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individually, and on behalf of Aggrieved
Employees pursuant to the California
Private Attorneys General Act

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

STEPHANIE LEON, individually, and on behalf of
Aggrieved Employees pursuant to the California
Private Attorneys General Act,

Plaintiff,

vs.

FULGENT THERAPEUTICS, LLC, a California
limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 25,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 24STCV14168

Honorable Richard S. Kemalyan
Department 61

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR APPROVAL OF PAGA
SETTLEMENT AND AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS,
ENHANCEMENT PAYMENT, AND
SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION
COSTS**

Reservation No.: 801068786933
Date: August 3, 2026
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Department: 61

Complaint Filed: June 6, 2024
Trial Date: Not Set

1 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

2 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT** on August 3, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. in Department 61 of the
3 above-captioned Court located at the Stanley Mosk Courthouse, 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles,
4 California 90012, Plaintiff Stephanie Leon (“Plaintiff”) will and hereby does move the Court for an
5 Order granting approval of the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004,
6 California Labor Code sections 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”) settlement. Specifically, Plaintiff requests
7 that the Court enter an Order:

- 8 1. Granting approval pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(1)(2) of the Settlement
9 Agreement (“Settlement,” “Agreement,” or “Settlement Agreement”) attached as **Exhibit**
10 **3** to the Declaration of Alexandra Rose in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Approval of
11 Paga Settlement and Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Enhancement Payment, and
12 Settlement Administration Costs (“Rose Decl.”);
- 13 2. Directing the distribution of the Gross Settlement Amount of Two Hundred Eighty-Five
14 Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$285,000.00) pursuant to the terms of the Agreement;
- 15 3. Approving the Net Settlement Amount, estimated to be One Hundred Forty-Five
16 Thousand Six Hundred Forty-One Dollars and Seventy-Four Cents (\$145,641.74), of
17 which seventy-five percent (75%) will be distributed to the California Labor and
18 Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and twenty-five percent (25%) of which will
19 be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees;
- 20 4. Approving an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees of thirty-five (35%) of the Gross
21 Settlement Amount (i.e., \$99,750.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$285,000.00) to
22 Plaintiff’s Counsel;
- 23 5. Approving the amount of Twenty-Four Thousand Six Hundred Eight Dollars and Twenty-
24 Six Cents (\$24,608.26) to Plaintiff’s Counsel for reimbursement of actual litigation
25 expenses payment pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(g)(1);
- 26 6. Approving the award of Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$5,000.00) to Plaintiff as
27 an Enhancement Payment;
- 28 7. Appointing ILYM Group, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator; and

8. Approving an award of up to Ten Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$10,000.00) in anticipated costs to ILYM Group, Inc. for its settlement administration services.

In accordance with California Labor Code sections 2699 *et. seq.*, on November 19, 2025, a copy of the proposed Settlement Agreement was submitted to the LWDA via online submission through the LWDA's website. (Rose Decl., ¶ 13 and Exh. 4).

This Motion is based upon this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declarations of Alexandra Rose, Plaintiff Stephanie Leon, and the Settlement Administrator (Lisa Mullins of ILYM Group, Inc.), the pleadings and other records on file with the Court in this matter, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: November 19, 2025

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

By:

Alexandra Rose

Attorneys for Plaintiff STEPHANIE LEON

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Pursuant to the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code
4 sections 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”), Plaintiff Stephanie Leon (“Plaintiff”) seeks approval of the
5 Settlement Agreement (“Settlement,” “Agreement,” or “Settlement Agreement”) entered into with
6 Defendants Fulgent Therapeutics, LLC and Fulgent Genetics, Inc. (together, “Defendants”)
7 (collectively, with Plaintiff, the “Parties”), which is attached as Exhibit 3 to the Declaration of
8 Alexandra Rose in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement and Award of
9 Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Enhancement Payment, and Settlement Administration Costs (“Rose
10 Decl.”). The Agreement terms are outlined as follows:

- 11 • Gross Settlement Amount: Two Hundred Eighty-Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
12 (\$285,000.00).
- 13 • Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: Attorneys’ fees of thirty-five (35%) of the Gross Settlement
14 Amount (i.e., \$99,750.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$285,000.00) plus
15 reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses in the amount of Twenty-Four Thousand
16 Six Hundred Eight Dollars and Twenty-Six Cents (\$24,608.26), to be paid from the Gross
17 Settlement Amount.
- 18 • Enhancement Payment: Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$5,000.00) to Plaintiff,
19 to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
- 20 • Settlement Administration Costs: Up to Ten Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
21 (\$10,000.00), to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
- 22 • Estimated Net Settlement Amount: One Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Six Hundred
23 Forty-One Dollars and Seventy-Four Cents (\$145,641.74), of which 75% (\$109,231.30)
24 will be paid to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and
25 the remaining 25% (\$36,410.44) will be paid to the Aggrieved Employees.

26 As set forth herein, the Settlement Agreement is the product of informed discovery, arms-
27 length negotiations, and provides a fair, adequate, and reasonable recovery for the State of California
28 and Aggrieved Employees. Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests that the Court grant approval of
the proposed Settlement Agreement, among other requested relief.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendants are a full-service genomic testing company founded in 2011 that provides testing options in oncology, anatomic pathology, infectious and rare diseases, and reproductive health. (Rose Decl., ¶ 2). Defendants employed Plaintiff as an hourly-paid, non-exempt Medical Biller from approximately August 2020 to August 2024. (Rose Decl., ¶ 2; Declaration of Stephanie Leon in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement and Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Enhancement Payment, and Settlement Administration Costs [“Leon Decl.”], ¶ 2).

On April 1, 2024, Plaintiff provided written notice by electronic submission to the LWDA and by U.S. Certified Mail to Defendant Fulgent Therapeutics, LLC, pursuant to California Labor Code § 2699.3, of the specific provisions of the California Labor Code alleged to have been violated by. (Rose Decl., ¶ 3 and Exh. 1).

On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Enforcement Action Under the Private Attorneys General Act, Cal. Labor Code §§ 2698 *Et Seq.* (“Operative Complaint”) in the action entitled *Stephanie Leon v. Fulgent Therapeutics, LLC, et al.*, Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 24STCV14168 (“Action”). (*Id.*, ¶ 4). The Operative Complaint asserts a single cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA for violations of multiple provisions of the California Labor Code and the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders. (*Ibid.*).

On August 20, 2024, Defendant Fulgent Therapeutics, LLC filed a Motion to Compel Mediation and, If Unsuccessful, Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings (“Motion to Compel Mediation”) and supporting documents. (*Id.*, ¶ 5). On November 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion to Compel Mediation. (*Ibid.*). On November 13, 2024, Defendant Fulgent Therapeutics, LLC filed a Reply in support of the Motion to Compel Mediation. (*Ibid.*). On November 20, 2024, the Court entered a Minute Order, which denied the Motion to Compel Mediation. (*Ibid.*).

On December 23, 2024, Plaintiff provided an amended written notice to the LWDA and to Defendants and also filed an Amendment to Complaint, both of which to add Defendant Fulgent Genetics, Inc. as an employer and defendant for purposes of the PAGA claim. (*Id.*, ¶ 6 and Exh. 2).

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1 On May 2, 2025, the Parties participated in a formal mediation conducted by Tripper Ortman,
2 Esq., a neutral and respected mediator with extensive experience in complex wage and hour matters,
3 during which the Parties were ultimately able to reach an agreement to resolve the Action in its
4 entirety. (*Id.*, ¶ 7).

5 On November 4, 2025, the Parties executed the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, ¶ 8 and Exh. 3).

6 During the course of informal discovery in the Action, Plaintiff's Counsel conducted an intense
7 investigation into the facts of the Action. (*Id.*, ¶ 9). This included obtaining data, information, and
8 documents relating to the underlying alleged violations, including, but not limited to, Plaintiff's
9 employee file, a twenty percent (20%) sampling of Aggrieved Employees' time and payroll data,
10 Employee Handbook, and Aggrieved Employees' data points so that Plaintiff could assess the number
11 of alleged potential violations and value of the recoverable penalties, as well as evaluate the strengths
12 and weaknesses of her claims. (*Ibid.*).

13 Based on the data, information, and documents received, as well as thorough discussions with
14 Defendant's counsel, Plaintiff's Counsel was able to (i) determine the total number of distinct
15 individuals falling within the definition of "Aggrieved Employees" for the relevant statutory period,
16 (ii) the number of affected pay periods at issue among them, and (iii) construct a damages model that
17 calculated the maximum realistic amount of PAGA penalties that could be levied against Defendants
18 within the relevant statutory period. (*Id.*, ¶ 10). Defendants, however, disputed Plaintiff's claims and
19 disputed both the existence of and extent of liability as alleged by Plaintiff, which allowed Plaintiff's
20 Counsel to further assess the strength of Plaintiff's claims. (*Ibid.*). Plaintiff's Counsel's experience in
21 litigating similar representative wage and hour claims, the degree of investigation that was conducted
22 here, and the amount of data, information, and documents that was obtained, was sufficient to
23 determine the potential value of the PAGA claims, and to evaluate the strength of these claims for
24 purposes of settlement. (*Ibid.*).

25 The Parties believe the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (*Id.*, ¶ 11).
26 The Parties understand, acknowledge, and agree that the Settlement Agreement constitutes a
27 compromise of Plaintiff's PAGA claims, and that it is the desire and intention of the Parties to affect
28 a final and complete resolution of the Action. (*Ibid.*).

Defendants deny all of the claims in the Action, and do not waive, but rather expressly reserve, all rights to challenge all such claims and allegations upon all legal, procedural, and factual grounds should the Settlement Agreement not become final. (*Id.*, ¶ 12). The Settlement Agreement reflects a compromise reached to end litigation in the Action. (*Ibid.*). Following significant investigation and extensive settlement negotiations, Plaintiff now seeks approval of the proposed Settlement Agreement, which will resolve all representative claims alleged in the Action. (*Ibid.*).

III. THE SETTLEMENT TERMS

A. Definition of the Aggrieved Employees

For purposes of settlement only, the Parties have agreed that the “Aggrieved Employees” shall be defined as “all persons who worked for Defendants in the State of California as hourly-paid and/or non-exempt employees at any time during the PAGA Period.” (Rose Decl., ¶ 14; Settlement Agreement, ¶ I.2). The “PAGA Period” is the period from April 1, 2023 through July 2, 2025. (Rose Decl., ¶ 14; Settlement Agreement, ¶ I.12). There are approximately one hundred and seventy-six (176) Aggrieved Employees (as of April 17, 2025). (Rose Decl., ¶ 14; Settlement Agreement, ¶ I.13).

B. Amount of Settlement

The Parties have agreed to settle the PAGA claims at issue in the Action for a non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of Two Hundred Eighty-Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$285,000.00). (Rose Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement, ¶ I.8).

C. Allocation and Funding of the Gross Settlement Amount

The Gross Settlement Amount is a common fund and therefore includes all requested costs, fees, and other allocations. (Rose Decl., ¶ 15). The Gross Settlement Amount includes: (1) counsel’s fees in the amount of thirty-five (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., \$99,750.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$285,000.00); (2) counsel’s actual litigation costs and expenses in the amount of Twenty-Four Thousand Six Hundred Eight Dollars and Twenty-Six Cents (\$24,608.26); (3) Enhancement Payment in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$5,000.00) to Plaintiff; and (4) Settlement Administration Costs, not to exceed Ten Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$10,000.00). (Rose Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ I.8, III.2, and III.3.a- III.3.c).

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1 After the above-estimated amounts are deducted from the Gross Settlement Amount, the Net
2 Settlement Amount will amount to approximately One Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Six Hundred
3 Forty-One Dollars and Seventy-Four Cents (\$145,641.74), of which seventy-five percent (75%), or
4 One Hundred Nine Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-One Dollars and Thirty Cents (\$109,231.30), will
5 be paid to the LWDA (“LWDA Payment”), and twenty-five percent (25%), or Thirty-Six Thousand
6 Four Hundred Ten Dollars and Forty-Four Cents (\$36,410.44), will be distributed and paid to
7 Aggrieved Employees on a *pro rata* basis based upon their number of Pay Periods. (Rose Decl., ¶ 16;
8 Settlement Agreement ¶¶ I.9 and III.4.a-III.4.b).

9 If the actual number of pay periods that the Aggrieved Employees worked for Defendants
10 during the PAGA Period (“Pay Periods”) is more than ten percent (10%) above 6,148, then the Gross
11 Settlement Amount will be increased by the percentage that the actual number exceeds 6,762 Pay
12 Periods (i.e., meaning if the Pay Periods increase by 11%, the Gross Settlement Amount will increase
13 by 1%). (Rose Decl., ¶ 17; Settlement Agreement ¶ III.2).

14 Within twenty-one (21) calendar days after the Effective Date, Defendants will deliver a list to
15 the Settlement Administrator, containing each Aggrieved Employee’s full name, last known mailing
16 or email address, total Pay Periods worked during the PAGA Period, dates worked during the PAGA
17 Period, and Social Security number (collectively, “Aggrieved Employees List”). (Rose Decl., ¶ 18;
18 Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ IV.2.a).

19 Within seven (7) business days of receiving the Aggrieved Employees List from Defendants,
20 the Settlement Administrator will circulate to counsel for both Parties an anonymized spreadsheet
21 containing the estimated Individual PAGA Payments to each Aggrieved Employee and the data used
22 to calculate said payments. (Rose Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ IV.2.b). After the Settlement
23 Administrator has provided preliminary calculations, the Parties will have five (5) business days to
24 finalize and approve the calculations. (Rose Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ IV.2.b).

25 Within seven (7) business days of the Parties having finalized and approved the calculations,
26 Defendants will fully fund the Gross Settlement Amount by transmitting the funds into Qualified
27 Settlement Fund established and maintained by the Settlement Administrator. (Rose Decl., ¶ 20;
28 Settlement Agreement, ¶ IV.2.d)

1 Within seven (7) business days of receiving the Gross Settlement Amount funds in the
2 Qualified Settlement Fund, the Settlement Administrator will distribute the Individual PAGA
3 Payments along with an explanatory letter to Aggrieved Employees, the LWDA Payment to the
4 LWDA, the Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff, the Attorneys' Fees and Costs to Plaintiff's Counsel,
5 and the Settlement Administration Costs to itself. (Rose Decl., ¶ 21; Settlement Agreement, ¶ IV.5).

6 Each Individual PAGA Payment check will be valid and negotiable for one hundred and eighty
7 (180) calendar days from the date the checks are issued, and thereafter, will be canceled. (Rose Decl.,
8 ¶ 22; Settlement Agreement, ¶ IV.3). Any funds associated with such canceled checks will be
9 distributed by the Settlement Administrator to the State Controller's Office Unclaimed Property
10 Division in the name of the Aggrieved Employee at issue and the amount of their Individual PAGA
11 Payment. (Rose Decl., ¶ 22; Settlement Agreement, ¶ IV.4).

12 **IV. STANDARD FOR APPROVAL OF PAGA SETTLEMENT**

13 The settlement of a PAGA claim requires court approval. (California Labor Code ("Lab.
14 Code") § 2699(l)). The Court must be mindful that a "[s]ettlement is a compromise, which balances
15 the possible recovery against the risks inherent in litigating further." (*In re TD Ameritrade Account*
16 *Holder Litig.*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103222 at *24 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 12, 2011)). "[T]he very essence
17 of a settlement is ... 'a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes,'" as "it is the very
18 uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of wasteful and expensive litigation that induce
19 consensual settlements." (*Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com.*, 688 F.2d 615, 624-26 (9th Cir.
20 1982)). As such, "the settlement or fairness hearing is not to be turned into a trial or rehearsal for trial
21 on the merits," or "judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been
22 achieved." (Ibid).

23 Although the California Labor Code does not set forth the criteria by which a PAGA settlement
24 is to be evaluated, it is presumed that a reviewing court may take into consideration some of the factors
25 that courts use when reviewing a class action settlement. However, "a PAGA claim asserted on a non-
26 class representative basis...is not considered a class action but a law enforcement action, and therefore
27 does not have to meet the requirements of [a class action]." (*Casida v. Sears Holdings Corp.*, 2012
28 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9302 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2012)).

1 A court's review of a PAGA settlement necessarily implicates the following unique features
2 that render the approval process distinct from approval of a class action settlement under Code of Civil
3 Procedure Section 382 and California Rules of Court Rule 3.769. First, in evaluating the adequacy of
4 the settlement amount, the Court's focus is not concerned with the amount aggrieved employees are
5 to receive, but rather, must focus on the total settlement amount in achieving PAGA's objective.
6 Indeed, "[t]he remedy sought in a PAGA suit consists of civil penalties, not individual or class
7 damages," and while a "[PAGA] action is ... designed to protect the public and penalize the employer
8 for past illegal conduct," a reviewing court must be mindful of the fact that settlement of a PAGA
9 claim involves a compromise. (*Mendez v. Tween Brands, Inc.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66454 at *11
10 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2010)). "Unlike class actions, these civil penalties are not meant to compensate
11 unnamed employees because the action is fundamentally a law enforcement action." (*Ochoa-*
12 *Hernandez v. Cjaders Foods, Inc.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32774 at *12 (Apr. 2, 2010)). The Court
13 should not lose sight of the fact that, "[u]nlike a class action seeking damages or injunctive relief for
14 injured employees, the purpose of PAGA is to incentivize private parties to recover civil penalties for
15 the government that otherwise may not have been assessed and collected by overburdened state
16 enforcement agencies." (*Ibid*).

17 Second, consistent with the fact that unnamed employees have no property interest in a PAGA
18 claim, "[u]nnamed employees need not be given notice of the PAGA claim, nor do they have the
19 ability to opt-out of the representative PAGA claim." (*Ochoa-Hernandez*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20 32774 at *13). Indeed, "[PAGA] does not create property rights or any other substantive rights" as
21 "[i]t is simply a procedural statute allowing an aggrieved employees to recover civil penalties – for
22 Labor Code violations – that otherwise would be sought by state labor law enforcement agencies."
23 (*Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Sup. Ct.*, 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003 (2009)). This
24 renders the approval process of a PAGA settlement distinct from a class action settlement, as there is
25 no need for the Court to employ the "two-step approval process" required under California Rules of
26 Court Rule 3.769.

27 ///

28 ///

1 Finally, unlike class action settlements, the scope of release permitted in a PAGA settlement
2 is limited. While “judgment in [a PAGA] action is binding not only on the named employee plaintiff
3 but also on government agencies and any aggrieved employee not a party to the proceeding...the
4 nonparty employees, because they were not given notice of the action or afforded any opportunity to
5 be heard, would not be bound by the judgment as to remedies other than civil penalties.” (*Arias v.*
6 *Sup. Ct.*, 46 Cal.4th 969, 985-87 (2009)). Thus, the scope of a release in a PAGA settlement is
7 confined to the PAGA penalties alleged in the complaint and/or the plaintiff’s notice to the LWDA
8 and to the claims that were, or could have been, alleged pursuant to PAGA based on the factual
9 allegations in the complaint and/or the plaintiff’s notice to the LWDA. In the case at hand, as the only
10 claims at issue are PAGA claims, those will be the only claims extinguished through the Settlement.

11 **V. THE AGREEMENT IS FAIR AND SHOULD BE APPROVED**

12 **A. The Agreement is Presumed to Be Fair**

13 California courts recognize that “a presumption of fairness exists where . . . [a] settlement is
14 reached through arm’s-length bargaining.” (*Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224,
15 245 (2001); *see also Clark v. Am. Residential Servs. LLC*, 175 Cal. App. 4th 785, 799 (2009)). Here,
16 the Agreement is presumptively fair because: (1) it occurred after counsel for the Parties engaged in
17 significant investigation to evaluate the strength and potential value of the PAGA claims, and the risks
18 of litigating these claims through trial; and (2) it was negotiated at great length and effort by counsel
19 with significant experience in similar complex labor and employment matters. (Rose Decl., ¶ 23).

20 **B. The Agreement is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’ Respective** 21 **Legal Positions and Recovery Risks**

22 In deciding whether to approve a proposed settlement, a trial court has broad powers to
23 determine if it is fair given the circumstances of the case. (*Mallick v. Sup. Ct.*, 89 Cal.App.3d 434,
24 438 (1979)). In exercising these powers, the overriding concern is to ensure that a proposed settlement
25 is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801 (internal quotations omitted)). A
26 settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at trial, nor
27 does the settlement have to obtain one hundred percent of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
28 (*Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 246, 250). In evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement, a trial court

1 must consider “the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of
2 further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in
3 settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and
4 views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to
5 the proposed settlement.”¹ (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008)).
6 Even though a *Kullar* analysis is not required for approval of a PAGA settlement, a brief analysis is
7 included to support approval of the Settlement Agreement. (*See* Rose Decl., ¶¶ 30-43).

8 These factors require balancing and are non-exhaustive. Trial courts should therefore tailor
9 the factors to each case and give due regard to “what is otherwise a private consensual agreement
10 between the parties.” (*Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1801).

11 1. Strength of Plaintiff’s Case

12 In order to prevail at trial, Plaintiff would have to prove violations of the California Labor
13 Code underlying her PAGA claims, demonstrate that Aggrieved Employees suffered, and demonstrate
14 that Defendant’s conduct gives rise to penalties. (*See Elliot v. Spherion Pac. Work, LLC*, 572
15 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1181-82 (C.D. Cal. 2008) [“Plaintiff’s claim under [PAGA] is wholly dependent
16 upon her other claims. Because all of Plaintiff’s other claims fail as a matter of law, so does her PAGA
17 claim.”]).

18 Here, Plaintiff’s core allegations are that Defendant systematically violated the California
19 Labor Code by, *inter alia*, failing to properly pay wages for all hours worked, failing to pay overtime
20 at the correct rate, failing to provide compliant meal and rest periods, failing to pay premiums at the
21 correct rate of pay, failing to timely pay wages during employment and upon termination, failing to
22 maintain accurate payroll records, failing to provide accurate wage statements, and failing to reimburse
23 necessary business expenses. (Rose Decl., ¶ 24).

24 Defendants maintained several defenses to Plaintiff’s theories of liability, which, if
25 successfully argued and proven, had the potential to eliminate or substantially reduce recovery. (*Id.*,
26 ¶ 25). Throughout this litigation, Defendants maintained, and continue to maintain, that they had, and
27

28 ¹ As this is not a class action, the *Kullar* factors pertaining to the risk of maintaining class action status through trial and the reaction of class members to the proposed settlement are inapplicable.

1 continue to have, compliant employment policies and practices throughout the time period at issue.
2 (Ibid). Defendants deny that they ever violated any provision of the California Labor Code, including,
3 but not limited to, those sections for which Plaintiff seeks penalties under PAGA. (Ibid). Defendants
4 further denied, and continue to deny, that the lawsuit is appropriate for representative treatment for
5 any purpose other than settlement. (Ibid). Defendants also challenged Plaintiff's standing as an
6 aggrieved employee and denied that any of Defendants' other employees whom Plaintiff seeks to
7 represent are aggrieved. (Ibid).

8 Defendants also argued that an important feature of PAGA is that the Court retains discretion
9 to lower the penalties if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise
10 would result in an award that is "unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory." (Ibid; Lab. Code
11 § 2699(e)(2); *see also Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.*, 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1136
12 (2012) [holding that a court may reduce the amount of PAGA penalties awarded to an employee based
13 upon discretionary factors]).

14 Even if violations of the California Labor Code occurred, which Defendants deny, Defendants
15 contended that said violations would only be considered "initial violations" and thus heightened
16 "subsequent violation" penalties were not warranted. (Rose Decl., ¶ 26; Lab. Code § 2699(f)(2); *see*
17 *also Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2*, 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1208-09 (2008) ["Until the employer has
18 been notified that it is violating a Labor Code provision [...], the employer cannot be presumed to be
19 aware that its continuing underpayment of employees is a 'violation' subject to penalties."]).

20 Defendants also contended that, with respect to PAGA claims, the Court was unlikely to assess
21 cumulative penalties for the maximum number of possible, separate California Labor Code violations,
22 because it would be unjust, arbitrary, oppressive, and/or confiscatory, especially where certain conduct
23 may be regulated by multiple provisions of the California Labor Code that are interrelated and work
24 in tandem. (Rose Decl., ¶ 27). While the PAGA does provide the potential for a heightened penalty
25 for subsequent violations, courts are often hesitant to award a heightened penalty where there is no
26 prior citation by the Labor Commissioner, as is the case here. (*See Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc.*, 3
27 F.4th 1127, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding no heightened penalty where defendant was not notified by
28 Labor Commissioner or any court that it was subject to the California Labor Code)). The Ninth

1 Circuit’s holding in *Bernstein* also supports that a settlement valuation that does not “stack” penalties.
2 (Ibid).

3 While Plaintiff maintains that her PAGA claims have merit, in reaching the Agreement,
4 Plaintiff and her counsel took into account the strengths and weaknesses of each side’s position, and
5 the uncertainty of how the case might have concluded as litigation continued, at trial, and/or upon
6 appeal. (Rose Decl., ¶ 28). Based on these disputes, which had the potential to completely eliminate
7 Plaintiff’s recovery, the range of realistic “litigation outcomes” on Plaintiff’s PAGA claims was
8 defined by a “maximum possible liability” amount of approximately \$614,800 and a “risk-adjusted
9 realistic value” amount of approximately \$301,252. (*Id.*, ¶ 43). In light thereof, the Gross Settlement
10 Amount of \$285,000 is a significant settlement. (Ibid).

11 2. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

12 Approval of the Settlement Agreement is also appropriate in light of the risk, expense, and
13 complexity of further litigation. As discussed above, the Settlement Agreement takes into
14 consideration the specific factual and legal hurdles faced by Plaintiff in establishing Defendants’
15 penalty-liability in this case, which may have resulted in a net-zero recovery. Any recovery on these
16 claims is not certain. And even when liability is found, PAGA claims are discretionary, such that the
17 Court could decline to award their full value. Some of Plaintiff’s claims are also derivative, and as
18 such, Plaintiff must prevail on her underlying California Labor Code claims in order to prevail on the
19 derivative claims. These risks – when balanced with the fact that the Agreement achieved a very
20 significant recovery (as demonstrated below), and that further litigation posed a risk of diminishing
21 such recovery by increasing litigation expenses – weigh strongly in favor of settlement approval.

22 3. The Benefits Conferred by the Agreement Balance in Favor of Approval

23 The Settlement Agreement provides a *significant* monetary benefit that falls well within the
24 range of an acceptable settlement under the circumstances, which is the standard on which the instant
25 Agreement must be judged. As held by the Ninth Circuit: “The proposed settlement is not to be judged
26 against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved by the negotiators.”
27 (*Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n*, 688 F.2d at 625 (emphasis in original)). As the Second
28 Circuit has pointed out: “The fact that a proposed settlement may only amount to a fraction of the

1 potential recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate
2 and should be disapproved.” (*City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.*, 495 F.2d 448, 455 & n.2 (2nd Cir.
3 1974)).

4 The Net Settlement Amount is currently estimated to be One Hundred Forty-Five Thousand
5 Six Hundred Forty-One Dollars and Seventy-Four Cents (\$145,641.74). (Rose Decl., ¶ 44). After all
6 deductions are made from the Gross Settlement Amount for the Attorneys’ Fees and Costs,
7 Enhancement Payment, and Settlement Administration Costs, One Hundred Nine Thousand Two
8 Hundred Thirty-One Dollars and Thirty Cents (\$109,231.30) (i.e. 75% of the Net Settlement Amount)
9 will go to the LWDA, and Thirty-Six Thousand Four Hundred Ten Dollars and Forty-Four Cents
10 (\$36,410.44) (i.e. 25% of the Net Settlement Amount) will go to the Aggrieved Employees, as required
11 by California Labor Code § 2699(i) in effect at the time of this matter (“civil penalties recovered by
12 aggrieved employees shall be distributed as follows: 75 percent to the Labor and Workforce
13 Development Agency . . . and 25 percent to the aggrieved employees.”). (Rose Decl., ¶ 44). There is
14 no reason to doubt the fairness of the proposed plan of allocation of the Net Settlement Amount as it
15 fully complies with California Labor Code section 2699(i). (Ibid).

16 The Settlement Agreement is a compromise of highly disputed claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 45). Plaintiff
17 and her counsel recognize the expense and length of continued proceedings necessary to litigate the
18 matter through trial and any possible appeals. (Ibid). Plaintiff and her counsel have also taken into
19 account the uncertainty and risk of the outcome of further litigation, and the difficulties and delays
20 inherent in such litigation. (Ibid). Plaintiff and her counsel are also aware of the burdens of proof
21 necessary to establish liability, both generally and in response to Defendants’ defenses thereto, and
22 the difficulties in establishing Defendants’ liability for, and the right to recover, penalties on behalf of
23 Plaintiff, the State of California, and other Aggrieved Employees. (Ibid). Plaintiff and her counsel
24 have also taken into account Defendants’ agreement to enter into a settlement that confers significant
25 relief upon the Aggrieved Employees and the State of California. (Ibid). Considering all of the facts
26 in this case, Plaintiff and her counsel have determined that the Agreement represents a fair, adequate,
27 and reasonable resolution of the PAGA claims, and that it is in the best interests of the Aggrieved
28 Employees and the State of California. (Ibid).

1 The result achieved in this case is well within the range of what is considered an acceptable
2 settlement under the circumstances, especially when compared to the settlement of PAGA claims in
3 other cases. (*Id.*, ¶ 46). (*See, e.g., DCH Auto Wage and Hour Cases*, Los Angeles Superior Court,
4 Case No. JCCP4833 (May 2017) [approving \$15,000 out of \$4 million toward settlement of PAGA
5 claims]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160052, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29,
6 2012) [approving \$10,000 out of \$3.7 million toward settlement of PAGA claims]; *Schiller v. David's*
7 *Bridal, Inc.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80776, at *40 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2012) [approving \$7,500 out of
8 \$518,245 toward settlement of PAGA claims]; *Chu v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC*, 2011 U.S. Dist.
9 LEXIS 15821, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011) (approving \$10,000 out of \$6.9 million toward
10 settlement of PAGA claims]; *Franco v. Ruiz Food Prods.*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169057, at *14
11 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2021) [approving \$10,000 out of \$2.5 million toward settlement of PAGA
12 claims]). Here, the value obtained for settlement of the PAGA claims is significant, and it will be
13 distributed in accordance with and in fulfillment of the objectives of the PAGA statute.

14 4. The Scope of the Release is Narrowly Tailored

15 As discussed above, the California Supreme Court has concluded that in the context of PAGA
16 “the nonparty employees, because they were not given notice of the action or afforded any opportunity
17 to be heard, would not be bound by the judgment as to remedies other than civil penalties.” (*See Arias*,
18 46 Cal. 4th, at 987). Thus, the scope of the limited release provided in exchange for the foregoing
19 consideration is limited to the civil penalties asserted in the Operative Complaint and the PAGA Letter,
20 under California Labor Code §§ 2698 *et seq.* (*See Settlement Agreement*, at ¶¶ I.15 and III.5).

21 As such, this factor balances strongly in favor of approval of the Agreement.

22 5. Experience and Views of Counsel Favor Approval

23 Plaintiff's Counsel is experienced in complex representative and class action wage-and-hour
24 litigation. (Rose Decl., ¶ 52). In the view of Plaintiff's Counsel, the benefits conferred by the
25 Agreement are eminently fair and reasonable, and in the best interests of the State of California and
26 the Aggrieved Employees in light of the risk, delay, and uncertainty of continued litigation and the
27 substantial monetary benefits provided for by the Agreement. (*Id.*, ¶ 47). Furthermore, courts have
28 acknowledged that “the interests of a plaintiff, counsel, and other potentially aggrieved employees are

1 largely aligned. All stand to gain from proving as convincingly as possible as many Labor Code
2 violations as the evidence will sustain[.]” (*Williams v. Superior Court*, 3 Cal. 5th 531, 548 (2017)
3 [citing Labor Code § 2699(g)(1)(i)]).

4 6. The Extent of Discovery and Stage of Proceedings Favor Approval

5 In evaluating this element, the Court should be mindful that “‘formal discovery is not a
6 necessary ticket to the bargaining table’” [*Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship*, 151 F.3d 1234, 1239], as
7 the relevant consideration is “whether ‘the parties have sufficient information to make an informed
8 decision about settlement.’” (*See Sandoval v. Roadlink United States Pac., Inc.*, 2011 U.S. Dist.
9 LEXIS 130378, at 26 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011)).

10 Here, the extent of informal discovery conducted was sufficient to enable Plaintiff’s Counsel
11 to evaluate the strength and value of the PAGA claims for purposes of settlement. (Rose Decl., ¶ 48).
12 Prior to mediation, Defendants provided Plaintiff with data, information, and documents relating to
13 the underlying alleged violations, including, but not limited to, Plaintiff’s employee file, a twenty
14 percent (20%) sampling of Aggrieved Employees’ time and payroll data, Employee Handbook, and
15 Aggrieved Employees’ data points. (*Id.*, ¶ 9). As discussed above, Plaintiff’s Counsel’s investigation
16 was sufficient to, among other things, tabulate with precision the total number of alleged California
17 Labor Code violations at issue during the relevant statutory period and identify the total number of
18 individuals falling within the definition of “Aggrieved Employees” for the relevant statutory period.
19 (*Id.*, ¶ 10).

20 Based on Plaintiff’s Counsel’s experience litigating wage and hour claims, such investigation
21 was sufficient to determine the potential value of the PAGA claims, and to evaluate the strength of
22 these claims for purposes of settlement. (*Ibid.*).

23 **VI. THE REQUESTED FEES PAYMENT IS FAIR AND REASONABLE**

24 As the prevailing party in settlement, Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for bringing
25 her PAGA claims. (Lab. Code § 2699(k) [“Any employee who prevails in any action shall be entitled
26 to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.”]). Plaintiff’s Counsel is also entitled to attorneys’
27 fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5(a), as the instant action has resulted in the
28 enforcement of important rights benefitting the public and secures monetary recovery for the State of

1 California as well as the Aggrieved Employees. A fee award is justified where the legal action has
2 produced its benefits by way of a voluntary settlement. (*See, e.g., Maria P. v. Riles*, 43 Cal.3d 1281,
3 1290-91 (1987); *Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo*, 33 Cal.3d 348, 352-53
4 (1983); *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 34 (1977) [“when a number of persons are entitled in common
5 to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff ... for the benefit of all results in the creation or
6 preservation of that fund, such plaintiff ... may be awarded attorney’s fees out of the fund.”]).

7 In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc.*, 1 Cal.5th 480, 506 (2016), the California Supreme Court
8 confirmed that “[t]he percentage of fund method survives in California class action cases.”
9 Specifically, the *Laffitte* Court held:

10 The recognized advantages of the percentage method-including relative ease of calculation,
11 alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better approximation of market
12 conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early
13 settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation-convince us the percentage
14 method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.
15 (*Id.*, at 503 [internal citation omitted]).

16 While trial courts have discretion to apply either a lodestar method or percentage-of-the-fund
17 method, the California Supreme Court has taken the position that trial courts also “retain the discretion
18 to forgo a lodestar cross-check and use other means to evaluate the reasonableness of a requested
19 percentage fee.” (*Lafitte*, 1 Cal.5th at 506; *see also Wershba*, 91 Cal.App. 4th at 253). Courts award
20 fees to serve as an economic incentive for lawyers to undertake litigation, and thereby enhance and
21 facilitate access to the judicial system for adjudication of meritorious claims, and to deter wrongdoing.
22 This is especially true in situations where multiple similar alleged wrongs would not be economically
23 feasible to pursue individually, such as here. Trial courts have “wide latitude” in assessing the value
24 of attorneys’ fees and their decisions will “not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of
25 discretion.” (*Lealao v. Beneficial Cal., Inc.*, 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 41 (2000); *see also Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th
26 at 506 [holding that “trial court did not abuse its discretion in using [the percentage of fund method],
27 in part to approve the fee request”]). Indeed, it is long settled that the “experienced trial judge is the
28 best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (*Ketchum v. Moses*, 24 Cal.4th

1 1122, 1132 (2001)).

2 The percentage method is particularly appropriate where a monetary settlement has been
3 recovered and “the benefit [recovered can be] easily quantified.” (*In re Bluetooth Headset Prods.*
4 *Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011)). Where the amount of a settlement is a “certain or
5 easily calculable sum of money,” California courts may calculate attorneys’ fees as a reasonable
6 percentage of the settlement created. (Weil and Brown, California Practice Guide, *Civil Procedure*
7 *Before Trial*, Chapter 14, section 14:145; *Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1808). The percentage fee
8 method is preferred in representative actions because “it better approximates the workings of the
9 marketplace than the lodestar approach.” (*Lealao, supra*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 49). California law
10 provides that the award for attorneys’ fees should be equivalent to fees freely negotiated in the legal
11 marketplace and paid in comparable litigation based on the result achieved and risk incurred. (*See*
12 *Lealao*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 47-50; *Laffitte*, 1 Cal.5th 480 at 503). In cases where the settlement
13 agreement provides that the defendant will pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys a percentage of the fund created
14 by the settlement, use of that percentage method is appropriate. (*Lealao*, 82 Cal.App.4th at 32). Fee
15 awards that are too small will “chill the private enforcement essential to the vindication of many legal
16 rights and obstruct the representative actions that often relieve the courts of the need to separately
17 adjudicate numerous claims.” (*Id.* at 53). Therefore, fees in representative actions should approximate
18 the probable terms of a contingent fee contract negotiated by a sophisticated attorney and client in
19 comparable litigation. (*Id.* at 48). “The ultimate goal ... is the award of a ‘reasonable’ fee to
20 compensate counsel for their efforts, irrespective of the method of calculation.” (*Consumer Privacy*
21 *Cases*, 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 557-58 (2009) [quoting *Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra*,
22 126 Cal.App.4th at 1270]).

23 Plaintiff’s Counsel’s application for attorneys’ fees in light of the facts and circumstances
24 surrounding the case is within the range of reasonableness. Historically, courts have awarded fees as
25 high as fifty percent (50%) of the settlement in complex actions, depending on the circumstances of
26 the case. (*See In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig.*, 526 F.Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1981) [awarding attorneys’
27 fees in the amount of 45% of the \$7.3 million total settlement amount]; *Beech Cinema, Inc. v.*
28 *Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp.* 480 F.Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) [awarding approximately 53%

of the settlement as attorneys' fees]).

Here, Plaintiff's Counsel's request of thirty-five (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., \$99,750.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$285,000.00) is fair and reasonable based on the percentage of the recovery method. Plaintiff's Counsel has vigorously litigated this case since it was commenced, with the very real possibility of an unsuccessful outcome and no fee recovery of any kind. (Rose Decl., ¶ 49). Counsel for Plaintiff undertook significant investigation and invested a significant amount of time analyzing relevant documents and data to evaluate the nature and extent of the alleged underlying California Labor Code violations and calculation of the potential monetary recovery as they relate to Plaintiff's PAGA claims under PAGA. (*Id.*, ¶ 53). Plaintiff's Counsel possesses combined extensive experience litigating wage and hour and other complex litigation matters, and the attorneys who worked on this matter have been approved as class counsel in the settlement of other class and PAGA actions, numerous times. (*Id.*, ¶ 52).

In the present case, Plaintiff's Counsel has borne all of the risks and costs of litigation and will not receive any compensation until recovery is obtained. (*Id.*, ¶ 50). Plaintiff's Counsel is experienced in complex wage-and-hour litigation and used that experience to obtain a favorable result for Plaintiff, the Aggrieved Employees, and the State of California. (*Ibid.*). Considering the amount of fees requested, work performed, risks incurred, and experience of Plaintiff's Counsel in handling similar matters, Plaintiff maintains that the requested attorneys' fees of thirty-five (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., \$99,750.00) are reasonable and should be awarded. (*Ibid.*).

VII. THE REQUESTED LITIGATION EXPENSES PAYMENT IS FAIR AND REASONABLE

The Agreement provides for reimbursement of the Plaintiff's Counsel's litigation costs and expenses up to the amount of Thirty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$30,000.00). (Rose Decl., ¶ 55; Settlement Agreement, ¶ III.3.a). However, Plaintiff's Counsel only seeks reimbursement of a total of Twenty-Four Thousand Six Hundred Eight Dollars and Twenty-Six Cents (\$24,608.26) in litigation costs and expenses. (Rose Decl., ¶ 55 and Exh. 6). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Counsel respectfully requests that the Court reimburse it for actual litigation costs and expenses in the amount of Twenty-Four Thousand Six Hundred Eight Dollars and Twenty-Six Cents (\$24,608.26).

1 **VIII. THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS PAYMENT ARE FAIR AND**
2 **REASONABLE**

3 As set forth in the Settlement Agreement, the Parties have agreed to retain, subject to approval
4 by the Court, ILYM Group, Inc., to handle the administration of the Agreement. (Rose Decl., ¶ 56;
5 Settlement Agreement, ¶ I.18). The fees and expenses of the Settlement Administrator are estimated
6 not to exceed Ten Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$10,000.00). (Rose Decl., ¶ 56; Settlement
7 Agreement, ¶ III.3.b). These costs include, but are not limited to, expenses for preparing, printing,
8 and mailing the explanatory letter and Individual PAGA Payment checks to the Aggrieved Employees,
9 re-mailing the returned Individual PAGA Payment checks to any new addresses obtained, and
10 handling inquiries from Aggrieved Employees regarding the Agreement, among other things. (Rose
11 Decl., ¶ 56). Accordingly, the Court should grant approval of the Settlement Administration Costs in
12 the amount of *up to* Ten Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$10,000.00) to ILYM Group, Inc., a
13 necessary third-party for handling the settlement process. (Ibid).

14 **IX. THE REQUESTED ENHANCEMENT PAYMENT IS FAIR AND**
15 **REASONABLE**

16 The purpose of an enhancement award is to incentivize aggrieved employees to step into the
17 shoes of the state labor agency and undertake the responsibilities associated with initiating a lawsuit
18 and serving in a representative capacity. (*See, e.g., Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 115 Cal.App.4th 715,
19 726 (2004) (upholding “service payments” to named plaintiffs for their efforts in bringing the action);
20 *Clark v. Am. Residential Servs., LLC*, 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804 (2009) (“an incentive award is
21 appropriate ‘if it is necessary to induce an individual to participate in the suit’”). Plaintiff initiated
22 this litigation on behalf of the State of California and her former co-workers who will now be entitled
23 to receive payment from the Agreement. By initiating and pursuing the Action, Plaintiff stepped into
24 the shoes of the State of California and undertook the responsibilities of serving in a representative
25 capacity. (Rose Decl., ¶ 58; *See generally* Leon Decl.). Plaintiff was available whenever Plaintiff’s
26 Counsel needed her and actively tried to obtain information that would benefit the prosecution of the
27 Action. (Rose Decl., ¶ 58; Leon Decl., ¶¶ 5-6). The Enhancement Payment for Plaintiff is eminently
28 reasonable given the time and effort Plaintiff spent on this matter, her services on behalf of the State

1 of California and the Aggrieved Employees, and her broader, general release of claims. (Rose Decl.,
2 ¶ 57).

3 Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully submits that it is appropriate and just for Plaintiff to receive
4 an Enhancement Payment in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$5,000.00) in
5 addition to the Individual PAGA Payment she will receive as an Aggrieved Employee, for her services
6 on behalf of the State of California and the other Aggrieved Employees, as well as for the broader,
7 general release of claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 59).


8 **X. CONCLUSION**

9 For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant Plaintiff's
10 Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement, Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Enhancement Payment, and
11 Settlement Administration Costs and grant the relief requested herein.

12 Respectfully submitted,

13 Dated: November 19, 2025

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

14
15 By: 

Alexandra Rose

Attorneys for Plaintiff STEPHANIE LEON



Make a Reservation

STEPHANIE LEON vs FULGENT THERAPEUTICS, LLC

Case Number: 24STCV14168 Case Type: Civil Unlimited Category: Other Employment Complaint Case
Date Filed: 2024-06-06 Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 61

Reservation

Case Name: STEPHANIE LEON vs FULGENT THERAPEUTICS, LLC	Case Number: 24STCV14168
Type: Motion for Order (Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement)	Status: RESERVED
Filing Party: STEPHANIE LEON (Plaintiff)	Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 61
Date/Time: 08/03/2026 10:00 AM	Number of Motions: 1
Reservation ID: 801068786933	Confirmation Code: CR-W4VYCZ9UPZKKXNUPT

Fees

Description	Fee	Qty	Amount
Motion for Order (name extension)	0.00	1	0.00
TOTAL			\$0.00

Payment

Amount: \$0.00	Type: NOFEE
Account Number: n/a	Authorization: n/a
Payment Date: n/a	

[Print Receipt](#)[+ Reserve Another Hearing](#)[View My Reservations](#)