

Benjamin H. Haber (SBN 315664)
benjamin.haber@wilshirelawfirm.com
Daniel J. Kramer (SBN 314625)
daniel.kramer@wilshirelawfirm.com
Alan Wilcox (SBN 287476)
alan.wilcox@wilshirelawfirm.com
Lucy Nguyen (SBN 338783)
lucy.nguyen@wilshirelawfirm.com
WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC
660 S. Figueroa Street, Sky Lobby
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Telephone: (213) 381-9988
Facsimile: (213) 381-9989

Attorneys for Plaintiff

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE**

MONICA OJEDA, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

U.S. PRECISION SHEET METAL, INC., a
California corporation; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. CVRI2401083

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

*[Assigned for all purposes to: Hon. Harold
Hopp, Dept. 1]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

Date: December 17, 2025

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept.: 1

Complaint filed: February 28, 2025

FAC filed: October 29, 2025

Trial date: Not set

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 17, 2025 at 8:30 a.m., in Department 1 of the Riverside County Superior Court, located at 4050 Main Street, Riverside, CA 92501, Plaintiff Monica Ojeda (“Plaintiff”) will, and hereby does, move for an order as follows:

1. Certifying the Class for settlement purposes;
2. Approving the settlement as fair and reasonable and finding that class members were given notice of the settlement, and advised of their rights to participate in the settlement, object to the settlement, or exclude themselves from the settlement, in a reasonable manner;
3. Appointing Plaintiff Monica Ojeda as Class Representative for settlement purposes, and approving a Class Representative Service Award of \$15,000.00 to Plaintiff Monica Ojeda;
4. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, Benjamin H. Haber, Daniel J. Kramer, Alan Wilcox and Lucy Nguyen of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel for settlement purposes, and approving payment of \$143,950.00 in attorneys’ fees, which is 1/3 of the Gross Settlement Amount;
5. Approving costs in the amount of \$15,466.81 for litigating this action to Class Counsel;
6. Approving payment of administrative expenses to Apex Class Action Administration as the Settlement Administrator in the amount of \$5,000.00;
7. Directing that the clerk of the Court to enter the Court’s order as a final judgment; and,
8. Without affecting the finality of the final judgment, reserving continuing jurisdiction over the Parties for the purposes of implementing, enforcing and/or administering the Settlement or enforcing the terms of the judgment.

This Motion will be based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declarations of Benjamin H. Haber, Madely Nava and such oral argument as may be heard by the Court, and all other papers on file in this action.

///

///


///

///

1 Dated: December 2, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

2 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

3 By: 
4
5 Benjamin H. Haber
6 Daniel J. Kramer
7 Alan Wilcox
8 Lucy Nguyen

9 Attorneys for Plaintiff

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION.....	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iii, iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....	v, vi
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.....	1
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT.....	2
A. Plaintiff’s Claims	2
B. Discovery and Investigation.....	3
C. Settlement Negotiations and Agreement.....	3
D. Preliminary Approval and Overwhelming Support for the Settlement.....	4
E. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement.....	4
III. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL	8
A. The Settlement Reflects a Reasonable Compromise	8
B. The Settlement was Reached After Arms-Length Negotiations Following Formal and Informal Discovery	9
C. Plaintiff’s Counsel Has Substantial Class Action Experience	10
D. There Are No Objections to the Settlement	10
IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFF THE REQUESTED AMOUNTS OF FEES, COSTS AND ENHANCEMENT PAYMENTS.....	11
A. A Fee Award Based on One-Third of the Common Fund is Standard	12
B. While the Lodestar Method is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, Courts May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees.....	12
1. Class Counsel’s Rates Have Been Approved by Several Courts.....	14
2. Applying a Positive Multiplier Is Appropriate.....	14
C. Costs Are Reasonable.	16
D. The Enhancement Payments to the Plaintiff is Reasonable.	17
E. Administration Expenses Should be Approved.	18

V. CONCLUSION.....	18
--------------------	----

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATE CASES

Cellphone Term. Fee Cases (2010)

186 Cal. App. 4th 138018

Chavez v. Netflix, Inc. (2008)

162 Cal.App.4th 4312, 15

Clark v. Am. Residential Services LLC (2009)

175 Cal. App. 4th 78518

Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996)

48 Cal.App.4th 17948

Gentry v. Super. Ct. (2007)

42 Cal.4th 443.....17

In re Consumer Privacy Cases (2009)

175 Cal.App.4th 54512, 13

Ketchum v. Moses (2001)

24 Cal.4th 1122.....14, 15

Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008)

168 Cal.App.4th 1168

Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc. (2016)

1 Cal.5th 480.....11, 13

Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc. (2000)

82 Cal.App.4th 1913

Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles (2010)

186 Cal.App.4th 39917

Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California (1992)

3 Cal.4th 272.....8

Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009)

175 Cal.App.4th 136313

1	<i>Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.</i> (2001)	
2	91 Cal.App.4th 224	8, 14
3	<u>FEDERAL CASES</u>	
4	<i>Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.</i>	
5	(E.D.Cal.2013) 297 F.R.D. 431.....	13
6	<i>Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels</i>	
7	(S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017) 2017 WL 4310707.....	12
8	<i>Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.</i>	
9	(W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174	17
10	<i>Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.</i>	
11	(9th Cir.1998) 150 F.3d 1011.....	11
12	<i>Harris v. Marhoefer</i>	
13	(9th Cir. 1994) 24 F.3d 16.....	16
14	<i>Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.</i>	
15	(W.D.Wash. 2001) 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5976, 2001 WL 34089697	10
16	<i>In re Lifelock, Inc. Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation</i>	
17	(D. Ariz. 2010) 2010 WL 3715138	10
18	<i>In re Prudential Ins. Co. America Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions</i>	
19	(3d Cir.1998) 148 F.3d 283.....	13
20	<i>Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.</i>	
21	(C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) No. 8:19-cv-02500-SB, 2021 WL 3673845.....	14
22	<i>Nunez v. BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair Inc.</i>	
23	(S.D. Cal. 2017) 292 F. Supp. 3d 1018	16
24	<i>Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.</i>	
25	(9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948.....	17
26	<i>Rutti v. Lojack Corp.</i>	
27	(C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) No. CV 06–00350 DOC, 2012 WL 3151077.....	16
28	///	

1	<i>United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp.</i>	
2	(9th Cir.1990) 896 F.2d 403.....	14
3	<i>Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company</i> (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294.....	12
4	<u>TREATISES</u>	
5	Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.....	12, 13
6	<u>OTHER AUTHORITIES</u>	
7	Theodore Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An	
8	Empirical Study”, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006)	17

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Monica Ojeda (“Plaintiff”) seeks final approval of a proposed \$431,850.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant U.S. Precision Sheet Metal, Inc. (“Defendant”, and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 66 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law.

The proposed settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. A presumption of fairness exists as the Settlement was reached through extensive, mediated arm’s-length negotiations, sufficient investigation and discovery, which allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently, and Class Counsel is experienced in similar wage and hour litigation. Upon the Court’s approval of the settlement, participating class members will receive an *average estimated individual net settlement payment of approximately \$2,293,68*, with the *highest individual estimated net settlement payment to be paid of approximately \$5,536.38* (Declaration of Madely Nava Regarding Notice and Settlement Administration [“Nava Decl.”], ¶ 16.) As of filing this Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (the “Motion”), there **no objections to the settlement and no requests for exclusion**. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 11-12.) The administrator will provide a supplemental declaration once the responsive deadline passes. Thus, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members.

Final approval of the settlement is warranted as it satisfies all the criteria for approval under California law. As demonstrated in the Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, the proposed Settlement provides excellent benefits to the class, particularly considering the complexities and risks of the case. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant final approval of the proposed Settlement.

///

///

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff's Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiff and the putative class members worked in California as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees for Defendant U.S. Precision Sheet Metal, Inc. (“Defendant,” and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”) during the class period. Defendant specializes in creating parts and components for end-users all over the world. (Declaration of Benjamin H. Haber in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement [“Haber Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to: provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods; and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts related claims for failure to pay wages during employment, failure to pay all final wages at termination, failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to keep requisite payroll records, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (Haber Decl., ¶ 3.)

On February 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194 and 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods (Labor Code § 226.7); (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination (Labor Code §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Labor Code § 226); (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (Labor Code § 2802); and (8) unfair business practices (Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, *et seq.*). (Haber Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA on March 26, 2024. On October 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendant adding

claims for civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.*)

B. Discovery and Investigation

Following the filing of the initial complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and information before mediating this action. (Haber Decl., ¶ 5.) Defendant produced a sample of time and pay records for class members. Defendant also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and practices during the class period, and information regarding the total number of current and former employees in its informal discovery. (*Id.*)

After reviewing documents regarding Defendant's wage and hour policies and practices and analyzing Defendant's timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant's maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (Haber Decl., ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis assessing Defendant's potential liability prior to mediation. (*Id.*) This extensive investigation and discovery allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the Settlement. (*Id.*)

C. Settlement Negotiations and Agreement

On August 20, 2024, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced class action mediator John F. Hyland, Esq. (Haber Decl., ¶ 7.) The mediation was conducted via Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached a settlement, the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, Ex. 1 [Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice].)

Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class

Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (Haber Decl., ¶ 8.)

D. Preliminary Approval and Overwhelming Support for the Settlement

Following the execution of the Settlement Agreement, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement on August 21, 2025. (Haber Decl., ¶ 9.) The deadline for class members to opt out or object to the Settlement is November 24, 2025. (*Id.*) The reaction of the Class to the settlement so far has been overwhelmingly positive. Indeed, as of the filing of this Motion, no Class Member has opted out of the settlement and no Class Member has objected to the settlement. (*Id.*)

E. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

Under the Settlement Agreement, Defendants will pay \$431,850.00 to resolve this litigation. The key terms include:

1. Class Definition: For purposes of this Settlement Agreement only, the Parties agree to the certification of the classes pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: "all persons employed by Defendant in California and classified as hourly-paid or non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant during the Class Period." (Settlement, § 1.5.)

2. Class Period: "means the period from December 22, 2020 to November 18, 2024." (Settlement, § 1.12.)

3. Participating Class Members: "means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement." (Settlement, § 1.35.)

4. Aggrieved Employees: "means a person employed by Defendant in California and classified as non-exempt, hourly-paid employee who worked for Defendant during the PAGA Period." (Settlement, § 1.4.)

5. Gross Settlement Amount: "means \$431,850.00 which is the total amount Defendant agrees to pay under the Settlement except as provided in Paragraph 8 below. The

Gross Settlement Amount will be used to pay Individual Class Payments, Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Counsel Fees, Class Counsel Expenses, Class Representative Service Payment and the Administrator's Expenses." (Settlement, § 1.22.)

6. Uncashed Checks: "For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date, the Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such checks to a Court approved nonprofit organization or foundation consistent with Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b) ("Cy Pres Recipient") Legal Aid at Work. The Parties, Class Counsel, and Defense Counsel represent that they have no interest or relationship, financial or otherwise, with the intended Cy Pres Recipient." (Settlement, § 4.4.3.)

7. Release by Participating Class Members: "All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release Released Parties from any and all claims asserted or that could have been asserted based on the facts pled in the operative complaints, including but not limited to, state wage and hour claims for any and all violations of California's Labor Code and Unfair Competition Law based on Defendant's failure to pay for all hours worked (including minimum, straight time, and overtime wages), failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and permit rest periods, failure to timely pay final wages at termination, failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements, and failure to indemnify employees for expenditures based on the alleged Labor Code violations, and all damages, interest, penalties, attorneys' fees, costs, and other amounts recoverable under said causes of action under California law, to the extent permissible, including, but not limited to, the California Labor Code and the applicable Wage Orders. Except as set forth in Section 5.3 of this Agreement, Participating Class Members do not release any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers' compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period." (Settlement, § 5.2.) This Release will be deemed effective on the date when the Court's order approving the settlement and judgment thereon

1 becomes final.” (Settlement, § 1.18.)

2 8. Release of Claims for PAGA Penalties: “Plaintiff releases for herself and the
3 State of California all claims for statutory penalties that could have been sought by the
4 Labor Commissioner for the violations alleged in Plaintiff’s pre-filing letter to the LWDA
5 against the Released Parties, including all claims for PAGA penalties that were alleged, or
6 reasonably could have been alleged, based on the PAGA Period facts stated in the PAGA Action
7 complaint, and the PAGA Notice, and ascertained in the course of the Actions, including, (1)
8 failure to pay for all hours worked, including minimum, straight time, regular rate, and overtime
9 wages; (2) failure to provide meal periods and/or pay associated premiums; (3) failure to
10 authorize and permit rest breaks and/or pay associated premiums; (4) failure to timely pay all
11 earned wages during employment; (5) failure to maintain accurate records of hours worked and
12 meal periods; (6) failure to timely pay all wages at termination; (7) failure to furnish accurate
13 itemized wage statements; and (8) failure to indemnify for necessary expenditures. Plaintiff
14 does not release any Aggrieved Employee’s claims for wages or damages except as specified in
15 Section 5.2 of the Settlement Agreement.” (Settlement, § 5.3.)

16 9. No Reversion: “None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant.”
17 (Settlement, § 3.1.)

18 10. PAGA Allocation: “PAGA Penalties in the amount of \$30,000.00 to be paid from
19 the Gross Settlement Amount, with 75% (\$22,500.00) allocated to the LWDA PAGA Payment
20 and 25% (\$7,500.00) allocated to the Individual PAGA Payments.” (Settlement, § 3.2.5.)

21 11. Net Settlement Amount: “means the Gross Settlement Amount, less the following
22 payments in the amounts approved by the Court: Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA
23 Payment, Class Representative Service Payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel
24 Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Expenses Payment. The remainder is to
25 be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments.” (Settlement, § 1.28.)

26 12. Distribution Formula: “An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing
27 the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class
28 Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class

Member's Workweeks." (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: "The Administrator will calculate each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of Aggrieved Employees' 25% share of PAGA Penalties \$7,500.00 by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved Employees' PAGA Period Pay Periods." (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

13. Tax Allocation: "20% of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of wage claims (the "Wage Portion"). The Wage Portions are subject to tax withholding and will be reported on an IRS W-2 Form. The remaining 80% of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of claims for interests and penalties (the "Non-Wage Portion"). The Non-Wage Portions are not subject to wage withholdings and will be reported on IRS 1099 Forms." (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

14. Class Representative Service Award: "Class Representative Service Payment to the Class Representative of not more than \$15,000.00 (in addition to any Individual Class Payment and Individual PAGA Payment the Class Representative is entitled to receive as a Participating Class Member)." (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

15. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: "A Class Counsel Fees Payment of not more than 33 and 1/3%, which is currently estimated to be \$143,950.00 and a Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment of not more than \$20,000.00. Defendant will not oppose requests for these payments provided that do not exceed these amounts." (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

16. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Nava Decl., ¶ 2, Settlement, Ex. A.) Class Members were notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 4.4.1.) Apex Class Action Administration, the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses.

1 **III. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS FINAL APPROVAL**

2 The law favors the settlement of lawsuits, particularly in class actions and other complex
3 cases. (*See e.g., Neary v. Regents of Univ. of California* (1992) 3 Cal.4th 272, 277-81.) Factors to
4 be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include “the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the
5 risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class
6 action status through proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a
7 government participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” (*Kullar*
8 *v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) A presumption that a settlement is
9 fair and reasonable exists where, as here, the following four factors are present: “(1) the settlement
10 is reached through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow
11 counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4)
12 the percentage of objectors is small.” (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th
13 224, 245.)

14 Whether a class action settlement should be approved is a question committed to the trial
15 court’s broad discretion. (*Id.* at pp. 234-35.) In exercising its discretion, the Court should give
16 “[d]ue regard ...to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” (*Dunk*
17 *v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) “The inquiry ‘must be limited to the extent
18 necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or
19 overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a
20 whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

21 **A. The Settlement Reflects a Reasonable Compromise**

22 A settlement is not judged against what the plaintiff might recover had he or she prevailed
23 at trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and
24 reasonable. (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent and
25 necessary in the settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is
26 substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar
27 to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in
28 which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

1 The settlement obviates the significant risk that this Court may deny certification of all or
2 some of Plaintiff's claims. (Haber Decl., ¶ 10.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of her
3 claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.*) Plaintiff also recognizes
4 that proving the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-
5 consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*) Furthermore, even if Plaintiff obtained certification
6 of all or some of the claims, continued litigation would be expensive, involving a trial and possible
7 appeals, and would substantially delay and reduce any recovery by the class. (*Id.*)

8 Because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief
9 and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the
10 uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish
11 liability, the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of
12 \$435,850.00 is within the "ballpark" of reasonableness, and settlement approval is appropriate.
13 *Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average benefit of approximately*
14 *\$2,293.68, and the highest estimated net payout is expected to be approximately \$5,536.38.* (Nava
15 Decl., ¶ 14.)

16 **B. The Settlement was Reached After Arms-Length Negotiations Following**
17 **Formal and Informal Discovery**

18 The Settlement was reached over the course of a full-day mediation with experienced
19 employment mediator, John F. Hyland, Esq. (Haber Decl., ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were
20 at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The
21 Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but
22 each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement
23 had not been reached. (*Id.*)

24 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class
25 certification, success on the merits, and Defendant's maximum monetary exposure for all claims.
26 Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in
27 the litigation. (Haber Decl., ¶ 6.) Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage
28 analysis prior to mediation. This extensive investigation and discovery allowed Class Counsel to

act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the Settlement. (*Id.*)

C. Plaintiff's Counsel Has Substantial Class Action Experience

Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with litigating wage and hour class actions. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 26-35.) Class Counsel has substantial experience in all facets of litigation in state and federal court, including discovery, law and motion, trial, appeals, arbitration and mediation. Class Counsel has litigated numerous class actions on behalf of plaintiffs and have been lead counsel or otherwise exercised significant case handling responsibilities in numerous cases resulting in millions of dollars in class action settlements. (*Id.*)

Based on Class Counsel's experience as employment and class action attorneys, Class Counsel is eminently qualified to evaluate the strength of Plaintiff's claims, the strength of Defendant's defenses against certification, the strength of Defendant's defenses on the merits, and the fairness of the Settlement. Their opinion that final approval of the Settlement would be in the best interests of class members in light of the significant risks of litigation is entitled to great weight. (*See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 129 ["The court undoubtedly should give considerable weight to the competency and integrity of counsel and the involvement of a neutral mediator in assuring itself that a settlement agreement represents an arms' length transaction entered without self-dealing or other potential misconduct"].)

D. There Are No Objections to the Settlement

To date, no class member has objected to the Settlement, and no class member has requested exclusion from the Settlement. (Nava Decl., ¶¶ 11-12.) The overwhelmingly positive response of the class strongly supports final approval of the Settlement. (*See, e.g., In re Lifelock, Inc. Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation* (D. Ariz. 2010) 2010 WL 3715138, *6 [relatively few objections and requests for exclusion support approval].)

Factors to be considered in evaluating a class action settlement include "the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement." (*Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) The reaction here has been overwhelmingly positive. Courts have approved class action settlements in lesser circumstances. (*See, e.g., Hughes v. Microsoft Corp.* (W.D.Wash. 2001) 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5976, 2001 WL 34089697, *8 [court found that the "class members overwhelmingly

support[ed] the settlement” where there were over 37,000 notices sent out, 2,745 class members participated in the settlement, “only nine objections were submitted”, and there were 86 timely opt-outs and over 20 additional defective or untimely opt-outs, “these indicia of the approval of the class of the terms of the settlement support a finding of fairness under Rule 23”], *citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir.1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 [despite vigorous objections and appeal by objectors, the “fact that the overwhelming majority of the class willingly approved the offer and stayed in the class presents at least some objective positive commentary as to its fairness,” and the court did not abuse its discretion in approving settlement].)

IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD PLAINTIFF THE REQUESTED AMOUNTS OF FEES, COSTS AND ENHANCEMENT PAYMENTS.

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant has agreed to pay Class Counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of \$143,950.00, which is 1/3 of the Gross Settlement Amount, costs up to \$20,000.00 for litigating this action, and enhancement awards of \$15,000.00 to named Plaintiff Monica Ojeda. Defendant has also agreed that it would not oppose an application for these payments addressed above, and no class member has objected to these amounts.

In common fund cases like this one, the primary method California courts use for calculating attorneys’ fees is the percentage of the common fund method, which may be followed by a lodestar cross-check. In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, the California Supreme Court affirmed an award of 33 1/3% of a \$19 million wage and hour class action settlement with a 2.03 to 2.13 multiplier. (*Id.* at p. 506.) In doing so, the California Supreme Court explained:

As to the incentives a lodestar cross-check might create for class counsel, we emphasize the lodestar calculation, when used in this manner, ***does not override the trial court’s primary determination of the fee as a percentage of the common fund*** and thus ***does not impose an absolute maximum or minimum on the potential fee award***. If the multiplier calculated by means of a lodestar cross-check is extraordinarily high or low, the trial court should consider whether the percentage used should be adjusted so as to bring the imputed multiplier within a justifiable range, but the court is not necessarily required to make such an adjustment. Courts using the percentage method have generally weighed the time counsel spent on the case as an important factor in choosing a reasonable percentage to apply.

(*Id.* at p. 505, emphasis added; *see also* *Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels* (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017) 2017 WL 4310707, at *9 [applying *Laffitte* standard to fee request for 33 1/3% of common fund].)

A. A Fee Award Based on One-Third of the Common Fund is Standard

According to a leading treatise on class actions, “[n]o general rule can be articulated on what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented.” (*See* Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys’ fees at fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with *thirty to forty percent* commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also* *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50% was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

The settled-for 33 1/3% fee award is consistent with the average fee award in class actions. Indeed, the custom and practice in class actions is to award approximately one-third of a fund as a fee award. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) Thus, Plaintiff’s fee request is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. Accordingly, the Court should approve the attorneys’ fees requested herein.

B. While the Lodestar Method is Not Necessary in Common Fund Cases, Courts May Perform a Cross-Check to Award Fees.

Although California supports the common fund doctrine, the lodestar method can be used to cross-check fee awards. “It may be appropriate in some cases, assuming the class benefit can be monetized with a reasonable degree of certainty, to “cross-check” or adjust the lodestar in comparison to a percentage of the common fund to ensure that the fee awarded is reasonable and within the range of fees freely negotiated in the legal marketplace in comparable litigation.” (*In re Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557.)

Applying the lodestar method requires a two-step process. The first step is to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The second step is to apply a multiplier to the lodestar to take into account various factors. “The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (*Id.* at pp. 556-57.) “Under certain circumstances, a lodestar calculation may be enhanced on the basis of a percentage-of-the-benefit analysis.” (*Id.* at p. 557.)

Detailed timesheets are not necessary to a lodestar cross-check. “The law is clear ... that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel’s declarations, without production of detailed time records.” (*Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) As the California Supreme Court explained in *Laffitte*:

With regard to expenditure of judicial resources, we note that trial courts conducting lodestar cross-checks have generally not been required to closely scrutinize each claimed attorney-hour, but have instead used information on attorney time spent to “focus on the general question of whether the fee award appropriately reflects the degree of time and effort expended by the attorneys.”

(5 Newberg on Class Actions, *supra*, § 15:86, p. 331; *see, e.g., Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., supra*, 209 F.3d at p. 50 [2d Cir.; “where used as a mere cross-check, the hours documented by counsel need not be exhaustively scrutinized by the district court”]; *In re Prudential Ins. Co. America Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions* (3d Cir.1998) 148 F.3d 283, 342 [agreeing with district court that “detailed time summaries were unnecessary where, as here, it was merely using the lodestar calculation to double check its fee award.”]; *Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.* (E.D.Cal.2013) 297 F.R.D. 431, 451 [“Where the lodestar method is used as a cross-check to the percentage method, it can be performed with a less exhaustive cataloguing and review of counsel’s hours.”].)

(*Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal.5th at p. 505.)

Class Counsel’s lodestar is at least \$130,325 based on over 142 hours of work performed thus far. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 18-19.) Accordingly, the requested fee of \$143,950.00 is reasonable and fair as it is based on an approximate multiplier of 1.1. To be sure, trial courts have substantial discretion in adjusting the lodestar to account for various factors. (*See Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26, 39-45; *see also Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) In addition, it has been held that “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.”

(See *Wershba*, *supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; see also *Van Vranken*, *supra*, 901 F. Supp. At p. 298 “[m]ultipliers in the 3-4 range are common in lodestar awards for lengthy and complex class action litigation.”).) Similar multipliers have been found to be reasonable for Class Counsel. (See, e.g., *Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) No. 8:19-cv-02500-SB, 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [finding Wilshire Law Firm, PLC’s multiplier of 2.57 reasonable “in light of the contingent nature of recovery, the complexity of the issues, and the result obtained”].)

1. Class Counsel’s Rates Have Been Approved by Several Courts.

Class Counsel provides a declaration to support their lodestar hourly rates. “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” (*United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp.* (9th Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 403, 407.) Class Counsel has received final approval of their hourly rates in other wage and hour class action settlements.

2. Applying a Positive Multiplier Is Appropriate

Once this lodestar figure has been determined, the Court may take into account other “enhancement” factors to adjust the lodestar award. While Plaintiff seek a positive multiplier of 1.1 here, the overall reasonableness of Plaintiff’s request is underscored by the fact that a significantly higher multiplier would be justified under applicable law.

Contingency fees should be higher than fees for the same legal services paid concurrently with the provision of the services. (*Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33.) “A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.” (*Id.* at p. 1133.) Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is brought to redress important rights of vulnerable persons. (*Id.*) A risk enhancement is “earned compensation; unlike a windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous. Rather it is intended to approximate market-level compensation for such services which typically pay a premium for the risk of nonpayment or delay in payment of attorney’s fees.” (*Id.* at p. 1138.)

1 “Multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at
2 p. 255; *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512
3 [applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class action]; *Chavez, supra*, 162
4 Cal.App.4th at p. 60 [applying a 2.5 multiplier on a lodestar cross-check]; *Vizcaino v. Microsoft*
5 *Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 [“most” common fund cases apply a multiplier
6 of 1.0-4.0]; *Been v. O.K. Industries Inc.* (E.D. Okla. 2011) 2011 WL 4478766, *11, *citing* a
7 study “reporting [an] average multiplier of 3.89 in survey of 1,120 class action cases” and
8 finding that a multiplier of 2.43 would be “per se reasonable.”) The intermediate court in
9 *Laffitte*, after finding that “2 to 4” is a reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check,
10 affirmed a 2.13 multiplier. (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 860, 881-82.)
11 The intermediate court opinion was affirmed in full by the California Supreme Court in its new
12 decision guiding lower courts on assessing fees.

13 Factors considered in determining whether a lodestar multiplier is appropriate generally
14 include: (1) the risks presented by the contingent nature of the case; (2) the novelty and difficulty
15 of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the
16 nature of the opposition; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
17 acceptance of the case; and (5) the result obtained and the importance of the lawsuit to the
18 public. (*Serrano, supra*, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 48-49.) All of these factors favor approval of a
19 multiplier along the lines of those approved in the cases above.

20 The major consideration in determining the necessity of a multiplier is the contingent nature
21 of the award. (*Ketchum, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-33.) Further, the possibility of no recovery
22 is only one of the uncertainties involved in taking on such a case. Other uncertainties are the
23 amount that will be recovered, uncertainty as to the cost, both in effort and expenses, and
24 uncertainty about how much time will pass before the recovery is obtained. (*Id.* at pp. 1132-1133,
25 1138.) Here, Class Counsel have been the only counsel to represent Class Members in this matter
26 and have borne the entire risk and costs of litigation purely on a contingency basis. Class Counsel’s
27 outlay of time and money in this case has been significant.

28 The other factors are also present here. Class Counsel are skilled attorneys who have had

1 success in wage and hour class actions. This case required experienced and competent lawyers
2 and expertise in the issues presented herein. Defendant’s contentions underscore the risk of
3 prevailing at class certification and trial, and any of these obstacles could have prevented
4 recovery completely. Further, proceeding to trial would have added years to the resolution of
5 this case because of the difficult legal and factual issues raised and the likelihood of appeals.
6 Despite these risks, Class Counsel took this case on a contingency basis. Yet, there are only so
7 many cases that Class Counsel can take at any one time. Consequently, there were other
8 meritorious cases presented to Class Counsel that would have generated substantial fees, but
9 were declined, during the pendency of this action in order to devote the attention necessary to
10 achieve favorable results. (Haber Decl., ¶ 25.) Considered against the risks of continued
11 litigation, and the importance of the employment rights and a speedy recovery, the relief
12 provided under the Settlement represents a very strong result for the Class.

13 **C. Costs Are Reasonable.**

14 As of the date of filing this Motion, Class Counsel has incurred around \$15,466.81 in costs,
15 and Defendant has agreed that they will not oppose any cost award request up to \$20,000.00.
16 (Haber Decl., ¶ 25.) Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests reimbursement of up to
17 \$20,000.00 in costs. The categories of costs are set forth in the accompanying Declaration of
18 Benjamin H. Haber, and these costs are easily seen to be both reasonable and necessary.

19 Counsel can recover “out-of-pocket expenses that ‘would normally be charged to a fee
20 paying client’” including costs for “service of summons and complaint, service of trial
21 subpoenas, fee for defense expert at deposition, postage, investigator, copying costs, hotel bills,
22 meals, messenger service and employment record reproduction.” (*Harris v. Marhoefer* (9th Cir.
23 1994) 24 F.3d 16, 19.) Such costs are properly recoverable on motions for settlement approval.
24 (*See Nunez v. BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair Inc.* (S.D. Cal. 2017) 292 F. Supp. 3d 1018,
25 1057; *Rutti v. Lojack Corp.* (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012) No. CV 06–00350 DOC, 2012 WL
26 3151077, at *12 [“Expenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging, photocopying,
27 long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service, mediation,
28 exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.”].)

1 **D. The Enhancement Payments to the Plaintiff is Reasonable.**

2 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
3 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
4 members of the class.” (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186
5 Cal.App.4th 399, 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements
6 containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to
7 represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring
8 about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.) The
9 California Supreme Court has also noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory
10 rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect
11 employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) Plaintiff should therefore be
12 rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman*
13 *Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

14 Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay
15 a Class Representative Service Payment in the amount of \$15,000.00 to Plaintiff Monica Ojeda.
16 This amount is also in exchange for Plaintiff’s general releases of all claims against Defendant.
17 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration demonstrating her devotion to this case, including her efforts
18 assisting counsel in the case, communicating with counsel frequently for litigation, preparing for
19 mediation, and reviewing case-related documents. (*See, generally*, Declaration of Plaintiff
20 submitted in support of Motion for Preliminary Approval.)

21 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
22 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a **2006** study examining the average incentive
23 award given to class action plaintiffs from **1993 to 2002** found that the “average award per class
24 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Theodore
25 Eisenberg & Jeffrey P. Miller, “Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study”,
26 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303, 1308 (2006).) Courts routinely approve a \$10,000 enhancement award
27 for plaintiffs represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno, supra*, 2021 WL 3673845 at *3
28 [“The Court concludes a \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez, supra*, 2024 WL

1 150721 at p. *4 [“The court approves awards of \$10,000 for each class representative.”].)

2 “Since without a named plaintiff there can be no class action, such compensation as may
3 be necessary to induce him to participate in the suit.” (*Clark v. Am. Residential Services LLC*
4 (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive
5 awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have
6 incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Id.* at p. 806.) “An incentive
7 award is appropriate ‘if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit.’”
8 (*Cellphone Term. Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1394, *quoting Clark*, 175
9 Cal.App.4th at p. 804.) The “criteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an
10 incentive award include: (1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both
11 financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class
12 representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the
13 duration of the litigation; and (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class
14 representative as a result of the litigation.” (*Id.* at pp. 1394–95.) Plaintiff’s declaration
15 describes how each of the five *Cellphone Termination* factors are present here.

16 **E. Administration Expenses Should be Approved.**

17 Apex Class Action Administration, the Settlement Administrator, estimates that it will
18 incur a total of \$5,000.00 in costs associated with the administration of this Settlement. (Nava
19 Decl., ¶ 19.) These expenses are reasonable, based upon the size of the class, claim and exclusion
20 tracking, and Class Member payment processing.

21 **V. CONCLUSION**

22 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant final approval
23 of the proposed settlement.

24 ///

25 ///

26 ///


27 ///

28 ///

1 Dated: December 2, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

2 **WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

3 

4 Benjamin H. Haber
5 Daniel J. Kramer
6 Alan Wilcox
7 Lucy Nguyen

8 Attorneys for Plaintiff