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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

ENYLLEL RUGAMA-HERNANDEZ
and EDGAR SANTIAGO, as
individuals, and on behalf of
themselves and on behalf of all
persons similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

P & B INTERMODAL SERVICES
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, a
Limited Liability Company; and
DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants

CASE No. **24STCV07771**

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
SETTLEMENT AND AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE
AWARDS (UNOPPOSED)**

Hearing Date: February 26, 2026
Hearing Time: 11:00 a.m.
[Hearing scheduled by Order dated October 10,
2025]

Judge: Hon. Timothy Patrick Dillon
Dept: SS-15

Date Filed: March 29, 2024
Trial Date: Not set

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	THE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE COURT	1
III.	GENERAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS.....	2
IV.	THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE.....	3
A.	The Settlement Satisfies the California Test for Fairness.....	4
1.	The Investigation and Analysis of Documents are Sufficient to Allow Counsel and the Court to Act Intelligently.....	4
2.	The Settlement was Reached Through Arm's Length Bargaining	4
3.	Class Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation	5
4.	There Are No Objections and No Requests for Exclusion.....	5
5.	The Strength of Plaintiff's Case	6
6.	The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation	8
7.	The Amount Offered in Settlement.....	9
V.	THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE AWARD SHOULD BE APPROVED	11
A.	The Attorneys' Fees are Reasonable and Supported by the Percentage of the Fund Method.....	11
B.	The Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses.....	14
C.	The Service Award Is Reasonable and Should be Approved.....	14
VI.	CONCLUSION.....	15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:	Page:
<i>7-Eleven Owners for Fair Fran. v. Southland Corp.</i> , 85 Cal. App. 4 th 1135 (2000)	2, 3
<i>Alberto v. GMRI, Inc.</i> , 252 F.R.D. 652 (E.D. Cal. Jun 24, 2008)	5
<i>Andrews v. Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P.</i> , 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172183, (C.D. Cal. 2022)	15
<i>Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.</i> , 297 F.R.D. 431 (E.D. Cal. 2013)	12
<i>Barcia v. Contain-A-Way, Inc.</i> , 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17118 (S. D. Cal. 2009)	8
<i>Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert</i> , 444 U.S. 472 (1980)	10
<i>Brinker v. Superior Court</i> , 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012)	7
<i>Browning v. Yahoo!, Inc.</i> , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86266 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2007)	7
<i>Buccellato v. At&T Operations, Inc.</i> , 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85699 (N.D. Cal. 2011).	13
<i>Cellphone Termination Fee Cases</i> , 180 Cal. App. 4th 1110 (2009)	3
<i>Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.</i> , 162 Cal.App.4th 43 (2008)	14
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> , 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794 (1996)	3
<i>Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.</i> , 59 Cal. 4th 1 (2014)	8
<i>Gaskill v. Gordon</i> , 160 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1998)	12
<i>Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.</i> , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476; 15 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1330 (N.D. Cal. 2007); <i>aff'd</i> 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10328 (9 th Cir. May 14, 2009)	5, 9, 11, 15
<i>Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.</i> , 150 F.3d 1011 (9 th Cir. 1998)	6
<i>Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.</i> , 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 (N.D. Cal. 2009).	7

1	<i>Huens v. Tatum,</i>	
2	52 Cal. App. 4 th 259 (1997).....	2
3	<i>In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litigation,</i>	
4	80 F. Supp. 2d 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).....	6
5	<i>In re Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases,</i>	
6	171 Cal.App.4th 495 (2009).....	13
7	<i>Johnson v. Brennan,</i>	
8	2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105775 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)	13
9	<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.,</i>	
10	168 Cal. App. 4th 116 (2008).....	3
11	<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l,</i>	
12	1 Cal. 5th 480 (2016)	11, 12, 13, 14
13	<i>Laskey v. Int'l Union,</i>	
14	638 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981)	6
15	<i>Louie v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.,</i>	
16	2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78314 (S.D. Cal. 2008)	8, 15
17	<i>Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.,</i>	
18	2014 WL 2472316, (C.D. Cal. 2014).....	11
19	<i>Mathein v. Pier 1 Imps.,</i>	
20	2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71386, 168 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P36,620 (E.D. Cal. 2018).....	15
21	<i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles,</i>	
22	186 Cal. App. 4th 399 (2010).	3
23	<i>Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.,</i>	
24	2024 Cal. LEXIS 2438 (May 6, 2024).....	7, 10
25	<i>Nordstrom Commission Cases,</i>	
26	186 Cal. App. 4th 576 (2010).....	10
27	<i>Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com'n,</i>	
28	688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1982)	3
	<i>Pellegrino v. Robert Half Intern., Inc.,</i>	
	182 Cal.App.4th 278 (2010).....	13
	<i>Reynolds v. Direct Flow Med., Inc.,</i>	
	2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149865, (N.D. Cal. 2019).....	15
	<i>Rutti v. Lojack Corp., Inc.,</i>	
	2012 WL 3151077 (C.D. Cal. 2012).....	14
	<i>Serrano v. Priest,</i>	
	20 Cal. 3d 25 (1977).....	11

1	<i>Stanger v. China Elec. Motor, Inc.,</i>	
2	812 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 2016)	13
3	<i>Stetson v. Grissom,</i>	
4	821 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2016)	13, 14
5	<i>Stoetzner v. U.S. Steel Corp.,</i>	
6	897 F.2d 115 (3d. Cir. 1990).	6
7	<i>Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.,</i>	
8	2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671 (N.D. Cal. 2015).	11
9	<i>Swedish Hospital v. Shalala,</i>	
10	1 F.3d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1993)	12
11	<i>Taylor v. Fedex Freight, Inc.,</i>	
12	2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142202 (E.D. Cal. 2016)	14
13	<i>Viceral v. Mistras Grp., Inc.,</i>	
14	2016 WL 5907869 (N.D. Cal. 2016)	11
15	<i>Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.,</i>	
16	557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1997)	11
17	<i>Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.,</i>	
18	290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002)	13
19	<i>Wershba v. Apple Computer,</i>	
20	91 Cal. App. 4 th 224 (2001).	3, 11, 13

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 The parties to this action have reached a Settlement and the Court preliminarily approved the
3 Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement”), a true and correct copy of which
4 is attached as Exhibit #2 to the Declaration of Norman Blumenthal (“Blumenthal Decl.”).¹ In
5 accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order dated October 10, 2025 (“Preliminary Approval
6 Order”), the approved Class Notice has been disseminated to the Class.²

7 The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether the proposed settlement of the litigation
8 should be finally approved. Plaintiffs Enyllel Rugama-Hernandez and Edgar Santiago (“Plaintiffs”)
9 respectfully move for final approval, including attorneys’ fees, costs and the service awards, and the
10 proposed entry of the Final Approval Order and Judgment, submitted herewith. The settlement
11 represents an excellent result for the Class and avoids the delays, risks, and costs of further litigation.
12 After disseminating the notice to the 549 members of the Class, there were **no objections and no**
13 **requests for exclusion**, which means the entire Class (100%) has elected to participate in the
14 Settlement. Blumenthal Decl. ¶4. This is a positive response from the Class evidencing their collective
15 approval of the settlement. As a result, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the class settlement should be
16 finally approved for the same reasons that the Court preliminarily approved the settlement as fair,
17 reasonable, and adequate.

18 **II. THE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE COURT**

19 As consideration for this Settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount to be paid by Defendant P
20 & B Intermodal Services Limited Liability Company (“Defendant”) is Nine Hundred Seventy-Five
21 Thousand Dollars (\$975,000) (the “Gross Settlement Amount”). (Agreement at ¶¶ 1.22 and 3.1.) Under
22 the Settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount consists of the following elements: (1) payment of the
23 Individual Class Payments to the Participating Class Members; (2) Class Counsel Fees Payment and
24 _____

25 ¹ Capitalized terms are defined in the Agreement.

26 ² The “Class” is defined as “all individuals who are or were previously employed by Defendant and
27 any of its subsidiaries in California and classified as a non-exempt employee at any time during the
28 Class Period.” (Preliminary Approval Order at ¶ 6.) The “Class Period” is defined as “January 1, 2022
 through December 31, 2024.” *Id.*

1 Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment; (3) Administration Expenses Payment; (4) the Class
2 Representative Service Payments to the Plaintiffs; and (5) the PAGA Penalties payment including the
3 Individual PAGA Payments and the LWDA PAGA Payment. (Agreement at ¶ 1.22.) Blumenthal Decl.
4 ¶3(a). The Gross Settlement Amount does not include Defendant's share of payroll taxes. (Agreement
5 at ¶ 3.1.) The Gross Settlement Amount shall be all-in with no reversion to Defendant. (Agreement at
6 ¶ 3.1.) Blumenthal Decl. ¶3(b). The following is a table of the key financial terms of the Settlement and
7 the proposed deductions:

8 **\$975,000** (Gross Settlement Amount)

- 9 - \$15,000 (Plaintiffs' proposed service awards - \$7,500 each - per the Court;s
Preliminary Approval Order filed October 10, 2025)
- 10 - \$30,000 (Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment - not to exceed amount)
- 11 - \$325,000 (Class Counsel Fees Payment - not to exceed 1/3 of settlement)
- 12 - \$20,000 (PAGA Payment - 75% to LWDA (\$15,000) / 25% to Aggrieved
Employees (\$5,000))
- \$9,900 (Administration Expenses Payment - not to exceed amount)

12 **\$575,100** (Net Settlement Amount)

13 The specific details of the Settlement were discussed in the Motion for Preliminary Approval and are
14 set forth again in the Declaration of Blumenthal at ¶¶ 3(c)-3(i).

15 The Settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable to the class and should be finally approved for
16 the same reasons the Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement, agreeing that the settlement
17 is "fair, adequate, and reasonable." (Preliminary Approval Order at ¶ 3.) In sum, the Settlement valued
18 at \$975,000 is an excellent result for the Class. This result is particularly favorable in light of the fact
19 that liability and class certification in this case were far from certain in light of the defenses asserted
20 by Defendant. Given the complexities of this case, the defenses asserted, the uncertainty of class
21 certification, along with the uncertainties of proof at trial and appeal, the proposed settlement is fair,
22 reasonable and adequate, and should be finally approved. Blumenthal Decl. ¶3(j).

23 **III. GENERAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL**
24 **OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS**

25 Settlements of disputed claims are favored by the courts. *Huens v. Tatum*, 52 Cal.App.4th 259,
26 265 (1997). In evaluating settlements, the courts have long recognized that compromise is particularly
27 appropriate since such litigation is difficult and notoriously uncertain. *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Fran.*
28 *v. Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1151 (2000) ("[V]oluntary conciliation and settlement are

1 the preferred means of dispute resolution. This is especially true in complex class action litigation.")

2 The court must decide whether the proposed settlement falls within the range of reasonable
3 settlements, taking into account that settlements are compromises between the parties reflecting
4 subjective, unquantifiable judgments concerning the risks and possible outcomes of litigation. *See*
5 *Wershba v. Apple Computer*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246 (2001) ("The proposed settlement is not to be
6 judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved had plaintiffs
7 prevailed at trial.") In *Wershba*, the Court explained that "the merits of the underlying class claims are
8 not a basis for upsetting the settlement of a class action." *Id.*; *see also 7-Eleven, supra*, at 1150.

9 In these cases, courts have repeatedly emphasized that there is a strong initial presumption that
10 the compromise is fair and reasonable. *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245. Courts should not substitute
11 their judgment for that of the parties who negotiated the settlement. *Id.* at 246. The presumption of
12 fairness exists where: (1) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
13 act intelligently; (2) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (3) counsel is
14 experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*,
15 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996). Here, the facts and circumstances compel the conclusion that the
16 proposed settlement satisfies that standard and the presumption applies.

17 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE**

18 The Court must determine whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. *Dunk v. Ford*
19 *Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996); *see also Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com'n*, 688
20 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether the settlement
21 is fair. *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1117 (2009). "The well-recognized
22 factors that the trial court should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a class action settlement
23 agreement include 'the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of
24 further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in
25 settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views
26 of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the
27 proposed settlement.'" *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008); *see also*

1 *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L. A.*, 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408 (2010).

2 The list of factors is not exhaustive and should be tailored to each case. *Dunk, supra*, at 1801.
3 Due regard should be given to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.
4 *Id.* The inquiry “must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the
5 agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties,
6 and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” *Id.*
7 “Ultimately, the [trial] court's determination is nothing more than 'an amalgam of delicate balancing,
8 gross approximations and rough justice.' [Citation omitted.]” *Id.*

9 These factors are analyzed seriatim below, and all support final approval of the class action
10 settlement before this Court, consistent with this Court’s Preliminary Approval Order.

11 **A. The Settlement Satisfies the California Test for Fairness**

12 1. The Investigation and Analysis of Documents are Sufficient to Allow Counsel
13 and the Court to Act Intelligently

14 Over the course of more than a year of litigation, the Parties engaged in the investigation of the
15 claims, including the production of documents, class data, and other information, allowing for the full
16 and complete analysis of liabilities and defenses to the claims in this Action. The procedural history and
17 investigation performed was detailed at length in support of the motion for preliminary approval. The
18 Settlement was the product of one arms-length mediation and contentious negotiations, both during and
19 after mediation, presided over by mediator Tagore Subramaniam, Esq. The details of the litigation are
20 set forth in the Blumenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 6(a)-6(g).

21 2. The Settlement was Reached Through Arm’s Length Bargaining

22 This settlement is the result of extensive and hard-fought litigation as well as negotiations before
23 an experienced and well-respected mediator. Defendant has expressly denied and continues to deny any
24 wrongdoing or legal liability arising out of the conduct alleged in the Action. Plaintiffs and Class
25 Counsel have determined that it is desirable and beneficial to the Class to resolve the Released Class
26 Claims of the Class and Released PAGA Claims as to the Aggrieved Employees in accordance with this
27 Settlement, based upon the experience of Class Counsel who has previously litigated similar claims
28 against other employers. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(a).

1 The Parties attended an arms-length mediation session with Tagore Subramaniam, Esq., a
2 respected and experienced mediator of wage and hour class actions, in order to reach this Settlement.
3 In preparation for the mediation, Defendant provided Plaintiffs and Class Counsel with payroll and
4 employment data and other information regarding the Class Members, various internal documents, and
5 other compensation and employment-related materials. Class Counsel analyzed the data using damages
6 expert Berger Consulting and prepared and submitted a mediation brief to the mediator. Following the
7 all-day mediation session, with after arms' length negotiations both during and after the mediation, the
8 Parties agreed to this Settlement based upon a mediator's proposal. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(b).

9 The fact that the settlement was negotiated with the assistance of an experienced mediator
10 supports approval. *Alberto v. GMRI, Inc.*, 252 F.R.D. 652, 666 (E.D. Cal. Jun 24, 2008); *Glass v. UBS*
11 *Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476; 15 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1330, at *15 (N.D. Cal.
12 2007) ("The settlement was negotiated and approved by experienced counsel on both sides of the
13 litigation, with the assistance of a well-respected mediator with substantial experience in employment
14 litigation[, and] this factor supports approval of the settlement").

15 From February 2025 to July 2025, the settlement agreement and exhibits thereto were finalized
16 and executed. On September 25, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval,
17 and on October 10, 2025, the Court entered the Preliminary Approval Order preliminarily finding the
18 settlement to be fair, adequate, and reasonable to the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(c).

19 3. Class Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation

20 Class Counsel in this matter has extensive class action experience and has represented thousands
21 of persons in class actions including employment litigation, wage and hour class actions, and complex
22 litigation. Class Counsel has previously litigated wage and hour class actions involving employees and
23 claims similar to this case and have been approved as experienced class counsel during contested
24 motions in state and federal courts throughout California. The experience of counsel and class action
25 cases managed and settled by the Class Counsel in this action is provided to the Court in the Blumenthal
26 Decl. at Exhibit #1 and the Declaration of James Clark at ¶¶ 14-16. Class Counsel have participated in
27 every aspect of the settlement discussions and have concluded the settlement is fair, adequate and
28 reasonable and in the best interests of the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶ 3(j).

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4. There Are No Objections and No Requests for Exclusion

The reaction of the Class unequivocally supports approval of the Settlement. On November 10, 2025, the Administrator mailed the Court-approved Class Notice to the Class Members, which provided each class member with the terms of the Settlement, including notice of the claims at issue and the financial terms of the settlement, including the attorneys' fees, costs, and service award that were being sought, how individual settlement awards would be calculated, and the specific, estimated payment amount to that individual. *See* Declaration of Katie Tran (“Tran Decl.”) ¶ 7, Exh. A. In disseminating the notice, the Administrator followed the notice procedures authorized by the Court in its Preliminary Approval Order. Significantly, there have been **no objections and no request for exclusion**. Tran Decl. ¶¶ 11-12. As such, the entire Class (100%) will participate in the Settlement and will be sent a settlement check. *See* Tran Decl. at ¶¶ 14, 17; Blumenthal Decl. ¶4.

The absence of any objector strongly supports the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the Settlement. *See In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litigation*, 80 F.Supp.2d 164, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“If only a small number of objections are received, that fact can be viewed as indicative of the adequacy of the settlement.”); *Stoetznner v. U.S. Steel Corp.*, 897 F.2d 115, 118-119 (3d. Cir. 1990) (29 objections out of 281 member class “strongly favors settlement”); *Laskey v. Int’l Union*, 638 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981) (The fact that 7 out of 109 class members objected to the proposed settlement should be considered when determining fairness of settlement). Here, where there are no objections, the approval of the class is evident.

5. The Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case

The Action generally alleges that Plaintiffs and other Class Members were not properly paid all overtime wages for hours worked and at the correct rate of pay, were not provided meal and rest periods or paid premiums at the correct rate of pay in lieu thereof, were not timely paid earned wages, were not provided reimbursement for required expenses, were not paid accrued and used sick pay at the correct rate of pay, were not provided accurate itemized wage statements, were not provide all wages when due, and that Defendant did not properly maintain accurate records. The Action seeks unpaid wages, penalties, attorney fees, litigation costs, and any other equitable or legal relief allegedly due and owing to Plaintiffs and the other Class Members by virtue of the foregoing claims. Blumenthal Decl. ¶5.

1 Where both sides face significant uncertainty, the attendant risks favor settlement. *Hanlon v.*
2 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, a number of defenses asserted by Defendant
3 present serious threats to the claims of the Plaintiffs and the other Class Members. Defendant asserted
4 that Defendant's practices complied with all applicable Labor laws. Defendant argued that Class
5 Members were paid for all time worked and that all work time was properly recorded and compensation
6 for that time was correctly compensated. Defendant contends that its meal and rest period policies fully
7 complied with California law and Defendant did not fail to provide the opportunity for legally required
8 meal and rest breaks. Defendant could argue that the payment of meal period premiums is evidence of
9 its lawful practices. Defendant contends that there was no failure to pay for business expenses and any
10 cell phone usage was merely convenient and voluntary such that reimbursement was not legally
11 required. Finally, Defendant could argue that the Supreme Court decision in *Brinker v. Superior Court*,
12 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012), weakened Plaintiffs' claims, on liability, value, and class certifiability as to
13 the meal and rest period claims. Defendant also argues that based on their facially lawful practices,
14 Defendant acted in good faith and without willfulness, which if accepted would negate the claims for
15 waiting time penalties and/or inaccurate wage statements. See e.g. *Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*,
16 15 Cal. 5th 1056, 1065 (May 6, 2024) ("if an employer reasonably and in good faith believed it was
17 providing a complete and accurate wage statement in compliance with the requirements of section 226,
18 then it has not knowingly and intentionally failed to comply with the wage statement law.")
19 Defendant's defenses could eliminate or substantially reduce any recovery to the Class. While Plaintiffs
20 believe that these defenses could be overcome, Defendant maintains these defenses have merit and
21 therefore present a serious risk to recovery by the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(a).

22 In a similar wage and hour case, the federal district court in *Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.*, 2009
23 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 (N.D. Cal. 2009), explained in approving an overtime class action settlement:

24 Plaintiffs may have a strong case, but the risks inherent in continued litigation are great.
25 Defendants strongly deny liability for Plaintiffs' principal claim... [...T]he gross
26 settlement amount and the Class Members' expected net recovery, after fees and other
costs are deducted, appear to be a reasonable compromise, in light of the risks of
litigation.

27 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 at *19-20 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see also *Browning v. Yahoo!, Inc.*, 2007
28 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86266, at *30 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("In considering the strength of Plaintiff's case, legal

1 uncertainties at the time of settlement - particularly those which go to fundamental legal issues - favor
2 approval.”). As recognized in a federal decision approving settlement of an overtime wage class action:

3 The potential complexity and possible duration of trial also weigh in favor of granting
4 final approval. Plaintiffs acknowledge the difficulties of proving damages, recognize the
5 uncertainty of outcome, and believe defendant would appeal in the event of adverse
6 judgment. A post-judgment appeal would require many years to resolve and delay
 payment to class members. Plaintiffs believe the benefits of a guaranteed recovery today
 outweigh an uncertain future result. Accordingly, plaintiffs argue, and the Court agrees,
 the actual recovery confers substantial benefits on the class that outweigh the potential
 recovery through full adjudication.

7 *Barcia v. Contain-A-Way, Inc.*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17118, *9 (S.D. Cal. 2009); *see also Louie v.*
8 *Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78314, *14 (S.D. Cal. 2008).

9 There was also a significant risk that, if the Action was not settled, Plaintiffs would be unable
10 to obtain a certified class and maintain the certified class through trial, and thereby not recover on behalf
11 of any employees other than themselves. At the time of the mediation, Defendant forcefully opposed
12 the propriety of class certification, arguing that individual issues precluded class certification. Further,
13 as demonstrated by the California Supreme Court decision in *Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.*, 59
14 Cal.4th 1 (2014), there are significant hurdles to overcome for a class-wide recovery even where the
15 class has been certified. While other cases have approved class certification in wage and hour claims,
16 class certification in this action was hotly disputed and the maintenance of a certified class through trial
17 was by no means a foregone conclusion. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(b).

18 In sum, the Settlement is a fair and reasonable result, and provides the Class with a significant
19 recovery, particularly when viewed in light of the fact that the Defendant asserted serious and
20 substantial defenses both to liability and to class certification. The maximum and average class member
21 allocation (in addition to their Individual PAGA Payment) are \$3,652.74 and \$1,048.29, respectively.
22 *See Tran Decl.* at ¶17. Given the complexities of this case, the defenses, along with the uncertainties
23 of proof and appeal, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and should be finally
24 approved. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶8(e).

25 6. The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

26 As demonstrated by the decision in *Duran*, the complexities and duration of further litigation
27 cannot be overstated. There is little doubt that Defendant would post a bond and appeal in the event of
28 an adverse judgment. A post-judgment appeal by Defendant would have required many more years to

1 resolve, assuming the judgment was affirmed. If the judgment was not affirmed in total, then the case
2 could have dragged on for years after the appeal. The benefits of a guaranteed recovery today outweigh
3 an uncertain result three or more years in the future. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(c).

4 Plaintiffs and Class Counsel recognize the expense and length of a trial against Defendant
5 through possible appeals which could take at least another two or three years. Class Counsel also have
6 taken into account the uncertain outcome, the risk of litigation, especially in complex actions such as
7 this one. Class Counsel are also mindful of and recognize the inherent problems of proof under, and
8 alleged defenses to, the claims asserted in the Action. Moreover, post-trial motions and appeals would
9 have been inevitable. Costs would have mounted and recovery would have been delayed if not denied,
10 thereby reducing the benefits of an ultimate victory. The Settlement confers substantial benefits upon
11 the Class. Based upon their evaluation, Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have determined that the Settlement
12 set forth in the Agreement is in the best interest of the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(c).

13 Although Plaintiffs and Class Counsel believe that their case has merit, which Defendant
14 continue to vigorously deny, they recognized the potential risks both sides would face if litigation of
15 the Action continued. As the federal court held in *Glass*, where the parties faced uncertainties similar
16 to those in this litigation:

17 In light of the above-referenced uncertainty in the law, the risk, expense, complexity,
18 and likely duration of further litigation likewise favors the settlement. Regardless of how
19 this Court might have ruled on the merits of the legal issues, the losing party likely
20 would have appealed, and the parties would have faced the expense and uncertainty of
21 litigating an appeal. "The expense and possible duration of the litigation should be
22 considered in evaluating the reasonableness of [a] settlement."

23 *Id.* at *12.

24 7. The Amount Offered in Settlement

25 The Settlement in this case is fair, reasonable and adequate considering Defendant's defenses
26 to Plaintiffs' claims. As set forth in the Declaration of Nordrehaug in support of preliminary approval
27 which discussed the value of the class claims in detail, the Gross Settlement Amount compares
28 favorably to the value of the claims. Based upon 549 Participating Class Members who collectively
worked an estimated 41,122 Workweeks, the Gross Settlement Amount provides an average value of
\$1,775 per Class Member and \$23.70 per workweek and, after deductions, the Net Settlement Amount

1 provides an average recovery of \$1,048.28 per Class Member and a recovery of \$13,99 per workweek.
2 Blumenthal Decl. at ¶8(d).

3 The calculations to compensate for the amount due for the Class at the time of the mediation
4 were calculated by Berger Consulting, Plaintiffs' damage expert. As to the Class whose claims are at
5 issue in this Action, Plaintiffs used the expert to analyze the data and determine the potential unpaid
6 wages for the employees. The maximum potential damages were calculated to be \$1,330,418 for the
7 alleged unpaid wages due to off-the-clock work at 1 hour per week, \$5,039 for the alleged underpaid
8 overtime due to the alleged miscalculation of the regular rate, \$1,410 for the alleged underpaid sick pay
9 due to the alleged miscalculation of the regular rate, \$3,500,630 for alleged meal period damages based
10 upon a 54% potential violation rate for shifts observed in the time records and after deduction of meal
11 premiums paid by Defendant, and \$3,504,302 for alleged rest period damages based upon the same
12 23.1% potential violation rate observed for meal breaks, \$247,318 for alleged unreimbursed business
13 expenses for personal cell phone usage at \$5 per month. As a result, the total damage valuation was
14 calculated that Defendant was subject to a maximum damage claim in the amount of \$8,589,119. As
15 to potential penalties, Plaintiffs calculated that potential waiting time penalties were a maximum of
16 \$3,563,715, and potential maximum wage statement penalties were \$1,740,000.³ Defendant vigorously
17 disputed Plaintiffs' calculations and exposure theories. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(d).

18 Consequently, the Gross Settlement Amount of \$975,000 represents more than 11% of the
19 maximum value of the alleged damages at issue in this case at the time this Settlement was negotiated.⁴
20 The mediation valuation set forth above likely overvalued the claims by at least 20% because the
21

22 ³ While Plaintiffs alleged claims for statutory penalties pursuant to Labor Code Sections 203 and
23 226, at mediation these claims are subject to additional, separate defenses asserted by Defendant,
24 including, a good faith dispute defense as to whether any wages were owed given Defendant's position
25 that Plaintiffs and Class Members were properly compensated. *See Nordstrom Commission Cases*, 186
26 Cal.App.4th 576, 584 (2010) ("There is no willful failure to pay wages if the employer and employee
27 have a good faith dispute as to whether and when the wages were due.").

28 ⁴ Because the PAGA claim is not a class claim and primarily is paid to the State of California,
Plaintiffs did not include the PAGA claim in this discussion of the value of the class claims. The PAGA
claim was addressed in the Declaration of Kyle Nordrehaug at ¶33 filed in support of Plaintiffs' Motion
for Preliminary Approval.

1 valuation used 49,761 workweeks, when in fact the actual workweeks were more than 20% less.
2 Importantly, the recent decision that good faith belief of compliance by the employer in *Naranjo v.*
3 *Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal.5th 1056, 1065 (2024), could completely negate the claims for
4 waiting time and wage statement penalties, even if wages were owed to the Class. The above maximum
5 calculations should then be adjusted in consideration for both the risk of class certification and the risk
6 of establishing class-wide liability on all claims. Given the amount of the settlement as compared to
7 the potential value of claims in this case and the defenses asserted by Defendant, this settlement is fair
8 and reasonable.⁵ Clearly, the goal of this litigation has been met. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(d).

9 **V. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE AWARD**
10 **SHOULD BE APPROVED**

11 **A. The Attorneys' Fees are Reasonable and Supported by the Percentage of the**
12 **Fund Method**

13 Class Counsel seeks a fee award calculated at one-third (1/3) of the total value of the settlement
14 for the successful prosecution and resolution of this action. California state and federal courts have
15 recognized that an appropriate method for determining award of attorneys' fees is based on a percentage
16 of the total value of benefits to class members by the settlement. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91
17 Cal.App.4th 224, 254 (2001); *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 34 (1977); *Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert*, 444
18 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); *Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.*, 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir. 1997). The purpose
19 of this equitable doctrine is to avoid unjust enrichment to the Class and to "spread litigation costs
20 proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden
21 alone." *Vincent*, 557 F.2d at 769.

22 The California Supreme Court has provided guidance regarding the award of attorneys' fees in

23 ⁵ See *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (approving a
24 settlement where the settlement amount constituted approximately 25% of the estimated overtime
25 damages for the class); *Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671, at *12
26 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting final approval where "the proposed Total Settlement Amount represents
27 approximately 10% of what class might have been awarded had they succeeded at trial."); *Viceral v.*
28 *Mistras Grp., Inc.*, 2016 WL 5907869 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (approving wage and hour class action
settlement amounting to 8.1% of full value); *Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.*, 2014 WL 2472316, (C.D.
Cal. 2014) (approving wage and hour class action settlement worth "somewhere between 9% and 18%"
of maximum valuation).

1 wage and hour class action settlements. Under California law, the award of attorneys' fees in common
2 fund wage and hour class action settlements should start with the percentage method. *See Laffitte v.*
3 *Robert Half Int'l*, 1 Cal. 5th 480, 503 (2016) ("We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state
4 courts in holding that when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
5 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court
6 may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund
7 created"). Under the percentage of the fund method, a court's objective remains to "mimic the market"
8 in fixing a reasonable fee. *See Gaskill v. Gordon*, 160 F.3d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 1998).

9 First, the fee award representing one-third of the fund clearly falls within that range and is
10 consistent with other rulings of other courts and comprehensive surveys of class action settlements and
11 fee awards. Attorneys' fees awards of one-third of the fund are within the expected range in the market
12 in legal services. *See Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Award*,
13 7 J. Empirical Leg. Stud. 811, 833 (2010) (analyzing 444 cases between 2006-2007 and concluding that
14 "[m]ost fee awards were between 25 percent and 35 percent"). In *Laffitte*, the Court expressly approved
15 of a one-third fee award. Such similar awards by other Courts are set forth in the Blumenthal Decl. ¶11.

16 Second, the results delivered by Class Counsel also support the requested percentage of the fund.
17 Here, Plaintiffs and their counsel secured a \$975,000 settlement for the benefit of the Class, and not one
18 Class Member objected. The Settlement was possible because Defendant recognized the risks that
19 Plaintiffs could potentially prevail on any or all of the contested issues regarding liability, and obtain
20 class certification. Blumenthal Decl. ¶10(f). In successfully navigating these hurdles Class Counsel
21 displayed the necessary skills in both wage and hour and class action litigation. Moreover, as discussed
22 above, there were significant risks to the contingent litigation. *See Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions*
23 *Corp.*, 297 F.R.D. 431, 449 (E.D. Cal. 2013) ("**Like this case, where recovery is uncertain, an award**
24 **of one-third of the common fund as attorneys' fees has been found to be appropriate.**")

25 Third, "the response of the class members to attorneys' fee notice, though not decisive, is
26 relevant to the ... reasonable determination" regarding fees. *Swedish Hospital v. Shalala*, 1 F.3d 1261,
27 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1993). A positive response rate tends to suggest that the court's "approximation of the
28 market" for fees is well supported. *Id.* at 1269. Here, the Class Notice specifically notified the Class that

1 Class Counsel would be seeking a one-third fee award. Again, there were no objections.

2 Fourth, it is recognized that one of the primary factors justifying an enhanced attorney's fees
3 reward is the attendant risks inherent in the litigation. Here, it is clear that a settlement fund of \$975,000
4 has been created. For Class Counsel, the fees here were wholly contingent in nature and the case
5 presented far more risk than the usual contingent fee case. Among the risks was the cost inherent in
6 class action litigation, as well as a long battle with a corporate Defendant who had retained a premier
7 and highly experienced defense firm. **Counsel retained on a contingency fee basis, whether in
8 private matters or in class action litigation, is entitled to a premium above their hourly rate in
9 order to compensate for both the risks and the delay in payment.** See e.g. *Stanger v. China Elec.*
10 *Motor, Inc.*, 812 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2016) (courts "must" apply a risk enhancement); *Stetson v.*
11 *Grissom*, 821 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2016) (abuse of discretion not to apply risk multiplier).

12 Fifth, the requested fee award is supported by the lodestar cross-check. The reasonableness of
13 the requested attorneys' fee of one-third equal to \$325,000 is also established by reference to Class
14 Counsel's lodestar in this matter. **The contemporaneous billing records for Class Counsel evidence
15 that through January 29, 2026, Class Counsel's total lodestar is \$232,475, with significant
16 additional fees still to be incurred to complete final approval and the settlement process.**
17 Blumenthal Decl. at ¶12 and Exhibit #3 [lodestar of \$137,500]; see also Declaration of James Clark at
18 ¶¶ 17-26. [lodestar of \$94,975]. The requested fee award is therefore currently equivalent to Class
19 Counsel's total lodestar with a reasonable multiplier cross-check of less than 1.4, and there will be
20 additional lodestar incurred by Class Counsel to complete the settlement process and manage the
21 settlement distribution and reports. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶12. In *Buccellato v. At&T Operations, Inc.*,
22 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85699, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2011), the Court explained that a multiplier of 4.3 is
23 reasonable in such a contingent class action. Here, the multiplier cross-check is below the range of
24 reasonable multipliers approved in other cases.⁶ As noted in *Laffitte*, the lodestar multiplier cross-check

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26 ⁶ See *Johnson v. Brennan*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105775 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("Courts regularly award
27 lodestar multipliers from two to six times lodestar"); *Buccellato v. At&T Operations, Inc.*, 2011 U.S.
28 Dist. LEXIS 85699, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (4.3 multiplier is reasonable); *Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal. 5th at
487 (approving 1/3 fee award with multiplier of 2.13); *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043,
1051 (9th Cir. 2002) (3.65 multiplier approved); *Pellegrino v. Robert Half Intern., Inc.*, 182

1 “does not override the trial court's primary determination of the fee as a percentage of the common
2 fund” and Courts may only consider adjustment when the “cross-check is extraordinarily high or low”.
3 *Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal. 5th at 505. For such reasons, Class Counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees in the
4 amount of one-third of the common fund is fair and reasonable, and should be approved.

5 **B. The Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses**

6 The Agreement provides at paragraph 3.2(b), that Class Counsel may seek a “Class Counsel
7 Litigation Expenses Payment of not more than \$30,000.” Class Counsel requests reimbursement for
8 incurred litigation expenses and costs in the amount of **\$22,915,90** based upon counsel’s billing records,
9 which is less than the “not to exceed” amount. These litigation expenses include filing fees, mediation
10 expenses, expert expenses (Berger Consulting), attorney service charges (OneLegal, Knox), and
11 CaseAnywhere charges, all of which are costs normally billed to the client.⁷ The details of the litigation
12 expenses incurred are set forth the Blumenthal Decl. at ¶13 and Exhibit #3 [expenses of \$20,645.61];
13 and Declaration of James Clark at ¶ 27 [expenses of \$2,270.29]. These costs were reasonably incurred
14 in the prosecution of the Action. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶13. Because these incurred expenses were
15 necessary to the successful prosecution of these claims, the request should be granted.

16 **C. The Service Award Is Reasonable and Should be Approved**

17 Plaintiffs respectfully submit that for their service as the only class representatives, Plaintiffs
18 should be awarded the agreed service award of \$7,500 each (reduced from \$15,000 each by the Court
19 at preliminary approval) in accordance with the Agreement for their time, risk and effort expended on
20 behalf of the Class as the class representatives. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(a).) Defendant has agreed to these

21
22 _____
23 Cal.App.4th 278 (2010) (in class actions reasonable multipliers of 2.0 to 4.0 are often applied);
24 *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 255 ("multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher."); *In re Sutter*
25 *Health Uninsured Pricing Cases*, 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (2009) (affirming multiplier of 2.52 as “fair
and reasonable); *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 (2008) (affirming multiplier of 2.53);
Taylor v. Fedex Freight, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142202 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (2.26 multiplier).

26 ⁷ Nontaxable costs are properly awarded where authorized by the parties’ agreement. *Stetson*, 821
27 F.3d at 1165. Accordingly, “[e]xpenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging, photocopying,
28 long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service, mediation, exhibits,
documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.” *Rutti v. Lojack Corp., Inc.*, 2012
WL 3151077, at *12 (C.D. Cal. 2012).

1 payments and there have been no objections to the requested service awards. The Blumenthal Decl., at
2 ¶14, provides a long list of equivalent service awards approved in California in similar cases, which
3 further supports the request in this case. Plaintiffs' Declarations in support of this request are attached
4 as Exhibits #5-6 to the Blumenthal Decl.

5 As the representatives of the Class, Plaintiffs performed their duties to the Class admirably and
6 without exception. Plaintiffs worked extensively with Class Counsel during the course of the litigation,
7 responding to numerous requests, searching for documents, working with counsel, and reviewing the
8 settlement documentation. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶ 14. Plaintiffs' Declarations detail the involvement,
9 stress and risks they undertook as a result of this Action. Plaintiffs also assumed the serious risk that
10 they might possibly be liable for costs and fees to Defendant, as well as the reputational risk of being
11 "blacklisted" by other future employers for having filed a class action on behalf of employees.
12 Blumenthal Decl. at ¶15. Without Plaintiffs' participation, cooperation and information, no other
13 employees would be receiving any benefit. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 15-16.

14 The payment of service awards to successful class representatives is appropriate and the amount
15 of \$7,500 each is well within the currently awarded range for similar settlements. *See, e.g., Andrews*
16 *v. Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172183, at *11 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (finding that
17 the requested service awards of \$15,000 each are appropriate); *Reynolds v. Direct Flow Med., Inc.*, 2019
18 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149865, at *19 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (granting request for \$12,500 service award);
19 *Mathein v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc.*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71386 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (awarding \$12,500
20 where average class member payment was \$351); *Louie v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.*, 2008
21 WL 4473183, *7 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (awarding \$25,000 service award to each of six plaintiffs in overtime
22 class action); *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*, 2007 WL 221862, *16-17 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (awarding \$25,000
23 service award in overtime class action).

24 **VI. CONCLUSION**

25 Plaintiffs respectfully request that the settlement be finally approved as fair, reasonable and
26 adequate and requests entry of the Final Approval Order and Judgment, submitted herewith.

27 Respectfully submitted,

28 Dated: January 29, 2026 **BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW LLP**

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By: /s/ Kyle Nordrehaug
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