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David W. Slayton,
Executive Officer/Clerk of Court,
By M. Vargas, Deputy Clerk

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

CHASE BRYAN, an individual and as a
representative of aggrieved employees pursuant to
the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA),

Plaintiff,

vs.

TRI SOURCE INTERNATIONAL LLC, a limited
liability company; and DOES 1 through 10 inclusive,

Defendant.

Case No. 24CH0V02579

PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR:

**1. PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
ACT (LABOR CODE SECTION 2698)**

Plaintiff Chase Bryan ("Plaintiff"), as an individual and as a representative of aggrieved employees pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), alleges and complains against Defendants Tri Source International LLC and Does 1 through 10 (collectively, "Defendant") as follows:

PARTIES | JURISDICTION | VENUE

1. Plaintiff, at all times relevant hereto, is and has been a resident of the State of California.
2. Defendant Tri Source International LLC operates a web based outsourcing company at 27770 Entertainment Drive, Suite 200, Valencia, California 91355 (the "worksite").
3. Defendant conducts business in the State of California.
4. Under California Code of Civil Procedure section 395(a), venue is proper in this County

1 because Defendant resides in this County and/or Plaintiff's alleged injuries herein occurred in this County.

2 5. The true names and capacities of the defendants named herein as Does 1 through 10,
3 inclusive, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise, are unknown to Plaintiff who therefore
4 sues such defendants by fictitious names pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 474.
5 Plaintiff believes that all of the Doe defendants are California residents. Plaintiff will amend this
6 Complaint to show such true names and capacities when they have been determined. Defendant and Doe
7 Defendants are collectively referred to as "Defendant," "Defendants" or "Defendant Employers."

8 6. Plaintiff believes that, at all times relevant herein, each defendant designated, including
9 Does 1 through 10, was the agent, managing agent, principal, owner, partner, joint venturer, representative,
10 manager, servant, employee, and/or co-conspirator of each of the other defendants, and was at all times
11 mentioned herein acting within the course and scope of said agency and employment, and that all acts or
12 omissions alleged herein were duly committed with the ratification, knowledge, permission,
13 encouragement, authorization, and consent of each defendant designated herein.

14 7. Defendant, and each of them, acted in concert with one another to commit the wrongful
15 acts alleged herein, and aided, abetted, incited, compelled and/or coerced one another in the wrongful acts
16 alleged herein, and/or attempted to do so, including pursuant to Government Code section 12940(i).
17 Defendant, and each of them, formed and executed a conspiracy or common plan pursuant to which they
18 would commit the unlawful acts alleged herein, with all such acts alleged herein done as part of and
19 pursuant to said conspiracy, intended to cause and actually causing Plaintiff harm.

20 **ALTER EGO | AGENCY | JOINT EMPLOYER**

21 8. There exists such a unity of interest and ownership between Defendant Employers that the
22 individuality and separateness of Defendant Employers have ceased to exist. At all times relevant hereto,
23 Defendant Employers, and each of them, were the agents, employees, managing agents, supervisors,
24 coconspirators, parent corporation, joint employers, alter egos, successors, and/or joint ventures of the
25 other Defendant Employers, and each of them, and in doing the things alleged herein, were acting at least
26 in part within the course and scope of said agency, employment, conspiracy, joint employer, alter ego
27 status, successor status and/or joint venture and with the permission and consent of each of the other
28 Defendant Employers. Whenever and wherever reference is made in this complaint to any act or failure

to act by a defendant or co-defendant, such allegations and references shall also be deemed to mean the acts and/or failures to act by each defendant acting individually, jointly and severally.

9. Plaintiff believes Defendant Employers were both Plaintiff's joint employer and are liable under the joint employer and single enterprise theories. *See Laird v. Capital Cities* (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 727, 737-38 (four factors to prove single enterprise are "interrelation of operations, common management, centralized control of labor relations, and common ownership or financial control. ... Although courts consider the four factors together, they often deem centralized control of labor relations the most important."); *see also Vernon v. State of California* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 114, 128 (separate entities can also be deemed a "joint employer" by having the right to control the employment relationship, as evaluated by focusing on "an examination of defendant's role with respect to the right to hire, fire, transfer, promote, discipline, set the terms, conditions and privileges of employment, train and pay the plaintiff.")).

10. Defendant Employers were Plaintiff's employers, joint employers and/or special employers within the meaning of Government Code sections 12926 (d), 12940 (a),(h),(1), (h)(3)(A), (i), and, 12950, and regularly employ five (5) or more persons and are therefore subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. Defendant Employers were Plaintiff's employers, joint employers and/or special employers within the meaning of the Labor Code and the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Order, and are each an "employer or other person acting on behalf of an employer" as such term is used in Labor Code sections 558 and/or 558.1, and liable to Plaintiff on that basis. Defendant Employers are Plaintiff's joint employers by virtue of a joint enterprise, and that Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant Employers. Plaintiff performed services for each and every one of Defendant Employers, and to the mutual benefit of all Defendant Employers, and all Defendant Employers shared control of Plaintiff as an employee, either directly or indirectly, and the manner in which Defendant Employers' business was and is conducted.

11. Labor Code section 558.1 provides that an employer or "other person acting on behalf of an employer" who violates certain California wage and hour laws "may be held liable as the employer for such violation." Labor Code section 558.1 defines "other person acting on behalf of an employer" as a "natural person who is an owner, director, officer, or managing agent" of the employer. Labor Code section 558.1(b). *See* Labor Code section 558(a) (authorizing civil penalties against "any employer or

other person acting on behalf of an employer” who causes overtime pay violations to occur.”); *see Atempa v. Pedrazzani*, 27 Cal.App.5th 809, 823-824 (2018); Labor Code section 1197.1 (“Any employer or other person acting either individually or as an officer, agent, or employee of another person” for failure to pay minimum wages.”); *see Reynolds v. Bement*, 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1089 (2005) (“aggrieved employees may ... maintain civil actions to recover such penalties”); *see Reynolds v. Bement*, 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1089, fn. 10 (2005) (alter ego doctrine may be used in wage claim actions to impose liability on controlling directors and shareholders); *see* Government Code section 12925(d) (defining “Person” as one *or more* individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, limited liability companies, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, and receivers or other fiduciaries).

12. Despite the formation of purported corporate existence, Defendant Employers are, in reality, one and the same, including, but not limited to because: (a) Defendant Employers are completely dominated and controlled by one another, who personally committed the frauds and violated the laws as set forth in this complaint, and who have hidden and currently hide behind Defendant Employers to perpetrate frauds, circumvent statutes, or accomplish some other wrongful or inequitable purpose; (b) Defendant Employers derive actual and significant monetary benefits by and through one another’s unlawful conduct, and by using one another as the funding source for their own personal expenditures; (c) Defendant Employers, while really one and the same, were segregated to appear as though separate and distinct for purposes of perpetrating a fraud, circumventing a statute, or accomplishing some other wrongful or inequitable purpose; (d) Defendant Employers does not comply with all requisite corporate formalities to maintain a legal and separate corporate existence; (e) the business affairs of Defendant Employers are, and at all times relevant were, so mixed and intermingled that the same cannot reasonably be segregated, and the same are in inextricable confusion. Defendant Employers are, and at all times relevant hereto were, used by one another as a mere shell and conduit for the conduct of certain of Defendant Employers’ affairs, and are, and were, the alter ego of one another. The recognition of the separate existence of each of the Defendant Employers would not promote justice, in that it would permit Defendant Employers to insulate themselves from liability to Plaintiff for violations of the law. The corporate existence of Defendant Employers should each be disregarded in equity and for the ends of justice because such disregard is necessary to avoid fraud and injustice to Plaintiff herein. Accordingly,

Defendant Employers constitute the alter ego of one another, and the fiction of their separate corporate existence must be disregarded.

ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION

13. Plaintiff exhausted administrative requirements for Plaintiff's claims.

14. On May 9, 2024, Plaintiff's counsel gave written notice by online filing with the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") and by sending via certified mail to Defendants a letter specifying the California Labor Code provisions Defendants violated, including the facts and theories supporting the alleged violations, with amended notice filed online and sent by certified mail on March 27, 2024. More than sixty-five (65) days have passed since Plaintiff's counsel submitted the initial and amended letters to the LWDA and certified-mailed the letters to Defendants, and the LWDA has not provided notice of intent to investigate the alleged violations, nor have Defendants provided notice of intent or any efforts to cure. Accordingly, the statutory period for any investigation or response has concluded and Plaintiff may commence this lawsuit pursuant to Labor Code section 2699, as provided by subsection 2699.3.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

15. **Plaintiff's Hire & Job Details.** On or about May 22, 2023, Defendant hired Plaintiff Chase Bryan as an employee in the job position of full-time Customer Success Manager to work at the worksite.

16. Defendant classified Plaintiff as an exempt employee paid \$80,000 annually, plus a 15% bonus, accrual of three weeks of paid time off, and benefits coverage. Exhibit 1.

17. Plaintiff's job duties included providing customer account management but no supervisory duties. Exhibit 1. Plaintiff was required to use his personal mobile device to review and respond to work-related messages and calls.

18. Plaintiff reported to VP of Customer Success ***Solange Mikita*** and eventually Director of Customer Success ***Kris Yeaman***.

19. In early March 2024, Defendant conducted Plaintiff's annual performance review. Defendant awarded Plaintiff a bonus based on an overall performance score of 85/100.

20. **Plaintiff's employment with Defendant ended** on March 8, 2024.

1 21. **Misclassification As Exempt.** Defendant misclassified Plaintiff as “exempt” as Plaintiff
2 should have been “non-exempt” thus entitled to overtime and breaks.

3 22. Even though Defendant paid Plaintiff the requisite minimum salary threshold (just barely),
4 Defendant did not allow Plaintiff to customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent
5 judgment in performing his job duties, presumably under the Executive and/or Administrative Exemption,
6 as required by California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Section 11040(1)(A)(2). Defendant’s employees
7 that supervised Plaintiff constantly micromanaged and essentially did Plaintiff’s job for her, allowing
8 almost zero discretion or independent judgment.

9 23. **Overtime Work.** Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff for work in excess of eight (8) hours in
10 a day or more than forty (40) hours in a workweek at the rate of time-and-one-half (1.5) times the regular
11 rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of eight (8) hours in a day or more than forty (40) hours in a
12 workweek, and for work in excess of twelve (12) hours in a day overtime compensation at a rate of two
13 (2) times the regular rate of pay.

14 24. **Meal Break Violations.** Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with first or second timely,
15 uninterrupted 30-minute meal break as required by law, according to proof. For instance, among other
16 things according to proof: Plaintiff was forced to work throughout Plaintiff’s meal breaks; Plaintiff was
17 “on-call” during meal breaks; Defendant automatically deducted unpaid meal break time from Plaintiff’s
18 time worked even though Plaintiff performed work during such time; Defendant rounded Plaintiff’s clock
19 in and out times for the start and end of meal breaks; Plaintiff’s meal breaks were not timely; Plaintiff’s
20 meal breaks were interrupted; and/or Plaintiff’s meal breaks were less than the full 30 minutes.

21 25. **Rest Break Violations.** Defendant failed to authorize and permit Plaintiff to take a 10-
22 minute rest break per each four (4) hour period worked or a major fraction thereof, according to proof.
23 For instance, among other things according to proof: Plaintiff did not get rest breaks at all; Plaintiff was
24 forced to work throughout Plaintiff’s rest breaks; Plaintiff was “on-call” during rest breaks; Plaintiff’s rest
25 breaks were not timely; Plaintiff’s rest breaks were interrupted; Plaintiff’s rest breaks were less than the
26 full 10 minutes; and/or Defendant required Plaintiff to remain on premises at the worksite during rest
27 breaks.

28 26. **Unreimbursed Expenses.** Defendant failed to fully reimburse Plaintiff’s reasonable

business expenses incurred, according to proof, including personal mobile device usage costs.

27. **Wage Statements.** Defendant knowingly and intentionally failed to provide Plaintiff with uniform, complete, and accurate wage statements because the wage statements provided to Plaintiff failed to list the: accurate totals of the hours worked; number of hours worked at each hourly rate; net wages earned; and/or gross wages earned.

28. **Final Pay.** Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff all wages owed to Plaintiff immediately upon Plaintiff's termination of employment, including earned and unpaid wages, such as: minimum wages; overtime wages; meal and rest period premium wages; and/or all wages owed for the final day of work.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

PAGA REPRESENTATIVE ACTION FOR PENALTIES PURSUANT TO LABOR CODE SECTION 2698

29. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding and subsequent paragraphs.

30. Under the California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ("PAGA"), Labor Code sections 2698-2699.5, private parties may recover civil penalties for violations of the Labor Code. These penalties are in addition to any other relief available under the Labor Code. As set forth above, Defendant has committed numerous violations of the Labor Code against Plaintiff, including but not limited to:

- **Labor Code §§ 201, 201.5, 202, 203.** Failure to pay all wages immediately upon termination or within 72 hours after notice of separation.
- **Labor Code § 204.** Failure to pay all earned wages within the time prescribed in Labor Code §§ 204(a) and 204(b).
- **Labor Code § 206.** Failure to pay all undisputedly owed wages.
- **Labor Code § 210.** Failure to pay wages as required by Labor Code §§ 201.3, 204, 204b, 204.1, 204.2, 205, 205.5, 227.3, and/or 1197.5.
- **Labor Code § 212.** Failure to include the name and address of established place of business in the state on pay checks to cash or deposit pay checks.
- **Labor Code § 213.** Unauthorized payment of final wages via direct deposit.
- **Labor Code § 221.** Failure to not collect and receive owed wages.
- **Labor Code § 226.** Failure to provide timely and accurate wage statements.

- 1 • **Labor Code § 226.3.** Failure to comply with Labor Code § 226(a).
- 2 • **Labor Code § 226.7.** Failure to provide rest periods and failure to provide an additional hour of
- 3 pay at the regular rate of compensation in lieu of the rest periods.
- 4 • **Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512.** Failure to provide meal periods and failure to provide an
- 5 additional hour of pay at the regular rate of compensation in lieu of the meal periods.
- 6 • **Labor Code § 256.** Failure to pay all wages immediately upon termination or within 72 hours
- 7 after notice of separation.
- 8 • **Labor Code §§ 510 and 1194.** Failure to pay overtime and double time compensation.
- 9 • **Labor Code §§ 510, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197.** Failure to pay minimum wages, including overtime
- 10 and double time compensation at the minimum wage rate.
- 11 • **Labor Code § 558.** Violation of a section of the chapter of the Labor Code starting with Labor
- 12 Code § 500, *et seq.*, or any provision regulating hours and days of work in any order of the
- 13 Industrial Welfare Commission.
- 14 • **Labor Code § 558.1.** Violation any provision regulating minimum wages or hours and days of
- 15 work in any order of the Industrial Welfare Commission, and violating Labor Code §§ 203, 226,
- 16 226.7, 1193.1, and/or 1194.
- 17 • **Labor Code § 1174.** Failure to maintain compliant employee and payroll records.
- 18 • **Labor Code § 1197.1.** Failure to pay minimum wage.
- 19 • **Labor Code § 1199.** Violation of an order of the Industrial Welfare Commission.
- 20 • **Labor Code § 1198.** Violation of the following sections of orders of the Industrial Welfare
- 21 Commission for conditions of labor prohibited by such:
 - 22 ○ **Wage Order 1-2001 (or other applicable Wage Order), Section 3,** requiring an
 - 23 employer to pay overtime and double time compensation.
 - 24 ○ **Wage Order 1-2001 (or other applicable Wage Order), Section 4,** requiring an
 - 25 employer to pay minimum wages, including overtime and double time compensation at the
 - 26 minimum wage rate.
 - 27 ○ **Wage Order 1-2001 (or other applicable Wage Order), Section 7,** requiring an
 - 28 employer to maintain accurate information with respect to each employee; provide

employees with thorough and accurate itemized wage statements; and, provide clocks within a reasonable distance from employees' work areas.

- **Wage Order 1-2001 (or other applicable Wage Order), Section 11**, requiring an employer to provide its employees with adequate meal periods and an additional hour of pay at the regular rate of compensation in lieu of the rest periods.
- **Wage Order 1-2001 (or other applicable Wage Order), Section 12**, requiring an employer to provide its employees with adequate rest periods and an additional hour of pay at the regular rate of compensation in lieu of the rest periods.
- **Labor Code § 2802**. Failure to reimburse necessary business expenses.

31. Plaintiff is an “aggrieved employee” within the meaning of California Labor Code section 2699(c), and a proper representative to bring a civil action on behalf of Plaintiff and other current and former employees of Defendant pursuant to the procedures specified in California Labor Code section 2699.3, because Plaintiff is employed by Defendant and the alleged violations of the California Labor Code were committed against Plaintiff.

32. Pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699.3, Plaintiff gave written notice on May 9, 2024 by online filing to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and by certified mail to Defendant of the specific provisions of the California Labor Code and IWC Wage Orders alleged to have been violated, including the facts and theories to support the alleged violations. More than 65 days have passed since Plaintiff provided written notice to the LWDA. The LWDA has not provided notice that it intends to investigate Plaintiff’s claims.

33. Pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699.3, Plaintiff served Defendant with the aforementioned LWDA notice via certified mail on May 9, 2024. More than 33 days have passed since that date. Defendant has not provided Plaintiff with notice that it cured any of the violations alleged therein.

34. Per the tolling provision in Labor Code section 2699.3(g), the period of liability under Plaintiff’s PAGA claim extends one year and sixty-five days before the filing of this complaint (the “PAGA Liability Period”).

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35. Accordingly, Plaintiff has complied with all of the requirements set forth in California Labor Code section 2699.3 to commence a representative action under PAGA.

36. Pursuant to PAGA, Plaintiff seeks civil penalties due to Plaintiff, other aggrieved employees, and the State of California according to proof, pursuant to the California Labor Code, including California Labor Code sections 2699(a) and 2699(f), which provides for \$100 for each initial violation and \$200 for each subsequent violation per employee pay period. In addition, pursuant to PAGA, Plaintiff seeks to recover civil penalties, including but not limited to penalties under Labor Code sections 210, 225.5, 226.3, 558, 1174.5, 1197.1, and 1199 from Defendant in a representative action for the violations set forth above. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Labor Code section 2699(g)(1).

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiff demands a jury to the extent permitted for PAGA claims.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendant as follows:

- a. For penalties where provided by law;
- b. For punitive damages where allowed by law;
- c. For prejudgment interest pursuant to California Labor Code section 218.6, California Civil Code section 3287 and/or California Civil Code section 3288 and/or any other provision of law providing for prejudgment interest;
- d. For attorneys' fees where allowed by law;
- e. For costs of suit incurred herein; and
- f. For such other and further relief as deemed just and proper.

DATED: July 15, 2024

COLBY LAW FIRM, PC

By: 

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ZOE YUZNA

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CHASE BRYAN