

Karen I. Gold (State Bar No. 258360)
kgold@blackstonepc.com
Marissa A. Mayhood (State Bar No. 334376)
mmayhood@blackstonepc.com
Alexandra Rose (State Bar No. 329407)
arose@blackstonepc.com
Shawn Bahmani (State Bar No. 343638)
sbahmani@blackstonepc.com
BLACKSTONE LAW, APC
8383 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 745
Beverly Hills, California 90211
Tel: (310) 622-4278 / Fax: (855) 786-6356

Attorneys for Plaintiff ANU VERMA,
individually, and on behalf of Aggrieved
Employees pursuant to the California
Private Attorneys General Act

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

ANU VERMA, individually, and on behalf of
Aggrieved Employees pursuant to the California
Private Attorneys General Act,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SINGERLEWAK LLP, a California Company; and
DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 24STCV11344

Honorable Gail Killefer
Department 37

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
APPROVAL OF PAGA SETTLEMENT
AND AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
AND COSTS AND SETTLEMENT
ADMINISTRATION COSTS**

Date: October 8, 2025

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Department: 37

Reservation ID: 798652547329

Complaint Filed: May 6, 2024

Trial Date: Not Set

1 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

2 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT** on October 8, 2025 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 37 of the
3 above-captioned Court located at the Stanley Mosk Courthouse, 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles,
4 California 90012, Plaintiff Anu Verma (“Plaintiff”) will and hereby does move the Court for an Order
5 granting approval of the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, California
6 Labor Code sections 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”) settlement. Specifically, Plaintiff requests that the Court
7 enter an Order:

- 8 1. Granting approval pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(l)(2) of the Private
9 Attorneys General Act Settlement Agreement and Release (“Settlement,” “Agreement,”
10 or “Settlement Agreement”) attached as **Exhibit 2** to the Declaration of Alexandra Rose
11 in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement and Award of
12 Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and Settlement Administration Costs (“Rose Decl.”);
- 13 2. Directing the distribution of the Gross Settlement Amount of One Hundred Fifty-Five
14 Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$155,000.00) pursuant to the terms of the Agreement;
- 15 3. Approving the Net Settlement Amount, estimated to be Seventy-Five Thousand Four
16 Hundred Ten Dollars and Three Cents (\$75,410.03), of which seventy-five percent (75%)
17 will be distributed to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency
18 (“LWDA”) and twenty-five percent (25%) of which will be distributed to the Aggrieved
19 Employees;
- 20 4. Approving an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross
21 Settlement Amount (i.e., \$54,250.00) to Plaintiff’s Counsel;
- 22 5. Approving the amount of Twenty Thousand Three Hundred Thirty-Nine Dollars and
23 Ninety-Seven Cents (\$20,339.97) to Plaintiff’s Counsel for reimbursement of actual
24 litigation costs and expenses pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(g)(1);
- 25 7. Appointing Apex Class Action LLC as the Settlement Administrator; and
- 26 8. Approving an award of up to Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$5,000.00) in
27 anticipated costs to Apex Class Action LLC for its settlement administration services.

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1 In accordance with California Labor Code sections 2699 *et. seq.*, a copy of the proposed
2 Settlement Agreement was submitted to the LWDA via online submission through the LWDA's
3 website on June 11, 2025. (Rose Decl., ¶ 13 and Exh. 3).

4 This Motion is based upon this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
5 the Declarations of Alexandra Rose, Plaintiff Anu Verma, and the Settlement Administrator (Sean
6 Hartranft of Apex Class Action LLC), the pleadings and other records on file with the Court in this
7 matter, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before
8 the hearing.

9 Respectfully submitted,

10 Dated: August 12, 2025

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC


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12 By: 
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14 Alexandra Rose
15 Attorney for Plaintiff Anu Verma
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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Pursuant to the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code
4 sections 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”), Plaintiff Anu Verma (“Plaintiff”) seeks approval of the Private
5 Attorneys General Act Settlement Agreement and Release (“Settlement,” “Agreement,” or
6 “Settlement Agreement”) entered into with Defendant SingerLewak LLP (“Defendant”) (together,
7 with Plaintiff, the “Parties”), which is attached as Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of Alexandra Rose in
8 Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement and Award of Attorneys’ Fees and
9 Costs and Settlement Administration Costs (“Rose Decl.”). The Agreement payment terms are
10 outlined as follows:

- 11 • Gross Settlement Amount: One Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
12 (\$155,000.00).
- 13 • Attorneys’ Fees: Fifty-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars and Zero Cents
14 (\$54,250.00) (35% of the Gross Settlement Amount), to be paid from the Gross Settlement
15 Amount.
- 16 • Attorneys’ Costs: Twenty Thousand Three Hundred Thirty-Nine Dollars and Ninety-
17 Seven Cents (\$20,339.97), to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
- 18 • Settlement Administration Costs: Up to Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
19 (\$5,000.00), to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
- 20 • Estimated Net Settlement Amount: Seventy-Five Thousand Four Hundred Ten Dollars
21 and Three Cents (\$75,410.03), of which 75% (\$56,557.52) will be paid to the California
22 Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and the remaining 25%
23 (\$18,852.51) will be paid to the Aggrieved Employees.

24 As set forth herein, the Settlement Agreement is the product of informed discovery, arms-
25 length negotiations, and provides a fair, adequate, and reasonable recovery for the State of California
26 and Aggrieved Employees. Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests that the Court grant approval of
27 the proposed Settlement Agreement, among other requested relief.

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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant is an accounting and business consulting firm with offices in multiple states nationally, including California. (Rose Decl., ¶ 2). Defendant employed Plaintiff as an hourly-paid, non-exempt Staff Accountant from approximately April 2022 through April 2023. (Rose Decl., ¶ 2; Declaration of Anu Verma in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement and Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and Settlement Administration Costs [“Verma Decl.”], ¶ 2).

On February 29, 2024, Plaintiff provided written notice to the LWDA by online submission and to Defendant by U.S. Certified Mail, pursuant to California Labor Code Section 2699.3, of the specified provisions of the California Labor Code alleged to have been violated by Defendant (“PAGA Letter”). (Rose Decl., ¶ 3 and Exh. 1).

On March 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint in the action entitled *Anu Verma v. SingerLewak LLP*, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2024-01383319-CU-OE-CXC (“Class Action”), thereby commencing a putative class action against Defendant. (*Id.*, ¶ 4).

On May 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Enforcement Action Under the Private Attorneys General Act, Cal. Labor Code §§ 2698 *Et Seq.* (“Operative Complaint”) in the action entitled *Anu Verma v. SingerLewak LLP*, Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 24STCV11344 (“Action”), thereby commencing a representative action under PAGA against Defendant. (*Id.*, ¶ 5). The Operative Complaint asserts a single cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA for violations of multiple provisions of the California Labor Code and the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders. (*Id.*, ¶ 5).

On May 13, 2024, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff Anu Verma’s Individual Claims, to Dismiss Class Claims and to Stay Proceedings (“Motion to Compel”) in the Class Action. (*Id.*, ¶ 6). On June 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Compel in the Class Action. (*Ibid.*). On June 13, 2024, Defendant filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition in the Class Action. (*Ibid.*). On June 21, 2024, the court in the Class Action entered a Minute Order, which granted Defendant’s Motion to Compel and ordered Plaintiff to arbitrate her individual claims, dismissed the class claims, and stayed the case until completion of arbitration. (*Ibid.*).

1 On April 17, 2025, Plaintiff and Defendant (together, the “Parties”) participated in a formal
2 mediation conducted by Marc Feder, Esq. (“Mediator”), a neutral and respected mediator with
3 extensive experience in complex wage and hour matters, and with the assistance of the Mediator’s
4 evaluations, the Parties were able to reach an agreement to settle and resolve the Action along with
5 Plaintiff’s individual claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 7).

6 On June 11, 2025, the Parties executed the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, ¶ 8 and Exh. 2).

7 During the course of informal discovery in the Action, Plaintiff’s Counsel conducted an intense
8 investigation into the facts of the Action. (*Id.*, ¶ 9). This included obtaining data, information, and
9 documents relating to the underlying alleged violations, including, but not limited to, Plaintiff’s
10 employee file, all of the Aggrieved Employees’ time and payroll data, Defendant’s employee
11 handbook and time and pay policies from February 28, 2023 to February 28, 2025, and Aggrieved
12 Employees’ data points so that Plaintiff could assess the number of alleged potential violations and
13 value of the recoverable penalties, as well as evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of her claims.
14 (*Ibid.*).

15 Based on the data, information, and documents received, as well as thorough discussions with
16 Defendant’s counsel, Plaintiff’s Counsel was able to (i) determine the total number of distinct
17 individuals falling within the definition of “Aggrieved Employees” for the relevant statutory period,
18 (ii) the number of affected pay periods at issue among them, and (iii) construct a damages model that
19 calculated the maximum realistic amount of PAGA penalties that could be levied against Defendant
20 within the relevant statutory period. (*Id.*, ¶ 10). Defendant, however, disputed Plaintiff’s claims and
21 disputed both the existence of and extent of liability as alleged by Plaintiff, which allowed Plaintiff’s
22 Counsel to further assess the strength of Plaintiff’s claims. (*Ibid.*). Plaintiff’s Counsel’s experience in
23 litigating similar representative wage and hour claims, the degree of investigation that was conducted
24 here, and the amount of data, information, and documents that was obtained, was sufficient to
25 determine the potential value of the PAGA claims, and to evaluate the strength of these claims for
26 purposes of settlement. (*Ibid.*).

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1 The Parties believe the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (*Id.*, ¶ 11).
2 The Parties understand, acknowledge, and agree that the Settlement Agreement constitutes a
3 compromise of Plaintiff's PAGA claims, and that it is the desire and intention of the Parties to affect
4 a final and complete resolution of the Action. (*Ibid.*).

5 Defendant denies all of the claims in the Action, and does not waive, but rather expressly
6 reserves, all rights to challenge all such claims and allegations upon all legal, procedural, and factual
7 grounds should the Settlement Agreement not become final. (*Id.*, ¶ 12). The Settlement Agreement
8 reflects a compromise reached to end litigation in the Action. (*Ibid.*). Following significant
9 investigation and extensive settlement negotiations, Plaintiff now seeks approval of the proposed
10 Settlement Agreement, which will resolve all representative claims alleged in the Action. (*Ibid.*).

11 **III. THE SETTLEMENT TERMS**

12 **A. Definition of the Aggrieved Employees**

13 For purposes of settlement only, the Parties have agreed that the "Aggrieved Employees" shall
14 be defined as "all current and former hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employees who worked for
15 Defendant in the State of California at any time during the PAGA Period." (Rose Decl., ¶ 14;
16 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3(a)(4)). The "PAGA Period" is the period from February 28, 2023 through
17 June 16, 2025. (Rose Decl., ¶ 14; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3(a)(4)). Based on information provided
18 by Defendant, it is estimated that there are a total of 253 Aggrieved Employees who worked
19 approximately 7,393 pay periods during the PAGA Period ("Pay Periods").¹ (Rose Decl., ¶ 14).

20 **B. Amount of Settlement**

21 The Parties have agreed to settle the PAGA claims at issue in the Action for a non-reversionary
22 Gross Settlement Amount of One Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
23 (\$155,000.00). (Rose Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3(a)).

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28 ¹ At the time of this filing, Defendant has represented that there are 7,393 Pay Periods. Accordingly, the Escalator Clause in Paragraph 3(a)(5) of the Settlement Agreement has not been triggered.

1 **C. Allocation and Funding of the Gross Settlement Amount**

2 The Gross Settlement Amount is a common fund and therefore includes all requested costs,
3 fees, and other allocations. (Rose Decl., ¶ 15). The Gross Settlement Amount includes: (1) Attorneys’
4 fees in the amount of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., \$54,250.00 if
5 the Gross Settlement Amount is \$155,000.00); (2) Attorneys’ actual litigation costs and expenses in
6 the amount of Twenty Thousand Three Hundred Thirty-Nine Dollars and Ninety-Seven Cents
7 (\$20,339.97); and (3) Settlement Administration Costs, not to exceed Five Thousand Dollars and Zero
8 Cents (\$5,000.00). (Rose Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 3(a)(1)-(2)).

9 After the above-estimated amounts are deducted from the Gross Settlement Amount, the Net
10 Settlement Amount will amount to approximately Seventy-Five Thousand Four Hundred Ten Dollars
11 and Three Cents (\$75,410.03), of which seventy-five percent (75%), or Fifty-Six Thousand Five
12 Hundred Fifty-Seven Dollars and Fifty-Two Cents (\$56,557.52), will be paid to the LWDA (“LWDA
13 Payment”) and twenty-five percent (25%), or Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty-Two Dollars
14 and Fifty-One Cents (\$18,852.51), will be distributed and paid to Aggrieved Employees (“Employees’
15 Portion”) on a *pro rata* basis based on their number of Pay Periods. (Rose Decl., ¶ 16; Settlement
16 Agreement ¶ 3(a)(4)).

17 Defendant has represented that the Aggrieved Employees worked approximately 6,739 pay
18 periods during the period February 28, 2023 to February 28, 2025. (Rose Decl., ¶ 17; Settlement
19 Agreement ¶¶ 3(a)(5)). If it is determined by the Settlement Administrator that the total number of
20 Pay Periods worked by the Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period actually exceeds 6,739 by
21 more than ten percent (10%) (i.e., if the Pay Periods exceed 7,413), then the Gross Settlement Amount
22 will be increased on a *pro rata* basis equal to the percentage increase in the number of Pay Periods
23 worked by the Aggrieved Employees above ten percent (10%) (i.e., if the number of Pay Periods
24 increases by 11%, then the Gross Settlement Amount will increase by 1%). (Rose Decl., ¶ 17;
25 Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 3(a)(5))

26 No later than seven (7) calendar days after the Court’s order granting approval of the
27 Settlement, Defendant shall provide the Settlement Administrator with a list of all Aggrieved
28 Employees (the “Aggrieved Employees List”), containing the following information for each

1 Aggrieved Employee: (i) first and last name; (ii) last known address; (iii) last known telephone
2 number; (iv) Social Security number; and (v) dates worked during the PAGA Period. (Rose Decl., ¶
3 18; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 5(c)(1)).

4 No later than twenty-one (21) calendar days after the Court's order granting approval of the
5 Settlement, Defendant shall transmit the Gross Settlement Amount into a qualified settlement account
6 established by the Settlement Administrator for administration of the Settlement. (Rose Decl., ¶ 19;
7 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 5(a)).

8 No later than seven (7) calendar days after the Settlement Administrator receives the Aggrieved
9 Employees List and the full funding of the Gross Settlement Amount, the Settlement Administrator
10 will distribute the Individual PAGA Payments (with Cover Letters) to Aggrieved Employees, the
11 LWDA Payment to the LWDA, the Attorneys' Fees and Costs to Plaintiff's Counsel, and the
12 Settlement Administration Costs to itself. (Rose Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 5(c)(3) and
13 5(c)(5)-(7)).

14 The Individual PAGA Payment checks issued to Aggrieved Employees shall remain valid for
15 one hundred eighty (180) calendar days, and thereafter, shall be canceled. (Rose Decl., ¶ 21;
16 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 5(c)(1)). Funds associated with such canceled checks shall be transmitted to
17 the State Controller's Office Unclaimed Property Division in the name of the Aggrieved Employee(s)
18 at issue and in the amount of their respective Individual PAGA Payment(s). (Rose Decl., ¶ 15;
19 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 5(c)(4)).

20 **IV. STANDARD FOR APPROVAL OF PAGA SETTLEMENT**

21 The settlement of a PAGA claim requires court approval. (California Labor Code ("Lab.
22 Code") § 2699(l)). The Court must be mindful that a "[s]ettlement is a compromise, which balances
23 the possible recovery against the risks inherent in litigating further." (*In re TD Ameritrade Account*
24 *Holder Litig.*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103222 at *24 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 12, 2011)). "[T]he very essence
25 of a settlement is ... 'a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes,'" as "it is the very
26 uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of wasteful and expensive litigation that induce
27 consensual settlements." (*Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com.*, 688 F.2d 615, 624-26 (9th Cir.
28 1982)). As such, "the settlement or fairness hearing is not to be turned into a trial or rehearsal for trial

1 on the merits,” or “judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been
2 achieved.” (Ibid).

3 Although the California Labor Code does not set forth the criteria by which a PAGA settlement
4 is to be evaluated, it is presumed that a reviewing court may take into consideration some of the factors
5 that courts use when reviewing a class action settlement. However, “a PAGA claim asserted on a non-
6 class representative basis...is not considered a class action but a law enforcement action, and therefore
7 does not have to meet the requirements of [a class action].” (*Casida v. Sears Holdings Corp.*, 2012
8 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9302 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2012)).

9 A court’s review of a PAGA settlement necessarily implicates the following unique features
10 that render the approval process distinct from approval of a class action settlement under Code of Civil
11 Procedure Section 382 and California Rules of Court Rule 3.769. First, in evaluating the adequacy of
12 the settlement amount, the Court’s focus is not concerned with the amount aggrieved employees are
13 to receive, but rather, must focus on the total settlement amount in achieving PAGA’s objective.
14 Indeed, “[t]he remedy sought in a PAGA suit consists of civil penalties, not individual or class
15 damages,” and while a “[PAGA] action is ... designed to protect the public and penalize the employer
16 for past illegal conduct,” a reviewing court must be mindful of the fact that settlement of a PAGA
17 claim involves a compromise. (*Mendez v. Tween Brands, Inc.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66454 at *11
18 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2010)). “Unlike class actions, these civil penalties are not meant to compensate
19 unnamed employees because the action is fundamentally a law enforcement action.” (*Ochoa-
20 Hernandez v. Cjaders Foods, Inc.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32774 at *12 (Apr. 2, 2010)). The Court
21 should not lose sight of the fact that, “[u]nlike a class action seeking damages or injunctive relief for
22 injured employees, the purpose of PAGA is to incentivize private parties to recover civil penalties for
23 the government that otherwise may not have been assessed and collected by overburdened state
24 enforcement agencies.” (Ibid).

25 Second, consistent with the fact that unnamed employees have no property interest in a PAGA
26 claim, “[u]nnamed employees need not be given notice of the PAGA claim, nor do they have the
27 ability to opt-out of the representative PAGA claim.” (*Ochoa-Hernandez*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28 32774 at *13). Indeed, “[PAGA] does not create property rights or any other substantive rights” as

1 “[i]t is simply a procedural statute allowing an aggrieved employees to recover civil penalties – for
2 Labor Code violations – that otherwise would be sought by state labor law enforcement agencies.”
3 (*Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Sup. Ct.*, 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003 (2009)). This
4 renders the approval process of a PAGA settlement distinct from a class action settlement, as there is
5 no need for the Court to employ the “two-step approval process” required under California Rules of
6 Court Rule 3.769.

7 Finally, unlike class action settlements, the scope of release permitted in a PAGA settlement
8 is limited. While “judgment in [a PAGA] action is binding not only on the named employee plaintiff
9 but also on government agencies and any aggrieved employee not a party to the proceeding...the
10 nonparty employees, because they were not given notice of the action or afforded any opportunity to
11 be heard, would not be bound by the judgment as to remedies other than civil penalties.” (*Arias v.*
12 *Sup. Ct.*, 46 Cal.4th 969, 985-87 (2009)). Thus, the scope of a release in a PAGA settlement is
13 confined to the PAGA penalties alleged in the complaint and/or the plaintiff’s notice to the LWDA
14 and to the claims that were, or could have been, alleged pursuant to PAGA based on the factual
15 allegations in the complaint and/or the plaintiff’s notice to the LWDA. In the case at hand, as the only
16 claims at issue are PAGA claims, those will be the only claims extinguished through the Settlement.

17 V. THE AGREEMENT IS FAIR AND SHOULD BE APPROVED

18 A. The Agreement is Presumed to Be Fair

19 California courts recognize that “a presumption of fairness exists where . . . [a] settlement is
20 reached through arm’s-length bargaining.” (*Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224,
21 245 (2001); *see also Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC*, 175 Cal. App. 4th 785, 799 (2009)). Here,
22 the Agreement is presumptively fair because: (1) it occurred after counsel for the Parties engaged in
23 significant investigation to evaluate the strength and potential value of the PAGA claims, and the risks
24 of litigating these claims through trial; and (2) it was negotiated at great length and effort by counsel
25 with significant experience in similar complex labor and employment matters. (Rose Decl., ¶ 22).

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1 **B. The Agreement is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’ Respective**
2 **Legal Positions and Recovery Risks**

3 In deciding whether to approve a proposed settlement, a trial court has broad powers to
4 determine if it is fair given the circumstances of the case. (*Mallick v. Sup. Ct.*, 89 Cal.App.3d 434,
5 438 (1979)). In exercising these powers, the overriding concern is to ensure that a proposed settlement
6 is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801 (internal quotations omitted)). A
7 settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at trial, nor
8 does the settlement have to obtain one hundred percent of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
9 (*Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 246, 250). In evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement, a trial court
10 must consider “the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of
11 further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in
12 settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and
13 views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to
14 the proposed settlement.”² (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008)).
15 Even though a *Kullar* analysis is not required for approval of a PAGA settlement, a brief analysis is
16 included to support approval of the Settlement Agreement. (See Rose Decl., ¶¶ 29-42).

17 These factors require balancing and are non-exhaustive. Trial courts should therefore tailor
18 the factors to each case and give due regard to “what is otherwise a private consensual agreement
19 between the parties.” (*Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1801).

20 1. Strength of Plaintiff’s Case

21 In order to prevail at trial, Plaintiff would have to prove violations of the California Labor
22 Code underlying her PAGA claims, demonstrate that Aggrieved Employees suffered, and demonstrate
23 that Defendant’s conduct gives rise to penalties. (See *Elliot v. Spherion Pac. Work, LLC*, 572
24 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1181-82 (C.D. Cal. 2008) [“Plaintiff’s claim under [PAGA] is wholly dependent
25 upon her other claims. Because all of Plaintiff’s other claims fail as a matter of law, so does her PAGA
26 claim.”]).

27 _____
28 ² As this is not a class action, the *Kullar* factors pertaining to the risk of maintaining class action status through trial and
the reaction of class members to the proposed settlement are inapplicable.

1 Here, Plaintiff's core allegations are that Defendant systematically violated the California
2 Labor Code by, *inter alia*, failing to properly pay wages for all hours worked, failing to provide
3 compliant meal and rest periods, failing to timely pay wages during employment and upon termination,
4 failing to maintain complete and accurate payroll records, failing to provide compliant wage
5 statements, and failing to reimburse necessary business expenses. (Rose Decl., ¶ 23).

6 Defendant maintained several defenses to Plaintiff's theories of liability, which, if successfully
7 argued and proven, had the potential to eliminate or substantially reduce recovery. (*Id.*, ¶ 24).
8 Throughout this litigation, Defendant maintained, and continues to maintain, that it had, and continues
9 to have, compliant employment policies and practices throughout the time period at issue. (*Ibid.*).
10 Defendant denies that it ever violated any provision of the California Labor Code, including, but not
11 limited to, those sections for which Plaintiff seeks penalties under PAGA. (*Ibid.*). Defendant further
12 denied, and continues to deny, that the lawsuit is appropriate for representative treatment for any
13 purpose other than settlement. (*Ibid.*). Defendant also challenged Plaintiff's standing as an aggrieved
14 employee and denied that any of Defendant's other employees whom Plaintiff seeks to represent are
15 aggrieved. (*Ibid.*).

16 Defendant also argued that an important feature of PAGA is that the Court retains discretion
17 to lower the penalties if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise
18 would result in an award that is "unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory." (*Ibid.*; Lab. Code
19 § 2699(e)(2); *see also Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.*, 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1136
20 (2012) [holding that a court may reduce the amount of PAGA penalties awarded to an employee based
21 upon discretionary factors]).

22 Even if violations of the California Labor Code occurred, which Defendant denies, Defendant
23 contended that said violations would only be considered "initial violations" and thus heightened
24 "subsequent violation" penalties were not warranted. (Rose Decl., ¶ 25; Lab. Code § 2699(f)(2); *see*
25 *also Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2*, 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1208-09 (2008) ["Until the employer has
26 been notified that it is violating a Labor Code provision [...], the employer cannot be presumed to be
27 aware that its continuing underpayment of employees is a 'violation' subject to penalties."]).

28 ///

1 Defendant also contended that, with respect to PAGA claims, the Court was unlikely to assess
2 cumulative penalties for the maximum number of possible, separate California Labor Code violations,
3 because it would be unjust, arbitrary, oppressive, and/or confiscatory, especially where certain conduct
4 may be regulated by multiple provisions of the California Labor Code that are interrelated and work
5 in tandem. (Rose Decl., ¶ 26). While the PAGA does provide the potential for a heightened penalty
6 for subsequent violations, courts are often hesitant to award a heightened penalty where there is no
7 prior citation by the Labor Commissioner, as is the case here. (*See Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc.*, 3
8 F.4th 1127, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding no heightened penalty where defendant was not notified by
9 Labor Commissioner or any court that it was subject to the California Labor Code)). The Ninth
10 Circuit’s holding in *Bernstein* also supports that a settlement valuation that does not “stack” penalties.
11 (Ibid).

12 While Plaintiff maintains that her PAGA claims have merit, in reaching the Agreement,
13 Plaintiff and her counsel took into account the strengths and weaknesses of each side’s position, and
14 the uncertainty of how the case might have concluded as litigation continued, at trial, and/or upon
15 appeal. (Rose Decl., ¶ 27). Based on these disputes, which had the potential to completely eliminate
16 Plaintiff’s recovery, the range of realistic “litigation outcomes” on Plaintiff’s PAGA claims was
17 defined by a “maximum possible liability” amount of approximately \$673,900 and a “risk-adjusted
18 realistic value” amount of approximately \$242,604. (*Id.*, ¶ 42). In light thereof, the Gross Settlement
19 Amount of \$155,000 is a significant settlement. (Ibid).

20 2. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

21 Approval of the Settlement Agreement is also appropriate in light of the risk, expense, and
22 complexity of further litigation. As discussed above, the Settlement Agreement takes into
23 consideration the specific factual and legal hurdles faced by Plaintiff in establishing Defendant’s
24 penalty-liability in this case, which may have resulted in a net-zero recovery. Any recovery on these
25 claims is not certain. And even when liability is found, PAGA claims are discretionary, such that the
26 Court could decline to award their full value. Some of Plaintiff’s claims are also derivative, and as
27 such, Plaintiff must prevail on her underlying California Labor Code claims in order to prevail on the
28 derivative claims. These risks – when balanced with the fact that the Agreement achieved a very

significant recovery (as demonstrated below), and that further litigation posed a risk of diminishing such recovery by increasing litigation expenses – weigh strongly in favor of settlement approval.

3. The Benefits Conferred by the Agreement Balance in Favor of Approval

The Settlement Agreement provides a *significant* monetary benefit that falls well within the range of an acceptable settlement under the circumstances, which is the standard on which the instant Agreement must be judged. As held by the Ninth Circuit: “The proposed settlement is not to be judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved by the negotiators.” (*Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n*, 688 F.2d at 625 (emphasis in original)). As the Second Circuit has pointed out: “The fact that a proposed settlement may only amount to a fraction of the potential recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate and should be disapproved.” (*City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.*, 495 F.2d 448, 455 & n.2 (2nd Cir. 1974)).

The Net Settlement Amount is currently estimated to be Seventy-Five Thousand Four Hundred Ten Dollars and Three Cents (\$75,410.03). (Rose Decl., ¶ 43). After the deductions are made from the Gross Settlement Amount for the Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and Settlement Administration Costs, Fifty-Six Thousand Five Hundred Fifty-Seven Dollars and Fifty-Two Cents (\$56,557.52) (i.e. 75% of the Net Settlement Amount) will go to the LWDA, and Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty-Two Dollars and Fifty-One Cents (\$18,852.51) (i.e. 25% of the Net Settlement Amount) will go to the Aggrieved Employees, as required by California Labor Code § 2699(i) in effect at the time of this matter (“civil penalties recovered by aggrieved employees shall be distributed as follows: 75 percent to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency . . . and 25 percent to the aggrieved employees.”). (Ibid). There is no reason to doubt the fairness of the proposed plan of allocation of the Net Settlement Amount as it fully complies with California Labor Code section 2699(i). (Ibid).

The Settlement Agreement is a compromise of highly disputed claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 44). Plaintiff and her counsel recognize the expense and length of continued proceedings necessary to litigate the matter through trial and any possible appeals. (Ibid). Plaintiff and her counsel have also taken into account the uncertainty and risk of the outcome of further litigation, and the difficulties and delays inherent in such litigation. (Ibid). Plaintiff and her counsel are also aware of the burdens of proof

1 necessary to establish liability, both generally and in response to Defendant’s defenses thereto, and
2 the difficulties in establishing Defendant’s liability for, and the right to recover, penalties on behalf of
3 Plaintiff, the State of California, and other Aggrieved Employees. (Ibid). Plaintiff and her counsel
4 have also taken into account Defendant’s agreement to enter into a settlement that confers significant
5 relief upon the Aggrieved Employees and the State of California. (Ibid). Considering all of the facts
6 in this case, Plaintiff and her counsel have determined that the Agreement represents a fair, adequate,
7 and reasonable resolution of the PAGA claims, and that it is in the best interests of the Aggrieved
8 Employees and the State of California. (Ibid).

9 The result achieved in this case is well within the range of what is considered an acceptable
10 settlement under the circumstances, especially when compared to the settlement of PAGA claims in
11 other cases. (*Id.*, ¶ 45). (*See, e.g., DCH Auto Wage and Hour Cases*, Los Angeles Superior Court,
12 Case No. JCCP4833 (May 2017) [approving \$15,000 out of \$4 million toward settlement of PAGA
13 claims]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160052, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29,
14 2012) [approving \$10,000 out of \$3.7 million toward settlement of PAGA claims]; *Schiller v. David’s*
15 *Bridal, Inc.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80776, at *40 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2012) [approving \$7,500 out of
16 \$518,245 toward settlement of PAGA claims]; *Chu v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC*, 2011 U.S. Dist.
17 LEXIS 15821, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011) (approving \$10,000 out of \$6.9 million toward
18 settlement of PAGA claims]; *Franco v. Ruiz Food Prods.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169057, at *14
19 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2021) [approving \$10,000 out of \$2.5 million toward settlement of PAGA
20 claims]). Here, the value obtained for settlement of the PAGA claims is significant, and it will be
21 distributed in accordance with and in fulfillment of the objectives of the PAGA statute.

22 4. The Scope of the Release is Narrowly Tailored

23 As discussed above, the California Supreme Court has concluded that in the context of PAGA
24 “the nonparty employees, because they were not given notice of the action or afforded any opportunity
25 to be heard, would not be bound by the judgment as to remedies other than civil penalties.” (*See Arias*,
26 46 Cal. 4th, at 987). Thus, the scope of the limited release provided in exchange for the foregoing
27 consideration is limited to the civil penalties asserted in the PAGA Letter and only to the extent that
28 they are alleged in the Operative Complaint, under California Labor Code §§ 2698 *et seq.* (*See*

1 Settlement Agreement, at ¶ 6).

2 As such, this factor balances strongly in favor of approval of the Agreement.

3 5. Experience and Views of Counsel Favor Approval

4 Plaintiff's Counsel is experienced in complex representative and class action wage-and-hour
5 litigation. (Rose Decl., ¶ 51). In the view of Plaintiff's Counsel, the benefits conferred by the
6 Agreement are eminently fair and reasonable, and in the best interests of the State of California and
7 the Aggrieved Employees in light of the risk, delay, and uncertainty of continued litigation and the
8 substantial monetary benefits provided for by the Agreement. (Rose Decl., ¶ 46). Furthermore, courts
9 have acknowledged that "the interests of a plaintiff, counsel, and other potentially aggrieved
10 employees are largely aligned. All stand to gain from proving as convincingly as possible as many
11 Labor Code violations as the evidence will sustain[.]" (*Williams v. Superior Court*, 3 Cal. 5th 531,
12 548 (2017) [citing Labor Code § 2699(g)(1)(i)]).

13 6. The Extent of Discovery and Stage of Proceedings Favor Approval

14 In evaluating this element, the Court should be mindful that "formal discovery is not a
15 necessary ticket to the bargaining table" [*Linney v. Cellular Alaska P'ship*, 151 F.3d 1234, 1239], as
16 the relevant consideration is "whether 'the parties have sufficient information to make an informed
17 decision about settlement.'" (*See Sandoval v. Roadlink United States Pac., Inc.*, 2011 U.S. Dist.
18 LEXIS 130378, at 26 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011)).

19 Here, the extent of informal discovery conducted was sufficient to enable Plaintiff's Counsel
20 to evaluate the strength and value of the PAGA claims for purposes of settlement. (Rose Decl., ¶ 47).
21 Prior to mediation, Defendant provided Plaintiff with data, information, and documents relating to the
22 underlying alleged violations, including, but not limited to, Plaintiff's employee file, all of the
23 Aggrieved Employees' time and payroll data, Defendant's employee handbook and time and pay
24 policies from February 28, 2023 to February 28, 2025, and Aggrieved Employees' data points. (*Id.*, ¶
25 9). As discussed above, Plaintiff's Counsel's investigation was sufficient to, among other things,
26 tabulate with precision the total number of alleged California Labor Code violations at issue during
27 the relevant statutory period and identify the total number of individuals falling within the definition
28 of "Aggrieved Employees" for the relevant statutory period. (*Ibid.*).

1 Based on Plaintiff's Counsel's experience litigating wage and hour claims, such investigation
2 was sufficient to determine the potential value of the PAGA claims, and to evaluate the strength of
3 these claims for purposes of settlement. (*Id.*, ¶ 10).

4 **VI. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES ARE FAIR AND REASONABLE**

5 As the prevailing party in settlement, Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys' fees and costs
6 for bringing her PAGA claims. (Lab. Code § 2699(k) ["Any employee who prevails in any action
7 shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs."]). Plaintiff's Counsel is also
8 entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5(a), as the instant action
9 has resulted in the enforcement of important rights benefitting the public and secures monetary
10 recovery for the State of California as well as the Aggrieved Employees. A fee award is justified
11 where the legal action has produced its benefits by way of a voluntary settlement. (*See, e.g., Maria P.*
12 *v. Riles*, 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1290-91 (1987); *Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo*,
13 33 Cal.3d 348, 352-53 (1983); *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 34 (1977) ["when a number of persons
14 are entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff ... for the benefit of all
15 results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff ... may be awarded attorney's fees out
16 of the fund."]).

17 In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc.*, 1 Cal.5th 480, 506 (2016), the California Supreme Court
18 confirmed that "[t]he percentage of fund method survives in California class action cases."
19 Specifically, the *Laffitte* Court held:

20 The recognized advantages of the percentage method-including relative ease of calculation,
21 alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better approximation of market
22 conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early
23 settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation-convince us the percentage
24 method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.
(*Id.*, at 503 [internal citation omitted]).

25 While trial courts have discretion to apply either a lodestar method or percentage-of-the-fund
26 method, the California Supreme Court has taken the position that trial courts also "retain the discretion
27 to forgo a lodestar cross-check and use other means to evaluate the reasonableness of a requested
28 percentage fee." (*Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th at 506; *see also Wershba*, 91 Cal.App. 4th at 253). Courts award
fees to serve as an economic incentive for lawyers to undertake litigation, and thereby enhance and

1 facilitate access to the judicial system for adjudication of meritorious claims, and to deter wrongdoing.
2 This is especially true in situations where multiple similar alleged wrongs would not be economically
3 feasible to pursue individually, such as here. Trial courts have “wide latitude” in assessing the value
4 of attorneys’ fees and their decisions will “not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of
5 discretion.” (*Lealao v. Beneficial Cal., Inc.*, 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 41 (2000); *see also Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th
6 at 506 [holding that “trial court did not abuse its discretion in using [the percentage of fund method],
7 in part to approve the fee request”]). Indeed, it is long settled that the “experienced trial judge is the
8 best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (*Ketchum v. Moses*, 24 Cal.4th
9 1122, 1132 (2001)).

10 The percentage method is particularly appropriate where a monetary settlement has been
11 recovered and “the benefit [recovered can be] easily quantified.” (*In re Bluetooth Headset Prods.*
12 *Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011)). Where the amount of a settlement is a “certain or
13 easily calculable sum of money,” California courts may calculate attorneys’ fees as a reasonable
14 percentage of the settlement created. (Weil and Brown, California Practice Guide, *Civil Procedure*
15 *Before Trial*, Chapter 14, section 14:145; *Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1808). The percentage fee
16 method is preferred in representative actions because “it better approximates the workings of the
17 marketplace than the lodestar approach.” (*Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 49). California law
18 provides that the award for attorneys’ fees should be equivalent to fees freely negotiated in the legal
19 marketplace and paid in comparable litigation based on the result achieved and risk incurred. (*See*
20 *Lealao*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 47-50; *Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th 480 at 503). In cases where the settlement
21 agreement provides that the defendant will pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys a percentage of the fund created
22 by the settlement, use of that percentage method is appropriate. (*Lealao*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 32). Fee
23 awards that are too small will “chill the private enforcement essential to the vindication of many legal
24 rights and obstruct the representative actions that often relieve the courts of the need to separately
25 adjudicate numerous claims.” (*Id.* at 53). Therefore, fees in representative actions should approximate
26 the probable terms of a contingent fee contract negotiated by a sophisticated attorney and client in
27 comparable litigation. (*Id.* at 48). “The ultimate goal ... is the award of a ‘reasonable’ fee to
28 compensate counsel for their efforts, irrespective of the method of calculation.” (*Consumer Privacy*

1 Cases, 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557-58 (2009) [quoting *Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court*, *supra*,
2 126 Cal.App.4th at 1270]].

3 Plaintiff's Counsel's application for attorneys' fees in light of the facts and circumstances
4 surrounding the case is within the range of reasonableness. Historically, courts have awarded fees as
5 high as fifty percent (50%) of the settlement in complex actions, depending on the circumstances of
6 the case. (*See In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig.*, 526 F.Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1981) [awarding attorneys'
7 fees in the amount of 45% of the \$7.3 million total settlement amount]; *Beech Cinema, Inc. v.*
8 *Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp.* 480 F.Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) [awarding approximately 53%
9 of the settlement as attorneys' fees]).

10 Here, Plaintiff's Counsel's fee request of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement
11 Amount (i.e., \$54,250.00) is fair and reasonable based on the percentage of the recovery method.
12 Plaintiff's Counsel has vigorously litigated this case since it was commenced, with the very real
13 possibility of an unsuccessful outcome and no fee recovery of any kind. (Rose Decl., ¶ 48). Counsel
14 for Plaintiff undertook significant investigation and invested a significant amount of time analyzing
15 relevant documents and data to evaluate the nature and extent of the alleged underlying California
16 Labor Code violations and calculation of the potential monetary recovery as they relate to Plaintiff's
17 PAGA claims under PAGA. (Rose Decl., ¶¶ 51-52). Plaintiff's Counsel possesses combined
18 extensive experience litigating wage and hour and other complex litigation matters, and the attorneys
19 who worked on this matter have been approved as class counsel and/or have had their billable rates
20 approved in the settlement of other class and PAGA actions, numerous times. (*Ibid*).

21 In the present case, Plaintiff's Counsel has borne all of the risks and costs of litigation and will
22 not receive any compensation until recovery is obtained. (*Id.*, ¶ 49). Plaintiff's Counsel is
23 experienced in complex wage-and-hour litigation and used that experience to obtain a favorable result
24 for Plaintiff, the Aggrieved Employees, and the State of California. (*Ibid*). Considering the amount
25 of fees requested, work performed, risks incurred, and experience of Plaintiff's Counsel in handling
26 similar matters, Plaintiff maintains that the requested attorneys' fees of thirty-five percent (35%) of
27 the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., \$54,250.00) are reasonable and should be awarded. (*Ibid*).

28 ///

1 **VII. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' COSTS ARE FAIR AND REASONABLE**

2 The Agreement provides for reimbursement of actual litigation costs and expenses up to the
3 amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$25,000.00). (Rose Decl., ¶ 51; Settlement
4 Agreement, ¶ 3(a)(1)). Plaintiff's Counsel only seeks reimbursement of a total of Twenty Thousand
5 Three Hundred Thirty-Nine Dollars and Ninety-Seven Cents (\$20,339.97) in litigation costs and
6 expenses. (Rose Decl., ¶ 51 and Exh. 5). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Counsel respectfully requests that
7 the Court reimburse it for actual litigation costs and expenses in the amount of Twenty Thousand
8 Three Hundred Thirty-Nine Dollars and Ninety-Seven Cents (\$20,339.97).

9 **VIII. THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS ARE FAIR AND**
10 **REASONABLE**

11 As set forth in the Settlement Agreement, the Parties have agreed to retain, subject to approval
12 by the Court, Apex Class Action LLC to handle the administration of the Agreement. (Rose Decl., ¶
13 52; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3(a)(2)). The fees and expenses of the Administrator are estimated not
14 to exceed Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$5,000.00). (Rose Decl., ¶ 52; Settlement
15 Agreement, ¶ 3(a)(2)). These costs include, but are not limited to, expenses for preparing, printing,
16 and mailing the Cover Letter and Individual PAGA Payment checks to the Aggrieved Employees, re-
17 mailing the returned Individual PAGA Payment checks to any new addresses obtained, and handling
18 inquiries from Aggrieved Employees regarding the Agreement, among other things. (Rose Decl., ¶
19 52). Accordingly, the Court should grant approval of the Settlement Administration Costs in the
20 amount of *up to* Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$5,000.00) to Apex Class Action LLC, a
21 necessary third-party for handling the settlement process. (Ibid).

22 **IX. CONCLUSION**

23 For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant Plaintiff's
24 Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement and Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Settlement
25 Administration Costs and grant the relief requested herein.

26 Dated: August 12, 2025

Respectfully submitted,
BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

27 By: 
28 _____

Alexandra Rose
Attorneys for Plaintiff Anu Verma



Court Reservation Receipt

Reservation	
Reservation ID: 798652547329	Status: RESERVED
Reservation Type: Motion re: (Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement)	Number of Motions: 1
Case Number: 24STCV11344	Case Title: ANU VERMA , INDIVIDUALLY, et al. vs SINGERLEWAK LLP, A CALIFORNIA COMPANY
Filing Party: ANU VERMA , individually (Plaintiff)	Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 37
Date/Time: October 8th 2025, 8:30AM	Confirmation Code: CR-AIWQVDHUFWJMWUVXS

Fees			
Description	Fee	Qty	Amount
Motion re: (name extension)	0.00	1	0.00
TOTAL			\$0.00

Payment	
Amount: \$0.00	Type: NOFEE

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