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6 Attorneys for Plaintiff, KEVIN LIBERATO
CAMPOS VARGAS, on behalf of himself and
7 all others similarly situated and aggrieved,

8
9 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

10 **FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE**

11
12 KEVIN LIBERATO CAMPOS VARGAS, an
individual, and on behalf of all others similarly
13 situated and aggrieved,

14
15 Plaintiff,

16 v.

17 CALIFORNIA ARBORIST COMPLETE
TREE CARE, INC., a California corporation;
18 and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,

19
20 Defendants.

CASE NO.: 24STCV11469 (Lead Case)

[RELATED CASE NO.: 24STCV20153]

*[Assigned for all purposes to the Hon.
Theresa Traber in Dept. 1]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS AND
REPRESENTATIVE ACTION
SETTLEMENT AND PROVISIONAL
CLASS CERTIFICATION FOR
SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY;
DECLARATIONS OF VEDANG J.
PATEL, DAVID D. BIBIYAN, KEVIN
LIBERATO CAMPOS VARGAS, AND
JODEY LAWRENCE IN SUPPORT
THEREOF**

HEARING INFORMATION:

DATE: June 17, 2026

TIME: 10:30 a.m.

DEPT: 1

1 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

2 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on June 17, 2026 at 10:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as they
3 may be heard in Department 1 of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los
4 Angeles, plaintiff Kevin Liberato Campos Vargas (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of himself and all others
5 similarly situated and aggrieved, will and hereby does move for this Court for entry of an Order:

6 1. Preliminarily certifying the following settlement class (“Class,” “Settlement Class
7 Members” or “Class Members”) for the purpose of settlement only: all persons employed by
8 defendant California Arborist Complete Tree Care, Inc. (“Defendant”) in California and classified
9 as non-exempt, hourly-paid employees who worked for Defendant during the period from May 7,
10 2020 through April 7, 2026, or through such earlier date as may apply under the escalation clause
11 in paragraph 8.1 of the Settlement Agreement (“Class Period”).

12 2. Preliminarily approving Plaintiff as Class Representative.

13 3. Preliminarily approving David D. Bibiyan and Vedang J. Patel of Bibiyan Law Group,
14 P.C., as Class Counsel.

15 4. Preliminarily approving the settlement claims under the terms set forth in the Settlement
16 Agreement.

17 5. Preliminarily approving payment of the Gross Settlement Amount of \$200,000.00, which
18 is subject to escalation pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.

19 6. Approving the form and content of the Class Notice submitted herewith.

20 7. Appointing Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions (“Phoenix”), to administer the
21 Settlement, including distribution of the Class Notice, as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

22 8. Preliminarily approving the payment of not to exceed \$6,750.00 for settlement
23 administration to Phoenix from the Gross Settlement Amount.

24 9. Preliminarily approving a service award of up to \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff in consideration for
25 Plaintiff’s extensive efforts in prosecuting this case.

26 10. Preliminarily approving payment of reasonable attorneys’ fees to Class Counsel in the
27 amount of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount which, unless escalated
28 pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, amounts to \$70,000.00.

1 11. Preliminarily approving reimbursement of Class Counsel’s costs in an amount, according
2 to proof, not to exceed \$30,000.00.

3 12. Preliminarily approving PAGA penalties in the amount of \$20,000.00, seventy-five percent
4 (75%) or \$15,000.00 of which will be paid to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency
5 (“LWDA”) out of the Gross Settlement Amount, and twenty-five percent (25%) or \$5,000.00 of
6 which will be distributed to “Aggrieved Employees,” defined as all persons employed by Defendant
7 in California and classified as non-exempt, hourly-paid employees who worked for Defendant
8 during the period from May 7, 2023 through the end of the Class Period (“PAGA Period”).

9 13. Entering an Order preliminarily approving the Settlement consistent with the terms of the
10 Settlement Agreement.

11 Good cause exists for granting this Motion in that the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable
12 and adequate.

13 This Motion will be based on this Notice of Motion, the Memorandum of Points and
14 Authorities filed herewith, the Declarations of Vedang J. Patel, David D. Bibiyan, Kevin Liberato
15 Campos Vargas, and Jodey Lawrence, and exhibits attached thereto, arguments of counsel and upon
16 such other materials contained in the file and pleadings of this action.

17
18 Dated: March 21, 2026

BIBIYAN LAW GROUP, P.C.

19 */s/ Vedang J. Patel*

20 _____
Vedang J. Patel

21 Attorneys for Plaintiff, KEVIN LIBERATO
22 CAMPOS VARGAS, on behalf of himself and
23 all others similarly situated and aggrieved
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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiff Kevin Liberato Campos Vargas (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of himself and all others
4 similarly situated and aggrieved, hereby applies for preliminary approval of the Class and PAGA
5 Settlement Agreement (“Settlement,” “Agreement” or “Settlement Agreement”) upon the terms
6 and conditions set forth in the Settlement Agreement, attached to the Declaration of Vedang J.
7 Patel as Exhibit “1.”

8 On May 7, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a class action complaint against
9 defendant California Arborist Complete Tree Care, Inc. (“Defendant”) for: (1) failure to pay
10 overtime wages; (2) failure to pay minimum wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods or
11 compensation in lieu thereof; (4) failure to provide rest periods or compensation in lieu thereof; (5)
12 failure to pay all wages due upon separation; (6) failure to provide accurate wage statements; (7)
13 failure to timely pay wages during employment; (8) failure to indemnify for business expenses; (9)
14 failure to pay unused vested vacation time; and (10) engaging in unfair competition (the “Action”).

15 Also on May 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed with the California Labor and Workforce Development
16 Agency (“LWDA”) and served on Defendant a notice under Labor Code section 2699.3, stating
17 Plaintiff intended to serve as a proxy of the LWDA to recover civil penalties on behalf of Aggrieved
18 Employees for alleged Labor Code violations (“PAGA Notice”). A true and correct copy of the
19 PAGA Notice is attached to the Declaration of Vedang J. Patel as Exhibit “2.”

20 On August 9, 2024, after sixty-five (65) days had passed since Plaintiff filed and served the
21 PAGA Notice, without any action by the LWDA with respect to the alleged Labor Code violations,
22 Plaintiff filed a separate representative action under PAGA, seeking PAGA civil penalties against
23 Defendant, captioned *Vargas v. California Arborist*, in the Los Angeles County Superior Court,
24 24STCV20153, for the Labor Code violations alleged in the PAGA Notice.

25 Thereafter, Plaintiff and Defendant (collectively, the “Parties”) agreed to exchange informal
26 discovery and attend mediation.

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1 Prior to mediation, Plaintiff obtained, through informal discovery: (a) time and payroll
2 records for the putative class members from May 7, 2020 through mediation; (b) data points,
3 including the number of putative class members, workweeks, shifts and the average hourly rate of
4 pay from May 7, 2020 through mediation, and the number of aggrieved employees from May 7,
5 2023 through mediation, among others; (c) wage and hour policy documents of Defendant; and (d)
6 all documents pertaining to Plaintiff available to Defendant. Plaintiff's investigation was sufficient
7 to satisfy the criteria for court approval set forth in *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th
8 1794, 1801 and *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal. App. 4th 116, 129-130
9 ("Dunk/Kullar").

10 On April 7, 2025, the Parties participated in an all-day mediation presided over by Tagore
11 Subramaniam, Esquire. The mediation was successful, and the Parties agreed to globally resolve all
12 class and PAGA claims in the Action. As part and parcel to the Agreement, the Parties agreed to
13 stipulate to Plaintiff's filing a First Amended Complaint in the Class Action, adding all allegations
14 in the PAGA Action, and, after acceptance of the First Amended Complaint, request for dismissal
15 without prejudice of the PAGA Action, thereby effectively consolidating the allegations in the two
16 actions for purposes of the Settlement. The First Amended Complaint in the Class Action is the
17 operative complaint in the Action ("Operative Complaint"). On March 4, 2026, Plaintiff filed a First
18 Amended Complaint in the Class Action (hereinafter, the "Action") pursuant to the Settlement
19 Agreement.

20 Class Counsel have conducted significant investigation of the law and facts relating to the
21 claims asserted in the Action and the PAGA Notice, and have concluded that the Settlement is fair,
22 reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of the Settlement Class, taking into account the
23 sharply contested issues involved, the expense and time necessary to litigate the Action through trial
24 and any appeals, the risks and costs of further litigation of the Action, the risk of an adverse outcome,
25 the uncertainties of complex litigation, the information learned through informal discovery
26 regarding Plaintiff's allegations, and the substantial benefits to be received by Settlement Class
27 Members.

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1 **II. THE SETTLEMENT**

2 Subject to Court approval pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and California
3 Rules of Court, rule 3.679, *et seq.*, the Parties have agreed to settle the Action by agreement upon
4 the terms and conditions and for the consideration set forth in the Settlement Agreement, a copy
5 of which is attached to the Declaration of Vedang J. Patel as Exhibit “1” thereto. A summary of
6 the terms of the settlement is as follows:

7 Defendant will stipulate, for purpose of this settlement only, as follows:

- 8 • Certification of a class (“Settlement Class,” “Settlement Class Members” or “Class
9 Members”) defined as: all persons employed by defendant California Arborist Complete
10 Tree Care, Inc. (“Defendant”) in California and classified as non-exempt, hourly-paid
11 employees who worked for Defendant during the period from May 7, 2020 through
12 April 7, 2026, or through such earlier date as may apply under the escalation clause in
13 paragraph 8.1 of the Settlement Agreement (“Class Period”).
- 14 • Defendants will pay \$200,000.00 (“Gross Settlement Amount”) to resolve the matter.
- 15 • Defendant represents that there are no more than 7,150 Workweeks worked by Class
16 Members during the Class Period. In the event the number of Workweeks worked by
17 Class Members during the Class Period increases by more than 10%, or 715 Workweeks,
18 then Defendant may, at their sole option, choose to either: (1) increase the Gross
19 Settlement Amount proportionally by the Workweeks in excess of 7,150 Workweeks
20 multiplied Defendant represents that there are no more than 7,150 Workweeks worked
21 by Class Members during the Class Period. In the event the number of Workweeks
22 worked by Class Members during the Class Period increases by more than 10%, or 715
23 Workweeks, then Defendant may, at their sole option, choose to either: (1) increase the
24 Gross Settlement Amount proportionally by the Workweeks in excess of 7,150
25 Workweeks multiplied by the Workweek Value; or (2) end the Class Period and PAGA
26 Period as of the date on which the number of Workweeks reaches 7,150. The Workweek
27 Value shall be calculated by dividing the originally agreed-upon Gross Settlement
28 Amount (\$200,000.00) by 7,150, which amounts to a Workweek Value of \$27.97. Thus,

1 for example, should there be 8,000 Workweeks in the Class Period, then the Gross
2 Settlement Amount shall be increased by \$23,774.50 ([8,000 Workweeks – 7,150
3 Workweeks] x \$27.97 per Workweek). Should Defendant elect to end the Class Period
4 and PAGA Period on the date as of which 7,150 Workweeks have been worked,
5 Defendant must provide written notice of its election and the end date of the Class Period
6 and PAGA Period no later than 30 days prior to the first set hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion
7 for Preliminary Approval.

- 8 • Defendant will pay the employer’s share of taxes separate and apart from the Gross
9 Settlement Amount.
- 10 • This is a non-reversionary settlement.
- 11 • Class Members will be paid their *pro rata* share of the class action settlement based
12 on the total number of Workweeks¹ worked during the Class Period.
- 13 • The Settlement Administration costs, estimated not to exceed \$6,750.00, will be paid
14 out of the Gross Settlement Amount.
- 15 • Class Counsel, comprised of David D. Bibiyan and Vedang J. Patel of Bibiyan Law
16 Group, P.C., may apply for, and Defendant will not oppose, attorneys’ fees of *up to*
17 thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount, which, unless escalated
18 pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, amounts to \$70,000.00, and actual costs, not to
19 exceed \$30,000.00, all of which will be paid out of the Gross Settlement Amount.
- 20 • Class Counsel hereby apply for, and Defendant will not oppose, a service award of up
21 to \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff, which will be paid out of the Gross Settlement Amount.
- 22 • “Aggrieved Employees” means all persons employed by Defendant in California and
23 classified as non-exempt, hourly-paid employees who worked for Defendant during the
24 period from May 7, 2023 through the end of the Class Period (“PAGA Period”).
- 25 • Defendant has agreed to pay \$20,000.00 as PAGA penalties, seventy-five percent
26 (75%) or \$15,000.00 of which will be paid to the LWDA out of the Gross Settlement

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28 ¹ “Workweek” means any week during which a Class Member worked for Defendant, for at least one day during the Class Period, based on hire dates, re-hire dates (as applicable), and termination dates (as applicable).

Amount, and twenty-five percent (25%) or \$5,000.00 of which will be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees.

- For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the Void Date (180 days after the date of mailing), the Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such checks to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund, in the name of the Class Member, thereby leaving no "unpaid residue" subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b).

III. THE TWO-STEP APPROVAL PROCESS AND THE PRESUMPTION OF FAIRNESS

Any settlement of class litigation must be reviewed and approved by the Court. (*See* Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769). This is done in two steps: (1) an early (preliminary) review by the trial court; and (2) a final review after notice has been distributed to the class members for their comment or objections. (*See id.*). Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement unless evidence to the contrary is offered. In short, there is a presumption that the negotiations were conducted in good faith. (Newberg on Class Actions, § 11.51; *In re Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability Litigation* (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2017) No. 16-cv-00295, 2017 WL 2214655, quoting *United States v. Oregon* (9th Cir. 1990) 913 F.2d 576, 580.)

IV. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS

A notice of settlement of a class action "must contain an explanation of the proposed settlement and procedures for class members to follow in filing written objections to it and in arranging to appear at the settlement hearing and state any objections to the proposed settlement." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769, subd. (f).)

Attached to the Declaration of Vedang J. Patel as Exhibit "1" thereto is the Settlement Agreement between the Parties. Attached to the Settlement Agreement as internal Exhibit "A" is the proposed Class Notice to be distributed to Class Members in English and Spanish. The proposed Class Notice satisfies these requirements. The Parties respectfully request that this Court approve

1 the above-referenced Class Notice and dissemination of the Class Notice to the Class Members,
2 consistent with the manner and timing as set forth in the Settlement Agreement. The Parties have
3 agreed to use Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions (“Phoenix”), an experienced
4 Settlement Administrator, to administer the settlement.

5 **V. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR AND REASONABLE BASED UPON**
6 **OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE**

7 **A. The Settlement was Negotiated at Arm’s-Length and is not Collusive**

8 The Settlement that has been reached, subject to this Court’s approval, is a product of
9 substantial efforts by the Parties and their counsel. The Settlement was reached after extensive
10 factual and legal investigation and research; the exchange of informal discovery; substantial
11 negotiation regarding the scope of informal discovery; exchange of documents and information that
12 included review of time and pay records and analysis thereof with the aid of Plaintiff and expert
13 consultant; analysis of shifts and Workweeks worked by Class Members in the Class Period, analysis
14 of the number of pay periods and number of Aggrieved Employees in the PAGA Period for
15 calculating PAGA penalties, number of Class Members eligible for wage statement penalties and
16 waiting time penalties; an analysis of Plaintiff’s employment records; extensive correspondence and
17 communication between counsel; a review of pleadings, evidence and rulings in similar actions
18 litigated elsewhere in the state; a review of similar cases in the same industry elsewhere in the
19 country; and preparation for and attendance at a full-day mediation, followed by further discussions
20 and coordination to finalize the terms and conditions of the general settlement parameters agreed to
21 by the Parties.

22 While Class Counsel believe in the chance of success of certifying the claims, Class Counsel
23 recognized the potential risk, expense and complexity posed by further litigation. Moreover,
24 litigating Plaintiff’s claims in this litigation—claims that involve approximately 125 Class Members
25 during the Class Period—would require substantial preparation and discovery, and ultimately would
26 involve the deposition and presentation of numerous more witnesses (including Class Members and
27 expert witnesses), as well as the consideration, preparation and analysis of expert reports. Therefore,
28 should litigation have progressed any further, there would have been significant expense incurred

1 by each side (above and beyond the expense already incurred).

2 **B. The Settlement Amount is Well Within the Range of Reasonableness**

3 The settlement amount reached in this case provides significant recovery to Class Members
4 and Aggrieved Employees, and easily falls within the range of reasonableness. Based on documents
5 and information provided by Defendant, Class Counsel understand, as of the date of the mediation,
6 there are no more than 7,150 Workweeks during the Class Period.

7 **1. Unpaid Wages for Failure to Pay for Off-the-Clock Work**

8 Class Counsel theorized, based on Plaintiff's narrative evidence and documents produced
9 by Defendant, that Defendant failed to pay all wages due to Class Members because Defendant
10 required Class Members to work off-the-clock or Class Members spent time off-the-clock under
11 Defendant's control, including: (1) pre-shift duties, such as checking that the machines were fully
12 fueled, unloading and reloading tools, conducting inventory of trucks for proper equipment, and
13 cleaning and organizing the shop, all before being allowed to clock in at their scheduled shift
14 times; and (2) post-shift duties, such as unloading tools and equipment from the trucks, and
15 straightening up the shop after their scheduled shifts, all without pay. Additionally, Class Counsel
16 understand, from the same bases, that Defendant had a practice of recording synthetic time entries,
17 instead of actual time worked by Class Members, resulting in unrecorded and unpaid time worked.

18 One theory advanced by Class Counsel alleged, based on Plaintiff's narrative evidence,
19 that Class Members worked off-the-clock for an estimate of ten (10) minutes each shift throughout
20 the Class Period, without pay. Class Counsel understand, based on time and payroll records
21 produced by Defendant and analysis thereof by expert data consultants retained by Class Counsel,
22 that there were approximately 31,216 shifts during the Class Period, 65.3% of which were over
23 eight (8) hours in length, and Class Members had an average regular hourly rate of pay of \$20.27.
24 Thus, one calculation performed by Class Counsel resulted in **Defendant's exposure for unpaid**
25 **off-the-clock work in a conservative amount of \$140,170** ([31,216 shifts x 0.653 shifts over 8
26 hours x 0.167 hour x \$20.27 x 1.5 overtime rate] + [31,216 shifts x 0.347 shifts less than 8 hours
27 x 0.167 hour x \$20.27 x 2 in liquidated damages]).

1 Defendant contends that their policies specifically prohibit off-the-clock work. Defendant
2 contends that it did not require Class Members to work off-the-clock and, rather, they were paid for
3 all time suffered or permitted to work. Defendant contends that any allegations that Class Members
4 were required to be under Defendant's control off-the-clock would necessitate an individualized
5 inquiry into when and why, making this claim not subject to class treatment and any trial in this
6 litigation unmanageable. Thus, Defendant contends that no damages can be recovered here, and,
7 even if, *arguendo*, it could, an estimate of ten (10) minutes of unpaid time for *every single* shift
8 worked by all Class Members during the Class Period is a *wild* exaggeration of time spent working
9 off-the-clock if *any* such time was spent.

10 **2. Recovery of Damages for Non-Compliant Meal Periods**

11 Class Counsel theorized, based on Plaintiff's narrative evidence and documents produced
12 by Defendant, that Defendant's meal period practices throughout the Class Period were non-
13 compliant because meal periods were late, short or missed due to: (1) Defendant's requirement of
14 Class Members to perform substantive duties even during their meal periods because of regular
15 understaffing; (2) interruptions during meal periods by managers, giving Class Members work-
16 related instructions; and (3) Defendant's practice of recording synthetic time entries and
17 automatically deducting an hour a day for meal periods, instead of recording actual time taken for
18 meals, giving rise to a reasonable presumption that meal periods were non-compliant throughout the
19 Class Period. Additionally, Class Counsel understand from the same bases that Defendant had a
20 practice of not allowing Class Members to freely leave the premises during meal periods, unless
21 authorized, in violation of California law. Notably, there were no meal period premiums ever issued
22 throughout the Class Period.

23 Class Counsel theorized, based on documents produced by Defendant and analysis thereof
24 by expert data consultants retained by Class Counsel that there were approximately 30,925 meal-
25 eligible shifts worked by Class Members in the Class Period, of which approximately 27,746 had
26 automatically-deducted meal periods recorded, and 3,179 had unique facial meal period violations
27 (late, short, or missed meal periods). Class Counsel theorized that of the 27,746 auto-deducted meal
28 periods, a 40% violation rate, approximately twice per Workweek, is a reasonable estimate of the

1 number of meal periods that were, in fact, short, late, or missed entirely. Thus, one calculation
2 advanced by Class Counsel resulted in Defendant's maximum exposure for unique facial meal
3 period violations in the amount of \$64,438 (3,179 unique facial meal period violations x
4 \$20.27/hour), and for non-facial violations in the amount of \$224,965 (27,746 auto-deducted meal
5 periods x \$20.27/hour x 0.40 violation rate) for a total estimated exposure of **\$289,403**.

6 Class Counsel understand that Defendant makes the following defenses in connection with
7 this claim: Defendant argues that it had compliant meal period policies and practices. Defendant
8 argues that Class Members took timely and full meal periods. Defendant contends that its policy
9 requires its employees to take timely and full meal periods. Defendant further contends that any
10 instance of a Class Member failing to take a compliant meal period was voluntary, in violation of
11 its meal period policy, would necessitate an individualized inquiry and would not lend itself to a
12 manageable trial. Thus, Defendant contends that *no* monies are owed for this account but, even if
13 any amounts were due, the amount calculated by Class Counsel is excessive.

14 3. Recovery of Damages for Non-Compliant Rest Periods

15 Class Counsel theorized, based on documents produced by Defendant, that Defendant had
16 no policy, providing Class Members compliant rest periods, in place. Class Counsel theorized, based
17 on Plaintiff's narrative evidence, that Defendants' rest period practices throughout the Class Period
18 were non-compliant because rest periods were late, short or missed due to, like meal periods,
19 Defendant's requirement that rest periods were effectively "on-duty." Additionally, Class Counsel
20 understand from the same basis that, like meal periods, Defendant had a practice of not allowing
21 Class Members to freely leave the premises during rest periods, unless authorized, in violation of
22 California law. Notably, there were no rest period premiums ever issued throughout the Class
23 Period.

24 Thus, one calculation performed by Class Counsel resulted in, assuming a 40% violation
25 rate for the 31,062 rest-eligible shifts, **Defendant's exposure for failure to provide compliant rest**
26 **periods in a conservative amount of \$251,851** (31,062 shifts x \$20.27/hour x 0.40 violation rate).

27 Class Counsel understand that Defendant makes the following defenses in connection with
28 this claim: Defendant argues that it had compliant rest period policies and practices. Defendant

1 argues that Class Members took timely and full rest periods. Defendant contends that its policy
2 requires its employees to take timely and full rest periods. Defendant further contends that any
3 instance of a Class Member failing to take a compliant rest period was voluntary, in violation of
4 its rest period policy, would necessitate an individualized inquiry and would not lend itself to a
5 manageable trial. Finally, Defendant contends that a 40% violation rate is a wild exaggeration of
6 non-compliant rest periods, if there were any. Thus, Defendant contends that *no* monies are owed
7 for this account but, even if any amounts were due, the amount calculated by Class Counsel is
8 excessive.

9 4. **Failure to Indemnify for Business Expenses**

10 Class Counsel initially theorized that Defendant failed to indemnify Class Members for
11 necessary business expenses because Defendant required their employees to use their cellphones for
12 work-related purposes, to purchase tools, such as hedge sheers and chainsaws, and personal
13 protective equipment, such as steel-toed boots, spikes for shoes, gloves, protective goggles, helmet
14 and tree-climbing harness, for use at work, and to separately launder their work clothes, without
15 compensation. Class Members were never reimbursed for these work expenses.

16 Class Counsel contend that Class Members incurred approximately \$20.00 per Workweek
17 in unreimbursed business expenses throughout the Class Period. With the approximately 7,150
18 Workweeks during the Class Period, one calculation performed at mediation by Class Counsel
19 resulted in Defendant's exposure for this claim to be **\$143,000** (\$20 x 7,150 Workweeks).

20 Class Counsel understand that Defendant argued the following: Defendant argued that Class
21 Members are not owed compensation for their tools because Class Members primarily used their
22 tools for personal purposes. Defendant further defend that they did not require Class Members to
23 use their cellphones for work-related purposes and that Class Members' cellphones were solely for
24 personal use. Defendant further argued that work clothes were not required to be laundered
25 separately. Defendant also argued that they reimbursed all employees for all expenses incurred in
26 furtherance of work. Thus, Defendant contends that no monies are owed under this theory, either.

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1 **5. Wage Statement Violations**

2 Class Counsel theorized that Class Members are entitled to recover penalties for
3 Defendant's alleged failure to issue compliant wage statements under Labor Code section 226,
4 subdivision (e), for the derivative impact of the failure to pay all wages owed on providing
5 accurate information on wage statements. Specifically, Class Counsel theorized that penalties are
6 owed under Labor Code section 226 due to, at minimum, Defendant's failure to pay premium
7 wages. A non-exempt employee suffering injury as a result of a knowing and intentional failure
8 by an employer to comply with Labor Code section 226, subdivision (a), is entitled to recover the
9 greater of all actual damages or fifty dollars (\$50) for the initial pay period in which a violation
10 occurs and one hundred dollars (\$100) per employee for each violation in a subsequent pay period.
11 Class Counsel understand from the data provided by Defendant that there were 1,593 pay periods
12 during the relevant statutory time period for Class Members. If, in fact, Class Members worked
13 every off-the-clock every shift as set forth above, and no rest premiums were paid, every wage
14 statement would thus, Class Counsel theorized, violate Labor Code section 226. Thus, one
15 calculation performed by Class Counsel, resulted in **Defendant's maximum exposure for wage**
16 **statement violations in the amount of \$159,300** (1,593 pay periods x \$100/pay period).

17 Class Counsel understand that Defendant makes the following defenses in connection with
18 this claim: Defendant contends that the wage statements issued to the employees fully complied
19 with Labor Code section 226. Defendant contends that because it believes no wages are unpaid
20 that, thus, there can be no derivative penalties. However, Class Counsel also understand the risks
21 inherent in this claim if the above claims were not certified. Class Counsel also had to factor in,
22 and did factor in, the risk that the Court would find there was no injury to Class Members even if
23 the wage statements were inaccurate or that Defendant's conduct was not intentional, both of
24 which are requirements of Labor Code section 226 before penalties can issue. Class Counsel also
25 note that the calculation used does not take into account the first pay period violation only being
26 \$50 and the fact that all Class Members did not work all pay periods and, therefore, do not qualify
27 for the maximum penalty of \$4,000 as calculated in Plaintiff's exposure model used at mediation.

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1 While Class Counsel are informed and believe that reasonable minds differ with regard to
2 calculation of PAGA penalties, Class Counsel believe it is reasonable to calculate Defendant's
3 maximum exposure in PAGA penalties as follows:

4 a. Overtime Violations: Labor Code section 558 prescribes penalties of \$50 for an
5 initial violation and \$100 for each subsequent violation. Using the initial pay period rate for all
6 violations, and a violation every single pay period for every single non-exempt employee in the
7 PAGA Period, this amounts to a maximum exposure of \$79,650 (1,593 pay periods x \$50).

8 b. Minimum Wage Violations: Labor Code section 1197.1 prescribes penalties of
9 \$100 for an initial violation and \$250 for each subsequent violation. Using the initial pay period
10 rate for all violations and a violation every single pay period for every single Aggrieved Employee
11 in the PAGA Period, this amounts to a maximum exposure of \$159,300 (1,593 pay periods x
12 \$100).

13 c. Meal Period Violations: Labor Code section 558 prescribes penalties of \$50 for an
14 initial violation and \$100 for each subsequent violation. Using the initial pay period rate for all
15 violations and a violation every single pay period for every single non-exempt employee in the
16 PAGA Period, this amounts to a maximum exposure of \$79,650 (1,593 pay periods x \$50).

17 d. Rest Period Violations: Labor Code section 558 prescribes penalties of \$50 for an
18 initial violation and \$100 for each subsequent violation. Using the initial pay period rate for all
19 violations and a violation every single pay period for every single non-exempt employee in the
20 PAGA Period, this amounts to a maximum exposure of \$79,650 (1,593 pay periods x \$50).

21 e. Wage Statement Violations: According to *Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.* (2021)
22 287 Cal.Rptr.3d 229, in this instance, Labor Code section 2699 would be the appropriate penalty
23 for wage statement violations that are inaccurate, which prescribes penalties of \$100 for an initial
24 violation and \$200 for each subsequent violation (*Id.* at 247-248). Using the initial pay period rate
25 for all violations and a violation every single pay period for every single Aggrieved Employee in
26 the PAGA Period, this amounts to a maximum exposure of \$159,300 (1,593 pay periods x \$100).

27 g. Waiting Time Penalties: Labor Code section 2699 prescribes penalties of \$100 for
28 an initial violation and \$200 for each subsequent violation. Because this violation is merited only

1 at separation of employment, a 100% violation rate would likely include just one violation per
2 employee. The data produced by Defendant indicate that there were 41 Aggrieved Employees
3 whose employment was separated during the PAGA Period. This amounts to a maximum exposure
4 of \$4,100 (41 Aggrieved Employees x \$100).

5 h. Conclusion: In sum, Class Counsel calculated Defendant's total maximum
6 exposure for PAGA violations if the Court were to find a 100% violation rate for every Aggrieved
7 Employee every pay period and not exercise its discretion to reduce any of those penalties to be
8 \$561,650. Class Counsel understand that Defendant argued the following in connection with this
9 claim: Defendant contends that no PAGA penalties are likely to be awarded and, even if they
10 were, the maximum exposure calculated by Class Counsel is vastly overstated. First, Defendant
11 defends that PAGA penalties cannot and should not be stacked. Second, Defendant asserts that
12 individualized issues predominate the PAGA claims, making the claims unmanageable for trial.
13 Third, Defendant denies that a violation for each pay period can be established. Fourth, Defendant
14 contends that a Court is unlikely to exercise its discretion to award civil penalties under PAGA
15 where, as here, there is no conduct shown by Plaintiff that would show any Labor Code violation
16 by Defendant is knowing and intentional. Defendant insists that this is especially true in the Action
17 where class action damages are available to Class Members, rendering an award of PAGA
18 penalties in addition to class action damages to be double recovery.

19 Class Counsel maintain that it is possible to recover the subsequent violation rate for
20 penalties, that stacking is permissible, and that there is no manageability requirement under PAGA
21 (citing *Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc.*). As such, Class Counsel believe a 10% valuation of
22 this claim to be reasonable, resulting in **\$56,165** as a reasonable estimate of the likelihood of what
23 Plaintiff may recover at trial for PAGA penalties (\$561,650 x 0.10). See also *Carrington v.*
24 *Starbucks Corp.*, 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 529 (2018) (upholding trial courts 90% reduction in
25 maximum penalties, from \$50 to \$5 per initial violation).

26 **8. Conclusion**

27 When including derivative penalties, such as waiting time penalties, wage statement
28 violations, and discretionary PAGA penalties, Class Counsel theorized Defendant's maximum

1 exposure to be approximately **\$1,467,991**. In all, Class Counsel obtained a Gross Settlement
2 Amount of **\$200,000.00**. Particularly in light of the risks involving obstacles to class certification,
3 all issues and risks related to liability, the issues with manageability at trial, the discretionary
4 nature of PAGA penalties, and considering the case law regarding fair, reasonable and adequate
5 settlements, Class Counsel strongly believe that the settlement reached is fair, reasonable and
6 adequate, and in the best interest of Class Members.

7 Moreover, \$20,000.00 of the Gross Settlement Amount was attributed to PAGA penalties.
8 This allocation was decided mutually by the Parties and the mutual decision was based on: (1) the
9 fact that damages are available for the failure to pay wage claims while only penalties are available
10 for the PAGA claims; (2) the risk that the Court may exercise its discretion to decline to stack
11 PAGA penalties; (3) the risk that the Court may exercise its discretion to not award the full amount
12 of PAGA penalties available; and (4) the risk that the Court may decline to award any PAGA
13 penalties at all in light of the fact that damages are available for Class Members and it may find
14 any further liability against Defendant unnecessarily punitive.

15 **VII. THE PROPOSED ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ARE REASONABLE**

16 Class Counsel seek an attorneys' fees award of *up to* thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross
17 Settlement Amount, which, unless escalated pursuant to this Agreement, would amount to
18 \$70,000.00. Class Counsel also seek reimbursement of costs not to exceed \$30,000.00. Class Counsel
19 may seek less than 35% at the time of final approval. The requested fees fall well within the historical
20 range of attorney's fees awards under the common fund theory, which is generally from 25% to 50%.
21 The requested fee is fair compensation for undertaking complex, risky, expensive and time-
22 consuming litigation on a contingent fee basis. Thus, the Court should preliminarily approve the
23 requested attorneys' fees and costs, which are justified by the results achieved, the complexity of the
24 issues, the difficulty of the case and the great risks undertaken by Class Counsel. The requested
25 attorneys' fees will not be opposed by Defendant and are well within established guidelines.

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1 **VIII. THE REQUESTED ENHANCEMENT AWARD TO THE NAMED**
2 **PLAINTIFF AND CLASS REPRESENTATIVE IS REASONABLE**

3 Plaintiff is entitled to an enhancement award for his service as class representative, for
4 answering extensive questions by Class Counsel, for being available and answering questions during
5 mediation, for the risks in being the named plaintiff and for providing Defendant with a more
6 expansive release of claims, including a waiver based upon California Civil Code section 1542, in
7 exchange for the enhancement award. Defendant does not oppose the requested enhancement to
8 Plaintiff. Plaintiffs risked intrusive discovery and the payment of employer costs. In the experience
9 of Class Counsel, the typical enhancement award in wage and hour class actions ranges from
10 approximately \$10,000.00 to \$25,000.00, although some awards are higher. In contrast, Class
11 Counsel seek an extremely limited enhancement of \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff.

12 **IX. CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES**

13 **A. The Class should be Preliminarily Certified**

14 In California, there are two certification prerequisites: (1) the existence of an “ascertainable
15 class;” and (2) “a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved
16 affecting the parties to be represented.” (*Sotelo v. MediaNews Group, Inc.* (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th
17 639, 647.) To certify a class, the party advocating class treatment must demonstrate: (1) a numerous
18 class; (2) predominant common questions of law or fact; (3) class representatives with claims or
19 defenses typical of the class; and (4) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.”
20 (*Williams v. Sup. Ct.* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1353, citing *Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Sup. Ct.*
21 (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) Each of the criteria for class certification is satisfied in this instance:

22 **1. Ascertainability** – “Ascertainability” is a due process requirement that
23 ensures it is possible to decide who will be bound by the judgment (*res judica* effect). The
24 determination is made by examining the class definition and the size of the class. Here, the Class
25 Members definition (*i.e.*, all persons employed by Defendant in California and classified as non-
26 exempt, hourly-paid employees who worked for Defendant during the Class Period) is derived from
27 the operative complaint, which complains of alleged violations of Labor Code sections that are
28 chiefly and, in some instances, solely applicable to non-exempt, hourly paid employees. There is no

1 difficulty ascertaining who is a Class Member based on the above-described definition as it is readily
2 apparent to all involved who is a person employed by Defendant in California and classified as non-
3 exempt, hourly-paid employee who worked for Defendant during the Class Period based solely from
4 Defendant's payroll records, which amounts to approximately 125 persons.

5 **2. Numerosity** – According to the California Supreme Court, a putative class is
6 sufficiently numerous to achieve the numerosity requirement if their joinder is impracticable and
7 thus substantial benefits accrue both to litigants and the courts if the action proceeds as a class action.
8 (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435, 446.) Numerosity is presumed satisfied if
9 there are forty (40) putative class members. (*Miri v. Dillon* (E.D. MI 2013) 292 F.R.D. 454, 461.)
10 However, as few as 10 class members has been found sufficient. (*See, e.g., Bowles v. Sup. Ct.* (1955)
11 44 Cal.2d 574.) Class Counsel understand from documents provided that Defendants identified at
12 least 125 Class Members. That is sufficiently numerous to establish the numerosity requirement.

13 **3. Commonality** – California law also requires that “questions of law or fact
14 common to the class [be] substantially similar and predominate over the questions affecting the
15 individual members.” (*In re Steroid Hormone Product Cases* (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 145, 153.)

16 This litigation is brought to resolve common issues that include whether Defendant failed to
17 pay for all hours worked; whether Defendant provided full, timely and un-interrupted meal and rest
18 periods; whether Class Members are entitled to premium pay for incomplete, untimely or interrupted
19 meal or rest periods, among other claims as set forth above.

20 **4. Typicality** – Typicality requires only that the named plaintiff's interests in
21 the action be significantly similar to those of other class members. (*Williams v. Sup. Ct.* (2013)
22 221 Cal.App.4th 1353, citing *Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Sup. Ct.* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.)
23 Plaintiff contends that his claims are typical of those of other Class Members as Plaintiff: (1) is a
24 non-exempt, hourly-paid employee like other Class Members; (2) complains of not being paid for
25 all time under Defendant's control or suffered and/or permitted to work for Defendants; (3) did
26 not receive premium pay for meal periods that were not compliant with the Labor Code; (4) did
27 not receive premium pay for rest periods that were not provided, among others as set forth above.
28 Thus, Plaintiff's claims are typical of other Class Members.

1 **5. Adequacy of Representation** - To maintain a class action, the representative
2 plaintiff must adequately protect the interests of the class. (*Williams v. Sup. Ct.* (2013) 221
3 Cal.App.4th 1353, citing *Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Sup. Ct.* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.)
4 Adequacy of representation consists of two components. First, there must be no disabling conflicts
5 of interest between the class representatives and the class. Second, the class representative must be
6 represented by counsel who are competent and experienced in the kind of litigation to be undertaken.
7 (*See McGhee v. Bank of Am.* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450; *accord In re Juniper Networks, Inc.*
8 *Securities Litigation* (N.D. Cal. 2009) 264 F.R.D. 584, 590.) Plaintiff contends, and Defendant does
9 not dispute for Settlement only, both criteria are met in this instance:

10 **(i) No Disabling Conflict of Interest Exists Between the Class**
11 **Representative and the Class**

12 No conflicts, disabling or otherwise, exists between Plaintiff and Class Members because
13 Plaintiff alleges to have been damaged by the same alleged conduct of Defendant (*i.e.*, Plaintiff is
14 classified as non-exempt, hourly-paid employee, not paid premium pay, etc.) and thus has the
15 incentive to fairly represent all Class Members' claims to achieve the maximum possible recovery.

16 **(ii) Class Counsel are Experienced Class Action Attorneys**

17 As set forth in the Declarations of Class Counsel, Class Counsel in this matter consist of
18 experienced class action attorneys, have been appointed as class counsel in other class actions and
19 have a successful "track record" in litigating class actions.

20 **6. Superiority of Class Action** - Also relevant to the Court's certification
21 decision is whether a class action is the superior method of adjudication. (*Brinker Restaurant Corp.*
22 *v. Sup. Ct.* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.)

23 It deals with common issues that are most efficiently adjudicated together, as indicated
24 above. Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that, with at least 125 Class Members, presentation of all of them
25 before this Court may be problematic, impractical, and burdensome. On the contrary, a class action
26 allows claims of many individuals to be resolved at the same time, eliminates the possibility of
27 repetitious litigation and affords small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims
28 which otherwise would be too insufficient to warrant individual litigation.

1 7. **Conclusion** – Thus, because this class action meets all criteria for
2 certification and a lesser standard of scrutiny applies when evaluating these criteria for settlement
3 purposes, it should be certified for purposes of effectuating this settlement.

4 **X. CONCLUSION**

5 Therefore, the Parties request the Court grant preliminary approval of the proposed
6 settlement.

8 Dated: March 21, 2026

BIBIYAN LAW GROUP, P.C.

9 /s/ *Vedang J. Patel*

10 _____
Vedang J. Patel

11 Attorneys for Plaintiff, KEVIN LIBERATO
12 CAMPOS VARGAS, on behalf of himself and
13 all others similarly situated and aggrieved
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