698 *et seq.*, 2802,
2810.5, 3366, 3457, 6401, and 8397.4, and those claims predicated on the same or
similar facts any PAGA letter sent to the LWDA by Plaintiffs in or prior to the
Action, as well as any claims that could have been pled which arise from the same

or similar facts concerning the Plaintiffs or the PAGA Employees; (collectively the “Released PAGA Claims”).

Settlement Agreement at § 5.3.

“Released Parties” means “Defendants and any of their past, present and future direct or indirect parents, subsidiaries, predecessors, successors and affiliates, as well as each of their past, present and future officers, directors, employees, partners, members, shareholders and agents, attorneys, insurers, reinsurers, and any individual or entity which could be jointly liable with Defendants.” Settlement Agreement at § 1.42.

Only Plaintiffs will agree to a general release and a waiver of Civil Code § 1542. *Id.* at §§ 5.1, 5.1.1.

IV. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT MEETS ALL CRITERIA FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL

A. Provisional Certification of the Class is Appropriate

Class certification is appropriate when there is: (1) an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class; (2) a well-defined community of interest among class members; and (3) substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives. *Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021 (2012). Although courts still need to review and consider each element for certification, a lesser standard can be used to provisionally certify a settlement class. *Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court*, 113 Cal.App.4th 836, 859 (2003).

1. The Proposed Class is Numerous and Ascertainable

“Ascertainability” is determined by examining the class definition and the size of the class, and may also involve examining the means available to identify class members. *Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.*, 7 Cal.5th 955, 980-981, 985-986 (2019). As the settlement eliminates the need for trial, “the case management issues inherent in the ascertainable class determination need not be confronted.” *Global Minerals*, 113 Cal.App.4th at 859. Further, under California law, there is no minimum number of class members for maintenance of a class action. *Hendershot v. Ready to Roll Transp., Inc.*, 228 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1222 (2014). Class sizes as small as 10 have been permitted.

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1 *Rose v. City of Hayward*, 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934 (1981), disapproved on other grounds by *Noel*,
2 7 Cal.5th at 986.

3 The Class here consists of all persons who worked for Defendants in California as non-
4 exempt hourly paid chauffeurs at any time during the Class Period. *See* Settlement Agreement at
5 § 1.5. The Class is also readily ascertainable from Defendants’ business records, because all Class
6 Members are or were employees of Defendants. *Id.* Defendants’ records show there are
7 approximately 334 Class Members, making joinder of all Class Members impracticable. Yslas
8 Decl. at ¶ 10.

9 **2. A Well-Defined Community of Interest Exists**

10 The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common
11 questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and
12 (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. *Brinker*, 53 Cal.4th at 1021.

13 **a. Common Questions Predominate**

14 In determining whether common issues “predominate,” courts consider both plaintiff’s
15 legal theories and defendant’s affirmative defenses. *Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n*, 59 Cal.4th 1,
16 28-29 (2014). The “predominate common questions” factor does not require that all class members
17 have identical claims. *Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc.*, 59 Cal.4th 522, 530 (2014).
18 Rather, the focus is on whether issues shared by the class members are sufficiently uniform to
19 permit class-wide assessment, and whether individual variations in proof on those issues are
20 manageable. *Id.*

21 Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants maintained common employment policies and/or
22 practices that unlawfully deprived Class Members of wages, meal periods, rest periods,
23 reimbursements for business expenses, accurate wage statements, timely payment of wages upon
24 separation of employment, and timely production of employment records. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 11.
25 These allegations present common factual and legal questions of, *inter alia*, whether Defendants
26 applied the same scheduling, timekeeping, pay, meal period, rest period, reimbursement, and
27 employment record production policies to all Class Members, whether these policies and practices
28 resulted in Labor Code violations, whether Defendants’ conduct was intentional, and whether Class

1 Members are entitled to damages and/or penalties. *Id.* These common questions could be resolved
2 using Class Members’ time records, payroll records, testimony from Defendants’ designated
3 representative(s), and Class Members’ testimony. *Id.* Therefore, the Court can and should exercise
4 its discretion to grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes.

5 **b. Plaintiffs are Typical of the Class**

6 Typicality does not require that the representative plaintiff’s claims and those of the class
7 members be identical or perfectly aligned. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224,
8 228 (2001), disapproved on other grounds by *Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.*, 4 Cal.5th
9 260, 269-280 (2018). Typicality does not require that a plaintiff’s claims be identical to those of
10 other class members, only that their claims and the defenses applicable to them are sufficiently
11 similar to those of other class members that a named plaintiff is able to adequately represent the
12 class and focus on common issues. *Medraza v. Honda of North Hollywood*, 166 Cal.App.4th 89,
13 99 (2008).

14 Plaintiffs have alleged that they and Class Members were employed by the same
15 Defendants and injured by Defendants’ common wage and hour policies and practices, including
16 Defendants’ scheduling, timekeeping, pay, meal period, rest period, reimbursement, and
17 employment record production policies. *See* Yslas Decl. at ¶ 11. Through informal discovery,
18 Plaintiffs confirmed that these challenged policies and practices applied to Plaintiffs and Class
19 Members alike. *See id.* at ¶ 9. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims and Class Members’ claims arise from
20 the same challenged employment policies and practices and are based on the same legal theories.

21 **c. Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ Counsel Will Adequately Represent the**
22 **Class**

23 Certification requires adequacy of both the proposed class representative and of the
24 proposed class counsel. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 382. “Only a conflict that goes to the very subject
25 matter of the litigation will defeat a party’s claim of representative status.” *Richmond v. Dart*
26 *Industries*, 29 Cal.3d 462, 470 (1981). Only conflicts that are “irreconcilable” can defeat adequacy.
27 *Nat’l Solar Equip. Owners’ Ass’n v. Grumman Corp.*, 235 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1286 (1991). The
28 proposed representative Plaintiffs and proposed Class Counsel present no such conflict.

1 Plaintiffs' interests are coextensive with Class Members' interests. Declaration of Roberto
2 Davis in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA
3 Settlement ("Davis Decl.") at ¶ 6; Declaration of Reginald Bruce Tyler, Jr. in Support of Plaintiffs'
4 Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement ("Tyler Decl.") at ¶ 6.
5 Plaintiffs have demonstrated an ability to advocate for the interests of Class Members by initiating
6 this lawsuit, providing information to their attorneys, meeting with their attorneys regarding the
7 claims, making themselves available the day of mediation to answer questions, and reviewing the
8 proposed Settlement. Davis Decl. at ¶ 7; Tyler Decl. at ¶ 7.

9 Likewise, Wilshire Law Firm, PLC has expended considerable time and effort on this case
10 and will continue to do so through final approval. *See generally*, Yslas Decl. Therefore, Plaintiffs
11 should be appointed Class Representatives, and their counsel should be appointed Class Counsel.

12 **3. A Class Action is Superior to a Multitude of Individual Lawsuits**

13 Courts have held that class treatment of wage and hour claims is clearly "superior to the
14 other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." *Dean Witter*
15 *Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 211 Cal.App.3d 758, 772-773 (1989). This is so because "[p]ublic
16 policy has long favored the 'full and prompt payment of wages due an employee.'" *Sav-On Drug*
17 *Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.4th 319, 340 (2004). Here, a class action is superior to a
18 multitude of individual lawsuits. Given the size and amount of each Class Members' claim, Class
19 Members have little incentive to litigate their claims on an individual basis because the out-of-
20 pocket expenses and personal commitment necessary to litigate each claim likely outweigh any
21 potential recovery. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 10. Therefore, a class action is the superior method for seeking
22 relief.

23 **B. The Settlement Meets the Standards for Preliminary Approval**

24 The moving party must demonstrate that "the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable."
25 *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 126 (2008). "In determining whether a
26 class settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors,
27 such as the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further
28 litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement,

1 the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of
2 counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the
3 proposed settlement.” *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 244-245 (internal quotations and citations
4 omitted).

5 **1. The Settlement is Entitled to a Presumption of Fairness**

6 A settlement is entitled to “a presumption of fairness . . . where: (1) the settlement is reached
7 through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel
8 and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the
9 percentage of objectors is small.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996).
10 The Settlement here satisfies the first three factors. Plaintiffs will analyze the fourth factor at final
11 approval after Class Members have been notified of the Settlement and provided with an
12 opportunity to object.

13 **a. The Settlement is the Result of Arm’s Length Negotiation**

14 Courts have recognized that the involvement of a respected mediator provides a high degree
15 of assurance that the settlement is the result of arm’s length bargaining. *See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*,
16 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 52-53 (2008). The Settlement in this matter was the product of a full-day
17 mediation session with a respected mediator. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 6. The negotiations were adversarial,
18 conducted at arm’s length, and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interests of their
19 clients. *Id.*

20 **b. Sufficient Investigation and Discovery Have Been Conducted**

21 Prior to attending mediation, Plaintiffs’ Counsel thoroughly investigated the claims,
22 applicable law, and potential defenses. *Id.* at ¶ 9. Plaintiffs’ Counsel assessed the value to the class
23 claims using the data and documents Defendants produced in informal discovery. *Id.* The data and
24 documents produced by Defendants included the number of Class Members and Aggrieved
25 Employees, the number of workweeks in the Class Period, and the number of pay periods in the
26 PAGA Period, the average rate of pay, documents concerning Plaintiffs, Defendants’ written wage-
27 and-hour policies, and a random sampling of Class Members’ time and payroll records. *Id.*

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1 **c. Plaintiffs' Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation**

2 Plaintiffs are represented by Wilshire Law Firm, PLC. *Id.* at ¶ 1. Plaintiffs' Counsel has
3 extensive experience litigating wage-and-hour class actions on behalf of employees. *See id.* at
4 ¶¶ 22-35. Plaintiffs' Counsel has been involved as counsel in numerous class actions that have
5 resulted in millions of dollars in recovery. *See id.*

6 **2. The Settlement is Reasonable Given the Strengths of Plaintiffs'**

7 **Claims and the Risks and Expense of Further Litigation**

8 A settlement does not have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be considered fair
9 and reasonable. *See Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1139 (1991). Although
10 the exposure Plaintiffs' Counsel calculated is substantial, the various risks at succeeding at class
11 certification and through trial affected the valuation of the claims for settlement purposes. Yslas
12 Decl. at ¶ 12. Based on an analysis of the facts and legal contentions in this case, documents and
13 information from Defendant, Plaintiffs' Counsel evaluated Defendants' maximum exposure. *Id.*
14 Plaintiffs' Counsel took into account the risk of not having the claims certified and the risk of not
15 prevailing at trial, even if the claims are certified. *Id.* After using the data Defendants provided,
16 including class member timekeeping and payroll records, as well as class member demographics,
17 with the assistance of a statistics expert, Plaintiffs' Counsel created a damages model to evaluate
18 the realistic range of potential recovery for the class. *Id.*

19 Minimum and Overtime Wages: Plaintiffs' unpaid minimum and overtime wage claims
20 were based on the allegation that Defendants required Class Members to routinely perform work
21 duties off the clock. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 13. For example, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants required
22 them and other Class Members to work during their recorded meal periods and complete tasks
23 before and after their scheduled shifts like inspecting their vehicles and taking their vehicles to car
24 washes, all without compensation. *Id.* Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs' Counsel
25 conservatively estimated that Class Members worked one (1) hour off the clock per week as
26 overtime in calculating potential exposure to be approximately \$808,199.78 for these claims
27 (34,605 workweeks x \$15.57 hourly rate x 1.5 overtime rate of pay x 1.00 hour of unpaid work per
28 workweek). *Id.* Because this claim would have relied heavily on Class Member testimony and

1 would not be evidenced in Defendants' time and payroll records, the risk of succeeding at class
2 certification was substantial. *Id.* Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Counsel applied a risk discount based on
3 a 40% chance of succeeding at class certification and a 40% chance of succeeding at trial on the
4 merits, yielding a realistic damage estimate of approximately \$129,311.96 ($\$808,199.78 \times 40\% \times$
5 40%). *Id.*

6 Meal Periods: Plaintiffs' meal period claim was based on the allegation that Defendants
7 failed to provide Class Members with legally compliant meal periods or pay meal period premiums
8 in lieu thereof. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 14. For example, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants failed to provide
9 them and other Class Members with timely uninterrupted meal periods. *Id.* Plaintiffs further alleged
10 that Defendants instructed them and other Class Members to not record any meal periods and that
11 Defendants regularly auto-deducted meal periods without regard to whether they were actually
12 taken or even legally compliant. *Id.* Plaintiffs' Counsel's expert found a facial violation rate of
13 approximately 100% in Defendants' time and payroll records for shifts greater than five (5) hours.
14 *Id.* Therefore, potential liability for the meal period claims is approximately \$2,534,702.58
15 ($162,794 \text{ shifts greater than 5 hours} \times \$15.57 \text{ hourly rate} \times 100\% \text{ violation rate}$). *Id.* However,
16 Defendants argued that Class Members were covered by meal period waivers. *Id.* Accordingly,
17 Plaintiffs' Counsel applied a risk discount based on a 50% chance of succeeding at class
18 certification and a 40% chance of succeeding at trial on the merits, yielding a realistic damage
19 estimate of approximately \$506,940.52 ($\$2,534,702.58 \times 50\% \times 40\%$). *Id.*

20 Rest Periods: Plaintiffs' rest period claim was based on the allegation that Defendants failed
21 to provide Class Members with legally compliant rest periods or pay rest period premiums in lieu
22 thereof. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 15. For example, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants never provided them
23 and other Class Members with rest periods and expressly forbade them from taking any breaks
24 while they had clients in their vehicle. *Id.* Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs' Counsel applied
25 a 100% violation rate to all shifts of 3.5 hours or longer. *Id.* Therefore, potential liability for the
26 rest period claims is approximately \$2,538,735.21 ($163,053 \text{ shifts of 3.5 hours or longer} \times \15.57
27 $\text{hourly rate} \times 100\% \text{ violation rate}$). *Id.* However, Plaintiffs' Counsel discounted this figure to
28 account for the difficulty of certifying and proving rest period claims, particularly because rest

1 periods do not have to be recorded, and to account for the possibility of Class Members voluntarily
2 choosing to forego a rest period. *Id.* Because this claim would have relied exclusively on Class
3 Member testimony, Plaintiffs' Counsel discounted this claim based on a 30% chance of succeeding
4 at class certification and a 20% chance of succeeding at trial, yielding a realistic damage estimate
5 of approximately \$152,324.11 ($\$2,538,735.21 \times 30\% \times 20\%$). *Id.*

6 Reimbursements: Plaintiffs' reimbursement claim was based on the allegation that
7 Defendants failed to indemnify Class Members for expenses incurred as a direct result of
8 performing their job duties for Defendants. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 16. For example, Plaintiffs alleged that
9 Defendants failed to reimburse them and other Class Members for mandatory personal cell phone
10 use for work and for occasions when a parking meter did not produce a receipt. *Id.* For purposes
11 of calculating Defendants' liability based on a best-case scenario for Plaintiffs and the Class,
12 Plaintiffs' Counsel estimated that Defendants were liable to each class member for \$30 per month,
13 or \$7.50 per workweek, in unreimbursed expenses, for a total amount of approximately
14 \$259,537.50 ($\$7.50 \times 34,605$ workweeks). *Id.* Plaintiffs' Counsel discounted this figure based on
15 an evaluation of a 30% chance of succeeding at class certification and a 30% chance of succeeding
16 at trial to account for the difficulty of certifying and proving expense reimbursement claims,
17 yielding a realistic damage estimate of approximately \$23,358.38 ($\$259,537.50 \times 30\% \times 30\%$). *Id.*

18 In sum, Plaintiffs' Counsel estimated that Plaintiffs' maximum recovery for the off-the-
19 clock claim, meal period violations, and rest period violations (i.e., the wage claims) is
20 approximately \$5.88 million, but after factoring in the risk and uncertainty of certification and
21 prevailing at trial, Plaintiffs' Counsel estimates that Plaintiffs' realistic estimated recovery for
22 these non-penalty wage claims is approximately \$788,576.59. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 17.

23 Derivative Penalties: Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of Defendants' failure to pay all
24 wages owed, Defendants owed waiting time penalties and wage statement penalties. Yslas Decl.
25 at ¶ 18. With respect to Plaintiffs' derivative claims for statutory penalties, Plaintiffs' Counsel
26 estimated that Defendants' realistic potential liability is approximately \$89,382.74. *Id.* Defendants'
27 maximum potential liability for waiting time penalties is approximately \$652,912.38 ([116
28 employees $\times$ \$15.57 hourly rate $\times$ 8.00 hours/day $\times$ 30 days] + [116 employees $\times$ \$15.57 hourly

1 rate x 2.70 hours of overtime/day x 1.5 overtime rate x 30 days)) based on approximately 116
2 formerly employed class members during the 3-year statute of limitations period with an average
3 shift length of 10.70 hours. *Id.* Defendants' maximum potential liability for inaccurate wage
4 statements is approximately \$836,800.00 ([244 employees x 1 initial violation/employee x \$50 for
5 an initial violation] + [(8,490 pay periods - 244 initial violations) x \$100 for each subsequent
6 violation]) based on approximately 244 class members who worked during the 1-year statute of
7 limitations period and approximately 8,490 pay periods in that statutory timeframe. *Id.* In light of
8 the foregoing, Plaintiffs' Counsel believes that it would be unrealistic to expect the Court to award
9 the full \$1,489,712.38 in statutory penalties given Defendants' defenses, the contested nature of
10 Plaintiffs' claims, the challenges of establishing willfulness as applicable, and the discretionary
11 nature of penalties. *Id.* Considering that the underlying wage claims are realistically estimated to
12 be approximately \$788,576.59, such a disproportionate award would also raise due process
13 concerns. *Id.* As such, Plaintiffs' counsel discounted these figures to account for the risk and
14 uncertainty of obtaining class certification and prevailing at trial, resulting in a realistic evaluation
15 of approximately \$39,174.74 for waiting time penalty claims (\$652,912.38 x 30% x 20%), and
16 approximately \$50,208.00 for wage statement penalty claims (\$836,800.00 x 30% x 20%), or
17 approximately \$89,382.74 total for statutory penalties. *Id.*

18 PAGA: For the PAGA claim, Plaintiffs' Counsel determined that Defendants' potential
19 exposure could potentially reach \$1,592,900.00, assuming the initial \$100 penalty would apply for
20 each of the 15,929 pay periods in the PAGA Period. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 19. However, even assuming
21 success on the merits of each claim, PAGA gives the Court discretion to reduce penalties for a
22 variety of reasons, including where to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary
23 and oppressive, or confiscatory. *Id.* As such, Plaintiffs' counsel discounted this figure to account
24 for the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at trial, resulting in a realistic evaluation of approximately
25 \$159,290.00 for PAGA penalties (\$1,592,900.00 x 10%). *Id.* The settlement allocates \$40,000.00
26 of the Gross Settlement Amount to PAGA, therefore the PAGA allocation amounts to
27 approximately 25% of the realistic maximum damages for PAGA penalties (\$40,000.00 /
28 \$159,290.00). *Id.*

1 Using these estimated figures, Plaintiffs' Counsel predicted that the realistic maximum
2 recovery for all claims, including penalties, would be approximately \$1,060,607.71. Yslas Decl. at
3 ¶ 20. This means that the gross settlement figure represents approximately 82% of the realistic
4 maximum recovery (\$865,000.00 / \$1,060,607.71). *Id.* Considering the risk and uncertainty of
5 prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. *Id.* Indeed,
6 because of the proposed Settlement, Class Members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will
7 avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. *Id.*

8 Based on the figures in the Settlement Agreement, the Net Settlement Amount available for
9 class settlement payments is currently estimated to be \$479,716.67 for approximately 334 Class
10 Members. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 21. As a result, each Settlement Class Member would be eligible to
11 receive an average net benefit of approximately \$1,436.28. Based on the estimated Net Settlement
12 Amount available for individual class payments and there being approximately 34,605 workweeks
13 in the Class Period, the estimated weekly valuation for individual class payments is \$13.86
14 (\$479,716.67/ 34,605 workweeks). *Id.* Based on these current estimates, the lowest estimated
15 individual class payment could be \$13.86 (\$13.86 x 1 week) and the highest estimated individual
16 class payment could be \$4,643.10 (\$13.86 x approximately 335 weeks in the Class Period). *Id.*

17 **C. The Requested Service Payments are Reasonable**

18 Each Plaintiff seeks a class representative service payment of up to \$10,000.00 for
19 accepting the responsibilities of representing the interests of the Class and potential costs that were
20 not borne by any other Class Members. Settlement Agreement at § 3.2.1. A named plaintiff is
21 eligible for payment that reasonably compensates him or her for undertaking and fulfilling a
22 fiduciary duty to represent absent class members. *See Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 186
23 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1393 (2010); *Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 115 Cal.App.4th 715, 726 (2004).

24 Throughout this case, Plaintiffs assisted counsel in providing information necessary to
25 prosecute the claims, meeting with counsel regarding the claims, maintaining regular contact with
26 counsel, making themselves available the day of mediation to answer questions, and reviewing the
27 Settlement to ensure it was fair to the Class. Davis Decl. at ¶ 7; Tyler Decl. at ¶ 7. No action would
28 likely have been taken by Class Members individually and no compensation would have been

1 recovered for them, but for Plaintiffs’ services on behalf of the Class. By actively pursuing this
2 action, Plaintiffs furthered the California public policy goal of enforcing the State’s wage and hour
3 laws. *See Sav-On*, 34 Cal.4th at 340. The requested class representative service payments are
4 reasonable and should be preliminarily approved. Plaintiffs have provided declarations regarding
5 their work performed to date and will provide additional information as requested or required by
6 the Court at final approval.

7 **D. The Requested Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

8 The purpose of an attorneys’ fee award in class action litigation is to reward counsel who
9 invested in a case despite the risk of non-payment and achieved a substantial positive result for the
10 class. California courts routinely award attorneys’ fees equaling one third or more of the potential
11 value of the common fund. *See Chavez*, 162 Cal.App.4th at 66, fn. 11 (“Empirical studies show
12 that, regardless of whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in
13 class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”).

14 Additionally, Courts utilize “multipliers” to account for the risk of taking on cases where
15 there is no guarantee of recovery, uncertainties as to the amount that will be recovered, uncertainty
16 as to the cost of litigating the case (both in effort and expenses), and uncertainty about how
17 much time will pass before the recovery is obtained. *Ketchum v. Moses*, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-
18 33 (2001); see also *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 48-49 (1977) (approving the adjustment of
19 the lodestar figure based on factors specific to the case to ensure fair market value for legal
20 services provided on a contingency basis). Application of that rule is particularly appropriate
21 where the case is brought to redress important rights of vulnerable persons. *Ketchum*, 24 Cal.4th
22 at 1133.

23 Generally, “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” *Wershba v. Apple*
24 *Computers, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255 (2001); see also *Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing*
25 *Cases*, 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (2009) (applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an
26 antitrust class action); *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal.App.4th 60 (2008) (applying a
27 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check); *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6
28 (9th Cir. 2002) (“most” common fund cases apply a multiplier of 1.0-4.0); *Laffitte v. Robert Half*

1 *Int'l*, 231 Cal.App.4th 860, 881-82 (2004) (affirming a 2.13 multiplier after finding that “2 to
2 4” is a reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check). *See also Bronshteyn v. State of*
3 *California – Department of Consumer Affairs*, 114 Cal.App.5th 537 (2025) (court did not abuse
4 its discretion by awarding 1.75 multiplier for fees incurred up to and including the jury verdict
5 and a 1.25 enhancement for hours worked after the verdict where hourly rates for plaintiff’s five
6 senior attorneys were \$1,100.00 and \$1,000.00); *Tran v. Golden State FC LLC, et al.* (LASC
7 Case No. BC699931), Fee Order filed April 8, 2022 (approving hourly rate of \$1,300.00 for
8 plaintiff’s 32-year attorney).

9 Plaintiffs seek appointment of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel. The attorneys
10 performed significant work and expended litigation costs in prosecuting this matter with no
11 guarantee of payment. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 22. Plaintiffs’ Counsel seeks preliminary approval of up to
12 one third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount, currently estimated to be \$288,333.33, and up to
13 \$30,000.00 in reimbursement of litigation costs. Given the work performed in this matter, the
14 extensive information exchange, and the substantial recovery obtained on behalf of the Class,
15 Plaintiffs’ Counsel achieved a settlement through efficient and diligent work. *See generally*, Yslas
16 Decl. At final approval, Plaintiffs’ Counsel will fully brief the merits of its request for the award
17 of attorneys’ fees and litigation costs.

18 **E. The Administration Costs are Reasonable**

19 The Parties have agreed upon using ILYM Group Inc. to administer this Settlement.
20 Settlement Agreement at § 1.2. Plaintiffs seek preliminary approval of \$6,950.00 for ILYM Group
21 Inc. to administer this Settlement pursuant to ILYM Group Inc.’s bid. *See Declaration of Lisa*
22 *Mullins of ILYM Group Inc. in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class*
23 *Action and PAGA Settlement at ¶¶ 9-10, Exhibit C.*

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1 **V. CONCLUSION**

2 The Parties have negotiated a fair and reasonable settlement of the class claims in light of
3 the risks presented in this case. Plaintiffs have presented the materials and information necessary
4 to demonstrate that the requirements for preliminary approval have been met, and therefore
5 respectfully request that the Court preliminarily approve the Settlement and schedule a date for the
6 final approval hearing.

7 Respectfully submitted,

8 Dated: January 28, 2026

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

9 By: /s/ Courtney M. Miller
10 Courtney M. Miller
11 Attorneys for Plaintiffs