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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO**

RHAY TAYLOR in a Representative capacity only, and on behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated,

Plaintiff

v.

ALTER MANAGEMENT LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; ALTER MENTAL HEAL TH LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; ALTER MENTAL HEALTH- DANA POINT, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; ALTER WELLNESS CARE LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; ALTIGNIS CAMPUS LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; ALTER HEALTH GROUP, INC., a California Corporation; CALIFORNIA REHAB CAMPUS, LLC, an Arizona Limited Liability Company; CAMBRIDGE MENTAL HEALTH MANAGEMENT LLC dba ALTER BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, a California Limited Liability Company; ALTIGNIS HEALTH, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; ALTER BEHAVIORAL HEALTH – CAPISTRANO BEACH, LLC, a California

CASE NO. 37-2024-00007620-CU-OE-CTL

**PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF THE UNOPPOSED
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT, AND
CERTIFICATION OF PROVISIONAL
SETTLEMENT CLASS**

Date: October 10, 2025

Time: 1:30p.m.

Dept.: C-63

Judge: Hon. Katherine Bacal

Limited Liability Company and DOES 1-10,
inclusive

Defendants

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I. SUMMARY OF MOTION

This matter is a “Wage and Hour” representative (*i.e.*, “PAGA”) and Proposed class action. Plaintiff Rhay Taylor, in a Representative capacity only, and on behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated, brings Labor Code claims against Defendants ALTER MANAGEMENT LLC; ALTER MENTAL HEALTH LLC; ALTER MENTAL HEALTH- DANA POINT, LLC; ALTER WELLNESS CARE LLC; ALTIGNIS CAMPUS LLC; ALTER HEALTH GROUP, INC.; CALIFORNIA REHAB CAMPUS, LLC; CAMBRIDGE MENTAL HEALTH MANAGEMENT LLC dba ALTER BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, ALTER BEHAVIORAL HEALTH - CAPISTRANO BEACH, LLC, and ALTIGNIS HEALTH, LLC (hereinafter, “Alter” or “Defendant”).

Following approximately **18 months** of formal litigation, exchanges of documents and data, a full-day of Mediation, and extensive arms length negotiations, the parties agreed to the terms of a class and PAGA action settlement. The parties have drafted and executed a Joint “Stipulation of Settlement and Release” (the “Agreement”), lodged as **Exhibit A¹** to the declaration of Eric K. Yaeckel. Briefly, the parties’ settlement figures are estimated as follows:

Approximate size of class:	367 individuals
Notice Period:	30 days from Mailing of Notice
Settlement Fund (“GSA”):	\$600,000.00
Settlement administration:	\$4,337.59 (or less)
Class representative incentive:	\$20,000.00 (\$10,000.00 each)
LWDA payment:	\$45,000.00 (75 % Share of \$60,000 allocation)
Attorney's fees:	\$200,000.00 (1/3 of total)
Litigation costs:	\$22,500.00

The estimated average payment (before taxes) to each Class Member based on the above figures will be **\$839.67**. These estimates are an “average” only, and do not account for the fact that Class Members will receive more or less than an “average” share, as the amounts owed are calculated based on the number of workweeks each individual worked for Defendants during the class period.

¹ This Memorandum incorporates by reference the definitions in the Agreement and the terms used herein are intended to have the same meaning as set forth in the Agreement.

1 **Please Note:** This is a **non reversionary** settlement, in that the entire Net Settlement Amount, after
2 the awarded costs, taxes and fees are deducted, will be automatically disbursed to all Class Members
3 who do not file a request to “opt-out” of participation in the lawsuit. (**Exhibit A** at ¶ 3.2.4.2).

4 Plaintiffs now move the Court for an order: **(1)** preliminarily approving the proposed class
5 action settlement; **(2)** directing that Notice (defined below) of the settlement be provided to Class
6 Members; and **(3)** scheduling a hearing for Final Approval of the proposed settlement and entry of the
7 parties’ proposed Final Approval Order and Judgment. Defendants do not oppose Plaintiff’s motion.

8 **II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

9 The class is comprised of all hourly, non-exempt employees of Defendants who performed
10 work for Defendant in California at any time between February 20, 2020 through the date of April 1,
11 2025.

12 **1. The Operative Claims, Investigation and Informal Discovery Conducted**

13 On **February 20, 2024**, Plaintiff *Rhay Taylor* filed a Complaint alleging representative PAGA
14 claims only, under the California Labor code, in San Diego Superior Court, Case No. 37-2024-
15 00007260-CU-OE-CTL involving, *inter alia*, (1) failure to pay minimum wages; (2) failure to pay
16 proper overtime compensation; (3) failure to provide meal breaks; (4) failure to provide rest breaks;
17 (5) failure to reimburse employees for necessary business expenses; (6) failure to provide accurate
18 itemized wage statements; and (7) failure to pay all wages to upon termination. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶ 3;
19 ROA #1).

20 On **September 30, 2024**, Plaintiff *Andrea Pungi* filed a wage and hour class action in the
21 Superior Court of California, County of Orange, Case No. 30-2024-01429796-CU-OE-CXC, alleging
22 meal and rest period violations, minimum wage and overtime violations, wage statement and final pay
23 violations, and failure to pay all accrued sick pay and vacation time, failure to pay wages in a timely
24 manner during employment, and failure to provide written notice of paid sick leave and supplemental
25 paid sick leave. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶4).

26 On **December 2, 2024**, Plaintiff *Pungi* filed a representative PAGA claim in the Superior Court
27 of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. 24STCV31655, based on the same alleged violations
28 in her wage and hour class action. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶5).

1 **Please Note:** As part of this settlement, and prior to preliminary approval, Plaintiff *Taylor* will
2 file a First Amended Complaint (the “Operative Complaint”), (1) adding Plaintiff *Pungi* as a plaintiff,
3 and (2) amending the class definition to include certain claims that are the subject of this global
4 Settlement. (**Exhibit A** at Recitals: § 2.1).

5 On **March 20, 2024**, Plaintiff propounded discovery requests on Alter. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶6).
6 Through these requests, Plaintiff sought, among other information and documents, the identities of
7 putative class members, compensation policies, Meal and Rest Period policies, employee handbooks,
8 wage statements, payroll records, time records, job descriptions, and reimbursement policies. (*Id.*).

9 In lieu of formal discovery, the parties agreed to engage in informal discovery. After meeting
10 and conferring, Alter produced, *inter alia*, Plaintiff’s time and wage records, copies of the relevant
11 employee handbooks, copies of all other relevant employee policies, the contents of Plaintiff’s
12 employee file, Plaintiff’s time records, and itemized wage statements. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶7).

13 Following further substantive exchanges of informal discovery, the parties agreed to explore
14 resolution. As part of the settlement discussions, Alter agreed to voluntarily produce hundreds of pages
15 of documents. The production included all relevant policies. It also included a large electronic
16 sampling of other class members’ time and wage data. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶8).

17 Alter provided informal discovery which consisted of, *inter alia*, the number of current and
18 former employees who worked under Alter during the limitations period, workweek and pay period
19 information, meal and rest period premiums paid, pay periods at issue, a redacted sampling of
20 employee time records and wage statements, as well as confirmation that various policies were
21 standard as to the class. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶9).

22 On **December 17, 2024**, the Parties attended a Mediation before experienced “Wage and Hour”
23 Mediator, Jill Sperber, Esq. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶10). Plaintiff Taylor and Defendants were able to reach
24 some agreements on the key terms of a settlement.

25 However, shortly thereafter, Defendants informed Plaintiff of the existence of the *Pungi*
26 Complaints. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶11). The parties then began negotiations regarding a potential global
27 settlement that would include all of the Class and PAGA claims on behalf of *Taylor* and *Pungi*. (*Id.*)
28

1 As of **September 17, 2025**, the parties agreed on all final terms of the settlement which was
2 memorialized in the Agreement, which is attached to the declaration of Eric K. Yaeckel as **Exhibit**
3 **A.** (Yaeckel Decl. ¶13). Plaintiffs now seek the Court’s preliminary approval of the Agreement. (*Id.*)

4 **III. SETTLEMENT TERMS**

5 The Agreement includes the following key terms:

6 **1. Contingent Nature of the Settlement**

7 This Agreement is contingent upon preliminary and final approval by the Court. If for any
8 reason the Settlement does not become final, the Parties will be returned to their positions with
9 respect to the Action as if the Agreement had not been entered into. Should the Settlement not
10 become final, for whatever reason, Defendants reserve the right to move to contest certification
11 should this Settlement be reversed on appeal or otherwise not become final. (**Ex. A** at ¶13.1).

12 **2. Description of the Settlement Class**

13 Solely for the purposes of the Agreement, the parties have agreed that the proposed settlement
14 “Class” is defined as:

15 all nonexempt employees of Alter in California from February 20, 2020 through
16 the date of April 1, 2025. (**Ex. A** at ¶1.5).

17 The parties estimate that as of April 1, 2025, the Settlement Class consisted of Three Hundred
18 Sixty Seven (367) individuals, as determined by Defendant’s employment records. (**Ex. A** at ¶4.1).

19 **3. Appointment of Settlement Administrator**

20 The parties agreed to use CAC Services, LLC, as the “Settlement Administrator” for purposes
21 of providing the Notice of Class Action Settlement, issuing payments pursuant to the Agreement, and
22 carrying out all duties pursuant to the Agreement. (**Ex. A** at ¶8.1). CAC’s sole business is the
23 administration of class action settlements and class action notices. (Yaeckel decl.¶14).

24 **4. Scope of the Release**

25 For purposes of the Agreement, Class Members release all claims that are either or both: (1)
26 alleged in the forthcoming First Amended Complaint (“FAC”); or (2) which relate to or arise out of
27 the allegations and claims asserted in the FAC and could have been alleged in the FAC relating in any
28 way to violations of the wage and hour provisions of the California Labor Code or the California Wage

1 Orders, or any wage and hour provisions of California law. The precise release language is reflected
2 in **Exhibit A** at ¶ 5.2.

3 **5. Cash Payment and Allocation**

4 The Agreement provides for an automatic Individual Settlement Payment to the members of
5 the Class. No claims need be submitted. Class Members will be entitled to an average share of
6 approximately **\$839.67**. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶15). The actual share will depend on the amount of
7 workweeks and pay periods they were employed during the limitations period. (**Ex. A** at ¶ 3.2.4). The
8 Individual Settlement will be allocated as follows: twenty percent (20%) constitutes wages (subject
9 to withholdings and deductions and reported as wage income on a Form W-2) and eighty percent
10 (80%) constitutes non-wage penalties, and interest. (**Ex. A** at ¶3.2.4.1).

11 **6. Proposed Settlement and Notice Program**

12 Subject to Court approval, the Parties agree that, within thirty (30) days after the Court enters
13 any Order granting preliminary approval of the Settlement, Defendant Alter will provide to the
14 Settlement Administrator the following information for each Settlement Class Member in a readable
15 Microsoft Office Excel spreadsheet: class member names and last known addresses, social security
16 numbers, number of workweeks, and number of PAGA pay periods. (*See Ex. A* at ¶4.2). The
17 Settlement Administrator will perform address updates and verifications, including running all names
18 through the National Change of Address Database, prior to the first mailing. (**Ex. A** at ¶8.4.2). Using
19 best efforts to perform as soon as possible, and in no event later than 7 days after receiving the class
20 data, the Settlement Administrator will mail the Class Notice (“Notice”) to each Class Member, by
21 first class mail. (**Ex. A**, at ¶8.4.2). The parties’ agreed upon Class Notice is attached to the Declaration
22 of Erik K. Yaeckel, as **Exhibit B**. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶16).

23 The Notice is designed to provide Class Members with detailed information about the lawsuit,
24 the Agreement, their rights and settlement benefits, and how to participate, exclude themselves, or
25 object. (**Ex. B**). The Class Members will have thirty (30) calendar days (from the date of notice) to
26 request to be excluded, or file objections. This deadline will be extended an additional 14 days if notice
27 is re-mailed. (**Ex. A**, at ¶¶8.4.4, 8.5.1; **Ex. B** at § V(B-C))
28

1 The Class Members will be given notice of the release, and information about the expected
2 settlement amount based on the workweeks and pay periods employed with Defendants during the
3 Class Period. If they wish to receive a share of the Settlement, Class Members need not take any
4 additional action. Class Members are also given instructions on how to exclude themselves, object to
5 the Settlement, or appear at the final approval hearing to state objections. (See **Ex. A**, at ¶¶8.4.4, 8.5.1;
6 **Ex. B** at § V(A-C)).

7 The Notice process also has additional safeguards. For instance, for Notices returned as non-
8 deliverable, the Settlement Administrator will perform a skip-trace and mail or re-mail Notice to an
9 updated address (if any), upon receipt of the returned mail. (See **Ex. A** at ¶¶1.11, 4.4.2). It is the intent
10 of the parties that all reasonable means be used to locate Class Members.

11 The Notice will inform Class Members of the number of weeks worked during the Class Period
12 (according to Defendant's records) and their estimated settlement amounts. Class Members will have
13 the opportunity to dispute the workweek calculation by submitting written documentation to the
14 Settlement Administrator. (See **Ex. A** at ¶ 8.6 and **Ex. B** at IV(D)).

15 PAGA Members do **not** require notice prior to a settlement, nor may they opt out of the PAGA
16 penalty portion of the settlement. *Robinson v. S. Ctys. Oil*, (2020) 53 Cal. App. 5th 476, 482–83,
17 2020). PAGA members are nonetheless informed of the Settlement and estimated payments. PAGA
18 members can opt-out of the Class Settlement to retain all non-PAGA claims in their individual
19 capacities. These rights are explained in the Class Notice. (**Ex. B** at § IV(F)).

20 **7. Contingent Costs**

21 The Agreement provides for Two Hundred Thousand (**\$200,000.00**) in Attorneys' Fees, which
22 is one-third (1/3%) of the total Settlement, and up to Twenty Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
23 (\$22,500.00) in litigation costs. (See **Ex. A** at ¶3.2.2). For costs incurred in administering the
24 Settlement, the Agreement provides for an estimated Four Thousand Three Hundred Thirty Seven
25 Dollars and Fifty-Nine Cents (\$4,337.59), or less. (See **Ex. A** at ¶ 3.2.3).

26 The Agreement also provides for Sixty Thousand Dollars (**\$60,000.00**) to be allocated for
27 Plaintiff's PAGA claims with 75% of the amount, or Forty Five Thousand Dollars (\$45,000) being
28 paid to the LWDA, and 25%, or Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00), being distributed amongst

1 the PAGA Members. (See **Ex. A** at ¶3.2.5).

2 The Agreement also provides payment to Plaintiffs Taylor and Pungi of Ten Thousand Dollars
3 (**\$10,000.00**) each, which represents a Class Representative Enhancement Payment in consideration
4 for her services as a Class Representative. (See **Ex. A** at ¶ 3.2.1). The class is being notified of the
5 payment to Plaintiffs. (See **Ex. B** at § IV(B)).

6 The Class Representative Enhancement Payments were part of good faith negotiations and are
7 intended to recognize that it was the Class Representatives (Ms. Taylor and Pungi) who initiated the
8 lawsuits, initiated the PAGA claims, provided critical documents and witnesses to their attorneys, and
9 worked with their attorneys to propound and prepare written discovery, all in an effort to obtain money
10 allegedly owed not only to themselves, but to hundreds of other employees. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶17).

11 **IV. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS AND ESTIMATES OF POTENTIAL DAMAGES**

12 Counsel hereby submits estimates and calculations for the total potential value of all claims
13 so this Court may evaluate if the amount to be paid to the class ultimately could be determined to be
14 fair and reasonable when balanced against the probable outcome of the future litigation. *Kullar v. Foot*
15 *Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168 Cal. App. 4th 116, 133.

16 Concerning the strength of the plaintiff's case, the California Court of Appeal has said that the
17 "merits of the underlying class claims are not a basis for upsetting the settlement of a class action; the
18 operative word is 'settlement.'" *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.* (2000) 85
19 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1150 [citing, *inter alia*, *City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.* (2d Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d
20 448,455 ("The fact that a proposed settlement may only amount to a fraction the potential recovery
21 does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate and should be
22 disapproved"); see also *Linney v. Cellular Alaska P'ship.* (9th Cir. 1998) 151 F.3d 1234, 1242 ("This
23 court has aptly held that 'it is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of wasteful
24 and expensive litigation that induce consensual settlements'"); *Officers for Justice v. Civil Servo Com.*
25 (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615, 625 ("The proposed settlement is not to be judged against a hypothetical
26 or speculative measure of what might have been achieved by the negotiators.")

27 Each of the primary claims also had risks to maintaining class certification and a finding of
28 liability. If Defendants' defenses were successful, the class would not receive anything. As set forth

1 below, Plaintiffs submit that the most realistic “best case” scenario would be an average recovery per
2 class member of approximately **\$18,013.26**, and a worst case scenario would be a recovery of \$0, by
3 way of decertification or defense verdict. (Yaeckel decl. ¶18). Given all the risks on each claim, the
4 estimated **\$839.67** average recovery secured via this settlement is a reasonable compromise and is in
5 the best interests of the class given all the risks of continued litigation. (Yaeckel decl. ¶19).

6 **A. FAILURE TO PAY ALL COMPENSATION CLAIMS**

7 Plaintiff's unpaid wages (and overtime) claims were based on the allegation that employees
8 were performing unpaid work due to the Alter timekeeping system, which required employees to
9 record their “scheduled” (not “actual”) work times. Moreover, Plaintiffs alleged that Alter’s
10 timekeeping system took “minutes worked” and transferred that amount to a decimal, causing other
11 losses due to certain alleged “transitional math errors” caused by the payroll system. Plaintiffs alleged
12 this resulted in regular time and overtime pay being owed where Defendants were on notice of work
13 being performed without pay.

14 Defendants adamantly denied that any unpaid work occurred, and even if some did occur,
15 Defendants claimed it was not on notice of these alleged Labor Code violations and had a strict written
16 prohibition against off-the-clock work and a mandate that all time worked must be accurately recorded.
17 Defendants asserted proof of these alleged violations would require individualized inquiries, which
18 could preclude class certification and make any PAGA claims unmanageable. (Yaeckel decl. ¶28).

19 Based on Class Counsels’ analysis, this claim was worth as little as \$0 (a defense verdict) or
20 as much as **\$345,890.25**. (Yaeckel decl. ¶ 20).

21 **B. MEAL AND REST PERIOD CLAIMS**

22 Plaintiff s were able to identify hundreds of examples of missing or late Meal Periods without
23 the provision of a Meal Period penalty payment. Defendants argued that these records do not
24 conclusively show whether (1) Defendants actually failed to provide the Meal Period, (2) there was
25 a voluntary waiver, (3) employees forgot to clock out, or (4) employees voluntarily chose to skip or
26 take them late even though they were provided. Defendant further argued that evidence existed that
27 rebutted any presumption that the same records could be used as a basis for determining liability.
28 Additionally, in light of the written Meal and Rest Period policy, Alter contended there was no uniform

1 policy or practice of denying Meal and Rest Periods, requiring individualized inquiries that would
2 make any PAGA claims unmanageable. (Yaeckel decl. ¶ 29).

3 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ Rest Period policy (1) contained patently illegal language
4 restricting employees to the work premises, and (2) lacks additional required statutory language.
5 Plaintiffs also alleged the Defendants’ written policies improperly restricted class members from
6 leaving the premises during their Rest Periods, among other deficiencies. Alter argued that it provided
7 for adequate breaks and that witness testimony would demonstrate that in practice, no restriction on
8 Rest Periods (to the extent Plaintiffs alleged one existed) was ever enforced. Alter also contended
9 individualized inquiries abound as to why individual employees may have failed to take appropriate
10 Meal or Rest Periods. (Yaeckel decl. ¶30).

11 While there are time records to support the existence of alleged Meal Period violations, there
12 are no corresponding rest period records, making this aspect of the claim much harder to prove. Some
13 Courts have been disinclined to accept survey evidence that may have been needed to help establish
14 rest period violations. See e.g. *Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.* (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 630.

15 Based on counsels’ analysis, these claims were worth as little as \$0 (a defense verdict) or as
16 much as **\$9,608,062.50**. (Yaeckel decl. ¶20).

17 **C. PLAINTIFF’S WAGE STATEMENT CLAIMS**

18 Plaintiffs acknowledge that these claims are largely derivative, in that both the gross and net
19 wages could be found to be inaccurate, due to the above-referenced claims. Alter argued that the failure
20 to list gross and net wages are derivative of other claims that may ultimately fail and as a result there
21 is no “knowing and intentional failure” to list information, which triggers liability under Labor Code
22 §226(e). (Yaeckel decl. ¶31).

23 The California Supreme Court has recently held that the failure to pay meal and rest period
24 premiums *may* give rise to a claim for inaccurate wage statements (or waiting time penalties).
25 However, such derivative liability is not automatic and the Plaintiffs still must show a “knowing and
26 intentional” or “wilful” failure to comply with the Labor Code. See *Naranjo v. Spectrum Security*
27 *Services, Inc.* (2022) 13 Cal.5th 93,109. Defendants (as with the underlying Meal and Rest Period
28 claims) maintained individualized inquiries would abound as to why breaks were missed and whether

1 meal and rest period premiums should have been paid, requiring individualized inquiries that would
2 make any PAGA claims unmanageable. (Yaeckel decl. ¶ 32).

3 Based on counsels' analysis, this claim was worth as little as \$0 (a defense verdict) or as much
4 as **\$700,000.00**. (Yaeckel decl. ¶ 20).

5 **D. OTHER "DERIVATIVE" CLAIMS**

6 The remaining claims are derivative in that PAGA and Labor Code § 203 penalties would only
7 be permissible if the above claims are proven.

8 Plaintiffs contended that Alter violated Labor Code section 2802 by failing to reimburse its
9 employees for certain costs. Alter contended that Plaintiff's (and others') position did not require the
10 use of a personal cell phone as it provides employees with Company issued cell phones for use during
11 work hours. (Yaeckel decl. ¶ 33). Based on counsels' analysis, this claim was worth as little as \$0 (a
12 defense verdict) or as much as \$3,670.00. (Yaeckel decl. ¶ 20).

13 The parties agreed to allocate \$60,000.00 to the PAGA claims, which is 10% of the total
14 settlement. This PAGA allocation is in the range routinely approved by California Courts. *See Garcia*
15 *v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.* (E.D. Cal., Oct. 31, 2012, No. 1:10-CV-0324 AWISKO) 2012 WL 5364575,
16 at *7 (approving \$10,000 PAGA penalty for a California class with a \$3.7 million gross settlement
17 payment); *Syed v. M-I, L.L.C.* (E.D. Cal., Feb. 22, 2017, No. 112CV01718DADMJS) 2017 WL
18 714367, at *13 (approving 2.53% of the estimated \$3.95 million Net Settlement Amount allocated to
19 the California class); *Viceral v. Mistras Group, Inc.* (N.D. Cal., Oct. 11, 2016, No.
20 15-CV-02198-EMC) 2016 WL 5907869 (approving allocation of \$20,000 to the PAGA claim (**0.15%**
21 of its total value of \$12,952,000) as reasonable in the context of the settlement as a whole); *In re Uber*
22 *FCRA Litigation* (N.D. Cal., June 29, 2017, No. 14-CV-05200-EMC) 2017 WL 2806698 (approving
23 a settlement agreement of \$7.5 million, where the amount allocated to the PAGA claims was only
24 \$7,500.00 – .01% of the total settlement amount).

25 Based on Class Counsel's analysis, the PAGA and Labor Code § 203 claims were worth as little
26 as \$0 (a PAGA defense verdict or denial of certification of the § 203 claim) or as much as **\$612,500.00**
27 and **\$1,791,175.13** respectively. (Yaeckel decl. ¶ 20).

28 ///

1 **E. PLAINTIFF'S INADEQUATE SEATING AND RESTING CLAIMS**

2 Plaintiffs allege they were not able to sit while on the computer at work because the area was
3 too cramped to allow room for seating. They could have done all their desk duties sitting on a stool
4 had one been provided. Additionally, during rare occasions when Plaintiffs were able to take a Rest
5 Period, Alter did not provide an area with adequate seating. The only available "break room" was a
6 very small and cramped office that did not have enough room for employees on break to sit, in
7 violation of California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 11050(13)(B). (Yaeckel decl. ¶34).
8 Defendants adamantly disputed these allegations.

9 Please Note: this is a PAGA only claim, not a class claim. Therefore it is valued as one of the
10 underlying claims for purposes of the potential PAGA penalties. (See Yaeckel decl. ¶20, at "'PAGA'
11 Violations"). However, there are no available damages and the release of this claim is pursuant to
12 PAGA only.

13 **F. CASE LAW SUPPORTS A FURTHER REDUCTION ON ANY RECOVERY**

14 Plaintiffs concede they would be highly unlikely to ever be awarded an amount approaching
15 the maximum damages set forth above. To wit, the majority of the recovery would be "derivative"
16 penalties under PAGA, Labor Code § 203 and Labor Code § 226. The Court would have great
17 discretion to mitigate any penalties awarded. *Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.* (2012)
18 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1135 (disapproved on other grounds).

19 In a recent trial involving Class Counsel in this case, the Court found liability, but then reduced
20 the PAGA penalties by 90%, from \$50 per violation down to \$5 a violation. See *Carrington v.*
21 *Starbucks Corp.* (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504; See accord *Fleming v. Covidien, Inc.*, No.
22 ED-CV-10-1487-RGK(OPx), 2011 WL 7563047 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011) (reducing PAGA
23 penalties by over 82%, in part because employer was "not aware" of violations). And in *Carrington*,
24 the Trial Court declined to award penalties under Labor Code §§ 203 and 226, noting that other trial
25 courts have declined to "stack" (impose multiple) penalties based on the same underlying Labor Code
26 violation. See *Ruelas v. Costco Wholesale Corporation* (N.D. Cal. 2014) 67 F.Supp.3d 1137.

27 Class Counsel believes a mitigation of the damages and potential PAGA penalties would be
28 warranted here. As in the *Carrington* case, there was evidence that Alter attempted to provide meal

1 and rest periods in practice, and the written policies contained no facially non-compliant terms. Given
2 this, it is likely that some of the violations by Alter were not "willful." Finally, given the defenses
3 raised by Defendants, there was a significant risk that many of the certified claims would not have been
4 maintained through trial and appeal.

5 The Parties agree the failure to pay "former employees" under § 203 is derivative of the other
6 claims. As Alter asserts a "good faith dispute" for withholding any unpaid wages, it would be difficult
7 to establish any liability for a "willful" failure to pay wages owed.

8 Based on the above, it is possible that PAGA penalties could be reduced to approximately \$5
9 per violation and the Court would find no basis for imposing Labor Code §§ 203 or 226 penalties.
10 Given those risks, the penalties were discounted by 75 %. If this occurred, the average class member's
11 pre-tax share of a realistic best case recovery would be **\$18,013.26**. (Yaeckel decl. ¶ 27).

12 Class Counsel submits the **\$839.67** average recovery secured via this Settlement, is a
13 reasonable compromise and in the best interests of the Class. (*Id.*)

14 **V. PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATION OF THE CLASS IS APPROPRIATE**

15 Under California law, a class action is appropriate when the class is ascertainable and there is
16 "a well defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties
17 to be represented." Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 382; *Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2004) 34
18 Cal. 4th 319, 341. State law requirements under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 for class
19 certification mirror those of federal law under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
20 numerosity, typicality of the class representatives' claims, adequacy of representation, predominance
21 of common issues, and superiority. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see also *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th
22 Cir. 1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1019. Thus, for settlement purposes, each of these elements must be present.
23 *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 237-38.

24 **A. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT CLASS IS ASCERTAINABLE**

25 The proposed class is ascertainable because all Class Members currently or formerly worked
26 for Defendants as a nonexempt employee and will be identified through Defendants' employment
27 records. See *Rose v. City of Hayward*, 126 Cal.App.3d 926 (1981) (finding that "Class Members are
28 'ascertainable' where they may be readily identified without unreasonable expense or time by reference

to official records”). Thus, the ascertainability requirement is met. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶37).

B. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT CLASS IS SUFFICIENTLY NUMEROUS

The numerosity requirement is met if the class is so large that joinder of all members would be impracticable. *In re Tobacco II Cases* (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 298, 318. Here, Defendants’ records show that approximately **367 class members** worked for the company during the limitations period. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶36). Thus, joinder of all members of the class would be impracticable.

C. THE COMMONALITY REQUIREMENT WAS MET

The commonality requirement is met if there are questions of law and fact common to the class. See *Hanlon, supra*, 150 F.3d at 1019. Here, for purposes of the Settlement, the parties agree the claims of Class Members all involve the same questions of law and fact. Namely, all class members were subject to the same employment policies and practices of Defendants. (Yaeckel decl. ¶ 38). The common question exists as to whether the policies and practices Class Members were subjected to are illegal. Therefore, the commonality requirement is satisfied. See *Hanlon, supra*, 150 F.3d at 1019-20.

D. THE TYPICALITY REQUIREMENT IS MET

The typicality requirement is met if the class representatives and class counsel have no interests adverse to the interests of the proposed Class Members and are committed to vigorously prosecuting the case on behalf of the class. See *Wehner v. Syntex Corp.*, 117 F.R.D. 641, 644 (N.D. Cal. 1987).

Here, there are no such adverse interests. Plaintiffs have claims substantially the same as all the other Class Members. (Yaeckel decl. ¶39). Factual differences may exist between the class representatives and the Class Members so long as the claims arise from the same events or course of conduct and are based on the same legal theories. See *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1020; see also 1 *Newberg* § 53.13 at 3-76-77 (“When it is alleged that the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both the named plaintiff and the class sought to be represented, the typicality requirement is usually met irrespective of varying fact patterns which under lie individual claims.”)

E. THE ADEQUACY REQUIREMENT IS MET

The adequacy of representation component of the community of interest requirement for class certification “comes into play when the party opposing certification brings forth evidence indicating widespread antagonism to the class suit.” *Capitol People First v. Dep’t of Develop. Servs.* (2007) 155

1 Cal. App. 4th 676, 696-97. The adequacy inquiry “serves to uncover conflicts of interest between
2 named parties and the class they seek to represent.” *Id.* To assure “adequate” representation, the “class
3 representative’s [...] claim must not be inconsistent with the claims of other members of the class.” *Id.*
4 Here, no such “inconsistencies” exist. Each Plaintiff will be compensated based on the same “pay
5 period” formula as all other members of the Class. (Yaeckel decl. ¶ 40).

6 Additionally, any Class Member who wishes to “opt out” of the Settlement may do so and
7 retain all of their individual rights. (Yaeckel decl. ¶ 41). There is therefore no conflict of interest
8 between the Class Representatives and the Class Members. (*Id.*) Thus, at least for settlement purposes,
9 the adequacy prong is met. (*Id.*)

10 **F. COMMON ISSUES PREDOMINATE AND CLASS-WIDE SETTLEMENT IS**
11 **SUPERIOR TO OTHER AVAILABLE METHODS OF RESOLUTION**

12 Class certification is authorized where common questions of law and fact predominate over
13 individual questions, and where class-wide treatment of a dispute is superior to individual litigation.
14 See *Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.*, 29 Cal.3d 462, 469 (1981).

15 The proposed class in this case is sufficiently cohesive because, for purposes of the Settlement
16 only, the parties have stipulated that all class certification elements are met. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶42). All
17 members of the Class worked under the same conditions and experienced the same policies and
18 practices of Defendants. (See section IV, *supra*). Thus, the class is sufficiently cohesive.

19 Further, it is preferable to resolve all of the Class Members’ claims by means of a classwide
20 settlement than to require each Class Member to litigate individual claims. (Yaeckel decl. ¶43).

21 **VI. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT IS PROPER**

22 The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a class action settlement is fair and
23 reasonable. *In re Microsoft I-V Cases* (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 706, 723. Fairness is presumed where
24 (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are
25 sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar
26 litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. *Chaves v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th
27 43, 52; *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*(1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1802. But, even where it appears the
28 settlement is fair, the court must still determine on the record before it whether the settlement should

1 be approved after considering “the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and risks of the particular
2 litigation.” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 129. The courts will
3 consider: (i) the strength of the plaintiff’s case; (ii) the risks, expense, complexity and likely duration
4 of further litigation; (iii) the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (iv) the amount
5 offered in settlement; (v) the extent of discovery completed; (vi) the stage of the proceedings; (vii) the
6 experience and views of counsel; (viii) the presence of a governmental participant; and (ix) any
7 reaction of putative class members to the proposed settlement. *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th, at 1800-1801;
8 *In re Microsoft I-V Cases*, 135 Cal.App.4th, at 723.

9 When evaluating factors, the court “must stop short of the detailed and thorough investigation
10 that it would undertake if it were actually trying the case,” but nonetheless it “must eschew any rubber
11 stamp approval in favor of an independent evaluation.” *Kullar*, 168 Cal.App.4th, at 130. Ultimately,
12 the court approves the proposed class action settlement when the settlement is fair and falls “within
13 the range of reasonableness.” *Hernandez v. Vitamin* (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1446.

14 **A. FAIRNESS OF THE SETTLEMENT**

15 For preliminary approval purposes, a proposed class action settlement is *presumed* to be fair
16 where, as here, (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation and
17 discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; and (3) counsel is
18 experienced in similar litigation. *Chaves, supra*, 162 Cal.App.4th at 52.

19 The proposed settlement here meets these criteria, and merits preliminary approval. As
20 discussed above, the parties only entered into the Agreement after engaging in a full day of mediation
21 with an experienced mediator who routinely handles “wage and hour” class action litigation. (Yaeckel
22 Decl. ¶10). The mediation was preceded by extensive informal discovery, investigation of claims at
23 issue, interviews of Class Members, disclosure and review of documents detailing company-wide
24 policies and practices, informal information exchanges for mediation purposes, and ongoing
25 discussions about the merits between the parties’ counsel during the span of the litigation. (Yaeckel
26 Decl. ¶¶6-12). Thereafter, the parties memorialized the details of this Settlement via the Agreement.
27 (Ex. A).

28 When negotiating the Settlement, both sides took into account the strengths and weaknesses

1 of their opponent's positions as pointed out by mediator Jill Sperber, Esq., the data available to
2 evaluate liability and damages, the lack of data or evidence on certain issues, and the substantial and
3 evolving law applicable to the merits of the claims. The Agreement was only agreed to after extensive
4 arms-length negotiations resulting in a unique compromise that permits all parties to move forward and
5 bring this action to close. Despite a mutual desire to resolve this action, the negotiations remained at
6 all times adversarial. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶44).

7 As set forth below in section H, *infra.*, counsel for both parties have extensive experience in
8 litigating wage and hour class action lawsuits. Based on this experience, Class Counsel has determined
9 that the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. (Yaeckel decl. ¶35).

10 **B. STRENGTH OF PLAINTIFFS' CASE**

11 The most important factor courts consider when evaluating the fairness of the class action
12 settlement is the strength of the plaintiffs' case balanced against the amount offered in settlement.
13 *Kullar*, 168 Cal.App.4th, at 130.

14 All of Plaintiff's claims — individual, PAGA, and class— presented hurdles including a
15 substantial risk of a defense verdict by way of summary judgment, or at trial. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶¶28-34).

16 The exchange of mediation briefs, the assistance of an experienced "wage and hour" mediator,
17 and the parties' ongoing negotiations all helped the parties realize the strengths and weaknesses of
18 their case, as well as the risks and expenses of continuing litigation.

19 Additionally, as trial approaches, each party's monetary risk increases significantly as
20 substantial additional attorney hours and expert witness hours would have to be devoted to this case
21 by each party. Each party bears a real risk at trial, and considering the balance of the strengths of
22 Plaintiff's claims versus the risks inherent in trial and the consideration given to settle now, the
23 settlement reflects a fair and adequate resolution to this action.

24 **C. THE RISK, EXPENSE, COMPLEXITY, AND LIKELY DURATION OF FURTHER** 25 **LITIGATION**

26 Plaintiffs' Counsel's effectiveness in prosecuting this case has translated into tangible monetary
27 and non-monetary benefits for the Settlement Class Members in the following respects: **(1)** a
28 guaranteed favorable result; **(2)** guaranteed monetary recovery over a reasonably short period of time,
as opposed to possibly waiting additional years for a potentially worse result; and **(3)** significant

1 savings in attorneys' fees and costs, which would have increased had the case progressed through trial
2 and possible appeals. (Yaeckel decl. ¶45).

3 Without entering into the Agreement, there existed a significant chance that Defendants would
4 prevail on the merits of some or all claims and that Class Members would receive nothing. Through
5 the Agreement, participating Class Members receive guaranteed cash, and this action has also been
6 the catalyst for programmatic relief. (Yaeckel decl. ¶46).

7 If the litigation were to proceed in lieu of settlement, additional and substantial attorneys fees
8 and costs, expert witnesses fees would quickly accumulate. Given the numerous claims being litigated,
9 the parties may be required to hire multiple experts each (as many as 6 total). This would result in not
10 only the production of six expert reports, but six depositions as well. And, based on previous
11 discussions between counsel regarding the remaining claims (including the PAGA claims), Plaintiff
12 anticipated at least one motion to compel, and two dueling motions for summary judgment /
13 adjudication (one from each side). (Yaeckel decl. ¶47).

14 Importantly, even after engaging in all of the potential continued and protracted litigation set
15 forth above, the putative class would continue to have no guarantee of success on any of the claims
16 advanced in this case. Thus, the parties and their counsel believe in good faith that the proposed
17 resolution is a fair, reasonable, and adequate compromise. (Yaeckel decl. ¶48).

18 **D. THE RISK OF MAINTAINING CLASS ACTION STATUS THROUGH THE TRIAL**

19 At the time of the settlement, a Motion for Class Certification had not been filed. (Yaeckel
20 decl. ¶49). As the Court never ruled on any such motion, neither side had a decided advantage in the
21 litigation. Even if Plaintiffs did obtain class certification of the claims, each claim is subject to
22 substantial risk of a Defense verdict at trial. (*Id.*)

23 Regarding the representative (PAGA) claims, there is also a substantial risk that, at trial,
24 Plaintiffs will either fail to obtain a favorable judgment on some of these claims, or that a favorable
25 award on one or more PAGA claims may be greatly reduced, as these claims are subject to mitigation
26 by the Court. *See Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Mgmt., Inc.* (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1135.

27 **E. THE AMOUNT OFFERED IN THE SETTLEMENT**

28 After deduction from the total "Settlement Amount" of the projected costs of administration,

1 proposed class representative service awards, potential attorney fees and costs, the “Net Settlement
2 Amount (“NSA”) will be distributed to all Class Members who do not file a request for exclusion.
3 Participating Class Members will receive their share of the NSA based on the total amount of time they
4 worked during the Class and PAGA Period. (**Exhibit A**, ¶3.2.4).

5 Based on the current proposed figures, each Class Member will receive an average of **\$839.67**
6 although the actual amount will vary based on the amount of pay periods employed. The Class Notice
7 will list that individual class member’s actual share. (See **Ex. B.**). Plaintiff’s counsel maintains this
8 recovery was significant in light of the circumstances of the case. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶48).

9 **F. THE EXTENT OF DISCOVERY COMPLETED**

10 Plaintiffs propounded written discovery devices on Defendants, including requests for
11 admission, special interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and general and employment
12 form interrogatories. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶6). Through these requests, Plaintiffs sought, among other
13 information and documents, the identities of putative class members, Defendants’ compensation
14 policies, meal and rest period policies, employee handbook s, wage statements, time records, job
15 descriptions, and reimbursement policies. *Id.* However, in lieu of formal discovery, the parties agreed
16 to engage in informal discovery. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶7).

17 Defendants provided all relevant employment policies, in addition to producing hundreds of
18 pages of documents. The document production also included a large sampling of other putative class
19 members time and wage records. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶¶ 6-8). Plaintiffs’ counsel has also interviewed
20 several Class Members in the course of investigating and litigating this matter. (Yaeckel decl. ¶ 50).
21 Counsel has also reviewed hundreds of pages of documents produced by Defendants, Plaintiffs, and
22 Class Members. (*Id.*)

23 This information, along with documents and information obtained through informal discovery
24 and from Class Members, allowed Plaintiff’s counsel to prepare a detailed Mediation Brief. (*Id.*) The
25 Brief was provided to opposing counsel and contained a breakdown of potential damages based on all
26 of the information obtained from all Parties. (*Id.*)

27 Thus, sufficient discovery has been conducted to allow the parties to participate in an informed,
28 arms-length negotiation process.

1 **G. THE STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS**

2 Plaintiffs have already obtained a large amount of informal discovery. Formal discovery,
3 depositions and a Class Certification Motion would have followed. The parties were familiar with
4 Plaintiffs' central allegations and Defendants' defenses thereto. The next phase of this litigation would
5 have been to complete class discovery, prepare expert reports and then prepare for Trial.

6 **H. THE EXPERIENCE AND VIEWS OF COUNSEL**

7 Class Counsel has considerable experience in wage and hour and class action litigation. Mr.
8 Yaeckel has over 14 years of experience in "class litigation." Mr. Kuhn has over 6 years of experience
9 in class action litigation. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶51; Raul Perez Decl. ¶¶6-14).

10 Plaintiff Pungi's counsel is also well qualified to act on behalf of a class, based on the firms
11 extensive class action experience. (Kyle C. Worrell Decl. ¶¶ 6-15).

12 Plaintiffs' counsel considers the Agreement to represent a fair, adequate and reasonable
13 settlement that is well within the accepted range of recoveries for similar cases. Counsel further
14 believes the Agreement is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶52).

15 **I. PRESENCE OF A GOVERNMENTAL ACTOR**

16 Although the State is not directly involved in this action, Plaintiffs "stand in the shoes" of the
17 Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") by bringing their PAGA action. Consideration
18 has been made to compensate to Labor Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") in the amount
19 of \$60,000.00, even though the LWDA declined to prosecute the claims itself. (*See* Exhibit "A," at
20 ¶3.2.5). To confirm, 75% of the total allocation of \$60,000 amount, or **\$45,000.00**, is being paid to the
21 LWDA, and 25%, or **\$15,000.00**, being distributed amongst the class members. (*Id*). Counsel for the
22 parties believe this is a fair, reasonable, and adequate allocation. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶53).

23 **J. REACTION OF THE CLASS MEMBERS TO THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT**

24 Prior to preliminary approval, what can be said of the reaction the class members is limited.
25 However, Plaintiffs' counsel has spoken to some Class Members since the parties reached a proposed
26 settlement agreement, and all were in favor of the Settlement. (Yaeckel Decl. ¶ 54).

27 As explained in the Agreement, the Settlement Claims Administrator will send a Notice to the
28 Settlement Class Members. (*See* Exhibit A at ¶8.4.2). The negotiated Class Notice form is attached
 to the declaration of Eric K. Yaeckel as **Exhibit B**.

1 The proposed Notice advises the Settlement Class Members of their anticipated recovery under
2 the Agreement, how to object, how to exclude themselves, the amount of fees and costs sought by
3 Class Counsel, the amount of enhancement payment sought on behalf of the Class Representative, and
4 the date of the final approval hearing. (*See* Exhibit “B”). Thus, the proposed Notice complies with the
5 notice requirements set forth in CRC Rule 3.766(d) and Rule 3.769(f).

6 **VII. PROPOSED TIMELINE OF EVENTS AND FINAL APPROVAL**

7 Assuming the Settlement merits Preliminary Approval from the Court, Plaintiffs request that
8 the Court set a Final Approval Hearing in accordance with the chronology of events set forth below:

- 9 1. Within thirty (30) days of Preliminary Approval, Defendant will provide to the Settlement
10 Administrator the Class List including Class Members’ names, last known addresses, social
11 security numbers, and the dates of employment;
- 12 2. Within seven (7) calendar days of receiving the Class List, the Settlement Administrator will
13 perform an NCOA check for information to update and correct for any known or identifiable
14 address changes and shall mail a Notice Packet to all Class Members via regular First-Class
15 U.S. Mail, using the most current, known mailing addresses identified in the Class List;
- 16 3. 30 calendar days after Settlement Administrator has mailed the Notice Packets to Class
17 Members: Deadline for Class Members to postmark and submit all disputes of pay period
18 information, request exclusion, or file written objection to the Settlement;
- 19 4. Approximately 7 Calendar days after the conclusion of the Notice and Response Period:
20 Plaintiffs will file a Motion for Final Approval; and
- 21 5. 16 Court days after the filing of the Final Approval motion: the Court can conduct the Final
22 Approval Hearing.

23
24 Dated: September 18, 2025

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Cody Archer

Eric K. Yaeckel

Ryan T. Kuhn

Cody D. Archer

Attorneys for Plaintiff RHAY TAYLOR in a Representative
capacity only, and on behalf of other members of the general
public similarly situated