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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA**

MILES JOURDAN, individually, and on behalf  
of all others similarly situated,

*Plaintiff,*

v.

ONE THE CHEESE STEAK SHOP, LLC, a  
California limited liability company; and DOES  
1 through 10, inclusive,

*Defendants.*

Case No.: 23CV048329

[Related Case No.: 24CV075887]

*[Assigned for All Purposes to the Hon.  
Patrick McKinney, Dept. 18]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION  
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY  
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND  
PAGA SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM  
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

Preliminary Approval Hearing:

Date: May 5, 2026

Time: 1:30 p.m.

Dept: 18

Reservation ID: 930703779782

Action Filed: October 18, 2023

**TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

**PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on May 5, 2026, at 1:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department 18 of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, Administration Building, located at 1221 Oak Street, Oakland, California 94612, Plaintiff Miles Jourdan (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) will and hereby does move this Court for an Order:

1. Granting preliminary approval of the proposed Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Settlement”);
2. Conditionally certifying the proposed Class for settlement purposes only;
3. Appointing Plaintiff Miles Jourdan as the Class Representative;
4. Appointing John G. Yslas, Jeffrey C. Bils, Mohamed Bholat, Emily K. Borman, and Courtney M. Miller of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel;
5. Appointing Apex Class Action LLC as the Settlement Administrator; and
6. Setting a final approval hearing date.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.769(d) and (e), this Motion is made on the grounds that the proposed Settlement satisfies all criteria for preliminary approval and falls well within the range of reasonableness. The Settlement was reached through informed, arm’s length bargaining between experienced attorneys with the assistance of an experienced neutral, and Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Class.

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This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of John G. Yslas, the Declaration of Miles Jourdan, and on all records and documents on file, together with such oral and documentary evidence that may be presented at the hearing on this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: March 17, 2026

**WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

By: /s/ Courtney M. Miller  
Courtney M. Miller  
 Attorneys for Plaintiff

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## **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

### **I. INTRODUCTION**

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.769(d) and (e), Plaintiff Miles Jourdan (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of a class action settlement of wage and hour claims, including representative claims brought under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”), against Defendant One the Cheese Steak Shop, LLC (hereinafter “Defendant”). The proposed Class is defined as all persons who worked for Defendant in California as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee (“Class Members”) at any time during the period from April 23, 2019, through May 13, 2025 (“Class Period”). The main terms of the Settlement are as follows:

1. A Gross Settlement Amount of \$391,160.00, which will be distributed to approximately 646 Class Members on a pro rata basis according to the total Workweeks worked by each Class Member during the Class Period;
2. Attorneys’ fees of up to one third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently estimated to be \$130,386.67) and up to \$27,000.00 in reimbursement of litigation costs to Plaintiff’s Counsel;
3. A Class Representative Service Payment of up to \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff;
4. Costs of settlement administration of up to \$10,250.00; and
5. Allocation of \$20,000.00 to PAGA penalties, seventy-five percent (75%) of which (\$15,000.00) will be paid to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”), and twenty-five percent (25%) of which (\$5,000.00) will be paid to all persons who worked for Defendant in California as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee (“Aggrieved Employees”) at any time during the period from March 12, 2023, through May 13, 2025 (“PAGA Period”).

The Settlement meets all criteria for preliminary approval and falls within the range of reasonableness given the risks and expenses of further litigation. The Settlement was reached through informed, arm’s length bargaining between experienced attorneys with the assistance of an experienced neutral. As such, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant preliminary approval of the Settlement, conditionally certify the Class for settlement purposes only, appoint Plaintiff as the

Class Representative, appoint Plaintiff's Counsel as Class Counsel, appoint Apex Class Action LLC as the Settlement Administrator, authorize the Settlement Administrator to administer notice of the Settlement to the Class, and set a final approval hearing date.

## **II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

On October 18, 2023, Plaintiff Miles Jourdan ("Plaintiff") filed this putative class action against Defendant One the Cheese Steak Shop, LLC ("Defendant") alleging: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; (8) failure to produce requested employment records; and (9) unfair business practices ("Class Action"). Declaration of John G. Yslas in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement ("MPA") ("Yslas Decl.") at ¶ 3.

On March 12, 2024, Plaintiff provided written notice to the LWDA and Defendant of the specific provisions the Labor Code alleged to have been violated, including the facts and theories in support. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 4, Exhibit 1. The LWDA did not notify Plaintiff that it intended to investigate within 65 days of this written notice. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 4. Therefore, on May 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed a separate representative action against Defendant for civil penalties under PAGA in the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, Case No. 24CV075887 ("PAGA Action"). Yslas Decl. at ¶ 5. On September 19, 2024, the Court deemed this Class Action and the PAGA Action related. *Id.* The Parties have agreed to file stipulations to consolidate the Class Action and PAGA Action for settlement purposes prior to the hearing for this Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement. *Id.*

On March 14, 2025, the Parties participated in a private full-day mediation with mediator, Todd Smith, Esq. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 6. The negotiations were adversarial, conducted at arm's length, and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interests of their clients. *Id.* The Parties accepted a mediator's proposal that day and agreed upon general settlement terms. *Id.*

The Parties negotiated the terms of the Settlement over the next few months, which was finalized in November 2025. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 7, Exhibit 2 ("Settlement Agreement"). On March 5,

2026, Plaintiff submitted a copy of the Settlement Agreement to the LWDA. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 8, Exhibit 3.

### **III. SUMMARY OF THE SETTLEMENT TERMS**

#### **A. Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

The parties have agreed to settle the claims alleged in this Class Action and PAGA Action for a Gross Settlement Amount of \$391,160.00. Settlement Agreement at § 3.1. Subject to Court approval, the following payments will be deducted from the Gross Settlement Amount: (1) a Class Representative Service Payment of up to \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff; (2) attorneys' fees of up to one third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently estimated to be \$130,386.67) and reimbursement of litigation costs of up to \$27,000.00 to Plaintiff's Counsel; (3) costs of settlement administration of up to \$10,250.00 to Apex Class Action LLC; (4) individual class payments to Class Members; and (5) PAGA penalties in the amount of \$20,000.00, which will be allocated 75% to the LWDA (\$15,000.00) and 25% to Aggrieved Employees (\$5,000.00). *Id.* at § 3.2. After all requested deductions are made, the remaining Net Settlement Amount is currently estimated to be \$196,023.33. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 21.

Individual class payments will be calculated based on the number of workweeks worked by each Class Member during the Class Period. Settlement Agreement at § 3.3.3. For tax purposes, the individual class payments will be allocated 20% to wages and 80% to interest, reimbursement, and penalties. *Id.* at § 3.3.3.1. Defendant will separately pay any and all employer payroll taxes owed on the wage positions of the individual class payments separate from the Gross Settlement Amount. *Id.* at 3.1.

Individual PAGA Payments to Aggrieved Employees will be calculated based on the number of PAGA Pay Periods worked by each Aggrieved Employee during the PAGA Period. *Id.* at § 3.3.4.1. For tax purposes, the Individual PAGA Payments will be allocated 100% to penalties. *Id.* at § 3.3.4.2.

Any deductions not approved by the Court will be retained by the Settlement Administrator in the Net Settlement Amount. *Id.* at §§ 3.2.1, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.4.2. Subject to Court approval, funds from any uncashed checks and accrued interest, if any, shall be distributed to the University of

1 California School of Law San Francisco Workers' Rights Clinic. *Id.* at § 4.4.3. None of the Gross  
2 Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant. *Id.* at § 3.1.

3 **B. Proposed Settlement Administration**

4 The parties' proposed Class Notice complies with the requirements of California Rules of  
5 Court, rule 3.766(d). *See* Exhibit A to Settlement Agreement. It provides information regarding  
6 the nature of this lawsuit, a summary of the settlement terms, the formula used for calculating  
7 individual class and PAGA payments and instructions to dispute the calculations, instructions on  
8 how to opt-out of or object to the Settlement, the date, time, and location of the final approval  
9 hearing, and the amounts sought for the class representative service payment, attorneys' fees and  
10 litigation costs, and settlement administration costs. *See generally, id.* The Class Notice also  
11 notifies Class Members that they do not need to submit a claim in order to participate in the  
12 Settlement and receive a payment. *See id.* The Settlement Administrator will mail Class Members  
13 the Class Notice by first-class mail in both English and Spanish. Settlement Agreement at § 7.5.2.

14 If a Class Notice is returned as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator will re-mail the  
15 Class Notice within five (5) days to the forwarding address provided by the U.S. Postal Service.  
16 *Id.* at § 7.5.3. If no forwarding address is provided, the Settlement Administrator will conduct a  
17 Class Member Address Search and re-mail the Class Notice to the most current address obtained.  
18 *Id.* The deadline to opt-out of the Settlement or to submit an objection or dispute will be extended  
19 by 14 days beyond the 45 days provided in the Class Notice for all Class Members whose Class  
20 Notice was remailed. *Id.* at § 7.5.4. <sup>1</sup>

21 **C. Proposed Releases**

22 Effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount and  
23 all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments, Plaintiff,  
24 Class Members, Plaintiff as a proxy for the LWDA, and Class Counsel will release claims against  
25 all Released Parties as follows:

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27 <sup>1</sup> The Parties have agreed to 45 days for the Class Notice, as referenced throughout the  
28 Settlement Agreement. The reference to a 60-day response deadline in Section 1.45 of the  
Settlement Agreement, was a scrivener's error.

1       Released Class Claims:

2       All Participating Class Members will release all claims, rights, demands, liabilities, and  
3       causes of action, alleged or which could have reasonably been alleged based on the facts  
4       alleged in the operative Complaint, including but not limited to: (1) failure to pay minimum  
5       and straight time wages (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, 1197 and  
6       1197.1); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 510, 1194, and  
7       1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512);  
8       (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.7); (5)  
9       failure to timely pay final wages at termination (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 201-203);  
10       (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§  
11       226); (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§  
12       2802); (8) failure to produce requested employment records (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code  
13       §§ 226, 432, and 1198.5); and (9) unfair business practices (pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof.  
14       Code §§ 17200, *et seq.*). The enumeration of these specific claims shall neither enlarge nor  
15       narrow the scope of *res judicata* based on the claims that were asserted in the Action or  
16       could have been asserted in the Action based on the facts and circumstances alleged in the  
17       Complaint. The Released Class Claims are those that accrued during the Class Period.

18       Settlement Agreement at § 5.2.

19       Release by Named Plaintiff as Proxy or Agent of the LWDA:

20       Upon the Effective Date, the LWDA, by and through Plaintiff as an agent and proxy of the  
21       LWDA, will release all claims for PAGA civil penalties that are alleged or reasonably could  
22       have been alleged based on the facts alleged in the operative Complaint and in Plaintiff's  
23       March 12, 2024 PAGA Notice, including but not limited to: (1) failure to pay minimum  
24       and straight time wages (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 204, 210, 510, 1194, 1194.2, 1197  
25       and 1197.1); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 510, 1194  
26       and 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 210, 226.7  
27       and 512); (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§  
28       210 and 226.7); (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination (pursuant to Cal. Labor  
Code §§ 201 – 203 and 213(d)); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements  
(pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 226 and 226.3); (7) failure to indemnify employees for  
expenditures (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code § 2802); (8) failure to produce requested  
employment records (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 226, 432, and 1198.5); (9) failure to  
pay all earned wages twice per month and unlawfully withholding accrued wages (pursuant  
to Cal. Labor Code §§ 204, 210 and 216); (10) failure to maintain accurate records of hours  
worked and meal periods (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 1174, and 1174.5); (11)  
recordkeeping requirement violations (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.6, 558.1, 1174,  
1174.5, 1198 and 1199); (12) willful misclassification (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §  
226.8); (13) retaliation (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5); and (14) civil penalties for  
wage and hour violations (pursuant to Cal. Labor Code § 558). The Released PAGA Claims  
are those that accrued during the PAGA Period.

29       Settlement Agreement at § 5.3.

30       “Released Parties” means Defendant. Settlement Agreement at § 1.43.

31       Only Plaintiff will agree to a general release and a waiver of Civil Code § 1542. *Id.* at  
32       §§ 5.1, 5.1.1.

33       ///

1 **IV. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT MEETS ALL CRITERIA FOR**  
2 **PRELIMINARY APPROVAL**

3 **A. Provisional Certification of the Class is Appropriate**

4 Class certification is appropriate when there is: (1) an ascertainable and sufficiently  
5 numerous class; (2) a well-defined community of interest among class members; and (3) substantial  
6 benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives. *Brinker*  
7 *Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021 (2012). Although courts still need to  
8 review and consider each element for certification, a lesser standard can be used to provisionally  
9 certify a settlement class. *Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court*, 113 Cal.App.4th  
10 836, 859 (2003).

11 **1. The Proposed Class is Numerous and Ascertainable**

12 “Ascertainability” is determined by examining the class definition and the size of the class,  
13 and may also involve examining the means available to identify class members. *Noel v. Thrifty*  
14 *Payless, Inc.*, 7 Cal.5th 955, 980-981, 985-986 (2019). As the settlement eliminates the need for  
15 trial, “the case management issues inherent in the ascertainable class determination need not be  
16 confronted.” *Global Minerals*, 113 Cal.App.4th at 859. Further, under California law, there is no  
17 minimum number of class members for maintenance of a class action. *Hendershot v. Ready to Roll*  
18 *Transp., Inc.*, 228 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1222 (2014). Class sizes as small as 10 have been permitted.  
19 *Rose v. City of Hayward*, 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934 (1981), disapproved on other grounds by *Noel*,  
20 7 Cal.5th at 986.

21 The Class here consists of all persons who worked for Defendant in California as an hourly-  
22 paid or non-exempt employee at any time during the Class Period. *See* Settlement Agreement at  
23 §§ 1.5, 1.13. The Class is also readily ascertainable from Defendant’s business records, because  
24 all Class Members are or were employees of Defendant. *Id.* Defendant’s records show there are  
25 approximately 646 Class Members, making joinder of all Class Members impracticable. Yslas  
26 Decl. at ¶ 10.

27 **2. A Well-Defined Community of Interest Exists**

28 The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common

1 questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and  
2 (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. *Brinker*, 53 Cal.4th at 1021.

3 **a. Common Questions Predominate**

4 In determining whether common issues “predominate,” courts consider both plaintiff’s  
5 legal theories and defendant’s affirmative defenses. *Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n*, 59 Cal.4th 1,  
6 28-29 (2014). The “predominate common questions” factor does not require that all class members  
7 have identical claims. *Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc.*, 59 Cal.4th 522, 530 (2014).  
8 Rather, the focus is on whether issues shared by the class members are sufficiently uniform to  
9 permit class-wide assessment, and whether individual variations in proof on those issues are  
10 manageable. *Id.*

11 Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant maintained common employment policies and/or  
12 practices that unlawfully deprived Class Members of wages, meal periods, rest periods,  
13 reimbursements for business expenses, accurate wage statements, timely payment of wages upon  
14 separation of employment, and timely production of employment records. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 11.  
15 These allegations present common factual and legal questions of, *inter alia*, whether Defendant  
16 applied the same scheduling, timekeeping, pay, meal period, rest period, reimbursement, and  
17 employment record production policies to all Class Members, whether these policies and practices  
18 resulted in Labor Code violations, whether Defendant’s conduct was intentional, and whether Class  
19 Members are entitled to damages and/or penalties. *Id.* These common questions could be resolved  
20 using Class Members’ time records, payroll records, testimony from Defendant’s designated  
21 representative(s), and Class Members’ testimony. *Id.* Therefore, the Court can and should exercise  
22 its discretion to grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes.

23 **b. Plaintiff is Typical of the Class**

24 Typicality does not require that the representative plaintiff’s claims and those of the class  
25 members be identical or perfectly aligned. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224,  
26 228 (2001), disapproved on other grounds by *Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.*, 4 Cal.5th  
27 260, 269-280 (2018). Typicality does not require that a plaintiff’s claims be identical to those of  
28 other class members, only that their claims and the defenses applicable to them are sufficiently

1 similar to those of other class members that a named plaintiff is able to adequately represent the  
2 class and focus on common issues. *Medraza v. Honda of North Hollywood*, 166 Cal.App.4th 89,  
3 99 (2008).

4 Plaintiff has alleged that he and Class Members were employed by the same Defendant and  
5 injured by Defendant's common wage and hour policies and practices, including Defendant's  
6 scheduling, timekeeping, pay, meal period, rest period, reimbursement, and employment record  
7 production policies. *See* Yslas Decl. at ¶ 11. Through informal discovery, Plaintiff confirmed that  
8 these challenged policies and practices applied to Plaintiff and other Class Members alike. *See id.*  
9 at ¶ 9. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims and Class Members' claims arise from the same challenged  
10 employment policies and practices and are based on the same legal theories.

11 **c. Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Counsel Will Adequately Represent the**  
12 **Class**

13 Certification requires adequacy of both the proposed class representative and of the  
14 proposed class counsel. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 382. "Only a conflict that goes to the very subject  
15 matter of the litigation will defeat a party's claim of representative status." *Richmond v. Dart*  
16 *Industries*, 29 Cal.3d 462, 470 (1981). Only conflicts that are "irreconcilable" can defeat adequacy.  
17 *Nat'l Solar Equip. Owners' Ass'n v. Grumman Corp.*, 235 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1286 (1991). The  
18 proposed representative Plaintiff and proposed Class Counsel present no such conflict.

19 Plaintiff's interests are coextensive with Class Members' interests. Declaration of Miles  
20 Jourdan in Support of Plaintiff's MPA ("Jourdan Decl.") at ¶ 6. Plaintiff has demonstrated an  
21 ability to advocate for the interests of Class Members by initiating this lawsuit, providing  
22 information and documentation to his attorneys, meeting with his attorneys regarding the claims,  
23 making himself available the day of mediation to answer questions, and reviewing the proposed  
24 Settlement. Jourdan Decl. at ¶ 7.

25 Likewise, Wilshire Law Firm, PLC has expended considerable time and effort on this case  
26 and will continue to do so through final approval. *See generally*, Yslas Decl. Therefore, Plaintiff  
27 should be appointed Class Representative, and his counsel should be appointed Class Counsel.

28 ///

### 3. A Class Action is Superior to a Multitude of Individual Lawsuits

Courts have held that class treatment of wage and hour claims is clearly “superior to the other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” *Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 211 Cal.App.3d 758, 772-773 (1989). This is so because “[p]ublic policy has long favored the ‘full and prompt payment of wages due an employee.’” *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.4th 319, 340 (2004). Here, a class action is superior to a multitude of individual lawsuits. Given the size and amount of each Class Members’ claim, Class Members have little incentive to litigate their claims on an individual basis because the out-of-pocket expenses and personal commitment necessary to litigate each claim likely outweigh any potential recovery. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 10. Therefore, a class action is the superior method for seeking relief.

#### B. The Settlement Meets the Standards for Preliminary Approval

The moving party must demonstrate that “the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable.” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 126 (2008). “In determining whether a class settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, such as the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 244-245 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

#### 1. The Settlement is Entitled to a Presumption of Fairness

A settlement is entitled to “a presumption of fairness . . . where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996). The Settlement here satisfies the first three factors. Plaintiff will analyze the fourth factor at final approval after Class Members have been notified of the Settlement and provided with an

1 opportunity to object.

2 **a. The Settlement is the Result of Arm's Length Negotiation**

3 Courts have recognized that the involvement of a respected mediator provides a high degree  
4 of assurance that the settlement is the result of arm's length bargaining. *See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*,  
5 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 52-53 (2008). The Settlement in this matter was the product of a full-day  
6 mediation session with a respected mediator. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 6. The negotiations were adversarial,  
7 conducted at arm's length, and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interests of their  
8 clients. *Id.*

9 **b. Sufficient Investigation and Discovery Have Been Conducted**

10 Prior to attending mediation, Plaintiff's Counsel thoroughly investigated the claims,  
11 applicable law, and potential defenses. *Id.* at ¶ 9. Plaintiff's Counsel assessed the value to the class  
12 claims using the data and documents Defendant produced in informal discovery. *Id.* The data and  
13 documents produced by Defendant included the number of Class Members and Aggrieved  
14 Employees, the number of workweeks in the Class Period, and the number of pay periods in the  
15 PAGA Period, the average rate of pay, documents concerning Plaintiff, Defendant's written wage-  
16 and-hour policies, and a sampling of Class Members' time and payroll records. *Id.* Plaintiff's  
17 Counsel engaged an expert to quantify the potential exposure using the time and payroll records,  
18 and then assessed the risks associated with each claim meriting reductions in the likely success at  
19 class certification and likely recovery at trial. *Id.*

20 **c. Plaintiff's Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation**

21 Plaintiff is represented by Wilshire Law Firm, PLC. *Id.* at ¶ 1. Plaintiff's Counsel has  
22 extensive experience litigating wage-and-hour class actions on behalf of employees. *See id.* at  
23 ¶¶ 22-33. Plaintiff's Counsel has been involved as counsel in numerous class actions that have  
24 resulted in millions of dollars in recovery. *See id.*

25 **2. The Settlement is Reasonable Given the Strengths of Plaintiff's**  
26 **Claims and the Risks and Expense of Further Litigation**

27 A settlement does not have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be considered fair  
28 and reasonable. *See Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1139 (1991). Although

1 the exposure Plaintiff's Counsel calculated is substantial, the various risks at succeeding at class  
2 certification and through trial affected the valuation of the claims for settlement purposes. Yslas  
3 Decl. at ¶ 12. Based on an analysis of the facts and legal contentions in this case, documents and  
4 information from Defendant, Plaintiff's Counsel evaluated Defendant's maximum exposure. *Id.*  
5 Plaintiff's Counsel took into account the risk of not having the claims certified and the risk of not  
6 having prevailed at trial, even if the claims are certified. *Id.* After using the data Defendant  
7 provided, including class member timekeeping and payroll records, as well as class member  
8 demographics, with the assistance of a statistics expert, Plaintiff's Counsel created a damages  
9 model to evaluate the realistic range of potential recovery for the class. *Id.*

10 Minimum and Overtime Wages: Plaintiff's unpaid minimum and overtime wage claims  
11 were based on the allegation that Defendant required Class Members to routinely perform work  
12 duties off the clock. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 13. For example, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant required him  
13 and other Class Members to complete tasks before clocking in at the start of their shifts and called  
14 them while off-the-clock to discuss scheduling and other work tasks, all without compensation. *Id.*  
15 Based on these allegations, Plaintiff's Counsel conservatively estimated that Class Members  
16 worked one (1) hour off the clock per week as overtime in calculating potential exposure to be  
17 approximately \$453,123.30 for these claims (17,780 workweeks x \$16.99 hourly rate x 1.5  
18 overtime rate of pay x 1.00 hour of unpaid work per workweek). *Id.* Because this claim would have  
19 relied heavily on Class Member testimony and would not be evidenced in Defendant's time and  
20 payroll records, the risk of succeeding at class certification was substantial. *Id.* Accordingly,  
21 Plaintiff's Counsel applied a risk discount based on a 40% chance of succeeding at class  
22 certification and a 40% chance of succeeding at trial on the merits, yielding a realistic damage  
23 estimate of approximately \$72,499.73 (\$453,123.30 x 40% x 40%). *Id.*

24 Meal Periods: Plaintiff's meal period claim was based on the allegation that Defendant  
25 failed to provide Class Members with legally compliant meal periods or pay meal period premiums  
26 in lieu thereof. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 14. For example, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant regularly required  
27 him and other Class Members to work through their recorded meal periods. *Id.* Additionally,  
28 Plaintiff's Counsel's expert found a facial violation rate of approximately 44% in Defendant's time

1 and payroll records for shifts greater than five (5) hours. *Id.* Therefore, potential liability for the  
2 meal period claims is approximately \$374,774.25 (50,133 shifts greater than 5 hours x \$16.99  
3 hourly rate x 44% violation rate). *Id.* However, Defendant argued that Class Members were  
4 covered by meal period waivers. *Id.* Accordingly, Plaintiff's Counsel applied a risk discount based  
5 on a 50% chance of succeeding at class certification and a 40% chance of succeeding at trial on  
6 the merits, yielding a realistic damage estimate of approximately \$74,954.85 ( $\$374,774.25 \times 50\%$   
7  $\times 40\%$ ). *Id.*

8 Rest Periods: Plaintiff's rest period claim was based on the allegation that Defendant failed  
9 to provide Class Members with legally compliant rest periods or pay rest period premiums in lieu  
10 thereof. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 15. For example, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant regularly failed to  
11 provide him and other Class Members with interrupted duty-free rest periods. *Id.* Based on these  
12 allegations, Plaintiff's Counsel applied a 100% violation rate to all shifts of 3.5 hours or longer.  
13 *Id.* Therefore, potential liability for the rest period claims is approximately \$1,289,524.01 (75,899  
14 shifts of 3.5 hours or longer x \$16.99 hourly rate x 100% violation rate). *Id.* However, Plaintiff's  
15 Counsel discounted this figure to account for the difficulty of certifying and proving rest period  
16 claims, particularly because rest periods do not have to be recorded, and to account for the  
17 possibility of Class Members voluntarily choosing to forego a rest period. *Id.* Because this claim  
18 would have relied exclusively on Class Member testimony, Plaintiff's Counsel discounted this  
19 claim based on a 30% chance of succeeding at class certification and a 20% chance of succeeding  
20 at trial, yielding a realistic damage estimate of approximately \$77,371.44 ( $\$1,289,524.01 \times 30\% \times$   
21  $20\%$ ). *Id.*

22 Reimbursements: Plaintiff's reimbursement claim was based on the allegation that  
23 Defendant failed to indemnify Class Members for expenses incurred as a direct result of performing  
24 their job duties for Defendant. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 16. For example, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant  
25 failed to reimburse him and other Class Members for mandatory personal cell phone use for work  
26 purposes and for gas and mileage when using their personal vehicle to deliver ingredients to  
27 Defendant's nearby stores. *Id.* For purposes of calculating Defendant's liability based on a best-  
28 case scenario for Plaintiff and the Class, Plaintiff's Counsel estimated that Defendant were liable

1 to each class member for \$30 per month, or \$7.50 per workweek, in unreimbursed expenses, for a  
2 total amount of approximately \$133,350.00 ( $\$7.50 \times 17,780$  workweeks). *Id.* Plaintiff's Counsel  
3 discounted this figure based on an evaluation of a 30% chance of succeeding at class certification  
4 and a 30% chance of succeeding at trial to account for the difficulty of certifying and proving  
5 expense reimbursement claims, yielding a realistic damage estimate of approximately \$12,001.50  
6 ( $\$133,350.00 \times 30\% \times 30\%$ ). *Id.*

7 In sum, Plaintiff's Counsel estimated that Plaintiff's maximum recovery for the off-the-  
8 clock claim, meal period violations, and rest period violations (i.e., the wage claims) is  
9 approximately \$2.12 million, but after factoring in the risk and uncertainty of certification and  
10 prevailing at trial, Plaintiff's Counsel estimates that Plaintiff's realistic estimated recovery for  
11 these non-penalty wage claims is approximately \$224,826.02. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 17.

12 Derivative Penalties: Plaintiff alleged that as a result of Defendant's failure to pay all wages  
13 owed, Defendant owed waiting time penalties and wage statement penalties. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 18.  
14 With respect to Plaintiff's derivative claims for statutory penalties, Plaintiff's Counsel estimated  
15 that Defendant's realistic potential liability is approximately \$112,355.06. *Id.* Defendant's  
16 maximum potential liability for waiting time penalties is approximately \$1,428,434.25 ( $475$   
17  $\text{employees} \times \$16.99 \text{ hourly rate} \times 5.90 \text{ hours/day} \times 30 \text{ days}$ ) based on approximately 475 formerly  
18 employed class members during the 3-year statute of limitations period and an average shift length  
19 of 5.90 hours. *Id.* Defendant's maximum potential liability for inaccurate wage statements is  
20 approximately \$444,150.00 ( $[333 \text{ employees} \times 1 \text{ initial violation/employee} \times \$50 \text{ for an initial}$   
21  $\text{violation}] + [(4,608 \text{ pay periods} - 333 \text{ initial violations}) \times \$100 \text{ for each subsequent violation}]$ )  
22 based on approximately 333 class members who worked during the 1-year statute of limitations  
23 period and approximately 4,608 pay periods in that statutory timeframe. *Id.* In light of the  
24 foregoing, Plaintiff's Counsel believes that it would be unrealistic to expect the Court to award the  
25 full \$1,872,584.25 in statutory penalties given Defendant's defenses, the contested nature of  
26 Plaintiff's claims, the challenges of establishing willfulness as applicable, and the discretionary  
27 nature of penalties. *Id.* Considering that the underlying wage claims are realistically estimated to  
28 be approximately \$224,826.02, such a disproportionate award would also raise due process

1 concerns. *Id.* As such, Plaintiff's counsel discounted these figures to account for the risk and  
2 uncertainty of obtaining class certification and prevailing at trial, resulting in a realistic evaluation  
3 of approximately \$85,706.06 for waiting time penalty claims ( $\$1,428,434.25 \times 30\% \times 20\%$ ), and  
4 approximately \$26,649.00 for wage statement penalty claims ( $\$444,150.00 \times 30\% \times 20\%$ ), or  
5 approximately \$112,355.06 total for statutory penalties. *Id.*

6 PAGA: For the PAGA claim, Plaintiff's Counsel determined that Defendant's potential  
7 exposure could potentially reach \$384,700.00, assuming the initial \$100 penalty would apply for  
8 each of the 3,847 pay periods in the PAGA Period. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 19. However, even assuming  
9 success on the merits of each claim, PAGA gives the Court discretion to reduce penalties for a  
10 variety of reasons, including where to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary  
11 and oppressive, or confiscatory. *Id.* As such, Plaintiff's counsel discounted this figure to account  
12 for the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at trial, resulting in a realistic evaluation of approximately  
13 \$38,470.00 for PAGA penalties ( $\$384,700.00 \times 10\%$ ). *Id.* The settlement allocates \$20,000.00 of  
14 the Gross Settlement Amount to PAGA, therefore the PAGA allocation amounts to 5.1% of the  
15 Gross Settlement Amount and approximately 52% of the realistic maximum damages for PAGA  
16 penalties ( $\$20,000.00 / \$38,470.00$ ). *Id.*

17 Using these estimated figures, Plaintiff's Counsel predicted that the realistic maximum  
18 recovery for all claims, including penalties, would be approximately \$387,652.58. Yslas Decl. at  
19 ¶ 20. This means that the gross settlement figure represents approximately 101% of the realistic  
20 maximum recovery ( $\$391,160.00 / \$387,652.58$ ). *Id.* Considering the risk and uncertainty of  
21 prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. *Id.* Indeed,  
22 because of the proposed Settlement, Class Members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will  
23 avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. *Id.*

24 Based on the figures in the Settlement Agreement, the Net Settlement Amount available for  
25 class settlement payments is currently estimated to be \$196,023.33 for approximately 646 Class  
26 Members. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 21. As a result, each Settlement Class Member would be eligible to  
27 receive an average net benefit of approximately \$303.44. *Id.* Based on the estimated Net Settlement  
28 Amount available for individual class payments and there being approximately 17,780 workweeks

1 in the Class Period, the estimated weekly valuation for individual class payments is \$11.02  
2 (\$196,023.33/ 17,780 workweeks). *Id.*

3 **C. The Requested Service Payment is Reasonable**

4 Plaintiff seeks a class representative service payment of up to \$7,500.00 for accepting the  
5 responsibilities of representing the interests of the Class and potential costs that were not borne by  
6 any other Class Members. Settlement Agreement at § 3.2.1. A named plaintiff is eligible for  
7 payment that reasonably compensates him or her for undertaking and fulfilling a fiduciary duty to  
8 represent absent class members. *See Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 186 Cal.App.4th 1380,  
9 1393 (2010); *Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 115 Cal.App.4th 715, 726 (2004).

10 Throughout this case, Plaintiff assisted counsel in providing information necessary to  
11 prosecute the claims, meeting with counsel regarding the claims, maintaining regular contact with  
12 counsel, making himself available the day of mediation to answer questions, and reviewing the  
13 Settlement to ensure it was fair to the Class. Jourdan Decl. at ¶ 7. No action would likely have been  
14 taken by Class Members individually and no compensation would have been recovered for them,  
15 but for Plaintiff's services on behalf of the Class. By actively pursuing this action, Plaintiff  
16 furthered the California public policy goal of enforcing the State's wage and hour laws. *See Sav-*  
17 *On*, 34 Cal.4th at 340. The requested class representative service payments are reasonable and  
18 should be preliminarily approved. Plaintiff has provided a declaration regarding his work  
19 performed to date and will provide additional information as requested or required by the Court at  
20 final approval.

21 **D. The Requested Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

22 The purpose of an attorneys' fee award in class action litigation is to reward counsel who  
23 invested in a case despite the risk of non-payment and achieved a substantial positive result for the  
24 class. California courts routinely award attorneys' fees equaling one third or more of the potential  
25 value of the common fund. *See Chavez*, 162 Cal.App.4th at 66, fn. 11 ("Empirical studies show  
26 that, regardless of whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in  
27 class actions average around one-third of the recovery.").

28 Additionally, courts utilize "multipliers" to account for the risk of taking on cases where

1 there is no guarantee of recovery, uncertainties as the amount that will be recovered, uncertainty  
2 as to the cost of litigating the case (both in effort and expenses), and uncertainty about how much  
3 time will pass before the recovery is obtained. *Ketchum v. Moses*, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33 (2001);  
4 *see also Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 48-49 (1977) (approving the adjustment of the lodestar  
5 figure based on factors specific to the case to ensure fair market value for legal services provided  
6 on a contingency basis). Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is  
7 brought to redress important rights of vulnerable persons. *Ketchum*, 24 Cal.4th at 1133.

8 Generally, “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” *Wershba v. Apple*  
9 *Computers, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255 (2001); *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases*,  
10 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (2009) (applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class  
11 action); *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 60 (2008) (applying a 2.5 multiplier on a  
12 lodestar cross-check); *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002)  
13 (“most” common fund cases apply a multiplier of 1.0-4.0); *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l*, 231  
14 Cal.App.4th 860, 881-82 (2004) (affirming a 2.13 multiplier after finding that “2 to 4” is a  
15 reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check). *See also Bronshteyn v. State of California –*  
16 *Department of Consumer Affairs*, 114 Cal.App.5th 537 (2025) (court did not abuse its discretion  
17 by awarding 1.75 multiplier for fees incurred up to and including the jury verdict and a 1.25  
18 enhancement for hours worked after the verdict where hourly rates for plaintiff’s five senior  
19 attorneys were \$1,100.00 and \$1,000.00); *Tran v. Golden State FC LLC, et al.* (LASC Case No.  
20 BC699931), Fee Order filed April 8, 2022 (approving hourly rate of \$1,300.00 for plaintiff’s 32-  
21 year attorney).

22 Plaintiff seeks appointment of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel. The attorneys  
23 performed significant work and expended litigation costs in prosecuting this matter with no  
24 guarantee of payment. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff’s Counsel seeks preliminary approval of up to  
25 one third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount, currently estimated to be \$130,386.67, and up to  
26 \$27,000.00 in reimbursement of litigation costs. Given the work performed in this matter, the  
27 extensive information exchange, and the substantial recovery obtained on behalf of the Class,  
28 Plaintiff’s Counsel achieved a settlement through efficient and diligent work. *See generally*, Yslas

Decl. At final approval, Plaintiff's Counsel will fully brief the merits of its request for the award of attorneys' fees and litigation costs.

**E. The Administration Costs are Reasonable**

The Parties have agreed upon using Apex Class Action LLC to administer this Settlement Agreement at § 1.2. Plaintiff seeks preliminary approval of \$10,250.00 for Apex Class Action LLC to administer this Settlement pursuant to Apex Class Action LLC's will-not-exceed bid. *See* Yslas Decl. at ¶ 34, Exhibit 4.

**V. CONCLUSION**

The Parties have negotiated a fair and reasonable settlement of the class claims in light of the risks presented in this case. Plaintiff has presented the materials and information necessary to demonstrate that the requirements for preliminary approval have been met, and therefore respectfully request that the Court preliminarily approve the Settlement and schedule a date for the final approval hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: March 17, 2026

**WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC**

By: /s/ Courtney M. Miller

Courtney M. Miller  
Attorneys for Plaintiff



# Superior Court of Alameda County Public Portal

## Make a Reservation

JOURDAN vs ONE THE CHEESE STEAK SHOP, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

Case Number: 23CV048329 Case Type: Civil Unlimited Category: Other Employment Complaint Case  
Date Filed: 2023-10-18 Location: Rene C. Davidson Courthouse - Department 18

### Reservation

Case Name:

JOURDAN vs ONE THE CHEESE STEAK SHOP, LLC, A  
CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

Case Number:

23CV048329

Type:

Motion re: (Plaintiff's MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY  
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND PAGA  
SETTLEMENT)

Status:

RESERVED

Filing Party:

Miles Jourdan (Plaintiff)

Location:

Rene C. Davidson Courthouse - Department 18

Date/Time:

05/05/2026 1:30 PM

Number of Motions:

1

Reservation ID:

930703779782

Confirmation Code:

CR-CQRQAVY5FJVDYMGLA

### Fees

| Description                 | Fee  | Qty | Amount |
|-----------------------------|------|-----|--------|
| Motion re: (name extension) | 0.00 | 1   | 0.00   |
| Court Technology Fee        | 1.00 | 1   | 1.00   |
| TOTAL                       |      |     | \$1.00 |

### Payment

Amount:

\$1.00

Type:

MasterCard

Account Number:

XXXX3132

Authorization:

61509Q

Payment Date:

n/a