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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE**

ALFONSO HERRERA, individually, and on
behalf of other similarly situated employees and
aggrieved employees pursuant to the California
Private Attorneys General Act,

Plaintiff,

vs.

W.L. BUTLER CONSTRUCTION, INC., a
California corporation; ALL AMERICAN
EQUIPMENT RENTAL, LLC, a California
Limited Liability Company; and DOES 1 through
25, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 30-2023-01335445-CU-OE-CXC

Honorable Randall J. Sherman
Department CX105

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF**

Reservation ID: 74389516
Date: January 3, 2025
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Dept.: CX105

Complaint Filed: July 5, 2023
FAC Filed: July 11, 2024
Trial Date: Not Set

1 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

2 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT** on **January 3, 2025 at 10:00 a.m.** in **Department CX105**
3 of the above-captioned Court located at Civil Complex Center, 751 W. Santa Ana Boulevard, Santa Ana,
4 California 92701, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and Rule 3.769 of the
5 California Rules of Court, Plaintiff Alfonso Herrera (“Plaintiff”) will and hereby does move the Court
6 for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action and PAGA settlement between
7 Plaintiff and Defendants W.L. Butler Construction, Inc. and All American Equipment Rental, LLC
8 (together, “Defendants”).

9 Plaintiff requests that the Court enter an Order:

10 1. Preliminarily approving the Joint Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement
11 (“Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”) attached as Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of Jonathan M. Genish
12 in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement
13 (“Genish Decl.”);

14 2. Certifying the Class for Settlement purposes;

15 3. Appointing Plaintiff Alfonso Herrera as the Class Representative;

16 4. Appointing Jonathan M. Genish, Miriam L. Schimmel, Joana Fang, Alexandra Rose, and
17 Jared C. Osborne of Blackstone Law, APC as Class Counsel;

18 5. Appointing Apex Class Action LLC as the Settlement Administrator;

19 5. Approving the proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement (“Class Notice”) and Request
20 for Exclusion Form (“Exclusion Form”), attached as Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2, respectively, to the
21 [Proposed] Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement, to be mailed to
22 the Class;

23 6. Approving the opt-out and objection procedures provided in the Settlement Agreement
24 and set forth in the Class Notice;

25 7. For each Class Member, directing Defendants to furnish their full name, last known
26 mailing address, Social Security number, dates worked for Defendants during the Class Period, and such
27 other information as is necessary for the Settlement Administrator to calculate Workweeks and PAGA
28 Workweeks (if applicable) to the Settlement Administrator within fourteen (14) calendar days after entry

1 of the order granting preliminary approval of the Settlement;

2 8. Approving the proposed deadlines for the settlement administration process; and

3 9. Setting a Final Approval Hearing.


4 Pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(1)(2), on August 30, 2024, a copy of the proposed
5 Settlement was submitted to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) via
6 online submission through the LWDA’s website. (Genish Decl., ¶ 46 & Exh, 3).

7 This Motion is based upon this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the
8 Declaration of Jonathan M. Genish, the Declaration of Plaintiff Alfonso Herrera, the pleadings and other
9 records on file with the Court in this matter, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court
10 may properly receive at or before the hearing.

11 Respectfully submitted,

12 Dated: September 23, 2024

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

13
14 By: 

Jonathan M. Genish
Attorneys for Plaintiff Alfonso Herrera

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiff Alfonso Herrera (“Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of the Joint Stipulation of Class
4 Action and PAGA Settlement (“Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”) entered into between Plaintiff
5 and Defendants W.L. Butler Construction, Inc. and All American Equipment Rental, LLC (together,
6 “Defendants”) (collectively, with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). (Declaration of Jonathan M. Genish in Support
7 of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement [“Genish Decl.”],
8 Exh. 2). The Settlement terms are outlined as follows:

- 9
- Class Size: Approximately 149 individuals.
 - 10 • Gross Settlement Amount: One Million Four Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars and
11 Zero Cents (\$1,475,000.00).
 - 12 • Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: Attorneys’ fees of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross
13 Settlement Amount (i.e., \$516,250.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$1,475,000.00) plus
14 actual litigation costs and expenses not to exceed Twenty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
15 (\$20,000.00), to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
 - 16 • Enhancement Payment: Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and Zero Cents (\$7,500.00),
17 to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
 - 18 • PAGA Amount: Fifty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$50,000.00) from the Gross
19 Settlement Amount, 75% of which will be paid to the Labor and Workforce Development
20 Agency (“LWDA”) and the remaining 25% to be paid to the PAGA Employees.
 - 21 • Settlement Administration Costs: Not to exceed Eight Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
22 (\$8,000.00), to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.
 - 23 • Estimated Net Settlement Amount: Eight Hundred Seventy-Three Thousand Two Hundred
24 Fifty Dollars and Zero Cents (\$873,250.00) to be distributed to Settlement Class Members.

25 As set forth herein, the Settlement is the product of informed discovery and arms-length
26 negotiations, and provides a fair, adequate, and reasonable recovery for the Class. Plaintiff therefore
27 respectfully requests that the Court grant preliminary approval of the Settlement, conditionally certify the
28 Class, approve the proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement (“Class Notice”) and Request for
Exclusion Form (“Exclusion Form”) (together, the “Notice Packet”), and set a hearing date for final

1 settlement approval, among other requested relief.

2 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

3 Defendant W.L. Butler Construction, Inc. is a general contractor based in Redwood City,
4 California. Defendant All American Equipment Rental, LLC is a full-service rental company also based
5 in Redwood City, California that partners with Defendant W.L. Butler Construction, Inc. to provide tools
6 and equipment.

7 Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as an hourly-paid, non-exempt Driver/Warehouse
8 Attendant from approximately June 2019 to October 2020. (Declaration of Alfonso Herrera in Support
9 of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement [“Herrera Decl.”], ¶ 2).

10 On July 5, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint for Damages in the action entitled
11 *Alfonso Herrera v. W.L. Butler Construction, Inc., et al.*, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-
12 2023-01335445-CU-OE-CXC (“Action”), thereby commencing a putative class action against
13 Defendants. (Genish Decl., ¶ 9).

14 April 24, 2024, the Parties participated in mediation conducted by Monique Ngo-Bonnici, Esq.
15 (“Mediator”), a neutral and respected mediator with extensive experience in complex wage and hour
16 matters. (*Id.*, ¶ 10). After a full day of mediation, and with the help of the Mediator, the Parties were
17 able to reach an agreement to resolve this dispute on a class and representative basis. (*Ibid.*).

18 On May 1, 2024, Plaintiff provided written notice to the LWDA by online submission and to
19 Defendants by U.S. Certified Mail, pursuant to California Labor Code Section 2699.3, of the specified
20 provisions of the California Labor Code alleged to have been violated by Defendants (“PAGA Letter”).
21 (*Id.*, ¶ 11 & Exh. 1).

22 On July 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Class and Representative Action Complaint
23 (“Operative Complaint”) in the Action, which added a cause of action under PAGA. (*Id.*, ¶ 12). The
24 Operative Complaint alleges nine (9) causes of action for violations of the California Labor Code for
25 failure to pay overtime wages, failure to pay minimum wages, failure to provide compliant meal periods
26 and premium payments in lieu thereof, failure to provide compliant rest periods and premiums payments
27 in lieu thereof, failure to timely pay wages upon termination, failure to provide accurate wage statements,
28 and failure to reimburse necessary business expenses, for violations of California Business & Professions

Code Section 17200, *et seq.* based on the aforementioned California Labor Code violations, and for civil penalties under PAGA based on the aforementioned California Labor Code violations. (*Ibid*).

On August 21, 2024, the Parties executed the Settlement Agreement. (*Id.*, ¶ 13 & Exh. 2).

III. THE SETTLEMENT TERMS

A. Class Definition

For purposes of settlement only, the Parties have agreed that the Class shall be defined as “all current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendants in the State of California at any time during the Class Period, but excluding all employees who signed a general release agreement with Defendants” (“Class Members” or “Class”). (Genish Decl., ¶ 14; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.b). The Class Period is defined as the period from July 5, 2019 through April 24, 2024. (Genish Decl., ¶ 14; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.f). Based on information provided by Defendants, it is estimated that there are a total of one hundred and forty-nine (149) Class Members. (Genish Decl., ¶ 14).

B. Amount of Settlement

The Parties have agreed to settle the class and PAGA claims at issue in the Operative Complaint for a non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of One Million Four Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$1,475,000.00), exclusive of employer-side payroll taxes. (Genish Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.q).

C. Allocation and Funding of the Gross Settlement Amount

The Gross Settlement Amount is a common fund and therefore includes all requested costs, fees, and other allocations. (Genish Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.q). The Gross Settlement Amount includes: (1) Class Counsel’s fees in the amount of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount (i.e., \$516,250.00 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$1,475,000.00); (2) Class Counsel’s actual litigation costs and expenses, not to exceed Twenty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$20,000.00); (3) Settlement Administration Costs, not to exceed Eight Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$8,000.00); (4) Enhancement Payment in the amount of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and Zero Cents (\$7,500.00); and (5) PAGA Amount in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$50,000.00). (Genish Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 6.q, 10, 11, 12, and 13). After the above-estimated amounts are deducted from the Gross Settlement Amount, the Net Settlement Amount that will

1 be available for Class Members is currently estimated to be Eight Hundred Seventy-Three Thousand Two
2 Hundred Fifty Dollars and Zero Cents (\$873,250.00). (Genish Decl., ¶ 15). Additionally, 25% of the
3 PAGA Amount (“PAGA Employee Amount”), which is \$12,500.00 out of \$50,000.00 will be fully
4 distributed to “all current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendants in the State of
5 California at any time during the PAGA Period, but excluding all employees who signed a general release
6 agreement with Defendants” (“PAGA Employees”). (Genish Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 6.q,
7 6.y, 6.aa, and 12). The “PAGA Period” is defined as the period from July 5, 2022 through April 24, 2024.
8 (Genish Decl., ¶ 15; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.bb).

9 Defendants have represented that the Class Members worked a total of 12,380 weeks for
10 Defendants as non-exempt employees in California during the Class Period (“Workweeks”). (Genish
11 Decl., ¶ 16; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 6.oo & 14). If it is determined by the Settlement Administrator
12 that the total number of Workweeks worked by the Class Members during the Class Period actually
13 exceeds 12,380 by more than 10% (i.e., by more than 13,618 Workweeks), then the Gross Settlement
14 Amount will be increased on a *pro rata* basis equal to the percentage increase in the number of
15 Workweeks worked by the Class Members above 10%. (Genish Decl., ¶ 16; Settlement Agreement, ¶
16 14). For example, if the number of Workweeks increases by 11% to 13,742 Workweeks, then the Gross
17 Settlement Amount will increase by 1%. (Genish Decl., ¶ 16; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 14).

18 The Net Settlement Amount will be distributed and paid to all Class Members who do not submit
19 a timely and valid Request for Exclusion (“Settlement Class Members”) on a *pro rata* basis based on
20 their number of Workweeks. (Genish Decl., ¶ 17; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 6.nn & 15). The *pro rata*
21 share of the Net Settlement Amount that a Class Member may be eligible to receive under the Class
22 Settlement (“Individual Settlement Share”) will be calculated by the Settlement Administrator, in
23 accordance with the Settlement Agreement. (Genish Decl., ¶ 17; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 6.7 and 15).
24 The highest Individual Settlement Share is estimated to be \$17,634.29¹, the average Individual Settlement
25 Share is estimated to be \$5,860.74, and the lowest Individual Settlement Share is estimated to be \$70.54.
26 (Genish Decl., ¶ 17).

27
28 ¹ The estimated highest Individual Settlement Share assumes a Class Member worked every Workweek in the Class Period. Accordingly, if it is determined by the Settlement Administrator that the highest number of Workweeks that one Class Member worked is less than every Workweek in the Class Period, the highest Individual Settlement Share will be less than \$17,634.29.

1 The PAGA Employee Amount will be distributed and paid to all PAGA Employees on a *pro rata*
2 basis based on the number of weeks each PAGA Employee worked for Defendants as a non-exempt
3 employee in California during the PAGA Period (“PAGA Workweeks”). (Genish Decl., ¶ 18; Settlement
4 Agreement, ¶¶ 6.dd and 12). The *pro rata* share of the PAGA Employee Amount that a PAGA Employee
5 may be eligible to receive under the PAGA Settlement (“Individual PAGA Payment”) will be calculated
6 by the Settlement Administrator, in accordance with the Settlement Agreement. (Genish Decl., ¶ 18;
7 Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 6.r and 16). The highest Individual PAGA Payment is estimated to be \$241.12,
8 the average Individual PAGA Payment is estimated to be \$134.41, and the lowest Individual PAGA
9 Payment is estimated to be \$2.57. (Genish Decl., ¶ 18).

10 Each Individual Settlement Share will be allocated as thirty-three and one-third percent (33 1/3%)
11 wages and sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66 2/3%) penalties, interest, and non-wage damages. (Genish
12 Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 17). The portion allocated to wages will be reported on an IRS
13 Form W-2 and the portions allocated to penalties, interest, and non-wage damages will be reported on an
14 IRS Form 1099 (if applicable) by the Settlement Administrator. (Genish Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement
15 Agreement, ¶ 17). The Settlement Administrator will withhold the employee’s share of taxes and
16 withholdings with respect to the wages portion of the Individual Settlement Shares, and issue checks to
17 Settlement Class Members for their net payment of their Individual Settlement Share (“Individual
18 Settlement Payment”). (Genish Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 6.s and 16). The employer taxes
19 will be paid separately and in addition to the Gross Settlement Amount. (Genish Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement
20 Agreement, ¶¶ 6.k, 6.q, and 17). Each Individual PAGA Payment will be allocated as one hundred
21 percent (100%) penalties and will be reported on an IRS Form 1099 (if applicable) by the Settlement
22 Administrator. (Genish Decl., ¶ 19; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 17).

23 The Settlement Agreement is a non-reversionary and non-claims made settlement. (Genish Decl.,
24 ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 6.q and 35). The Net Settlement Amount will be fully distributed to
25 Settlement Class Members and the PAGA Amount will be fully distributed to the LWDA and PAGA
26 Employees, in accordance with the Settlement Agreement. (Genish Decl., ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement,
27 ¶¶ 15 and 16). No money will revert to Defendants. (Genish Decl., ¶ 20; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.q).

28 ///

Each Individual Settlement Payment and Individual PAGA Payment check will be valid and negotiable for one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days from the date the checks are issued, and thereafter, shall be canceled. (Genish Decl., ¶ 21; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 35). Any funds associated with such canceled checks will be distributed by the Settlement Administrator to the State of California's Unclaimed Property Division in the name of the Settlement Class Member and/or PAGA Employee. (Genish Decl., ¶ 21; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 35).

D. Released Claims

Upon the full funding of the Gross Settlement Amount, Plaintiff and all Settlement Class Members will be deemed to have fully, finally, and forever released, settled, compromised, relinquished, and discharged the Released Parties of all Released Class Claims. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 36).

Upon the full funding of the Gross Settlement Amount, Plaintiff, the State of California with respect to all PAGA Employees, and all PAGA Employees will be deemed to have fully, finally, and forever released, settled, compromised, relinquished, and discharged the Released Parties of all Released PAGA Claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 37).

"Released Class Claims" means any and all claims which were alleged or which could have been alleged based on the factual allegations in the Operative Complaint, arising during the Class Period, including but not limited to claims for Defendants' alleged failure to pay overtime and minimum wages, provide compliant meal and rest periods and associated premium payments, timely pay wages upon termination, provide accurate wage statements, and reimburse necessary business-related expenses in violation of California Labor Code Sections 201, 202, 203, 226(a), 226.7, 510, 512(a), 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2800, and 2802, and the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order(s), and California Business and Professions Code sections 17200, *et seq.* (*Id.*, ¶ 6.gg).

"Released PAGA Claims" means any and all claims which were alleged or which could have been alleged based on the factual allegations in the Operative Complaint and PAGA Letter, arising during the PAGA Period, for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, California Labor Code Sections 2698 *et seq.*, for Defendants' alleged failure to pay overtime and minimum wages, provide compliant meal and rest periods and associated premium payments, timely pay wages upon termination, provide accurate wage statements, and reimburse necessary business-related expenses in violation of

California Labor Code Sections 201, 202, 203, 226(a), 226.7, 510, 512(a), 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2800, and 2802, and the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order(s). (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.hh).

“Released Parties” means Defendants, W.L. Butler, Inc., and any related entities, and their directors, officers, members, and investors. (*Id.*, ¶ 6.ii).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL

The settlement of a class action requires court approval. *See Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794 (1996). “In general, questions whether a settlement was fair and reasonable, whether notice to the class was adequate, whether certification of the class was proper, and whether the attorney fee award was proper are matters addressed to the trial court’s broad discretion.” *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 234-35 (2001) (disapproved on other grounds).

The review and approval of a proposed class action settlement involves a two-step process. *See* Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(c). First, counsel submit the proposed terms of the settlement and the Court makes a preliminary assessment of whether the settlement appears to be sufficiently within the range of a fair settlement to justify providing notice of the proposed settlement to class members. After notice is provided to the class, the Court must conduct a second inquiry into whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. *Id.*

The initial evaluation of the settlement at the preliminary approval step “is not a fairness hearing.” *Armstrong v. Board of School Directors of City of Milwaukee*, 616 F.2d 305, 314 (7th Cir. 1980). Rather, the limited purpose of this initial inquiry is to determine, at a threshold level, only whether the proposed settlement is within the range of possible approval and, as a result, “whether there is any reason to notify the class members of the proposed settlement and to proceed with a fairness hearing.” A presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. *See In re Microsoft I-V Cases*, 135 Cal. App. 4th 706, 723 (2006).

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1 Preliminary approval does not require a court to make a final determination that the settlement is
2 fair, reasonable, and adequate. Rather, that decision is made only at the final approval stage, after notice
3 of the settlement has been given to the class members and they have had an opportunity to object or
4 exclude themselves from the settlement. *See* Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(g). In considering a
5 potential class settlement, the court need not reach any ultimate conclusions on the issues of fact and law
6 which underlie the merits of the dispute and need not engage in a trial on the merits. *See Officers for*
7 *Justice v. Civil Service Commission*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982).

8 **V. THE SETTLEMENT IS PRESUMED FAIR**

9 **A. The Settlement Was Reached as a Result of Arm's-Length Bargaining**

10 California courts recognize that “a presumption of fairness exists where . . . [a] settlement is
11 reached through arm's-length bargaining.” *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245; *see also Clark v. Am.*
12 *Residential Servs. LLC*, 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 799 (2009). Here, the Parties' settlement negotiations
13 were at all times made at arm's-length and were adversarial. (Genish Decl., ¶ 22). The Settlement was
14 reached following a full day of mediation with a highly respected mediator with substantial experience
15 mediating wage and hour cases, and Plaintiff engaged in additional negotiations in order to finalize the
16 long-form agreement presently before the Court. (Ibid). At all times, Plaintiff was willing and prepared
17 to litigate this matter through class certification and trial if the Parties had been unable to reach a favorable
18 resolution. (*Id.*, ¶ 43).

19 **B. Sufficient Investigation and Discovery by Experienced Class Counsel**

20 Courts typically assess the status of discovery in determining whether a class action settlement
21 agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1801. Prior to mediation,
22 Defendants produced a random sampling of putative class members' time and pay records, as well as
23 Defendants' employee handbook, relevant wage and hour policies, and information regarding the total
24 number of putative class members. (Genish Decl., ¶ 23).

25 This allowed Plaintiff's counsel to conduct an informed assessment and analysis of the strengths
26 and weaknesses of the claims and the potential class-wide damages. (*Id.*, ¶ 24). Based on information
27 exchanged, the Parties extensively briefed issues regarding class certification and liability and provided
28 their analyses to the Mediator who helped the Parties debate the strengths and weakness of their respective

positions. (Genish Decl., ¶ 25). Additionally, settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel. (Genish Decl., ¶¶ 1-8). Accordingly, Class Counsel had sufficient information and experience to act intelligently in negotiating the Settlement.

C. The Settlement is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties' Respective Legal Positions and Recovery Risks

A settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at trial, nor does the settlement have to obtain 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable. *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 246, 250. In evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement, a trial court must consider “the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008).

Here, the reasonableness of the Settlement is underscored by the fact that Defendants have legal and factual grounds for defending the Action. Based upon Class Counsel’s experience litigating similar complex matters, Plaintiff reasonably expected a vigorous and lengthy defense to both class certification and the merits of the Action absent a settlement.

1. Class Counsel’s Analysis of the Maximum Available Liability and Damages

Class Counsel analyzed all available data and estimated Defendants’ maximum potential exposure to be approximately \$3,357,880, assuming the litigation was successful at trial on all claims at issue and every employee had a violation for each claim on every shift worked, and then reduced this exposure analysis based on the challenges facing the likelihood of obtaining class certification, prevailing at trial, and other attendant risks. (Genish Decl., ¶ 26). This estimate is based off an estimated maximum liability for all claims at issue and the total aggregate workweeks during the relevant time period, less interest, and based on the analysis of the data which was extrapolated out for all Class Members across the entire putative class period, which included: \$30,321 for meal period violations; \$1,769,353 for rest period violations; \$603,191 for unpaid off-the-clock work (\$15,682.97 attributed to minimum wages and \$587,508.03 attributed to overtime wages); \$36,046 for unpaid overtime wages at the required regular

rate of pay; \$577,599 for waiting time penalties; \$244,950 in wage statement penalties; and \$96,420 for unreimbursed business expenses. (Genish Decl., ¶ 26). Plaintiff further estimated that Defendants faced an additional exposure of \$250,000 in potential, non-stacked (i.e., one penalty, per employee, per pay period during the PAGA statutory period) PAGA penalties. (Ibid). Together with the PAGA penalties, Defendants' maximum potential exposure totaled \$3,607,880 in damages. (Ibid).

2. Class Counsel's Risk-Based Analysis and Risk-Based Adjustments

While Plaintiff believes that Defendants faced significant exposure, substantial barriers to a recovery existed. Defendants contended that Plaintiff's claims are not suitable for class certification because individual issues and affirmative defenses would predominate should this case go to trial. (Genish Decl., ¶ 29; *See Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal.4th 1004 (2012); *Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn.*, 59 Cal.4th 1, 35-36 (2014); *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). While Plaintiff and Class Counsel disagree with Defendants' predictions, they also recognize that there is a significant risk that the Court may deny class certification. (Genish Decl., ¶ 29; *see also*, *Findings of the Study of California Class Action Litigation*, 2000-2006, available at <http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/class-action-lit-study.pdf> (finding that only 21.4% of all class actions were certified either as part of a settlement or as part of a contested certification motion)).

For example, Plaintiff's meal period claims, which were based on Defendants' alleged failure to provide lawful meal periods, have been increasingly difficult to certify in recent years. (Genish Decl., ¶ 30; *See Brinker*, 53 Cal. 4th at 1034-35). Plaintiff's theory of liability for meal period violations was based on allegations that Defendants had failed to implement their policies and that their practices failed to allow Class Members to take meal breaks in the manner required under California law. (Genish Decl., ¶ 30; *See Bradley v. Networkers Int'l, LLC*, 211 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1150 (2012) (holding that "the lack of a meal/rest break policy and uniform failure to authorize such breaks are matters of common proof.")). Here, Class Counsel's analysis revealed that the majority of meal break violations reflected in the timekeeping records was low – approximately 1.7%, but employee time records also revealed that all of the recorded meal breaks – 100% of all recorded meal breaks – were *exactly* 30 minutes in length. (Genish Decl., ¶ 30). This raised the strong suspicion that Defendants were either automatically deducting meal breaks or inputting precise 30-minute meal breaks that were not reflective of the actual length of time

1 that employees took their meal breaks. (Genish Decl., ¶ 30). Defendants contended that their policies
2 and practices at all times during the Class Period were lawful. (Ibid). Defendants further argued that the
3 rate of purported meal period violations reflected in the data would require individualized inquiry and
4 that such inquiry would prohibit a class from being certified. (Ibid). Class Counsel also had to consider
5 the risk that the Court would find validity in an individualized proof defense to certification of Plaintiff's
6 meal period claim. (Ibid).

7 Additionally, a large portion of Defendants' overall liability lies in Plaintiff's rest period
8 allegations. (*Id.*, ¶ 31). As with the meal period allegations, Defendants contended that they had a lawful
9 written rest period policy, provided compliant rest breaks, and relieved Class Members of all duties as
10 required under California law. (Ibid). Additionally, this claim was even more uncertain given the
11 difficulties associated with proving the alleged rest period violations, as Defendants were not required to
12 record these breaks. (Ibid). Given the lack of records demonstrating rest period violations, there were
13 legitimate concerns Plaintiff would not be able to certify these claims or prove substantial damages with
14 requisite certainty, which made the estimated value of this claim subject to much challenge. (Ibid).

15 Plaintiff also faced challenges certifying and proving liability for his minimum wage and overtime
16 claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 32). These claims were largely based on unrecorded, off-the-clock work performed by
17 the putative class members before their shifts and during purported meal and rest periods. (Ibid).
18 However, the individualized nature of why this work was performed and the individualized nature of
19 damages presented substantial concerns regarding the manageability of the case and the risk the Court
20 could find these issues prevented certification, and the estimated damages for this claim were based on
21 an assumption that all putative class members worked off the clock for at least one hour per week. (Ibid).

22 Plaintiff also contended that Defendants failed to reimburse Plaintiff and the putative class
23 members for necessary business-related expenses, such as the purchase of uniforms and steel-toed boots
24 for work-related purposes. (*Id.*, ¶ 33). Defendants contended that they had a policy and practice of
25 reimbursing employees for necessary business-related expenses. (Ibid). Defendants further contended
26 that, with respect to the alleged expenses for which Plaintiff and the other Class Members never requested
27 reimbursement from Defendants, it did not know and had no reason to know that alleged business-related
28 expenses had been incurred. (Ibid). Defendants further contended that the reason for why a putative

1 class member undertook certain expenses, while not others, and failed to receive reimbursement for
2 certain expenses while not others, would raise individual issues that could not be certified. (Genish Decl.,
3 ¶ 33).

4 There are also substantial risks associated with Plaintiff's waiting time penalties and wage
5 statement claims. (*Id.*, ¶ 34). First, these claims were derivative of Plaintiff's claims for unpaid meal
6 period premiums, unpaid rest period premiums, unpaid minimum wages, and unpaid overtime wages,
7 and if certification was denied on those underlying claims, these derivative claims for penalties would
8 also likely fail. (*Ibid.*). Further, even if Plaintiff prevailed on his underlying claims, he would still be
9 required to demonstrate that Defendants' violations of California Labor Code section 203 were *willful*
10 violations. (Genish Decl., ¶ 34; *See, e.g., Choate v. Celite Corp.*, 215 Cal App. 4th 1460, 1468 (2013)
11 (holding that "an employer's reasonable, good faith belief that wages are not owed may negate a finding
12 of willfulness")). Wage statement claims have also seen varying treatment at the appellate level because
13 such claims have an element of discretion attached to them rather than a pure calculation of damages after
14 liability is proven. (Genish Decl. ¶ 34; *Jaimez v. DAIOHS USA, Inc.*, 181 Cal.App.4th 1286 (2010) *with*
15 *Price v. Starbucks Corp.*, 192 Cal.App.4th 1136 (2011)). Accordingly, these derivative claims, which
16 comprised a substantial portion of Defendants' estimated liability, were therefore uncertain. (Genish
17 Decl., ¶ 34).

18 Class Counsel also recognized that, even if Plaintiff prevailed at class certification, proving the
19 amount of wages due to Class Members would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain
20 proposition. (*Id.*, ¶ 35). In order to prove liability and damages, Class Counsel would need to request
21 and analyze thousands of pages of documents, obtain the Class Members' contact information, contact
22 them, and obtain their declarations at great expense. (*Ibid.*). Obtaining the cooperation of current
23 employees would also be difficult, given the likely reluctance to aid prosecution of a lawsuit against a
24 current employer. (*Ibid.*). On the other hand, Defendants would likely be able to obtain the cooperation
25 of their employees. (*Ibid.*). Moreover, even if Plaintiff prevailed at class certification and trial, possible
26 appeals would substantially delay any recovery by the Class. (*Ibid.*).

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1 Therefore, taking into account how each of the above risks potentially affected Plaintiff's ability
2 to obtain class certification, then to prove the underlying violations, and the cost and delay in recovering
3 the alleged potential damages, Class Counsel discounted Defendants' estimated liability by 40% to
4 \$2,164,728. (*Id.*, ¶ 36). The merits-based risk factors further reduced Defendants' estimated liability by
5 an additional 25%. (*Ibid.*). This resulted in an adjusted estimated liability of \$1,623,546. In light thereof,
6 the settlement amount of \$1,475,000 is a significant settlement. (*Ibid.*).

7 Class Counsel also contemplated the risks of proceeding with the PAGA claim and potential
8 liability Defendants could face from this claim as part of the global resolution. (*Id.*, ¶ 37). Existing case
9 law makes PAGA claims subject to the same defenses and risks as Plaintiff's underlying wage claims.
10 (Genish Decl., ¶ 37; see, *Elliot v. Spherion Pac. Work, LLC*, 572 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1181-82 (C.D. Cal.
11 2008) ("Plaintiff's claim under [PAGA] is wholly dependent upon her other claims. Because all of
12 Plaintiff's other claims fail as a matter of law, so does her PAGA claim"). Class Counsel also anticipated
13 that even if successful on the merits at trial, the imposition of cumulative civil penalties based on the
14 alleged wage and hour violations could be considered unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory,
15 and that Defendants would argue that they made a good faith attempt to comply with its legal obligations
16 warranting a reduction in penalties. (Genish Decl., ¶ 37).² Class Counsel also anticipated Defendants
17 would argue that the violations per pay period were low, warranting an additional reduction in civil
18 penalties. (*Ibid.*). Finally, Class Counsel was also mindful of the fact that PAGA is fundamentally not
19 intended to be compensatory in nature but is instead intended to facilitate enforcement of California's
20 labor laws by financing state activities and educating and deterring non-compliance. (*Ibid.*).

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24 ² See, e.g., *Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc.*, 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1131 (2012) (imposition of both statutory
25 and civil penalties for same conduct is impermissible double recovery) (disapproved on other grounds); *Aguirre v. Genesis*
26 *Logistics*, 2013 WL 10936035, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2013) ("duplicative effect" of penalties is a factor in favor of "reducing ...the
27 PAGA penalty"); *Smith v. Lux Retail North America, Inc.*, 2013 WL 2932243, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2013) (declining to
28 stack penalties based on the same conduct); *Castillo v. ADT, LLC*, 2017 WL 363108, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2017); *Sanchez*
v. McDonalds Restaurants of California, Inc., 2017 WL 4620746 (LA Super. Ct. July 6, 2017) (declining to stack penalties
arising out of the same conduct); *Fleming v. Covidien, Inc.*, 2011 WL 756304718, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011) (reducing
PAGA penalties by 80%); *Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.*, 193 F.Supp.3d 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (indicating that a substantial reduction is
warranted where good faith dispute exists in legal obligations); *Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.*, 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 529 (2018)
(approving reduction in penalties from \$50 per pay period to \$5 per pay period based on good faith attempts to comply with
obligations and minimal violations).

1 Therefore, after considering this multitude of factors, Plaintiff and Class Counsel concluded that
2 it was in the best interest of the State of California and the PAGA Employees to enter into the Settlement,
3 and to allocate Fifty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$50,000.00) of the Gross Settlement Amount
4 towards the PAGA claim, which represents approximately 3.39% of the Gross Settlement Amount.
5 (Genish Decl., ¶ 38). This percentage of the settlement is well within the range of wage and hour
6 settlements regularly approved in both state and federal court for cases that include both a class and
7 PAGA action. (Ibid). Typically, such hybrid cases allocate only 1% of the gross settlement value to
8 resolve PAGA claims, and, indeed, settlements allocations as little as 0.22% of the gross settlement
9 amount have been approved as reasonable by courts. (Ibid). Moreover, the overall relief obtained by the
10 Settlement is significant, not only from a monetary perspective, but also because it fulfills the public
11 policy objectives of PAGA—to promote enforcement of California’s labor laws, provide funds to the
12 state, and deter future non-compliance by the employer. (Ibid).

13 Therefore, the Settlement is in the best interest of the Class Members, the PAGA Employees, and
14 the State of California and is within the accepted range of recoveries for this type of litigation given the
15 inherent risk of litigation, the risk of obtaining and maintaining class certification, and the costs of further
16 litigation. (*Id.*, ¶ 39).

17 VI. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED

18 Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 provides that three basic requirements must be met in order
19 to sustain any class action: (1) there must be an ascertainable class; (2) there must be a well-defined
20 community of interest in the question of law or fact affecting the parties to be represented; and (3)
21 certification will provide substantial benefits to litigants and the courts, i.e., proceeding as a class action
22 is superior to other methods. *See Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1806. Plaintiff contends that the Action, which
23 is based upon Defendants’ wage and hour policies and practices, satisfies the class certification
24 requirements under California Code of Civil Procedure section 382. Defendants deny Plaintiff’s
25 allegations, but for purposes of the Settlement only, Defendants have stipulated to certification of the
26 Class.

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1 **A. An Ascertainable Class Exists Which is So Numerous That Joinder of All Members is**
2 **Impracticable**

3 Whether an ascertainable class exists turns on three factors: (1) the class definition, (2) the size of
4 the class, and (3) the means of identifying the class members. *See Miller v. Woods*, 148 Cal.App.3d 862,
5 873 (1983). In this case, all three considerations strongly favor class certification. Here, the Class is
6 defined as “all current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendants in the State of
7 California at any time during the Class Period, but excluding all employees who signed a general release
8 agreement with Defendants.” (Genish Decl., ¶ 14; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.b). This provides a clear
9 and definite scope for the proposed class.

10 Next, the Class is sufficiently numerous. There is no magic number that satisfies the numerosity
11 requirement. Courts have certified classes with as few as ten or twenty-eight class members. *Rose v.*
12 *City of Hayward*, 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934 (1981); *Bowles v. Superior Court*, 44 Cal. 2d 574 (1995);
13 *Hebbard v. Colgrove*, 28 Cal.App.3d 1017, 1030 (1972). Here, the estimated Class size of one hundred
14 and forty-nine (149) individuals meets the numerosity requirement.

15 Finally, the question of whether class members are easily identifiable turns on whether a plaintiff
16 can establish “the existence of an ascertainable class.” *Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.*, 67 Cal.2d 695 at 706
17 (1967). The existence of an ascertainable class in this case can be established through Defendants’ payroll
18 records, and the Class definition is sufficiently specific to enable the Parties, Class Members, and the
19 Court to determine the parameters of the Class. *See Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.*, 191 Cal.App.3d
20 605, 617 (1987).

21 **B. The Class Shares a Well-Defined Community of Interest**

22 The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant questions of law
23 and fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives
24 who can adequately represent the class. *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1806. Here, all three requirements are
25 easily satisfied.

26 The commonality criterion requires the existence of common question of law or fact and is
27 generally established with the issues of predominance and typicality. *See Daar*, 67 Cal.2d 695, 706.
28 What is required is that a common question of fact or law exists which predominates over issues unique

1 to individual plaintiffs. The existence of individual issues or facts—generally present in any case arising
2 from employment—is not a bar to class certification as long as they do not render class litigation
3 unmanageable or predominate over the common issues. *See B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois,*
4 *Inc.*, 191 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1354 (1987).

5 Here, Plaintiff’s claims present common issues of law and fact that predominate and warrant class
6 certification. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied compliant meal and rest periods to employees,
7 required employees to perform work off-the-clock, and failed to fully compensate employees for all time
8 actually worked. These policies and practices meant that Defendants allegedly failed to pay minimum
9 and overtime wages, and other related claims. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ policies and practices
10 were uniform as to all Class Members. Thus, class treatment is appropriate.

11 To satisfy the typicality requirement, California law does not require that plaintiffs’ claims be
12 identical to the other class members. Rather, the test of typicality for a class representative is whether
13 other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not
14 unique to the named plaintiff, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of
15 conduct. *See Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.*, 149 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502 (2007). The typicality requirement
16 for a class representative refers to the nature of the claim or defense of the representative, and not to the
17 specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought. *See ibid.*

18 Here, Plaintiff alleges that his claims are similar to that of the other Class Members and that
19 Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same alleged course of conduct giving rise to the claims of the other
20 Class Members. Because Plaintiff’s claims are based upon the same alleged conduct and business
21 practices as those of Class Members, the typicality requirement has been satisfied.

22 Finally, the question of adequacy of representation “depends on whether the plaintiff’s attorney
23 qualifies to conduct the proposed litigation in the plaintiff’s interest or not antagonistic to the interests of
24 the class.” *McGee v. Bank of America*, 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450 (1976). Here, these considerations are
25 satisfied. Class Counsel is well-regarded and is qualified and experienced in employment-related, class-
26 action litigation. (Genish Decl., ¶¶ 1-8). Plaintiff will vigorously, adequately, and fairly represent the
27 interests of the Class. Plaintiff has, at all times, throughout the course of the litigation considered the
28 interests of the Class and understood that he must take steps to adequately represent the Class and their

interests. (Herrera Decl., ¶ 10). Because Plaintiff's claims are typical of other Class Members and are not based on unique circumstances, there is no antagonism between the interests of Plaintiff and the Class.

C. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation

Under the circumstances, proceeding as a class action is a superior means of resolving this dispute, as the Class Members and the Court will derive substantial benefits. Class certification would serve as the only means to deter and redress the alleged violations. *See Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal.4th 429, 434 (2000) (relevant considerations include the probability that each class member will come forward to prove his or her separate claim and whether the class approach would actually serve to deter and redress the alleged wrongdoing). Further, individual actions arising out of the same operative facts would unduly burden the courts and could result in inconsistent results. Therefore, class action proceedings are superior to individual litigation.

VII. THE REQUESTED ENHANCEMENT PAYMENT IS REASONABLE

Plaintiffs in class action lawsuits are eligible for reasonable incentive payments as compensation "for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class." *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co.*, 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 412 (2010). Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representative, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. *See In re Online DVD Rental*, 779 F.3d 934, 947-948 (9th Cir. 2014) (approving incentive award 417 times larger than individual payments where incentive award made up a mere .17% of the settlement); *Gaudin v. Saxon Mortgage Servs., Inc.*, 2015 WL 7454183, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2015) (finding service award of \$15,000 to be "fair and reasonable").

Plaintiff initiated this litigation on behalf of his former co-workers who will now be entitled to receive payment from the Settlement. Plaintiff invested substantial time and effort into litigation, including his own research, reviewing documents, and extensive discussions with Class Counsel. (Herrera Decl., ¶¶ 3-5). Further, the requested amount for Plaintiff is also reasonable given the average award and the benefit gained by other Class Members. For these reasons, Plaintiff requests that an Enhancement Payment of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and Zero Cents (\$7,500.00) to Plaintiff be preliminarily approved by the Court. (Genish Decl., ¶ 40; Herrera Decl., ¶ 12).

1 **VIII. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ARE REASONABLE**

2 Trial courts have “wide latitude” in assessing the value of attorneys’ fees and their decisions will
3 “not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” *Lealao v. Beneficial Cal, Inc.*, 82
4 Cal.App.4th 19, 41 (2000). California law provides that attorney fee awards should be equivalent to fees
5 paid in the legal marketplace to compensate for the result achieved and risk incurred. *Id.* at 47. In cases
6 where class members present claims against a common fund and the defendant agrees to a percentage of
7 the fund as part of the settlement, use of the percentage method is appropriate. *Id.* at 32.

8 Here, the requested attorneys’ fees of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount
9 (i.e., \$516,250 if the Gross Settlement Amount is \$1,475,000.00) is disclosed to Class Members in the
10 proposed Class Notice. (Settlement Agreement, Exh. A). The requested fee was freely negotiated, is
11 common in the legal marketplace, and is not opposed by Defendants. The Motion for Final Approval
12 will elaborate on the nature of the legal services provided and will also support Class Counsel’s request
13 for the reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses not to exceed Twenty Thousand Dollars and Zero
14 Cents (\$20,000.00). (Genish Decl., ¶¶ 41 & 43). The Attorneys’ Fees and Costs that are not ultimately
15 approved by the Court shall instead be included in the Net Settlement Amount to be distributed to
16 Settlement Class Members. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 10).

17 **IX. THE CLASS NOTICE AND THE OPT-OUT AND OBJECTION PROCESS**
18 **MEETS DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS**

19 The Parties have jointly drafted the Class Notice, which will be mailed to the Class Members.
20 (*Id.*, Exh. A). The Class Notice will include information regarding the nature of the Action, a summary
21 of the terms of the Settlement, the Class definition, information on how to object to and/or opt-out of the
22 Class Settlement and to dispute Workweeks and/or PAGA Workweeks, and the date of the Final Approval
23 Hearing. (*Ibid.*). The Class Notice will list each Class Member’s total Workweeks and their estimated
24 Individual Settlement Share and each PAGA Employee’s total PAGA Workweeks and their estimated
25 Individual PAGA Payment. (*Ibid.*).

26 Within fourteen (14) calendar days after entry of the preliminary approval order, Defendants will
27 provide a list in a formatted readable Microsoft Office Excel spreadsheet to the Settlement Administrator
28 containing the following information for each Class Member: full name, last known mailing address,

1 Social Security number, dates worked for Defendants during the Class Period, and such other information
2 as is necessary for the Settlement Administrator to calculate Workweeks and PAGA Workweeks (if
3 applicable) (collectively referred to as the “Class List”). (Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 6.d & 24). Within
4 seven (7) calendar days after receiving the Class List from Defendants, the Settlement Administrator will
5 perform a search based on the National Change of Address Database or other similar services available,
6 such as provided by Experian, for information to update and correct for any known or identifiable address
7 changes, and will mail a Class Notice and Exclusion Form (i.e., Notice Packet) in English and Spanish
8 to all Class Members via First-Class U.S. Mail, using the most current, known mailing addresses
9 identified by the Settlement Administrator. (*Id.*, ¶ 25.a). The Parties have agreed to use Apex Class
10 Action LLC as the Settlement Administrator. (Genish Decl., ¶ 44; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.ll).

11 In determining whether to approve a settlement of a class action, a trial court has virtually
12 complete discretion as to the manner of giving notice to class members, and review on appeal is governed
13 by the abuse of discretion standard. *See In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases*, 186 Cal.App.4th 1380
14 (2010). Here, Class Counsel is not aware of an alternative method of providing notice to the Class which
15 would result in a higher likelihood of actual notice. (Genish Decl., ¶ 45). The original source of the
16 mailing addresses is from Class Members, who provided the information to Defendants. (*Ibid*).

17 Class Members will have forty-five (45) calendar days after the initial mailing of the Notice
18 Packet by the Settlement Administrator to submit a Request for Exclusion, Notice of Objection, and/or
19 Workweeks Dispute (“Response Deadline”). (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 6.kk).

20 Any Notice Packet returned to the Settlement Administrator as undeliverable on or before the
21 Response Deadline will be sent promptly via First-Class U.S. Mail to the forwarding address affixed
22 thereto and the Settlement Administrator will indicate the date of such re-mailing on the Class Notice.
23 (*Id.*, ¶ 25.b). If no forwarding address is provided, the Settlement Administrator will promptly attempt
24 to determine a correct address using a skip-trace or other search, using the name, address, and/or Social
25 Security number of the Class Member, and perform a single re-mailing within five (5) calendar days.
26 (*Ibid*). In the event that a Notice Packet is re-mailed to a Class Member, the Response Deadline for that
27 Class Member shall be extended fifteen (15) calendar days from the original Response Deadline. (*Id.*, ¶
28 6.kk).

1 Class Members will have an opportunity to dispute the number of Workweeks and/or PAGA
2 Workweeks to which they have been credited, as reflected in their respective Class Notices, by submitting
3 a timely and valid letter (“Workweeks Dispute”) to the Settlement Administrator, by mail, postmarked
4 on or before the Response Deadline. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 6.oo and 26). A Workweeks Dispute must: (a) contain the
5 case name and number of the Action; (b) contain the Class Member’s full name, signature, address,
6 telephone number, and the last four (4) digits of the Class Member’s Social Security number; (c) clearly
7 state that the Class Member disputes the number of Workweeks and/or PAGA Workweeks credited to
8 the Class Members and what the Class Member contends is the correct number; and (d) be returned by
9 mail to the Settlement Administrator at the specified address, postmarked on or before the Response
10 Deadline. (*Id.*, ¶ 6.pp).

11 Any Class Member wishing to be excluded from the Class Settlement must submit a timely and
12 valid Exclusion Form or letter (both of which are referred to as a “Request for Exclusion”) to the
13 Settlement Administrator, by mail, postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 6.jj & 27).
14 A Request for Exclusion must: (a) contain the case name and number of the Action; (b) contain the Class
15 Member’s full name, signature, address, telephone number, and last four (4) digits of the Class Member’s
16 Social Security number; (c) clearly state that the Class Member does not wish to be included in the Class
17 Settlement; and (d) be returned by mail to the Settlement Administrator at the specified address,
18 postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (*Id.*, ¶ 6.jj). Notwithstanding the above, all PAGA
19 Employees will be bound to the PAGA Settlement and will be issued their Individual PAGA Payment,
20 irrespective of whether they submit a Request for Exclusion. (*Id.*, ¶ 27).

21 To object to the Class Settlement, Settlement Class Members must submit a timely and complete
22 written objection (“Notice of Objection”) to the Settlement Administrator, by mail, postmarked on or
23 before the Response Deadline. (*Id.*, ¶¶ 6.w & 28). A Notice of Objection must: (a) contain the case name
24 and number of the Action; (b) contain the objector’s full name, signature, address, telephone number, and
25 the last four (4) digits of the objector’s Social Security number; (c) contain a written statement of all
26 grounds for the objection accompanied by any legal support for such objection; (d) contain copies of any
27 papers, briefs, or other documents upon which the objection is based; and (e) be returned by mail to the
28 Settlement Administrator at the specified address, postmarked on or before the Response Deadline. (*Id.*,

1 6.w). Settlement Class Members, individually or through counsel, may also present their objection orally
2 at the Final Approval Hearing, regardless of whether they have submitted a Notice of Objection.
3 (Settlement Agreement., ¶ 28).

4 **X. CONCLUSION**

5 For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant Plaintiff's
6 Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement and the relief requested herein.

7 Respectfully submitted,

8 Dated: September 23, 2024

BLACKSTONE LAW, APC

9
10 By:


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