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4/8/2025 2:59 PM
Superior Court of California
County of Stanislaus
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By: Brenton Ratley, Deputy

John G. Yslas (SBN 187324)
john.yslas@wilshirelawfirm.com
Samantha A. Smith (SBN 233331)
samantha.smith@wilshirelawfirm.com
Eugene Zinovyev (SBN 267245)
eugene.zinovyev@wilshirelawfirm.com
John Brown (SBN 233605)
jbrown@wilshirelawfirm.com
Lisa B. Iturriaga (SBN 339678)
lisa.iturriaga@wilshirelawfirm.com
WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90010
Telephone: (213) 381-9988
Facsimile: (213) 381-9989

\$60 PAID
\$30 PAID

Attorneys for Plaintiff

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF STANISLAUS**

CHRISTINA PEREZ, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE CARSWELL GROUP INC. DBA
INDEPENDENT MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
a Michigan corporation; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: CV-23-007642 (Lead Case)
Case No.: CV-24-003622

*Assigned for all purposes to:
Hon. John R. Mayne
Dept. 21*

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION AND PAGA
SETTLEMENT**

Date: April 25, 2025
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept.: 21

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
AND PAGA SETTLEMENT

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on either April 25, 2025 at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department 21 of the above-entitled Court, located at 801 10th Street, 6th Floor, Modesto, CA 95354, Plaintiff Christina Perez (“Plaintiff”) will and hereby does move this Court for an Order:

1. Granting preliminary approval of the proposed Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Settlement”);
2. Conditionally certifying the proposed Class for settlement purposes only;
3. Appointing Plaintiff as the Class Representative;
4. Appointing Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel;
5. Appointing Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions (“Phoenix”) as the Settlement Administrator; and
6. Setting a final approval hearing date.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(d) and (e), this Motion is made on the grounds that the proposed Settlement satisfies all criteria for preliminary approval and falls well within the range of reasonableness. The Settlement was reached through informed, arm’s length bargaining between experienced attorneys with the assistance of an experienced neutral, and Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Class.

This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of John G. Yslas, and on all records and documents on file, together with such oral and documentary evidence that may be presented at the hearing on this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: April 3, 2025

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

By: Samantha Smith

John G. Yslas
Samantha A. Smith
Eugene Zinovyev
John Brown
Lisa B. Iturriaga
Attorneys for Plaintiff

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I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(d) and (e), Plaintiff seeks preliminary approval of a class action settlement of wage and hour claims, including representative claims brought under the Private Attorneys' General Act of 2004 ("PAGA"), against Defendant The Carswell Group Inc. dba Independent Management Services ("Defendant") (hereinafter, with Plaintiff, collectively referred to as the "Parties"). The proposed Class is defined as all individuals who are or were employed by Defendant or performed work for Defendant as non-exempt employees in California ("Class Members") during the Class Period of December 28, 2019 through December 31, 2024 ("Class Period"). The main terms of the Settlement are as follows:

1. A Gross Settlement Amount of \$110,000.00, which will be distributed to approximately 52 Class Members on a pro rata basis according to the total workweeks worked by each Class Member during the Class Period;
2. Attorneys' fees of up to one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently \$36,666.66) and up to \$30,000.00 in reimbursement of litigation costs to Plaintiff's Counsel;
3. A class representative service payment of up to \$5,000.00 to Plaintiff Christina Perez;
4. Costs of settlement administration of up to \$5,750.00; and
5. Allocation of \$10,000.00 to PAGA penalties, seventy-five percent (75%) of which (\$7,500.00) will be paid to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA"), and twenty-five percent (25%) of which (\$2,500.00) will be paid to all individuals who are or were employed by Defendant or performed work for Defendant as non-exempt employees in California during the PAGA Period of December 28, 2022 through December 31, 2024 ("Aggrieved Employees").

The Settlement meets all criteria for preliminary approval and falls within the range of reasonableness given the risks and expenses of further litigation. The Settlement was reached through informed, arm's length bargaining between experienced attorneys with the assistance of an experienced neutral. As such, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant preliminary approval of the

Settlement, conditionally certify the Class for settlement purposes only, appoint Plaintiff as the Class Representative, appoint Plaintiff's Counsel as Class Counsel, appoint Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions ("Phoenix") as the Settlement Administrator, authorize the Settlement Administrator to administer notice of the Settlement to the Class, and set a final approval hearing date.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed an action as a putative class action against Defendant, alleging: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; (8) failure to produce requested employment records; and (9) unfair business practices, Case No. CV-23-007642. Declaration of John G. Yslas in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement ("Yslas Decl.") at ¶ 3.

On January 2, 2024, Plaintiff Christina Perez sent a letter to the LWDA as required by Lab. Code § 2699.3(a). Yslas Decl. at ¶ 4. The LWDA did not respond to this notice, indicating it did not intend to investigate, thereby authorizing Plaintiff to represent the State of California as a private attorney general for the purposes of PAGA. *Id.*

On May 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed a representative action against Defendant alleging civil penalties under PAGA (Cal. Lab. Code § 2699, *et seq.*), Case No. CV-24-003622. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 5.

The Parties subsequently participated in a private mediation with mediator Gig Kyriacou on October 23, 2024. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 6. The negotiations were adversarial, conducted at arm's length, and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interest of their clients. *Id.* Ultimately, the parties were able to reach a settlement agreement. *Id.*

The Parties negotiated the terms of the Settlement over the next few months, which was finalized on January 21, 2025. *Id.* at ¶ 7, Exhibit 1 ("Settlement Agreement"). On April 1, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a copy of the Settlement Agreement to the LWDA. *Id.* at ¶ 8, Exhibit 2.

III. SUMMARY OF THE SETTLEMENT TERMS

A. Terms of the Proposed Settlement

The parties have agreed to settle the claims alleged in this case for a Gross Settlement Amount of \$110,000.00. Settlement Agreement at §§ 1.22, 3.1. Subject to Court approval, the following payments will be deducted from the Gross Settlement Amount: (1) a class representative service payment of up to \$5,000.00 to Christina Perez; (2) attorneys' fees of up to one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently \$36,666.66) and reimbursement of actual litigation costs to Plaintiff's Counsel currently estimated not to exceed \$30,000.00; (3) costs of settlement administration of up to \$5,750.00 to Phoenix; and (4) PAGA penalties in the amount of \$10,000.00, which will be allocated 75% to the LWDA (\$7,500.00) and 25% to Aggrieved Employees (\$2,500.00). *Id.* at §§ 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.5. After all requested deductions are made, the remaining Net Settlement Amount is currently estimated to be \$22,583.34. *Id.* at § 1.28.

Individual Class Payment will be calculated by (a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period, and (b) multiplying the result by each individual Participating Class Member's Workweeks. *Id.* at § 3.3.4. For tax purposes, the individual class payments will be allocated 20% to wages and 80% to penalties, interest, and reimbursement of expenses. *Id.* at § 3.3.4.1. Defendant will separately pay any and all employer payroll taxes owed on the wage positions of the Individual Class Payments separate from the Gross Settlement Amount. *Id.* at § 3.1.

Individual PAGA Payments to Aggrieved Employees will be calculated by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees' 25% share of PAGA Penalties (\$2,500.00) by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period, and (b) multiplying the result by each individual Aggrieved Employee's PAGA Pay Periods. *Id.* at § 3.3.5.1. Aggrieved Employees assume full responsibility and liability for any taxes owed on their Individual PAGA Payment. *Id.* For tax purposes, the Individual PAGA Payments will be allocated 100% to penalties.

Any deductions not approved by the Court will be retained by the Settlement Administrator in the Net Settlement Amount. *Id.* at §§ 3.3.1-3.3.3. Funds from any uncashed checks will be

transmitted by the Settlement Administrator to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no "unpaid residue" subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b). *Id.* at § 4.4.3. None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant. *Id.* at § 3.2.

B. Proposed Settlement Administration

The Parties' proposed Class Notice complies with the requirements of California Rules of Court, Rule 3.766(d). *See* Exhibit A to Settlement Agreement. It provides information regarding the nature of this lawsuit, a summary of the settlement terms, the formula used for calculating Individual Class Member and PAGA Payments and instructions to dispute the calculations, instructions on how to opt-out of or object to the Settlement, the date, time, and location of the final approval hearing, and the amounts sought for the class representatives service payment, attorneys' fees and litigation costs, and settlement administration costs. *See generally, Id.* The Class Notice also notifies Class Members that they do not need to submit a claim in order to participate in the Settlement and receive a payment. *See Id.* The Settlement Administrator will mail Class Members the Class Notice by first-class mail in English with a Spanish translation. Settlement Agreement at §§ 1.11, 7.4.2.

If a Class Notice is returned as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator will re-mail the Class Notice no later than three calendar days to the forwarding address provided by the U.S. postal Service. *Id.* at § 7.4.3. The deadline to opt-out of the Settlement or to submit an objection or dispute will be extended by 14 days for all Class Members whose Class Notice was remailed. *Id.* at § 7.4.4.

C. Proposed Release

All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, predecessors, and assigns, release Released Parties from all claims arising during the Class Period that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts stated in the Action, including, claims for: (1) failure to pay minimum wage for all hours worked in violation of Labor Code sections 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197, and the Applicable Wage Orders; (2) failure to pay proper overtime wages in violation of Labor Code sections 510, 1194, 1197, and 1198, and the Applicable Wage Order;

(3) failure to provide compliant meal periods and pay missed rest break premiums in violation of Labor Code section 226.7 and 512, and the Applicable Wage Order; (4) failure to provide compliant rest periods and pay missed meal period premiums in violation of Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512, and the Applicable Wage Order; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination in violation of Labor Code sections 201-203; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements in violation of Labor Code section 226; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures in violation of Labor Code section 2802; (8) failure to produce requested employment records in violation of Labor Code sections 226 and 1198.5; and, (9) unfair business practices based on the foregoing in violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17200–17210) (“Released Class Claims”). Except as set forth in Section 5.3 of this Agreement, Participating Class Members do not release any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers’ compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period. Settlement Agreement at § 5.2.

All Aggrieved Employees, including Non-Participating Class members, are deemed to release, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, predecessors, and assigns, the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA civil penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the PAGA Period facts stated in the Action and the PAGA Notice, including, claims for PAGA civil penalties based on: (1) failure to pay minimum wage for all hours worked in violation of Labor Code sections 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197, and the Applicable Wage Orders; (2) failure to pay proper overtime wages in violation of Labor Code sections 510, 1194, 1197, and 1198, and the Applicable Wage Order; (3) failure to provide compliant meal periods and pay missed rest break premiums in violation of Labor Code section 226.7 and 512, and the Applicable Wage Order; (4) failure to provide compliant rest periods and pay missed meal period premiums in violation of Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512, and the Applicable Wage Order; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination in violation of Labor Code sections 201-203; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements in violation of Labor Code section 226; (7) failure to indemnify

employees for expenditures in violation of Labor Code section 2802; and (8) failure to produce requested employment records in violation of Labor Code sections 226 and 1198.5 (“Released PAGA Claims”). *Id.* at § 5.3. Only Plaintiff will agree to a general release and a waiver of Civil Code § 1542. *Id.* at §§ 5.1, 5.1.1., 5.1.2.

IV. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT MEETS ALL CRITERIA FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL

A. Provisional Certification of the Class is Appropriate

Class certification is appropriate when there is: (1) an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class; (2) a well-defined community of interest among class members; and (3) substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives. *Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021 (2012). Although courts still need to review and consider each element for certification, a lesser standard can be used to provisionally certify a settlement class. *Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court*, 113 Cal.App.4th 836, 859 (2003).

1. The Proposed Class is Numerous and Ascertainable

“Ascertainability” is determined by examining the class definition and the size of the class, and may also involve examining the means available to identify class members. *Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.*, 7 Cal.5th 955, 980-981, 985-986 (2019). As the settlement eliminates the need for trial, “the case management issues inherent in the ascertainable class determination need not be confronted.” *Global Minerals*, 113 Cal.App.4th at 859. Further, under California law, there is no minimum number of class members for maintenance of a class action. *Hendershot v. Ready to Roll Transp., Inc.*, 228 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1222 (2014). Class sizes as small as 10 have been permitted. *Rose v. City of Hayward*, 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934 (1981), disapproved on other grounds by *Noel*, 7 Cal.5th at 986.

The Class here consists of all individuals who are or were employed by Defendant or performed work for Defendant as non-exempt employees in California during the Class Period. See Settlement Agreement at § 1.5. The Class is also readily ascertainable from Defendant’s business records, because all Class Members are or were employees of Defendant. Yslas Decl. at

¶ 10. Defendant's records show there are approximately 52 Class Members, making joinder of all Class Members impracticable. *Id.*

2. *A Well-Defined Community of Interest Exists*

The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. *Brinker*, 53 Cal.4th at 1021.

a. Common Questions Predominate

In determining whether common issues "predominate," courts consider both plaintiff's legal theories and defendant's affirmative defenses. *Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n*, 59 Cal.4th 1, 28-29 (2014). The "predominate common questions" factor does not require that all class members have identical claims. *Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc.*, 59 Cal.4th 522, 530 (2014). Rather, the focus is on whether issues shared by the class members are sufficiently uniform to permit class-wide assessment, and whether individual variations in proof on those issues are manageable. *Id.*

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant maintained common employment policies and/or practices that unlawfully deprived Class Members of wages, meal periods, rest periods, reimbursements for business expenses, accurate wage statements, and timely payment of wages upon separation of employment. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 11. These allegations present common factual and legal questions of, *inter alia*, whether Defendant applied the same scheduling, timekeeping, pay, meal period, rest period, and reimbursement policies to all Class Members, whether these policies and practices resulted in Labor Code violations, whether Defendant's conduct was intentional, and whether Class Members are entitled to damages and/or penalties. *Id.* These common questions could be resolved using Class Members' time records, payroll records, testimony from Defendant's designated representative(s), and Class Members' testimony. *Id.* Therefore, the Court can and should exercise its discretion to grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes.

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1 b. Plaintiff is Typical of the Class

2 Typicality does not require that the representative plaintiff's claims and those of the class
3 members be identical or perfectly aligned. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224,
4 228 (2001), disapproved on other grounds by *Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.*, 4 Cal.5th
5 260, 269-280 (2018). Typicality does not require that a plaintiff's claims be identical to those of
6 other class members, only that their claims and the defenses applicable to them are sufficiently
7 similar to those of other class members that a named plaintiff is able to adequately represent the
8 class and focus on common issues. *Medraza v. Honda of North Hollywood*, 166 Cal.App.4th 89,
9 99 (2008).

10 Plaintiff has alleged that she and Class Members were employed by the same Defendant
11 and injured by Defendant's common wage and hour policies and practices, including Defendant's
12 scheduling, timekeeping, pay, meal period, rest period, and reimbursement policies. *See Yslas*
13 *Decl.* at ¶ 11. Through informal discovery, including the production of documents by Defendant,
14 Plaintiff confirmed that these challenged policies and practices applied to Plaintiff as well as Class
15 Members. *See Id.* at ¶ 9. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims and Class Members' claims arise from the
16 same challenged employment policies and practices and are based on the same legal theories.

17 c. Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Class

18 Certification requires adequacy of both the proposed class representative and of the
19 proposed class counsel. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 382. "Only a conflict that goes to the very subject
20 matter of the litigation will defeat a party's claim of representative status." *Richmond v. Dart*
21 *Industries*, 29 Cal.3d 462, 470 (1981). Only conflicts that are "irreconcilable" can defeat adequacy.
22 *Nat'l Solar Equip. Owners' Ass'n v. Grumman Corp.*, 235 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1286 (1991). The
23 proposed representative Plaintiff and proposed Class Counsel present no such conflict.

24 Plaintiff's interests are coextensive with Class Members' interests. *Yslas Decl.* at ¶ 33.
25 Plaintiff has demonstrated an ability to advocate for the interests of Class Members by initiating
26 this lawsuit, gathering documents and information, being available on the day of mediation to
27 answer questions, meeting with her attorneys to understand the claims and theories of liability at
28

1 issue, assisting her attorneys in preparation for mediation, and reviewing the proposed Settlement.
2 *Id.*

3 Likewise, Wilshire Law Firm has expended considerable time and effort on this case and
4 will continue to do so through final approval. *See generally*, Yslas Decl. Therefore, Plaintiff should
5 be appointed Class Representative, and her counsel should be appointed Class Counsel.

6 **3. A Class Action is Superior to a Multitude of Individual Lawsuits**

7 Courts have held that class treatment of wage and hour claims is clearly “superior to the
8 other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” *Dean Witter*
9 *Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 211 Cal.App.3d 758, 772-773 (1989). This is so because “[p]ublic
10 policy has long favored the ‘full and prompt payment of wages due an employee.’” *Sav-On Drug*
11 *Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.4th 319, 340 (2004). Here, a class action is superior to a
12 multitude of individual lawsuits. Given the size and amount of each Class Members’ claims, Class
13 Members have little incentive to litigate their claims on an individual basis because the out-of-
14 pocket expenses and personal commitment necessary to litigate each claim likely outweighs any
15 potential recovery. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 10. Therefore, a class action is the superior method for seeking
16 relief.

17 **B. The Settlement Meets the Standards for Preliminary Approval**

18 The moving party must demonstrate that “the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable.”
19 *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 126 (2008). “In determining whether a
20 class settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors,
21 such as the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further
22 litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement,
23 the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of
24 counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the
25 proposed settlement.” *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 244-245 (internal quotations and citations
26 omitted).

1 ***1. The Settlement is Entitled to a Presumption of Fairness***

2 A settlement is entitled to “a presumption of fairness . . . where: (1) the settlement is reached
3 through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel
4 and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the
5 percentage of objectors is small.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996).
6 The Settlement here satisfies the first three factors. Plaintiff will analyze the fourth factor at final
7 approval after Class Members have been notified of the Settlement and provided with an
8 opportunity to object.

9 ***a. The Settlement is the Result of Arm’s Length Negotiation***

10 Courts have recognized that the involvement of a respected mediator provides a high degree
11 of assurance that the settlement is the result of arm’s length bargaining. *See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*,
12 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 52-53 (2008). The Settlement in this matter was achieved with the assistance
13 of a respected mediator following a full day of mediation. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 6. The negotiations were
14 adversarial, conducted at arm’s length, and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the
15 interests of their clients. *Id.*

16 ***b. Sufficient Investigation and Discovery Have Been Conducted***

17 Prior to attending mediation, Plaintiff’s Counsel thoroughly investigated the claims,
18 applicable law, and potential defenses. *Id.* at ¶ 9. Plaintiff’s Counsel assessed the value to the class
19 claims using the documents and data Defendant produced in informal discovery, including class
20 data providing the number of Class Members, the number of workweeks in the Class Period, and
21 the number of pay periods in the PAGA Period, Plaintiff Christina Perez’s personnel file,
22 employment handbooks and policies, job descriptions, and a random sampling of time and payroll
23 records. *Id.*

24 ***c. Plaintiffs’ Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation***

25 Plaintiff is represented by Wilshire Law Firm. *Id.* at ¶ 21. Plaintiff’s Counsel have extensive
26 experience litigating wage and hour class actions on behalf of employees. *See Id.* at ¶¶ 22-32.
27 Plaintiff’s Counsel have been involved as counsel in numerous class actions that have resulted in
28 millions of dollars in recovery. *See Id.*

1 **2. The Settlement is Reasonable Given the Strengths of Plaintiff's Claims**
2 **and the Risks and Expense of Further Litigation**

3 A settlement does not have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be considered fair
4 and reasonable. *See Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1139 (1991). Although
5 the exposure Plaintiff's Counsel calculated is substantial, the various risks at succeeding at class
6 certification and through trial affected the valuation of the claims for settlement purposes. Yslas
7 Decl. at ¶ 9.

8 Minimum and Overtime Wages: Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours
9 worked, including minimum wages, straight time wages, and overtime wages, by requiring class
10 members to work off-the-clock, unpaid. *Id.* at ¶ 13. For purposes of calculating Defendant's
11 liability based on a best-case scenario for Plaintiff and the Class, Plaintiff's expert estimates that
12 Defendant's maximum potential exposure by assuming that all unpaid work time should have been
13 paid at the overtime rate, not minimum or straight time wages, and we assumed that Defendant is
14 liable for one (1) hour of unpaid worktime per workweek. *Id.* This results in an estimate of \$78,602,
15 but we applied a risk discount based on a 60% chance at class certification and 50% chance at trial
16 to reach a settlement value of approximately \$23,580.60 (\$78,602 x 60% x 50%) because liability
17 depends on whether Defendant knew or should have known that class members were working off-
18 the-clock. *Id.*

19 Meal Periods: With respect to the meal period claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
20 required her and similarly situated class members to either work in lieu of taking meal periods, or
21 their meal periods were untimely or interrupted. *Id.* at ¶ 14. Based on our investigation, we
22 discovered that approximately 80% of meal periods were exactly 60 minutes which indicated the
23 likelihood of synthetic time entries and/or inaccuracy. *Id.* Additionally, Plaintiff and other class
24 members were instructed to record that they took a meal break that was 60 minutes in length when
25 in fact they often did not due to the heavy workload. *Id.* Plaintiff's experts calculated that the
26 potential liability for the meal period claim is \$107,561.00. *Id.* However, we discounted this figure
27 based on a 50% chance of succeeding at class certification and a 50% chance of succeeding at trial,
28 as well as Defendant's contention that the claim lacks merit, resulting in a risk discount to reach a

1 settlement value of approximately \$26,890.25 ($\$107,561.00 \times 50\% \times 50\%$). *Id.* at ¶ 14.

2 Rest Breaks: Plaintiff's rest period claim was based on the allegation that Defendant
3 required Plaintiff and other class members to work in lieu of taking rest breaks, and/or their rest
4 periods were untimely or interrupted and failed to pay rest break premiums when class members
5 were deprived their rest breaks. *Id.* at ¶ 15. Assuming a 100% violation rate for the Class Period
6 based on Plaintiff's and other Class Members' experience working for Defendant, Defendant's
7 potential liability for the rest period claim is \$227,574.00; however, we discounted this figure to
8 account for the difficulty of certifying and proving rest period claims, particularly because rest
9 periods do not have to be recorded, and to account for the possibility of Class Members voluntarily
10 choosing to forego a rest period. *Id.* Thus, yielding a realistic damage estimate of \$27,308.88
11 ($\$227,574.00 \times 40\% \times 30\%$) based on a 40% chance of succeeding at class certification and a 30%
12 chance of succeeding at trial. *Id.*

13 Reimbursements: Plaintiff's reimbursement claim was based on the allegation that
14 Defendant required Class Members to use their personal cellular phones for work-related purposes.
15 *Id.* at ¶ 16. Assuming a very conservative \$10/per month per employee for unpaid reimbursements,
16 this results in a damage estimate of \$21,570.00 ($\$10/\text{workweek} \times 2,157 \text{ workweeks}$). *Id.* However,
17 after discounting this figure based on an evaluation of a 50% chance of succeeding at class
18 certification and a 40% chance of succeeding at trial to account for the difficulty of certifying and
19 proving unpaid reimbursements and necessary business expenses, yields a realistic damage
20 estimate of \$4,314.00 ($\$21,570.00 \times 50\% \times 40\%$). *Id.*

21 Derivative and PAGA Penalties: Plaintiff alleged that as a result of Defendant's alleged
22 failure to pay all wages and meal and rest period premiums owed, Defendant owed waiting time
23 penalties and wage statement penalties. *Id.* at ¶ 18. With respect to Plaintiff's claims for statutory
24 and civil penalties, Plaintiff estimates that Defendant's realistic potential liability is \$82,093.73
25 ($\$23,580.60$ for unpaid wages + $\$26,890.25$ for meal period violations + $\$27,308.88$ for rest break
26 violations + $\$4,314.00$ for unpaid reimbursements). *Id.* While Defendant's maximum potential
27 liability for waiting time penalties is \$185,043.00, \$40,450.00 for inaccurate wage statements, and
28 \$46,000 for PAGA violations based on the Court assessing a \$100 penalty for initial violations for

all 460 pay periods within the one-year statute. *Id.* However, we believe that it would be unrealistic to expect the Court to award the full \$271,493.00 in penalties given Defendant's defenses, the contested nature of Plaintiff's claims, and the discretionary nature of penalties. *Id.* Considering that the underlying claims are realistically estimated to be \$82,093.73¹, such a disproportionate award would also raise due process concerns. *Id.* at ¶ 18.

Weighing these factors and applying a discount to account for the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at trial, we arrived at \$37,059.16 (based on Plaintiff's realistic estimated recovery of \$22,205.16 for waiting time penalties + \$4,854.00 + \$10,000 for PAGA) for statutory and civil penalties. *Id.* at ¶ 19. Most importantly, after taking into consideration that the Court would have discretion to reduce the PAGA award based on whether the amount of the award would be "unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory" Lab. Code §2699(e)(2), Plaintiff could not place a high value on the PAGA penalties, and therefore allocated \$10,000 of the Gross Settlement Amount to settle these claims. *Id.* See *Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.*, No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 at *24 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) (finding amount of PAGA penalties reasonable where the amounts are negotiated in good faith and "there is no indication that [the] amount was the result of self-interest at the expense of other Class Members"); *Nordstrom Comm'n Cases* 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 579 (2010) ("trial court did not abuse its discretion in approving a settlement which does not allocate any damages to the PAGA claims").

Using these estimated figures, Plaintiff predicted that the realistic maximum recovery for all claims, including penalties, would be \$119,152.89 (\$82,093.73 in damages for violations + \$37,059.16 (inclusive of wage statement penalties, waiting time penalties, and PAGA penalties) in statutory and civil penalties). *Id.* at ¶ 20. This means that the \$110,000.00 settlement figure represents 92.32% of the realistic maximum recovery. *Id.* Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. *Id.* Indeed,

¹ We estimate that Plaintiff's realistic estimated recovery for the non-penalty claims is \$82,093.73 (\$23,580.60 for unpaid wages + \$26,890.25 for meal period violations + \$27,308.88 for rest break violations + \$4,314.00 for unpaid reimbursements). Yslas Decl., ¶ 17.

1 because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will
2 avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. *Id.*

3 **C. The Requested Service Payment is Reasonable**

4 Plaintiff seeks a Class Representative Service Payment of up to \$5,000.00 for Plaintiff
5 Christina Perez, for accepting the responsibilities of representing the interests of the Class and
6 potential costs that were not borne by any other Class Member. Settlement Agreement at § 3.3.1.
7 A named plaintiff is eligible for payment that reasonably compensates her for undertaking and
8 fulfilling a fiduciary duty to represent absent class members. *See Cellphone Termination Fee*
9 *Cases*, 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1393 (2010); *Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 115 Cal.App.4th 715, 726
10 (2004).

11 Throughout this case, Plaintiff assisted counsel in gathering evidence necessary to
12 prosecute the claims, maintained regular contact with counsel, was available on the day of
13 mediation to answer questions, and reviewed the Settlement to ensure it was fair to the Class. Yslas
14 Decl. at ¶ 33. No action would likely have been taken by Class Members individually and no
15 compensation would have been recovered for them, but for Plaintiff's services on behalf of the
16 Class. *Id.* at ¶ 34. By actively pursuing this action, Plaintiff furthered the California public policy
17 goal of enforcing the State's wage and hour laws. *See Sav-On*, 34 Cal.4th at 340. The requested
18 Class Representative Service Payment is reasonable and should be preliminarily approved.

19 **D. The Requested Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

20 The purpose of an attorneys' fee award in class action litigation is to reward counsel who
21 invested in a case despite the risk of non-payment and achieved a substantial positive result for the
22 class. California courts routinely award attorneys' fees equaling one-third or more of the potential
23 value of the common fund. *See Chavez*, 162 Cal.App.4th at 66, fn. 11 ("Empirical studies show
24 that, regardless of whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in
25 class actions average around one-third of the recovery.").

26 Plaintiff seeks appointment of Wilshire Law Firm as Class Counsel. The attorneys
27 performed significant work and expended litigation costs in prosecuting this matter with no
28 guarantee of payment. Yslas Decl. at ¶¶ 21-32. Plaintiff's Counsel seeks preliminary approval for

1 \$36,666.66 in attorneys' fees, which is up to one-third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount, and
2 reimbursement of actual litigation costs not to exceed \$30,000.00. Given the work performed in
3 this matter, the extensive information exchange, and the substantial recovery obtained on behalf of
4 the Class, Plaintiff's Counsel achieved a settlement through efficient and diligent work. *See*
5 *generally*, Yslas Decl. At final approval, Plaintiff's Counsel will fully brief the merits of its request
6 for the award of attorneys' fees and litigation costs.

7 **V. CONCLUSION**

8 The Parties have negotiated a fair and reasonable settlement of the class claims in light of
9 the risks presented in this case. Plaintiff has presented the materials and information necessary to
10 demonstrate that the requirements for preliminary approval have been met, and therefore
11 respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily approve the Settlement and schedule a date for
12 the final approval hearing.

13 Respectfully submitted,

14 Dated: April 3, 2025

15 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM**

16 By: _____

17 *Samantha Smith*

18 John G. Yslas
Samantha A. Smith
Eugene Zinovyev
John Brown
Lisa B. Iturriaga

19 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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28

PROOF OF SERVICE

Perez v. The Carswell Group, Inc. dba Independent Management Services
County of Stanislaus Case No.: CV-23-007642

I, Jonathan Daniel Melendez, state that I am employed in Los Angeles County, State of California; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90010. My electronic service address is Jonathan.melendez@wilshirelawfirm.com

On April 3, 2025, I served the foregoing: **NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT**, on the interested parties below and by following the method of service as follows:

Brandon D. Saxon (SBN: 252712)
bsaxon@grsm.com

Heather T. Daiza (SBN: 323272)
hdaiza@grsm.com

GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI, LLP
101 W. Broadway, Suite 2000
San Diego, CA 92101
Telephone: (619) 544-7229
Facsimile: (619) 696-7124

Attorneys for Defendant
THE CARSWELL GROUP, INC. DBA INDEPENDENT MANAGEMENT SERVICES

(X) **BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE:** Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept service by electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the person at email addresses listed above using One Legal.

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on April 3, 2025, at Oakland, California.

Jonathan Daniel Melendez

Type or Print Name



Signature