

1 **BIBIYAN LAW GROUP, P.C.**

2 Vedang J. Patel (SBN 328647)

3 *vedang@tomorrowlaw.com*

4 Keaton D. Mendoza (SBN 321172)

5 *kmendoza@tomorrowlaw.com*

6 1460 Westwood Boulevard

7 Los Angeles, California 90024

8 Tel: (310) 438-5555; Fax: (310) 300-1705

9 Attorneys for Plaintiff, FIDENCIO PEREZ, an individual and on behalf of all others similarly  
10 situated and aggrieved

11 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

12 **FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES- SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE**

13 FIDENCIO PEREZ, an individual and on  
14 behalf of all others similarly situated and  
15 aggrieved,

16 Plaintiff,

17 v.

18 CALO COSTA MESA LLC, a California  
19 limited liability company; CALO LAGUNA  
20 NIGUEL, LLC, a California limited liability  
21 company; CALO EL SEGUNDO LLC, a  
22 California limited liability company; and  
23 DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,  
24 Defendants.

Case No.: 24STCV18135

[Assigned for All Purposes to the Hon. Laura  
A. Seigle in Dept. 17]

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION  
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY  
APPROVAL OF CLASS AND  
REPRESENTATIVE ACTION  
SETTLEMENT AND PROVISIONAL  
CLASS CERTIFICATION FOR  
SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY;  
DECLARATIONS OF VEDANG J.  
PATEL, DAVID D. BIBIYAN,  
FIDENCIO PEREZ AND SEAN  
HARTRANFT IN SUPPORT THEREOF**

HEARING INFORMATION:

DATE: July 2, 2026

TIME: 9:00 a.m.

DEPT: 17

1 **TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

2 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on July, 2, 2026 at : 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as they  
3 may be heard in Department 17 of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of  
4 Los Angeles – Spring Street Courthouse, plaintiff Fidencio Perez ("Plaintiff"), on behalf of himself  
5 and all others similarly situated and aggrieved, will and hereby do move this Court for entry of an  
6 Order:

7 1. Preliminarily certifying the following settlement class ("Settlement Class," "Settlement  
8 Class Members" or "Class Members") for the purpose of settlement only: all non-exempt employees  
9 employed by Defendants Calo Costa Mesa LLC; Calo Laguna Niguel, LLC; and Calo El Segundo  
10 LLC in California during the period from July 19, 2020 through September 5, 2025 ("Class Period").

11 2. Preliminarily approving Plaintiff as Class Representative.

12 3. Preliminarily approving David D. Bibiyan, and Vedang J. Patel of Bibiyan Law Group,  
13 P.C., as Class Counsel.

14 4. Preliminarily approving the settlement claims under the terms set forth in the Settlement  
15 Agreement.

16 5. Preliminarily approving payment of the Gross Settlement Amount of \$475,000.00, which  
17 is subject to escalation pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.

18 6. Approving the form and content of the Class Notice submitted herewith.

19 7. Appointing Apex Class Action LLC ("Administrator" or "Apex") to administer the  
20 Settlement, including distribution of the Class Notice, as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

21 8. Preliminarily approving the payment of not to exceed \$6,500.00 for settlement  
22 administration to Apex from the Gross Settlement Amount.

23 9. Preliminarily approving a service award of up to \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff, in consideration  
24 for Plaintiff's extensive efforts in prosecuting this case.

25 10. Preliminarily approving payment of reasonable attorneys' fees to Class Counsel in the  
26 amount of up to 35% of the Gross Settlement Amount which, unless escalated pursuant to the  
27 Settlement Agreement, amounts to \$166,250.00

28 11. Preliminarily approving reimbursement of Class Counsel's costs in an amount, according

1 to proof, not to exceed \$25,000.00.

2 12. Preliminarily approving PAGA penalties in the amount of \$47,500.00, seventy-five percent  
3 (75%) or \$35,625.00 of which will be paid to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency  
4 ("LWDA") out of the Gross Settlement Amount, and twenty-five percent (25%) or \$11,875.00 of  
5 which will be distributed to "Aggrieved Employees," defined as all non-exempt employees  
6 employed by Defendants Calo Costa Mesa LLC; Calo Laguna Niguel, LLC; and Calo El Segundo  
7 LLC at any time during the period from June 27, 2023 through September 5, 2025 ("PAGA Period").

8 13. Entering an Order preliminarily approving the Settlement consistent with the terms of the  
9 Settlement Agreement.

10 14. Good cause exists for granting this Motion in that the proposed settlement is fair,  
11 reasonable and adequate.

12 15. This Motion will be based on this Notice of Motion, the Memorandum of Points and  
13 Authorities filed herewith, the Declarations of Vedang J. Patel, David D. Bibiyan, Fidencio Perez,  
14 and Sean Hartranft, and exhibits attached thereto, arguments of counsel and upon such other  
15 materials contained in the file and pleadings of this action.

16  
17 Dated: May 4, 2026

BIBIYAN LAW GROUP, P.C.

18 */s/ Vedang J. Patel*

19 \_\_\_\_\_  
VEDANG J. PATEL

20 Attorneys for Plaintiff, FIDENCIO PEREZ, on behalf  
21 of himself and all others similarly situated and  
22 aggrieved  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiff Fidencio Perez ("Plaintiff"), on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated  
4 and aggrieved, hereby applies for preliminary approval of the Class and PAGA Settlement  
5 Agreement ("Settlement," "Agreement" or "Settlement Agreement") upon the terms and  
6 conditions set forth in the Settlement Agreement, attached to the Declaration of Vedang J. Patel  
7 as Exhibit "1."

8 On July 19, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint alleging against  
9 defendants Calo Costa Mesa LLC; Calo Laguna Niguel, LLC; and Calo El Segundo LLC  
10 (collectively, "Defendants") for: (1) failure to pay overtime wages; (2) failure to pay minimum  
11 wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to provide rest periods; (5) waiting time  
12 penalties; (6) wage statement violations; (7) failure to timely pay wages; (8) failure to indemnify;  
13 (9) violation of Labor Code section 227.3; and (10) unfair competition (the "Action").

14 On June 27, 2024, Plaintiff Fidencio Perez filed with the LWDA and served on Defendants  
15 a notice under Labor Code section 2699.3, stating Plaintiff intended to serve as a proxy of the  
16 LWDA to recover civil penalties on behalf of non-exempt employees for alleged Labor Code  
17 violations (PAGA Notice"). A true and correct copy of the PAGA Notice is attached to the  
18 Declaration of Vedang J. Patel as Exhibit "2."

19 On August 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint in the Action adding a  
20 cause of action under PAGA for the alleged violations of the Labor Code set forth in the PAGA  
21 Notice, constituting the operative complaint in the Action (the "Operative Complaint").

22 Thereafter, Plaintiff and Defendants (collectively, the "Parties") agreed to exchange  
23 informal discovery and attend mediation.

24 Prior to mediation, Plaintiff obtained, through informal discovery: (1) time and payroll  
25 records for 26.7% of Class Members; (2) a class list of hire dates, termination dates, and rates of  
26 pay for all Class Members; (3) wage and hour policy documents; and (4) all documents concerning  
27 Plaintiff available to Defendants. Plaintiff's investigation was sufficient to satisfy the criteria for  
28

1 court approval set forth in *Dunk v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1801 and  
2 Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal. App. 4th 116, 129-130 (Dunk/Kullar).

3 On June 5, 2025, the Parties participated in an all-day mediation presided over by Monique  
4 Ngo-Bonnici, Esq., which led to the Agreement to settle the Action.

### 5 **THE SETTLEMENT**

6 Subject to Court approval pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and California  
7 Rules of Court, rule 3.679, *et seq.*, the Parties have agreed to settle the Action by agreement upon  
8 the terms and conditions and for the consideration set forth in the Settlement Agreement, a copy  
9 of which is attached to the Declaration of Vedang J. Patel as Exhibit "1" thereto. A summary of  
10 the terms of the settlement are as follows:

11 Defendants will stipulate, for purpose of this settlement only, as follows:

- 12 • Certification of a class ("Settlement Class," "Settlement Class Members" or "Class  
13 Members") defined as: non-exempt employees employed by Defendants Calo Costa  
14 Mesa LLC; Calo Laguna Niguel, LLC; and Calo El Segundo LLC in California during  
15 the period from July 19, 2020 through September 5, 2025 ("Class Period").
- 16 • Defendant will pay \$475,000.00 ("Gross Settlement Amount") to resolve the matter.
- 17 • The Parties estimate that there are approximately 10,000 PAGA Pay Periods worked  
18 by non-exempt hourly employees of Defendants in California during PAGA Period  
19 (from June 27, 2023, to June 5, 2025). Should the actual number of PAGA Pay Periods  
20 worked by this group of people during the PAGA Period increase beyond 10%,  
21 Defendants shall have the option of (1) increasing the Gross Settlement Amount by the  
22 percentage increase in the number of PAGA Pay Periods worked by the Aggrieved  
23 Employees above 10% (e.g. if the number of PAGA Pay Periods increases by 11%, the  
24 Total Settlement Amount will increase by 1%); or (2) rolling back the end of the Class  
25 and PAGA Release periods to the date in which 11,000 pay periods is met. Defendant  
26 shall make its election no later than 30 days following full execution of this Agreement.  
27 Should Defendant fail to make its election within that timeframe, option (2) shall be  
28 presumed chosen.

- Defendant will pay the employer's share of taxes separate and apart from the Gross Settlement Amount.
- This is a non-reversionary settlement.
- Class Members will be paid their pro rata share of the class action settlement based on the total number of Pay Periods <sup>1</sup> worked during the Class Period.
- The Settlement Administration costs, estimated not to exceed \$6,500.00, will be paid out of the Gross Settlement Amount.
- Class Counsel, comprised of David D. Bibiyan and Vedang J. Patel of Bibiyan Law Group, P.C., may apply for, and Defendants will not oppose, attorneys' fees of up to 35% of the Gross Settlement Amount, which, unless escalated pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, amounts to \$166,250.00, and actual costs, not to exceed \$25,000.00, all of which will be paid out of the Gross Settlement Amount.
- Class Counsel hereby apply for, and Defendants will not oppose, a service award of up to \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff, Fidencio Perez, which will be paid out of the Gross Settlement Amount.
- "Aggrieved Employees" means all current and former non-exempt employees employed by Defendants Calo Costa Mesa LLC; Calo Laguna Niguel, LLC; and Calo El Segundo LLC in California at any time during the period from June 27, 2023 through September 5, 2025 ("PAGA Period").
- Defendants have agreed to pay \$47,500.00 as PAGA penalties, seventy-five percent (75%) or \$35,625.00 of which will be paid to the LWDA out of the Gross Settlement Amount, and twenty-five percent (25%) or \$11,875.00 of which will be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees.
- For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date (i.e., 180 days after the date of mailing) the Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such checks

---

<sup>1</sup> "Pay Period" means any pay period during which a Class Member worked for Defendants, for at least one day during the Class Period, based on hire dates, re-hire dates (as applicable), and termination dates (as applicable).

1 to the California State Controller's Office, Unclaimed Property Fund.

2 **II. THE TWO-STEP APPROVAL PROCESS AND THE PRESUMPTION OF**  
3 **FAIRNESS**

4 Any settlement of class litigation must be reviewed and approved by the Court. (*See* Cal.  
5 Rules of Court, rule 3.769). This is done in two steps: (1) an early (preliminary) review by the  
6 trial court; and (2) a final review after notice has been distributed to the class members for their  
7 comment or objections. (*See id.*). Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the  
8 negotiation of a settlement unless evidence to the contrary is offered. In short, there is a  
9 presumption that the negotiations were conducted in good faith. (Newberg on Class Actions, §  
10 11.51; *In re Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability*  
11 *Litigation* (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2017) No. 16-cv-00295, 2017 WL 2214655, quoting *United States*  
12 *v. Oregon* (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1990) 913 F.2d 576, 580.)

13 **III. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS**

14 A notice of settlement of a class action "must contain an explanation of the proposed  
15 settlement and procedures for class members to follow in filing written objections to it and in  
16 arranging to appear at the settlement hearing and state any objections to the proposed settlement."  
17 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769, subd. (f).)

18 Attached to the Declaration of Vedang J. Patel as Exhibit "1" thereto is the Settlement  
19 Agreement between the Parties. Attached to the Settlement Agreement as internal Exhibit "A" is the  
20 proposed Class Notice to be distributed to Class Members in English and Spanish. The proposed  
21 Class Notice satisfies these requirements.

22 The Parties respectfully request that this Court approve the above-referenced Class Notice  
23 and dissemination of the Class Notice to the Class Members, consistent with the manner and timing  
24 as set forth in the Settlement Agreement. The Parties have agreed to use Apex Class Action LLC  
25 ("Apex"), an experienced Settlement Administrator, to administer the settlement.

26 ///

27 ///

28 ///

1           **IV. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR AND REASONABLE BASED UPON**  
2           **OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE**

3           **A. The Settlement was Negotiated at Arm's-Length and is not Collusive**

4           The Settlement that has been reached, subject to this Court's approval, is a product of  
5 substantial efforts by the Parties and their counsel. The Settlement was reached after extensive  
6 factual and legal investigation and research; the exchange of informal discovery; substantial  
7 negotiation regarding the scope of informal discovery; exchange of documents and information that  
8 included review of time and pay records and analysis thereof with the aid of Plaintiffs and expert  
9 consultant; analysis of shifts and Workweeks worked by Class Members in the Class Period, analysis  
10 of the number of pay periods and number of Aggrieved Employees in the PAGA Period for  
11 calculating PAGA penalties, number of Class Members eligible for wage statement penalties and  
12 waiting time penalties; an analysis of Defendant's financial ability to fund the settlement; an analysis  
13 of Plaintiff's employment records; extensive correspondence and communication between counsel;  
14 a review of pleadings, evidence and rulings in similar actions litigated elsewhere in the state; a  
15 review of similar cases in the same industry elsewhere in the country; and preparation for and  
16 attendance at a full-day mediation, followed by further discussions and coordination to finalize the  
17 terms and conditions of the general settlement parameters agreed to by the Parties.

18           While Class Counsel believes in the chance of success of certifying the claims, Class  
19 Counsel recognized the potential risk, expense and complexity posed by further litigation.  
20 Moreover, litigating Plaintiff's claims in this litigation—claims that involve approximately 206  
21 Class Members during the Class Period—would require substantial preparation and discovery and  
22 ultimately would involve the deposition and presentation of numerous more witnesses (including  
23 Class Members and expert witnesses), as well as the consideration, preparation and analysis of  
24 expert reports. Therefore, should litigation have progressed any further, there would have been  
25 significant expense incurred by each side (above and beyond the expense already incurred).

26           **B. The Settlement Amount is Well Within Range of Reasonableness**

27           The settlement amount reached in this case provides significant recovery to Class Members  
28 and Aggrieved Employees, and easily falls within the range of reasonableness. Based on documents

1 and information provided by Defendant, Class Counsel understand there are no more than 10,000  
2 PAGA Pay Periods during the PAGA Period.

3 **1. Unpaid Wages for Failure to Accurately Record Hours Worked**

4 Class Counsel theorized, based on Plaintiff's narrative evidence and information provided  
5 by Defendant, that Defendant failed to pay for work performed off-the-clock, which resulted in a  
6 failure to pay for all hours worked. Class Counsel theorized that Plaintiff and other putative class  
7 members performed off-the-clock tasks including mandatory preparatory tasks (e.g. storing their  
8 personal items in lockers before entering the kitchen to clock in, performing work tasks such as  
9 retrieving items, etc.); mandatory post-shift tasks (e.g. retrieving personal items from the locker  
10 room after clocking out, completing cleaning or closing tasks upon request of a supervisor, etc.);  
11 receiving calls on their days off from supervisors regarding their work schedule; and working  
12 through meal breaks or having them interrupted for work tasks. As a result, Defendant failed to  
13 compensate Class Members for all time under Defendant's control or direction.

14 One theory advanced by Class Counsel alleged, based on Plaintiff's narrative evidence,  
15 that Class Members worked off-the-clock for an estimate of ten (10) minutes each shift throughout  
16 the Class Period, without pay. Class Counsel understand, based on time and payroll records  
17 produced by Defendant and analysis thereof by expert data consultants retained by Class Counsel,  
18 that there were approximately 30,508 shifts during the Class Period, 15.3% of which were over  
19 eight (8) hours in length, and Class Members had an average hourly rate of pay of \$20.00. Thus,  
20 one calculation performed by Class Counsel at mediation resulted in **Defendant's exposure for**  
21 **unpaid off-the-clock work in a conservative amount of \$195,998** ([30,508 shifts x .153 shifts  
22 over eight hours x .167 hour x \$20.00 x 1.5 overtime rate] + [30,508 x .847 shifts under eight  
23 hours x .167 hour x \$20.00 x 2 in liquidated damages]).

24 Class Counsel understand that Defendant makes the following defenses in connection with  
25 this claim: Defendant contends that its policies specifically prohibit off-the-clock work. Defendant  
26 contends that it did not require Class Members to work off-the-clock and, rather, they were paid for  
27 all time suffered or permitted to work. Defendant contends that any allegations that Class Members  
28 were required to be under Defendant's control off-the-clock would necessitate an individualized

1 inquiry into when and why, making this claim not subject to class treatment and any trial in this  
2 litigation unmanageable. Thus, Defendant contends that no damages can be recovered here, and,  
3 even if, *arguendo*, they could, an estimate of ten (10) minutes of unpaid time worked for every  
4 single shift worked by Class Members during the Class Period is an exaggeration of time spent  
5 working off-the-clock if *any* such time was spent. Finally, Defendant contends that no class action  
6 is even tenable here because Class Members signed what they believe to be enforceable arbitration  
7 agreements.

## 8                                   2.       Damages for Non-Compliant Meal Periods

9           Class Counsel theorized, based on documents and information produced by Defendant and  
10 Plaintiff's narrative evidence, that Plaintiff and other putative class members had to work through  
11 their meal periods if the restaurant was short staffed or busy. Class Counsel theorized, based on  
12 Plaintiff's narrative evidence, that when Plaintiff and other putative class members were able to take  
13 a lunch break, they reported regularly having to walk to a suitable break area and having to return  
14 early prior to their 30-minute meal break ending, which resulted in meal breaks being shorter than  
15 the legal minimum. Class Counsel also theorized that Plaintiff and other putative class members had  
16 their meal breaks interrupted or cut short to perform work tasks approximately once per week, taking  
17 late breaks two to three times per week, and numerous other instances of missed, short, late, and  
18 interrupted meal breaks. Nonetheless, Plaintiff and other putative class members were instructed to  
19 clock in and out for their full meal period, regardless of whether they were able to take the full meal  
20 period.

21           Class Counsel theorized, based on documents produced by Defendant and analysis thereof  
22 by expert data consultants retained by Class Counsel, that 11,562 (45.4%) of 25,466 meal-eligible  
23 shifts had unique meal break violations (late, short or missed meal periods). Thus, one calculation  
24 advanced at mediation by Class Counsel resulted in **Defendant's exposure for non-compliant**  
25 **meal periods in an amount of \$231,240** (11,562 unique meal break violations x \$20.00/hour).

26           Class Counsel understand that Defendant argues that it had compliant meal period policies  
27 and practices. Defendant argues that Class Members took timely and full meal periods. Defendant  
28 contends that its policy requires their employees to take timely and full meal periods. Defendant

1 further contends that any instance of a Class Member failing to take a compliant meal period was  
2 voluntary, in violation of their meal period policy, would necessitate an individualized inquiry and  
3 would not lend itself to a manageable trial. Finally, Defendant contends that no class action is even  
4 tenable here because Class Members signed what they believe to be enforceable arbitration  
5 agreements. Thus, Defendant contends that *no* monies are owed for this account but, even if any  
6 amounts were due, the amount calculated by Class Counsel is excessive.

### 7                                   **3.       Recovery of Damages for Non-Compliant Rest Breaks**

8           Class Counsel theorized, based on documents and information produced by Defendant and  
9 Plaintiff's narrative evidence, that Plaintiff and other putative class members' rest breaks were  
10 regularly missed due to their workload, cut short due to a work-related task or question, or cut short  
11 as they walk to a suitable break area. Notably, there were no rest period premiums ever issued  
12 throughout the Class Period with 29,637 rest-eligible shifts.

13           Thus, one calculation performed by Class Counsel, assuming a 40 % violation rate, resulted  
14 in **Defendant's exposure for failure to provide compliant rest periods in a conservative amount**  
15 **of \$237,096** (29,637 shifts x \$20.00/hour x .40 violation rate).

16           Class Counsel understand that Defendant makes the following defenses in connection with  
17 this claim: Defendant argues that it had compliant rest period policies and practices. Defendant  
18 argues that Class Members took timely and full rest periods. Defendant contends that its policy  
19 requires their employees to take timely and full rest periods. Defendant further contends that any  
20 instance of a Class Member failing to take a compliant rest period was voluntary, in violation of  
21 their rest period policy, would necessitate an individualized inquiry and would not lend itself to a  
22 manageable trial. Defendant contends that a rest break violation for every rest-eligible shift is an  
23 exaggeration of non-compliant rest periods, if there were any. Finally, Defendant contends that no  
24 class action is even tenable here because Class Members signed what they believe to be enforceable  
25 arbitration agreements. Thus, Defendant contends that *no* monies are owed for this account but, even  
26 if any amounts were due, the amount calculated by Class Counsel is excessive.

### 27                                   **4.       Wage Statement Violations**

28           Class Counsel theorized that Class Members are entitled to recover penalties for

1 Defendant's alleged failure to issue compliant wage statements under Labor Code section 226,  
2 subdivision (e), for the derivative impact of the failure to pay all wages owed on providing  
3 accurate information on wage statements. Specifically, Class Counsel theorized that penalties are  
4 owed under Labor Code section 226 due to, at minimum, Defendant's failure to pay premium  
5 wages. A non-exempt employee suffering injury as a result of a knowing and intentional failure  
6 by an employer to comply with Labor Code section 226, subdivision (a), is entitled to recover the  
7 greater of all actual damages or fifty dollars (\$50) for the initial pay period in which a violation  
8 occurs and one hundred dollars (\$100) per employee for each violation in a subsequent pay period.  
9 Class Counsel understand from the data provided by Defendant that there were 1,411 pay periods  
10 during the relevant statutory time period for Class Members. If, in fact, Class Members worked  
11 every off-the-clock every shift as set forth above, and no rest premiums were paid, every wage  
12 statement would thus, Class Counsel theorized, violate Labor Code section 226. However, due to  
13 the derivative nature of wage statement penalties, as well as the requirement that Defendant's  
14 failure to comply with Labor Code section 226 be knowing and intentional, one calculation  
15 performed by Class Counsel at mediation, based on the initial penalty of fifty dollars (\$50) in light  
16 of Defendant's defenses, resulted in **Defendant's maximum exposure for wage statement**  
17 **violations in the amount of \$70,550** (1,411 pay periods x \$50/pay period).

18 Class Counsel understand that Defendant makes the following defenses in connection with  
19 this claim: Defendant contends that the wage statements issued to the employees fully complied  
20 with Labor Code section 226. Defendant contends that because it believes no wages are unpaid  
21 that, thus, there can be no derivative penalties. However, Class Counsel also understand the risks  
22 inherent in this claim if the above claims were not certified. Class Counsel also had to factor in,  
23 and did factor in, the risk that the Court would find there was no injury to Class Members even if  
24 the wage statements were inaccurate or that Defendant's conduct was not intentional, both of  
25 which are requirements of Labor Code section 226 before penalties can issue. Class Counsel also  
26 note that the calculation used does not take into account the fact that all Class Members did not  
27 work all pay periods and, therefore, Class Counsels' calculation does not take into account the  
28 maximum penalty of \$4,000 in Plaintiff's exposure model used at mediation. Finally, Defendant

contends that no class action is even tenable here because Class Members signed what they believe to be enforceable arbitration agreements.

## 5. Waiting Time Penalties

Pursuant to Labor Code sections 201, 202 and 203, each employee in the relevant statutory period (*i.e.*, three years before the filing of the initial Complaint) is entitled to 30 days' worth of wages as waiting time penalty for not being paid all wages due upon separation from employment. Class Counsel theorized at mediation, based on relevant documents provided by Defendant, that, under Labor Code section 203, Defendant is liable to pay each Class Member, who was terminated during the relevant statutory period, a full 30-day worth of wages as waiting time penalty for failure to pay compensation in lieu of compliant meal and rest periods, and failure to timely pay all wages due at the time of termination or resignation. Based on relevant documents provided by Defendant, there were approximately 85 Class Members who were terminated or resigned during the relevant statutory period. The average length of shifts was 6.5 hours. Thus, one calculation performed at mediation by Class Counsel resulted in **Defendant's exposure for waiting time penalties to be approximately \$331,500** (85 separated Class Members x \$20.00/hour x 6.5 hours x 30 days).

Class Counsel understand that Defendant contends that there is no credence to Plaintiff's off-the-clock theory and that, thus, no waiting time penalties are owed based on that theory. Finally, Defendant contends that its actions were not "willful" and that, thus, waiting time penalties cannot be awarded. Thus, Defendant argued that no waiting time penalties are owed.

Class Counsel understand that Defendant argued the following: Defendant argued that it reimbursed employees for all expenses incurred in furtherance of work. Defendant argued that, to the extent any Class Members' claims to have purchased boots and replacement gloves, glasses and ear protectors would necessitate an individualized inquiry, thereby precluding certification and making any trial thereon unmanageable. Finally, Defendant contends that no class action is even tenable here because Class Members signed what they believe to be enforceable arbitration agreements. Thus, Defendant contends that it owes no monies to Class Members under this theory, either.

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25
- 26
- 27
- 28

2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11

12  
13  
14

15  
16  
17  
18

19  
20  
21  
22  
23

24

25

26

27

1           d.     Rest Period Violations: Labor Code section 558 prescribes penalties of \$50 for an  
2 initial violation and \$100 for each subsequent violation. Using the initial pay period rate for all  
3 violations and a violation every single pay period for every single non-exempt employee in the  
4 PAGA Period, this amounts to a maximum exposure of \$500,000 (10,000 pay periods x \$50).

5           e.     Wage Statement Violations: According to *Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.* (2021)  
6 287 Cal.Rptr.3d 229, in this instance, Labor Code section 2699 would be the appropriate penalty  
7 for wage statement violations that are inaccurate, which prescribes penalties of \$100 for an initial  
8 violation and \$200 for each subsequent violation (*Id.* at 247-248). Using the initial pay period rate  
9 for all violations and a violation every single pay period for every single Aggrieved Employee in  
10 the PAGA Period, this amounts to a maximum exposure of \$1,000,000 (10,000 pay periods x  
11 \$100).

12           f.     Waiting Time Penalties: Labor Code section 2699 prescribes penalties of \$100 for  
13 an initial violation and \$200 for each subsequent violation. Because this violation is merited only  
14 at separation of employment, a 100% violation rate would likely include just one violation per  
15 employee. The data produced by Defendant indicate that there were 105 Aggrieved Employees  
16 whose employment was separated during the PAGA Period. This amounts to a maximum exposure  
17 of \$14,200 (142 Aggrieved Employees x \$100).

18           g.     Conclusion: In sum, Class Counsel calculated Defendant's total maximum  
19 exposure for PAGA violations if the Court were to find a 100% violation rate for every Aggrieved  
20 Employee every pay period and not exercise its discretion to reduce any of those penalties to be  
21 **\$3,514,200**. Class Counsel understand from the mediator and the mediation process that  
22 Defendant argued the following in connection with this claim: Defendant contends that no PAGA  
23 penalties are likely to be awarded and, even if they were, the maximum exposure calculated by  
24 Class Counsel is vastly overstated. First, Defendant defends that PAGA penalties cannot and  
25 should not be stacked. Second, Defendant asserts that individualized issues predominate the  
26 PAGA claims, making the claims unmanageable for trial. Third, Defendant denies that a violation  
27 for each pay period can be established. Fourth, Defendant contends that a Court is unlikely to  
28 exercise its discretion to award civil penalties under PAGA where, as here, there is no conduct

1 shown by Plaintiff that would show any Labor Code violation by Defendant is knowing and  
2 intentional. Defendant insists that this is especially true in this Action where class action damages  
3 are available to Class Members, rendering an award of PAGA penalties in addition to class action  
4 damages to be double recovery.

5 Class Counsel maintain that it is possible to recover the subsequent violation rate for  
6 penalties, that stacking is permissible, and that there is no manageability requirement under PAGA  
7 (citing *Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc.*). As such, Class Counsel believe a 90% discount of this  
8 claim to be reasonable, resulting in a valuation of **\$351,420** as a reasonable estimate of the likelihood  
9 of what Plaintiff may recover at trial for PAGA penalties (\$3,514,200 x .10).

#### 10 **10. Conclusion**

11 When including derivative penalties, such as waiting time penalties, wage statement  
12 violations, and discretionary PAGA penalties, Class Counsel theorized Defendant's maximum  
13 exposure to be approximately **\$1,417,804**. In all, Class Counsel obtained a Gross Settlement  
14 Amount of **\$475,000.00**. Particularly in light of the risks involving obstacles to class certification,  
15 all issues and risks related to liability, the issues with manageability at trial, the discretionary  
16 nature of PAGA penalties, and considering the case law regarding fair, reasonable and adequate  
17 settlements, Class Counsel strongly believe that the settlement reached is fair, reasonable and  
18 adequate, and in the best interest of Class Members.

19 Moreover, \$47,500.00 of the Gross Settlement Amount was attributed to PAGA penalties.  
20 This allocation was decided mutually by the Parties and the mutual decision was based on: (1) the  
21 fact that damages are available for the failure to pay wage claims while only penalties are available  
22 for the PAGA claims; (2) the risk that the Court may exercise its discretion to decline to stack  
23 PAGA penalties; (3) the risk that the Court may exercise its discretion to not award the full amount  
24 of PAGA penalties available; and (4) the risk that the Court may decline to award any PAGA  
25 penalties at all in light of the fact that damages are available for Class Members and it may find  
26 any further liability against Defendants unnecessarily punitive.

#### 27 **VII. THE PROPOSED ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ARE REASONABLE**

28 Class Counsel seek an attorneys' fees award of up to 35% of the Gross Settlement Amount,

1 which, unless escalated pursuant to this Agreement, would amount to \$166,250.00. Class Counsel  
2 also seek reimbursement of costs not to exceed \$25,000.00. The requested fees fall well within the  
3 historical range of attorney's fees awards under the common fund theory, which is generally from  
4 25% to 50%. The requested fee is fair compensation for undertaking complex, risky, expensive and  
5 time-consuming litigation on a contingent fee basis. Thus, the Court should preliminarily approve  
6 the requested attorneys' fees and costs, which are justified by the results achieved, the complexity of  
7 the issues, the difficulty of the case and the great risks undertaken by Class Counsel. The requested  
8 attorneys' fees will not be opposed by Defendants and are well within established guidelines.

9 **VIII. THE REQUESTED ENHANCEMENT AWARD TO THE NAMED**  
10 **PLAINTIFFS AND CLASS REPRESENTATIVE IS REASONABLE**

11 Plaintiff is entitled to enhanced award for his services as class representative, for answering  
12 extensive questions by Class Counsel, for being subjected to intrusive questioning during his  
13 deposition, for being available and answering questions during mediation, for the risks in being the  
14 named plaintiff and for providing Defendants with a more expansive release of claims, including a  
15 waiver based upon California Civil Code section 1542, in exchange for the enhancement award.  
16 Defendants do not oppose the requested enhancement to Plaintiff. Plaintiff risked intrusive  
17 discovery and the payment of employer costs. In the experience of Class Counsel, the typical  
18 enhancement award in wage and hour class actions ranges from approximately \$10,000.00 to  
19 \$25,000.00, although some awards are higher. In contrast, Class Counsel seek an extremely limited  
20 enhancement of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff for his services.

21 **IX. CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES**

22 **A. The Class should be Preliminarily Certified**

23 In California, there are two certification prerequisites: (1) the existence of an “ascertainable  
24 class;” and (2) “a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved  
25 affecting the parties to be represented.” (*Sotelo v. MediaNews Group, Inc.* (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th  
26 639, 647.) To certify a class, the party advocating class treatment must demonstrate: (1) a numerous  
27 class; (2) predominant common questions of law or fact; (3) class representatives with claims or  
28 defenses typical of the class; and (4) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.”

(*Williams v. Sup. Ct.* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1353, citing *Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Sup. Ct.* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) Each of the criteria for class certification is satisfied in this instance:

**1. Ascertainability** – “Ascertainability” is a due process requirement that ensures it is possible to decide who will be bound by the judgment (*res judica* effect). The determination is made by examining the class definition and the size of the class. Here, the Class Members definition (*i.e.*, all individuals employed by Defendant in California as non-exempt, hourly-paid employees during the Class Period) is derived from the operative complaint, which complains of alleged violations of Labor Code sections that are chiefly and, in some instances, solely applicable to non-exempt, hourly paid employees. There is no difficulty ascertaining who is a Class Member based on the above-described definition as it is readily apparent to all involved who is a non-exempt, hourly-paid employee who worked in California for Defendant during the Class Period based solely from Defendant’s payroll records, which amounts to approximately 206 persons.

**2. Numerosity** – According to the California Supreme Court, a putative class is sufficiently numerous to achieve the numerosity requirement if their joinder is impracticable and thus substantial benefits accrue both to litigants and the courts if the action proceeds as a class action. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435, 446.) Numerosity is presumed satisfied if there are forty (40) putative class members. (*Miri v. Dillon* (E.D. MI 2013) 292 F.R.D. 454, 461.) However, as few as 10 class members has been found sufficient. (*See, e.g., Bowles v. Sup. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574.) Class Counsel understand from documents provided that Defendant identified at least 206 Class Members. That is sufficiently numerous to establish the numerosity requirement.

**3. Commonality** – California law also requires that “questions of law or fact common to the class [be] substantially similar and predominate over the questions affecting the individual members.” (*In re Steroid Hormone Product Cases* (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 145, 153.)

This litigation is brought to resolve common issues that include whether Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked; whether Defendant provided full, timely and un-interrupted meal and rest periods; whether Class Members are entitled to premium pay for incomplete, untimely or interrupted meal or rest periods, among other claims as set forth above.

**4. Typicality** – Typicality requires only that the named plaintiff’s interests in

1 the action be significantly similar to those of other class members. (*Williams v. Sup. Ct.* (2013)  
2 221 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 1353, citing *Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Sup. Ct.* (2012) 53 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 1004, 1021.)  
3 Plaintiff's claims are typical of those of other Class Members as Plaintiff: (1) is a non-exempt,  
4 hourly-paid employee like other Class Members; (2) complains of not being paid for all time under  
5 Defendant's control or suffered and/or permitted to work for Defendant; (3) did not receive full  
6 premium pay for meal periods that were not compliant with the Labor Code; (4) did not receive  
7 premium pay for rest periods that were not provided, among others as set forth above.

8               **5. Adequacy of Representation** - To maintain a class action, the representative  
9 plaintiff must adequately protect the interests of the class. (*Williams v. Sup. Ct.* (2013) 221  
10 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 1353, citing *Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Sup. Ct.* (2012) 53 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 1004, 1021.)  
11 Adequacy of representation consists of two components. First, there must be no disabling conflicts  
12 of interest between the class representatives and the class. Second, the class representative must be  
13 represented by counsel who are competent and experienced in the kind of litigation to be undertaken.  
14 (*See McGhee v. Bank of Am.* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450; *accord In re Juniper Networks, Inc.*  
15 *Securities Litigation* (N.D. Cal. 2009) 264 F.R.D. 584, 590.) Both criteria are met in this instance:

16               **(i) No Disabling Conflict of Interest Exists Between the Class**  
17               **Representative and the Class**

18               No conflicts, disabling or otherwise, exists between Plaintiffs and Class Members because  
19 Plaintiffs alleges to have been damaged by the same alleged conduct of Defendant (*i.e.*, Plaintiffs  
20 classified as non-exempt, hourly-paid employee, not paid premium pay, etc.) and thus have the  
21 incentive to fairly represent all Class Members' claims to achieve the maximum possible recovery.

22               **(ii) Class Counsel are Experienced Class Action Attorneys**

23               As set forth in the Declarations of Class Counsel, Class Counsel in this matter consist of  
24 experienced class action attorneys, have been appointed as class counsel in other class actions and  
25 have a successful "track record" in litigating class actions.

26               **6. Superiority of Class Action** - Also relevant to the Court's certification  
27 decision is whether a class action is the superior method of adjudication. (*Brinker Restaurant Corp.*  
28 *v. Sup. Ct.* (2012) 53 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 1004, 1021.)

1 It deals with common issues that are most efficiently adjudicated together, as indicated  
2 above. Moreover, with at least 206 Class Members, presentation of all of them before this Court  
3 may be problematic, impractical, and burdensome. On the contrary, a class action allows claims of  
4 many individuals to be resolved at the same time, eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation  
5 and affords small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims which otherwise would  
6 be too insufficient to warrant individual litigation.

7 **7. Conclusion** – Thus, because this class action meets all criteria for  
8 certification and a lesser standard of scrutiny applies when evaluating these criteria for settlement  
9 purposes, it should be certified for purposes of effectuating this settlement.

10 **X. CONCLUSION**

11 Therefore, the Parties request the Court grant preliminary approval of the proposed  
12 settlement.

13  
14 Dated: May 4, 2026

BIBIYAN LAW GROUP, P.C.

15 */s/ Vedang J. Patel*

16 \_\_\_\_\_  
VEDANG J. PATEL

17 Attorneys for Plaintiff, FIDENCIO PEREZ, on  
18 behalf of himself and all others similarly situated and  
19 aggrieved.  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28