

Benjamin H. Haber (SBN 315664)
benjamin.haber@wilshirelawfirm.com
Arrash T. Fattahi (SBN 333676)
arrash.fattahi@wilshirelawfirm.com
Bradford Smith (SBN 345879)
bradford.smith@wilshirelawfirm.com
WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC
3055 Wilshire Boulevard, 12th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90010
Telephone: (213) 381-9988
Facsimile: (213) 381-9989

Attorneys for Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE

EILEEN HARRIS, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

D&D GEAR INCORPORATED DBA
ABSOLUTE TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a
California corporation; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 30-2021-01222330-CU-OE-CXC

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. William
Claster, Dept. CX-101]

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

Date: April 18, 2025
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept.: CX101

Complaint filed: September 20, 2021
FAC filed: June 24, 2024
Trial date: Not set

1 **NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION**

2 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

3 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on April 18, 2025 at 9:00 a.m., in Department CX101 of the
4 Orange County Superior Court, located at 751 W. Santa Ana Boulevard, Santa Ana, California
5 92701, Plaintiff Eileen Harris (“Plaintiff”) will, and hereby does, move for an order as follows:

- 6 1. Certifying the Class for settlement purposes;
- 7 2. Approving the settlement as fair and reasonable and finding that class members were given
8 notice of the settlement, and advised of their rights to participate in the settlement, object to
9 the settlement, or exclude themselves from the settlement, in a reasonable manner;
- 10 3. Appointing Plaintiff Eileen Harris as a Class Representative for settlement purposes, and
11 approving a Class Representative Service Award of \$15,000.00 to Plaintiff Eileen Harris;
- 12 4. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Benjamin H. Haber and Arrash T. Fattahi of Wilshire Law
13 Firm, PLC as Class Counsel for settlement purposes, and approving payment of \$291,666.67
14 in attorneys’ fees, which is 33 and 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount;
- 15 5. Approving costs in the amount of \$28,766.72 for litigating this action to Class Counsel;
- 16 6. Approving payment of administrative expenses to CPT Group, Inc. as the Settlement
17 Administrator in the amount of \$15,000.00;
- 18 7. Directing that the clerk of the Court to enter the Court’s order as a final judgment; and,
- 19 8. Without affecting the finality of the final judgment, reserving continuing jurisdiction over the
20 Parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing and/or administering the Settlement or
21 enforcing the terms of the judgment.

22 This Motion will be based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
23 the Declarations of Benjamin H. Haber, and Jacqueline Koh, and such oral argument as may be
24 heard by the Court, and all other papers on file in this action.

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
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1 Dated: April 2, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

2 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

3 By: 
4 Benjamin H. Haber
5 Arrash T. Fattahi

6 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION.....	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iii, iv
TABLE OF ATHORITIES	v, vi
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.....	1
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT.....	1
A. Plaintiff’s Claims.....	1
B. Discovery and Investigation.....	2
C. Settlement Negotiations and Agreement	3
D. Preliminary Approval and Overwhelming Support for the Settlement.....	4
E. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement.....	4
III. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL	7
A. The Settlement Reflects a Reasonable Compromise	8
B. The Settlement was Reached After Arms-Length Negotiations Following Formal and Informal Discovery	9
C. Plaintiff’s Counsel Has Substantial Class Action Experience	9
D. There Are No Objections to the Settlement	10
IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFF THE REQUESTED AMOUNTS OF FEES, COSTS AND ENHANCEMENT PAYMENTS.....	11
A. A Fee Award Based on One-Third of the Common Fund is Standard	12
B. While the Lodestar Method is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, Courts May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees.....	12
1. Class Counsel’s Rates Have Been Approved by Several Courts.....	14
2. Applying a Positive Multiplier Is Appropriate.....	14
C. Costs Are Reasonable.	16
D. The Enhancement Payment to the Plaintiff is Reasonable.	17
E. Administration Expenses Should be Approved.	18

V. CONCLUSION	18
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(W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 17417

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(9th Cir. 1994) 24 F.3d 16.....16

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Eileen Harris (“Plaintiff”) seeks final approval of a proposed \$875,000 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant D & D Gear, Inc., dba Absolute Technologies, Inc. (“Absolute” or “Defendant,” and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 400 class members. Indeed, upon the Court’s approval of the settlement, participating class members will receive an *average estimated individual net settlement payment of approximately \$1,233.33*, with the *highest individual net settlement payment to be paid of approximately \$2,722.61*. (Declaration of Jacqueline Koh with Respect to Settlement Administration and Notice [“Koh Decl.”], ¶ 16.)

As set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. A presumption of fairness exists as the Settlement was reached through extensive, mediated arm’s-length negotiations, sufficient investigation and discovery, which allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently, and Class Counsel is experienced in similar wage and hour litigation. As of filing this Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (the “Motion”), there are **no objections to the settlement** and **no requests for exclusion**, thus showing a 100% participation rate. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 12-13.) Accordingly, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members.

Final approval of the settlement is warranted as it satisfies all the criteria for approval under California law. As demonstrated in the Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, the proposed Settlement provides excellent benefits to the class, particularly considering the complexities and risks of the case. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant final approval of the proposed Settlement.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”)

1 representative action. Plaintiff and the putative class members worked in California as hourly-
2 paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant during the class period. Defendant runs and
3 operates a machine shop out of Anaheim, California and provides its services to an array of
4 sectors, including the aerospace, transportation, and medical industries. (Declaration of
5 Benjamin H. Haber in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
6 Settlement [“Haber Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

7 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices
8 resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours
9 worked. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally
10 compliant meal and rest periods and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based
11 on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts related claims for failure to provide accurate wage
12 statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil
13 penalties under the PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

14 On September 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint
15 against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§ 204,
16 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194 and 1198); (3)
17 failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and
18 permit rest periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (5) failure to timely pay final wages at
19 termination (Labor Code §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements
20 (Labor Code § 226); (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (Labor Code § 2802);
21 and (8) unfair business practices (Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, *et seq.*). On January
22 12, 2024, Plaintiff sent notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development
23 Agency (“LWDA”) alleging wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA. On June 24, 2024,
24 Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendant adding a cause of action for civil
25 penalties under PAGA. (Haber Decl., ¶ 4.)

26 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

27 Following the filing of the initial complaint, the Parties engaged in both formal and informal
28 discovery, including depositions of Plaintiff and a Person Most Knowledgeable for Defendant and

1 a production of documents and information relevant to Plaintiff's claims. Defendant produced an
2 approximate 25% sample of time and pay records for the class members. Defendant also provided
3 documents of its wage and hour policies and practices during the class period and information
4 regarding the total number of current and former employees in its discovery responses. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

5 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant's wage and hour policies and practices
6 and analyzing Defendant's timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate
7 the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant's maximum monetary
8 exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding
9 the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these records and
10 prepared a damage analysis assessing Defendant's potential liability prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

11 **C. Settlement Negotiations and Agreement**

12 The Parties participated in multiple mediation sessions with experienced class action and
13 employment mediator, Hon. Amy D. Hogue (Ret.) on December 13, 2022, April 4, 2023, and
14 December 28, 2023. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) The mediation sessions were conducted via Zoom. The
15 settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner,
16 were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a
17 settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial
18 and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and
19 discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's
20 defenses, the Parties reached a settlement, the material terms of which are encompassed within
21 the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, at ¶¶ 7-9, **Exs. 1-2** [Class Action and PAGA Settlement
22 Agreement and Class Notice; *see also* Addendum to Settlement].)

23 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
24 on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
25 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best
26 interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk
27 of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and
28 on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.)

1 **D. Preliminary Approval and Overwhelming Support for the Settlement**

2 On August 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
3 Settlement (“MPA”). (Haber Decl., ¶ 9.) On October 4, 2024, the Court continued Plaintiff’s
4 MPA to November 22, 2024 and asked the Parties to address to several points raised by the
5 Court. (*Id.*) In response, the Parties met and conferred and agreed to incorporate all of the
6 Court’s requested changes. The Parties also executed an Addendum to Class Action and PAGA
7 Settlement (“Addendum to Settlement”) and Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Memorandum In
8 Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (“Supplemental
9 Memorandum”) in response. (*Id.*) Following the execution of the Addendum to Settlement and
10 the filing of the Supplemental Memorandum, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for
11 Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement on November 22, 2024. (*Id.*) The deadline
12 for class members to opt out or object to the Settlement was March 24, 2025. (*Id.*) The reaction
13 of the Class to the settlement has been overwhelmingly positive. Indeed, as of the filing of this
14 Motion, **no Class Member has opted out of the settlement and no Class Member has**
15 **objected to the settlement.** (*Id.*; see also Koh Decl., ¶¶ 11-13.)

16 **E. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

17 Under the Settlement Agreement, Defendant will pay \$875,000.00 to resolve this
18 litigation. The key terms include:

19 1. Settlement Class: For purposes of this Settlement Agreement only, the Parties
20 agree to the certification of the class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382
21 defined as: “all persons who worked for Absolute as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee at
22 any time during the Class Period.” (Settlement, § 1.5.)

23 2. Class Period: “means the period from March 26, 2017 to August 25, 2024.”
24 (Addendum to Settlement, § G(1).)

25 3. Participating Class Member: “means a Class Member who does not submit a valid
26 and timely Request for Exclusion form the Settlement.” (Settlement, § 1.35.)

27 4. Gross Settlement Amount: This amount is \$875,000.00, for all claims, including
28 Individual Class Payments, Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class

Counsel Fees Class Counsel Expenses, Class Representative Service Payment, and the Administrator's Expenses. (Settlement, § 1.22.)

5. Uncashed Checks: If a settlement check is returned to the Settlement Administrator as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator shall promptly attempt to obtain a valid mailing address by performing a skip trace search and, if another address is identified, shall mail the check to the newly identified address. Any settlement checks remaining uncashed after one hundred and eighty (180) days shall be transmitted to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no "unpaid residue" subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b). (Settlement, § 4.4.3.)

6. Released by Participating Class Members: "All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release Released Parties from all claims that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the Class Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint and ascertained in the course of the Action including, e.g., any and all claims involving any alleged failure to (a) pay minimum and straight time wages; (b) pay overtime wages; (c) provide meal periods; (d) authorize and permit rest periods; (e) timely pay final wages at termination; (f) provide accurate itemized wage statements; and (g) indemnify employees for expenditures; and claims for unfair business practices arising out of the same. Except as set forth in Section 5.3 of this Agreement, Participating Class Members do not release any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers' compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period." (Settlement, § 5.2.) This Release will be deemed effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount and funds all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments." (Settlement, § 5.)

7. No Reversion: "None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Absolute." (Settlement, § 3.1.)

1 8. Net Settlement Amount: “means the Gross Settlement Amount, less the following
2 payments in the amounts approved by the Court: Class Representative Service Payment, Class
3 Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration
4 Expenses Payment. The remainder is to be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual
5 Class Payments.” (Settlement, § 1.24.)

6 9. PAGA Allocation: the Settlement includes \$40,000.00 allocated to Plaintiff’s
7 claims under PAGA, with 75% of which (\$30,000.00) being paid to the LWDA and 25%
8 (\$10,000.00) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 1.34.) Class Counsel
9 submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing the MPA. (Haber Decl., ¶ 11.)

10 10. Release by Aggrieved Employees: “All Aggrieved Employees, including Non-
11 Participating Class Members who are Aggrieved Employees, are deemed to release, on behalf
12 of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs,
13 administrators, successors, and assigns, the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA penalties
14 that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the PAGA Period facts stated
15 in the Operative Complaint, the PAGA Notice and ascertained in the course of the Action
16 including, e.g., any and all claims involving any alleged failure to (a) pay minimum and straight
17 time wages; (b) pay overtime wages; (c) provide meal periods; (d) authorize and permit rest
18 periods; (e) timely pay final wages at termination; (f) provide accurate itemized wage
19 statements; and (g) indemnify employees for expenditures.” (Settlement, § 5.3.)

20 11. Distribution Formula: “An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing
21 the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class
22 Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class
23 Member’s Workweeks.” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: “The Administrator will calculate
24 each Individual PAGA Payments by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees’ 25%
25 share of PAGA Penalties by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all
26 Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved
27 Employee’s PAGA Period Pay Periods.” (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

28 12. Tax Allocation: Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class Members will be

1 allocated as 20% wages and 80% to penalties and interest. (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

2 13. Class Representative Service Award: Subject to Court approval, Plaintiff shall be
3 paid an enhancement award not to exceed \$15,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This amount is
4 for Plaintiff's time and effort in bringing and presenting the action, and in exchange for a general
5 release of all claims, known and unknown, pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542. (Settlement,
6 § 5.1.) If the Court approves a lesser enhancement, then the unapproved portion or portions
7 shall revert into the Net Settlement Amount. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

8 14. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not
9 oppose a fee application of up to 33 and 1/3% (\$291,666.67) of the Gross Settlement Amount,
10 plus out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$30,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

11 15. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice set forth in plain terms,
12 a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of
13 attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement
14 allocations are calculated. (Koh Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. A.) Class Members were notified by first-class
15 mail of the settlement. (*Id.* ¶ 8; Settlement, § 7.4.) CPT Group, Inc., the Settlement
16 Administrator, undertook its best efforts to ensure that the notice was provided to the current
17 addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-
18 mailing the notice to updated addresses. (Koh Decl., ¶¶ 3-10.)

19 **III. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL**

20 The law favors the settlement of lawsuits, particularly in class actions and other complex
21 cases. (*See e.g., Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 272, 277-81.) Factors
22 to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include "the strength of plaintiffs' case, the
23 risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class
24 action status through proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a
25 government participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." (*Kullar*
26 *v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) A presumption that a settlement is
27 fair and reasonable exists where, as here, the following four factors are present: "(1) the settlement
28 is reached through arm's length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow

counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.” (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245.)

Whether a class action settlement should be approved is a question committed to the trial court’s broad discretion. (*Id.* at pp. 234-35.) In exercising its discretion, the Court should give “[d]ue regard ...to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) “The inquiry ‘must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.’” (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

A. The Settlement Reflects a Reasonable Compromise

A settlement is not judged against what the plaintiff might recover had he or she prevailed at trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable. (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent and necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

The settlement obviates the significant risk that this Court may deny certification of all or some of Plaintiff’s claims. (Haber Decl., ¶ 10.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of her claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.*) Plaintiff also recognizes that proving the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*) Furthermore, even if Plaintiff obtained certification of all or some of the claims, continued litigation would be expensive, involving a trial and possible appeals, and would substantially delay and reduce any recovery by the class. (*Id.*)

Because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish

liability, the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$875,000.00 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and settlement approval is appropriate. *Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average benefit of approximately \$1,233.33, and the highest estimated net payout is expected to be approximately \$2,722.61.* (Koh Decl., ¶ 16.) Moreover, the lowest estimated net payout is expected to be approximately \$5.90, and Plaintiff’s estimated net payout (not including the enhancement award) is estimated to be \$375.76. (*Id.*)

B. The Settlement was Reached After Arms-Length Negotiations Following Formal and Informal Discovery

The Settlement was reached following multiple sessions with experienced class action and employment mediator, Hon. Amy D. Hogue (Ret.). (Haber Decl., ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*)

Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted formal and informal discovery concerning the claims set forth in the litigation, including, exchange of documents relevant to Plaintiff’s claims, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll records, Defendant’s policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect, the amount of meal and rest period premium wages paid to class members, and depositions of Plaintiff and a Person Most Knowledgeable for Defendant. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiff and her counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

C. Plaintiff’s Counsel Has Substantial Class Action Experience

Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with

litigating wage and hour class actions. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 27-35.) Class Counsel has substantial experience in all facets of litigation in state and federal court, including discovery, law and motion, appeals, arbitration and mediation. Class Counsel has litigated numerous class actions on behalf of employees and have been lead counsel or otherwise exercised significant case handling responsibilities in numerous cases resulting in millions of dollars in class action settlements. (*Id.*)

Based on Class Counsel’s experience as employment and class action attorneys, Class Counsel is eminently qualified to evaluate the strength of Plaintiff’s claims, the strength of Defendant’s defenses against certification, the strength of Defendant’s defenses on the merits, and the fairness of the Settlement. Their opinion that final approval of the Settlement would be in the best interests of class members in light of the significant risks of litigation is entitled to great weight. (*See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 129 [“The court undoubtedly should give considerable weight to the competency and integrity of counsel and the involvement of a neutral mediator in assuring itself that a settlement agreement represents an arms’ length transaction entered without self-dealing or other potential misconduct”].)

D. There Are No Objections to the Settlement

No class member has objected to the Settlement, and no class member has requested exclusion from the Settlement. (Koh Decl., ¶¶ 12-13.) The overwhelmingly positive response of the class strongly supports final approval of the Settlement. (*See, e.g., In re Lifelock, Inc. Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation* (D. Ariz. 2010) 2010 WL 3715138, *6 [relatively few objections and requests for exclusion support approval].)

Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include “the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” (*Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) The reaction here has been overwhelmingly positive. Courts have approved class action settlements in lesser circumstances. (*See, e.g., Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.* (W.D.Wash. 2001) 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5976, 2001 WL 34089697, *8 [court found that the “class members overwhelmingly support[ed] the settlement” where there were over 37,000 notices sent out, 2,745 class members participated in the settlement, “only nine objections were submitted”, and there were 86 timely opt-outs and over 20 additional defective or untimely opt-outs, “these indicia of the approval of

the class of the terms of the settlement support a finding of fairness under Rule 23”], *citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir.1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 [despite vigorous objections and appeal by objectors, the “fact that the overwhelming majority of the class willingly approved the offer and stayed in the class presents at least some objective positive commentary as to its fairness,” and the court did not abuse its discretion in approving settlement].)

IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFF THE REQUESTED AMOUNTS OF FEES, COSTS AND ENHANCEMENT PAYMENTS.

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant has agreed to pay Class Counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$291,666.67, which is 33 and 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount, costs up to \$30,000.00 for litigating this action, and an enhancement award of \$15,000.00 to named Plaintiff Eileen Harris. Defendant has also agreed that they would not oppose an application for these payments addressed above, and no class member has objected to these amounts.

In common fund cases like this one, the primary method California courts use for calculating attorneys’ fees is the percentage of the common fund method, which may be followed by a lodestar cross-check. In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, the California Supreme Court affirmed an award of 33 1/3% of a \$19 million wage and hour class action settlement with a 2.03 to 2.13 multiplier. (*Id.* at p. 506.) In doing so, the California Supreme Court explained:

As to the incentives a lodestar cross-check might create for class counsel, we emphasize the lodestar calculation, when used in this manner, ***does not override the trial court’s primary determination of the fee as a percentage of the common fund*** and thus ***does not impose an absolute maximum or minimum on the potential fee award***. If the multiplier calculated by means of a lodestar cross-check is extraordinarily high or low, the trial court should consider whether the percentage used should be adjusted so as to bring the imputed multiplier within a justifiable range, but the court is not necessarily required to make such an adjustment. Courts using the percentage method have generally weighed the time counsel spent on the case as an important factor in choosing a reasonable percentage to apply.

(*Id.* at p. 505, emphasis added; *see also Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels* (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017) 2017 WL 4310707, at *9 [applying *Laffitte* standard to fee request for 33 1/3% of common fund].)

1 **A. A Fee Award Based on One-Third of the Common Fund is Standard**

2 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “[n]o general rule can be articulated on
3 what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on
4 a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
5 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
6 are not unprecedented.” (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
7 Attorneys’ fees at fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with ***thirty to***
8 ***forty percent*** commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also*
9 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most
10 cases where 30-50% was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

11 The settled-for 33 and 1/3% fee award is consistent with the average fee award in class
12 actions. Indeed, the custom and practice in class actions is to award approximately one-third of a
13 fund as a fee award. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical
14 studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee
15 awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) Thus, Plaintiff’s fee request
16 is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature
17 and is consistent with awards in California. Accordingly, the Court should approve the attorneys’
18 fees requested herein.

19 **B. While the Lodestar Method is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, Courts**
20 **May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees.**

21 Although California supports the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be used
22 to cross-check fee awards. “It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit can
23 be monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to “cross-check” or adjust the lodestar in
24 comparison to a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and
25 within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.” (*In*
26 *re Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.)

27 Applying the lodestar method requires a two-step process. The first step is to multiply the
28 number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The second step is to apply a

multiplier to the lodestar to take into account various factors. “The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (*Id.* at pp. 556-57.) “Under certain circumstances, a lodestar calculation may be enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit analysis.” (*Id.* at p. 557.)

Detailed timesheets are not necessary to a lodestar cross-check. “The law is clear ... that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records.” (*Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) As the California Supreme Court explained in *Laffitte*:

With regard to expenditure of judicial resources, we note that trial courts conducting lodestar cross-checks have generally not been required to closely scrutinize each claimed attorney-hour, but have instead used information on attorney time spent to “focus on the general question of whether the fee award appropriately reflects the degree of time and effort expended by the attorneys.” (5 Newberg on Class Actions, *supra*, § 15:86, p. 331; *see, e.g., Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc.*, *supra*, 209 F.3d at p. 50 [2d Cir.; “where used as a mere cross-check, the hours documented by counsel need not be exhaustively scrutinized by the district court”]; *In re Prudential Ins. Co. America Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions* (3d Cir.1998) 148 F.3d 283, 342 [agreeing with district court that “detailed time summaries were unnecessary where, as here, it was merely using the lodestar calculation to double check its fee award.”]; *Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.* (E.D.Cal.2013) 297 F.R.D. 431, 451 [“Where the lodestar method is used as a cross-check to the percentage method, it can be performed with a less exhaustive cataloguing and review of counsel’s hours.”].)

(*Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal.5th at p. 505.)

Class Counsel’s lodestar is at least \$221,420.00 based on approximately 304.5 hours of work performed thus far. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 18-19.) Accordingly, the requested fee of \$291,666.67 is reasonable and fair as it is based on an approximate multiplier of 1.31. To be sure, trial courts have substantial discretion in adjusting the lodestar to account for various factors. (*See Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26, 39-45; *see also Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) In addition, it has been held that “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*See Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; *see also Van Vranken, supra*, 901 F. Supp. At p. 298 [“[m]ultipliers in the 3-4 range are common in lodestar awards for lengthy and

complex class action litigation.”].) Similar multipliers have been found to be reasonable for Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) No. 8:19-cv-02500-SB, 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [finding Wilshire Law Firm, PLC’s multiplier of 2.57 reasonable “in light of the contingent nature of recovery, the complexity of the issues, and the result obtained”].)

1. Class Counsel’s Rates Have Been Approved by Several Courts.

Class Counsel provides a declaration to support their lodestar hourly rates. “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” (*United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp.* (9th Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407.) Class Counsel has received final approval of their hourly rates in other wage and hour class action settlements.

2. Applying a Positive Multiplier Is Appropriate.

Once this lodestar figure has been determined, the Court may take into account other “enhancement” factors to adjust the lodestar award. While Plaintiff seeks a modest multiplier of 1.31 here, the overall reasonableness of Plaintiff’s request is underscored by the fact that a significantly higher multiplier would be justified under applicable law.

Contingency fees should be higher than fees for the same legal services paid concurrently with the provision of the services. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33.) “A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.” (*Id.* at p. 1133.) Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is brought to redress important rights of vulnerable persons. (*Id.*) A risk enhancement is “earned compensation; unlike a windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous. Rather it is intended to approximate market-level compensation for such services which typically pay a premium for the risk of nonpayment or delay in payment of attorney’s fees.” (*Id.* at p. 1138.)

“Multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at

p. 255; *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 [applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class action]; *Chavez, supra*, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 60 [applying a 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check]; *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 [“most” common fund cases apply a multiplier of 1.0-4.0]; *Been v. O.K. Industries Inc.* (E.D. Okla. 2011) 2011 WL 4478766, *11, *citing* a study “reporting [an] average multiplier of 3.89 in survey of 1,120 class action cases” and finding that a multiplier of 2.43 would be “per se reasonable.”) The intermediate court in *Laffitte*, after finding that “2 to 4” is a reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check, affirmed a 2.13 multiplier. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 860, 881-82.) The intermediate court opinion was affirmed in full by the California Supreme Court in its new decision guiding lower courts on assessing fees.

Factors considered in determining whether a lodestar multiplier is appropriate generally include: (1) the risks presented by the contingent nature of the case; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the nature of the opposition; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; and (5) the result obtained and the importance of the lawsuit to the public. (*Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 48-49.) All of these factors favor approval of a multiplier along the lines of those approved in the cases above.

The major consideration in determining the necessity of a multiplier is the contingent nature of the award. (*Ketchum, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-33.) Further, the possibility of no recovery is only one of the uncertainties involved in taking on such a case. Other uncertainties are the amount that will be recovered, uncertainty as to the cost, both in effort and expenses, and uncertainty about how much time will pass before the recovery is obtained. (*Id.* at pp. 1132-1133, 1138.) Here, Class Counsel have been the only counsel to represent Class Members in this matter and have borne the entire risk and costs of litigation purely on a contingency basis. Class Counsel’s outlay of time and money in this case has been significant.

The other factors are also present here. Class Counsel are skilled attorneys who have had success in wage and hour class actions. This case required experienced and competent

lawyers and expertise in the issues presented herein. Defendant’s contentions underscore the risk of prevailing at class certification and trial, and any of these obstacles could have prevented recovery completely. Further, proceeding to trial would have added years to the resolution of this case because of the difficult legal and factual issues raised and the likelihood of appeals. Despite these risks, Class Counsel took this case on a contingency basis. Yet, there are only so many cases that Class Counsel can take at any one time. Consequently, there were other meritorious cases presented to Class Counsel that would have generated substantial fees, but were declined, during the pendency of this action in order to devote the attention necessary to achieve favorable results. (Haber Decl., ¶ 25.) Considered against the risks of continued litigation, and the importance of the employment rights and a speedy recovery, the relief provided under the Settlement represents a very strong result for the Class.

C. Costs Are Reasonable.

As of the date of filing this Motion, Class Counsel has incurred around \$28,266.72 in costs, and they anticipate incurring at least \$500 in combined additional costs up to the time the Court enters a judgment in this action and schedules a hearing on distribution. (Haber Decl., ¶ 26.) Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests reimbursement of up to \$28,766.72 in costs. Notably, Defendant has agreed that they will not oppose any cost award request up to \$30,000.00. The categories of costs are set forth in the accompanying Declaration of Benjamin H. Haber, and these costs are easily seen to be both reasonable and necessary.

Counsel can recover “out-of-pocket expenses that ‘would normally be charged to a fee paying client’” including costs for “service of summons and complaint, service of trial subpoenas, fee for defense expert at deposition, postage, investigator, copying costs, hotel bills, meals, messenger service and employment record reproduction.” (*Harris v. Marhoefer* (9th Cir. 1994) 24 F.3d 16, 19.) Such costs are properly recoverable on motions for settlement approval. (*See Nunez v. BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair Inc.* (S.D. Cal. 2017) 292 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1057; *Rutti v. Lojack Corp.* (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) No. CV 06–00350 DOC, 2012 WL 3151077, at *12 [“Expenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging, photocopying, long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service, mediation,

exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.”].)

D. The Enhancement Payment to the Plaintiff is Reasonable.

Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.) The California Supreme Court has also noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) Plaintiffs should therefore be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff a Class Representative Service Payment in the amount of \$15,000.00. These amounts are also in exchange for Plaintiff’s general releases of all claims against Defendant. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration demonstrating her devotion to this case, including her efforts responding to written discovery, preparing for and attending her deposition, assisting counsel in the case and at the various mediations, communicating with counsel frequently for litigation, and reviewing case-related documents. (*See, generally*, Declaration of Plaintiff, filed on August 27, 2024.)

When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) Courts routinely approve a \$10,000 enhancement award for plaintiffs represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno, supra*, 2021 WL 3673845 at *3

1 [“The Court concludes a \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez, supra*, 2024 WL
2 150721 at p. *4 [“The court approves awards of \$10,000 for each class representative.”].)

3 “Since without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may
4 be necessary to induce him to participate in the suit.” (*Clark v. Am. Residential Services LLC*
5 (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive
6 awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have
7 incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Id.* at p. 806.) “An incentive
8 award is appropriate ‘if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit.’”
9 (*Cellphone Term. Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1394, *quoting Clark*, 175
10 Cal.App.4th at p. 804.) The “criteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an
11 incentive award include: (1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both
12 financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class
13 representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the
14 duration of the litigation; and (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class
15 representative as a result of the litigation.” (*Id.* at pp. 1394–95.) Plaintiff’s declaration
16 describes how each of the five *Cellphone Termination* factors are present here.

17 **E. Administration Expenses Should be Approved.**

18 CPT Group, Inc., the Settlement Administrator, estimates that it will incur a total of
19 \$15,000.00 in costs associated with the administration of this Settlement. (Koh Decl., ¶ 18.) These
20 expenses are reasonable, based upon the size of the class, claim and exclusion tracking, and Class
21 Member payment processing.

22 **V. CONCLUSION**

23 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant final approval
24 of the proposed settlement.

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26 ///


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1 Dated: April 2, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

2 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

3 

4 Benjamin H. Haber
5 Arrash T. Fattahi

6 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Harris v. D & D Gear Incorporated dba Absolute Industries, Inc., et al.
30-2021-01222330-CU-OE-CXC

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

$$\left. \begin{array}{l}) \\) \\) \end{array} \right\} \text{SS}$$

I, Rebecca Padilla, state that I am employed in the aforesaid County, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is rebecca.padilla@wilshirelawfirm.com.

On April 2, 2025, I served the foregoing **PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**, on the interested parties by placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope by following one of the methods of service as follows:

Amy R. Patton
arp@paynefears.com
Blake A. Dillion
bad@paynefears.com
Connie Cason
ccason@paynefears.com
Jess Gray
jgray@paynefears.com
PAYNE & FEARS LLP
4 Park Plaza, Suite 1100
Irvine, California 92614
Telephone: (949) 851-1100
Facsimile: (949) 851-1212

Attorneys for Defendant

(X) **BY E-MAIL:** I hereby certify that this document was served from Los Angeles, California, by e-mail delivery on the parties listed herein at their most recent known email address or e-mail of record in this action.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this **April 2, 2025** at Los Angeles, California.

Rebecca Padilla
Type or Print Name

Signature