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15
16 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
17 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
18

19 Herman Pappoe, Jesse Perez, Fatoumata Barry,
20 and Amelia Myers, individually and on behalf of
21 all others similarly situated, the Collective and as
private attorney generals under the Private
Attorneys General Act,

22 Plaintiffs,

23 vs.
24

25 Kite Pharma, Inc., Gilead Sciences, Inc., and Does
26 1 through 10,

27 Defendants.
28

Case No. 24STCV02259

CLASS ACTION

(Assigned to the Hon. Samantha P. Jessner –
Dept. 7)

**Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class, Collective, and PAGA
Action Settlement**

Date: September 28, 2026

Time: 11:00 a.m.

Dept.: 7

**Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class,
Collective, and PAGA Action Settlement**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND	1
A.	Factual Background	1
B.	Procedural Background	2
III.	SETTLEMENT TERMS	4
A.	The Settlement Fund	4
B.	Eligible Employees and Definition of Class	4
C.	Release of Claims	5
D.	Allocation Formula	6
E.	Tax Characterization of Settlement Payments.	6
F.	Notice and Settlement Administrator	6
G.	Opt-Out and Objection Procedure	7
IV.	ARGUMENT	7
A.	Certification of the Settlement Class Is Appropriate	7
1.	The Settlement Class Is Ascertainable.	7
2.	The Settlement Class Is Sufficiently Numerous	8
3.	Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate.	8
4.	The Typicality Requirement Is Met	8
5.	The Adequacy Requirement Is Met	9
6.	A Class Action Is Superior to Other Available Methods.	9
B.	Conditional Certification of the Settlement Collective Is Appropriate	9
C.	The Settlement Meets the Requirements for Preliminary Approval.	10
1.	The Settlement is the Product of Arm's Length Negotiations by Experienced Counsel After Sufficient Information Exchange.	11
2.	The Settlement Provides Substantial Relief for Class Members.	12
3.	Anticipated Recovery.	12
D.	Fairness, Adequacy and Reasonableness.	13
E.	The Proposed Notice and Administration Procedure Are Appropriate.	13
F.	Plaintiffs' Forthcoming Request for Attorneys' Fees and Costs is Appropriate.	13
G.	The Proposed Service Award Is Appropriate.	14
V.	A Final Approval Hearing Should be Scheduled.	15
VI.	Conclusion.	15

Table of Authorities

Cases

<i>Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct.</i> , 53 Cal. 4th 1004	7, 8
<i>Bufile v. Dollar Fin. Grp., Inc.</i> , 162 Cal. App. 4th 1193	9
<i>Campbell v. City of Los Angeles</i> , 903 F.3d 1090.....	9
<i>Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.</i> , 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 413	14
<i>Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC</i> , 175 Cal. App. 4th 803.....	15
<i>Darling v. Dignity Health</i> , 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135262	10
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> , 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794.....	11
<i>Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin</i> , 391 F.2d 555	9
<i>Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein</i> , 30 Cal. 4th 1037	10, 12
<i>Fireside Bank v. Super. Ct.</i> , 40 Cal. 4th 1069	7
<i>Golba v. Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc.</i> , 238 Cal. App. 4th 1251	15
<i>Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.</i> , 150 F.3d 1011	8
<i>Hernandez v. Dutton Ranch Corp.</i> , No. 19 Civ. 817, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47106.....	9
<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i> , 168 Cal. App. 4th 116	11, 12
<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.</i> , 376 P.3d 672.....	13, 14
<i>McGhee v. Bank of Am.</i> , 60 Cal. App. 3d 442.....	9
<i>Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.</i> , 339 U.S. 306	13
<i>Palacios v. Penny Newman Grain, Inc.</i> , No. 14 Civ. 01804, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87457	10
<i>Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.</i> , 29 Cal. 3d 462	9
<i>Rose v. City of Hayward</i> , 126 Cal. App. 3d 926.....	7, 8
<i>Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct.</i> , 34 Cal. 4th 319	8
<i>Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.</i> , 149 Cal. App. 4th 1496.....	8
<i>Vasquez v. Super. Ct.</i> , 4 Cal. 3d 800.....	10
<i>Wershba v. Apple Comp., Inc.</i> , 91 Cal. App. 4th 224.....	13

Statutes

1 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).....9

2 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 103214

3 Code Civ. Proc. § 382.....7, 8

4 **Rules**

5 Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(c)-(g).....10

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Plaintiffs Herman Pappoe, Jesse Perez, Amelia Myers, and Fatoumata Barry Yapo (the “Named
3 Plaintiffs”), respectfully submit for the Court’s preliminary approval a proposed class and collective
4 action settlement reached with Defendant Gilead Sciences, Inc. (“Gilead”) and Kite Pharma, Inc. (“Kite”)
5 (jointly, “Defendants”) (collectively, “the Parties”). The proposed settlement provides a non-
6 reversionary Maximum Settlement Amount of \$8,000,000 to resolve claims of the Settlement Class and
7 Settlement Collective members, as defined below.¹ The Settlement Agreement for this proposed
8 settlement is attached to the Blanchard Decl. as Exhibit 1. This settlement resolves the claims of
9 approximately 1,800 class members in California and approximately 350 collective members outside
10 California, and provides a net average recovery of approximately \$2,292 per Class Member and
11 approximately \$280 per Collective Member.

12 This proposed settlement is the product of extensive arm’s-length negotiation between the Parties
13 following over a year of litigation in two separate cases and a full-day mediation with the Honorable
14 Suzanne H. Segal (Ret.), an experienced mediator, and warrants approval because the terms are fair,
15 reasonable, and adequate. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court: (1) grant
16 preliminary approval of the settlement; (2) conditionally certify the Class, as defined herein, for
17 settlement purposes only and appoint The Blanchard Law group, APC, Outten & Golden LLP (“O&G”),
18 and Jeff Holmes of Holmes Law Group, APC as Class Counsel; (3) conditionally certify the collective
19 for settlement purposes only; (4) appoint Apex Class Action LLC (“Apex”) as the Settlement
20 Administrator; (5) approve the Parties’ agreed Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement and direct its
21 distributions; and (6) set a date for the final fairness hearing for the Class, Collective and PAGA
22 settlements of the cases.

23 **II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

24 **A. Factual Background**

25 Gilead is a biopharmaceutical company headquartered in Foster City, CA. Its wholly owned
26 subsidiary, Kite, is also a biopharmaceutical company and is based in Santa Monica, CA. Plaintiffs
27 worked for Gilead and were classified as non-exempt, hourly employees and are alleged to have worked
28 overtime at various points during their tenure at Gilead.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated numerous wage and hour laws. *First*, on behalf of
California employees, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants required employees to perform uncompensated
off-the-clock work. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants required Plaintiffs to undergo COVID

¹ For ease, Plaintiffs refer to the class and collective members jointly, unless otherwise specified.

1 testing but did not compensate them for the time they spent being tested. *Second*, Plaintiffs allege that
2 Defendants did not provide certain California employees the mandatory, unencumbered meal and rest
3 periods. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants prevented Class Members from leaving the facility they were
4 working at during meal and rest periods and from taking off their personal protective equipment (“PPE”)
5 and using their personal devices during meal and rest periods. *Third*, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
6 failed to pay California employees for the use of cellular phones for work purposes. *Fourth*, Plaintiffs
7 allege that Defendants failed to furnish California employees with accurate wage statements and failed
8 to pay all wages earned upon termination. And, *Fifth*, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to pay
9 certain Class and Collective members all overtime earned because it improperly calculated their regular
10 rate of pay. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants did not include the value of restricted stock
11 units (“RSUs”) and non-discretionary incentive awards in employees’ regular rate of pay. By excluding
the value of RSUs and other incentive awards from the regular rate, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants did
not pay non-exempt employees all of the overtime owed.

12 **B. Procedural Background**

13 On January 29, 2024, Plaintiff Herman Pappoe filed a California State Court complaint containing
14 the above allegations. (See Blanchard Decl. ¶¶ 8-10.)²

15 On May 3, 2024, in a separate matter, Plaintiffs Fatoumata Barry and Amelia Myers filed a Federal
16 Court Complaint containing allegations about the RSU regular-rate violations and bringing claims under
17 the FLSA and California Labor Law in the Northern District of California. *Barry and Myers v. Gilead*,
18 No. 24 Civ. 2668, (N.D. Cal. 2024). Shortly thereafter, the *Barry and Myers* Plaintiffs moved for an
19 order authorizing conditional collective action “stage one” certification, in order to permit the distribution
20 of notice to the proposed Collective Members pursuant to the FLSA. Defendants opposed the motion
21 and simultaneously moved to dismiss, or alternatively, stay Plaintiffs’ action. On January 1, 2025, the
22 Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss and its motion to stay the FLSA claims. *Barry and Myers*,
23 No. 24 Civ. 2668, ECF No. 58. However, the Court granted a partial stay as to Plaintiffs’ California
24 claims pending final resolution of the *Pappoe* matter. On March 20, 2025, the Court granted conditional
25 certification of Plaintiffs claims and ordered notice to be shared with the collective. *Barry and Myers*,
26 No. 24 Civ. 2668, ECF No 69. The Court authorized Plaintiffs to distribute their proposed notice and
consent to join form by mail, email, and text. *Id.* at 10-11.

27 ² In order to comply with the statutory page limitation, the Declarations submitted in support of this
28 motion contain a more detailed description of the Cases.

1 In April 2025, counsel for the *Pappoe* matter and counsel for the *Barry and Myers* matter entered
2 a joint prosecution agreement, which the Plaintiffs each reviewed and approved, and subsequently
3 entered appearances in each other's cases. Blanchard Decl. ¶ 11. On April 8, 2025, the Parties agreed
4 to set a private mediation and attempt a global resolution of both matters. *Id.* ¶ 12. To that end, the
5 Parties entered into an agreement tolling the claims of those individuals who were authorized to receive
6 notice and opt in to the *Barry and Myers* case. *Barry and Myers*, ECF No. 74-01. The court in *Barry*
7 *and Myers* thereafter on April 16, 2025, stayed all deadlines in this matter, including as to the distribution
8 of the FLSA notice, until after mediation. *Id.* ECF No. 75. The Parties similarly agreed to continue the
9 upcoming deadlines in *Pappoe* pending mediation. Blanchard Decl. ¶ 12.

10 Prior to mediation, Plaintiffs requested that Defendants provide certain documents and extensive
11 data so that Plaintiffs could evaluate the strength of their claims, litigation risks, and the extent of
12 available damages and penalties. For the *Myers* claims, Defendants produced relevant personnel data,
13 as well as a representative sample of collective-wide data including earnings for all hours worked,
14 overtime hourly rate of pay, overtime premium paid, and copies of relevant RSU documents and
15 Incentive Pay Awards. Swartz Decl. ¶ 14. For the *Pappoe* case, Defendants supplemented previously-
16 produced class-wide data and documents with information including data reflecting which employees
17 were required to wear PPE and which were subject to COVID screening requirements; data related to
18 meal and rest breaks, job titles, and PPE Operating Procedures. Blanchard Decl. ¶ 13. With the
19 assistance of an outside expert, Justin Regus of Agility Economics, as well as O&G's internal data
20 analysts, Plaintiffs carefully and robustly analyzed Defendants' data and potential exposure, which they
21 shared with Defendants in advance of mediation. Blanchard Decl. ¶ 14; Swartz Decl. ¶ 15.

22 Following the exchange of data and documents, the Parties attended a full-day mediation on
23 December 11, 2025 before the Honorable Suzanne H. Segal (who is a former California Superior Court
24 judge, the former Chief Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District Court of the Central District of California
25 and an experienced and respected private mediator). The Parties reached a settlement in principle with
26 the assistance of the mediator (based upon a mediator's proposal and negotiated further for approximately
27 5 months to execute a memorandum of understanding on April 29, 2026), and finalized and executed a
28 settlement agreement thereafter. The final Settlement Agreement was not finalized and executed until
June 8, 2026. Blanchard Decl. ¶ 20.

On June 5, 2026, as part of the terms and conditions of the settlement (and for settlement purposes
only), by agreement, the Parties Stipulated to consolidate the claims of both the *Barry and Myers* and
Pappoe cases and to add Plaintiffs Barry and Myers into the *Pappoe* matter, which is currently before
this Court. As stated earlier, the *Meyers* case is currently stayed pending resolution of this motion.

III. SETTLEMENT TERMS

A. The Settlement Fund

The Settlement Agreement establishes a non-reversionary Total Settlement Amount of \$8,000,000.00. Ex. 1 (“Settlement Agreement”) at Section 3, ¶ 45. The Maximum Settlement Amount covers: (a) all settlement payments to the Class and Collective members eligible for settlement payments; (b) Plaintiffs’ Class Representative Enhancement Payments; (c) Class Counsels’ attorneys’ fees of not more than one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Fund, plus reasonable costs and expenses incurred to date and to be incurred related to the Action and/or Settlement; (d) the payment to the LWDA for a share of the settlement of claims for civil penalties; (e) the PAGA Payment to the PAGA Employees; and (f) the Settlement Administrator’s fees and costs. The Gross Settlement Amount Fund does not include Employer Payroll Taxes, which Defendants shall pay separately from the Gross Settlement Amount.

The following table lists the key financial terms:

Total Settlement Amount	\$8,000,000.00
Total Class Representative Enhancement Payments to Four Named Plaintiffs	(\$48,000.00)
Class Counsel’s Attorneys’ Fees	(\$2,666,666.67)
Class Counsel’s Estimated Costs, including costs expected to be incurred after preliminary approval (not to exceed)	(\$80,000.00)
Settlement Administrator’s Fees and Costs (not to exceed)	(\$21,000.00)
PAGA Fund (75% of the PAGA Fund is payable to the LWDA and 25% of the remain fund is payable to the Aggrieved Employees)	(\$600,000.00)
Net Fund (preliminarily calculated)	= \$4,584,333.33

B. Eligible Employees and Definition of Class

The proposed Settlement provides recovery for three different groups of current and former employees:

First, Settlement Class members are all persons who worked for Gilead or Kite as non-exempt, overtime-eligible employees in California between January 29, 2020, and June 8, 2026 (the “Class Period”).

Second, Collective Members are all persons who worked for Defendants as non-exempt, overtime eligible employees in the United States between May 3, 2021 and June 8, 2026 (the “FLSA Period”), who during that time: (1) were granted a Restricted Stock Unit (“RSU”) award that vested after May 3, 2021, and recorded more than 40 hours in a week in at least one workweek between the date that RSU award was granted and the date that RSU award vested; or (2) received an incentive award pursuant to

1 Gilead’s Corporate Annual Incentive Plan after May 3, 2021, and recorded more than 40 hours in at least
2 one workweek during the relevant performance year for that incentive award.

3 Third, PAGA Employees are all members of the Settlement Class who were employed by
4 Defendants in California at any time between January 26, 2023, and June 8, 2026 (the “PAGA Period”).

5 Based on the data produced at mediation, there are approximately 1,800 Class Members, 350
6 Settlement Collective Members outside of California, and 1,300 PAGA Members.

6 **C. Release of Claims**

7 The Settlement Agreement provides for a release tailored to each proposed group. In each release,
8 the Released Parties are Defendants and each of their past, present, and/or future, direct, and/or indirect,
9 officers, directors, members, managers, employees, agents, representatives, attorneys, insurers, partners,
10 investors, shareholders, administrators, parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions,
11 predecessors, successors, assigns, and joint ventures. Each release runs through June 8, 2026.
12 Participating Settlement Class Members (i.e. those who do not opt out) will release all California state
13 wage and hour claims pled in the operative Complaint that accrued during the Class Period, from January
14 29, 2020 until June 8, 2026, as well as any claims under the California Labor Code, California Industrial
15 Welfare Commission’s Wage Orders, or the California Code of Regulations, that were alleged or which
16 could have been alleged under the same or similar facts, allegations, or claims in the operative Complaint,
17 as defined more fully in the Settlement Agreement. Settlement Agreement § 2(31); § 3(66)(a).

18 Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, by cashing their settlement check and thereby opting into
19 the Settlement, Participating Settlement Collective Members will release all wage and hour claims under
20 the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) (29 U.S.C. § 201 *et seq.*) pled in the operative Complaint, that
21 accrued during the Collective Class Period, from May 3, 2021 until June 8, 2026, including without
22 limitations, any and all state and federal claims for unpaid overtime wages, and all related claims for
23 penalties, interest, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses that were alleged or which
24 could have been alleged under the same or similar facts, allegations, or claims in the operative Complaint,
25 as defined more fully in the Settlement Agreement. Settlement Agreement § 2(34); § 3(66)(c).

26 By operation of the judgment in this action, PAGA Employees will release all claims under PAGA
27 pled in the PAGA Letters and/or the operative Complaint, that accrued during the PAGA Period,
28 including without limitations, all claims for penalties (including but not limited to claims deriving from
unpaid wages, unpaid overtime, alleged meal and rest break violations, waiting time penalties, wage
statement penalties), interest, attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses, and other remedies available under
PAGA. Settlement Agreement § 2(33); § 3(66)(b).

1 **D. Allocation Formula**

2 Individual Settlement Payments will be calculated and apportioned from Ninety Percent (90%) of
3 the Net Settlement Amount to Participating Settlement Class Members on a pro rata basis depending on
4 the number of Workweeks worked during the Class Period. Settlement Class Members do not need to
5 submit a claim to participate and receive their Individual Settlement Payment.

6 Individual Collective Payments will be calculated and apportioned from Ten Percent (10%) of the
7 Net Settlement Amount to Settlement Collective Members on a pro rata basis depending on the number
8 of Workweeks worked during the FLSA Period. Settlement Collective Members do not need to submit
9 a claim to participate and receive their Individual Collective Payment.

10 Individual PAGA Payments will be calculated and apportioned from the Twenty-Five Percent
11 (25%) portion of the PAGA Settlement Amount allocated to PAGA Employees on a pro rata basis
12 depending on the number of Workweeks worked during the PAGA Period. PAGA Employees do not
13 need to submit a claim to participate in the PAGA portion of the Settlement and also may not opt out or
14 object to the resolution of the PAGA claim.

15 None of the Total Settlement Amount will revert to Defendants. Any uncashed checks or
16 unclaimed funds will be distributed to the Controller of the State of California to be held pursuant to the
17 Unclaimed Property Law, California Civil Code Section 1500 *et seq.*

18 **E. Tax Characterization of Settlement Payments.**

19 For Participating Settlement Class and Collective Members, the Settlement Administrator shall
20 allocate 50% of the payment as W-2 wage payments and 50% of the payment as 1099 non-wage
21 compensation as liquidated damages, statutory penalties, and interest. For PAGA Employees, the
22 Settlement Administrator shall allocate 100% of the payment as 1099 non-wage compensation as
23 statutory penalties. Blanchard Decl. ¶ 62. Defendants will pay the Employer Payroll Taxes separately
24 from and in addition to the Maximum Settlement Amount. Settlement Agreement § 2(15).

25 **F. Notice and Settlement Administrator**

26 The Parties have selected Apex as the Settlement Administrator. Blanchard Decl. ¶ 74. Apex has
27 agreed to administer the settlement for an amount not to exceed \$21,000.00, based on the Parties'
28 estimated class size, which includes all service fees, costs, and expenses. Sutherland Decl. Exhibit B.
Apex is a qualified Settlement Administrator, and collectively their team has decades of experience
administering class action settlements. *See* Sutherland Decl. ¶¶ 2-6.

Apex will disseminate the Court-approved Notice to Class Members and Collective Members via
mail and email using contact information obtained from Defendant. If a Notice is returned as
undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator shall attempt to obtain a correct address, including a skip

1 trace, and shall attempt to re-send the Notice. Blanchard Decl. ¶¶ 78-81. The proposed Notice is attached
2 as Exhibits A to the Settlement Agreement which is attached to the Blanchard Decl. as Exhibit 1.

3 **G. Opt-Out and Objection Procedure**

4 The Settlement allows for Settlement Class Members to request exclusion from the class by opting
5 out. Class Members who choose to opt-out of the Settlement must sign and fax or mail a written Request
6 for Exclusion to the Settlement Administrator by the Response Deadline. Opt-Out Statements must be
7 mailed no later than forty-five (45) calendar days from the date the Settlement Administrator mails the
8 notice. The Settlement also allows Class Members to object to the Settlement and appear at the Motion
9 for Final Approval. To do so, Class Members must submit an Objection in writing, which includes the
10 reasons for the objection, as well as the name, address, and telephone number of the Objector. Blanchard
11 Decl. ¶¶ 82-84.

12 Settlement Collective Members will only be bound by the Settlement if they choose to
13 affirmatively opt in by cashing, depositing, or otherwise negotiating their Settlement Check. Blanchard
14 Decl. ¶ 71.

15 **IV. ARGUMENT**

16 Among other things, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court (1) preliminarily certify the
17 Settlement Class; (2) preliminarily certify the Collective; (3) make a preliminary finding that the
18 settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate; and (4) authorize dissemination of the Notice to Class and
19 Collective Members. In this motion, Plaintiffs also provide preliminary arguments on the reasonableness
20 of the request for attorneys' fees and costs as well as service awards to the Named Plaintiffs.

21 **A. Certification of the Settlement Class Is Appropriate**

22 The Court should provisionally certify the Settlement Class for purposes of this settlement because
23 it is ascertainable and sufficiently numerous, there exists a well-defined community of interest, and a
24 class is superior to alternative proceedings. *See Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct.*, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1021
(2012); *see also* Code Civ. Proc. § 382. A well-defined community of interest exists when there are "(1)
25 predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical
26 of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class." *Brinker Rest. Corp.*,
27 53 Cal. 4th at 1021 (quoting *Fireside Bank v. Super. Ct.*, 40 Cal. 4th 1069, 1089 (2006)).

28 **1. The Settlement Class Is Ascertainable.**

A class is ascertainable when its members may be identified by reference to official records. *Rose*
v. City of Hayward, 126 Cal. App. 3d 926, 934 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). Here, the Settlement Class is

ascertainable because Class Members are current and former employees of Gilead and/or Kite, whose identities can be (and already have been) identified from its employment records. Blanchard Decl. ¶ 71.

2. The Settlement Class Is Sufficiently Numerous.

The numerosity requirement is satisfied because the Settlement Class is of such a size that is “it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.” Code Civ. Proc. § 382. Here, the Settlement Class meets this requirement because it is understood to include approximately 1,800 members. Blanchard Decl. 16.; *see also Rose*, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 934 (numerosity requirement satisfied with class of 42).

3. Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate.

Common questions predominate where the legal theory is “likely to prove amenable to class treatment,” such that the resolution of claims “in a single class proceeding would be both desirable and feasible.” *Brinker*, 53 Cal. 4th at 1021-22 (quoting *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct.*, 34 Cal. 4th 319, 327 (2004)). The test for determining predominance of common issues is whether the proposed class is sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication on a class wide basis. *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998).

Here, common questions predominate because Plaintiffs have alleged common policies and practices that cause the underlying violations. Common legal and factual questions about Defendants’ pay practices accordingly predominate over individual questions. *See* Blanchard Decl. ¶ 17.

4. The Typicality Requirement Is Met.

Where plaintiffs’ injuries are of the same nature as those of other class members and arise from the same general course of conduct, the typicality requirement is satisfied. *See, e.g., Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.*, 149 Cal. App. 4th 1496, 1502 (Cal. App. 2007). Here, Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the Settlement Class’s claims because they each worked as non-exempt overtime-eligible employees during the Class Period in California and were subject to Defendants’ common policies. Plaintiffs all worked in Gilead’s Los Angeles County facilities, including in Santa Monica and El Segundo. Plaintiffs further allege that each plaintiff received RSU grants which vested during their tenure and incentive awards; worked overtime; were required to wear PPE which encumbered their meal and rest breaks; and were subject to COVID screening requirements. Pappoe Decl. ¶ 2; Perez Decl. ¶ 2; Myers Decl. ¶ 2; Barry Decl. ¶ 2. Plaintiffs’ claims, therefore, arise from the same set of facts and legal theories as do those of the Class Members, satisfying the typicality requirement.

1 **5. The Adequacy Requirement Is Met.**

2 The adequacy requirement is met if the named plaintiffs and their counsel have no interests adverse
3 to the proposed class and are committed to vigorously prosecuting the case on behalf of the class.
4 *McGhee v. Bank of Am.*, 60 Cal. App. 3d 442, 450-51 (Cal. App. 1976). Here, Plaintiffs are adequate
5 representatives because they have no known conflicts of interest with the Settlement Class, and their
6 claims are consistent with the claims of other Class Members. Blanchard Decl. ¶ 18; Pappoe Decl. ¶ 6;
7 Perez Decl. ¶ 6; Myers Decl. ¶ 6; Yapo Decl. ¶ 6. Plaintiffs' Counsel are adequate because they are
8 skilled and experienced in employment class action litigation and have prosecuted the case vigorously
9 on behalf of the Settlement Class. Blanchard Decl. ¶¶ 5-14; Swartz Decl. ¶¶ 2-15.

10 **6. A Class Action Is Superior to Other Available Methods.**

11 Class treatment is superior to individual adjudication of class members' claims when it would
12 prevent repetitious litigation and provide "a method of obtaining redress for claims which would
13 otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation." *Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.*, 29 Cal. 3d 462,
14 469 (1981) (quoting *Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin*, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968)). Here, each Class
15 Member's claim is relatively small, each would consume substantial judicial resources if litigated
16 individually to trial. It would therefore be inefficient to resolve claims of approximately 1,800 employees
17 in separate trials. *See Bufil v. Dollar Fin. Grp., Inc.*, 162 Cal. App. 4th 1193, 1208 (2008), disapproved
18 of on another grounds by *Noel*, 445 P.3d 626. Because the class mechanism will achieve economies of
19 scale, conserve judicial resources, and avoid repetitive proceedings, superiority is met. Blanchard Decl.
20 ¶ 19.

21 **B. Conditional Certification of the Settlement Collective Is Appropriate**

22 Employees alleging violation of their rights under the FLSA may bring a claim seeking relief on
23 their own behalf and on behalf of "other employees similarly situated." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). At the
24 conditional certification stage, courts determine whether the proposed collective should be given notice.
25 *Campbell v. City of Los Angeles*, 903 F.3d 1090, 1109 (9th Cir. 2018). This stage is lenient; loosely akin
26 to a plausibility standard. *Hernandez v. Dutton Ranch Corp.*, No. 19 Civ. 817, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27 47106, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2020) (quoting *Campbell*, 903 F.3d at 1109). Plaintiffs are similarly
28 situated when they share "a similar issue of law or fact material to the disposition of their FLSA claims."
Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1117.

 In the *Barry and Myers* Case, the court therein granted Plaintiffs' request for Conditional
Certification and authorized the distribution of notice. *Barry and Myers*, No. 24 Civ. 2668, ECF No. 69.
In so doing, the Federal Court concurred that Plaintiffs' proposed collective members were similarly
situated, given the evidence Plaintiffs provided via their accompanying declarations, Defendants'

1 compensation plan, job postings, incentive plan summaries, and earnings statement which “together
2 demonstrate [Gilead’s] uniform policy of failing to include supplemental remuneration paid to Collective
3 Members in the regular rate of calculation for overtime wages.” *Id.* at 3.

4 Here as well, which alleges the same claims already found suitable to conditional certification,
5 Plaintiffs have demonstrated that conditional certification is appropriate because they meet the low
6 threshold for establishing that they are similarly situated. Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that the Collective
7 Members were subject to common policies that deprived them of proper overtime pay under the FLSA.
8 *See Darling v. Dignity Health*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135262, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2021) (granting
conditional certification to collective of employees who had to work off the clock).

9 **C. The Settlement Meets the Requirements for Preliminary Approval.**

10 Settlement of class actions is favored by public policy. *See Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann*
11 *& Bernstein*, 30 Cal. 4th 1037, 1054 (2003) (“Settlement of class actions is encouraged . . . because they
12 consume substantial judicial resources and present unusually large risks for the litigants.”) (citation and
13 quotation marks omitted). A class settlement is reviewed and approved by a court in two steps: (1) an
14 early (preliminary) review, and (2) a final review at a fairness hearing after notice has been distributed
to the class members. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(c)-(g).

15 At the preliminary approval stage, the court “need only determine whether the proposed settlement
16 is within the range of possible approval such that there is a reason to notify the class members of the
17 proposed settlement and to proceed with a fairness hearing.” *Palacios v. Penny Newman Grain, Inc.*,
18 No. 14 Civ. 01804, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87457, at *17-18 (E.D. Cal. July 6, 2015) (citation and
19 quotation marks omitted).³ “The well-recognized factors that the trial court should consider in evaluating
20 the reasonableness of a class action settlement agreement include [1] ‘the strength of plaintiffs’ case, [2]
21 the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, [3] the risk of maintaining class
22 action status through trial, [4] the amount offered in settlement, [5] the extent of discovery completed
and the stage of the proceedings, [and 5] the experience and views of counsel.”⁴ *Kullar v. Foot Locker*

23 ³ The California Supreme Court has authorized California’s trial courts to use Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
24 Civil Procedure and cases applying it for guidance in considering class issues. *See Vasquez v. Super. Ct.*, 4 Cal.
3d 800, 821 (1971).

25 ⁴ *Kullar* also lists as factors “the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members
26 to the proposed settlement.” 168 Cal. App. 4th at 128. Here, the proposed settlement did not involve the
27 presence of a governmental participant; therefore, this factor is neutral and does not weigh in favor of or against
28 preliminary approval. Class Members have not yet been notified of the proposed Settlement so the Court cannot
evaluate Class Members’ reaction. The Court can evaluate this factor at the final approval stage, after notice has
issued to Class Members, and after the Court has had an opportunity to review any objections and the number of
exclusion requests.

1 *Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal. App. 4th 116, 128 (2008) (quoting *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794,
2 1801 (1996)).

3 In the class settlement context, “a presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is
4 reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel
5 and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage
6 of objectors is small.” *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1802.

7 **1. The Settlement is the Product of Arm’s Length Negotiations by Experienced**
8 **Counsel After Sufficient Information Exchange.**

9 “The court . . . should give considerable weight to the competency and integrity of counsel and the
10 involvement of a neutral mediator in assuring itself that a settlement agreement represents an arm’s length
11 transaction entered without self-dealing or other potential misconduct.” *Kullar*, 168 Cal. App. 4th at
12 129. Here, the proposed Settlement was reached through vigorous, hard-fought, arm’s-length negotiation
13 between lawyers with significant experience. Plaintiffs’ counsel are experienced in the litigation,
14 certification, settlement, and trial of wage and hour class actions cases similar to this case. Blanchard
15 Decl. ¶¶ 5-7; Swartz Decl. ¶¶ 2-8. On the defense side, defense counsel in both cases are formidable
16 lawyers from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (one of the most experienced and most important law firms
17 in the employment related class, collective and PAGA cases in the US and the world). The Parties
18 reached this settlement after an intense private mediation before the Hon. Suzane H. Segal (Ret.) (an
19 experienced and respected mediator with years of complex class, collective and PAGA employment
20 litigation and experience as a private mediator, a former California Superior Court Judge and as the
21 former Chief Magistrate Judge in the US Districts Court of the Central District of California) and further
22 intense subsequent negotiation related to the drafting of the final Settlement Agreement. It should be
23 noted that the negotiation and drafting of the final Settlement Agreement in this matter took
24 approximately 6 months. Blanchard Decl. ¶ 20.

25 The Parties also engaged in sufficient discovery to strongly recommend this settlement. In
26 *Pappoe*, both in the course of discovery and in advance of mediation, Defendants produced robust
27 timekeeping, payroll, and other relevant class-wide data, including information about rest and meal
28 breaks, employees subject to COVID screenings, employees required to wear PPE and RSU grants and
incentive compensation. Blanchard Decl. ¶ 21. Similarly, in *Myers*, Defendants provided robust pre-
mediation data for the Class Members, including class-wide data reflecting the number of employees
who received RSU grants that vested during the relevant time period or who received incentive awards;
the total covered workweeks; the total number of RSUs granted and their average value; and the total
overtime hours worked. Swartz Decl. ¶ 14. Defendants also produced complete and detailed payroll and

1 RSU data for a representative sample of the class. *Id.* This substantial information exchanged was more
2 than sufficient to create “an understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of
3 outcomes of the litigation.” *Kullar*, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 120.

4 Additionally, the *Barry and Myers* and *Pappoe* cases were both filed in early 2024, then vigorously
5 litigated since then, including multiple contested motions in *Myers*. After being made aware of each
6 other’s overlapping class actions, the Plaintiffs resolved to work together and consolidate their efforts to
7 maximize the best possible outcome for the class, collective and PAGA claims. Given that the settlement
8 is the product of good faith arm’s-length negotiations involving the participation of very experienced
9 plaintiffs and defense counsel and a very experienced and respected private mediator who was both a
10 former California State Court Judge and Chief Federal Magistrate Judge after meaningful document
11 exchange and was negotiated by experienced counsel, this settlement is entitled to a presumption of
12 fairness and preliminary approval is warranted.

12 **2. The Settlement Provides Substantial Relief for Class Members.**

13 The Court should approve the proposed Settlement because it provides substantial relief to the
14 Classes relative to the theoretical maximum recovery. The maximum average gross award is
15 approximately \$4,444, and the average net award (after deduction for attorneys’ fees, costs, service
16 award, and administration) is approximately \$2,292 per person. This is a substantial portion of the unpaid
17 wages and other damages Class and Collective Members could have recovered at trial, as described
18 below.

18 **3. Anticipated Recovery.**

19 The settlement provides an excellent recovery relative to the potential recovery and the risks that
20 these claims presented. The details of the exposure and risk analysis for the claims of these cases is set
21 forth in the Blanchard Decl. Based upon defenses raised by Defendants and their defense counsel, this
22 settlement recovery is particularly reasonable in light of the significant litigation risks that Plaintiffs
23 faced. Blanchard Decl. ¶ 22. Although Plaintiffs and their counsel both strongly believe in the strength
24 of their claims, they recognize that class, collective and PAGA action litigation inherently involves
25 significant risk and delay (*see Ferguson*, 30 Cal. 4th at 1054 (class actions “present unusually large risks
26 for litigants”)), and that they faced particular risks here based upon the defenses raised by Defendant and
27 their defense counsel. Blanchard Decl. ¶ 23. The details of just some of the defenses raised by
28 Defendants and their defense counsel are set forth in the Blanchard Decl. ¶¶ 24-31.

In sum, although Plaintiffs would dispute each of Defendants’ arguments and defenses, a class and
collective trial (if Plaintiffs could defeat Defendants’ arbitration agreements for all of the class and the

collective) would be long, arduous, and risky; and even if Plaintiffs prevailed on each of their claims, they might face a lengthy appeals process. In light of the myriad risks and delay that litigation would entail, and based on Plaintiffs' counsel's experience litigating class actions and employment lawsuits, it is the opinion of Plaintiffs' counsel that the proposed Settlement is in the best interests of the Class Members. Blanchard Decl. ¶ 32.

D. Fairness, Adequacy and Reasonableness.

Because all of the considerations cited above indicate that the Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, the Court should grant preliminary approval of the Settlement.

E. The Proposed Notice and Administration Procedure Are Appropriate.

Constitutional due process requires that notice to class members provides sufficient information to make an informed decision to accept or object to a proposed settlement and an opportunity to be heard in the proceedings. See *Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); *Wershba v. Apple Comp., Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 251-52 (2001). The proposed Notice is set forth in Exhibit A of the Settlement Agreement attached as Exhibit 1 to the Blanchard Decl. and, for the reasons set forth in that declaration, satisfies these requirements. See a detailed breakdown of the notice process in Blanchard Decl. ¶¶ 36-41; 78-84 .

The proposed Settlement Administrator, Apex, is experienced in the field and was chosen only after comparing bids from a number of other well-known administrators. Blanchard Decl. ¶ 42; Ex. 2 Sutherland Decl. ¶¶ 2-6. The Court should approve Apex, which has estimated that its fees for administering the settlement are not to exceed \$21,000. Sutherland Decl. ¶ 7; Exhibit B.

F. Plaintiffs' Forthcoming Request for Attorneys' Fees and Costs is Appropriate.

With this motion, Plaintiffs and their counsel submit argument in support of their forthcoming request for one-third (33 1/3%) of the Maximum Settlement Amount as attorneys' fees (\$2,666,666.67). At the Final Approval stage, Plaintiffs' counsel will file an application to approve attorney's fees and memorandum of points and authorities in support. The details of Plaintiffs request for these attorneys are discussed in the Blanchard Decl. ¶¶ 43-55.

"California has long recognized, as an exception to the general American rule that parties bear the costs of their own attorneys, the propriety of awarding an attorney fee to a party who has recovered or preserved a monetary fund for the benefit of himself or herself and others." *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.*, 376 P.3d 672, 676 (Cal. 2016). In awarding fees in a class action, courts generally use either the percentage of the recovery or the lodestar approach. See generally *id.* at 677-82. "The choice of a fee calculation method is generally one within the discretion of the trial court, the goal under either the percentage or lodestar approach being the award of a reasonable fee to compensate counsel for their

1 efforts.” *Id.* at 687. In this case, the proposed attorneys’ fee award is reasonable and supported by the
2 percentage-of-recovery method.

3 The California Supreme Court confirmed that the percentage method is appropriate, fair, and
4 efficient. *See id.* at 688. The Court noted that “most courts and commentators now believe that the
5 percentage method is superior.” *Id.* at 680. It explained that there are numerous “recognized advantages
6 of the percentage method – including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between
7 counsel and the class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the
8 encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the
litigation.” *Id.* at 686.

9 Plaintiffs’ counsel’s request for one-third of the Maximum Settlement Amount is reasonable
10 because it is consistent with the percentages awarded in other class action settlements. In California,
11 “[e]mpirical studies show that, regardless [of] whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is
12 used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.” *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 75
Cal. Rptr. 3d 413, 433 n.11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).

13 Employing the percentage method in this case rewards the extreme efficiency with which
14 Plaintiffs’ counsel obtained a resolution in this case. *See Laffitte*, 376 P.3d at 686 (benefit of the
15 percentage method is “the encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid
16 unnecessarily prolonging the litigation.”). Plaintiffs’ counsel’s efforts to master the relevant facts and
17 legal questions, including through promptly exchanging discovery in *Pappoe* and litigating multiple
18 critical motions in *Myers*, made the resolution of this case possible prior to court rulings that could have
19 significantly weakened Plaintiffs’ claims. Blanchard Decl. ¶¶ 33-35; Swartz Decl. ¶ 30. Plaintiffs’
20 counsel made an informed judgment that this Settlement, as opposed to protracted litigation, is in the
best interests of Class, Collective, and PAGA Members and secures substantial benefits now. *Id.*

21 Plaintiffs also seek reimbursement of reasonably expended litigation costs, which shall not exceed
22 are \$80,000.00. These litigation costs, which include filing fees, mediators’ fees, travel costs for multiple
23 in-person hearings in *Myers*, travel costs for in-person mediation, and research costs, were incidental and
24 necessary to the effective representation of the Class and are appropriately reimbursed. *See* Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code § 1032(a)(4), (b). Costs will continue to accrue somewhat as Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks
25 preliminary and final approval.

26 **G. The Proposed Service Award Is Appropriate.**

27 In evaluating the reasonableness of a proposed service award, courts consider, inter alia, (1) the
28 amount of time and effort spent by the class representative, the duration of the litigation, and the actions
they took to protect the interests of the class; (2) the degree to which the class has benefitted from those

1 actions; (3) the personal benefit received by the class representative as a result of the litigation; (4) the
2 risk, both financial and otherwise, the class representative faced in bringing the suit; and (5) the notoriety
3 and personal difficulties encountered by the representative. *Golba v. Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc.*, 238
4 Cal. App. 4th 1251, 1272 (2015); *see also Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC*, 175 Cal. App. 4th 803
5 (2018). In this regard, Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' counsel propose and believe that class and collective
6 representative service award of \$12,000 each for the Plaintiffs in both cases are appropriate for this
7 settlement. The preliminary argument and facts related to these proposed service awards are set forth in
8 the Decls. of Blanchard ¶¶ 56-59, Pappoe ¶¶ 7-10, Perez ¶¶ 7-10, Myers ¶¶ 7-10 and Yapo ¶¶ 7-10 which
9 are filed with this motion.

V. A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING SHOULD BE SCHEDULED.

10 The last step in the settlement approval process is the Final Approval hearing, at which the Court
11 will hear evidence and argument necessary to evaluate the proposed Settlement and rule upon final
12 approval. Cal. Rule of Ct. 3.769(e). A proposed order is submitted contemporaneously with this motion
13 which setting forth the proposed briefing schedule for final approval of the settlement and other matters
14 related to preliminary approval.

VI. CONCLUSION.

15 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court preliminarily approve
16 this settlement based upon the terms and conditions as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

17
18 Dated: June 8, 2026

Respectfully,



Lonnie C. Blanchard III (SBN 93530)
THE BLANCHARD LAW GROUP, APC

Justin Swartz and Jennifer Davidson
OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP

*Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Proposed Class and
Collective Members and PAGA Aggrieved
Employees*

1 **PROOF OF SERVICE**

2 I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 177 East
3 Colorado Blvd., Suite 200, Pasadena, California 91105. On June 8, 2026, I served the following
4 document(s) described as:

5 **Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of**
6 **Class, Collective, and PAGA Action Settlement**

7 on interested parties in this action addressed as follows:

8 *See below service list.*

9 **(By Mail)** I deposited such envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid in the United States
10 mail at a facility regularly maintained by the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles,
11 California.

12 **(By Email)** Based on a court order, Rules of Court, or an agreement of the parties to accept
13 electronic service, I caused the documents to be sent to the person(s) at the email addresses set
14 forth above.

15 **(By Overnight Delivery)** I enclosed the documents in an envelope or package provided by an
16 overnight delivery carrier and addressed to the persons at the address(es) identified above. I
17 placed the envelope or package for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly
18 utilized drop box of the overnight delivery carrier.

19 xxx **(By Case Anywhere)** A true and correct copy was electronically served on counsel of record
20 by transmission to Case Anywhere.

21 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true
22 and correct. Executed on June 8, 2026.

23 

24 _____
25 Kale Morita
26
27
28

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