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8
9 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

10 **FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE**

11 JOSEPH VILLANUEVA, an individual and on
12 behalf of all others similarly situated;

13 Plaintiff,

14 vs.

15 NEWPORT PACIFIC CAPITAL COMPANY,
16 INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1
through 50,

17 Defendants.
18

Case No.: 30-2024-01380407-CU-OE-CXC

[Assigned for All Purposes to:
Hon. David A. Hoffer, Dept. CX 103]

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR APPROVAL OF PAGA
SETTLEMENT, ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS, AND SERVICE AWARD**

(Filed Concurrently with Supporting
Declarations and [Proposed] Judgment and
Order)

DATE: August 24, 2026

TIME: 1:30 p.m.

DEPT: CX103

Reservation No: 74882961

Action Filed: February 16, 2024

Trial Date: Not Set

1 TO THE COURT, AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 24, 2026, at 1:30 p.m. in Department CX103 of
3 the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Orange, Civil Complex Center,
4 located at 751 W. Santa Ana Blvd., Santa Ana, CA 92701, before the Honorable David A. Hoffer,
5 Judge presiding, Plaintiff Joseph Villanueva (“Plaintiff”) will move the Court, pursuant to
6 California Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), Labor Code §§ 2698, *et seq.*, for an Order:

7 1. Approving the settlement of this PAGA representative action in the form agreed to
8 by Plaintiff and Defendant Newport Pacific Capital Company, Inc. (“Defendant”) (together with
9 Plaintiff, the “Parties”) in the PAGA Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement” or “Agreement”);

10 2. Appointing Plaintiff’s counsel as PAGA counsel, for settlement purposes only, and
11 approving an award to Plaintiff’s counsel for reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of
12 \$102,000.00 (30% of the Gross Settlement Amount) and reasonable costs in the amount of
13 \$13,480.30;

14 3. Appointing Phoenix Settlement Administrators as the Settlement Administrator, and
15 approving payment of Settlement Administrator’s costs in the amount of \$5,750.00;

16 4. Approving a service award in the amount of \$5,000.00 to Plaintiff for Plaintiff’s
17 service to the LWDA and Aggrieved Employees;

18 5. Approving the release of PAGA claims by Plaintiff on behalf of Aggrieved
19 Employees and the LWDA;

20 6. Directing consummation of the Settlement pursuant to its terms and provisions;

21 7. Entering final Judgment;

22 8. Setting a Hearing Re: Distribution for on or after June 21, 2027; and

23 9. Without affecting the finality of the Judgment and Order, reserving exclusive and
24 continuing jurisdiction over the Action, the Parties, and the Aggrieved Employees for purposes of
25 interpreting and enforcing the terms, conditions, and obligations of the Settlement pursuant to
26 California Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6.

27 This Motion will be based upon this notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and
28 Authorities, Declarations of William C. Sung, Joseph Villanueva, and Jodey Lawrence of Phoenix

1 Settlement Administrators, and exhibits thereto that were filed concurrently herewith, the records
2 and files in this action, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly
3 receive at or before the hearing.

4
5 DATED: June 21, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

6 **JUSTICE FOR WORKERS, P.C.**

7
8 By: 

9 William C. Sung

10 Tiffany L. Luu

11 Joseph C. Ramli

12 Attorneys for Plaintiff Joseph Villanueva
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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiff Joseph Villanueva (“Plaintiff”) seeks approval of a proposed representative action
4 settlement for civil penalties pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code
5 §§ 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”) against Defendant Newport Pacific Capital Company, Inc.
6 (“Defendant”) (together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). After a full day of mediation with experienced
7 neutral mediator Tagore Subramaniam, Esq. and months of follow-up negotiations, the Parties
8 reached a settlement and thereafter executed a PAGA Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement” or
9 “Agreement”)¹.

10 The Settlement calls for a Gross Settlement Amount of **\$340,000.00**. After deducting
11 Plaintiff’s counsel’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs awards, payment for the Settlement
12 Administrator’s cost, and required payment to the California Labor and Workforce Development
13 Agency (the “LWDA”), approximately **\$53,442.43** will be paid to approximately **370** Aggrieved
14 Employees. The average approximate share of the settlement paid to Aggrieved Employees is
15 **\$144.44**. Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699(1)(2)², Plaintiff now file this unopposed motion, seeking
16 an order approving the proposed Settlement.

17 The settlement of a PAGA claim requires court approval pursuant to the operative PAGA
18 statute, which states that the “court shall review and approve any penalties sought as part of a
19 proposed settlement agreement pursuant to this part.” (Lab. Code § 2699(1)(2).) In deciding whether
20 to grant approval of a proposed settlement, the primary issues to be decided is whether the
21 settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. (*Villalobos v. Calandri Sunrise Farm LP* (C.D. Cal.,
22 July 22, 2015, No. CV 12-2615 PSG (JEMx)) 2015 WL 12732709, at *5.)

23 As set forth herein, the proposed Settlement embodies all the features of a settlement that is
24 fair, adequate, and reasonable, as it is the product of (1) an arms-length negotiation, (2) negotiated
25

26
27 ¹ A true and correct copy of the Agreement is attached as **Exhibit 1** to the Declaration of William C. Sung (“Sung
Decl.”). The proposed explanatory letter regarding PAGA settlement is attached to the Agreement as **Exhibit A** to the
Agreement. All defined terms in this Motion have the same definition as that in the Agreement.

28 ² This Action and Settlement are subject to pre-PAGA reform, July 1, 2024 PAGA requirements. All citations to Labor
Code §§ 2698, *et seq.* are to the pre-July 1, 2024 PAGA statute.

1 by attorneys experienced in wage and hour issues, (3) subsequent to undertaking sufficient
2 investigation necessary to evaluate the relative strength and value of the PAGA claim, and (4)
3 reflects a reasoned compromise based directly on the relative strength and value of the PAGA
4 claims, as well as the risks, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation.

5 **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT**

6 **A. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

7 Defendant owns and operates a property management company headquartered in Newport
8 Beach, California. (Sung Decl., ¶ 9.) Defendant employed Plaintiff as an hourly-paid, non-exempt
9 employee from approximately February 2022 to approximately June 2023 as an on-site property
10 manager. (Declaration of Joseph Villanueva [“Villanueva Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

11 On February 16, 2024, Plaintiff submitted the LWDA Letter of alleged Labor Code
12 violations to Defendant and the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (the
13 “LWDA”). (Sung Decl., ¶ 10, **Exh. 2** – LWDA Letter.) Plaintiff’s administrative exhaustion period
14 expired without the LWDA indicating its intent to investigate the allegations. (*Id.*)

15 On the same day, February 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint alleging
16 causes of action for (1) Minimum Wage Violations; (2) Overtime Wage Violations; (3) Meal Period
17 Violations; (4) Rest Period Violations; (5) Wage Statement Penalties; (6) Waiting Time Penalties;
18 (7) Failure to Reimburse Necessary Business Expenses; (8) Failure to Pay Call-Back Pay
19 Premiums; and (9) Unfair Competition. (Sung Decl., ¶ 11.) On April 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed the
20 operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) adding a cause of action for Civil Penalties Under the
21 California Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”). (Sung Decl., ¶ 12, **Exh. 3** – FAC.)

22 On November 20, 2024, the Parties stipulated to arbitration of Plaintiff’s individual claims
23 and to stay representative PAGA claims. (Sung Decl., ¶ 13.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Demand for
24 Arbitration with AAA. (*Ibid.*) During the course of the arbitration proceedings, the Parties agreed to
25 mediate on a PAGA representative basis. (*Ibid.*)

26 **B. DISCOVERY AND INVESTIGATION**

27 Prior to mediation, the Parties engaged in informal discovery which allowed the Parties to
28 meaningfully mediate this matter. (Sung Decl., ¶ 14.) Specifically, Defendant produced: (1) PAGA

1 demographics including the number of Aggrieved Employees and dates of employment; (2) a 20%
2 sampling of employee time and payroll records; (3) examples of Defendant's On-Site Employee
3 Agreement and relevant policies and procedures; and (4) Plaintiff's personnel records. (*Id.*)

4 Plaintiff's counsel, with the assistance of a retained expert data analyst, analyzed and
5 reviewed the documents regarding Defendant's wage and hour policies and practices, the Aggrieved
6 Employees' time and pay records, and other information provided by Defendant and Plaintiff.
7 (Sung Decl., ¶ 15.) Plaintiff's counsel was able to evaluate the probability of success on the merits
8 and Defendant's maximum and risk-adjusted monetary exposure and prepare a damage analysis
9 prior to mediation. (*Id.*) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation, Plaintiff's counsel
10 also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*)

11 **C. SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS**

12 On September 23, 2025, the Parties participated in private mediation before Tagore
13 Subramaniam, Esq., an experienced, neutral, class action and PAGA mediator. (Sung Decl., ¶ 16.)
14 Despite extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's
15 claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties did not reach a settlement of this Action at mediation.
16 (*Id.*) In the months that followed, the Parties continued to negotiate through Mr. Subramaniam and
17 reached a tentative settlement in mid-December 2025. (*Id.*) The Parties recognized that the issues
18 presented in the Action are likely only to be resolved with extensive and costly pretrial and trial
19 proceedings, and that further litigation will lead to inconvenience, distraction, disruption, delay, and
20 expense disproportionate to the potential benefits of litigation. (*Id.*) Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel
21 considered the risk and uncertainty of the outcome inherent in any litigation when determining
22 whether this Settlement was the correct option. (*Id.*)

23 **D. KEY TERMS OF THE PROPOSED PAGA SETTLEMENT**

24 The Settlement covers all current and former hourly or non-exempt employees employed by
25 Defendant in California during the PAGA Period ("Aggrieved Employees"). (Agreement, § I.2.)
26 The PAGA Period is from of February 16, 2023 through November 22, 2025. (Agreement, § I.11.)
27 The Gross Settlement Amount of the Settlement is \$340,000.00. (Agreement, § I.9.) The Settlement
28 provides that Plaintiff's counsel may seek an award of reasonable attorney's fees of up to one-third

1 of the Gross Settlement Amount (Plaintiff only seeks \$102,000.00, or 30%, in fees in this Motion),
2 and up to \$20,000.00 in litigation costs. (Agreement, § III.4.a.) Plaintiff's litigation costs are
3 approximately \$13,480.30, including estimated future costs in filing this Motion and supporting
4 papers (\$77.97), supplemental filings for this Motion (\$16.17), and filing of the Settlement
5 Administrator's declaration of compliance re settlement administration (\$16.17). (Sung Decl., ¶ 17;
6 Exh. 4 – Itemized Costs, Including Mediation and Expert Invoices.)

7 The Settlement Administrator will be paid administration costs not to exceed \$5,750.00.
8 (Agreement, § III.4.b.) The Parties jointly selected Phoenix Settlement Administrator as the neutral
9 entity to administer this Settlement based on its bid of \$5,750.00. (Sung Decl., ¶ 18; *see also*
10 Declaration of Jodey Lawrence ["Admin. Decl."], ¶ 22, Exh. B – Administrator Bid.) The
11 Settlement further provides that Plaintiff will be paid a service award in the amount of \$5,000.00
12 for Plaintiff's service to the LWDA and the Aggrieved Employees. (Agreement, § III.4.c.)

13 After deducting Plaintiff's attorney's fee and cost awards, service award, and payment to the
14 Settlement Administrator, in the amounts approved by the Court, the remainder, called the Net
15 Settlement Amount, will be distributed as 75% to the LWDA and 25% to Aggrieved Employees.
16 (Agreement, § III.5.) The amount estimated in the Net Settlement Amount for the LWDA payment
17 and the Aggrieved Employee payment is **\$213,769.70**. (Sung Decl., ¶ 19.) Accordingly,
18 approximately **\$53,442.43** (25% of the Net Settlement Amount) will be paid to the estimated 370
19 Aggrieved Employees on a pro-rata basis based on the number of pay periods each Aggrieved
20 Employee worked during the PAGA Period, and the raw average payment to Aggrieved Employees
21 is estimated at **\$144.44**, with the highest payment estimated at \$240.67 and the lowest payment
22 estimated at \$3.54. (*Id.*; *see* Agreement, § III.5.a.)

23 Defendant will fund the Gross Settlement Amount within 14 days of the Effective Date,
24 which is the date that the Court enters a final order and judgment approving the Settlement.
25 (Agreement, §§ I.5, III.2.) Within 14 days of the Effective Date, Defendant will provide the
26 Settlement Administrator with a PAGA list of all Aggrieved Employees, including their full name,
27 last known mailing address, social security number, and number of Pay Periods or dates of
28 employment. (Agreement, § IV.2.)

1 Upon receipt of the PAGA list, the Settlement Administrator will perform a search on the
2 National Change of Address database to update the Aggrieved Employees' addresses. (Agreement,
3 § IV.3.) Within 14 calendar days of the Settlement being fully funded, the Settlement Administrator
4 will mail copies of the explanatory letter, attached as **Exhibit A** to the Agreement and translated
5 into Spanish, along with Individual PAGA Payments to all Aggrieved Employees; and distribute the
6 75% share of PAGA penalties to the LWDA, court-approved attorney's fees and cost awards to
7 Plaintiff's counsel; and court-approval administration costs to itself. (Agreement, §§ IV.3, IV.5.)

8 Any checks for Individual PAGA Payments returned as non-deliverable will be remailed to
9 the forwarding address affixed thereto. (Agreement, § IV.4.) If no forwarding address is provided,
10 the Settlement Administrator will promptly attempt to determine the correct address, using a skip-
11 trace or other similar search, using the name, address and/or Social Security number of the
12 Aggrieved Employee involved and will perform a single re-mailing if a new address is located. (*Id.*)
13 Funds represented by checks returned as undeliverable after a re-mailing, and funds represented by
14 checks remaining un-cashed for more than 180 days after issuance, will be tendered to the State
15 Controller's Office under the unclaimed property fund laws in the names of the Aggrieved
16 Employees to whom the checks were issued. (*Id.*)

17 Finally, Defendant shall verify the number of pay periods worked by Aggrieved Employees,
18 and if applicable, elect whether to increase the Gross Settlement Amount or decrease the end date of
19 the PAGA Period. (Agreement, § III.3.)

20 **III. DISCUSSION**

21 **A. AVAILABILITY OF CIVIL PENALTIES**

22 The LWDA and its constituent departments and divisions are authorized to assess and
23 collect civil penalties for specified violations of the Labor Code committed by an employer. With a
24 stated goal of improving enforcement of existing Labor Code obligations, the California Legislature
25 adopted the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, permitting, as an alternative, an
26 aggrieved employee to initiate a private civil action "on behalf of himself or herself and other
27 current or former employees . . ." (Lab. Code § 2699(a).) The penalties collected in these private
28 civil actions are to be distributed 75% to the LWDA and 25% to the aggrieved employees. (*Id.* at §

1 2699(i).) Before an employee may file an action seeking to recover civil penalties for violations of
2 any of the Labor Code provisions enumerated in Labor Code § 2699.5, he or she must comply with
3 the Act's administrative procedures as set forth in Labor Code § 2699.3, subdivision (a). (*Caliber*
4 *Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 370; *see also Dunlap v. Superior*
5 *Court* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 330.) Here, in compliance with Labor Code § 2699.3, Plaintiff
6 provided notice to the LWDA and Defendant. (Sung Decl., ¶ 10; Exh. 2.) Plaintiff's administrative
7 exhaustion periods expired without the LWDA indicating its intent to investigate the allegations.
8 (*Ibid.*) Accordingly, Plaintiff may proceed with this PAGA representative action.

9 **B. THE SETTLEMENT WARRANTS APPROVAL**

10 Settlement of PAGA claims must be approved by a Court. (Lab. Code § 2699(l).) Here, the
11 circumstances weigh heavily in favor of approval, as explained below.

12 **1. The Relief is Genuine, Meaningful, and Consistent with the Underlying**
13 **Purpose of the Statute to Benefit the Public**

14 Plaintiff's counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. (Sung
15 Decl., ¶ 20.) Based on the foregoing discovery and on their own independent investigation and
16 evaluation, Plaintiff's counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
17 (*Id.*) Furthermore, considering all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, trial
18 risk, appellate risk, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant on the merits, the Settlement is
19 in the best interests of the Aggrieved Employees and the State. (*Id.*) The Settlement avoids the
20 risks, burdens, and the accompanying expense of further litigation. (*Id.*) Although the Parties have
21 engaged in a significant amount of investigation, informal discovery, and employee data analysis,
22 they have not participated in substantial formal discovery procedures, including depositions and
23 expert discovery. (*Id.*) Moreover, preparation for trial would remain for the Parties, as well as the
24 prospect of appeals in the wake of any summary judgment ruling. (*Id.*) As a result, the Parties
25 would incur considerably more attorneys' fees and costs through trial. (*Id.*)

26 Based on Plaintiff's counsel's analysis of the time and payroll records provided by
27 Defendant and on information from Plaintiff, Plaintiff's counsel evaluated Defendant's maximum
28 and risk-adjusted potential exposure. (Sung Decl., ¶ 21.) Based on Defendant's disclosures, there

1 were approximately 370 Aggrieved Employees who collectively worked approximately 15,100 pay
2 periods. (*Id.*) Plaintiff's counsel's damages valuation utilizes the initial violation rate penalty of
3 \$100 in analyzing PAGA penalties because, based on Plaintiff's counsel's investigation, Defendant
4 has not been subject to any prior court judgments or Labor Commissioner order placing it on notice
5 of any violation pertaining to the claims Plaintiff asserted and the heightened subsequent violation
6 penalty does not apply. (*Id.*; see *Bernstein v. Virgin America, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2021) 990 F.3d 1157,
7 1173.) Plaintiff's counsel's valuation of each theory of liability is set forth below.

8 Regular Rate Violations. Regular rate of pay, which can change from pay period to pay
9 period, includes adjustments to the straight time rate, reflecting, among other things, shift
10 differentials and the per-hour value of any nonhourly compensation the employee has earned.”
11 *Alvarado v. Dart Container Corp. of California* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 542, 554; see also *Ferra v. Loews*
12 *Hollywood Hotel, LLC* (2021) 11 Cal. 5th 858, 863 (meal and rest period premiums to be paid at
13 regular rate of pay); Lab. Code § 246(l)(1) (paid sick leave to be paid at the regular rate of pay or at
14 a rate based on a 90-day lookback of compensation earned).

15 Here, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to factor incentive compensation into the
16 regular rate of pay for overtime, meal period premiums, and paid sick leave. (Sung Decl., ¶ 22.)
17 Plaintiff's counsel found approximately 8.71% of pay periods had an overtime regular rate
18 violation, 1.11% of pay periods had a meal period premium regular rate violation, and
19 approximately 2.6% of pay periods had a paid sick leave violation. (*Id.*) At \$50 initial penalty rates
20 for overtime and meal period premiums and \$100 initial penalty rates for paid sick leave and
21 extrapolated to 15,100 pay periods, PAGA penalties for regular rate violations total **\$114,490.07**.
22 (*Id.*) In response, Defendant argued that the bonuses and other paycodes were not nondiscretionary
23 incentives and need not be included in the regular rate of pay. (*Id.*)

24 Off-the-Clock Work. Here, Plaintiff alleged that, as an on-site property manager, he
25 regularly worked off the clock afterhours and during weekends without compensation. (Sung Decl.,
26 ¶ 23.) Plaintiff's reporting time claim is subsumed under the off-the-clock work theory and is not
27 valued separately. (*Id.*) Based on the class list, approximately 28% of Aggrieved Employees were
28 on-site managers. (*Id.*) At \$100 initial penalty per pay period and extrapolating a 28% violation rate

1 to 15,100 pay periods, PAGA penalties for off-the-clock work violations total **\$422,800.00**. (*Id.*) In
2 response, Defendant vigorously denied that it had knowledge of Plaintiffs and other employees
3 working off the clock, and argued that they were responsible for recording all time worked and it
4 paid all employees in accordance with their submitted time sheets. (*Id.*) Defendant pointed to the
5 fact that it paid approximately 6,000 overtime hours totaling over \$200,000 in the sampling as
6 evidence of its compliant timekeeping practices. (*Id.*)

7 Meal Period Violations. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant often failed to provide him with
8 full, 30-minute meal periods before the end of the fifth hour of work. (Sung Decl., ¶ 24.) Plaintiff's
9 counsel and his expert analyzed the 20% sampling of time and payroll records and found, after
10 accounting for meal period premiums paid, 33.05% of pay periods had one or more meal period
11 violations. (*Id.*). At \$50 initial penalty per pay period, an 33.05% violation rate, and extrapolated to
12 15,100 pay periods, PAGA penalties for meal period violations are **\$249,527.50**. (*Id.*) In response,
13 Defendant countered that it has maintained compliant meal period policies and practices throughout
14 the PAGA Period and always provided compliant meal periods in line with those policies. (*Id.*; see
15 *Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1040-1041 [holding employers need
16 only "provide" meal periods to employees and are not obligated to "police" meal periods].)
17 Defendant pointed to the fact that it paid approximately 948 meal period premiums totaling over
18 \$29,000 in the sampling as evidence of its superior meal period compliance practices. (*Id.*)

19 Rest Period Violations. Plaintiff contends that he often could not take his 10-minute rest
20 breaks because of his work duties. (Sung Decl., ¶ 25.) Any rest period violations would not be
21 reflected in the time or payroll records. (*Id.*) Estimating that Aggrieved Employees experienced rest
22 period violations during approximately 20% of pay periods, and at \$50 initial violation rates and
23 extrapolated to the date of mediation, PAGA penalties for rest period violations are **\$188,750.00**.
24 (*Id.*) In response, Defendant counters that it has maintained compliant rest period policies and
25 practices throughout the PAGA Period and always provided compliant rest periods in line with
26 those policies. (*Id.*)

27 Derivative Wage Statement and Waiting Time Violations. Plaintiff alleged that, as a result
28 of the aforementioned wage violations, Defendant failed to furnish Aggrieved Employees with

1 accurate itemized wage statements in violation of Labor Code § 226(a). (Sung Decl., ¶ 26.)
2 Estimating a 50% violation rate by pay period, and at \$100 initial violation rate penalty per pay
3 period, PAGA penalties are estimated at **\$755,000.00**. (*Id.*) Plaintiff alleged that, as a result of the
4 aforementioned wage violations, Defendant failed to pay all wages due to formerly employed
5 Aggrieved employees upon their separation of employment in violation of Labor Code §§ 201 and
6 202. (*Id.*) At \$100 per former employee for 125 former employees, PAGA penalties are estimated to
7 be **\$12,500.00**. (*Id.*) In response, Defendant points to its substantive defenses on regular rate, off-
8 the-clock work, and meal/rest period claims to argue that these derivative claims will fail with the
9 underlying claims. (*Id.*)

10 Failure to Reimburse Business Expenses. During the PAGA period, Plaintiff, as an on-site
11 manager, had to use his personal cellphone for work and purchase office equipment without
12 reimbursement. (Sung Decl., ¶ 27.) Based on the class list, approximately 28% of Aggrieved
13 Employees were on-site managers. (*Id.*) At \$100 initial penalty per pay period and extrapolating a
14 28% violation rate to 15,100 pay periods, PAGA penalties for reimbursement violations total
15 **\$422,800.00**. (*Id.*) In response, Defendant argued that it provided Plaintiff and other employees with
16 office equipment and phone, and any personal cellphone use and office equipment purchased by
17 them were for their own convenience and not required. (*Id.*)

18 Maximum Exposure and Realistic Recovery. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's counsel
19 estimates Defendant's maximum exposure for PAGA penalties to be approximately **\$2,165,867.57**,
20 which is approximately 15.70% of the Gross Settlement Amount. (Sung Decl., ¶ 28.) However,
21 PAGA penalties are subject to discretionary reduction by this Court. (*Id.*) Pursuant to Labor Code §
22 2699(f)(2), the Court can decline to award the full amount of PAGA penalties where “. . . if, based
23 on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise, would result in an award that
24 is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.” Indeed, courts have affirmed the reduction of
25 PAGA penalties in the past. As shown in *Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.* (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504,
26 517, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's reduction of PAGA penalties by 90%, citing the
27 employer's good-faith attempt at complying with the law. (*See also Thurman v. Bayshore Transit*
28 *Mgmt., Inc.* (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1135 [affirming reduction of PAGA penalties]; *Fleming*

1 *v. Covidien Inc.* (C.D. Cal. 2011) Case No. ED CV10-01487 RGK (OPx), 2011 WL 7563047, at *4
2 [reducing PAGA penalties by over 82% in part because employer “not aware” of violations].) Here,
3 Defendant argued that based on their compliant policies and practices, their defenses on Plaintiff’s
4 theories of liability on the merits, and the hypertechnical nature of the regular rate claims, the Court
5 will significantly reduce any award of PAGA penalties based on its good-faith compliance with the
6 Labor Code. (Sung Decl., ¶ 28.)

7 Considering Defendant’s defenses on the merits and the potential for the Court to reduce a
8 PAGA penalty award, Plaintiff’s counsel believes there is a 75% risk factor that the Court will find
9 some of the claims in Defendant’s favor and/or exercise its discretion to reduce the PAGA penalty
10 award. (Sung Decl. at ¶ 29.) Accordingly, applying a 75% discount to the maximum penalty
11 exposure, Plaintiff’s counsel believes the realistic recovery at trial on these claims to be
12 **\$541,466.89**. (*Id.*) The \$340,000.00 settlement is an excellent result and amounts to “genuine and
13 meaningful” relief “consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute to benefit the public” as it
14 represents approximately **62.79%** of Plaintiff’s realistic recovery. (*Id.*; see *Villalobos v. Calandri*
15 *Sonrise Farm LP* (C.D. Cal., July 22, 2015, No. CV 12-2615 PSG (JEMx)) 2015 WL 12732709, at
16 *5; see also *O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. 2016) 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1135.)

17 **C. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COST AWARD SHOULD BE**
18 **APPROVED**

19 For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff requests that the Court approve an attorney’s fee
20 award of **\$102,000.00** and cost award of **\$13,480.30** to Plaintiff’s counsel.

21 **1. Plaintiff’s Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the Common**
22 **Fund Method**

23 California courts have long awarded attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the benefit created by
24 counsel in pursuing claims on behalf of a class. (See, e.g., *Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25.) The
25 California Supreme Court has held, “when a number of persons are entitled in common to a specific fund,
26 and an action brought by a plaintiff or Plaintiff for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation
27 of that fund, such plaintiff or Plaintiff may be awarded attorney’s fees out of the fund.” (*Id.* at p. 34.)

28 ///

1 Plaintiff's counsel seeks an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/common
2 fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionately among all the
3 beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." (*Vincent v. Hughes Air*
4 *W., Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of Cal.* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 162, the California
5 Supreme Court stated, "one who expends attorneys' fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from
6 which others derive benefits, may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation
7 costs." (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the
8 California Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine has been applied "consistently in
9 California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons[] are entitled to
10 share." (*Id.* at pp. 110–11 [pincite omitted].) The reasons for applying this doctrine include:

11 fairness to the successful litigant, who might otherwise receive no benefit because his
12 recovery might be consumed by the expenses; correlative prevention of an unfair
13 advantage to the others who are entitled to share in the fund and who should bear their
14 share of the burden of its recovery; encouragement of the attorney for the successful
litigant, who will be more willing to undertake and diligently prosecute proper litigation
for the protection or recovery of the fund if he is assured that he will be properly and
directly compensated should his efforts be successful.

15 (*Id.* at p. 111.)

16 The percentage approach is preferable to the lodestar because: (1) it aligns the interests of
17 class counsel and absent class members; (2) it encourages efficient resolution of the litigation by
18 providing an incentive for early, yet reasonable, settlement; and (3) it reduces the demands on judicial
19 resources. (*Id.* at pp. 1378–79.) California Courts now routinely use the percentage of the common
20 fund approach to determine the award of attorney's fees. (*See, e.g., In re Pac. Enter. Sec. Litig.* (9th
21 Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 373, 378–79 [approving attorneys' fee award of 33%.])

22 **2. The Requested Fee is in Line with Typical Cases**

23 According to a leading treatise on class actions: "No general rule can be articulated on what is a
24 reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually, 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a reasonable fee
25 award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a disproportionate part of the
26 recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented." (Newberg,
27 Newberg on Class Actions (3rd ed. 1992) § 14.03.) Attorneys' fees that are 50% of the fund are typically
28 considered the upper limit, with 30–40% commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively

1 small. (*Id.*; see also *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294, 297 [stating
2 that most cases where 30–50% was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10 million].)
3 Here, Plaintiff request attorneys’ fees equal to 30% of the Gross Settlement Amount, which is in
4 line with the prevailing guidelines established under California case law and in academic literature
5 and is consistent with awards in California. (*Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66,
6 n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar
7 method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].)

8 **3. The Matter Involves a Fee and Cost Shifting Provision under PAGA**

9 Labor Code § 2699 provides for the recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees as well as costs of
10 suit. (Lab. Code § 2699(g)(1).) Specifically, it states: “Any employee who prevails in any [PAGA]
11 action shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs . . .” (*Id.*) This fee/cost-
12 shifting provision reflects the understanding that PAGA Counsel must accept significant risk of
13 substantial expenses and consumption of time, energy, and other resources in litigating a PAGA
14 claim, and thus, that PAGA Counsel is not only permitted, but entitled, to recover reasonable
15 attorneys’ fees and costs if successful in litigating a PAGA claim.

16 This Settlement is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption
17 of time, energy, and resources facing Defendant while at the same time rewarding Plaintiff’s
18 counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. (Sung Decl., ¶ 30.) In fact,
19 prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Plaintiff’s counsel. (*Id.*) Plaintiff’s
20 counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*)
21 Once Plaintiff’s counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the Aggrieved Employees, they
22 committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing their fiduciary duty to the Aggrieved Employees
23 ahead of all other concerns. (*Id.*)

24 **4. The Experience, Reputation, and Ability of Plaintiff’s counsel Support** 25 **the Requested Fee Award**

26 As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class and representative actions on
27 behalf of employees, Plaintiff’s counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class action and
28 representative matters. (Sung Decl., ¶¶ 2-7.) Plaintiff’s counsel have been involved as lead counsel

1 or co-counsel in a multitude of class and representative actions resulting in beneficial results to class
2 members and aggrieved employees in California. (Sung Decl., ¶¶ 5-7.) Because it is reasonable to
3 compensate Plaintiff’s counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation, and experience, Plaintiff’s
4 counsel’s requested fee award is supported here. Plaintiff’s counsels’ experience in wage and hour
5 class and representative actions was integral in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case
6 against Defendant and the reasonableness of this Settlement. Practice in the narrow field of wage and
7 hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state
8 and federal), as well as the procedural law of representative action litigation.

9 **5. While the Lodestar Method is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases,**
10 **the Court May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees**

11 “Despite its primacy, the lodestar method is not necessarily utilized in common fund cases.”
12 (*Lealao v. Beneficial Cal., Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 27.) Courts have criticized the lodestar
13 method as a drain on the judicial system and a disincentive on attorneys to take on high-risk,
14 challenging cases. (*Id.* at p. 29.) Indeed, the lodestar approach: “(1) ‘increases the workload of an
15 already overtaxed judicial system,’ (2) is ‘insufficiently objective and produce[s] results that are far
16 from homogenous,’ (3) ‘creates a sense of mathematical precision that is unwarranted in terms of
17 the realities of the practice of law,’ (4) ‘is subject to manipulation by judges who prefer to calibrate
18 fees in terms of percentages of the settlement fund or the amounts recovered by the Plaintiff or of
19 an overall dollar amount,’ (5) ‘encourages lawyers to expend excessive hours, and . . . engage in
20 duplicative and unjustified work,’ (6) ‘creates a disincentive for the early settlement of cases,’ (7)
21 deprives trial courts of ‘flexibility to reward or deter lawyers so that desirable objectives, such as
22 early settlement, will be fostered,’ (8) ‘works to the particular disadvantage of the public interest
23 bar,’ and (9) results in ‘confusion and lack of predictability.’” (*Id.* [quoting Third Circuit Task
24 Force, *Court Awarded Attorney Fees* (1985) 108 F.R.D. 237, 246–49].)

25 Although California courts support the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be
26 used to cross-check fee awards. “It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit
27 can be monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to ‘cross-check’ or adjust the lodestar in
28 comparison to a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and

1 within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.” (*In re*
2 *Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557 [quoting *Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th
3 at pp. 49–50].)

4 Applying the lodestar method is a two-step process. The first step is to multiply the number
5 of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate, and the second step is to apply a
6 multiplier to the lodestar to account for various factors. (*Id.* at p. 556.) “The purpose of such
7 adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court
8 determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required
9 extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate
10 the fair market rate for such services.” (*Id.*) “Under certain circumstances, a lodestar calculation
11 may be enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit analysis.” (*Id.* at pp. 556–57.) Further,
12 “California case law permits fee awards in the absence of detailed time sheets.” (*Wershba v. Apple*
13 *Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 255.)

14 Under California law, lodestar multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher. *See, e.g.,*
15 *Chavez v. Netflix* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 49-50 (approving multiplier of about 2.5); *Coalition*
16 *for L.A. County Planning etc. Interest v. Bd. of Supervisors* (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 241, 251
17 (approving multiplier of about 12.8). In representative actions such as this one, where the value of
18 the benefit conferred to the representative group “can be monetized with a reasonable degree of
19 certainty,” the court may “adjust the lodestar in comparison to a percentage of the common fund to
20 ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal
21 marketplace in comparable litigation.” *Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.

22 Moreover, the use of a multiplier is permitted in a PAGA action. PAGA provides that “[a]ny
23 employee who prevails in any action shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and
24 costs.” (Lab. Code § 2699(g)(1).) Although PAGA does not provide a specific standard for
25 evaluating attorneys’ fees in connection with a settlement of PAGA claims, California Courts have
26 employed a lodestar analysis and use of multipliers for this purpose. “Where a settlement produces
27 a common fund for the benefit of the entire class, courts have discretion to employ either the
28 lodestar method or the percentage-of-recovery method. . . To guard against an unreasonable result,

the Ninth Circuit encourages district courts to “cross-check[] their calculations against a second method. . . . Accordingly, the Court calculates attorneys’ fees in the instant case using the percentage-of-recovery method and then cross-checks its calculations against the lodestar method.” (*Hermosillo v. Davey Tree Surgery Co.* (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2021, No. 18-CV-00393-LHK) 2021 WL 2826697, at *1 [quoting *In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.* (9th Cir. 2011) 654 F.3d 935, 942, 944–45].) The court in *Hermosillo* granted, in part, a plaintiff’s counsel’s unopposed motion for attorneys’ fees and costs in a PAGA-only settlement, wherein 33.33% of the gross settlement fund was requested for fees. (*Hermosillo*, at *1–3.)

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel’s current lodestar is **\$97,530.00**, broken down as:

Name	Laffey Matrix Fee	Actual Billing Rate	Hours Billed	Lodestar
William C. Sung (14 th Year Attorney)	\$948	\$900	73.80	\$66,420.00
Tiffany L. Luu (5 th Year Attorney)	\$581	\$550	41.20	\$22,660.00
Joseph C. Ramli (4 th Year Attorney)	\$581	\$500	16.90	\$8,450.00

(Sung Decl., ¶¶ 31-33, **Exh. 5** – Time and Task Logs for William Sung, Tiffany Luu, and Joseph Ramli.) Plaintiff’s counsel’s requested fee award represents a **1.05** lodestar multiplier. (Sung Decl., ¶ 31.) Additionally, Plaintiff’s counsel estimate they will devote no less than 10 hours, although likely more time, to additional tasks, which are hours not included in the foregoing lodestar total. (Sung Decl., ¶ 34.) These additional hours will include time spent to obtain and monitor approval of the Settlement and requested awards, oversee the settlement administration process and distribution of funds, respond to inquiries, and communicate with Plaintiff regarding the case. (*Id.*)

Plaintiff’s counsel also bear the risk of taking whatever actions are necessary if Defendant fails to pay. The amount of fees requested under the Settlement is warranted based on the contingent risk that Counsel incurred, the difficulty of the questions involved, the substantial benefit conferred on the Aggrieved Employees and State of California as a result of the Settlement, and the skill displayed by Plaintiff’s counsel. Thus, the request for attorneys’ fees satisfies a lodestar check. Accordingly, the Court should find that the circumstances of the present case justify an award of

1 30% of the Gross Settlement Amount for attorneys' fees.

2 **6. Plaintiff's Counsels' Costs Are Reasonable and Actually Incurred**

3 Plaintiff's counsel are entitled to recover the out-of-pocket costs and expenses they
4 reasonably incurred in investigating, prosecuting, and settling a case. (*Staton v. Boeing Co.* (9th Cir.
5 2003) 327 F.3d 938, 974; Lab. Code § 2699(g)(1).) Under the proposed Settlement, Plaintiff's
6 counsel may request reimbursement of costs up to \$20,000.00. (Agreement, § III.4.a.) Plaintiff's
7 counsel seek reimbursement of actual costs in the amount of \$13,480.30, including estimated future
8 costs in filing this Motion and supporting papers (\$77.97), supplemental filings for this Motion
9 (\$16.17), and filing of the Settlement Administrator's declaration of compliance re settlement
10 administration (\$16.17). (Sung Decl., ¶ 17; **Exh. 4**.) Plaintiff's mediation and expert invoices are
11 included in Exhibit 4. These expenses were reasonably necessary to the litigation and were actually
12 incurred. Moreover, these expenses are below the maximum amount allowed in the Settlement, and
13 the remainder will be allocated to the Net Settlement Amount. Therefore, costs should be
14 reimbursed in full, up to the maximum amount allowed in the Settlement.

15 **D. THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE REQUESTED PLAINTIFF'S**
16 **ENHANCEMENT AWARD.**

17 Courts routinely approve enhancement payments to compensate named plaintiffs for the
18 services they provide and the risks they incur during class action litigation. (*See, e.g., Bell v.*
19 *Farmers Ins. Exchange* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 715, 726 [upholding "service payments" to named
20 plaintiffs for their efforts in bringing the case]; *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co.* (N.D. Cal.
21 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [approving \$50,000 service payment].) Indeed, "[i]ncentive awards are
22 fairly typical in class action cases." (*Rodriguez v. West Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948,
23 958.) The Court may award incentive payments to compensate Plaintiff for work done on behalf of
24 the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action. (*Id.* at 958-
25 59.)

26 Here, Plaintiff seeks an enhancement award of \$5,000.00 and Plaintiff and Plaintiff's
27 counsel submit that this request is reasonable given Plaintiff's efforts in this case and the risks
28 Plaintiff undertook on behalf of the State and Aggrieved Employees. (Villanueva Decl., ¶¶ 4-5;

1 Sung Decl., ¶ 35.) Plaintiff expended substantial time and effort on behalf of the State and
2 Aggrieved Employees, including providing factual information and documents to counsel, attending
3 meetings with counsel to discuss the claims and theories at issue in the litigation, and otherwise
4 actively participating in the prosecution of his claims. (Villanueva Decl., ¶ 4.) As a result of
5 Plaintiff's efforts, he has helped the State recover over \$160,327.28 in civil penalties and 370
6 Aggrieved Employees recover on average \$144.44 in civil penalties per person.

7 **E. THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE SETTLEMENT**
8 **ADMINISTRATION FEES**

9 Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement, the fees and costs of the Settlement Administrator,
10 are to be paid out of the common fund. (Agreement, § III.4.B.) The settlement administration fees
11 are based on a flat-sum amount of \$5,750.00. (*Id.*; Admin. Decl., ¶ 15, Exh. B.) The Settlement
12 Administrator's duties include, but are not limited to, receiving and analyzing the Aggrieved
13 Employee list, processing Aggrieved Employees' names and addresses against the National Change
14 of Address database ("NCOA") prior to mailing, setting up and managing a Qualified Settlement
15 Fund ("QSF") Escrow Account, calculating Individual PAGA Payments to Aggrieved Employees,
16 disbursing settlement payments to Aggrieved Employees, the State of California, and Plaintiff's
17 counsel including necessary tax forms (i.e., 1099 Forms) and PAGA settlement explanatory letter,
18 tendering funds from uncashed checks to the Unclaimed Property Fund to be held in the name of the
19 Aggrieved Employee, and submitting final accounting to the Court. (Admin Decl., ¶¶ 14-15, Exh.
20 C; Agreement, §§ IV.1-7.) All of these duties are included in the agreed-upon flat fee of \$5,750.00.
21 Thus, the Administrator's fees should be approved.

22 **F. PROOF OF SERVICE OF SETTLEMENT AND ALL MOVING PAPERS ON**
23 **THE LWDA**

24 On June 21, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel served the LWDA via filing through its online portal at
25 <https://dir.govfa.net/432> (Proposed Settlement of PAGA Case) with a copy of the fully executed
26 Agreement, Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement, the Declarations of William C. Sung, Jodey
27 Lawrence, and Joseph Villaneuva, and the Proposed Judgment and Order. (Sung Decl., ¶ 36, **Exh. 6**
28 – LWDA Filing Confirmation.)

1 **IV. CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully request that the Court grant approval of the
3 proposed Settlement, sign the (Proposed) Judgment and Order submitted herewith, and set a
4 Compliance Hearing Re: Status of Distribution for on or after June 21, 2027.

5

6 DATED: June 21, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

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JUSTICE FOR WORKERS, P.C.

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By: 

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William C. Sung

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Tiffany L. Luu

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Joseph C. Ramli

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Attorneys for Plaintiff JOSEPH VILLANUEVA

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