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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF STANISLAUS**

LORI COOPER and RONDİ NERI,
individually, and on behalf of other members
of the general public similarly situated;

Plaintiffs,

v.

ROCK STAR LUXURY LIMOS LLC, a
California limited liability company;
LUXURY LIMOUSINE INC., a California
corporation; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive;

Defendants.

Case No.: CV-24-003753

Assigned for All Purposes to:
Honorable Sonny S. Sandhu
Department 24

CLASS ACTION

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT,
CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION,
APPROVAL OF CLASS NOTICE,
SETTING OF FINAL APPROVAL
HEARING DATE; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT THEREOF**

*[Declaration of Proposed Class Counsel
(Douglas Han); Declarations of Proposed
Class Representatives (Lori Cooper and
Rondi Neri); and [Proposed] Order filed
concurrently herewith]*

Hearing Date: June 25, 2026
Hearing Time: 8:30 a.m.
Hearing Place: Department 24

Complaint Filed: May 16, 2024
Trial Date: None Set

1 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on June 25, 2026 at 8:30 a.m., or as soon as the matter
2 may be heard, before the Honorable Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24 of the Stanislaus County
3 Superior Court located at 801 10th Street, Modesto California 95354, Plaintiffs Lori Cooper and
4 Rondi Neri (“Plaintiffs,” “Plaintiff Cooper,” and “Plaintiff Neri”) will and hereby do move for an
5 order:

- 6 • Granting Preliminary Approval of the class action settlement described herein and
7 as set forth in the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Settlement
8 Agreement,” “Settlement,” or “Agreement”), attached as **Exhibit 2** to the
9 Declaration of Douglas Han, including, and not limited to, the means of allocation
10 and distribution of funds;
- 11 • Approving the Court Approved Notice of Class and Representative Action
12 Settlement and Hearing Date for Final Court Approval (“Class Notice”) attached
13 as **Exhibit A** to the Settlement Agreement;
- 14 • Directing the mailing of the Class Notice with a postage-paid return envelope to
15 the Class Members;
- 16 • Approving Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions as the Administrator;
- 17 • Approving the proposed deadlines for the settlement administration process;
- 18 • Conditionally certifying the Class for settlement purposes only;
- 19 • Appointing Justice Law Corporation as Class Counsel;
- 20 • Appointing Plaintiffs as the class representatives; and
- 21 • Scheduling a hearing to consider whether to grant Final Approval of the Settlement
22 Agreement, at which time the Court will also consider whether to grant Final
23 Approval of the requests for the Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel
24 Litigation Expenses Payment, Class Representative Service Payments,
25 Administration Expenses Payment, and approval of the allocation of the Private
26 Attorney General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”) Penalties.

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1 This motion is based upon the following memorandum of points and authorities;
2 Declaration of Proposed Class Counsel (Douglas Han); Declarations of Proposed Class
3 Representatives (Lori Cooper and Rondi Neri); [Proposed] Order filed concurrently with this
4 motion; pleadings and other records on file with the Court in this matter; and such documentary
5 evidence and oral argument as may be presented at the hearing on this motion.

6
7 Dated: March 6, 2026

JUSTICE LAW CORPORATION

8 By: 
9 Douglas Han
10 *Attorneys for Plaintiffs*
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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 This motion seeks preliminary approval of a non-reversionary proposed wage-and-hour
3 class action settlement by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all current and former hourly-paid
4 or non-exempt employees of Defendant Rock Star Luxury Limos LLC (“Defendant”) and Marie
5 Joiner dba Luxury Limousine Service within the State of California at any time during the period
6 from May 16, 2020, through December 1, 2024 (“Class,” “Class Members,” and “Class Period”).
7 At the time of this filing, the number of Class Members is estimated to be eighty-three (83), which
8 was confirmed by Defendant. (Declaration of Douglas Han In Support of Motion for Preliminary
9 Approval of Class Action Settlement (“Han Decl.”), ¶¶ 7, 8.)

10 **II. BACKGROUND**

11 On March 4, 2024, Plaintiffs provided written notice to the California Labor and Workforce
12 Development Agency and Defendant. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 9; Exhibit 3.)

13 On May 16, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a wage-and-hour class action lawsuit in the Superior
14 Court of California, County of Stanislaus, alleging nine (9) causes of action. (Han Decl., *supra*, at
15 ¶ 10; Exhibit 4.)

16 After engaging in discovery, investigations, and settlement negotiations, the Parties
17 eventually negotiated a settlement. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 11.)

18 **III. INVESTIGATION/ LITIGATION HISTORY**

19 **a. Discovery, Investigation, and the Parties’ Staunchly Conflicting Positions**

20 After initiating this lawsuit, the Parties engaged in discovery. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 13.)
21 Plaintiffs drafted and propounded special interrogatories and requests for production of
22 documents, and Defendant responded to the formal discovery requests. (*Ibid.*) The Parties met and
23 conferred and agreed to engage in the informal exchange of information and then engaged in
24 settlement negotiations. (*Ibid.*)

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1 Defendant produced financial records and documents relating to its policies, practices, and
2 procedures. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 14.) As part of Defendant’s production, Class Counsel
3 reviewed time records, pay records, and information relating to the size and scope of the Class.
4 (*Ibid.*) Class Counsel also reviewed Defendant’s financial records regarding the financial
5 hardships that Defendant has been experiencing in recent years. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 14.)

6 Based on the information provided by Defendant, Plaintiffs contend – and Defendant
7 denies – Defendant: (1) failed to provide employees with legally mandated meal and rest breaks;
8 (2) failed to pay employees for all hours worked; (3) failed to reimburse employees for necessary
9 business expenses; (4) issued noncompliant wage statements; and (5) is liable for waiting time
10 penalties. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 16-22.)

11 **b. The Parties Were Able to Reach an Agreement**

12 **i. The Parties Engaged in Settlement Negotiations Which Led to the**
13 **Settlement**

14 The Parties engaged in settlement negotiations and discussed the financial hardships that
15 Defendant has been experiencing in recent years. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 23.) After participating
16 in settlement negotiations, the Parties eventually reached a settlement, the terms of which were
17 memorialized in the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 23; Exhibits 2, 5.)

18 **ii. The Settlement Was Reached as a Result of Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

19 The Settlement Agreement was reached because of arm’s-length negotiations. (Han Decl.,
20 *supra*, at ¶ 26.) Though cordial and professional, the settlement negotiations have always been
21 adversarial and non-collusive in nature. (*Ibid.*) During settlement negotiations, the Parties’ counsel
22 conducted arm’s-length settlement negotiations until an agreement was reached. (*Ibid.*)

23 Plaintiffs and Class Counsel recognize the expense and length of additional proceedings
24 necessary to continue the litigation through trial and any possible appeals. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶
25 27.) Plaintiffs and Class Counsel also considered the uncertainty and risk of further litigation,
26 potential outcome, and difficulties and delays inherent in such litigation. (*Ibid.*) Based on the
27 foregoing, Plaintiffs and Class Counsel believe that the Settlement Agreement is a fair, adequate,
28 and reasonable settlement and is in the best interests of the Class Members. (*Ibid.*)

1 **iii. The Settlement Is the Result of Thorough Investigation and Discovery**

2 The Parties investigated and evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and
3 defenses before reaching the Settlement Agreement and engaged in research and discovery to
4 support the Settlement Agreement. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 28.) The Settlement Agreement was
5 only possible following significant investigation and evaluation of the relevant policies and
6 practices, permitting Class Counsel to engage in a comprehensive analysis of liability and potential
7 damages. (*Ibid.*) This case has reached the stage where the Parties understand “the strength of the
8 case; the reasonableness of the settlement in light of the attendant risks of litigation, and in light
9 of the best possible recovery” sufficient to support the reasonableness, adequacy, and fairness of
10 the Settlement Agreement. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 28; *Boyd v. Bechtel Corp.* (N.D.Cal. 1979) 485
11 F.Supp. 610, 617.)

12 **c. Terms of the Settlement**

13 **i. Deductions from the Settlement**

14 The Parties agreed that (subject to the Court’s approval) this matter be settled and
15 compromised for the non-reversionary sum of \$100,000 (“Gross Settlement Amount”) which
16 includes: (1) Class Counsel Fees Payment up to \$35,000 (35% of the Gross Settlement Amount);
17 (2) Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment up to \$5,000; (3) Class Representative Service
18 Payments totaling \$20,000; (4) Administration Expenses Payment up to \$7,500; and (5) PAGA
19 Penalties up to \$5,000 to the LWDA. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 24.)

20 **ii. Calculating Settlement Payments**

21 After all the Court-approved deductions from the Gross Settlement Amount, it is estimated
22 that \$27,500 (“Net Settlement Amount”) will be paid to the Participating Class Members – with a
23 gross *average* Individual Class Payment estimated at \$331.33. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 25.)

24 The Participating Class Members will receive a proportionate share of the Net Settlement
25 Amount using the formula set forth in the Settlement Agreement. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 23;
26 Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § C(2)(e).) The Individual Class Payments will be allocated twenty percent
27 (20%) to the settlement of wage claims and eighty percent (80%) to the settlement of claims for
28 interests and penalties. (*Ibid.*)

1 The portion of the PAGA Penalties that is to be paid to each Aggrieved Employee shall be
2 determined using the formula set forth in the Settlement Agreement. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 23;
3 Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § C(2)(d).) The Aggrieved Employees' portion of the PAGA Penalties will be
4 allocated as one hundred percent (100%) penalties. (*Ibid.*)

5 **iii. Notice to the Class**

6 No later than fourteen (14) calendar days after the Court grants Preliminary Approval of
7 the Settlement, Defendant will deliver the Class Data to the Administrator. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶
8 23; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § G(4)(a).) No later than fourteen (14) calendar days after receiving the
9 Class Data, the Administrator will send the Class Notice to all Class Members identified in the
10 Class Data via first-class United States Postal Service mail. (*Id.* at § G(4)(c).)

11 **iv. Distribution of Funds**

12 The Gross Settlement Amount will be funded and distributed pursuant to the timeline,
13 payment plan, and manner set forth in the Agreement. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 23; Exhibit 2, *supra*,
14 at §§ D(2), D(3).) The uncashed settlement checks will be canceled and transmitted to the
15 California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member. (*Id.* at §§
16 D(3)(a), D(3)(c).)

17 **v. Release of Claims**

18 Effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount and
19 funds all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments, all
20 the Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their former and present
21 representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release the
22 Released Parties from the Released Class Claims. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 23; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at
23 § E(2).)

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1 Effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount and
2 funds all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments, all
3 the Participating and Non-Participating Class Members, who are Aggrieved Employees, are
4 deemed to release, on behalf of themselves and their former and present representatives, agents,
5 attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, the Released Parties from the Released
6 PAGA Claims. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 23; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § E(3).)

7 Effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount and
8 funds all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments,
9 Plaintiffs and their former and present spouses, representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs,
10 administrators, successors, and assigns generally release and discharge the Released Parties from
11 the Plaintiffs' Release. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 23; Exhibit 2, *supra*, at § E(1).) Furthermore,
12 Plaintiffs expressly waive and relinquish the provisions, rights, and benefits, if any, of section 1542
13 of the Civil Code. (*Ibid.*)

14 With regards to class action releases, “[A] court may release not only those claims alleged
15 in the complaint and before the court, but also claims which ‘could have been alleged by reason of
16 or in connection with any matter or fact set forth or referred to in’ the complaint.”” (*Amaro v.*
17 *Anaheim Arena Management, LLC* (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 521, 537.) The scope of the releases in
18 this case are acceptable because they are limited to the scope of the allegations in the operative
19 complaint. Moreover, the released claims are ““based on *the identical factual predicate* as that
20 underlying the claims in the settled class action.”” (*Ibid.*) In other words, the released claims do
21 not ““go beyond the scope of the allegations in the operative complaint”” (*Ibid.*)

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1 **d. Counsel for Both Parties Are Experienced in Similar Litigation**

2 The Parties' counsel are experienced in wage-and-hour employment law and class actions.
3 (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 2-6; Exhibit 1.) Class Counsel have prosecuted numerous cases on behalf
4 of employees for Labor Code violations and are experienced and qualified to evaluate the class
5 claims, settlement versus trial on a fully informed basis, and viability of the defenses. (*Ibid.*) This
6 experience instructed Class Counsel on the risks and uncertainties of further litigation and guided
7 their determination to endorse the Settlement Agreement.¹ (*Ibid.*)

8 **IV. ARGUMENT**

9 **a. Class Action Settlements Are Subject to Court Review**

10 Rules of Court, rule 3.769 requires court approval for class action settlements.² "Before
11 final approval, the court must conduct an inquiry into the fairness of the proposed settlement."
12 (Rules of Court, rule 3.769(g).) Rule 3.769 further requires a noticed motion for preliminary
13 approval of class settlements:

14 (a) A settlement or compromise of an entire class action, or a cause of action in
15 a class action, or as to a party, requires the approval of the court after
16 hearing.

17 ...

18 (c) Any party to a settlement agreement may serve and file a written notice of
19 motion for preliminary approval of the settlement. The settlement
20 agreement and proposed notice to class members must be filed with the
21 motion, and the proposed order must be lodged with the motion.

22 Courts have discretion to approve settlements that are fair, not collusive, and consider "all
23 the normal perils of litigation as well as the additional uncertainties inherent in complex class
24 actions.'" (*In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation* (5th Cir. 1979) 607 F.2d 167, 179, cert. den. *sub*
25 *nom. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Meat Price Investigators Ass'n* (1981) 452 U.S. 905.)

26 ¹ The final factor mentioned in *Dunk* – the number of objectors – is not determinable until
27 the Class Notice has been mailed to the Class Members, and the Class Members have had an
28 opportunity to respond. This information will be provided to the Court in conjunction with the
Motion for Final Approval.

² The California Supreme Court has authorized California's trial courts to use Federal Rule
23 and cases applying it for guidance in considering class issues. (*Vasquez v. Superior Court*
(1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 821; *Green v. Obledo* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 145-146.) Where appropriate,
the Parties cite Federal Rule 23 and federal case law in addition to California law.

1 **b. The Settlement Is a Reasonable Compromise of Claims**

2 An understanding of the amount in controversy is an important factor in whether the
3 settlement “of the class members’ claims is reasonable in light of the strengths and weaknesses of
4 the claims and the risks of the particular litigation.” (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168
5 Cal.App.4th 116, 129; see also *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186
6 Cal.App.4th 399, 409.) The most important factor in this regard is ““the strength of the case for
7 plaintiffs on the merits, balanced against the amount offered in settlement.”” (*Kullar*, at p. 130;
8 see also *Munoz*, at p. 409.)

9 *Kullar’s* instruction to the court is not to “decide the merits of the case or to substitute its
10 evaluation of the most appropriate settlement for that of the attorneys.” (*Kullar v. Foot Locker*
11 *Retail, Inc.*, *supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 133.) *Kullar* does not require a statement of the maximum
12 amount the class could recover if plaintiff prevailed on all his claims, provided there is a record
13 that allows “an understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of
14 outcomes of the litigation.” (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles*, *supra*, 186
15 Cal.App.4th at p. 409.) “[A]s the court does when it approves a settlement as in good faith under
16 Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6, the court must at least satisfy itself that the class settlement is
17 within the ‘ballpark’ of reasonableness.” (*Kullar*, at p. 133.)

18 **i. The Settlement Amount of \$100,000 Is Fair and Reasonable**

19 The Settlement Agreement was only possible following an investigation and evaluation of
20 the relevant policies and procedures, as well as the data produced, as referenced in Section III
21 above, permitting Class Counsel to engage in a comprehensive analysis of liability and potential
22 damages. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 28.)

23 The claims are predicated on the alleged: (1) failure to pay overtime wages; (2) failure to
24 pay minimum wages; (3) failure to provide meal and rest breaks and pay applicable premium
25 wages; (4) failure to timely pay wages; (5) failure to issue compliant wage statements; (6) failure
26 to reimburse business expenses; (7) violation of PAGA; and (8) violation of Business &
27 Professions Code section 17200. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 29.) Defendant vehemently denies the
28 theories of liability. (*Id.* at ¶ 30.)

1 While Plaintiffs believe that the case is suitable for certification, uncertainties with respect
2 to certification are always present. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 31.) As the California Supreme Court
3 ruled in *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, class certification is
4 always a matter of the trial court's sound discretion. (*Ibid.*) Decisions following *Sav-On Drug*
5 *Stores, Inc.* have reached different conclusions regarding certification of wage-and-hour claims.³
6 (*Ibid.*) Thus, the calculations for potential damages were discounted.

7 **ii. The PAGA Penalties of \$5,000 Is Reasonable**

8 The provisions of the Labor Code potentially triggering PAGA penalties include Labor
9 Code sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 218.5, 221, 226(a), 226.3, 226.7, 246, 432.5, 510, 512(a),
10 551, 552, 558, 1174(d), 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2800, and 2802. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 39.)
11 Defendant asserted that, regardless of the results of the underlying causes of action, PAGA
12 penalties are not mandatory but permissive and discretionary. (*Ibid.*) Defendant also maintained
13 that it had a strong argument that it would be unjust to award maximum PAGA penalties given the
14 law's current unsettled state. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 39; *Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Mgmt.*
15 (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112 [reducing penalties by 30% under this authority].) Furthermore,
16 Defendant argued that limited to the initial violation, the PAGA penalties would be limited to
17 about **\$5,000** (50 employees x \$100 penalty for initial violation) on the low end and **\$30,000** (50
18 employees x \$100 penalty for initial violation x 6 theories of recovery) on the high end. (Han
19 Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 40-42.)

20 Plaintiffs recognized that the risk that any PAGA award could be reduced. (Han Decl.,
21 *supra*, at ¶ 43.) Many of the causes of action brought were also duplicative of the statutory claims.
22 (*Ibid.*) Allocating \$5,000 to PAGA penalties was reasonable given that Defendant is also paying
23 an additional \$95,000 in the class settlement. (*Ibid.*) When PAGA penalties are negotiated in good

24 ³ (See e.g. *Harris v. Superior Court* (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 164 [reversing decertification
25 of class claiming misclassification and ordering summary adjudication in favor of employees],
26 review granted Nov. 28, 2007, (2007) 171 P.3d 545 [not cited as precedent, but rather for
27 illustrative purposes only]; *Walsh v. IKON Office Solutions, Inc.* (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1440
28 [affirming decertification of class claiming misclassification]; *Aguiar v. Cintas Corp. No. 2* (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 121 [reversing denial of certification]; *Dunbar v. Albertson's Inc.* (2006) 141
Cal.App.4th 1422 [affirming denial of certification].)

faith and “there is no indication that [the] amount was the result of self-interest at the expense of other Class Members,” such amounts are reasonable.⁴ (*Ibid.*)

Considering the defenses, supporting evidence, and position that the case is not suitable for class treatment, the Settlement Agreement is reasonable, adequate, and fair.

c. Discount Analysis Justifies the Settlement

Excluding the civil penalties, which could be completely discretionary, the total estimated potential exposure, assuming certification and prevailing at trial, would be about **\$941,473** on the low end and around **\$968,689** on the high end. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 44.)

Category	Potential Exposure	Certification Risk	Merits Risk	Realistic Exposure
Rest Break Premiums	\$362,883	75%	65%	\$31,752.26
Meal Break Premiums	\$217,729.80	65%	55%	\$34,292.44
Overtime/Minimum Wage: Off-the-Clock Work	\$54,432.45 to \$81,648.68	65%	55%	\$8,573.11 to \$12,859.67
Unreimbursed Business Expenses	\$46,860	35%	75%	\$7,614.75
Wage Statement Penalty	\$200,000	55%	55%	\$40,500
Waiting Time Penalty	\$59,568	55%	55%	\$12,062.52
MAXIMUM TOTAL EXPOSURE	\$941,473 to \$968,689⁵			\$134,795.08 to \$139,081.64⁶

The realistic recovery for this case is about **\$134,795.08** on the low end and **\$139,081.64** on the high end. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 51.) The Gross Settlement Amount is about ten percent (10.32%) of the maximum potential exposure and around seventy-two percent (71.90%) of the maximum realistic exposure at trial, which is a reasonable settlement. (*Ibid.*)

⁴ (*Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D.Cal. Apr. 3, 2009, No. CV-08-0844 EDL) 2009 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 33900, at *24; see e.g. *Nordstrom Com. Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 579, “[T]rial court did not abuse its discretion in approving a settlement which does not allocate any damages to the PAGA claims.”)

⁵ (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶¶ 32-38.)

⁶ (*Id.* at ¶¶ 45-50.)

1 The only question at preliminary approval is whether the settlement is within the range of
2 possible approval. (*In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation* (7th Cir. 1979) 594
3 F.2d 1106, 1124; *Acosta v. TransUnion, LLC* (C.D. Cal. 2007) 240 F.R.D. 564, 575.) “The fact
4 that a proposed settlement may only amount to a fraction of the potential recovery does not, in and
5 of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate and should be disapproved.”
6 (*Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.* (2d Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 448, 455; see also *Linney v. Cellular Alaska*
7 *P’ship* (9th Cir. 1998) 151 F.3d 1234, 1242, “[I]t is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation
8 and avoidance of wasteful and expensive litigation that induce consensual settlements. The
9 proposed settlement is not to be judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what
10 might have been achieved by the negotiators”). This settlement is in line with the realistic exposure
11 if Plaintiffs prevailed at trial and provides a significant recovery for the Class Members.

12 **d. Conditional Certification of the Class Is Appropriate**

13 Code of Civil Procedure section 382 “authorizes class actions ‘when the question is one of
14 a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is
15 impracticable to bring them all before the court.’” (*Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*,
16 *supra*, 34 Cal.4th at p. 326.) California courts certify class actions if plaintiff identifies “both [1]
17 an ascertainable class and [2] a well-defined community of interest among class members.” (*Ibid.*)

18 The Class is ascertainable and numerous as to make it impracticable to join all the Class
19 Members, and there are common questions of law and fact that predominate over any questions
20 affecting the individual Class Member. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 52.) Plaintiffs contend that their
21 claims are typical of the claims of the Class, and Class Counsel will fairly and adequately protect
22 the interests of the Class. (*Ibid.*) Plaintiffs assert that the prosecution of separate actions by
23 individual Class Members would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications. (*Ibid.*)

24 **i. The Class Is Ascertainable and Sufficiently Numerous**

25 “Ascertainability is required in order to give notice to putative class members as to whom
26 the judgment in the action will be res judicata.” (*Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad Home Corp.* (2001)
27 89 Cal.App.4th 908, 914.) “A class is ascertainable if it identifies a group of unnamed plaintiffs
28 by describing a set of common characteristics sufficient to allow a member of that group to identify

1 himself or herself as having a right to recover based on the description.” (*Bartold v. Glendale*
2 *Federal Bank* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 816, 828.) The proposed class must also be sufficiently
3 numerous. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435.)

4 This case involves approximately eighty-three (83) Class Members, meaning that the Class
5 is sufficiently numerous. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 53.) All the Class Members can and will be
6 identified by the Administrator through a review of Defendant’s employment records regarding
7 hourly-paid, non-exempt persons employed during the Class Period. (*Ibid.*)

8 **ii. Class Members Share a Well-defined Community of Interest**

9 The community of interest requirement “embodies three factors: (1) predominant common
10 questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and
11 (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v.*
12 *Superior Court*, *supra*, 34 Cal.4th at p. 326.) “[T]he community of interest requirement for
13 certification *does not mandate that class members have uniform or identical claims.*” (*Capitol*
14 *People First v. Department of Developmental Services* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 676, 692 (emphasis
15 in original).) The courts focus on the defendant’s internal policies and “pattern and practice . . . in
16 order to assess whether that common behavior toward similarly situated plaintiffs renders class
17 certification appropriate.” (*Ibid.*) The application of each of these factors is discussed below.

18 **1. Common Issues Predominate**

19 The “common issues” requirement “involves analysis of whether the proponent’s ‘theory
20 of recovery’ is likely to prove compatible with class treatment.” (*Capitol People First v.*
21 *Department of Developmental Services*, *supra*, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 690.) In other words, courts
22 determine whether the elements necessary to establish liability are susceptible to common proof,
23 even if the class members must individually prove their damages. (*Brinker Restaurant Corp. v.*
24 *Superior Court* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1024). These types of claims are regularly granted class
25 certification when the plaintiff can present evidence of common policies. (See e.g. *Jones v. JGC*
26 *Dallas LLC* (N.D.Tex. Nov. 29, 2012, Civil Action No. 3:11-CV-2743-O) 2012 U.S.Dist.LEXIS
27 185042 [certified collective action involving 190 dancers]; *Espinoza v. Galardi South Enters.*
28 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 11, 2016, No. 14-21244-CIV-GOODMAN) 2016 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 2904 [court

certified class of dancers on state law claims].)

Plaintiffs assert that common issues of fact and law predominate as to each of the claims alleged. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 54.) Plaintiffs contend that all the Class Members were subject to the same or similar employment practices, policies, and procedures described above. (*Ibid.*)

2. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Typical of the Class Claims

Typical claims rely on legal theories and facts that are substantially like those of other class members. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 46.)

Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendant and allege that they and the Class Members were employed by the same company and injured by the common policies and practices related to the claims described above. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 55.) Plaintiffs seek relief for these claims and derivative claims on behalf of the Class Members. (*Ibid.*) Thus, the claims arise from the same employment practices and are based on the same legal theories applicable to the Class. (*Ibid.*)

3. Plaintiffs Are Adequate to Represent the Class

Plaintiffs have proven to be adequate class representatives. (Han Decl., *supra*, at ¶ 56.) Plaintiffs conducted themselves diligently and responsibly in representing the Class Members, understand the fiduciary obligations, and actively participated in the prosecution of this case. (*Ibid.*) Plaintiffs spent time in meetings and conferences with Class Counsel to provide them with a complete understanding of the work experience and environment. (*Ibid.*) Plaintiffs have no interest adverse to the interests of the other Class Members. (*Ibid.*)

4. Class Action Is Superior for the Fair and Efficient Adjudication of this Controversy

A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Plaintiffs contends that the joinder of all Class Members is impractical and that class treatment will permit many similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims for settlement purposes simultaneously in a single forum without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would necessitate. Because some Class Members are also current employees, Plaintiffs believe that the fear of retaliation further supports the superiority of class-wide relief as this fear often discourages current employees from seeking legal redress.

1 **e. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate**

2 In deciding whether to approve a proposed class action settlement under Code of Civil
3 Procedure section 382, the Court must find a proposed settlement is “fair, adequate and
4 reasonable.” (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801.) A proposed class action
5 settlement is presumed fair under the following circumstances: (1) parties reached settlement after
6 arm’s-length negotiations; (2) investigation and discovery were sufficient to allow counsel and the
7 court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) percentage of
8 objectors is small. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, *supra*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1802.) All these elements
9 are present herein.

10 **f. Notice to the Class Complies with Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(f)**

11 Rules of Court, rule 3.769(f), provides:

12 If the court has certified the action as a class action, notice of the final approval
13 hearing must be given to class members in the manner specified by the court. The
14 notice must contain an explanation of the proposed settlement and procedures for
15 class members to follow in filing written objections to it and in arranging to appear
16 at the settlement hearing and state any objections to the proposed settlement.

17 The Class Notice meets all these requirements. The Class Notice advises the Class
18 Members of their right to participate in the Settlement, how and when to object to or request
19 exclusion from the Settlement, and date, time, and location of the Final Approval Hearing.

20 **V. CONCLUSION**

21 Plaintiffs submit the Settlement is in the best interests of the Class. Under the applicable
22 class action criteria and guidelines, the Settlement should be preliminarily approved, Class should
23 be conditionally certified for settlement purposes, and Class Notice should be approved.

24 Dated: March 6, 2026

JUSTICE LAW CORPORATION

25 By: 
26 Douglas Han
27 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
28

**PROOF OF SERVICE
1013A(3) CCP**

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 751 N. Fair Oaks Avenue, Suite 101, Pasadena, California 91103 and my electronic service address is ccastro@justicelawcorp.com.

On March 6, 2026, I served the foregoing document described as

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENT, CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION, APPROVAL OF
CLASS NOTICE, SETTING OF FINAL APPROVAL HEARING DATE;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF**

for the following case: **Cooper, et al. v. Rock Star Luxury Limos LLC, et al.**
LWDA/Court Case No.: **LWDA Case No.: CM-1014527-24**
Court Case No.: CV-24-003753
Stanislaus County Superior Court

on interested parties in this action by electronically submitting as follows:

State of California
Labor & Workforce Development Agency
800 Capitol Mall, MIC-55
Sacramento, California 95814

[X] BY ELECTRONIC SUBMISSION

Pursuant to California Senate Bill No. 836, I caused the documents described above to be electronically submitted by and through the procedure stated on the website of the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency.

[X] STATE

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on March 6, 2026, at Pasadena, California.



Christina Castro