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KENNETH ANTHONY BUCHANAN, JR

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SOLANO

KENNETH ANTHONY BUCHANAN, JR.,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

VERTUS PROPERTIES, INC., a California
corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: CU24-03325

*[Assigned for all purposes to the Hon. Wendy Getty,
Dept. 8]*

CLASS ACTION

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL
OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE
ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

Date: October 8, 2025
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Courtroom: Dept. 8
Judge: Hon. Wendy Getty

Action Filed: May 1, 2024
Trial Date: Not Set

1 TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on October 8, 2025, 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter
3 may be heard, in Department 8 of the above-captioned Court, located at 580 Texas Street, Fairfield,
4 California 94533, Plaintiff KENNETH ANTHONY BUCHANAN, JR (“Plaintiff”) will and hereby does
5 move this Court for an order:

6 1. Granting class certification of the Class, solely for settlement purposes pursuant to
7 Code of Civil Procedure § 382;

8 2. Preliminarily approving the CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT
9 AGREEMENT AND CLASS NOTICE (“Settlement” or “Agreement”);

10 3. Appointing counsel for Plaintiff, Moon Law Group, PC, as Class Counsel;

11 4. Appointing Plaintiff KENNETH ANTHONY BUCHANAN, JR., as the Class
12 Representative;

13 5. Approving the use of the proposed notice procedure and related notice form;

14 6. Approving PHOENIX CLASS ACTION ADMINISTRATION as the third-party
15 administrator;

16 7. Directing that notice be mailed to the Class; and,

17 8. Scheduling a hearing date for motions for final approval of class action settlement
18 and awards of attorneys’ fees and costs.

19 Good cause exists to grant this Motion because: (1) the Class meets all of the requirements for
20 class certification for settlement purposes under Code of Civil Procedure § 382; (2) the Settlement
21 Agreement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable compromise of the disputed wage and hour claims asserted
22 by Plaintiff; (3) Plaintiff and Class Counsel are adequate to represent the Class; (4) the proposed notice
23 procedures and related forms comply with California Rules of Court 3.766(d) and (e), adequately apprise
24 Class Members of their rights, and fully comport with due process; and, (5) based on the foregoing, notice
25 should be directed to the Class Members and a final fairness hearing should be scheduled (Plaintiff suggests
26 about 145 days after preliminary approval is granted).

27 This Motion is made pursuant to Rule 3.769 and Rule 3.1113(e) of the California Rules of Court,
28 which require approval by the Court of a class action settlement and permit the Court to extend the page

1 limit for memoranda.


2 **TENTATIVE RULINGS:** Civil tentative rulings will be posted to the Court's web site after 2:00
3 p.m. on the day before the hearing date. All rulings and notes will be deleted the following morning. The
4 tentative ruling shall become the ruling of the court unless a party desiring to be heard contacts the judicial
5 assistant of the department hearing the matter by 4:30 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing and
6 further advises that such party has notified the other side of its intention to request a hearing. A party
7 requesting a hearing must notify all parties of the request to be heard by 4:30. A party requesting to be
8 heard may notify the judicial assistant either by completing and submitting the Request for Oral Argument
9 Form for the department hearing the case or by contacting the judicial department assigned to the case by
10 telephone. The phone number to the appropriate judicial assistant can be found in the tentative ruling
11 document or on the civil setting guide page.

12 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached Memorandum of Points
13 and Authorities, the Declarations of H. Scott Leviant, Plaintiff, and the Settlement Administrator in support
14 thereof, all papers and pleadings on file with the Court in this action, all matters judicially noticeable, and
15 on such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented in connection with the hearing on the Motion.

16 Respectfully submitted,

17 Dated: August 28, 2025

MOON LAW GROUP, PC

18 By: 
19 Kane Moon
20 H. Scott Leviant
21 Sandy Pham

22 Attorneys for Plaintiff

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS	i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	iii
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. THE MAJOR TERMS OF SETTLEMENT	1
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND	5
A. Plaintiff's Claims	5
B. Pre-Mediation Data Production and Analysis.....	6
C. Settlement.....	6
IV. CLASS DEFINITION	7
V. DISCUSSION.....	7
A. The Court Should Conditionally Certify the Class for Settlement Purposes	7
1. The Members of the Class Are Both Ascertainable and Numerous.	8
2. There Are Common Questions That Predominate Over Any Questions That May Be Unique to Individual Class Members.....	8
3. Plaintiff's Claims Are Typical of Those of the Class.	9
4. Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Class.....	9
5. Proceeding as a Class Action is Superior to Individual Actions.....	10
6. The Proposed Class Notice Complies with Rule 3.766(d) and (e)	10
a) The Notice Procedure Satisfies Due Process	10
b) The Notice is Accurate and Informative	11
B. The Court Should Preliminarily Approve the Settlement Because It Is a Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise of Disputed Wage Claims.....	11
1. Class Action Settlements Are Subject to Review and Approval.	11
2. The Parties Reached the Settlement Through Arms' Length Negotiations Between Experienced Counsel with the Assistance of a Highly Qualified Mediator After Sufficient Data Was Exchanged to Evaluate Settlement.	12

1	3.	The Settlement Represents a Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise of	
2		Class Members’ Claims Based on Defendant’s Estimated Liability Exposure	
3		Given the Risks Continued Litigation Would Entail.	13
4	a)	The Class Settlement is Fair, Adequate and Reasonable	13
5	b)	The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable.....	17
6	4.	The Proposed Method for Allocating Settlement Funds Is Fair.	18
7	5.	The Proposed Enhancement Award to Plaintiff Warrants Approval.	19
8	6.	The Proposed Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Is Also Fair, Adequate,	
9		and Reasonable and Merits Preliminary Approval.	19
10	7.	The Proposed Payment to the Administrator Is Fair and Reasonable.....	20
11	VI.	THE COURT SHOULD SCHEDULE A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING	20
12	VII.	CONCLUSION	21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CALIFORNIA DECISIONAL AUTHORITY

<i>7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.</i> , 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135 (2000).....	12
<i>Amaral v. Cintas Corp.</i> , 163 Cal. App. 4th 1157 (2008).....	18
<i>Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Mgmt., LLC</i> , 69 Cal. App. 5th 521 (2021).....	19
<i>Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct.</i> , 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012).....	7, 9, 16
<i>Cartt v. Sup. Ct.</i> , 50 Cal. App. 3d 960 (1975)	10
<i>Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC</i> , 175 Cal. App. 4th 785 (2009)	19
<i>Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.</i> , 191 Cal. App. 3d 605 (1987).....	8
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794 (1996).....	7, 12, 19
<i>Duran v. US Bank Nat’l Ass’n</i> , 59 Cal. 4th 1 (2014).....	13
<i>Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.</i> , 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524 (2008).....	9
<i>Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court</i> , 113 Cal. App. 4th 836 (2003)	7
<i>Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc.</i> 181 Cal. App. 4th 1286 (2010).....	7, 8
<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i> , 168 Cal. App. 4th 116 (2008).....	11
<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern. Inc.</i> , 1 Cal. 5th 480 (2016).....	19
<i>Linderv. Thrifty Oil Co.</i> , 23 Cal. 4th 429 (2000).....	7, 10
<i>Malibu Outrigger Bd. of Governors v. Superior Court</i> , 103 Cal. App. 3d 573 (1980).....	11
<i>McGhee v. Bank of America</i> , 60 Cal. App. 3d 442 (1976).....	9
<i>Miller v. Woods</i> , 148 Cal. App. 3d 862 (1983)	8
<i>Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.</i> , 72 Cal. App. 5th 56 (2021)	17
<i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles</i> , 186 Cal. App. 4th 399 (2010)	12
<i>Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.</i> , 7 Cal. 5th 955, 980 (2019).....	8
<i>Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court</i> , 34 Cal. 4th 319 (2004).....	7, 8
<i>Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.</i> , 149 Cal. App. 4th 1496 (2007).....	9
<i>Stambaugh v. Superior Court</i> , 62 Cal. App. 3d 231 (1976).....	11
<i>Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.</i> , 91 Cal. App. 4th 224 (2001)	13

FEDERAL DECISIONAL AUTHORITY

<i>Miller v. CEVA Logistics U.S.A., Inc.</i> , 2015 WL 729638 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2015)	17
<i>O'Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.</i> , 201 F.Supp.3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2016)	17
<i>Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp.</i> , 563 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2000)	17
<i>Willis v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC</i> , 2013 WL 6053831 (E.D. Cal. 2013)	18

STATUTES

Code of Civil Procedure § 382	7
-------------------------------------	---

RULES

Rules of Court, Rule 3.766	10
Rules of Court, Rule 3.769	7, 11

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Class Certification in California: SECOND INTERIM REPORT FROM THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION LITIGATION - FEBRUARY 2010	16
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TREATISES

3 NEWBERG § 8.39	11
Manual for Complex Litigation (2d Ed. 1993), § 30.211	11

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rules 3.769, Plaintiff KENNETH ANTHONY
3 BUCHANAN, JR. (“Plaintiff”) requests that this Court preliminarily approve the class action settlement
4 set forth in the CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND CLASS NOTICE
5 (the “Agreement”; “Settlement” means the disposition of the Action effected by this Agreement and the
6 Judgment) with Defendant VERTUS PROPERTIES, INC. (“Defendant”).

7 After the exchange of documents and data, and an arm’s-length mediation session with mediator
8 Hon. Carl West, (Ret.), Plaintiff and Defendant (collectively referred to herein as the “Parties”) reached a
9 proposed class action settlement with a gross settlement amount (“GSA”) of **\$605,000.00** in compromise
10 of disputed claims asserted on behalf of the below-defined Class consisting of approximately **254**
11 members. Plaintiff believes this settlement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable compromise of disputed
12 claims for alleged wage and hour violations and penalties asserted in this case.

13 Plaintiff now submits this Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, along with
14 the Settlement (attached to the Declaration of H. Scott Leviant [“Leviant Decl.”], Exhibit 1 thereto). For
15 the Court’s convenience, below is a summary of the key provisions of the Settlement.

16 **II. THE MAJOR TERMS OF SETTLEMENT**

17 The provisions of the proposed Settlement include the following:

- 18 • Defendant agrees not to oppose certification for purposes of settlement. (Agreement, ¶ 12.1.)
- 19 • Class: All persons who worked for Defendant as hourly, non-exempt employees in the State
20 of California during the Class Period (the period from May 1, 2020, to the date of preliminary
21 approval of the Action). (Agreement, ¶¶ 1.1 (at 1:17-18), 1.5, 1.8, 1.30.)¹
- 22 • Settlement Amount: Defendant will pay a maximum of **\$605,000.00**, referred to as the Gross
23 Settlement Amount (or GSA herein), resulting in an estimated average **gross** benefit per Class
24 Member of about **\$2,381.89**. (Agreement, ¶¶ 1.17, 8; Leviant Decl., ¶ 17.)

25
26
27 ¹ After the Agreement was finalized and signed, a numbering error in the Paragraphs of Section 1 of
28 the Agreement was discovered. After Paragraph 1.4, the numbering restarts at 1.1, which results in two
 of each Paragraph number from 1.1 to 1.4. For clarity, page and line numbers will be specified when
 citing to the Paragraphs with duplicate numbers.

- 1 • Escalator Clause: If the number of actual Workweeks at the close of the Class Period is more
2 than ten percent higher than the estimated Workweeks, Defendant may (a) increase the Gross
3 Settlement Amount in the exact proportionate amount as to any additional work weeks above
4 ten percent or (b) end the Class Period on the date that the total Workweeks equals 33,354.
5 This election must be made prior to the Preliminary Approval Hearing. (Agreement, ¶ 8.)
- 6 • Funding of Gross Settlement Amount: Defendant shall fund the GSA, and also fund the
7 amounts necessary to fully pay Defendant's share of payroll taxes in two installment payments.
8 The first installment shall be due no later than April 29, 2026, or 60 calendar days after the
9 Effective Date, whichever is later, and (2) the second installment shall be due no later than six
10 (6) months following the first installment funding date. (Agreement, ¶ 4.1.)
- 11 • Class Size: An estimated **254** individuals worked about **32,263** workweeks through the Class
12 Period. (Agreement, ¶ 8.)
- 13 • PAGA Group Size: An estimated **180** aggrieved employees who worked about **6,582** pay
14 periods through the PAGA Period. (Agreement, ¶ 8.)
- 15 • PAGA Period: April 28, 2023 to the date of preliminary approval of the Settlement.
16 (Agreement, ¶ 1.26.)
- 17 • Kullar/Munoz Analysis: Plaintiff addresses the claims analysis herein, at Part V.B.3, and in
18 the Declaration of Leviant, at Paragraph 18.
- 19 • No Reversion: The Settlement is a **non-reversionary** settlement. (Agreement, ¶ 3.1.)
- 20 • Certification: Plaintiff addresses certification requisites herein, at Part V.A., and in the
21 Declaration of Leviant, at Paragraphs 34-40;
- 22 • No Claim Form: No claim form is required. (Agreement., ¶ 3.1.)
- 23 • Class Release: All Participating Class Members release all claims that were alleged or
24 reasonably could have been alleged based on the facts and legal theories contained in the
25 Operative Complaint in the Action. (Agreement, ¶ 5.2.)
- 26 • PAGA Release: The State of California, and anyone purporting to act on its behalf, including
27 Plaintiff, release the Released Parties from all claims for civil penalties under PAGA, based on
28 the facts and Labor Code sections that were alleged or reasonably could have been alleged in

Plaintiff's PAGA Notice of violations and the Operative Complaint. (Agreement, ¶ 5.3.)

- Net Settlement Amount: The Gross Settlement Amount, less the following payments in the amounts approved by the Court: Individual PAGA Payments to Aggrieved Employees, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Representative Service Payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Expenses Payment. The remainder is to be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments. (Agreement, ¶ 1.23.) The Net Settlement Amount is estimated to be at least **\$330,833.33**, resulting in an average **net** payment per Class Member of at least **\$1,302.49**, before any tax withholdings. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 17.)
- Tax Allocation: 15 percent of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of wage claims and reported on an IRS W-2 Form. 85 percent of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of claims for interest and penalties and reported on IRS 1099 Forms. (Agreement, ¶ 3.2.4.1.) The PAGA Settlement payments to Aggrieved Employees will be allocated as 100% penalties. (Agreement, ¶ 3.2.5.2.)
- Employer's Portion of Payroll Taxes Paid Separately: Defendant's portion of payroll taxes (e.g., FICA, FUTA, etc.) owed on any settlement payments to Class Members that constitute wages will be paid separate and apart from the GSA. (Agreement, ¶ 3.1.)
- Settlement Administrator: The notice portion of the Settlement will be administered by a third-party Administrator, Phoenix Settlement Administrators ("Phoenix"), with the costs of administration not to exceed \$10,000.00, except for a showing of good cause as approved by the Court. (Agreement, ¶ 3.2.3.) Phoenix's estimate for settlement administration services, in the amount of **\$8,250.00**, was selected as the most reasonable bid for all required services, with all due regard for the administrator's reputation and known quality of work from a competitive bidding process. (Declaration of Jodey Lawrence, ["Lawrence Decl."], ¶ 16.)

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- 1 • Class Data for Administration: The Settlement Administrator will receive the Class Data not
2 later than fifteen (15) calendar days after the Court grants Preliminary Approval, use the
3 National Change of Address (“NCOA”) database to update the Class Data, and then use skip
4 tracing on returned Notices. (Agreement, ¶¶ 1.6; 4.2; 7.5.3.)
- 5 • Notice: The Notice will issue within fourteen (14) calendar days of receipt of the Class Data.
6 (Agreement, ¶ 7.5.2.) The Notice describes how to dispute workweeks, submit an objection in
7 writing, in person, or through an attorney, or request exclusion. (Agreement, ¶¶ 7.5 – 7.8.)
- 8 • Notice Language: Notice will issue in English *and* Spanish, as needed. (Agreement, ¶¶ 1.7.)
- 9 • Objections: Objections can be timely submitted to the Administrator by fax, email, or mail.
10 Alternatively, Participating Class Members may appear in Court (or hire an attorney to appear
11 in Court) to present objections at the Final Approval Hearing. (Agreement, ¶ 7.8.2.)
- 12 • Exclusion Requests: Signed, written requests for exclusion can be timely submitted to the
13 Administrator by fax, email, or mail. (Agreement, ¶ 7.6.1.)
- 14 • PAGA Allocation: From the GSA, **\$30,000.00** will be allocated to settle claims brought
15 pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code § 2699 *et seq.*
16 (“PAGA”), allocated as seventy-five percent (75%), or at least **\$22,500.00**, to the California
17 Labor & Workforce Development Agency, and twenty-five percent (25%), or at least
18 **\$7,500.00** to Aggrieved Employees. (Agreement, ¶¶ 1.29; 3.2.5.)
- 19 • Notice to LWDA: Notice was provided prior to the filing of this Motion. Evidence is attached
20 to the Leviant Declaration as Exhibit 2.
- 21 • Enhancement/Service Award to Plaintiffs: Defendant will not oppose application for a Class
22 Representative Service Payment up to **\$7,500.00**, paid from the GSA. (Agreement, ¶ 3.2.1.)
- 23 • Fees and Costs: Defendant will not oppose Class Counsel’s application for fees of not more
24 than one-third of the GSA, which is currently estimated to be **\$201,666.67** subject to the
25 escalator clause, and actual costs in an amount not to exceed **\$25,000.00**, to be paid out of the
26 GSA. (Agreement, ¶ 3.2.2.)
- 27 • Check Void Period: Settlement checks will be valid for 180 days. (Agreement, ¶ 4.2.1.)

28 //

- Uncashed Checks: For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date, the Administrator shall transmit those funds to the California Controller’s Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member, leaving no “unpaid residue” subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure § 384(b). (Agreement, ¶ 4.2.3.)
- Judgment Notice: Judgment will be posted on the Administrator’s website after entry. (Agreement, ¶ 7.9.1.)
- Confidentiality Provisions: The Agreement permits Class Counsel to discuss the Settlement with Class Members. (Agreement ¶ 12.2.)

(Leviant Decl., ¶¶ 11-12 and Exhibit 1 thereto.)

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

Defendant is a property management company that engages in the management, marketing, leasing, rehabilitation, remodeling, and revitalization of multi-family properties in the greater Sacramento area. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 4.) On May 1, 2024, this action was commenced with the filing of a Complaint alleging causes of action against Defendant for failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime compensation, failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and provide rest breaks, failure to timely pay final wages at termination, failure to indemnify for necessary business expenses, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and unfair business practices. (*Id.*)

Plaintiff sent a letter to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”), pursuant to California Labor Code § 2699.3, providing notice of his intent to seek civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code § 2698, *et seq.* (*Id.*, at ¶ 5.) The LWDA did not indicate that it intended to investigate the alleged violations referenced in the letter, and the 65-day time period permitted for the LWDA to provide such a notification expired. (*Id.*) On October 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint alleging an additional cause of action against Defendant for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”). (*Id.*) The First Amended Complaint is the operative complaint in the Action (the “Operative Complaint”). (*Id.*)

1 **B. Pre-Mediation Data Production and Analysis**

2 The Parties conducted informal discovery and investigation of the facts and law. (*Id.*, at ¶ 6.) Such
3 investigation included, *inter alia*, the exchange of extensive data and discoverable information in
4 preparation for the mediation session. (*Id.*) The Parties have analyzed time clock, pay and other data
5 pertaining to Plaintiff and the Class during the settlement period, including but not limited to the numbers
6 of former and current members of the Class, average workweeks and pay periods, and the average rate of
7 hourly pay. (*Id.*) Data was drawn from the entire Class. (*Id.*) In addition, Defendant also provided other
8 data pertaining to Plaintiff and the Class during the relevant Class Period, including but not limited
9 documents reflecting wage and hour policies and practices during the Class Period. (*Id.*)

10 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices and other
11 information obtained during the exchange of discovery, Class Counsel were able to evaluate the probability
12 of class certification, success on the merits, and the reasonably obtainable maximum monetary exposure
13 for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to
14 mediation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses
15 asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*)

16 **C. Settlement**

17 On April 29, 2025, the Parties participated in a full day mediation presided over by the Hon. Carl
18 West (Ret.), which led to this Agreement to settle the Action. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) The Parties discussed at length
19 the burdens and risks of continuing with the litigation. (*Id.*) At the mediation, the Parties agreed to settle
20 the Action and thereafter prepared and signed a settlement agreement (the “Agreement”). (*Id.*)

21 Plaintiff and Class Counsel are aware of the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability for the
22 claims asserted in the Action, both generally and in response to Defendant’s defenses thereto. (*Id.* at ¶ 9).
23 Plaintiff and Class Counsel have also taken into account Defendant’s agreement to enter into a Settlement
24 that confers substantial relief upon the Class. (*Id.*)

25 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff and Class Counsel have determined that the Settlement to be
26 implemented by the Agreement is a fair, adequate, and reasonable settlement and is in the best interests of
27 the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 10). Solely for the purpose of settling this case, the Parties agree that the requirements
28 for establishing class action certification with respect to this class have been met and are met. (*Id.*) If this

1 Settlement is not approved by the Court for any reason, Defendant reserves its right to contest class
2 certification. (*Id.*) This Settlement, if approved, will result in the termination of the litigation through the
3 entry of the Judgment and the release of all Released Claims for all Class Members who have not elected
4 to exclude themselves from the Class. (*Id.*)

5 **IV. CLASS DEFINITION**

6 The Class is defined as follows:

7 All persons currently or formerly employed by Defendant as a non-exempt employee in
8 California during the Class Period (the “Class Period” is the period from May 1, 2020,
9 through the date the Court grants preliminary approval). “Participating Class Member”
means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion
from the Class portion of the Settlement. (Settlement, ¶¶ 1.1(at 1:17-18), 1.5, 1.8, 1.30)

10 (Leviant Decl., ¶ 11 and Exhibit 1.)

11 **V. DISCUSSION**

12 **A. The Court Should Conditionally Certify the Class for Settlement Purposes**

13 The Class should be provisionally certified for settlement because: (1) the Class is ascertainable
14 and numerous; (2) there exists a well-defined community of interest; and (3) a class action is the superior
15 method of adjudication for this settlement. Code of Civ. Proc. § 382; *Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct.*, 53
16 Cal. 4th 1004, 1021 (2012); *Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal. 4th 429, 435 (2000); *Sav-on Drug Stores,*
17 *Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.4th 319, 326, 332 (2004). For purposes of this Settlement *only*, Defendant
18 stipulates to conditional certification. (Agreement, ¶ 12.1.)

19 “The certification question is ‘essentially a procedural one that does not ask whether an action is
20 legally or factually meritorious.’” *Id.*, at 326, quoting *Linder*. Indeed, the certification question simply
21 asks whether the theory of recovery advanced by the plaintiff is likely to prove amenable to class treatment.
22 *See, e.g., Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc.*, 181 Cal. App. 4th 1286, 1298 (2010). “[I]t is also well established
23 that trial courts should use different standards to determine the propriety of a settlement class, as opposed
24 to a litigation class certification. Specifically, a lesser standard of scrutiny is used for settlement cases.”
25 *Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court*, 113 Cal. App. 4th 836, 859 (2003), citing *Dunk v.*
26 *Ford Motor Co.* 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1807 n. 19 (1996).

27 //
28

1 In view of these standards, the Class should be certified for purposes of settlement. Code Civ.
2 Proc. § 382; Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(c).

3 **1. The Members of the Class Are Both Ascertainable and Numerous.**

4 Whether an ascertainable class exists turns on three factors: (1) the class definition, (2) the size of
5 the class, and (3) the means of identifying the class members. *See Miller v. Woods*, 148 Cal. App. 3d 862,
6 873 (1983). A class is ascertainable when “it is defined ‘in terms of objective characteristics and common
7 transactional facts’ that make ‘the ultimate identification of class members possible when that
8 identification becomes necessary.’” *Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.*, 7 Cal. 5th 955, 980 (2019). The class
9 definition is sufficiently specific to enable the Parties, Class Members, and the Court to determine the
10 parameters of the class. *See Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.*, 191 Cal. App. 3d 605, 617 (1987). Here,
11 there were about 254 Class Members, all of whom may be identified by reference to Defendant’s records.
12 (Leviant Decl., ¶ 35.) The Class is not only ascertainable, but also numerous.

13 **2. There Are Common Questions That Predominate Over Any Questions That**
14 **May Be Unique to Individual Class Members.**

15 The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant questions of law
16 and fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives
17 who can adequately represent the class. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1806; *Richmond*, 29 Cal. 3d at 473-75.
18 A question of law or fact is common to the members of a class if it may be resolved through common
19 proof. *See, Jaimez*, 181 Cal.App.4th at 1305. As for predominance, it “is a comparative concept, and ‘the
20 necessity for class members to individually establish eligibility and damages does not mean individual fact
21 questions predominate.’” *Sav-on*, 34 Cal. 4th at 334.

22 In this case, common questions include, but are not limited to: (i) whether or not Defendant paid
23 proper wages to the Class; (ii) whether or not Defendant provided meal periods to the Class; (iii) whether
24 or not Defendant provided rest periods to the Class; (iv) whether or not Defendant paid compensation
25 timely upon separation of employment to former Class Members; (v) whether or not Defendant paid
26 compensation timely throughout Class Members’ employment; (vi) whether or not Defendant provided
27 accurate itemized wage statements to the Class; and, (vii) whether or not Defendant engaged in unlawful
28 or unfair business practices affecting the Class in violation of the California Business and Professions Code

1 §§ 17200-17208. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 37.) In addition, common defenses apply to most of the Class.

2 In the Action, Plaintiff's claims present sufficient common issues of law and fact that predominate
3 over individual issues and warrant class certification. From their review of the documentation provided,
4 Class Counsel determined that for purposes of these claims, Defendant's policies and practices are either
5 identical, or sufficiently similar, to raise the same questions of liability, and applied to all Class Members.
6 Because Class Members would have to prove the same issues of law and fact to prevail, and because their
7 potential legal remedies are identical, it would be preferable to resolve all Class Members' claims by means
8 of the Settlement than to require each Class Member to litigate his or her individual claims. Therefore,
9 common questions predominate over questions that may be unique to individual Class Members, and class-
10 wide settlement is superior to any other resolution.

11 **3. Plaintiff's Claims Are Typical of Those of the Class.**

12 Typicality "requires a showing that the class representative has claims or defenses typical of the
13 class." *See, e.g., Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.*, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524, 1534 (2008), approved
14 by *Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct.*, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012). California law does not require that plaintiffs
15 have claims identical to the other class members. Rather, the test of typicality for a class representative is
16 whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is
17 not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course
18 of conduct. *Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.*, 149 Cal. App. 4th 1496, 1502 (2007).

19 In light of these standards, Plaintiff is typical of class members. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 36.) Like other
20 Class Members, Defendant employed Plaintiff as an hourly employee during the Class Period. (*Id.*)
21 Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff and other Class Members share the same claims stemming from Defendant's
22 alleged violations of the Labor Code and relevant wage order. (Declaration of Kenneth Anthony
23 Buchanan, Jr., ["Buchanan Decl."], ¶¶ 9-11.) In addition, Defendant's main defense, that the wage and
24 hour policies and practices fully comply with California law, apply equally to the claims of all Class
25 Members. Thus, Plaintiff is typical of the Class.

26 **4. Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Class.**

27 Adequacy is shown where the plaintiff is represented by counsel qualified to conduct the litigation
28 and the plaintiff's interest in the litigation is not antagonistic to class members. *McGhee v. Bank of*

1 *America*, 60 Cal. App. 3d 442, 451 (1976). In other words, where the plaintiff has adequate counsel, the
2 plaintiff may represent the entire class absent any disabling conflicts of interest that might hinder the
3 plaintiff's ability to represent the class. *Id.* In the Action, Plaintiff has no conflicts of interest with other
4 Class Members and has agreed to place Class interests above his own. (Buchanan Decl., ¶¶ 5-21; Leviant
5 Decl., ¶ 39.) Moreover, Plaintiff's counsel is experienced in wage and hour class litigation and has no
6 conflicts of interest with absent Class Members. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 39). Thus, this Court should appoint
7 Plaintiff as the Class Representative and appoint Plaintiff's Counsel as Class Counsel.

8 **5. Proceeding as a Class Action is Superior to Individual Actions**

9 Plaintiff contends that proceeding as a class action is a superior means of resolving this dispute, as
10 the Class Members and the Court will derive substantial benefits. Class certification would serve as the
11 only means to deter and redress the alleged Labor Code violations. *See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* 23 Cal.
12 4th at 434. Furthermore, individual actions arising out of the same operative facts would unduly burden
13 the courts and could result in inconsistent results, which may be avoided by class certification.

14 **6. The Proposed Class Notice Complies with Rule 3.766(d) and (e)**

15 Notice requirements are set forth in Rules of Court, Rule 3.766. In determining the manner of
16 notice, the court must consider interests of the class, relief requested, stakes of individual class members,
17 costs of notifying class members, resources of the parties, possible prejudice to class members who do not
18 receive notice, and the *res judicata* effect on class members. Rules of Court, Rule 3.766(e).

19 *a) The Notice Procedure Satisfies Due Process*

20 The proposed procedure for distributing the Proposed Notice is robust and meets the requirement
21 that it have "a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the class members." *Cartt v. Sup.*
22 *Ct.*, 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 974 (1975). There is no statutory or due process requirement that all class
23 members receive actual notice, but in this matter, the Class Members will receive direct notice. Here, the
24 proposed procedure includes safeguards, including, but not limited to, mailing notice to Class Members'
25 last known addresses; skip tracing; searches for address changes; and the re-mailing of returned notices to
26 any forwarding addresses. (Lawrence Decl., ¶ 8). This manner of giving notice complies with Rule of
27 Court 3.766(c) because it provides a reasonable chance that Notice will reach most or all Class Members.
28

1 b) *The Notice is Accurate and Informative*

2 The proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement should be approved for dissemination to the Class
3 Members because its content complies with Rule of Court 3.766(d) in that it contains a brief explanation
4 of the case, including the basic contentions or denials of the Parties, detailed information about Class
5 Members' rights to be excluded from the Settlement and object to the Settlement; a statement that the
6 Settlement will bind all members who do not timely opt-out. Thus, the Notice also satisfies Rule of Court
7 3.769(f) regarding the contents of settlement notices.

8 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. 3 NEWBERG § 8.39. It
9 summarizes the proceedings and the terms and conditions of the proposed Settlement, in an informative
10 and coherent manner, in compliance with the Manual for Complex Litigation ("MANUAL"), (2d Ed.
11 1993), which states that "the notice should be accurate, objective, and understandable to Class Members .
12 .." MANUAL, § 30.211. It makes clear that the Settlement does not constitute an admission of liability
13 by Defendant and recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits. It also states that the final
14 settlement approval decision has yet to be made. Accordingly, the Notice complies with the standards of
15 fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a combined settlement-certification class notice.

16 **B. The Court Should Preliminarily Approve the Settlement Because It Is a Fair,**
17 **Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise of Disputed Wage Claims**

18 California courts favor settlement. *See, e.g., Stambaugh v. Superior Court*, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231,
19 236 (1976). Unlike most settlements, class action settlements involve a court approval process that exists
20 to prevent fraud, collusion, and unfairness to class members. *Malibu Outrigger Bd. of Governors v.*
21 *Superior Court*, 103 Cal.App.3d 573, 578-579 (1980). For the reasons discussed below, this Court should
22 preliminarily approve the Settlement, allow the Parties to give notice to the Class as proposed, and schedule
23 a Final Approval Hearing.

24 **1. Class Action Settlements Are Subject to Review and Approval.**

25 Any settlement of class litigation must be reviewed and approved by the presiding court. Rules of
26 Court, Rule 3.769(a). Approval occurs in two steps: (1) an early (preliminary) review and (2) a subsequent
27 (final) review after notice has been distributed to the class members. The Preliminary Approval Hearing
28 and Final Approval Hearing coincide with these two steps. The present motion seeks *preliminary approval*

1 and the setting of a Final Approval Hearing.

2 To evaluate a settlement, a court must receive “*basic*” information about the nature and magnitude
3 of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of
4 those claims represents a reasonable compromise.” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal. App. 4th
5 116, 133 (2008). But the record need *not* contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical amount
6 the class could recover. *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 399, 409
7 (2010).

8 **2. The Parties Reached the Settlement Through Arms’ Length Negotiations**
9 **Between Experienced Counsel with the Assistance of a Highly Qualified**
10 **Mediator After Sufficient Data Was Exchanged to Evaluate Settlement.**

11 A settlement is presumptively fair where it is reached through arms’ length bargaining, based on
12 sufficient discovery and investigation to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently, counsel is
13 experienced in similar litigation, and the percentage of objectors is small.² *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1802;
14 *In re Microsoft I-V Cases*, 135 Cal. App. 4th 706, 723 (2006); *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v.*
15 *Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1146 (2000). In exercising the power to approve a settlement,
16 the overriding concern is to ensure that a proposed settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable,” *Dunk*, at
17 1801, considering “the complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class
18 action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the state
19 of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and
20 the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. *Id.* These factors require balancing, are non-
21 exhaustive, and, as such, trial courts should tailor the factors considered to each case and give due regard
22 to “what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” *Id.*

23 Here, the Settlement resulted from thorough, arms’ length negotiations between experienced
24 counsel with the assistance of a skilled mediator, Hon. Carl West (Ret.). (Levant Decl., ¶¶ 8-10.) Plaintiff
25 obtained data from Defendant and then carefully reviewed that data. (*Id.* at ¶ 6-7). Counsel for Plaintiff
26

27 ² Because the fourth prerequisite for the presumption to arise cannot be addressed until the final
28 approval hearing, only the first three prerequisites are relevant at this preliminary stage of the settlement
approval process.

1 also examined policies, financial records, and interviewed witnesses in detail about their work experiences
2 and Defendant's practices. (*Id.*)

3 Based on the review of data, Plaintiff's counsel estimated potential exposure and then estimated
4 risk factors to adjust the reasonable expected outcome. The investigation that Plaintiff's counsel conducted
5 was sufficient to provide them with enough information to intelligently evaluate the estimated exposure
6 for purposes of negotiating the Settlement in view of the risks discussed below and was sufficient to allow
7 this Court to do the same. *See, e.g., Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 245 (2001).
8 A thorough data analysis was conducted.

9 **3. The Settlement Represents a Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable Compromise**
10 **of Class Members' Claims Based on Defendant's Estimated Liability**
11 **Exposure Given the Risks Continued Litigation Would Entail.**

12 *a) The Class Settlement is Fair, Adequate and Reasonable*

13 A settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at trial
14 and does not have to provide 100% of damages sought to be fair and reasonable. "In the context of a
15 settlement agreement, the test is not the maximum amount plaintiffs might have obtained at trial on the
16 complaint, but rather whether the settlement is reasonable under all of the circumstances." *Wershba*, 91
17 Cal. App. 4th at 250. Accordingly, because settlements involve compromise, even one that provides for
18 substantially narrower relief than would likely be obtained if the suit were successfully litigated can be
19 reasonable given that "the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each
20 side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation." *Id.*

21 With respect to the claims asserted on behalf of the Class, there are serious risks that support this
22 compromise amount. These risks include, but are not limited to: (i) the risk that Plaintiff would be unable
23 to establish liability for unpaid wages, *see Duran v. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n*, 59 Cal. 4th 1, 39 & n. 33 (2014)
24 ("*Duran*"); (ii) the risk that Defendant's meal and rest period policies might not support class certification
25 or a class-wide liability finding; (iii) the risk that uncertainties about the legality of Defendant's policies
26 and practices could preclude class-wide awards of statutory penalties; (iv) the risk that individual
27 differences between Class Members could be construed as pertaining to liability and not just damages; (v)
28 the risk that any penalty award under PAGA could be reduced by the Court in its discretion; (vi) the risk

1 that lengthy trial or appellate litigation could ensue; and (vi) the risk that violation rates could prove lower
2 than expected. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 16.) These risks are non-exhaustive. (*Id.*)

3 In light of the uncertainties of protracted litigation, the settlement amount reflects a fair and
4 reasonable recovery for the Class Members. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 17.) The settlement amount is, of course, a
5 compromise figure. (*Id.*) By necessity it took into account risks related to liability, damages, and the
6 defenses asserted by Defendant. (*Id.*) Moreover, each Class Member will be given the opportunity to opt-
7 out of the Settlement, allowing those who feel they have claims that are greater than the benefits they can
8 receive under this Settlement to pursue their own claims. (*Id.*) For the approximately **254** members of the
9 Class, the average **gross** benefit is **\$2,381.89** per class member, and the estimated average **net** recovery for
10 each Class Member would be approximately **\$1,302.49**. (*Id.*) Given that Defendant could potentially
11 defeat certification, this is a significant sum to have achieved in settlement. (*Id.*) Moreover, a Class
12 Member who worked a greater number of weeks for Defendant will receive a larger share of the Settlement
13 than a Class Member who worked for a shorter amount of time during the class period. (*Id.*)

14 After analyzing the claims in this matter, Class Counsel has concluded that the value of this
15 Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 18.) The Gross Settlement Amount of
16 **\$605,000.00** is about 97% of the **\$626,809.67** estimate of *risk-adjusted* recovery (excluding interest) at
17 this stage in the litigation. (*Id.*) This assessment is based on a carefully constructed model of the current
18 fair value of the case, using estimated risks, average wage rates, numbers of employees, and the amount of
19 time covered by the class period, resulting in the following exposure projections:

- 20 • A reasonably estimated exposure for unpaid off-the-clock wages was calculated, with the
21 assistance of an expert, to be approximately **\$207,432.50**, based on an estimate of five (5)
22 minutes of off-the-clock work for all shifts for every Class Member. However, with the
23 high-risk factor discounts for certification and liability proof, the value of that claim is
24 estimated by Plaintiff's counsel to be approximately **\$24,891.90**, assuming certification
25 probability of 40% and merits success at 30%. The off-the-clock time resulted from
26 allegations that calls during "standby" time were compensable. Here, a \$24,891.90
27 exposure has a value of about 12% of its maximum, given a likelihood of success on both
28 certification and the merits, which is an approximation of the chain probability of
certification multiplied by merits chances: $0.4 \times 0.3 = 0.12$. This theory of recovery has a
high degree of risk because it depends on Class Member estimates of the frequency and
duration and is testimony dependent.
- Exposure for unpaid off-the-clock wages was determined to be of no recoverable value,
since the additional compensation was in the form of discretionary holiday bonuses.

- A reasonably calculated exposure for meal break violations over the class period was calculated at **\$352,739.00**, with chances of certification and liability risks (40% and 40%, respectively), resulting in a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$56,438.24**. This exposure is based upon a 25% violation rate. Employee choice is a serious issue in the context of a meal period claim. So long as an employee has the opportunity to take a lawful meal period, an employee can choose to take it late, cut it short, or skip it. In addition, facility maintenance or management employees operated with little supervision.
- A reasonably estimated exposure for rest break violations over the class period was calculated at **\$705,478.00**, but with chances of certification and proof of liability (20% and 20%, respectively), resulting in a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$28,219.12**. This claim is based entirely on class member testimonials that rest breaks were sometimes missed due to work demands. Plaintiff estimated the exposure assuming 100% of the Class missed one rest break per pay period, while understanding that this theory carries the potential for high risk given that employees were often allowed to determine when to take rest breaks and worked in small teams at job sites. In addition, facility maintenance or management employees operated with little supervision.
- A reasonably calculated exposure for unreimbursed expenses was estimated to be **\$157,360.00**, but with chances of certification and proof of liability (50% and 50%, respectively), resulting in a risk-adjusted exposure of **\$48,273.75**. The allegation is that employees paid for tools and supplies without reimbursement, and \$20.00 was assumed as the monthly expense. It is likely, however, that this severely overstates the prevalence of this issue, and the actual exposure is likely much lower.
- The risk-adjusted penalty recovery for wage statement penalties were estimated to be approximately **\$72,787.50**, on a maximum exposure of **\$323,500.00** (with certification and merits success chances of 75% and 30%, respectively, based on all theories of unpaid wages, adjusted for the additional risk of needing to prove other elements in addition to the underlying wage claim). The value of this claim was just dealt a severe blow by the recent California Supreme Court decision of *Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc.* (May 6, 2024), which significantly strengthened the good faith defense to Section 226 penalties.
- The risk-adjusted penalty recovery for Labor Code § 203 penalties was estimated to be approximately **\$67,807.91**, on a maximum exposure of **\$301,368.50** (with certification and merits success chances of 75% and 30%, respectively, based on all theories of unpaid wages, adjusted for the additional risk of needing to prove other elements in addition to the underlying wage claim). The need to show a knowing and intentional violation constitutes an additional risk factor.
- Performing risk-adjusted valuations for all claims yields a total value in the range of **\$289,484.67**, excluding PAGA.³
- For the PAGA Period, the number of PAGA Pay Periods at issue is estimated to be **6,582** for the approximately **180** Aggrieved Employees. Using the most straightforward formulation of applying the “catch-all” \$100 penalty specified in Labor Code § 2699(f)(2) to each PAGA Pay Period, the total penalty exposure is approximately **\$658,200.00**. In

³ It is difficult to assign specific percentages to future events, but it does provide a method for attempting to reduce the concept of “very high risk” or “high risk” to a quantifiable amount. Certification of a claim is typically a binary event. One does not obtain a 20% certification; a claim is either certified or it is not. But the current expected value is best quantified by applying a risk reduction, based on the total experience of counsel. The numbers explain with math what can also be described conceptually in words.

1 addition, with assistance from Plaintiff's data consultant, and after a thorough review of
2 evidence casting serious doubt on the viability of many of the theories of penalty recover,
3 counsel separately estimated the plausible potential PAGA exposure to be, on a penalty-
4 by-penalty basis, to be approximately Plausible PAGA penalties exposure was calculated
5 to be **\$3,373,250.00** (but with significant stacking of penalties that would probably be
6 disallowed by the Court). Assuming issues with proof and cooperation of aggrieved
7 employees, along with the Court's power to reduce penalties, the realistic exposure was
8 calculated to be **\$337,325.00**.

9 (See, Leviant Decl., ¶ 18.)

10 This result here is fully supportable as reasonable. (*Id.* at ¶ 19). First, it is important to recognize
11 the wilfulness finding required for Labor Code §§ 203 and 226 is challenging to establish. (*Id.*) Second,
12 rest break and meal period claims have been challenging to certify for many years, even after *Brinker*. (*Id.*)
13 Arbitration agreements present a very high risk to all class claims. (*Id.*) The Judicial Council's Class
14 Certification in California: SECOND INTERIM REPORT FROM THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA
15 CLASS ACTION LITIGATION - FEBRUARY 2010 ("Second Interim Report"), at page 5, states that
16 "less than a quarter of disposed cases in the study sample were certified, either through a litigated motion
17 for certification or as part of a classwide settlement agreement." See, Second Interim Report, at 5
18 (emphasis added).⁴ (*Id.*) That "or" is significant. (*Id.*) The certification rates identified in the study of
19 less than 25% includes **both** contested certifications and settlement certifications, which are the majority of
20 certifications. (*Id.*) In other words, one must assume in any wage and hour class action prior to certification
21 that a contested certification motion will have a success rate of well under 25%, and probably closer to
22 10% as a starting point for risk evaluation. (*Id.*) The facts of each case have significant bearing on these
23 percentages. (*Id.*) But it cannot be disputed that certification is an exceptionally difficult procedural hurdle
24 to successfully overcome. (*Id.*) Thus, it is not unreasonable to start from the proposition that a pre-
25 certification settlement that is 10% to 15% of the maximum plausible exposure is a valid starting point for
26 valuation. (*Id.*) If roughly 10% of class actions are certified on a contested basis, then, on average, 90%
27 of the time a class will not be certified and the result for the class is *zero* dollars. (*Id.*)

28 Here, the estimated certification probabilities are **above** the average rate at which cases were
certified in California over the study years, based upon data available through the California Courts

⁴ The report is available at <https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/classaction-certification.pdf> (last viewed March 12, 2024).

1 websites. (*Id.*) Since well under 20% of all cases filed as proposed class actions are ultimately certified
2 by way of a *contested* motion, the recovery falls within the expected outcome under the likelihood of
3 success metric. (*Id.*) It would also be appropriate to evaluate the result by examining only the premium
4 wages at issue (approximately \$1,265,649.50, *with no risk reduction*), excluding penalties and interest.⁵
5 (*Id.*) This Settlement achieves the goals of the litigation.

6 *b) The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable*

7 The ultimate decision as to the amount of penalties is always up to the discretion of the Court.
8 Labor Code § 2699(e)(2) states: “In any action by an aggrieved employee seeking recovery of a civil
9 penalty available under subdivision (a) or (f), a court may award a lesser amount than the maximum civil
10 penalty amount specified by this part if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do
11 otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.”

12 Prior to the issuance of *Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc.*, 72 Cal. App. 5th 56 (2021), the only sources
13 of persuasive guidance as to how to assess the reasonableness of a PAGA allocation were found in federal
14 court decisions. In their view, a PAGA allocation, even if a small portion of the total settlement, could be
15 reasonable if the settlement of the wage and hour claims is robust and serves the deterrent purpose of
16 PAGA. *O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.*, 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“By providing
17 fair compensation to the class members as employees and substantial monetary relief, a settlement not only
18 vindicates the rights of class members as employees, but may have a deterrent effect upon the defendant
19 employer and other employers, an objective of PAGA.”). *Moniz* provided explicit confirmation that this
20 was an appropriate yardstick by which to measure reasonableness of a PAGA settlement. *Moniz*, 72 Cal.
21 App. 5th at 77. *Moniz*, in agreeing with federal courts that have considered how to evaluate a PAGA
22 settlement, concluded that the class action factors are appropriately considered, along with a consideration
23

24
25 ⁵ The exclusion of interest and penalties from the fairness evaluation is proper because, first, PAGA
26 penalties are discretionary (*see* Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2) (the court in its discretion “may award a lesser
27 amount than the maximum civil penalty amount specified by this part...”)), and, second, courts evaluate
28 the strength of a proposed settlement without taking potential penalties or interest into consideration. *See*
Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2000); *see also Miller v. CEVA Logistics*
U.S.A., Inc., 2015 WL 729638, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2015) (court utilized calculation of a defendant’s
exposure exclusive of interest and penalties to determine whether the settlement fell within the range of
possible approval).

1 of whether the settlement furthers “PAGA’s purposes to remediate present labor law violations, deter
2 future ones, and to maximize enforcement of state labor laws.”

3 As to the first set of elements (the class-type analysis), it is embodied in Plaintiff’s discussion of
4 the adequacy of the settlement generally. Here, the expense, complexity and likely duration of future
5 litigation was to some extent an unknown. However, what is certain is that to adequately establish the
6 violations that would support a substantial penalty, tremendous time and expense would be invested.

7 The second element (the PAGA purposes element) is also satisfied here. As held by *Moniz*,
8 PAGA’s purposes include (1) remediation of present labor law violations, (2) deterrence of future
9 violations, and (3) maximization of enforcement of state labor laws. Here, the allocation of a major portion
10 of settlement funds to class members still advances the goal of labor law violation remediation. The
11 allocation of a major portion of settlement funds to class members also deters future violations. This is a
12 \$605,000.00 settlement, which is a good result. Deterrence is fulfilled. Finally, allocation of a major
13 portion of settlement funds to class members still advances the goal of enforcement of state labor law. This
14 settlement is, by definition, a response to alleged violations of labor laws, balanced against risks.

15 In addition, there is no evidence that a court or a commissioner had informed Defendant that its
16 conduct violated the Labor Code. *Amaral v. Cintas Corp.*, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1157, 1209 (2008); *Willis v.*
17 *Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC*, 2013 WL 6053831, *7-8 (E.D. Cal. 2013). And in *Cotter*, the court found a
18 significant reduction of the PAGA claim would be appropriate because “[t]his does not appear to be a case
19 where a company has deliberately sought to evade the law.” *Cotter*, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 941.

20 Finally, the PAGA allocation is fair. Out of \$30,000.00, the LWDA is receiving \$22,500.00
21 allocated as PAGA penalties. The Class is receiving, net, an estimated \$339,833.33 for the releases of *all*
22 other claims. While the proportion is tipped in favor of employees, the allocation satisfies California’s
23 wage and hour policies.

24 **4. The Proposed Method for Allocating Settlement Funds Is Fair.**

25 The proposed method of allocating the Settlement Fund to Class Members also is fair and
26 reasonable. The Settlement Fund is to be allocated between all Class Members, based on time worked by
27 the Class Member during the Class Period, in relation to the total amount of time worked by all
28 participating Class Members. This proposed method is fair and reasonable because each Class Member’s

1 actual potential damages vary based on the number of workweeks he or she worked. A Class Member
2 who worked a greater number of work weeks will receive a larger payment under the Settlement than a
3 Class Member who worked for a shorter amount of time. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 17.)

4 **5. The Proposed Enhancement Award to Plaintiff Warrants Approval.**

5 The proposed enhancement of \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff is intended to recognize substantial initiative
6 and significant efforts on behalf of the Class. Courts routinely approve incentive awards to compensate
7 named plaintiffs for the services they provide and the risks they incur during class action litigation, often
8 in much higher amounts than that sought here. Factors considered when awarding an incentive include
9 the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the class, the degree to which the class has benefitted, the
10 amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in the litigation, the risk to the class representative in
11 commencing suit (financial and otherwise), the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered, the
12 duration of the litigation, and the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the plaintiff as a result of
13 the litigation. *Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC*, 175 Cal. App. 4th 785, 804 (2009). Here, Plaintiff
14 contributed time to the prosecution of this matter, including providing information to counsel; assisted with
15 the settlement process (with included conferring with counsel during the preparation of Plaintiff's
16 mediation brief); and, regularly conferred with counsel regarding the case whenever questions arose.
17 (Buchanan Decl., ¶¶ 5-20; Leviant Decl., ¶ 32.) The enhancement also recognizes risks Plaintiff took to
18 be personally liable for costs regardless of the success of the litigation, as well as the personal risk of facing
19 intrusive discovery and potential disclosure to future employers that Plaintiff sued an employer, making
20 future employment less certain.

21 **6. The Proposed Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs Is Also Fair, Adequate,**
22 **and Reasonable and Merits Preliminary Approval.**

23 The California Supreme Court removed any lingering doubt about the use of the percentage of the
24 fund method to award attorney's fees in California Courts. *Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern. Inc.*, 1 Cal. 5th
25 480, 503 (2016).⁶ Thus, this Court may and, pursuant to *Laffitte*, should award fees to Plaintiff's counsel
26

27 ⁶ The Supreme Court also corrected the misconception that *Dunk* should be viewed as expressing doubt
28 about the use of the percentage method: "The *Dunk* court, while finding the percentage method

1 based upon the percentage of the fund methodology.

2 Setting *Laffitte* aside, whether the once-again-confirmed percentage of the fund method or the
3 lodestar method is used, the outcome is roughly the same: “[F]ee awards in class actions average around
4 one-third of the recovery’ regardless of ‘whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used.’”
5 *Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Mgmt., LLC*, 69 Cal. App. 5th 521 (2021). This is also consistent with counsels’
6 experience in class cases. Here, Plaintiff’s attorneys intend to request attorneys’ fees of up to \$201,666.67
7 (one-third of the GSA), and costs capped at \$25,000.00 (which includes payment for mediations, filing
8 fees, service of process fees, and other standard expenses). (Leviant Decl., ¶ 31.) Given the efforts and
9 risks involved in this case, as well as the results achieved, these amounts are within the range of
10 reasonableness and warrant *preliminary approval*.

11 **7. The Proposed Payment to the Administrator Is Fair and Reasonable**

12 Phoenix, which has been selected due to its most reasonable bid for all required services, with all
13 due regard for its reputation and known quality of work, states that administration can be performed for a
14 flat rate of **\$8,250.00**. (Lawrence Decl., ¶ 16; Leviant Decl., ¶ 33). In counsel’s experience, based on
15 similar wage-and-hour actions, an estimated cost of **\$8,250.00** is a fair and reasonable amount for
16 administration fees, is below the Parties’ estimate of \$10,000.00 in costs for administration, and should be
17 preliminarily approved. (Leviant Decl., ¶ 33.) Phoenix also confirmed its capabilities and security protocols
18 in the accompanying declaration. (Lawrence Decl., ¶¶ 6-11.)

19 **VI. THE COURT SHOULD SCHEDULE A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING**

20 Plaintiff requests that the fairness hearing in this case be scheduled for about 145 calendar days
21 after issuance of the Court’s Order granting preliminary approval. Under the Settlement, Defendant will
22 have 15 calendar days after preliminary approval to provide the data to Phoenix, which will then have 14
23 calendar days to mail out the class notice. Class Members have sixty (60) calendar days after mailing of
24 the notice to submit exclusions or objections (with a 14-day extension available for re-mailed notices).
25 Therefore, Plaintiff proposes a final approval hearing scheduled for the first available hearing date that is
26 about 145 days after preliminary approval is granted.

27 _____
28 inapplicable to the settlement before it due to the lack of a readily valued common fund, did not purport to
bar its usage generally in common fund cases.” *Laffitte*, 1 Cal. 5th at 501.

1 **VII. CONCLUSION**


2 For all the foregoing reasons, because the Class meets the requirements for certification, because
3 the Settlement bears all requisite indicia of fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy, and because the
4 proposed notice procedure and forms comport with Rule 3.766 and due process, this Court should grant
5 this Motion for Preliminary Approval and schedule a Final Approval Hearing.

6 Respectfully submitted,

7 Dated: August 28, 2025

MOON LAW GROUP, PC

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9 By:



Kane Moon
H. Scott Leviant
Sandy Pham

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11 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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