

1 **JUSTICE FOR WORKERS, P.C.**

William C. Sung SB# 280792

2 E-Mail: william@justiceforworkers.com

Tiffany L. Luu SB# 335127

3 E-Mail: tluu@justiceforworkers.com

Joseph C. Ramli SB# 339491

4 E-Mail: jramli@justiceforworkers.com

9575 Bolsa Ave

5 Westminster, CA 92683

Tel: 323-922-2000

6 Fax: 323-922-2000

7 Attorneys for Plaintiffs EDGAR LUNA TORRES
and EFRAIN BARRIOS

9 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

10 **FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

12 EDGAR LUNA TORRES, an individual and
on behalf of all others similarly situated;

13 Plaintiffs,

14 vs.

15 YUNEXPRESS USA, INC., a New Jersey
16 corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,

17 Defendants.

Case No.: 24STCV16391

[Assigned for All Purposes to:
Hon. Elihu M. Berle, Dept. 6]

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND
PAGA SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

(Filed concurrently with Supporting
Declarations and [Proposed] Order)

DATE: December 1, 2025

TIME: 11:00 a.m.

DEPT: 6

Action Filed: July 1, 2024

Trial Date: Not Set

1 TO THE HONORABLE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF
2 RECORD:

3 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court, on
4 December 1, 2025 at 11 a.m. in Department 6 of the Spring Street Courthouse, Los Angeles
5 Superior Court, located at 312 N. Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, Plaintiffs Edgar Luna
6 Torres and Efrain Barrios (“Plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
7 individuals, will and hereby does move this Court for:

8 1. Preliminary approval of the proposed class settlement of this lawsuit;
9 2. Pursuant to section 382 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, provisional
10 certification of the following Class defined as follows:

11 All current and former non-exempt employees of Defendant YunExpress USA, Inc.
12 in the State of California during the Class Period of July 1, 2020 through the date of
Preliminary Approval.

13 3. Preliminary appointment of Plaintiffs as Class Representatives;
14 4. Preliminary appointment of William C. Sung, Tiffany L. Luu, and Joseph C. Ramli
15 of Justice for Workers, P.C. as Class Counsel;

16 5. The scheduling of a hearing to consider whether the Settlement should be finally
17 approved and to permit a Class Representative Service Payment to Plaintiffs, civil penalties payable
18 to the LWDA, settlement administration costs, and attorneys’ fees and costs to Class Counsel;

19 6. Appointment of Phoenix Settlement Administrators as the third-party Administrator
20 for mailing notices and administering the Settlement; and

21 7. Approval of the proposed Class Notice and an order that it be disseminated to the
22 proposed Class as provided in the Settlement Agreement.

23 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion; the attached Memorandum of Points and
24 Authorities; the supporting declarations of William C. Sung, Tiffany L. Luu, Plaintiffs Edgar Luna
25 Torres and Efrain Barrios, and Jodey Lawrence of Phoenix Settlement Administrators, and the
26 exhibits attached thereto; the pleadings, and other papers filed in this Action; and on any further oral
27 or documentary evidence or argument presented at the time of the hearing.

28 ///

1 DATED: October 30, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

2 **JUSTICE FOR WORKERS, P.C.**

3
4 By: 

5 William C. Sung

6 Tiffany L. Luu

7 Attorneys for Plaintiffs EDGAR LUNA TORRES
8 and EFRAIN BARRIOS
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION.....2

 A. THE PARTIES AND BRIEF PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

 B. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AND DEFENDANT’S DEFENSES2

 1. Unpaid Wages Due to Off-the-Clock Work2

 2. Meal Period Violations.....3

 3. Rest Period Violations.....4

 4. Waiting Time and Wage Statement Penalties.....4

 5. Failure to Reimburse Necessary Business Expenses.....4

 6. PAGA Civil Penalties5

 C. DISCOVERY AND MEDIATION5

III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT6

 A. ESSENTIAL TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT6

 1. The Settlement Provides for Reasonable Monetary Payments.....6

 2. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Service Payment, and PAGA Payment8

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT..... 10

 A. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL IS WARRANTED.....10

 1. The Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case and Risk, Expense, Complexity, and
 Duration of Further Litigation 11

 2. Amount Offered in Settlement Given Realistic Value of Claims 11

 3. The Experience and Views of Counsel 15

 4. The Preliminary Approval Standard Is Met.....15

 B. THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY THE CLASS..... 17

 C. THE COURT SHOULD ORDER DISTRIBUTION OF THE CLASS NOTICE19

 D. THE COURT SHOULD SET A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING.....20

V. CONCLUSION20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

State Cases

<i>Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2</i> (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157	15
<i>B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.</i> (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1341	19
<i>Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc.</i> (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 701	18
<i>Bowles v. Superior Court</i> (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574	18
<i>Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court</i> (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004	3
<i>Capital People First v. State Dept. of Developmental Services</i> (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 676	19
<i>Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.</i> (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504	5
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794	11
<i>In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases</i> (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380	8
<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i> (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116	10, 16
<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc.</i> (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480	9
<i>Lubin v. The Wackenhut Corp.</i> (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 926	6
<i>McGhee v. Bank of America</i> (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442	19
<i>Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc.</i> (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1056	4
<i>Price v. Starbucks Corp.</i> (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1136	5
<i>Reed v. United Teachers Los Angeles</i> (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 322	10
<i>Sav-On Drug Store, Inc. v. Superior Court (Rocher)</i> (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319	18
<i>Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court</i> (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319,	18
<i>Sevidal v. Target Corp.</i> (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 905	18
<i>Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Mgmt., Inc.</i> (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112	5, 15
<i>Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.</i> (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 230	11
<i>Williams v. Superior Court</i> (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1353	3

Federal Cases

<i>Chu v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC</i> (N.D. Cal. 2011) Case No. C 05-4526 MHP, 2011 WL 672645	10
<i>Doty v. Costco Wholesale Corp.</i> , Case No. CV05-3241 FMC-JWJx (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2007)	17

1	<i>Dunleavy v. Nadler</i> (9th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 454.....	17
2	<i>Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin</i> (1974) 417 U.S. 156	19
3	<i>Fleming v. Covidien Inc.</i> (C.D. Cal. 2011) Case No. ED CV10-01487 RGK (OPx), 2011 WL 7563047	5, 15
4	<i>Glass v. UBS Finan. Servs.</i> (N.D. Cal. 2007) Case No. C-06-4068 MMC, 2007 WL 221862.....	17
5	<i>Green v. Lawrence Service Co.</i> (C.D. Cal. 2013) 2013 WL 3907506	15
6	<i>Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.</i> (9th Cir. 1998) 150 F.3d 1011	10
7	<i>In re Pacific Enterprises Securities Litigation</i> (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 373	16
8	<i>In re Syncor ERISA Litig</i> (9th Cir. 2008) 516 F.3d 1095	10
9	<i>Lazarin v. Pro Unlimited, Inc.</i> (N.D. Cal. 2013) Case No. C11-03609 HRL, 2013 WL 3541217...	10
10	<i>Nat'l Rural Telecomm. Coop. v. DirecTV, Inc.</i> (C.D. Cal. 2004) 221 F.R.D. 523	17
11	<i>Sorenson v. PetSmart, Inc.</i> , Case No. 2:06-CV-02674-JAM-DAD (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008)	17
12	<i>Troester v. Starbucks Corporation</i> (C.D. Cal., Jan. 27, 2020, No. CV1207677CJCPJWX) 2020 WL 553572	3
13	<i>Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo</i> (2016) 136 S.Ct. 1036	6
14	Statutes	
15	Code Civ. Proc. § 382.....	18
16	Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2)	5
17	Labor Code § 203	4
18	Labor Code § 226(e).....	4
19	Labor Code § 2699(i)	10
20	Regulations and Court Rules	
21	California Rule of Court 3.766(d)	20
22	California Rule of Court 3.769	10, 20
23	Unpublished Cases	
24	<i>Bercea v. AE Retail West</i> , Case No. 34-2012-00123947 (Sacramento County Super. Ct. May 9, 2012).....	17
25	<i>Gomez v. Amadeus Salon, Inc.</i> , Case No. BC392297 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. July 23, 2010)	17
26	<i>Lim v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc.</i> , Case No. 04CC00213 (Orange County Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2006).....	17

1	<i>Palencia v. 99 Cents Only Stores</i> , Case No. 34-2010-00079619 (Sacramento County Super. Ct.) .	17
2	<i>Ressler v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.</i> , Case No. BC335018 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2009)	17

Treatises

4	4 Newberg on Class Actions § 11:24-25	16
5	4 Newberg on Class Actions § 14.6 (4th Ed. 2013)	9
6	Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.41(3rd Ed. 1995)	16

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiffs Edgar Luna Torres and Efrain Barrios (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought this wage
4 and hour class and representative action on behalf of a Class of all current and former non-exempt
5 employees who worked for Defendant YunExpress USA, Inc. (“Defendant”) within the State of
6 California during the Class Period of July 1, 2020 through the date of Preliminary Approval, subject
7 to the Escalator Clause in Section 8 of the Agreement. The primary issues in this case pertain to
8 Defendant’s alleged failure to pay all wages due to off-the-clock work, meal and rest period
9 violations, and unreimbursed business expenses. Plaintiffs contend Defendant is also liable for
10 inaccurate wage statement penalties, waiting time penalties, and civil penalties under the California
11 Private Attorneys’ General Act (“PAGA”). Plaintiffs now request that this Court preliminarily
12 approve this non-reversionary, common-fund class action settlement¹, in which Defendant has
13 agreed to pay the Gross Settlement Amount of Three Hundred Forty Thousand Dollars and Zero
14 Cents (\$340,000.00) to approximately 244 Class Members. Plaintiffs’

15 After deducting administration costs, requested Class Representative Service Payments, the
16 amount set aside as PAGA Penalties, and requested Class Counsel Fees Payment and Litigation
17 Expense Payment, the Net Settlement Amount of approximately \$161,666.67 will be distributed to
18 all Class Members who do not opt out of the Settlement based on the proportionate number of
19 Workweeks worked by each Class Member during the Class Period. Employees with standing for
20 PAGA Penalties will receive additional consideration for their release of PAGA claims.

21 Significantly, all Class Members will automatically receive a payment unless they
22 affirmatively opt-out. There are approximately 244 Class Members, and **the average payment to**
23 **participating Class Members is projected to be approximately \$686.13**. This is an excellent
24 result for Class Members, who will be releasing only those claims alleged or which could have been

25 _____
26
27 ¹ The Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice (“Settlement” or “Agreement”) is
28 attached to the Declaration of William C. Sung as **Exhibit 1**. The proposed Class Notice is attached to the
Agreement as **Exhibit A**. All defined terms in this motion have the same definition as that in the Agreement.
A redlined copy of the Agreement is attached as **Exhibit 2** and a redlined copy of the Class Notice is
attached as **Exhibit A** to the redlined Agreement.

1 alleged in the Action. The proposed Settlement is within the range of possible approval in light of
2 the significant legal and factual obstacles that Plaintiffs faced, the risks and costs of further
3 litigation, and the tangible monetary benefits to be received by the Class. For the reasons discussed
4 herein, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant preliminary approval of the Settlement.

5 **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION**

6 **A. THE PARTIES AND BRIEF PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

7 Defendant is an eservice logistics provider that provides cross-border small parcel solutions
8 to global e-commerce merchants, and has two locations (one in Vernon, California and one in
9 Inglewood, CA). Declaration of William C. Sung (“Sung Decl.”), ¶ 9. Defendant employed Plaintiff
10 Torres as an hourly-paid, non-exempt employee from approximately December 9, 2020 to May 12,
11 2024 as an Operator and employed Plaintiff Barrios as an hourly-paid, non-exempt employee from
12 approximately November 1, 2022 to April 5, 2024 as an Operator. *Ibid.*

13 On June 28, 2024, Plaintiff Torres filed the PAGA letter with the LWDA and gave notice to
14 Defendant. Sung Decl., ¶ 10, **Exh. 3** (PAGA Notice). On September 3, 2024, Plaintiff Torres filed
15 an amended PAGA letter adding Plaintiff Barrios as a second Plaintiff and gave notice to
16 Defendant. *Id.*, **Exh. 4** (Amended PAGA Notice).

17 On July 1, 2024, Plaintiff Torres filed the Class Action Complaint, alleging (1) Minimum
18 Wage Violations; (2) Overtime Wage Violations; (3) Meal Period Violations; (4) Rest Period
19 Violations; (5) Wage Statement Penalties; (6) Waiting Time Penalties; (7) Failure to Reimburse
20 Necessary Business Expenses; and (8) Unfair Competition. Sung Decl., ¶ 11. On September 5,
21 2024, Plaintiff Torres filed the First Amended Complaint (“Operative Complaint”) adding Plaintiff
22 Barrios as a second plaintiff and adding a cause of action for Civil Penalties under the California
23 Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”). Sung Decl., ¶ 12, **Exh. 5** (Operative Complaint).

24 **B. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AND DEFENDANT’S DEFENSES**

25 **1. Unpaid Wages Due to Off-the-Clock Work**

26 Plaintiffs allege that they frequently worked off the clock during their meal breaks at the
27 instruction of their supervisors. Sung Decl., ¶ 13. In response, Defendant denies this claim and
28 argues it has compliant policies that prohibit working off the clock and that Defendant’s pay

1 statistics evidence superior compliance with its policies and practices requiring all employees to
2 receive wages for all hours worked. *Ibid.* During the Class Period and per data provided for the
3 mediation, Defendant paid Class Members over 23,400.00 overtime hours totaling over
4 \$720,000.00 in overtime wages and over 1,500 meal period premiums.² *Ibid.* Defendant thus
5 contends that Plaintiffs’ off-the-clock work claim is individualized and not suited for class
6 certification since there is no evidence of a common policy or practice forcing Class Members to
7 work off the clock and numerous individual inquiries would be needed to assess which Class
8 Members, if any, worked off the clock, how often, the reasons why a particular Class Member
9 worked off the clock, and whether Defendant knew or should have known that Class Members
10 worked off the clock for the imposition of classwide liability. *Ibid*; *see, e.g., Troester v. Starbucks*
11 *Corporation* (C.D. Cal., Jan. 27, 2020, No. CV1207677CJCPJWX) 2020 WL 553572, at *9
12 (denying certification of off-the-clock work claim because of individualized inquiries); *Williams v.*
13 *Superior Court* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1369, as modified (Dec. 24, 2013) (liability for off-
14 the-clock work is based on the “know or should have known” standard).

15 2. Meal Period Violations

16 Plaintiffs claim that often were unable to take compliant meal periods because of operational
17 needs. Sung Decl., ¶ 14. Defendant counters that they have maintained compliant meal period
18 policies and practices throughout the Class Period and always provided compliant meal periods in
19 line with those policies. *Ibid*; *see Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004,
20 1040-1041 (holding employers need only “provide” meal periods to employees and are not
21 obligated to “police” meal periods). Defendant points to the fact that the payroll record produced for
22 mediation evidenced that it paid approximately over 1,500 meal period premiums as evidence of
23 their superior meal period compliance practices. *Ibid.* As such, Defendant maintains Plaintiffs’ meal
24 period claim is not suited for class certification since individual inquiries would be needed to assess
25 which employees, if any, took non-compliant meal periods, how many meal periods were non-
26 compliant, and the reasons why a particular employee did not take a meal period on a particular
27

28 ² Defendant provided the time and pay data for approximately 150 Class Members during the Class Period.

1 shift and a meal period premium was not paid. *Ibid.*

2 **3. Rest Period Violations**

3 Plaintiffs claim that they often were unable to take compliant rest periods because of
4 operational needs. Sung Decl., ¶ 15. Defendant counters that they have maintained compliant rest
5 period policies and practices and provided compliant rest periods in line with those policies. *Ibid.*
6 Defendant further maintains Plaintiffs’ rest period claim is not suited for class certification since
7 individual inquiries would be needed to assess which employees, if any, took non-compliant rest
8 periods, how many rest periods were non-compliant, and the reasons why a particular employee did
9 not take a rest period on a particular shift. *Ibid.*

10 **4. Waiting Time and Wage Statement Penalties**

11 As a result of the unpaid wages and meal and rest period premium wages described above,
12 Plaintiffs contend that Defendant failed to comply with its final pay obligations set forth in Labor
13 Code §§ 201 to 203 to former employees and failed to issue accurate itemized wage statements to
14 Class Members as set forth in Labor Code § 226(a). Sung Decl., ¶ 16. Thus, the claims for waiting
15 time and wage statement penalties are derivative of the underlying claims. *Ibid.*

16 Defendant argues that they possess strong, good faith defenses to Plaintiffs’ underlying
17 claims and these claims cannot meet the willfulness standard in Labor Code § 203 or the knowing
18 and intentional standard in Labor Code § 226(e). Sung Decl., ¶ 17. Notably, Defendant relied on the
19 California Supreme Court decision in *Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc.* (2024) 15 Cal.5th
20 1056, 1065, which held that an employer’s good-faith defenses precludes a “willfulness” finding
21 under Labor Code § 203 and a “knowing and intentional” finding under Labor Code § 226(e) for the
22 imposition of statutory penalties. *Ibid.* Defendant further asserts that Plaintiffs’ waiting time and
23 wage statement penalty exposure was inflated as not every employee experienced the alleged Labor
24 Code violations. *Ibid.*

25 **5. Failure to Reimburse Necessary Business Expenses**

26 Plaintiffs contend they were required to use their personal cellphones to communicate with
27 Defendant via the WeChat app, such as merchandise that would arrive at the warehouse and also to
28 send photos of merchandise to their supervisors and managers. Sung Decl., ¶ 18. In response,

1 Defendant counters that Plaintiffs could have communicated with their supervisors in person and, to
2 the extent anyone used their personal cell phone for communications, they did so out of their own
3 convenience and not because it was necessary to do so. *Ibid.* Defendant further maintains Plaintiffs’
4 reimbursement claim is not suited for class certification since individual inquiries would be needed
5 to assess which employees, if any, used their personal cellphones and whether they were required to
6 use their cellphones. *Ibid.*

7 **6. PAGA Civil Penalties**

8 Plaintiffs further contend that, as a result of the foregoing Labor Code violations, Defendant
9 is liable for civil penalties under the PAGA. Sung Decl., ¶ 19. Since Plaintiffs’ PAGA claims are
10 derivative of Plaintiffs’ underlying wage claims, Defendant asserts the PAGA claim would fail with
11 those claims. *Ibid.*; see *Price v. Starbucks Corp.* (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1147 (“Because the
12 underlying causes of action fail, the derivative UCL and PAGA claims also fail.”).

13 Defendant further maintains that, given their good faith defenses, this Court would exercise
14 its discretion to substantially reduce any PAGA penalties if it were to find Defendant liable for any
15 of Plaintiffs’ claims. Sung Decl., ¶ 19; see Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2); *Thurman v. Bayshore Transit*
16 *Mgmt., Inc.* (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1135 (affirming reduction of PAGA penalties); *Fleming*
17 *v. Covidien Inc.* (C.D. Cal. 2011) Case No. ED CV10-01487 RGK (OPx), 2011 WL 7563047, at *4
18 (reducing PAGA penalties by over 82% in part because employer “not aware” of violations);
19 *Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.* (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 529 (affirming PAGA civil penalty of
20 just \$5 per pay period where employer made “good faith attempts” to comply with the law).

21 **C. DISCOVERY AND MEDIATION**

22 Prior to mediation, the Parties engaged in extensive informal discovery. Sung Decl., ¶ 20.
23 Defendant produced (1) class and PAGA demographic information, including the number of
24 currently and formerly employed Class Members and Aggrieved Employees and Class Workweeks
25 and PAGA Pay Periods; (2) time and payroll records of 150 Class Members which is an
26 approximately 61% sample; (3) Defendant’s employee handbooks, standalone policy documents,
27 and employment agreements; and (4) Plaintiffs’ personnel records, time records, and wage
28 statements. *Ibid.*

1 Plaintiffs submit that the sampling of Class Members' time and payroll records is
2 statistically significant and reliable. *Ibid.* The timekeeping data and payroll data produced for
3 mediation were generated from uniform timekeeping and payroll systems, which allowed Plaintiffs'
4 counsel to extrapolate his and his expert's findings with confidence. *Ibid.* Class Members worked in
5 multiple job positions but were subject to the same wage and hour policies and procedures. *Ibid.*
6 Given these circumstances, the experiences of a subset of employees – the sampling – can be
7 probative as to the experiences of all Class Members. *See e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo*
8 (2016) 136 S.Ct. 1036 (holding that statistical evidence was admissible to prove liability and
9 damages across a class, thereby allowing it to support class certification); *Lubin v. The Wackenhut*
10 *Corp.* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 926, 938 (following *Tyson* and finding that a sampling of class records
11 is probative as to the experience of the entire class).

12 In preparation for mediation, Plaintiffs' counsel worked with an expert data analyst and
13 conducted a comprehensive analysis and extrapolation of the payroll and timekeeping data
14 produced by Defendant to create a detailed exposure analysis for all claims at issue. Sung Decl., ¶
15 21. This discovery and analysis allowed the Parties to assess the merits and value of Plaintiffs'
16 claims, the chances of certification of Plaintiffs' claims, and Defendant's potential defenses. *Ibid.*

17 On August 14, 2025, the Parties participated in a full-day mediation with Tagore
18 Subramaniam, Esq. a well-respected wage and hour class action mediator. Sung Decl., ¶ 22. During
19 mediation, the Parties vigorously debated their opposing legal positions, the likelihood of
20 certification of Plaintiffs' claims, and the legal basis for the claims and defenses. *Ibid.* The Parties
21 reached a tentative class and PAGA settlement at the mediation. *Ibid.* The Parties then finalized the
22 terms of the Settlement and executed Agreement now before the Court. *Ibid*; see Sung Decl., ¶ 22,
23 **Exhibit 1** (Agreement)³.

24 ///

25
26 _____
27 ³ Plaintiffs' individual, non-wage and hour claims were also negotiated and resolved at mediation through Confidential
28 Individual Settlement Agreements. Defendant will lodge the Confidential Individual Settlement Agreements with the
Court for in-camera review or file them under seal if requested by the Court. If the Court requires the Confidential
Individual Settlement Agreements to be filed, Plaintiff will file the agreements..

1 **III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT**

2 **A. ESSENTIAL TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT**

3 If the Court preliminarily approves the Settlement, Defendant will pay a Gross Settlement
4 Amount of \$340,000.00. Agreement, § 1.22 (Ex. 1 to Sung Decl.). Significantly, this Settlement is
5 non-reversionary, and no Class Member will have to submit a claim form to receive an Individual
6 Settlement Payment. Agreement, § 3.1. Each Class Member will automatically receive an
7 Individual Settlement Payment unless they affirmatively opt out of the Settlement. Agreement, §
8 7.5. The monetary terms of the Settlement are summarized below:

Gross Settlement Amount:	\$340,000.00
Minus Court-approved attorneys' fees:	\$113,333.33
Minus Court-approved verified costs (up to):	\$20,000.00
Minus Court-approved Service Payments:	\$10,000.00 (\$5,000 to each
Plaintiff)	
Minus estimated settlement administration costs:	\$9,250.00
Minus amount set aside as PAGA penalties:	\$20,000.00
Net Settlement Amount:	\$167,416.67
Plus 35% "PAGA Penalties" to Aggrieved Employees:	\$7,000.00
Total Amount Paid to Class Members:	\$174,416.67

14
15 Sung Decl., ¶ 23.

16 **1. The Settlement Provides for Reasonable Monetary Payments**

17 After deducting amounts for the Court-approved attorneys' fees and costs, Class
18 Representative Service Payment to Plaintiffs, the amount set aside as PAGA Penalties, and
19 settlement administration costs, the Settlement requires Defendant to pay a Net Settlement Amount
20 of at least **\$167,416.67** to all Class Members who do not timely opt-out. Agreement, § 3.2. The Net
21 Settlement Amount shall be distributed to participating Class Members as Individual Class
22 Payment, calculated by (a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks
23 worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by
24 each Participating Class Member's Workweeks. Agreement, § 3.2.4. Additionally, \$7,000.00 of the
25 Gross Settlement Amount has been designated as Individual PAGA Payments to Aggrieved
26 Employees and shall be distributed to Aggrieved Employees (including those who submit a valid
27 and timely Request for Exclusion from the class action settlement) who were employed during the
28 PAGA Period proportionally based on the number of Pay Periods worked during the PAGA Period.

1 Agreement, §§ 3.2.5, 7.5.4. In addition to the Gross Settlement Amount, Defendant is obligated to
2 pay the employer's share of payroll taxes on Individual Class Payments allocated to settlement of
3 wage claims. Agreement, § 3.1.

4 According to Defendant, there are approximately 244 Class Members. Sung Decl., ¶ 24.
5 Therefore, the average Individual Class Payment from the Net Settlement Amount is projected to be
6 approximately **\$686.13**. *Ibid.* There are also approximately 93 Aggrieved Employees during the
7 PAGA Period who will each receive an average of approximately **\$75.27** as Individual PAGA
8 Payments. *Ibid.* Class Members will have 45 calendar days from the mailing of the Class Notice to
9 opt-out or object to the Settlement, thereby providing ample time to review the Class Notice without
10 unduly delaying the Settlement. Agreement, §§ 1.43, 7.5, 7.7.

11 Effective on the date when Defendant fully fund the Gross Settlement Amount and
12 Employer Taxes, Participating Class Members will release all claims that were alleged, or
13 reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts alleged in the Operative Complaint arising
14 during the Class Period, and all Aggrieved Employees are deemed to release all claims for civil
15 penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (Labor Code §§ 2698, *et seq.*) that were alleged,
16 or reasonably could have been alleged, based on facts alleged in the Operative Complaint and the
17 PAGA Notice arising during the PAGA Period. Agreement, §§ 5, 5.2, 5.3. Defendant shall fund the
18 Gross Settlement Amount no later than 30 days after the Effective Date (i.e., the date the Court
19 enters a Judgment on its Order Granting Final Approval and the Judgment is final). Agreement, §§
20 1.18, 4.3.

21 **2. Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Service Payment, and PAGA Payment**

22 Plaintiffs will apply for Class Representative Service Payments at the time of seeking final
23 approval of the proposed class action settlement in the amount of \$5,000.00 each (totaling
24 \$10,000.00) for Plaintiffs' service to the Class. Agreement, § 3.2.1. "[I]ncentive awards are fairly
25 typical in class action cases . . . and are intended to compensate class representatives for work done
26 on behalf of the class [and] to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the
27 action." *In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1393-94. Plaintiffs'
28 requested Service Payment is intended to recognize the time and effort Plaintiffs expended on

1 behalf of the Class, including providing substantial information and documents to Class Counsel,
2 discussing the claims at issue in the litigation, actively participating in the prosecution of Plaintiffs’
3 claims, as well as the risks Plaintiffs undertook by agreeing to serve as the named plaintiff in this
4 case. *See* Declaration of Edgar Luna Torres (“Torres Decl.”), ¶¶ 4-6; Declaration of Efrain Barrios
5 (“Barrios Decl.”), ¶¶ 4-6.

6 Class Counsel will also apply for an attorneys’ fees award of 33 1/3% of the Gross
7 Settlement Amount, which is equivalent to \$113,333.33, and up to \$20,000.00 in verified costs
8 reimbursement. Agreement, § 3.2.2. The requested fee is fair compensation for undertaking
9 complex, risky, expensive, and time-consuming litigation on a purely contingent fee basis. Sung
10 Decl., ¶ 25. Class Counsel have incurred substantial attorneys’ fees and costs conducting pre-filing
11 investigation, analyzing Plaintiffs’ claims, conducting legal research, conducting informal
12 discovery, analyzing Class Members’ time and payroll records, creating a comprehensive damages
13 model, preparing for and attending mediation, negotiating and preparing the long-form Agreement,
14 preparing this Motion, and otherwise litigating the case. *Ibid.* Class Counsel expect to expend
15 additional attorney time in attending the hearing on this Motion, overseeing the Class Notice
16 process and fielding questions from Class Members, preparing the Final Approval papers, and
17 attending the Final Approval hearing. *Ibid.*

18 California courts recognize that an appropriate method for awarding attorneys’ fees in class
19 actions is to award a percentage of the “common fund” created as a result of a settlement. *See, e.g.,*
20 *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 506 (holding “the percentage of fund method
21 survives in California class action cases”). Class Counsel’s request for fees of 33 1/3% of the Gross
22 Settlement Amount is well within the range of reasonableness and indeed is considered the typical
23 rate for common fund settlements. Historically, courts have awarded percentage fees in the range of
24 20% to 50%, depending on the circumstances of the case. *See* 4 Newberg on Class Actions § 14.6
25 (4th Ed. 2013). Class Counsel submit that their request for attorneys’ fees is reasonable when
26 viewed as an overall percentage of the Settlement and in light of the substantial risks and significant
27 work undertaken, the results obtained, and the efficiency with which the litigation has been
28 conducted. Should the Court grant preliminary approval, Class Counsel will seek an award of

1 attorneys' fees and verified costs upon seeking Final Approval.

2 Additionally, the parties have agreed to designate \$20,000.00 of the Gross Settlement
3 Amount as PAGA civil penalties, of which \$13,000.00 (65%) will be paid to the LWDA, with the
4 remaining \$7,000.00 (35%) for distribution to the Aggrieved Employees pursuant to Labor Code §
5 2699(m) (post-July 1, 2024 PAGA amendment). Agreement, § 3.2.5. Plaintiffs submit this
6 allocation to the LWDA for civil PAGA penalties is appropriate. *See, e.g., Chu v. Wells Fargo*
7 *Investments, LLC* (N.D. Cal. 2011) Case No. C 05-4526 MHP, 2011 WL 672645 at *1 (approving
8 PAGA payment of \$7,500 to LWDA out of \$6.9 million common-fund settlement); *Lazarin v. Pro*
9 *Unlimited, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. 2013) Case No. C11-03609 HRL, 2013 WL 3541217 (approving PAGA
10 payment of \$7,500 to LWDA out of \$1.25 million common-fund settlement).

11 **IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT**

12 **A. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL IS WARRANTED**

13 California Rule of Court 3.769 conditions settlement of a class action on court approval,
14 which is generally evaluated under the federal standards applicable under Rule 23 of the Federal
15 Rules of Civil Procedure. *See Reed v. United Teachers Los Angeles* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 322,
16 337 (Rule 3.769 requires trial court to determine “that the settlement is fair, reasonable and
17 adequate to all concerned”); *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir. 1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (Rule
18 23(e) requires the trial court to determine “whether a proposed settlement is fundamentally fair,
19 adequate, and reasonable”). Settlement is the preferred means of dispute resolution, particularly in
20 complex class action litigation. *See In re Syncor ERISA Litig* (9th Cir. 2008) 516 F.3d 1095, 1101.
21 The Court’s role in evaluating a proposed settlement is limited to ensuring that the agreement taken
22 as a whole is fair. *See e.g., Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1027. There is an initial presumption of fairness
23 where, as here, the Settlement was negotiated at arm’s-length by class counsel and with the
24 assistance of an experienced wage and hour class action mediator. *See e.g., Kullar v. Foot Locker*
25 *Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 130.

26 To make a fairness determination, the Court should consider “the strength of Plaintiffs’ case,
27 the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class
28 action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and

1 the stage of the proceedings, [and] the experience and views of counsel.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*
2 (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801. “The list of factors is not exclusive, and the court is free to
3 engage in a balancing and weighing of the factors depending on the circumstances of each case.”
4 *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 230, 245. Here, the proposed Settlement is
5 fair, adequate, and reasonable in light of the overall balance of factors in this case.

6 **1. The Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case and Risk, Expense, Complexity, and**
7 **Duration of Further Litigation**

8 Although Plaintiffs maintain that Plaintiffs’ claims are meritorious, Plaintiffs acknowledge
9 that there were substantial risks and uncertainty in proceeding with litigation. As described above,
10 Defendant denied Plaintiffs’ claims and presented multiple defenses to Plaintiffs’ claims, both on
11 the merits and with respect to class certification. Thus, while Plaintiffs were prepared to litigate
12 these claims through class certification and ultimately trial, success was far from certain. Although
13 the Parties engaged in significant informal discovery prior to mediation, the Parties still had
14 significant formal discovery to complete if the Action did not resolve. Sung Decl., ¶ 26. This would
15 have required the expenditure of substantial time and resources by both Parties that would have very
16 likely spanned several years. *Ibid.* Even if Plaintiffs were to certify the class, the Parties would incur
17 considerably more attorneys’ fees and costs through a possible decertification motion, trial, and
18 possible appeal. *Ibid.* This Settlement avoids those risks and the accompanying expense. *Ibid.*

19 Plaintiffs have not yet filed a motion for class certification, and as such, the extent to which
20 Plaintiffs’ proposed classes were certifiable is somewhat speculative. Absent settlement, there was a
21 risk that there would not be a certified class at the time of trial, or if there were, it would consist of a
22 significantly smaller group of employees than the proposed Class due to a narrowing of the class
23 definition in a Court order on a contested motion for class certification or through executing a *Pick-*
24 *Up-Stix* strategy by buying releases from Class Members. Sung Decl., ¶ 27. Thus, this factor, too,
25 supports preliminary approval of the settlement.

26 **2. Amount Offered in Settlement Given Realistic Value of Claims**

27 The Settlement provides a positive recovery for the Class in the face of disputed claims.
28 Plaintiffs conducted a detailed analysis of alleged unpaid wages and meal and rest period premium

1 payments owing, wage statement penalties, waiting time penalties, and PAGA civil penalties. A
2 summary of the results of Plaintiffs' exposure analysis are discussed below:

3 Unpaid Wages Due to Off-the-Clock Work: **\$152,617.50**

4 Plaintiffs allege that they frequently worked off the clock during their meal breaks at the
5 instruction of their supervisors. Sung Decl., ¶ 28. Any off-the-clock work would not be reflected in
6 the time records. *Ibid.* Thus, estimating that Class Members on average worked 2 hours off the
7 clock each week, at a \$19.95 average hourly rate and extrapolating to approximately 10,200
8 workweeks, Plaintiffs estimate Defendant's maximum exposure for unpaid wages, including
9 overtime, to be approximately \$610,470.00. *Ibid.*

10 As discussed above, Defendant argues that an off-the-clock work class is not certifiable
11 because it maintained complaint policies and paid a significant amount of overtime and meal period
12 premiums. *Ibid.* Thus, Plaintiffs discounted Defendant's maximum exposure by 50% to account for
13 the risk of non-certification and an additional 50% to account for Defendant's defenses on the
14 merits or failing to recover the full amount sought to arrive at an estimated realistic recovery of
15 approximately **\$152,617.50**. *Ibid.*

16 Meal Period Violations: **\$61,810.09**

17 Plaintiffs contend that Class Members often were unable to take meal breaks because of
18 operational needs. Sung Decl., ¶ 29. Plaintiffs' counsel's expert data analyst found, of 30,823 shifts
19 analyzed, 5.57% of shifts had a first missed meal period; 10.40% of shifts had a late first meal
20 period; 0.70% of shifts had a short first meal period; 10.86% of shifts had a missed second meal
21 period; 0.49% of shifts had a short second meal period; after applying meal period premiums,
22 18.22% of shifts had a true meal period violation; and on average, there is 0.81 meal period
23 violation per workweek. *Ibid.* At an average hourly rate of \$19.95 and extrapolated across
24 approximately 10,200 workweeks, Plaintiffs estimate Defendant's maximum exposure for meal
25 period violations to be approximately \$164,826.90. *Ibid.*

26 As discussed above, Defendant denies Plaintiffs' allegations and counters that it has
27 maintained compliant written meal period policies during the Class Period; provided compliant
28 meal periods in line with those policies; and paid a significant amount of meal period premiums.

1 *Ibid.* As such, Defendant maintains Plaintiffs' meal period claim is not suited for class certification
2 since individual inquiries would be needed to assess which employees, if any, took non-compliant
3 meal periods, how many meal periods were non-compliant, and the reasons why a particular
4 employee did not take a meal period on a particular shift and a meal period premium was not paid.
5 *Ibid.* Thus, Plaintiffs discounted Defendant's maximum exposure by 25% to account for the risk of
6 non-certification, and an additional 50% to account for Defendant's defenses on the merits or failing
7 to recover the full amount sought, to arrive at an estimated realistic recovery of approximately
8 **\$61,810.09. *Ibid.***

9 **Rest Period Violations: \$50,872.50**

10 Plaintiffs contend that Class Members often were unable to take rest breaks because of
11 operational needs. Sung Decl., ¶ 30. Any instances of rest period violations would not be reflected
12 in the records. *Ibid.* Estimating two rest period violation per workweek (40% violation rate) and
13 extrapolated across 10,200 workweeks and an average hourly rate of \$19.95, Plaintiffs estimate
14 Defendant's maximum exposure for rest period violations to be approximately \$406,980.00. *Ibid.*

15 As discussed above, Defendant denies Plaintiff's allegations and counters that any potential
16 classwide damages must be significantly reduced because it has compliant policies and practices
17 regarding rest periods and that a class cannot be certified due to individualized issues. *Ibid.* Thus,
18 Plaintiffs discounted Defendant's maximum exposure by 70% to account for the risk of non-
19 certification, and an additional 50% to account for Defendant's defenses on the merits or failing to
20 recover the full amount sought, to arrive at an estimated realistic recovery of approximately
21 **\$50,872.50.**

22 **Waiting Time Penalties: \$98,247.52**

23 As a result of the unpaid wages and meal and rest period premiums described above,
24 Plaintiffs contend that Defendant failed to comply with its final pay obligations set forth in Labor
25 Code §§ 201 to 203 to former employees. Sung Decl., ¶ 31. There are approximately 206 former
26 employees during the 3-year limitations period, and estimating a 50% violation rate, and at each
27 former employee's hourly rate and a shift length of 8.5 hours per day, Plaintiffs estimate
28 Defendant's maximum exposure for waiting time penalties to be approximately \$523,986.75. *Ibid.*

1 Defendant denied Plaintiffs' claims and presented several defenses, including that because
2 they possessed good-faith defenses to the underlying wage claims, any failure to pay wages was not
3 "willful" as a matter of law; Plaintiffs' waiting time penalty exposure was grossly inflated as not
4 every former employee experienced the alleged Labor Code violations; and because the waiting
5 time claim is derivative of Plaintiffs' underlying wage claims, Plaintiffs would need to overcome
6 Defendant's defenses, both as to class certification and on the merits, as to the underlying claims.
7 *Ibid.* Thus, Plaintiffs discounted Defendant's maximum exposure by 25% to account for the risk of
8 non-certification and an additional 75% to account for Defendant's defenses on the merits or failing
9 to recover the full amount sought, to arrive at an estimated realistic recovery of approximately
10 **\$98,247.52. *Ibid.***

11 Wage Statement Penalties: **\$32,718.75**

12 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant is liable for wage statement penalties as a result of the
13 unpaid wages and meal and rest period premiums. Sung Decl., ¶ 32. Those penalties are calculated
14 as \$50 for each "initial" violation and \$100 for each "subsequent" violation, with a maximum of
15 \$4,000 per employee. Lab. Code § 226(e). There are approximately 2,407 pay periods during the
16 one-year limitations period, and estimating a 50% violation rate and at \$50 for the first pay period
17 and \$100 for each subsequent pay period, Plaintiffs estimate Defendant's maximum exposure for
18 wage statement penalties are approximately \$118,025.00. *Ibid.*

19 As discussed above, Defendant denied Plaintiffs' claims and presented several defenses,
20 most notably their assertion that because they possessed good-faith defenses to the underlying
21 claims for meal and rest period violations and any failure to pay wages was not "knowing and
22 intentional" as a matter of law and because the wage statement claim is derivative of Plaintiffs'
23 underlying wage claims, Plaintiffs would need to overcome Defendant's defenses, both as to class
24 certification and on the merits, as to his underlying claims. *Ibid.* Thus, Plaintiffs discounted
25 Defendant's maximum exposure by 25% to account for the risk of non-certification and an
26 additional 75% to account for Defendant's defenses on the merits or failing to recover the full
27 amount sought, to arrive at an estimated realistic recovery of approximately **\$32,718.75. *Ibid.***

28 ///

1 Failure to Reimburse Necessary Business Expenses: \$12,750.00

2 Plaintiffs contend they were required to use their personal cellphones to communicate with
3 and send photos to their supervisors. Sung Decl., ¶ 33. At an estimated weekly reimbursement rate
4 of \$5 and extrapolated over 10,200 workweeks, Plaintiffs estimate Defendant's maximum exposure
5 for unreimbursed business expenses is \$51,000.00. *Ibid.* As discussed above, Defendant denies
6 Plaintiffs' claims and counters that Plaintiffs could have communicated with their supervisors in
7 person and to the extent anyone used their personal cell phone that they did so out of their own
8 convenience and doing so was not required, and further contends that this claim is not certifiable
9 due to numerous individualized inquiries. *Ibid.* Thus, Plaintiffs discounted Defendant's maximum
10 exposure by 50% to account for the risk of non-certification and an additional 50% to account for
11 Defendant's defenses on the merits or failing to recover the full amount sought, to arrive at an
12 estimated realistic recovery of approximately **\$12,750.00**. *Ibid.*

13 PAGA Penalties: \$48,140.00

14 Plaintiffs estimate a maximum total PAGA exposure of approximately \$240,700.00 (2,407
15 pay periods during the PAGA Period x \$100 "initial" penalty). Sung Decl., ¶ 34; *Amaral v. Cintas*
16 *Corp. No. 2* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1207 (finding "initial" violation rate applies until
17 employer is notified that it is violating a Labor Code provision). However, these penalties derive
18 from the underlying wage and hour violations discussed above, which Defendant disputes
19 vigorously. Sung Decl., ¶ 34; *see e.g., Green v. Lawrence Service Co.* (C.D. Cal. 2013) 2013 WL
20 3907506, *5, n.5 (explaining that a PAGA claim's success was determined by the merits of its
21 underlying claims). Defendant also assert that the Court would drastically reduce any award of
22 PAGA penalties as "confiscatory." Sung Decl., ¶ 33 *see also Thurman*, 203 Cal.App.4th at 1135
23 (affirming reduction of PAGA penalties); *Fleming*, 2011 WL 7563047, at *4 (reducing PAGA
24 penalties from \$2.8 million to \$500,000). Therefore, Plaintiffs discounted the maximum figure by
25 80% for the risk of losing on the merits and/or not recovering a PAGA penalty for each and every
26 pay period and to account for the possibility of this Court reducing penalties, to arrive at an
27 estimated exposure of approximately **\$48,140.00**. Sung Decl., ¶ 33.

28 ///

1 Conclusion

2 Using these estimated figures for each of the claims described above, Plaintiffs predicted
3 that the potential realistic recovery for the Class would be approximately **\$446,567.29**. Sung Decl.,
4 ¶ 35. The proposed Settlement of \$340,000.00 represents approximately **76.14%** of the reasonably
5 forecasted recovery for the Class. *Ibid*. Preliminary approval is appropriate since the Settlement will
6 provide significant monetary relief to the Class, which is consistent with what Plaintiffs’ counsel
7 believes could have been recovered had the case proceeded through trial. *Ibid*.

8 **3. The Experience and Views of Counsel**

9 “Parties represented by competent counsel are better positioned than courts to produce a
10 settlement that fairly reflects each party’s expected outcome in litigation.” In *In re Pacific*
11 *Enterprises Securities Litigation* (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 373, 378. Here, Plaintiffs are represented
12 by competent, experienced counsel who possess extensive experience prosecuting and defending
13 wage-and-hour class actions and who have been appointed as class counsel. *See* Sung Decl., ¶¶ 2-7;
14 Declaration of Tiffany L. Luu (“Luu Decl.”), ¶¶ 2-6. Plaintiffs’ counsel conducted an in-depth
15 review of class records and drew on their extensive experience in similar cases to assess the
16 strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ case. The Settlement was also reached with the assistance of
17 an experienced and respected wage-and-hour class action mediator. Sung Decl., ¶ 22. This factor
18 strongly supports preliminary approval of the Settlement. *See Kullar*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 130.

19 **4. The Preliminary Approval Standard Is Met**

20 At this stage, the Court can grant preliminary approval of the Settlement and direct that
21 notice be given if the proposed Settlement: (1) falls within the range of possible approval; (2)
22 appears to be the product of serious, informed, and non-collusive negotiations; and (3) has no
23 obvious deficiencies. *See* Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.41(3rd Ed. 1995); 4 Newberg on
24 Class Actions § 11:24-25 (4th Ed. 2013).

25 The proposed Settlement reflects approximately **76.14%** of the estimated recovery the Class
26 could reasonably expect in light of the significant litigation risks and will provide tangible,
27 substantial monetary compensation for hotly disputed claims. Indeed, the percentage of the liability
28 exposure recovered in this case far exceeds percentages routinely approved by courts. *See, e.g.,*

1 *Glass v. UBS Finan. Servs.* (N.D. Cal. 2007) Case No. C-06-4068 MMC, 2007 WL 221862, *4
2 (approving settlement representing 25% to 35% of potential damages); *Dunleavy v. Nadler* (9th Cir.
3 2000) 213 F.3d 454, 459 (approving settlement representing about one-sixth of potential recovery);
4 *Nat'l Rural Telecomm. Coop. v. DirecTV, Inc.* (C.D. Cal. 2004) 221 F.R.D. 523, 527 (“it is well-
5 settled law that a proposed settlement may be acceptable even though it amounts to only a fraction
6 of the potential recovery that might be available to the Class Members at trial”). The average
7 Individual Class Payment of approximately **\$686.13** far exceeds average payments achieved in
8 other wage and hour class action settlements.⁴ Thus, the proposed settlement is within the range of
9 possible approval, such that notice should be provided to the Class Members so that they can
10 consider the Settlement. The Court will have the opportunity to again assess the reasonableness of
11 the Settlement after the Class Members have had the opportunity to opt-out or object.

12 The Settlement resulted from an exchange of substantial information, arm’s-length
13 negotiations by counsel, a full-day mediation before an experienced wage and hour mediator, and
14 additional months of negotiating the long-form settlement agreement. Thus, the Settlement is
15 entitled to an initial presumption of fairness. *See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 130. As
16 discussed above, Plaintiffs carefully vetted the claims at issue, analyzed extensive sampling time
17 and payroll data, and conducted a detailed damages analysis to arrive at the estimated class-wide
18 damages figures. *See Sung Decl.*, ¶¶ 28-35. Thus, this factor supports preliminary approval.

19 Preliminary approval of the Settlement is also warranted because there are no obvious
20 deficiencies. The Settlement will provide substantial monetary relief to the Class. The amounts
21 proposed for Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fees and costs, LWDA payment, and Plaintiffs’ Class
22
23

24 ⁴ *See e.g., Bercea v. AE Retail West*, Case No. 34-2012-00123947 (Sacramento County Super. Ct. May 9,
25 2012) (average recovery of approximately \$105); *Ressler v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.*, Case No.
26 BC335018 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2009) (average recovery of approximately \$90); *Palencia*
27 *v. 99 Cents Only Stores*, Case No. 34-2010-00079619 (Sacramento County Super. Ct.) (average recovery of
28 approximately \$80); *Doty v. Costco Wholesale Corp.*, Case No. CV05-3241 FMC-JWJx (C.D. Cal. May 14,
2007) (average recovery of approximately \$65); *Lim v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc.*, Case No. 04CC00213
(Orange County Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2006) (average net recovery of approximately \$35); *Gomez v. Amadeus*
Salon, Inc., Case No. BC392297 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. July 23, 2010) (average net recovery of
approximately \$20); *Sorenson v. PetSmart, Inc.*, Case No. 2:06-CV-02674-JAM-DAD (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17,
2008) (wage and hour class action settlement approved where average recovery was approximately \$60).

Representative Service Payment, are all reasonable and appropriate based on the facts of this case. Because the Settlement is devoid of obvious deficiencies, this factor supports preliminary approval.

B. THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY THE CLASS

The Class satisfies the criteria for certification of a settlement class under California law because: (1) the Class is so numerous that joinder would be impractical; (2) common questions of law and fact predominate over individual questions such that class certification is the most efficient and desirable way to maintain this litigation; (3) Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of absent Class Members; and (4) Plaintiffs and Class Counsel will fairly and adequately represent Class Members' interest. *See* Code Civ. Proc. § 382.

A class is "ascertainable" where the members "may be readily identified without unreasonable expense or time by reference to official [or business] records." *See Sevidal v. Target Corp.* (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 905, 916 (alterations in original). Here, the Class is defined as "all current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant within the State of California during the Class Period." Therefore, Class Members can be identified from Defendant's personnel and employment records. Defendant represents that the Class consists of approximately 244 current and former non-exempt employees. *Sung Decl.*, ¶ 24. It would therefore be impracticable to bring all Class Members before the Court or for each Class Member to bring an individual lawsuit. Thus, the proposed Class satisfies numerosity. *See, e.g., Bowles v. Superior Court* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574 (holding a class representing 10 beneficiaries of a trust sufficiently numerous).

The focus in a certification dispute is not on the merits but rather on what types of questions, "common or individual," are likely to arise in the Action. *See Sav-On Drug Store, Inc. v. Superior Court (Rocher)* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 327. Plaintiffs' claims are predicated on, among other issues, Defendant's uniform policy and practice regarding provision of meal periods, regular rate of pay, timekeeping, and provision of wage statements and final wages. These types of claims are commonly held to be proper for class certification. *See e.g., Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc.* (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 701, 726 (certifying meal and rest period claims); *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 324 (certifying exemption misclassification and unpaid overtime claim).

1 The typicality requirement is satisfied where class representatives have claims that are
2 typical of those of the rest of the class. *B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.* (1987) 191
3 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1347 (finding typicality satisfied where named Plaintiffs purchased the same
4 goods as the putative class in a consumer class action). Here, Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those
5 held by the Class Members. First, Defendant employed Plaintiffs as non-exempt employee during
6 the Class Period, and Plaintiffs were subject to Defendant's wage and hour policies at issue in this
7 case. Torres Decl., ¶¶ 2-3; Barrios Decl., ¶¶ 2-3. Second, Plaintiffs were injured by the same
8 challenged policies/practices that allegedly injured the Class as a whole: meal/rest period violations,
9 off-the-clock work, and derivative statutory and civil penalties. Torres Decl., ¶ 3; Barrios Decl., ¶ 3.
10 Because Plaintiffs have suffered the same injuries as the other members of the Class, the typicality
11 requirement is satisfied.

12 The adequacy requirement examines conflicts of interest between named parties and the
13 class(es) they seek to represent. *See Capital People First v. State Dept. of Developmental Services*
14 (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 676, 697. Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' counsel will adequately represent the
15 Class, as there are no conflicts between Plaintiffs and the proposed Class, and Plaintiffs possess
16 claims that are in line with those of the Class. Sung Decl., ¶ 35; Torres Decl., ¶ 5; Barrios Decl., ¶ 5;
17 *see McGhee v. Bank of America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450-51 (adequacy satisfied where there
18 was no indication that Class Counsel were not qualified and the named plaintiff had no interests
19 antagonistic to those of the proposed class). Class Counsel also have extensive experience in wage
20 and hour class action litigation. *See* Sung Decl., ¶¶ 2-7; Luu Decl., ¶¶ 2-6.

21 C. THE COURT SHOULD ORDER DISTRIBUTION OF THE CLASS NOTICE

22 This Court should order distribution to the Class of the proposed Class Notice by U.S. Mail,
23 postage prepaid using the last known mailing address information provided by Defendant. *See*
24 Agreement, §§ 1.8, 7.4.2, **Exhibit A** (Class Notice). The Class Notice will be distributed in English,
25 Spanish, and Simplified Chinese. Agreement, § 1.11. This manner of giving notice is the "best
26 notice practicable" under the circumstances because it provides "individual notice to all members
27 who can be identified through reasonable effort." *See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin* (1974) 417 U.S.
28 156, 173. Here, the Parties have agreed that the Settlement be administered by Phoenix Settlement

Administrators (“Administrator”), an experienced class action settlement administrator. *See generally* Declaration of Jodey Lawrence (“Administrator Decl.”) and attached exhibits. Class Members’ addresses will be ascertainable through Defendant’s personnel and payroll records, which Defendant will provide to the Administrator within 30 days of preliminary approval of the Settlement. Agreement, § 4.2. Within 14 days of receipt of the Class Members’ addresses, the Administrator will run the names of all Class Members through the National Change of Address database to update addresses and mail the Class Notice to all Class Members. Agreement, § 7.4.2. To the extent that any notices are returned, the Administrator will perform a “skip trace” to track any Class Member’s current mailing address and remail the notice within 3 business days. Agreement, § 7.4.3.

The content of the proposed Class Notice satisfies California Rule of Court 3.766(d) because it advises Class Members of the nature of the claims, basic contentions and denials of the parties, and the key terms of the Settlement, the 45-day deadline to opt-out or object to the Settlement and the procedures by which to do so, explains the recovery formula and expected recovery amount for each Class Member, and advises them that they will be bound by the terms of the Agreement if they do not opt-out. *See* Agreement, **Exhibit A** (Class Notice). The proposed Class Notice will also notify Class Members of the final approval hearing date and provides the Class contact information for Class Counsel and advises Class Members that they may enter an appearance through counsel if they wish to. *Ibid.* This manner of giving notice satisfies California Rule of Court 3.766(e) as the most reliable and cost-effective method of reaching Class Members.

D. THE COURT SHOULD SET A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING

Finally, this Court should set a hearing for Final Approval of the Settlement on a date appropriately scheduled to follow the deadline by which Class Members must file objections to the Settlement or opt-out. *See* California Rule of Court 3.769.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, provisionally certify the Class, and enter the Proposed Order submitted concurrently herewith.

1 DATED: October 30, 2025

JUSTICE FOR WORKERS, P.C.

2
3 By:



4 William C. Sung

5 Tiffany L. Luu

6 Attorneys for Plaintiffs EDGAR LUNA TORRES
7 and EFRAIN BARRIOS
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28