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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

LERE GARRETT, an individual, on behalf of
themselves, and on behalf of all persons
similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

CORE ANALYTICS RADIOLOGY, INC., a
California corporation; and DOES 1-50,
Inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 24CV103976

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF
CLASS AND PAGA ACTION
SETTLEMENT, APPROVAL OF CLASS
COUNSEL FEES PAYMENT AND
CLASS LITIGATION EXPENSES
PAYMENT**

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Dept.: 18

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I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Lere Garrett (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) seeks final approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice and Amendment No. 1 to Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (collectively, the “Agreement”)¹, which if approved, would provide valuable monetary relief for 118 Participating Class Members employed by Defendant Core Analytics Radiology (“Defendant”) in California during the Class Period. Plaintiff and Class Counsel also seek approval of a class counsel award in the amount of **\$99,272.09**, comprised of \$75,000.00 in attorneys’ fees and \$24,272.09 for reimbursement of actually incurred litigation expenses.

An objective evaluation of the proposed settlement of \$225,000.00 (“Gross Settlement Amount”) confirms that the relief negotiated on behalf of the Class is fair, reasonable, and valuable. The Settlement is a product of informed, adversarial, and non-collusive negotiations between experienced counsel, guided by the wisdom and experience of mediator Lisa Klerman, Esq., an experienced mediator of class and PAGA actions. Declaration of Shani O. Zakay (“SOZ Dec.”), ¶ 19. Plaintiff estimates that the Settlement, if approved, would result in a Net Settlement Amount of approximately \$92,760.00, with an average Individual Settlement Payment of **\$786.10**, a high payment of \$1,928.02, and a low payment of \$7.97. Aggrieved Employees will receive an estimated average Individual PAGA Payment of **\$57.57**, a high payment of \$83.65, and a low payment of \$2.09.² Declaration of Missy Carey (“Apex Dec.”), ¶¶ 15-18.

The relief offered by the Settlement is immediate and is particularly impressive when viewed against the difficulties encountered by plaintiffs pursuing similar wage and hour cases (*see infra*). As discussed below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all criteria for final settlement approval under California law and falls well within the range of reasonableness. SOZ Dec., ¶ 20.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE LITIGATION

Defendant owns and operates a company that provides mobile imaging and diagnostic services, including x-rays, ultrasounds, and EKGs, throughout California, including in Alameda County, where

¹ The Agreement is attached as Ex “A” to the Declaration of Shani O. Zakay (“SOZ Dec.”) at ¶ 3. All citations to the Agreement incorporate by this reference a citation to the SOZ Dec., ¶ 3. Further, unless indicated otherwise, capitalized terms used herein have the same meaning as those defined by the Agreement.

1 Plaintiff worked. This action asserts claims on behalf of Defendant’s current and former non-exempt
2 employees employed in California during the Class Period. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant
3 from July 2022 through June 2024 as a non-exempt employee paid on an hourly basis. At all times
4 during her employment, Plaintiff was paid an hourly wage and was entitled to legally compliant meal
5 and rest periods. Throughout her employment, Plaintiff was subject to Defendant’s written policies
6 and procedures. Declaration of Lere Garrett (“LG Dec.”) at ¶ 3.

7 Generally, Plaintiff claims that Defendant failed to provide compliant meal and rest periods;
8 failed to pay for all hours worked; failed to furnish accurate itemized wage statements; and failed to
9 pay all wages upon separation. SOZ Dec. at ¶ 21.

10 Following the Parties’ agreement to mediate the action, Defendant agreed to informally produce
11 documents and data points subject to the mediation privilege and pertinent written wage and hour
12 policies. SOZ Dec. at ¶ 22. On August 6, 2025, the Parties participated in a full day mediation with
13 mediator Lisa Klerman, Esq. The Parties accepted the mediator’s proposal shortly after mediation
14 concluded, resulting in a global settlement of Plaintiff’s class and PAGA claims, which was
15 subsequently memorialized in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding. After reaching an
16 agreement in principle, the parties negotiated a long-form settlement agreement, which is the subject of the
17 instant motion. SOZ Dec., ¶ 23.

18 On March 30, 2026, this Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement. SOZ Dec. ¶ 5. On
19 April 23, 2026, the Settlement Administrator mailed Notice Packets to all 118 Settlement Class
20 members. Apex Dec., ¶ 7. The mailing of the Notice Packets triggered a forty-five (45) day Response
21 Deadline for the Settlement Class to submit requests for exclusion or objections to the Settlement.
22 Agreement at § 1.43. Notably, there were zero objections and 100% of the Class Members are
23 participating in the Settlement. Apex Dec., ¶¶ 11-12, 14.

24 **III. THE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE COURT**

25 The Court preliminarily approved a Gross Settlement Amount of \$225,000.00. The Gross
26 Settlement Amount is all-in with no reversion to Defendant. Agreement at § 3.1. The Net Settlement
27 Amount shall be used for the payment of all Individual Class Payments to satisfy all Released Class
28 Claims. The Settlement Administrator will calculate Individual Class Payments by adding up the total

1 number of Workweeks for all Participating Class Members. They will then divide the Net Settlement
2 Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class
3 Period and multiply the result by each Participating Class Member's Workweeks. Agreement at § 3.2.4.
4 The Settlement Administrator estimates the average Individual Settlement Payment is **\$786.10** and the
5 highest Individual Settlement Payment is \$1,928.02. Apex Dec., ¶ 16.

6 When Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount and funds all employer payroll
7 taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments, the Participating Class Members will
8 release the Released Parties from all claims that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged,
9 based on the facts stated in the Operative Complaint. Plaintiff, on behalf of the LWDA and the State of
10 California, will release the Released Parties from all PAGA claims alleged, or that reasonably could
11 have been alleged based on the facts alleged in the Operative Complaint and in Plaintiff's PAGA notice
12 to the LWDA on December 19, 2024, which occurred during the PAGA Period, and expressly excluding
13 all other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, unemployment insurance,
14 disability, social security, workers' compensation, and PAGA claims outside the PAGA Period.
15 Agreement at §§ 6.1, 6.2; Amendment No. 1 to Agreement at ¶ A. Apex Class Action, LLC, was
16 appointed as the Settlement Administrator for the class. The settlement administration costs are
17 \$4,740.00. Apex Dec., ¶ 19. These expenses shall be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
18 Agreement at §§ 3.2.3, 4.4. Subject to Court approval, Class Counsel shall seek attorneys' fees in the
19 amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$75,000.00), equal to one-third of the Gross
20 Settlement Amount, and attorneys' expenses in the amount of \$24,272.09 for actually incurred litigation
21 expenses. Agreement at § 3.2.2.

22 Subject to Court approval, the Agreement provides for a Class Representative Service Payment
23 in an amount of up to \$10,000.00 for Plaintiff in consideration of her time, risk, and efforts as the Class
24 Representative on behalf of the Settlement Class. Agreement at § 3.2.1.

25 As set forth in the Agreement, \$12,500.00 of the Gross Settlement Amount has been allocated for
26 civil penalties under the PAGA ("PAGA Penalties"). Sixty-five percent (65%) of the PAGA Penalties
27 will be paid to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency. The Settlement Administrator
28 shall distribute the remaining thirty-five percent (35%) of the PAGA Penalties to the Aggrieved

Employees. (Agreement at § 3.2.5). The Settlement Administrator estimates that Aggrieved Employees will receive an average Individual PAGA Payment of **\$57.57**, and a high payment of \$83.65. Apex Dec., ¶ 18. As explained in further detail below, given the complexities of this case, the defenses asserted, and the uncertainty of class certification, along with the uncertainties of proof at trial and appeal, the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and should be granted final approval. SOZ Dec., ¶ 19.

IV. GENERAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS

Settlements of disputed claims are favored by the courts. (*Huens v. Tatum*, 52 Cal. App. 4th 259, 265 (1997).). In evaluating settlements, the courts have long recognized that compromise is particularly appropriate since such litigation is difficult and notoriously uncertain. (*7-Eleven Owners for Fair Fran. v. Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1151 (2000).). “[T]o prevent fraud, collusion or unfairness to the class, the settlement or dismissal of a class action requires court approval.” (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1801 (1996) *citing* *Malibu Outrigger Bd. of Governors v. Superior Court*, 103 Cal. App. 3d 573, 578-579 (1980).). The court must decide whether the proposed settlement falls within the range of reasonable settlements, taking into account that settlements are compromises between the parties reflecting subjective, unquantifiable judgments concerning the risks and possible outcomes of litigation. (See also *Wershba v. Apple Computer*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246 (2001).).

In *Wershba*, appellants argued that the settlement was too low given the “clear” liability, however, the Court rejected this argument and held that “the merits of the underlying class claims are not a basis for upsetting the settlement of a class action.” (*Wershba, supra*, at 246; see also *7-Eleven, supra*, at 1150.). In these cases, Courts have repeatedly emphasized that there is a strong initial presumption that the compromise is fair and reasonable. (*Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245.). The presumption of fairness exists where: (1) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (2) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1801, *citing* Newberg & Conte, *Newberg on Class Actions*, (3d ed. 1992) §11.41, pp. 11-91.). Here, all of these factors support a presumption of fairness.

1 **V. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE, AND ADEQUATE**

2 The court must determine whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. (*Dunk v. Ford*
3 *Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996); see also *Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com'n*, 688
4 F. 2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982).). The purpose of the requirement is "the protection of those class
5 members, including the named plaintiffs, whose rights may not have been given due regard by the
6 negotiating parties." (*Dunk, supra*, at 1801.).

7 The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether the settlement is fair. (*Rebney v. Wells*
8 *Fargo Bank*, 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1138 (1990).). "The well-recognized factors that the trial court
9 should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a class action settlement agreement include 'the
10 strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk
11 of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery
12 completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a
13 governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.' [Citations.]"
14 (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008); see also *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola*
15 *Bottling Co. of Los Angeles*, 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408 (2010).). The list of factors is not exhaustive and
16 should be tailored to each case. (*Dunk, supra*, at 1801.). Due regard should be given to what is otherwise
17 a private consensual agreement between the parties. (*Id.*). The inquiry "must be limited to the extent
18 necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching
19 by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair,
20 reasonable and adequate to all concerned." (*Id.*). "Ultimately, the [trial] court's determination is nothing
21 more than 'an amalgam of delicate balancing, gross approximations and rough justice.' [Citation
22 omitted.]" (*Id.*). These factors are analyzed below and all support final approval of the class and PAGA
23 action settlement before this Court.

24 **A. Class Counsel Conducted a Thorough Investigation.**

25 As detailed in the motion for preliminary approval, Class Counsel thoroughly investigated the
26 proposed Class Members' claims, applicable law, and potential defenses. Specifically, Class Counsel
27 assessed the value of the class claims using data and documents provided by Defendant in informal
28 discovery. Class Counsel obtained the time and payroll data for 111 Class Members, along with pertinent

1 written wage and hour policies. Class Counsel’s investigation, research, experience, and damage models
2 informed and guided the mediated negotiations that resulted in this settlement. SOZ Dec., ¶ 24.

3 **B. The Parties Settled After Mediation by Accepting a Mediator’s Proposal**

4 The Settlement is the product of a mediation session with a respected mediator and negotiations
5 over the terms of the Settlement. The negotiations were adversarial, conducted at arm’s length and
6 tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interests of their clients. SOZ Dec., ¶ 25.

7 **C. Class Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation.**

8 Class Counsel in this matter have extensive class action experience in multiple fields and have
9 represented tens-of-thousands of persons in class actions. Class Counsel’s experience is summarized in
10 their concurrently filed declarations. Class Counsel has concluded the settlement is fair, adequate, and
11 reasonable and in the best interests of the Class. SOZ Dec., ¶¶ 26-27; Declaration of Jean-Claude
12 Lapuyade, Esq. (“JCL Dec.”), ¶¶ 13-18.

13 **D. The Settlement Class Responded Positively to the Settlement.**

14 The reaction of the Settlement Class unequivocally supports approval of the Settlement. None
15 of the 118 members of the Class opted-out of the Settlement and there are zero objections. Stated
16 differently, 100% of the Settlement Class has chosen to participate in the Settlement. Apex Dec., ¶¶
17 11-14. The high approval rate by the Settlement Class strongly supports a finding that the Settlement
18 is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (See *In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litigation*, 80 F. Supp.
19 2d 164, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) [“If only a small number of objections are received, that fact can be
20 viewed as indicative of the adequacy of the settlement.”]; *Stoetznner v. U.S. Steel Corp.* (3d. Cir. 1990)
21 897 F.2d 115, 118-119 [29 objections out of 281 member class “strongly favors settlement”]; *Laskey*
22 *v. Int’l Union* (6th Cir. 1981) 638 F.2d 954 [The fact that 7 out of 109 class members objected to the
23 proposed settlement should be considered when determining fairness of settlement.]). Consequently,
24 Class Counsel respectfully requests the Court to follow the high participation rate of the Settlement
25 Class and grant final approval of the Settlement.

26 **E. The Strength of Plaintiff’s Case and Risks of Continued Litigation**

27 Although Plaintiff and Class Counsel believe that the case has merit, they recognize the potential
28 risks both sides would face if litigation of this action continued. SOZ Dec., ¶ 28. As the federal court

1 in *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*, 2007 WL221862 held, where the parties faced uncertainties similar to those
2 in this litigation:

3 ***“In light of the above-referenced uncertainty in the law, the risk, expense,***
4 ***complexity, and likely duration of further litigation likewise favors the***
5 ***settlement.*** Regardless of how this Court might have ruled on the merits of
6 the legal issues, the losing party likely would have appealed, and the parties
would have faced the expense and uncertainty of litigating an appeal. The
expense and possible duration of the litigation should be considered in
evaluating the reasonableness of [a] settlement.”

7 With respect to the most immediate challenge, i.e., class certification, the risks attendant to the
8 certification of similar wage and hour claims are demonstrated by *Ali v. U.S.A. Cab Ltd.* (2009) 176
9 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1341. There, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Trial Court’s denial of class
10 certification because employees’ declarations attesting to having taken meal and rest breaks
11 demonstrated that individualized inquiries were required to show harm. (See also *Campbell v. Best Buy*
12 *Stores, L.P.*, (C.D. Cal. 2013) 2013 WL 5302217 at *11-13 [following *Brinker* and denying certification
13 of proposed off-the-clock and rest and meal break classes due to lack of uniform policy]; *Brown v. Fed*
14 *Express Corp.* (C.D. Cal. 2008) 249 F.R.D. 580, 587-88 [denying certification of driver meal and rest
15 period claims based on the predominance of individual issues].). Further, even if a class is certified,
16 liability remains uncertain. The risks attendant to the issue of Defendant’s liability in similar wage and
17 hour actions are demonstrated by *Duran v. U.S. Bank National Association* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1, 31.
18 There, the Court reversed a trial verdict in favor of plaintiffs in a wage and hour class action. (See also
19 *Tien v. Tenet Healthcare Corp.* (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088 “[T]he reason, if any, that
20 employees might not take their breaks were predominantly individualized questions of fact not
21 susceptible to class treatment.”].)

22 Finally, even if a class is certified and Defendant is found liable for the class claims alleged,
23 post-certification risks remain, including a reversal of a favorable judgment for Plaintiff and
24 decertification of the class. These post-certification risks are demonstrated by *Magadia v. Wal-Mart*
25 *Associates, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2021) 999 F.3d 668. There, the Ninth Circuit vacated, reversed and remanded
26 a \$110 million judgment against an employer for, *inter alia*, inaccurately paying overtime, and directed
27 the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the employer. See also *O’Connor v. Uber Technologies,*
28 *Inc.* (9th Cir. 2018) 904 F.3d 1087 [decertification of wage and hour misclassification action].

1 Collectively, the examples cited above illustrate the uncertain nature of class litigation.
2 Consequently, the uncertainty of obtaining certification through a contested motion is a significant risk
3 factor favoring settlement. Although Plaintiff is confident about the strength of her claims, Plaintiff
4 nevertheless recognizes that Defendant has factual and legal defenses that, if successful, would
5 potentially defeat or impair the value of the lawsuit. Legally, the fast-changing landscape of wage and
6 hour litigation can drastically affect the value of Plaintiff's claims and, in fact, already has. In a similar
7 wage and hour case, the federal district court in *Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.*, No. CV-08-0844 EDL,
8 2009 WL 928133 at *19-20 (N.D. Cal. 2009), granted approval of an overtime class action settlement
9 and explained:

10 **Plaintiffs may have a strong case, but the risks inherent in continued**
11 **litigation are great.** Defendants strongly deny liability for Plaintiffs'
12 principal claim that full-time Service Associates were misclassified as
13 exempt. In addition to the uncertainties raised by Defendants at the
14 preliminary stage regarding Plaintiffs' chance of success in this case,
15 Defendants notes that the question of an employer's duty to provide rest and
16 meal periods is an open one, signaling even less certainty for
17 Plaintiffs.....[T]he **Total Settlement amount and the Class Members'**
18 **expected net recovery, after fees and other costs are deducted, appear**
19 **to be a reasonable compromise, in light of the risks of litigation.**

20 (Id. at *19-20, emphasis added).

21 In sum, while other courts have approved class certification in wage and hour claims, class
22 certification in this action would have been hotly disputed and was by no means a foregone conclusion.
23 Where both sides face significant uncertainty, as here, the attendant risks favor settlement. *Hanlon v.*
24 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F. 3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff and Class Counsel recognize the
25 expense and length of a trial against Defendant through possible appeals, which could take years. In
26 arriving at their informed belief that the present settlement is fair and adequate, Class Counsel
27 accounted for the uncertain outcome and risk inherent in complex actions such as this one. Class
28 Counsel is also mindful of and recognizes the inherent problems of proof under, and alleged defenses
to, the claims asserted in the litigation. Moreover, post-trial motions and appeals would have been
inevitable. Costs would have mounted, and recovery would have been delayed if not denied, thereby
reducing the benefits of an ultimate victory. Plaintiff and Class Counsel believe that the Settlement
confers substantial monetary and non-monetary benefits upon the Class. Based upon their evaluation,

Plaintiff and Class Counsel have determined that the Settlement set forth in the Agreement is in the best interest of the Class, is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and should be granted final approval.

F. The Gross Settlement Amount is Fair and Reasonable.

The Gross Settlement Amount of Two Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$225,000.00) in this case is fair and well within the range of recognized reasonableness. As detailed at the time of preliminary approval, the Gross Settlement Amount is fair and reasonable considering the nature and magnitude of the claims being settled and the various potential impediments to recovery. Class Counsel developed varied economic damages models measuring Defendant's liability exposure while accounting for the uncertainties of continued litigation. The various models were informed by Class Counsel's investigation, including the analysis of a total of 111 Class Members' time and payroll data.

The settlement also provides significant relief to the Participating Class Members. The average Class Member Individual Class Payment is approximately \$786.10, the highest is approximately \$1,928.02, and the lowest is approximately \$7.97. Apex Dec., ¶ 16. This average net recovery is greater than many wage and hour class action settlements approved by California state and federal courts. (See, e.g., *Palencia v. 99 Cents Only Stores*, No. 34-2010-00079619 (Sacramento County Super. Ct.) [average net recovery of approximately \$80]; *Fukuchi v. Pizza Hut*, Case No. BC302589 (LA. County Super. Ct.) [average net recovery of approximately \$120]; *Contreras v. United Food Group, LLC*, Case No. BC389253 (L.A. County Super. Ct.) [average net recovery of approximately \$120]; *Ressler v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.*, Case No. BC335018 (L.A. County Super. Ct.) [average net recovery of approximately \$90].) Clearly the goal of this litigation to obtain redress for the class has been met by this Settlement. Given the amount of the Settlement, the risks of litigation and the arm's length negotiations between experienced counsel, the settlement is entitled to final approval.

VI. THE PENALTIES UNDER THE PAGA ARE REASONABLE

Courts routinely approve amounts for PAGA penalties in the range of zero to two percent of the settlement. (See *Hopson, supra*, 2009 WL 928133, at *1, 9 [approving a PAGA payment of 0.3%]; *Jack v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.*, No. 09cv1683 MMA (JMA), 2011 WL 4899942, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) [approving a PAGA payment of 0.25%]; *McKenzie v. Fed. Express Corp.*, No. CV 10-02420

GAF (PLAx), 2012 WL 12882124, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) [acknowledging that courts approve PAGA claim settlements in the range of zero to two percent of the total settlement].) Here, Plaintiff and Defendant negotiated a good faith payment of PAGA Penalties in the amount of \$12,500.00 which is 5.5% of the Gross Settlement Amount. This amount falls well within the range of approved PAGA penalty payments. Sixty-five percent (65%) of the PAGA Penalties (\$8,125.00) will be paid to the LWDA, and the remaining thirty-five percent (35%) of the PAGA Penalties (\$4,375.00) will be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees, which is within the range of PAGA penalty payments approved by courts and thus, respectfully, should be approved. The Settlement Administrator estimates that Aggrieved Employees will receive an average Individual PAGA Payment of **\$57.57** and a high payment of \$83.65. Apex Dec., ¶ 18.

Further, on December 22, 2025, Class Counsel gave the LWDA notice of this Settlement and proposed allocation by filing a copy of the Settlement and the Motion for Preliminary Approval with the LWDA. On July 1, 2026, Plaintiff gave the LWDA notice of this motion seeking final approval of this settlement. SOZ Dec., ¶¶ 6-7. By not registering an objection with either Class Counsel or the Court, the LWDA has accepted and approved of the proposed PAGA Payment.

VII. CLASS COUNSEL’S REQUEST FOR FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES

As part of the Settlement, the Parties agreed to a payment of Class Counsel’s Fees Payment in the amount of one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount (\$75,000.00) and Class Counsel’s Litigation Expenses Payment in an amount up to \$30,000.00. The requested attorneys’ fees equal to one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount are fair compensation and, respectfully, should be approved. Class Counsel undertook complex, risky, and time-consuming wage and hour litigation on a contingent basis. The attorneys’ fees are within the historically recognized range of attorneys’ fees awarded in common fund class action settlements – between 25% and 50% – and are supported by Class Counsel’s lodestar cross-check with a negative .78 multiplier. That is well under the recognized multiplier range of between 2 and 4³, and there is additional work to be performed. Thus, the reasonableness of the

³ See *Wershba v. Apple Computer*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 255 (2001) ("multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher."); *In re Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases*, 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (2009) (affirming multiplier of 2.52 as “fair and reasonable”); *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 (2008) (affirming multiplier of 2.53 as well within the approved range of 2 to 4).

requested attorneys' fees is confirmed by reference to the lodestar with a negative multiplier with significant additional work still to be performed. SOZ Dec., ¶ 14.

A. Common Fund

Courts have long recognized that when class counsel's efforts result in the creation of a common fund that benefits plaintiffs and unnamed class members, class counsel have an equitable right to be compensated from that fund. (See, e.g., *Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert*, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) ["recogniz[ing] consistently that a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund...is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from the fund as a whole"]; *Laffitte*, 1 Cal. 5th at 488-89 [common fund doctrine "long recognized" under California law]). The common fund doctrine rests on the understanding that attorneys should normally be paid by their clients and that, unless attorneys' fees are paid out of the common fund, those who benefit from the fund will be "unjustly enriched." (*Boeing*, 444 U.S. at 478.). As noted above, in *Laffitte*, the California Supreme Court upheld the trial court's award of one-third of the settlement amount of \$19 million with a 2.13 multiplier and affirmed that "empirical studies show the percentage method with a lodestar cross-check is the most prevalent form of fee method in practice." (*Laffitte*, 1 Cal. 5th at 496-97.). In fact, courts have historically awarded between 25% and 50% of the common fund as attorneys' fees class action settlements. (*In re Warner Communications*, 618 F.Supp. 735, 749-50 (S.D.N.Y 1985).).

Here, the fairest way to calculate a reasonable fee when contingency-fee litigation has produced a fixed settlement amount for the Settlement Class Members is by awarding Class Counsel a percentage of the total settlement sum. (See, e.g., *In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011).). More importantly, a fee award under the common fund method here would achieve the two underlying goals of the common fund doctrine by: (1) equitably requiring the beneficiaries of the common fund to pay their pro rata share of fees incurred in creating the fund; and (2) providing an incentive to attract competent counsel to handle wage and hour class actions, which California courts recognize as a fundamental tool to ensure the effective enforcement of the Labor Code and minimum labor standards. (See, e.g., *Gentry v. Super. Ct.*, 42 Cal. 4th 443, 455-56 (2007) [overruled on other grounds by *Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC*, 59 Cal.4th 348 (2014) emphasizing the indispensable value of private enforcement of California's wage-and-hour

laws through class actions].).

The Agreement provides for payment of Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and litigation expenses from the common fund. Accordingly, it is well within the Court's discretion to award fees to Class Counsel under the common fund doctrine. Class Counsel requests attorneys' fees in the amount of \$75,000.00, representing one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount. Class Counsel's request is consistent with many fee awards in similar wage and hour class actions. Moreover, the requested attorneys' fee award is in the middle of historically recognized range of attorneys' fees awarded in common fund settlements. SOZ Dec., ¶ 17. The attorneys' fees request should be awarded based upon the Gross Settlement Amount in accordance with *Laffitte*, i.e., percentage of the fund with a lodestar cross check.

B. Class Counsels' Lodestar Supports the Requested Attorneys' Fees

Class Counsel's lodestar to date is \$99,272.09 *exclusive of costs*, with significant work remaining. SOZ Dec., ¶¶ 11-13; JCL Dec., ¶¶ 5-8. Thus, Class Counsel's fee request is equal to Class Counsel's lodestar with a negative .78 multiplier—well below the recognized multiplier range between 2 and 4. (See also *Taylor v. FedEx Freight, Inc.*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142202 (E.D. Cal. 2016) [following *Laffitte*, approved 30% fee award with cross-check lodestar multiplier of 2.26]; *Emmons v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Labs., Inc.*, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27249 (E.D. Cal. 2017) [following *Laffitte*, approved 33% fee award with cross-check lodestar multiplier of 1.7]). Because the Settlement in this case is a pure common fund case, and the percentage of the fund is the comparable marketplace for fee awards in common fund cases, *Laffitte* supports an award based upon the percentage of the common fund. Moreover, Class Counsel's lodestar supports the requested attorneys' fees with a multiplier well below the recognized range of reasonableness, and in fact, below what the California Supreme Court approved in *Laffitte*.

Although no rigid formula applies, an analysis of each of the following "basic factors" that California courts typically consider further supports the reasonableness of a fee request: (1) the result class counsel obtained; (2) the time and labor required of the attorneys; (3) the contingent nature of the case and the delay in payment to class counsel; (4) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by class counsel; (5) the experience, reputation, and ability of the

1 attorneys who performed the services, the skill they displayed in the litigation, and the novelty,
2 complexity and difficulty of the case; and (6) the informed consent of the clients to the fee agreement.
3 (*Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 49 (1977); *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1810 n.2.).
4 Those factors support Class Counsel's request and are addressed in more detail in Counsel's
5 declarations submitted concurrently herewith. In short: (1) Considering the issues presented in the
6 case, the Gross Settlement Amount of \$225,000.00 is an excellent result for the Settlement Class, (2)
7 Collectively, Class Counsel worked hard on this case and expended approximately 133.9 hours in the
8 prosecution of this litigation in the eighteen months since it was filed for a total lodestar of \$99,272.09,
9 (3) Class Counsel undertook this litigation on a contingent-fee basis, assuming a significant risk that
10 the litigation would yield no recovery after many years of work, (4) Class Counsel negotiated a one-
11 third contingency fee arrangement, which is a reasonable arrangement to obtain competent counsel in
12 the marketplace for representation in wage and hour class actions of this nature, and it is only equitable
13 that Settlement Class who share in the excellent results achieved by this Settlement bear their pro rata
14 share of the attorneys' fees award to Class Counsel, (5) Class Counsel possesses significant experience
15 litigating complex wage and hour class actions and the way this Settlement was achieved is
16 demonstrative of the highly efficient way this litigation was managed and resolved (See Class
17 Counsel's declarations for a detailed outline of their skills and experience), and (6) Settlement Class
18 Counsel's hourly rates are well within the range of rates billed by comparable attorneys in this market
19 and reasonably compare with rates approved by other trial courts in wage and hour class action
20 litigation. SOZ Dec., ¶ 16; JCL Dec., ¶¶ 8-9.

21 **C. Class Counsel's Litigation Expenses**

22 Common fund fee and expense awards include counsel's incurred expenses because those who
23 benefit from their effort should share in the cost. (See *Rider v. City of San Diego*, 11 Cal. App. 4th
24 1410, 1423 n.6 (1992).). The appropriate analysis in deciding if costs are compensable is whether the
25 costs are of the type typically billed by attorneys to paying clients in the marketplace. (See *Harris v.*
26 *Marhoefer*, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994).). Class Counsel has expended a total of \$24,272.09 in
27 prosecuting this action. All of Class Counsel's out-of-pocket expenses are the types of expenses
28 normally charged to paying clients including the following: filing fees; copying; postage; mediation

1 fees; and expert costs, which were all incurred during, and were necessary for the successful
2 prosecution of, the litigation and, therefore, should be reimbursed. SOZ Dec. ¶ 18; JCL Dec., ¶¶ 11-
3 12.

4 **D. Plaintiff's Class Representative Service Payment Is Reasonable and Should be**
5 **Approved**

6 Courts routinely approve service payments to compensate named plaintiffs for the services they
7 provide and the risks they incur during the class litigation. (*Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 115
8 Cal.App.4th 715, 726 (2004).). The factors courts use in determining the amount of service awards
9 include: (1) a comparison between the service awards and the range of monetary recovery available to
10 the class; (2) time and effort put into the litigation; (3) whether the litigation will further the public
11 policy underlying the statutory scheme; and (4) risks of retaliation. (*Clark v. American Residential*
12 *Services, LLC*, 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804-805 (2009).).

13 Regarding the amount of the requested award, courts frequently approve awards of \$10,000.00
14 or more. See, e.g., *In re Cellphone*, 186 Cal.App.4th 1380. The amount of the requested Class
15 Representative Service Payment to Plaintiff for \$10,000.00 is reasonable by reference to the amounts
16 that California courts (both federal and state) have repeatedly awarded in similar class action
17 settlements. Further, the unanimous consent by the Class Members favors the Court's approval of the
18 requested service award. Equally important, the time, effort, and services provided to the Settlement
19 Class justifies the requested Service Award. The Class Representative performed her duties to the
20 Settlement Class admirably. Plaintiff's work is summarized in her declaration filed concurrently
21 herewith. Plaintiff assumed the serious risk of liability for Defendant's costs and potentially fees if the
22 case was unsuccessful. Nevertheless, Plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily undertook the risk to
23 vindicate the rights of the Settlement Class. LG Dec., ¶¶ 1-17.


24 **VIII. CONCLUSION**

25 Plaintiff respectfully submits that the proposed settlement satisfies the standard of fairness
26 established by California law and should therefore be finally approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate
27 and requests entry of the Final Approval Order and Judgment submitted herewith. Further, based on the
28 foregoing, Class Counsel respectfully requests approval of the attorneys' fees payment in the amount of

1 \$75,000.00 and Attorneys' Expenses in the amount of \$24,272.09, as supported by Class Counsel's
2 billing records. Class Counsel and the Class Representative also respectfully request approval of the
3 requested Class Representative Service Payment in the amount of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff.
4

5 Dated: July 1, 2026

ZAKAY LAW GROUP, APLC

6 By: _____
7 Jaclyn Joyce, Esq.
8 Attorney for PLAINTIFF
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