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individually, and on behalf of Aggrieved
Employees pursuant to the California
Private Attorneys General Act

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

JOSHUA GILMORE, individually, and on behalf
of Aggrieved Employees pursuant to the
California Private Attorneys General Act,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

GOLDEN BOLT, LLC a California Limited
Liability Company; and DOES 1 through 25,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 24STCV11281

Honorable Theresa M. Traber
Department 1

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR APPROVAL OF PAGA
SETTLEMENT AND AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS,
ENHANCEMENT PAYMENT, AND
SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION
COSTS**

Date: March 5, 2026
Time: 10:30 a.m.
Department: 1

Complaint Filed: May 3, 2024
Trial Date: Not Set

1 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

2 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT** on March 5, 2026 at 10:30 a.m. in Department 1 of the
3 above-captioned Court located at the Spring Street Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles,
4 California 90012, Plaintiff Joshua Gilmore (“Plaintiff”) will and hereby does move the Court for an
5 Order granting approval of the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004,
6 California Labor Code sections 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”) settlement. Specifically, Plaintiff requests
7 that the Court enter an Order:

- 8 1. Granting approval pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(1)(2) of the Private
9 Attorneys General Act Settlement Agreement and Release (“Settlement,” “Agreement,”
10 or “Settlement Agreement”) attached as **Exhibit 2** to the Declaration of Alexandra Rose
11 in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Approval of Paga Settlement and Award of Attorneys’
12 Fees and Costs, Enhancement Payment, and Settlement Administration Costs (“Rose
13 Decl.”);
- 14 2. Directing the distribution of the Gross Settlement Amount of Two Hundred Sixty-Six
15 Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and Zero Cents (\$266,500.00) pursuant to the terms of
16 the Agreement;
- 17 3. Approving the Net Settlement Amount, estimated to be One Hundred Forty-Two
18 Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars and Twenty-Nine Cents (\$142,991.29), of
19 which seventy-five percent (75%) will be distributed to the California Labor and
20 Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and twenty-five percent (25%) of which will
21 be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees;
- 22 4. Approving an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees of thirty-five (35%) of the Gross
23 Settlement Amount (i.e., \$93,275.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$266,500.00) to
24 Plaintiff’s Counsel;
- 25 5. Approving the amount of Twenty-One Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars and
26 Seventy-One Cents (\$21,483.71) to Plaintiff’s Counsel for reimbursement of actual
27 litigation expenses payment pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(g)(1);

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Pursuant to the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code
4 sections 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”), Plaintiff Joshua Gilmore (“Plaintiff”) seeks approval of the Private
5 Attorneys General Act Settlement Agreement and Release (“Settlement,” “Agreement,” or
6 “Settlement Agreement”) entered into with Defendant Golden Bolt, LLC (“Defendant”) (together,
7 with Plaintiff, the “Parties”), which is attached as Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of Alexandra Rose in
8 Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement and Award of Attorneys’ Fees and
9 Costs, Enhancement Payment, and Settlement Administration Costs (“Rose Decl.”). The Agreement
10 terms are outlined as follows:

- 11 • Gross Settlement Amount: Two Hundred Sixty-Six Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and
12 Zero Cents (\$266,500.00).
- 13 • Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: Attorneys’ fees of thirty-five (35%) of the Gross Settlement
14 Amount (i.e., \$93,275.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$266,500.00) plus
15 reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses in the amount of Twenty-One Thousand
16 Four Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars and Seventy-One Cents (\$21,483.71), to be paid from
17 the Gross Settlement Amount.
- 18 • Enhancement Payment: Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$5,000.00) to Plaintiff,
19 to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
- 20 • Settlement Administration Costs: Up to Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars and
21 Zero Cents (\$3,750.00), to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
- 22 • Estimated Net Settlement Amount: One Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Nine Hundred
23 Ninety-Nine Dollars and Twenty-Nine Cents (\$142,991.29), of which 75% (\$107,243.47)
24 will be paid to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and
25 the remaining 25% (\$35,747.82) will be paid to the Aggrieved Employees.

26 As set forth herein, the Settlement Agreement is the product of informed discovery, arms-
27 length negotiations, and provides a fair, adequate, and reasonable recovery for the State of California
28 and Aggrieved Employees. Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests that the Court grant approval of
the proposed Settlement Agreement, among other requested relief.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant is a fulfillment and distribution company that operates as the logistics arm of Golden Hippo, a health and wellness brand collective. (Rose Decl., ¶ 2). Defendant manages the warehousing, packing, and shipping of various products, ensuring customers receive their Golden Hippo products. (Ibid). Defendant employed Plaintiff as an hourly-paid, non-exempt Rover from approximately July 2023 to approximately November 2023. (Rose Decl., ¶ 2; Declaration of Joshua Gilmore in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement and Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Enhancement Payment, and Settlement Administration Costs ["Gilmore Decl.,"] ¶ 2).

On February 27, 2024, Plaintiff provided written notice by electronic submission to the LWDA and by U.S. Certified Mail to Defendant, pursuant to California Labor Code § 2699.3, of the specific provisions of the California Labor Code alleged to have been violated ("PAGA Letter"). (Rose Decl., ¶ 3 and Exh. 1).

On February 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint in the action entitled *Josuha Gilmore v. Golden Bolt, LLC*, Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 24STCV05199 ("Class Action") thereby commencing a putative class action against Defendant. (*Id.*, ¶ 4).

On May 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Enforcement Action Under the Private Attorneys General Act, Cal. Labor Code §§ 2698 *Et Seq.* ("Operative Complaint") in the action entitled *Josuha Gilmore v. Golden Bolt, LLC*, Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 24STCV11281 ("Action"). (*Id.*, ¶ 5). The Operative Complaint asserts a single cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA for violations of multiple provisions of the California Labor Code and the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders. (Ibid).

On January 23, 2025, pursuant to the joint stipulation of the Parties, Plaintiff's individual claims in the Class Action were ordered to arbitration and the class claims in the Class Action were dismissed without prejudice. (*Id.*, ¶ 6).

On July 9, 2025, the Parties participated in a formal mediation conducted by Todd Smith, Esq., a neutral and respected mediator with extensive experience in complex wage and hour matters, during which the Parties were ultimately able to reach an agreement to resolve the Action in its entirety. (*Id.*, ¶ 7).

1 On December 17, 2025, the Parties executed the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, ¶ 8 and Exh. 2).

2 During the course of informal discovery in the Action, Plaintiff's Counsel conducted an intense
3 investigation into the facts of the Action. (*Id.*, ¶ 9). This included obtaining data, information, and
4 documents relating to the underlying alleged violations, including, but not limited to, Plaintiff's
5 employee file, a sampling of Aggrieved Employees' time and payroll data, Defendant's wage and hour
6 policies, and Aggrieved Employees' data points so that Plaintiff could assess the number of alleged
7 potential violations and value of the recoverable penalties, as well as evaluate the strengths and
8 weaknesses of his claims. (*Ibid.*).

9 Based on the data, information, and documents received, as well as thorough discussions with
10 Defendant's counsel, Plaintiff's Counsel was able to (i) determine the total number of distinct
11 individuals falling within the definition of "Aggrieved Employees" for the relevant statutory period,
12 (ii) the number of affected pay periods at issue among them, and (iii) construct a damages model that
13 calculated the maximum realistic amount of PAGA penalties that could be levied against Defendant
14 within the relevant statutory period. (*Id.*, ¶ 10). Defendant, however, disputed Plaintiff's claims and
15 disputed both the existence of and extent of liability as alleged by Plaintiff, which allowed Plaintiff's
16 Counsel to further assess the strength of Plaintiff's claims. (*Ibid.*). Plaintiff's Counsel's experience in
17 litigating similar representative wage and hour claims, the degree of investigation that was conducted
18 here, and the amount of data, information, and documents that was obtained, was sufficient to
19 determine the potential value of the PAGA claims, and to evaluate the strength of these claims for
20 purposes of settlement. (*Ibid.*).

21 The Parties believe the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (*Id.*, ¶ 11).
22 The Parties understand, acknowledge, and agree that the Settlement Agreement constitutes a
23 compromise of Plaintiff's PAGA claims, and that it is the desire and intention of the Parties to affect
24 a final and complete resolution of the Action. (*Ibid.*).

25 Defendant denies all of the claims in the Action, and does not waive, but rather expressly
26 reserves, all rights to challenge all such claims and allegations upon all legal, procedural, and factual
27 grounds should the Settlement Agreement not become final. (*Id.*, ¶ 12). The Settlement Agreement
28 reflects a compromise reached to end litigation in the Action. (*Ibid.*). Following significant

investigation and extensive settlement negotiations, Plaintiff now seeks approval of the proposed Settlement Agreement, which will resolve all representative claims alleged in the Action. (Ibid).

III. THE SETTLEMENT TERMS

A. Definition of the Aggrieved Employees

For purposes of settlement only, the Parties have agreed that the “Aggrieved Employees” shall be defined as “all current and former hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in the State of California at any time during the PAGA Period.” (Rose Decl., ¶ 14; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3(a)(5)). The “PAGA Period” is the period from February 27, 2023 through August 15, 2025. (Rose Decl., ¶ 14; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3(a)(5)). There are approximately one hundred fifteen (115) Aggrieved Employees who worked approximately five thousand four hundred twenty-nine (5,429) pay periods for Defendant during the PAGA Period (“Pay Periods”).¹ (Rose Decl., ¶ 14; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 5(b)).

B. Amount of Settlement

The Parties have agreed to settle the PAGA claims at issue in the Action for a non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of Two Hundred Sixty-Six Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and Zero Cents (\$266,500.00). (Rose Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3(a)).

C. Allocation and Funding of the Gross Settlement Amount

The Gross Settlement Amount is a common fund and therefore includes all requested costs, fees, and other allocations. (Rose Decl., ¶ 15). The Gross Settlement Amount includes: (1) counsel’s fees in the amount of thirty-five (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., \$93,275.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$266,500.00); (2) counsel’s actual litigation costs and expenses in the amount of Twenty-One Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars and Seventy-One Cents (\$21,483.71); (3) Enhancement Payment in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$5,000.00) to Plaintiff; and (4) Settlement Administration Costs, not to exceed Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars and Zero Cents (\$3,750.00). (Rose Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 3(a), 3(a)(1) – 3(a)(3)).

¹ At the time of this filing, Defendant has represented that there are 5,429 Pay Periods. Accordingly, the escalator clause in Section 3(a)(6) of the Settlement Agreement has not been triggered.

After the above-estimated amounts are deducted from the Gross Settlement Amount, the Net Settlement Amount will amount to approximately One Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars and Twenty-Nine Cents (\$142,991.29), of which seventy-five percent (75%), or One Hundred Seven Thousand Two Hundred Forty-Three Dollars and Forty-Seven Cents (\$107,243.47), will be paid to the LWDA (“LWDA Payment”), and twenty-five percent (25%), or Thirty-Five Thousand Seven Hundred Forty-Seven Dollars and Eighty-Two Cents (\$35,747.82) (“Employees’ Portion”), will be distributed and paid to Aggrieved Employees on a *pro rata* basis based upon their number of Pay Periods. (Rose Decl., ¶ 16; Settlement Agreement ¶ 3(a)(5)).

If the actual number of Pay Periods is more than five percent (5%) above 5,330, then the Gross Settlement Amount will be increased on a *pro rata* basis equal to the percentage increase in the number of Pay Periods worked by the Aggrieved Employees above 5% (i.e., if the number of Pay Periods increased by 6%, then the Gross Settlement Amount will increase by 1%).² (Rose Decl., ¶ 17; Settlement Agreement ¶ 3(a)(6)).

No later than fourteen (14) calendar days after the Court’s order granting approval of the Settlement, Defendant will deliver a list to the Settlement Administrator, containing each Aggrieved Employee’s: (i) first and last name; (ii) last known address; (iii) last known telephone number; (iv) Social Security number; and (v) dates worked during the PAGA Period (collectively, “Aggrieved Employees List”). (Rose Decl., ¶ 18; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 5(c)(1)).

No later than twenty-one (21) calendar days after the Court’s order granting approval of the Settlement, Defendant will fully fund the Gross Settlement Amount by transmitting the funds to a qualified settlement account established by the Settlement Administrator. (Rose Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 5(a)). If the date by which payment by Defendant is due falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday in the State of California, then the due date shall be extended to the next following day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday in the State of California. (Rose Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 5(a)).

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² See the escalator clause in Section 3(a)(6) of the Settlement Agreement.

1 No later than seven (7) calendar days of receiving the Aggrieved Employees List and Gross
2 Settlement Amount, the Settlement Administrator will distribute the Individual PAGA Payments along
3 with a cover letter (“Cover Letter”) to Aggrieved Employees, the LWDA Payment to the LWDA, the
4 Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff, the Attorneys’ Fees and Costs to Plaintiff’s Counsel, and the
5 Settlement Administration Costs to itself. (Rose Decl., ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 5(c)(3), 5(c)(5)
6 – 5(c)(8)).

7 Each Individual PAGA Payment check will be valid and negotiable for one hundred and eighty
8 (180) calendar days from the date the checks are issued, and thereafter, will be canceled. (Rose Decl.,
9 ¶ 21; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 5(c)(4)). Any funds associated with such canceled checks will be
10 distributed by the Settlement Administrator to the State Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property
11 Division in the name of the Aggrieved Employee at issue and the amount of their Individual PAGA
12 Payment(s). (Rose Decl., ¶ 21; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 5(c)(4)).

13 **IV. STANDARD FOR APPROVAL OF PAGA SETTLEMENT**

14 The settlement of a PAGA claim requires court approval. (California Labor Code (“Lab.
15 Code”) § 2699(1)). The Court must be mindful that a “[s]ettlement is a compromise, which balances
16 the possible recovery against the risks inherent in litigating further.” (*In re TD Ameritrade Account*
17 *Holder Litig.*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103222 at *24 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 12, 2011)). “[T]he very essence
18 of a settlement is ... ‘a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes,’” as “it is the very
19 uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of wasteful and expensive litigation that induce
20 consensual settlements.” (*Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com.*, 688 F.2d 615, 624-26 (9th Cir.
21 1982)). As such, “the settlement or fairness hearing is not to be turned into a trial or rehearsal for trial
22 on the merits,” or “judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been
23 achieved.” (*Ibid.*).

24 Although the California Labor Code does not set forth the criteria by which a PAGA settlement
25 is to be evaluated, it is presumed that a reviewing court may take into consideration some of the factors
26 that courts use when reviewing a class action settlement. However, “a PAGA claim asserted on a non-
27 class representative basis...is not considered a class action but a law enforcement action, and therefore
28 does not have to meet the requirements of [a class action].” (*Casida v. Sears Holdings Corp.*, 2012

1 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9302 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2012)).

2 A court's review of a PAGA settlement necessarily implicates the following unique features
3 that render the approval process distinct from approval of a class action settlement under Code of Civil
4 Procedure Section 382 and California Rules of Court Rule 3.769. First, in evaluating the adequacy of
5 the settlement amount, the Court's focus is not concerned with the amount aggrieved employees are
6 to receive, but rather, must focus on the total settlement amount in achieving PAGA's objective.
7 Indeed, "[t]he remedy sought in a PAGA suit consists of civil penalties, not individual or class
8 damages," and while a "[PAGA] action is ... designed to protect the public and penalize the employer
9 for past illegal conduct," a reviewing court must be mindful of the fact that settlement of a PAGA
10 claim involves a compromise. (*Mendez v. Tween Brands, Inc.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66454 at *11
11 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2010)). "Unlike class actions, these civil penalties are not meant to compensate
12 unnamed employees because the action is fundamentally a law enforcement action." (*Ochoa-*
13 *Hernandez v. Cjaders Foods, Inc.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32774 at *12 (Apr. 2, 2010)). The Court
14 should not lose sight of the fact that, "[u]nlike a class action seeking damages or injunctive relief for
15 injured employees, the purpose of PAGA is to incentivize private parties to recover civil penalties for
16 the government that otherwise may not have been assessed and collected by overburdened state
17 enforcement agencies." (*Ibid*).

18 Second, consistent with the fact that unnamed employees have no property interest in a PAGA
19 claim, "[u]nnamed employees need not be given notice of the PAGA claim, nor do they have the
20 ability to opt-out of the representative PAGA claim." (*Ochoa-Hernandez*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21 32774 at *13). Indeed, "[PAGA] does not create property rights or any other substantive rights" as
22 "[i]t is simply a procedural statute allowing an aggrieved employees to recover civil penalties – for
23 Labor Code violations – that otherwise would be sought by state labor law enforcement agencies."
24 (*Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Sup. Ct.*, 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003 (2009)). This
25 renders the approval process of a PAGA settlement distinct from a class action settlement, as there is
26 no need for the Court to employ the "two-step approval process" required under California Rules of
27 Court Rule 3.769.

28 ///

1 Finally, unlike class action settlements, the scope of release permitted in a PAGA settlement
2 is limited. While “judgment in [a PAGA] action is binding not only on the named employee plaintiff
3 but also on government agencies and any aggrieved employee not a party to the proceeding...the
4 nonparty employees, because they were not given notice of the action or afforded any opportunity to
5 be heard, would not be bound by the judgment as to remedies other than civil penalties.” (*Arias v.*
6 *Sup. Ct.*, 46 Cal.4th 969, 985-87 (2009)). Thus, the scope of a release in a PAGA settlement is
7 confined to the PAGA penalties alleged in the complaint and/or the plaintiff’s notice to the LWDA
8 and to the claims that were, or could have been, alleged pursuant to PAGA based on the factual
9 allegations in the complaint and/or the plaintiff’s notice to the LWDA. In the case at hand, as the only
10 claims at issue are PAGA claims, those will be the only claims extinguished through the Settlement.

11 **V. THE AGREEMENT IS FAIR AND SHOULD BE APPROVED**

12 **A. The Agreement is Presumed to Be Fair**

13 California courts recognize that “a presumption of fairness exists where . . . [a] settlement is
14 reached through arm’s-length bargaining.” (*Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224,
15 245 (2001); *see also Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC*, 175 Cal. App. 4th 785, 799 (2009)). Here,
16 the Agreement is presumptively fair because: (1) it occurred after counsel for the Parties engaged in
17 significant investigation to evaluate the strength and potential value of the PAGA claims, and the risks
18 of litigating these claims through trial; and (2) it was negotiated at great length and effort by counsel
19 with significant experience in similar complex labor and employment matters. (Rose Decl., ¶ 22).

20 **B. The Agreement is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’ Respective** 21 **Legal Positions and Recovery Risks**

22 In deciding whether to approve a proposed settlement, a trial court has broad powers to
23 determine if it is fair given the circumstances of the case. (*Mallick v. Sup. Ct.*, 89 Cal.App.3d 434,
24 438 (1979)). In exercising these powers, the overriding concern is to ensure that a proposed settlement
25 is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801 (internal quotations omitted)). A
26 settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at trial, nor
27 does the settlement have to obtain one hundred percent of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
28 (*Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 246, 250). In evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement, a trial court

1 must consider “the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of
2 further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in
3 settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and
4 views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to
5 the proposed settlement.”³ (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008)).
6 Even though a *Kullar* analysis is not required for approval of a PAGA settlement, a brief analysis is
7 included to support approval of the Settlement Agreement. (*See* Rose Decl., ¶¶ 29-42).

8 These factors require balancing and are non-exhaustive. Trial courts should therefore tailor
9 the factors to each case and give due regard to “what is otherwise a private consensual agreement
10 between the parties.” (*Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1801).

11 1. Strength of Plaintiff’s Case

12 In order to prevail at trial, Plaintiff would have to prove violations of the California Labor
13 Code underlying his PAGA claims, demonstrate that Aggrieved Employees suffered, and demonstrate
14 that Defendant’s conduct gives rise to penalties. (*See Elliot v. Spherion Pac. Work, LLC*, 572
15 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1181-82 (C.D. Cal. 2008) [“Plaintiff’s claim under [PAGA] is wholly dependent
16 upon his other claims. Because all of Plaintiff’s other claims fail as a matter of law, so does his PAGA
17 claim.”]).

18 Here, Plaintiff’s core allegations are that Defendant systematically violated the California
19 Labor Code by, *inter alia*, failing to properly pay all overtime wages and minimum wages for all hours
20 worked, failing to provide all meal and rest breaks, failing to timely pay all wages upon termination
21 of employment, failing to provide accurate wage statements, failing to keep accurate employment
22 records, failing to reimburse necessary business-related expenses, and failing to adhere to other related
23 protections afforded by the California Labor Code and applicable Industrial Welfare Commission
24 Wage Order. (Rose Decl., ¶ 23).

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28 ³ As this is not a class action, the *Kullar* factors pertaining to the risk of maintaining class action status through trial and the reaction of class members to the proposed settlement are inapplicable.

1 Defendant maintained several defenses to Plaintiff's theories of liability, which, if successfully
2 argued and proven, had the potential to eliminate or substantially reduce recovery. (*Id.*, ¶ 24).
3 Throughout this litigation, Defendant maintained, and continues to maintain, that it had, and continues
4 to have, compliant employment policies and practices throughout the time period at issue. (*Ibid.*).
5 Defendant denies that it ever violated any provision of the California Labor Code, including, but not
6 limited to, those sections for which Plaintiff seeks penalties under PAGA. (*Ibid.*). Defendant further
7 denies, and continues to deny, that the lawsuit is appropriate for representative treatment for any
8 purpose other than settlement. (*Ibid.*). Defendant also challenged Plaintiff's standing as an aggrieved
9 employee and denied that any of Defendant's other employees whom Plaintiff seeks to represent are
10 aggrieved. (*Ibid.*).

11 Defendant also argued that an important feature of PAGA is that the Court retains discretion
12 to lower the penalties if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise
13 would result in an award that is "unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory." (*Ibid.*; Lab. Code
14 § 2699(e)(2); *see also Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.*, 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1136
15 (2012) [holding that a court may reduce the amount of PAGA penalties awarded to an employee based
16 upon discretionary factors]).

17 Even if violations of the California Labor Code occurred, which Defendant denies, Defendant
18 contended that said violations would only be considered "initial violations" and thus heightened
19 "subsequent violation" penalties were not warranted. (Rose Decl., ¶ 25; Lab. Code § 2699(f)(2); *see*
20 *also Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2*, 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1208-09 (2008) ["Until the employer has
21 been notified that it is violating a Labor Code provision [...], the employer cannot be presumed to be
22 aware that its continuing underpayment of employees is a 'violation' subject to penalties."]).

23 Defendant also contended that, with respect to PAGA claims, the Court was unlikely to assess
24 cumulative penalties for the maximum number of possible, separate California Labor Code violations,
25 because it would be unjust, arbitrary, oppressive, and/or confiscatory, especially where certain conduct
26 may be regulated by multiple provisions of the California Labor Code that are interrelated and work
27 in tandem. (Rose Decl., ¶ 26). While the PAGA does provide the potential for a heightened penalty
28 for subsequent violations, courts are often hesitant to award a heightened penalty where there is no

1 prior citation by the Labor Commissioner, as is the case here. (*See Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc.*, 3
2 F.4th 1127, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding no heightened penalty where defendant was not notified by
3 Labor Commissioner or any court that it was subject to the California Labor Code)). The Ninth
4 Circuit’s holding in *Bernstein* also supports that a settlement valuation that does not “stack” penalties.
5 (Ibid).

6 While Plaintiff maintains that his PAGA claims have merit, in reaching the Agreement,
7 Plaintiff and his counsel took into account the strengths and weaknesses of each side’s position, and
8 the uncertainty of how the case might have concluded as litigation continued, at trial, and/or upon
9 appeal. (Rose Decl., ¶ 27). Based on these disputes, which had the potential to completely eliminate
10 Plaintiff’s recovery, the range of realistic “litigation outcomes” on Plaintiff’s PAGA claims was
11 defined by a “maximum possible liability” amount of approximately \$533,000 and a “risk-adjusted
12 realistic value” amount of approximately \$299,813. (*Id.*, ¶ 42). In light thereof, the Gross Settlement
13 Amount of \$266,500 is a significant settlement. (Ibid).

14 2. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

15 Approval of the Settlement Agreement is also appropriate in light of the risk, expense, and
16 complexity of further litigation. As discussed above, the Settlement Agreement takes into
17 consideration the specific factual and legal hurdles faced by Plaintiff in establishing Defendant’s
18 penalty-liability in this case, which may have resulted in a net-zero recovery. Any recovery on these
19 claims is not certain. And even when liability is found, PAGA claims are discretionary, such that the
20 Court could decline to award their full value. Some of Plaintiff’s claims are also derivative, and as
21 such, Plaintiff must prevail on his underlying California Labor Code claims in order to prevail on the
22 derivative claims. These risks – when balanced with the fact that the Agreement achieved a very
23 significant recovery (as demonstrated below), and that further litigation posed a risk of diminishing
24 such recovery by increasing litigation expenses – weigh strongly in favor of settlement approval.

25 3. The Benefits Conferred by the Agreement Balance in Favor of Approval

26 The Settlement Agreement provides a *significant* monetary benefit that falls well within the
27 range of an acceptable settlement under the circumstances, which is the standard on which the instant
28 Agreement must be judged. As held by the Ninth Circuit: “The proposed settlement is not to be judged

1 against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved by the negotiators.”
2 (*Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n*, 688 F.2d at 625 (emphasis in original)). As the Second
3 Circuit has pointed out: “The fact that a proposed settlement may only amount to a fraction of the
4 potential recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate
5 and should be disapproved.” (*City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.*, 495 F.2d 448, 455 & n.2 (2nd Cir.
6 1974)).

7 The Net Settlement Amount is currently estimated to be One Hundred Forty-Two Thousand
8 Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars and Twenty-Nine Cents (\$142,991.29). (Rose Decl., ¶ 43). After
9 all deductions are made from the Gross Settlement Amount for the Attorneys’ Fees and Costs,
10 Enhancement Payment, and Settlement Administration Costs, One Hundred Seven Thousand Two
11 Hundred Forty-Three Dollars and Forty-Seven Cents (\$107,243.47) (i.e. 75% of the Net Settlement
12 Amount) will go to the LWDA, and Thirty-Five Thousand Seven Hundred Forty-Seven Dollars and
13 Eighty-Two Cents (\$35,747.82) (i.e. 25% of the Net Settlement Amount) will go to the Aggrieved
14 Employees, as required by California Labor Code § 2699(i) in effect at the time of this matter (“civil
15 penalties recovered by aggrieved employees shall be distributed as follows: 75 percent to the Labor
16 and Workforce Development Agency . . . and 25 percent to the aggrieved employees.”). (Rose Decl.,
17 ¶ 43). There is no reason to doubt the fairness of the proposed plan of allocation of the Net Settlement
18 Amount as it fully complies with California Labor Code section 2699(i). (Ibid).

19 The Settlement Agreement is a compromise of highly disputed claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 44). Plaintiff
20 and his counsel recognize the expense and length of continued proceedings necessary to litigate the
21 matter through trial and any possible appeals. (Ibid). Plaintiff and his counsel have also taken into
22 account the uncertainty and risk of the outcome of further litigation, and the difficulties and delays
23 inherent in such litigation. (Ibid). Plaintiff and his counsel are also aware of the burdens of proof
24 necessary to establish liability, both generally and in response to Defendant’s defenses thereto, and
25 the difficulties in establishing Defendant’s liability for, and the right to recover, penalties on behalf of
26 Plaintiff, the State of California, and other Aggrieved Employees. (Ibid). Plaintiff and his counsel
27 have also taken into account Defendant’s agreement to enter into a settlement that confers significant
28 relief upon the Aggrieved Employees and the State of California. (Ibid). Considering all of the facts

1 in this case, Plaintiff and his counsel have determined that the Agreement represents a fair, adequate,
2 and reasonable resolution of the PAGA claims, and that it is in the best interests of the Aggrieved
3 Employees and the State of California. (Ibid).

4 The result achieved in this case is well within the range of what is considered an acceptable
5 settlement under the circumstances, especially when compared to the settlement of PAGA claims in
6 other cases. (*Id.*, ¶ 45). (*See, e.g., DCH Auto Wage and Hour Cases*, Los Angeles Superior Court,
7 Case No. JCCP4833 (May 2017) [approving \$15,000 out of \$4 million toward settlement of PAGA
8 claims]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160052, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29,
9 2012) [approving \$10,000 out of \$3.7 million toward settlement of PAGA claims]; *Schiller v. David's*
10 *Bridal, Inc.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80776, at *40 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2012) [approving \$7,500 out of
11 \$518,245 toward settlement of PAGA claims]; *Chu v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC*, 2011 U.S. Dist.
12 LEXIS 15821, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011) (approving \$10,000 out of \$6.9 million toward
13 settlement of PAGA claims]; *Franco v. Ruiz Food Prods.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169057, at *14
14 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2021) [approving \$10,000 out of \$2.5 million toward settlement of PAGA
15 claims]). Here, the value obtained for settlement of the PAGA claims is significant, and it will be
16 distributed in accordance with and in fulfillment of the objectives of the PAGA statute.

17 4. The Scope of the Release is Narrowly Tailored

18 As discussed above, the California Supreme Court has concluded that in the context of PAGA
19 “the nonparty employees, because they were not given notice of the action or afforded any opportunity
20 to be heard, would not be bound by the judgment as to remedies other than civil penalties.” (*See Arias*,
21 46 Cal. 4th, at 987). Thus, the scope of the limited release provided in exchange for the foregoing
22 consideration is limited to the civil penalties asserted in the Operative Complaint and the PAGA Letter,
23 under California Labor Code §§ 2698 *et seq.* (*See Settlement Agreement*, at ¶ 6(a)).

24 As such, this factor balances strongly in favor of approval of the Agreement.

25 5. Experience and Views of Counsel Favor Approval

26 Plaintiff's Counsel is experienced in complex representative and class action wage-and-hour
27 litigation. (Rose Decl., ¶ 51). In the view of Plaintiff's Counsel, the benefits conferred by the
28 Agreement are eminently fair and reasonable, and in the best interests of the State of California and

1 the Aggrieved Employees in light of the risk, delay, and uncertainty of continued litigation and the
2 substantial monetary benefits provided for by the Agreement. (*Id.*, ¶ 46). Furthermore, courts have
3 acknowledged that “the interests of a plaintiff, counsel, and other potentially aggrieved employees are
4 largely aligned. All stand to gain from proving as convincingly as possible as many Labor Code
5 violations as the evidence will sustain[.]” (*Williams v. Superior Court*, 3 Cal. 5th 531, 548 (2017)
6 [citing Labor Code § 2699(g)(1)(i)]).

7 6. The Extent of Discovery and Stage of Proceedings Favor Approval

8 In evaluating this element, the Court should be mindful that “‘formal discovery is not a
9 necessary ticket to the bargaining table’” [*Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship*, 151 F.3d 1234, 1239], as
10 the relevant consideration is “whether ‘the parties have sufficient information to make an informed
11 decision about settlement.’” (*See Sandoval v. Roadlink United States Pac., Inc.*, 2011 U.S. Dist.
12 LEXIS 130378, at 26 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011)).

13 Here, the extent of informal discovery conducted was sufficient to enable Plaintiff’s Counsel
14 to evaluate the strength and value of the PAGA claims for purposes of settlement. (Rose Decl., ¶ 47).
15 Prior to mediation, Defendant provided Plaintiff with data, information, and documents relating to the
16 underlying alleged violations, including, but not limited to, Plaintiff’s employee file, a sampling of
17 Aggrieved Employees’ time and payroll data, Defendant’s wage and hour policies, and Aggrieved
18 Employees’ data points so that Plaintiff could assess the number of alleged potential violations and
19 value of the recoverable penalties, as well as evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of his claims. (*Id.*,
20 ¶ 9). As discussed above, Plaintiff’s Counsel’s investigation was sufficient to, among other things,
21 tabulate with precision the total number of alleged California Labor Code violations at issue during
22 the relevant statutory period and identify the total number of individuals falling within the definition
23 of “Aggrieved Employees” for the relevant statutory period. (*Id.*, ¶ 10).

24 Based on Plaintiff’s Counsel’s experience litigating wage and hour claims, such investigation
25 was sufficient to determine the potential value of the PAGA claims, and to evaluate the strength of
26 these claims for purposes of settlement. (*Ibid.*).

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1 **VI. THE REQUESTED FEES PAYMENT IS FAIR AND REASONABLE**

2 As the prevailing party in settlement, Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for bringing
3 his PAGA claims. (Lab. Code § 2699(k) [“Any employee who prevails in any action shall be entitled
4 to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.”]). Plaintiff’s Counsel is also entitled to attorneys’
5 fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5(a), as the instant action has resulted in the
6 enforcement of important rights benefitting the public and secures monetary recovery for the State of
7 California as well as the Aggrieved Employees. A fee award is justified where the legal action has
8 produced its benefits by way of a voluntary settlement. (*See, e.g., Maria P. v. Riles*, 43 Cal.3d 1281,
9 1290-91 (1987); *Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo*, 33 Cal.3d 348, 352-53
10 (1983); *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 34 (1977) [“when a number of persons are entitled in common
11 to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff ... for the benefit of all results in the creation or
12 preservation of that fund, such plaintiff ... may be awarded attorney’s fees out of the fund.”]).

13 In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc.*, 1 Cal.5th 480, 506 (2016), the California Supreme Court
14 confirmed that “[t]he percentage of fund method survives in California class action cases.”
15 Specifically, the *Laffitte* Court held:

16 The recognized advantages of the percentage method-including relative ease of calculation,
17 alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better approximation of market
18 conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early
19 settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation-convince us the percentage
20 method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.

21 (*Id.*, at 503 [internal citation omitted]).

22 While trial courts have discretion to apply either a lodestar method or percentage-of-the-fund
23 method, the California Supreme Court has taken the position that trial courts also “retain the discretion
24 to forgo a lodestar cross-check and use other means to evaluate the reasonableness of a requested
25 percentage fee.” (*Lafitte*, 1 Cal.5th at 506; *see also Wershba*, 91 Cal.App. 4th at 253). Courts award
26 fees to serve as an economic incentive for lawyers to undertake litigation, and thereby enhance and
27 facilitate access to the judicial system for adjudication of meritorious claims, and to deter wrongdoing.
28 This is especially true in situations where multiple similar alleged wrongs would not be economically

feasible to pursue individually, such as here. Trial courts have “wide latitude” in assessing the value of attorneys’ fees and their decisions will “not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” (*Lealao v. Beneficial Cal., Inc.*, 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 41 (2000); *see also Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th at 506 [holding that “trial court did not abuse its discretion in using [the percentage of fund method], in part to approve the fee request”]). Indeed, it is long settled that the “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (*Ketchum v. Moses*, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 (2001)).

The percentage method is particularly appropriate where a monetary settlement has been recovered and “the benefit [recovered can be] easily quantified.” (*In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011)). Where the amount of a settlement is a “certain or easily calculable sum of money,” California courts may calculate attorneys’ fees as a reasonable percentage of the settlement created. (Weil and Brown, California Practice Guide, *Civil Procedure Before Trial*, Chapter 14, section 14:145; *Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1808). The percentage fee method is preferred in representative actions because “it better approximates the workings of the marketplace than the lodestar approach.” (*Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 49). California law provides that the award for attorneys’ fees should be equivalent to fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace and paid in comparable litigation based on the result achieved and risk incurred. (*See Lealao*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 47-50; *Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th 480 at 503). In cases where the settlement agreement provides that the defendant will pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys a percentage of the fund created by the settlement, use of that percentage method is appropriate. (*Lealao*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 32). Fee awards that are too small will “chill the private enforcement essential to the vindication of many legal rights and obstruct the representative actions that often relieve the courts of the need to separately adjudicate numerous claims.” (*Id.* at 53). Therefore, fees in representative actions should approximate the probable terms of a contingent fee contract negotiated by a sophisticated attorney and client in comparable litigation. (*Id.* at 48). “The ultimate goal ... is the award of a ‘reasonable’ fee to compensate counsel for their efforts, irrespective of the method of calculation.” (*Consumer Privacy Cases*, 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557-58 (2009) [quoting *Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra*, 126 Cal.App.4th at 1270]).

1 Plaintiff's Counsel's application for attorneys' fees in light of the facts and circumstances
2 surrounding the case is within the range of reasonableness. Historically, courts have awarded fees as
3 high as fifty percent (50%) of the settlement in complex actions, depending on the circumstances of
4 the case. (*See In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig.*, 526 F.Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1981) [awarding attorneys'
5 fees in the amount of 45% of the \$7.3 million total settlement amount]; *Beech Cinema, Inc. v.*
6 *Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp.* 480 F.Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) [awarding approximately 53%
7 of the settlement as attorneys' fees]).

8 Here, Plaintiff's Counsel's request of thirty-five (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e.,
9 \$93,275.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$266,500.00) is fair and reasonable based on the
10 percentage of the recovery method. Plaintiff's Counsel has vigorously litigated this case since it was
11 commenced, with the very real possibility of an unsuccessful outcome and no fee recovery of any
12 kind. (Rose Decl., ¶ 48). Counsel for Plaintiff undertook significant investigation and invested a
13 significant amount of time analyzing relevant documents and data to evaluate the nature and extent of
14 the alleged underlying California Labor Code violations and calculation of the potential monetary
15 recovery as they relate to Plaintiff's PAGA claims under PAGA. (*Id.*, ¶ 52). Plaintiff's Counsel
16 possesses combined extensive experience litigating wage and hour and other complex litigation
17 matters, and the attorneys who worked on this matter have been approved as class counsel in the
18 settlement of other class and PAGA actions, numerous times. (*Id.*, ¶ 51).

19 In the present case, Plaintiff's Counsel has borne all of the risks and costs of litigation and will
20 not receive any compensation until recovery is obtained. (*Id.*, ¶ 49). Plaintiff's Counsel is
21 experienced in complex wage-and-hour litigation and used that experience to obtain a favorable result
22 for Plaintiff, the Aggrieved Employees, and the State of California. (*Ibid.*). Considering the amount
23 of fees requested, work performed, risks incurred, and experience of Plaintiff's Counsel in handling
24 similar matters, Plaintiff maintains that the requested attorneys' fees of thirty-five (35%) of the Gross
25 Settlement Amount (i.e., \$93,275.00) are reasonable and should be awarded. (*Ibid.*).

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1 **VII. THE REQUESTED LITIGATION EXPENSES PAYMENT IS FAIR AND**
2 **REASONABLE**

3 The Agreement provides for reimbursement of the Plaintiff's Counsel's litigation costs and
4 expenses up to the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$25,000.00). (Rose
5 Decl., ¶ 54; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3(a)(1)). However, Plaintiff's Counsel only seeks reimbursement
6 of a total of Twenty-One Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars and Seventy-One Cents
7 (\$21,483.71) in litigation costs and expenses. (Rose Decl., ¶ 54 and Exh. 5). Accordingly, Plaintiff's
8 Counsel respectfully requests that the Court reimburse it for actual litigation costs and expenses in the
9 amount of Twenty-One Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars and Seventy-One Cents
10 (\$21,483.71).

11 **VIII. THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS ARE FAIR AND**
12 **REASONABLE**

13 As set forth in the Settlement Agreement, the Parties have agreed to retain, subject to approval
14 by the Court, ILYM Group, Inc., to handle the administration of the Agreement. (Rose Decl., ¶ 55;
15 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3(a)(3)). The fees and expenses of the Settlement Administrator are
16 estimated not to exceed Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars and Zero Cents (\$3,750.00).
17 (Rose Decl., ¶ 55; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 3(a)(3)). These costs include, but are not limited to,
18 expenses for preparing, printing, and mailing the Cover Letter and Individual PAGA Payment checks
19 to the Aggrieved Employees, re-mailing the returned Individual PAGA Payment checks to any new
20 addresses obtained, and handling inquiries from Aggrieved Employees regarding the Agreement,
21 among other things. (Rose Decl., ¶ 55). Accordingly, the Court should grant approval of the
22 Settlement Administration Costs in the amount of *up to* Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars
23 and Zero Cents (\$3,750.00) to ILYM Group, Inc., a necessary third-party for handling the settlement
24 process. (Ibid).

25 **IX. THE REQUESTED ENHANCEMENT PAYMENT IS FAIR AND**
26 **REASONABLE**

27 The purpose of an enhancement award is to incentivize aggrieved employees to step into the
28 shoes of the state labor agency and undertake the responsibilities associated with initiating a lawsuit

1 and serving in a representative capacity. (*See, e.g., Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 115 Cal.App.4th 715,
2 726 (2004) (upholding “service payments” to named plaintiffs for their efforts in bringing the action);
3 *Clark v. Am. Residential Servs., LLC*, 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804 (2009) (“an incentive award is
4 appropriate ‘if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit’”). Plaintiff initiated
5 this litigation on behalf of the State of California and his former co-workers who will now be entitled
6 to receive payment from the Agreement. By initiating and pursuing the Action, Plaintiff stepped into
7 the shoes of the State of California and undertook the responsibilities of serving in a representative
8 capacity. (Rose Decl., ¶ 57; *See generally* Gilmore Decl.). Plaintiff was available whenever
9 Plaintiff’s Counsel needed him and actively tried to obtain information that would benefit the
10 prosecution of the Action. (Rose Decl., ¶ 57; Gilmore Decl., ¶¶ 4-5). The Enhancement Payment for
11 Plaintiff is eminently reasonable given the time and effort Plaintiff spent on this matter, his services
12 on behalf of the State of California and the Aggrieved Employees, and his broader, general release of
13 claims. (Rose Decl., ¶ 56).

14 Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully submits that it is appropriate and just for Plaintiff to receive
15 an Enhancement Payment in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$5,000.00) in
16 addition to the Individual PAGA Payment he will receive as an Aggrieved Employee, for his services
17 on behalf of the State of California and the other Aggrieved Employees, as well as for the broader,
18 general release of claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 58).


19 X. CONCLUSION

20 For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant Plaintiff’s
21 Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement, Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Enhancement Payment, and
22 Settlement Administration Costs and grant the relief requested herein.

23 Respectfully submitted,

24 Dated: January 21, 2026

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

25 By: 
26 _____

Alexandra Rose

Attorneys for Plaintiff JOSHUA GILMORE