

**BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK
DE BLOUW LLP**

Norman B. Blumenthal (State Bar #068687)

Kyle R. Nordrehaug (State Bar #205975)

Aparajit Bhowmik (State Bar #248066)

2255 Calle Clara

La Jolla, CA 92037

Telephone: (858)551-1223

Facsimile: (858) 551-1232

Email: norm@bamlawca.com

Website: www.bamlawca.com

Timothy B. Del Castillo (State Bar #277296)

tdc@castleemploymentlaw.com

Kent L. Bradbury (State Bar #279402)

kb@castleemploymentlaw.com

CASTLE LAW: CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT COUNSEL, PC

2999 Douglas Blvd., Suite 180

Roseville, CA 95661

Telephone: (916) 245-0122

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

RUTH OYENIYI ABE, MISTY
BECK, and SARAH CHRISTIAN,
individually, on behalf of themselves
and on behalf of all persons similarly
situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

UNITED CEREBRAL PALSY OF
GREATER SACRAMENTO, INC., a
Corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: **23CV008763**

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
SETTLEMENT AND AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE
AWARDS**

Hearing Date: July 11, 2025

Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

*[Hearing scheduled by Order dated February 24,
2025]*

Judge: Hon. Jill H. Talley
Dept: 23

Date Filed: October 6, 2022

Trial Date: Not set

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.	-1-
II.	THE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE COURT	-1-
III.	GENERAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS	-2-
IV.	THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE.	-3-
A.	The Settlement Satisfies the California Test for Fairness.	-4-
1.	The Investigation and Analysis of Documents are Sufficient to Allow Counsel and the Court to Act Intelligently	-4-
2.	The Settlement was Reached Through Arm's Length Bargaining	-4-
3.	Class Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation	-5-
4.	There Are No Objections and Only Nine (9) Requests for Exclusion	-5-
5.	The Strength of Plaintiffs' Case	-6-
6.	The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation.	-8-
7.	The Amount Offered in Settlement.	-9-
V.	THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE AWARD SHOULD BE APPROVED	11
A.	The Attorneys' Fees are Reasonable and Supported by the Percentage of the Fund Method.	11
B.	The Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses.	14
C.	The Service Awards Are Reasonable and Should be Approved.	14
VI.	CONCLUSION	15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:	Page:
<i>7-Eleven Owners for Fair Fran. v. Southland Corp.</i> , 85 Cal. App. 4 th 1135 (2000)	2, 3
<i>Alberto v. GMRI, Inc.</i> , 252 F.R.D. 652 (E.D. Cal. Jun 24, 2008)	5
<i>Andrews v. Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P.</i> , 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172183, (C.D. Cal. 2022)	15
<i>Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.</i> , 297 F.R.D. 431 (E.D. Cal. 2013)	12
<i>Barcia v. Contain-A-Way, Inc.</i> , 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17118 (S. D. Cal. 2009)	8
<i>Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert</i> , 444 U.S. 472 (1980)	11
<i>Brinker v. Superior Court</i> , 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012)	7
<i>Browning v. Yahoo!, Inc.</i> , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86266 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2007)	7
<i>Cellphone Termination Fee Cases</i> , 180 Cal. App. 4th 1110 (2009)	3
<i>Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.</i> , 162 Cal.App.4th 43 (2008)	13
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> , 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794 (1996)	3,4
<i>Dunleavy v. Nadler (In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.)</i> , 213 F.3d 454	11
<i>Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.</i> , 59 Cal. 4th 1 (2014)	8
<i>Gaskill v. Gordon</i> , 160 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1998)	12
<i>Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.</i> , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476; 15 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1330 (N.D. Cal. 2007); <i>aff'd</i> 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10328 (9 th Cir. May 14, 2009)	5, 9, 11, 15
<i>Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.</i> , 150 F.3d 1011 (9 th Cir. 1998)	6
<i>Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.</i> , 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 (N.D. Cal. 2009)	7

1	<i>Huens v. Tatum,</i>	
2	52 Cal. App. 4 th 259 (1997).....	2
3	<i>In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litigation,</i>	
4	80 F. Supp. 2d 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).....	6
5	<i>In re Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases,</i>	
6	171 Cal.App.4th 495 (2009).....	13
7	<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.,</i>	
8	168 Cal. App. 4th 116 (2008).....	3
9	<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l,</i>	
10	1 Cal. 5th 480 (2016)	11, 12, 13
11	<i>Laskey v. Int'l Union,</i>	
12	638 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981)	6
13	<i>Louie v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.,</i>	
14	2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78314 (S.D. Cal. 2008)	8, 15
15	<i>Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.,</i>	
16	2014 WL 2472316, (C.D. Cal. 2014)	11
17	<i>Mathein v. Pier 1 Imps.,</i>	
18	2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71386, 168 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P36,620 (E.D. Cal. 2018).....	15
19	<i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles,</i>	
20	186 Cal. App. 4th 399 (2010).	3
21	<i>Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.,</i>	
22	15 Cal. 5th 1056, 1065 (2024).....	7, 10
23	<i>Nordstrom Commission Cases,</i>	
24	186 Cal. App. 4th 576 (2010).	10
25	<i>Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com'n,</i>	
26	688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1982)	3
27	<i>Pellegrino v. Robert Half Intern., Inc.,</i>	
28	182 Cal.App.4th 278 (2010).....	13
	<i>Reynolds v. Direct Flow Med., Inc.,</i>	
	2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149865, (N.D. Cal. 2019).....	15
	<i>Rutti v. Lojack Corp., Inc.,</i>	
	2012 WL 3151077 (C.D. Cal. 2012).....	14
	<i>Serrano v. Priest,</i>	
	20 Cal. 3d 25 (1977).....	11
	<i>Stanger v. China Elec. Motor, Inc.,</i>	
	812 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 2016)	13

1	<i>Stetson v. Grissom</i> ,	
2	821 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2016)	13, 14
3	<i>Stoetznner v. U.S. Steel Corp.</i> ,	
4	897 F.2d 115 (3d. Cir. 1990).	6
5	<i>Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.</i> ,	
6	2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671 (N.D. Cal. 2015).	11
7	<i>Swedish Hospital v. Shalala</i> ,	
8	1 F.3d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1993)	12
9	<i>Taylor v. Fedex Freight, Inc.</i> ,	
10	2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142202 (E.D. Cal. 2016).	13
11	<i>Viceral v. Mistras Grp., Inc.</i> ,	
12	2016 WL 5907869 (N.D. Cal. 2016)	11
13	<i>Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.</i> ,	
14	557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1997)	11
15	<i>Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.</i> ,	
16	290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002)	13
17	<i>Wershba v. Apple Computer</i> ,	
18	91 Cal. App. 4 th 224 (2001).	3, 11, 13
19	Secondary Sources:	
20	Fitzpatrick, <i>An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Award</i> ,	
21	7 J. Empirical Leg. Stud. 811 (2010)	12

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 The parties to this action have reached a Settlement and the Court preliminarily approved the
3 Joint Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement and Release (“Stipulation of Settlement” or
4 “Agreement”), a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit #2 to the Declaration of Norman
5 Blumenthal (“Blumenthal Decl.”).¹ In accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order dated February
6 24, 2025 (“Preliminary Approval Order”), the approved Class Notice has been disseminated to the
7 Class.²

8 The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether the proposed settlement of the litigation
9 should be finally approved. Plaintiffs Ruth Oyeniyi Abe, Misty Beck and Sarah Christian (“Plaintiffs”)
10 respectfully move for final approval, including attorneys’ fees, costs and the service awards, and the
11 proposed entry of the proposed Order Granting Motion for Final Approval and Judgment, submitted
12 herewith. The settlement represents an excellent result for the Class and avoids the delays, risks, and
13 costs of further litigation. After disseminating the notice to the members of the Class, there were **no**
14 **objections and only nine (9) requests for exclusion**, which means that almost the entire Class
15 (99.55%) has elected to participate in the Settlement. Blumenthal Decl. ¶4. This is a positive response
16 from the Class evidencing their collective approval of the settlement. As a result, Plaintiffs respectfully
17 submit that the class settlement should be finally approved for the same reasons that the Court
18 preliminarily approved the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate.

19 **II. THE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE COURT**

20 As consideration for this Settlement, the Maximum Settlement Amount to be paid by Defendant
21 United Cerebral Palsy of Greater Sacramento, Inc. (“Defendant”) is One Million Three Hundred Fifty
22 Thousand Dollars (\$1,350,000) (the "Maximum Settlement Amount") (Agreement at ¶ 15(c).) Under
23 the Settlement, the Maximum Settlement Amount consists of the following elements: (1) payment of
24 the Settlement Awards to the Class Members; (2) all Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and litigation costs;

26 ¹ Capitalized terms are defined in the Agreement.

27 ² The “Class” is defined as ““all persons employed by Defendant in California as a non-exempt
28 employee from September 20, 2019 through August 8, 2024.” Preliminary Approval Order, ¶ 8.

(3) the enhancement award to the class representatives; (4) the PAGA penalty payment to the LWDA and the PAGA Shares to the PAGA Members; and (5) settlement administration expenses. (Stipulation of Settlement at ¶ 15(c).) The Maximum Settlement Amount does not include Defendant's share of payroll taxes which Defendant will pay in addition to the Maximum Settlement Amount. (Stipulation of Settlement at ¶ 15(c).) The Maximum Settlement Amount will be fully paid out, with no residue returning to Defendant. (Stipulation of Settlement at ¶ 15(c).) Blumenthal Decl. ¶3(b). The following is a table of the key financial terms of the Settlement and the proposed deductions:

\$1,350,000 (Maximum Settlement Amount)

- \$30,000 (Plaintiffs' proposed Enhancement Awards not to exceed \$10,000 each)
- \$25,000 (Class Counsel's litigation costs - not to exceed amount)
- \$450,000 (Class Counsel's attorneys' fees - not to exceed 33 1/3% of settlement)
- \$27,000 (PAGA allocation - 75% to LWDA / 25% to PAGA Members)
- \$13,000 (settlement administration expenses - not to exceed amount)

\$805,000 (Net Settlement Amount)

The specific details of the Settlement were discussed in the Motion for Preliminary Approval and are set forth again in the Declaration of Blumenthal at ¶¶ 3(c)-3(i).

The Settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable to the class and should be finally approved for the same reasons the Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement, agreeing that the settlement is "fair, adequate, and reasonable." (Preliminary Approval Order at ¶ 2.) In sum, the Settlement valued at \$1,350,000 is an excellent result for the Class. This result is particularly favorable in light of the fact that liability and class certification in this case were far from certain in light of the defenses asserted by Defendant. Given the complexities of this case, the defenses asserted, the uncertainty of class certification, along with the uncertainties of proof at trial and appeal, the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and should be finally approved. Blumenthal Decl. ¶3(j).

III. GENERAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS

Settlements of disputed claims are favored by the courts. *Huens v. Tatum*, 52 Cal. App. 4th 259, 265 (1997). In evaluating settlements, the courts have long recognized that compromise is particularly appropriate since such litigation is difficult and notoriously uncertain. *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Fran. v. Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1151 (2000) ("[V]oluntary conciliation and settlement are the preferred means of dispute resolution. This is especially true in complex class action litigation.")

1 The court must decide whether the proposed settlement falls within the range of reasonable
2 settlements, taking into account that settlements are compromises between the parties reflecting
3 subjective, unquantifiable judgments concerning the risks and possible outcomes of litigation. *See*
4 *Wershba v. Apple Computer*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 246 (2001) (“The proposed settlement is not to be
5 judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved had plaintiffs
6 prevailed at trial.”) In *Wershba*, the Court explained that “the merits of the underlying class claims are
7 not a basis for upsetting the settlement of a class action.” *Id.*; *see also 7-Eleven, supra*, at 1150.

8 In these cases, courts have repeatedly emphasized that there is a strong initial presumption that
9 the compromise is fair and reasonable. *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 245. Courts should not substitute
10 their judgment for that of the parties who negotiated the settlement. *Id.* at 246. The presumption of
11 fairness exists where: (1) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
12 act intelligently; (2) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (3) counsel is
13 experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*,
14 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996). Here, the facts and circumstances compel the conclusion that the
15 proposed settlement satisfies that standard and the presumption applies.

16 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE**

17 The Court must determine whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. *Dunk v. Ford*
18 *Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996); *see also Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com'n*, 688
19 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether the settlement
20 is fair. *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1117 (2009). “The well-recognized
21 factors that the trial court should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a class action settlement
22 agreement include 'the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of
23 further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in
24 settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views
25 of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the
26 proposed settlement.” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008) (internal
27 citations omitted); *see also Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L. A.*, 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408
28 (2010).

1 The list of factors is not exhaustive and should be tailored to each case. *Dunk, supra*, at 1801.
2 Due regard should be given to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.
3 *Id.* The inquiry “must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the
4 agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties,
5 and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” *Id.*
6 “Ultimately, the [trial] court's determination is nothing more than 'an amalgam of delicate balancing,
7 gross approximations and rough justice.' [Citation omitted.]” *Id.*

8 These factors are analyzed seriatim below, and all support final approval of the class action
9 settlement before this Court, consistent with this Court’s Preliminary Approval Order.

10 **A. The Settlement Satisfies the California Test for Fairness**

11 1. The Investigation and Analysis of Documents are Sufficient to Allow Counsel
12 and the Court to Act Intelligently

13 Over the course of almost two years of litigation, the Parties engaged in the investigation of the
14 claims, including the production of documents, class data, and other information, allowing for the full
15 and complete analysis of liabilities and defenses to the claims in this Action. The procedural history and
16 investigation performed was detailed at length in support of the motion for preliminary approval. The
17 Parties participated in mediation on May 1, 2024 with Russ J. Wunderli, which after arms’ length
18 negotiations both during and after the mediation, resulted in this Settlement. The details of the litigation
19 are set forth in the Blumenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 6(a)-6(g).

20 2. The Settlement was Reached Through Arm’s Length Bargaining

21 This settlement is the result of extensive and hard-fought litigation as well as negotiations before
22 an experienced and well-respected mediator. Defendant has expressly denied and continues to deny any
23 wrongdoing or legal liability arising out of the conduct alleged in the Action. Plaintiffs and Class
24 Counsel have determined that it is desirable and beneficial to the Class to resolve the Released Class
25 Claims of the Class in accordance with this Settlement, based upon the experience of Class Counsel
26 who has previously litigated similar claims against other employers. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(a).

27 The Parties attended an arms-length mediation session with Russ J. Wunderli, a respected and
28 experienced mediator of wage and hour class actions, in order to reach this Settlement. In preparation

1 for the mediation, Defendant provided Class Counsel with payroll and employment data and other
2 information regarding the Class Members, various internal documents, and other compensation and
3 employment-related materials. Class Counsel analyzed the data with the assistance of damages expert
4 Berger Consulting and prepared and submitted a mediation brief to the mediator. The final settlement
5 terms were negotiated and set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement now presented for this Court's
6 approval. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(b).

7 The fact that the settlement was negotiated with the assistance of an experienced mediator
8 supports approval. *Alberto v. GMRI, Inc.*, 252 F.R.D. 652, 666 (E.D. Cal. Jun 24, 2008); *Glass v. UBS*
9 *Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476; 15 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1330, at *15 (N.D. Cal.
10 2007) (“The settlement was negotiated and approved by experienced counsel on both sides of the
11 litigation, with the assistance of a well-respected mediator with substantial experience in employment
12 litigation[, and] this factor supports approval of the settlement”). Following mediation, in October 2024
13 the Agreement was finalized and executed, and on January 24, 2025 for the Motion for Preliminary
14 Approval was filed. On February 24, 2025, the Court issued its Preliminary Approval Order granting
15 preliminary approved of the settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable to the Class. Blumenthal Decl.
16 ¶7(c).

17 3. Class Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation

18 Class Counsel in this matter has extensive class action experience and has represented thousands
19 of persons in class actions including employment litigation, wage and hour class actions, and complex
20 litigation. Class Counsel has previously litigated wage and hour class actions involving employees and
21 claims similar to this case and have been approved as experienced class counsel during contested
22 motions in state and federal courts throughout California. The experience of counsel and class action
23 cases managed and settled by the Class Counsel in this action is provided to the Court in the Blumenthal
24 Decl. at Exhibit #1 and the Declaration of Kent Bradbury (“Bradbury Decl.”) at ¶¶ 3-8. Class Counsel
25 have participated in every aspect of the settlement discussions and have concluded the settlement is fair,
26 adequate and reasonable and in the best interests of the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶ 3(j).

27 4. There Are No Objections and Only Nine (9) Requests for Exclusion

28 The reaction of the Class unequivocally supports approval of the Settlement. On April 10, 2025,

1 the Administrator mailed the Court-approved Class Notice to the Class Members, which provided each
2 class member with the terms of the Settlement, including notice of the claims at issue and the financial
3 terms of the settlement, including the attorneys' fees, costs, and service award that were being sought,
4 how individual settlement awards would be calculated, and the specific, estimated payment amount to
5 that individual. See Declaration of Nathalie Beltran ("Beltran Decl.") ¶ 7, Exh. A. In disseminating the
6 notice, the Administrator followed the notice procedures authorized by the Court in its Preliminary
7 Approval Order. Significantly, there have been no objections and only nine (9) requests to opt-out.
8 Beltran Decl. ¶¶ 11-12. As such, almost the entire Class (99.55%) will participate in the Settlement and
9 will be sent a settlement check. See Beltran Decl. at ¶¶ 13-14; Blumenthal Decl. ¶4.

10 The absence of any objector strongly supports the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the
11 Settlement. See *In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litigation*, 80 F.Supp.2d 164, 175 (S.D.N.Y.
12 2000) ("If only a small number of objections are received, that fact can be viewed as indicative of the
13 adequacy of the settlement."); *Stoetznner v. U.S. Steel Corp.*, 897 F.2d 115, 118-119 (3d. Cir. 1990) (29
14 objections out of 281 member class "strongly favors settlement"); *Laskey v. Int'l Union*, 638 F.2d 954
15 (6th Cir. 1981) (The fact that 7 out of 109 class members objected to the proposed settlement should
16 be considered when determining fairness of settlement). Here, where there are no objections, the
17 approval of the class is evident.

18 5. The Strength of Plaintiffs' Case

19 The Action generally alleges that Plaintiffs and other Class Members were not properly paid all
20 overtime wages for hours worked and at the correct rate of pay, were not provided meal and rest periods
21 or paid premiums at the correct rate of pay in lieu thereof, were not timely paid earned wages, were not
22 provided reimbursement for required expenses, were not provided accurate itemized wage statements,
23 were not pay all sick wages and the correct rate of pay, and were not paid all wages at the time of
24 termination. The Action seeks unpaid wages, penalties, attorney fees, litigation costs, and any other
25 equitable or legal relief allegedly due and owing to Plaintiffs and the other Class Members by virtue of
26 the foregoing claims. Blumenthal Decl. ¶5.

27 Where both sides face significant uncertainty, the attendant risks favor settlement. *Hanlon v.*
28 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, a number of defenses asserted by Defendant

1 present serious threats to the claims of the Plaintiffs and the other Class Members. Defendant asserted
2 that Defendant's practices complied with all applicable Labor laws. Defendant argued that Class
3 Members were paid for all time worked, that all work time was properly recorded, and that the regular
4 rate was properly calculated. Defendant contends that its meal and rest period policies fully complied
5 with California law and Defendant did not fail to provide the opportunity for legally required meal and
6 rest breaks. Defendant contends that there was no failure to pay for business expenses and any cell
7 phone usage was merely convenient and voluntary such that reimbursement was not legally required.
8 Finally, Defendant could argue that the Supreme Court decision in *Brinker v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal.
9 4th 1004 (2012), weakened Plaintiffs' claims, on liability, value, and class certifiability as to the meal
10 and rest period claims. Defendant also argue that based on their facially lawful practices, Defendant
11 acted in good faith and without willfulness, which if accepted would negate the claims for waiting time
12 penalties and/or inaccurate wage statements. *See e.g. Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal. 5th
13 1056, 1065 (2024) ("if an employer reasonably and in good faith believed it was providing a complete
14 and accurate wage statement in compliance with the requirements of section 226, then it has not
15 knowingly and intentionally failed to comply with the wage statement law.") If successful, Defendant's
16 defenses could eliminate or substantially reduce any recovery to the Class. While Plaintiffs believe that
17 these defenses could be overcome, Defendant maintains these defenses have merit and therefore present
18 a serious risk to recovery by the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(a).

19 In a similar wage and hour case, the federal district court in *Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.*, 2009
20 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 (N.D. Cal. 2009), explained in approving an overtime class action settlement:

21 Plaintiffs may have a strong case, but the risks inherent in continued litigation are great.
22 Defendants strongly deny liability for Plaintiffs' principal claim... [...T]he gross
23 settlement amount and the Class Members' expected net recovery, after fees and other
costs are deducted, appear to be a reasonable compromise, in light of the risks of
litigation.

24 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 at *19-20 (N.D. Cal. 2009); *see also Browning v. Yahoo!, Inc.*, 2007
25 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86266, at *30 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("In considering the strength of Plaintiff's case, legal
26 uncertainties at the time of settlement - particularly those which go to fundamental legal issues - favor
27 approval."). As recognized in a federal decision approving settlement of an overtime wage class action:

28 The potential complexity and possible duration of trial also weigh in favor of granting

1 final approval. Plaintiffs acknowledge the difficulties of proving damages, recognize the
2 uncertainty of outcome, and believe defendant would appeal in the event of adverse
3 judgment. A post-judgment appeal would require many years to resolve and delay
4 payment to class members. Plaintiffs believe the benefits of a guaranteed recovery today
outweigh an uncertain future result. Accordingly, plaintiffs argue, and the Court agrees,
the actual recovery confers substantial benefits on the class that outweigh the potential
recovery through full adjudication.

5 *Barcia v. Contain-A-Way, Inc.*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17118, *9 (S.D. Cal. 2009); *see also Louie v.*
6 *Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78314, *14 (S.D. Cal. 2008).

7 There was also a significant risk that, if the Action was not settled, Plaintiffs would be unable
8 to obtain a certified class and maintain the certified class through trial, and thereby not recover on behalf
9 of any employees other than themselves. At the time of the mediation, Defendant forcefully opposed
10 the propriety of class certification, arguing that individual issues precluded class certification. Further,
11 as demonstrated by the California Supreme Court decision in *Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.*, 59
12 Cal. 4th 1 (2014), there are significant hurdles to overcome for a class-wide recovery even where the
13 class has been certified. While other cases have approved class certification in wage and hour claims,
14 class certification in this action was hotly disputed and the maintenance of a certified class through trial
15 was by no means a foregone conclusion. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(b).

16 In sum, the Settlement is a fair and reasonable result, and provides the Class with a significant
17 recovery, particularly when viewed in light of the fact that the Defendant asserted serious and
18 substantial defenses both to liability and to class certification. Currently, the maximum and average
19 class member allocation are \$1,794.81 and \$401.02, respectively. *See* Beltran Decl. ¶ 14. Given the
20 complexities of this case, the defenses, along with the uncertainties of proof and appeal, the proposed
21 Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and should be finally approved. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶8(e).

22 6. The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

23 As demonstrated by the decision in *Duran*, the complexities and duration of further litigation
24 cannot be overstated. There is little doubt that Defendant would post a bond and appeal in the event
25 of an adverse judgment. A post-judgment appeal by Defendant would have required many more years
26 to resolve, assuming the judgment was affirmed. If the judgment was not affirmed in total, then the case
27 could have dragged on for years after the appeal. The benefits of a guaranteed recovery today outweigh
28 an uncertain result three or more years in the future. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(c).

1 Plaintiffs and Class Counsel recognize the expense and length of continuing to litigate and trying
2 this Action against Defendant through possible appeals which could take several years. Class Counsel
3 has also taken into account the uncertain outcome and risk of litigation, especially in complex class
4 actions such as this Action. Class Counsel is also mindful of and recognize the inherent problems of
5 proof under, and alleged defenses to, the claims asserted in the Action. Moreover, post-trial motions
6 and appeals would have been inevitable. Costs would have mounted and recovery would have been
7 delayed if not denied, thereby reducing the benefits of an ultimate victory. The Settlement confers
8 substantial benefits upon the Class. Based upon their evaluation, Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have
9 determined that the Settlement set forth in the Agreement is in the best interest of the Class.
10 Blumenthal Decl. at ¶8(c); Bradbury Decl. at ¶ 15.

11 Although Plaintiffs and Class Counsel believe that their case has merit, which Defendant
12 continues to vigorously deny, they recognized the potential risks both sides would face if litigation of
13 the Action continued. As the federal court held in *Glass*, where the parties faced uncertainties similar
14 to those in this litigation:

15 In light of the above-referenced uncertainty in the law, the risk, expense, complexity,
16 and likely duration of further litigation likewise favors the settlement. Regardless of how
17 this Court might have ruled on the merits of the legal issues, the losing party likely
18 would have appealed, and the parties would have faced the expense and uncertainty of
19 litigating an appeal. "The expense and possible duration of the litigation should be
20 considered in evaluating the reasonableness of [a] settlement."

21 *Id.* at *12.

22 7. The Amount Offered in Settlement

23 The Settlement in this case is fair, reasonable and adequate considering Defendant's defenses
24 to Plaintiffs' claims. As set forth in the Declaration of Nordrehaug in support of preliminary approval
25 which discussed the value of the class claims in detail, the Maximum Settlement Amount compares
26 favorably to the value of the claims. Based upon 2,012 Participating Class Members who collectively
27 worked an estimated 114,634 workweeks, the Maximum Settlement Amount provides an average value
28 of \$670 per Class Member and \$11.77 per workweek and after deductions the Net Settlement Amount
provides an average recovery of \$401.01 per Class Member and a recovery of \$7.03 per workweek.
Blumenthal Decl. at ¶8(d).

1 The calculations to compensate for the amount due for the Class at the time of the mediation
2 were calculated by Berger Consulting, Plaintiffs' damage expert. As to the Class whose claims are at
3 issue in this Action, Plaintiffs used the expert to analyze the data and determine the potential unpaid
4 wages for the employees. The maximum potential damages were calculated to be \$2,097,265 for the
5 alleged unpaid wages due to off-the-clock work at 1 hour per week, \$2,238 for the alleged unpaid wages
6 due to the regular rate miscalculation, \$14,769 for the alleged unpaid wages due to sick pay, \$1,275,014
7 for alleged meal period damages based upon a 20% potential violation rate for shifts observed in the
8 time records, \$3,482,552 for alleged rest period damages based upon a potential 44.7% violation rate
9 observed for shifts observed in the time records, \$133,630 for alleged unreimbursed business expenses
10 for personal cell phone usage at \$5 per month. As a result, the total damage valuation was calculated
11 that Defendants were subject to a maximum damage claim in the amount of \$7,005,469. As to potential
12 penalties, Plaintiffs calculated that potential waiting time penalties were a maximum range of between
13 \$767,090 and \$2,764,860, depending on the predicate violation, and potential maximum wage statement
14 penalties were \$1,824,900.³ Defendant vigorously disputed Plaintiffs' calculations and exposure
15 theories. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(d).

16 Consequently, the Maximum Settlement Amount of \$1,350,000 represents more than 19.2% of
17 the maximum value of the alleged damages at issue in this case at the time this Settlement was
18 negotiated.⁴ Importantly, the recent decision that good faith belief of compliance by the employer in
19 *Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal. 5th 1056, 1065 (2024), could completely negate the
20 claims for waiting time and wage statement penalties, even if wages were owed to the Class. The above

21
22 ³ While Plaintiffs alleged claims for statutory penalties pursuant to Labor Code Sections 203 and
23 226, at mediation Plaintiffs recognized that these claims were subject to additional, separate defenses
24 asserted by Defendant, including, a good faith dispute defense as to whether any premium wages for
25 meal or rest periods or other wages were owed given Defendant's position that Plaintiffs and Class
26 Members were properly compensated. *See Nordstrom Commission Cases*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 576, 584
27 (2010) ("There is no willful failure to pay wages if the employer and employee have a good faith dispute
28 as to whether and when the wages were due.").

29 ⁴ Because the PAGA claim is not a class claim and primarily is paid to the State of California,
30 Plaintiffs have not included the PAGA claim in this discussion of the value of the class claims. The
31 PAGA claim was addressed in the Declaration of Nordrehaug at ¶33 submitted in support of the Motion
32 for Preliminary Approval.

1 maximum calculations should then be adjusted in consideration for both the risk of class certification
2 and the risk of establishing class-wide liability on all claims. Given the amount of the settlement as
3 compared to the potential value of claims in this case and the defenses asserted by Defendant, this
4 settlement is fair and reasonable.⁵ Clearly, the goal of this litigation has been met. Blumenthal Decl.
5 ¶8(d).

6 **V. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE AWARD SHOULD**
7 **BE APPROVED**

8 **A. The Attorneys' Fees are Reasonable and Supported by the Percentage of the Fund Method**

9 Class Counsel seeks a fee award calculated at one-third (1/3) of the total value of the settlement
10 for the successful prosecution and resolution of this action. California state and federal courts have
11 recognized that an appropriate method for determining award of attorneys' fees is based on a percentage
12 of the total value of benefits to class members by the settlement. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91
13 Cal.App.4th 224, 254 (2001); *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 34 (1977); *Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert*, 444
14 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); *Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.*, 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir. 1997). The purpose
15 of this equitable doctrine is to avoid unjust enrichment to the Class and to "spread litigation costs
16 proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden
17 alone." *Vincent*, 557 F.2d at 769.

18 The California Supreme Court has provided guidance regarding the award of attorneys' fees in
19 wage and hour class action settlements. Under California law, the award of attorneys' fees in common
20 fund wage and hour class action settlements should start with the percentage method. See *Laffitte v.*

21
22 ⁵ See *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (approving a
23 settlement where the settlement amount constituted approximately 25% of the estimated overtime
24 damages for the class); *Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671, at *12
25 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting final approval where "the proposed Total Settlement Amount represents
26 approximately 10% of what class might have been awarded had they succeeded at trial."); *Dunleavy v.*
27 *Nadler (In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.)*, 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming approval of
28 a class settlement which represented "roughly one-sixth of the potential recovery".) See also *Viceral v.*
Mistras Grp., Inc., 2016 WL 5907869 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (approving wage and hour class action
settlement amounting to 8.1% of full value); *Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.*, 2014 WL 2472316, (C.D.
Cal. 2014) (approving wage and hour class action settlement worth "somewhere between 9% and 18%"
of maximum valuation).

1 *Robert Half Int'l*, 1 Cal. 5th 480, 503 (2016) (“We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state
2 courts in holding that when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
3 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court
4 may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund
5 created”). Under the percentage of the fund method, a court’s objective remains to “mimic the market”
6 in fixing a reasonable fee. See *Gaskill v. Gordon*, 160 F.3d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 1998).

7 First, the fee award representing one-third of the fund clearly falls within that range and is
8 consistent with other rulings of other courts and comprehensive surveys of class action settlements and
9 fee awards. Attorneys’ fees awards of one-third of the fund are within the expected range in the market
10 in legal services. See Fitzpatrick, *An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Award*,
11 7 J. Empirical Leg. Stud. 811, 833 (2010) (analyzing 444 cases between 2006-2007 and concluding that
12 “[m]ost fee awards were between 25 percent and 35 percent”). In *Laffitte*, the Court expressly approved
13 of a one-third fee award. Such similar awards by other Courts are set forth in the Blumenthal Decl. ¶11.

14 Second, the results delivered by Class Counsel also support the requested percentage of the fund.
15 Here, Plaintiffs and their counsel secured a \$1,350,000 settlement for the benefit of the Class, and not
16 one Class Member objected. The Settlement was possible only because Class Counsel was able to
17 convince Defendant that Plaintiffs could potentially prevail on the contested issues regarding liability,
18 maintain class certification, overcome difficulties in proof as to monetary relief and take the case to trial
19 if need be. Blumenthal Decl. ¶10(f). In successfully navigating these hurdles Class Counsel displayed
20 the necessary skills in both wage and hour and class action litigation. Moreover, as discussed above,
21 there were significant risks to the contingent litigation. See *Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.*,
22 297 F.R.D. 431, 449 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“**Like this case, where recovery is uncertain, an award of**
23 **one-third of the common fund as attorneys' fees has been found to be appropriate.**”)

24 Third, “the response of the class members to attorneys’ fee notice, though not decisive, is
25 relevant to the ... reasonable determination” regarding fees. *Swedish Hospital v. Shalala*, 1 F.3d 1261,
26 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1993). A positive response rate tends to suggest that the court’s “approximation of the
27 market” for fees is well supported. *Id.* at 1269. Here, the Class Notice specifically notified the Class that
28 Class Counsel would be seeking a one-third fee award. Again, there were no objections.

1 Fourth, it is recognized that one of the primary factors justifying an enhanced attorney's fees
2 reward is the attendant risks inherent in the litigation. Here, it is clear that a settlement fund of
3 \$1,350,000 has been created. For Class Counsel, the fees here were wholly contingent in nature and the
4 case presented far more risk than the usual contingent fee case. Among the risks was the cost inherent
5 in class action litigation, as well as a long battle with a corporate Defendant who had retained a premier
6 and highly experienced defense firm. **Counsel retained on a contingency fee basis, whether in**
7 **private matters or in class action litigation, is entitled to a premium above their hourly rate in**
8 **order to compensate for both the risks and the delay in payment.** *See e.g. Stanger v. China Elec.*
9 *Motor, Inc.*, 812 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2016) (courts "must" apply a risk enhancement); *Stetson v.*
10 *Grissom*, 821 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2016) (abuse of discretion not to apply risk multiplier).

11 Fifth, the requested fee award is supported by the lodestar cross-check. The reasonableness of
12 the requested attorneys' fee of one-third equal to \$450,000 is also established by reference to Class
13 Counsel's lodestar in this matter. **The contemporaneous billing records for Class Counsel evidence**
14 **that Class Counsel's combined lodestar currently totals \$216,993.75, with significant additional**
15 **fees still to be incurred to complete final approval and the settlement process.** (*See* Blumenthal
16 Decl. at ¶12 and Exhibit #3 [lodestar of \$140,643.75]; Bradbury Decl. at ¶¶ 17-18 [lodestar of
17 \$76,350.00.]) The requested fee award is therefore currently equivalent to Class Counsel's total lodestar
18 with a reasonable multiplier cross-check of less than 2.1, and there will be additional lodestar incurred
19 by Class Counsel to complete the settlement process and manage the settlement distribution and reports.
20 (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶12.) Such an award is within the range of positive multipliers approved in other
21 cases such as *Laffitte* and *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002).⁶ For such
22 reasons, Class Counsel's request for attorneys' fees in the amount of one-third of the common fund is

23
24 ⁶ *See Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal. 5th at 487 (approving 1/3 fee award with multiplier of 2.13); *Vizcaino*
25 *supra*, at 1051 (3.65 multiplier approved); *Pellegrino v. Robert Half Intern., Inc.*, 182 Cal.App.4th 278
26 (2010) (in class actions reasonable multipliers of 2.0 to 4.0 are often applied); *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App.
27 4th at 255 ("multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher."); *In re Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing*
28 *Cases*, 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (2009) (affirming multiplier of 2.52 as "fair and reasonable"); *Chavez*
v. Netflix, Inc., 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 (2008) (affirming multiplier of 2.53 as well within the approved
range of 2 to 4); *Taylor v. Fedex Freight, Inc.*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142202 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (2.26
multiplier).

1 fair and reasonable, and should be approved.

2 **B. The Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses**

3 The Agreement provides at paragraph 17, that Class Counsel may seek “attorneys’ costs not to
4 exceed \$25,000.” Class Counsel requests reimbursement for incurred litigation expenses and costs in
5 the combined amount of \$12,251.61 based upon counsel’s billing records which evidence total
6 combined expenses of \$12,251.61.⁷ The details of the litigation expenses incurred are set forth the
7 Blumenthal Decl. at ¶13 and Exhibit #3 [expenses of \$7,847.64]; Bradbury Decl. at ¶ 22 [expenses of
8 \$4,403.97]). These costs were reasonably incurred in the prosecution of the Action. Because these
9 costs were reasonable and necessary to the successful prosecution of these claims, the request is
10 reasonable and should be granted.

11 **C. The Service Awards Are Reasonable and Should be Approved**

12 Plaintiffs respectfully submit that for their service as the class representatives, Plaintiffs should
13 be awarded the agreed service award of \$10,000 each, in accordance with the Stipulation of Settlement
14 for their time, risk and effort expended on behalf of the Class as the class representatives. (Agreement
15 at ¶ 15(c)(vi)).) Defendant has agreed to these payments and there have been no objections to the
16 requested service awards. The Blumenthal Decl., at ¶14, provides a long list of equivalent service
17 awards approved in California in similar cases, which further supports the request in this case. The
18 Plaintiffs’ Declarations are submitted in support of this request and is attached as Exhibits #5, 6 and 7
19 to the Blumenthal Decl.

20 As the representatives of the Class, Plaintiffs performed their duties to the Class admirably and
21 without exception. Plaintiffs worked extensively with Class Counsel during the course of the litigation,
22 responding to numerous requests, searching for documents, working with counsel, and reviewing the
23 settlement documentation. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶ 14.) The Plaintiffs’ Declarations detail the
24 involvement, stress and risks they undertook as a result of this Action. Plaintiffs also assumed the

25
26 ⁷ Nontaxable costs are properly awarded where authorized by the parties’ agreement. *Stetson*, 821
27 F.3d at 1165. Accordingly, “[e]xpenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging,
28 photocopying, long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service,
mediation, exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.” *Rutti v.*
Lojack Corp., Inc., 2012 WL 3151077, at *12 (C.D. Cal. 2012).

1 serious risk that they might possibly be liable for costs and fees to Defendant, as well as the reputational
2 risk of being “blacklisted” by other future employers for having filed a class action on behalf of
3 employees. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶15.) Without the Plaintiffs’ participation, cooperation and
4 information, no other employees would be receiving any benefit. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 15-16).

5 The payments of a service awards to a successful class representatives are appropriate and the
6 amount of \$10,000 each is well within the currently awarded range for similar settlements. *See, e.g.,*
7 *Andrews v. Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172183, at *11 (C.D. Cal. 2022)
8 (service awards of \$15,000 each are appropriate); *Reynolds v. Direct Flow Med., Inc.*, 2019 U.S. Dist.
9 LEXIS 149865, at *19 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (granting \$12,500 service award); *Mathein v. Pier 1 Imps.*
10 *(U.S.), Inc.*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71386 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (awarding \$12,500 where average class
11 member payment was \$351); *Louie v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.*, 2008 WL 4473183, *7
12 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 06, 2008) (awarding \$25,000 service award to each of six plaintiffs); *Glass v. UBS Fin.*
13 *Servs.*, 2007 WL 221862, *16-17 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (awarding \$25,000 service award). Class Counsel
14 respectfully request approval of the Class Representative Service Payments in accordance with the
15 Agreement.

16 **VI. CONCLUSION**

17 Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the proposed settlement satisfies the standard of fairness
18 established in California law and should therefore be finally approved as fair, reasonable and adequate
19 and requests entry of the proposed Order and Judgment, submitted herewith.

20 Respectfully submitted,

21 Dated: June 13, 2025

BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW LLP

By: /s/ Kyle Nordrehaug

Kyle R. Nordrehaug

Attorneys for Plaintiff