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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

AMORINA HUERTA, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

WIDO PIZZA, INC., a California corporation;
and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: CIVSB2422482

*[Assigned for All Purposes to the Hon.
Michael A. Sachs, Dept. S28]*

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND
PAGA SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

Preliminary Approval Hearing:

Date: January 5, 2026

Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept: S28

Action Filed: July 12, 2024

TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 5, 2026, at 8:30 a.m., in Department S28 of the Superior Court of California, County of San Bernardino, Justice Center, located 247 W. 3rd St., San Bernardino, CA 92415, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769, *et seq.*, Plaintiffs Amorina Huerta, Wiliam Rhoades, Raheem Cooper, Brandon Ruiz, and Francisca Rincon (“Plaintiffs”) will move the Court for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiffs and Defendant Wido Pizza, Inc. (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs further move the Court for an Order:

1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice;
2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
4. Appointing Plaintiffs Amorina Huerta, Wiliam Rhoades, Raheem Cooper, Brandon Ruiz, and Francisca Rincon as Class Representatives for settlement purposes;
5. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, John G. Yslas, Arrash T. Fattahi, Emily Borman, Lisa B. Iturriaga, and Arman A. Salehi of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, and Sam Kim and Yoonis Han of Verum Law Group, APC as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
6. Appointing Phoenix Settlement Administrators as the Settlement Administrator; and
7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

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1 The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and
2 authorities, the Declaration of Arrash T. Fattahi, the Declaration of Sam Kim, the Declaration of
3 Amorina Huerta, the Declaration of Wiliam Rhoades, the Declaration of Raheem Cooper, the
4 Declaration of Brandon Ruiz, and the Declaration of Francisca Rincon, the Declaration of Jodey
5 Lawrence filed concurrently herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other further
6 evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

7 Respectfully submitted,

8 Dated: October 13, 2025

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

9
10 By: 

Arrash T. Fattahi
Emily Borman
Lisa B. Iturriaga
Arman A. Salehi

11
12
13 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
14 Amorina Huerta, Wiliam Rhoades,
Raheem Cooper, and Brandon Ruiz

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Amorina Huerta (“Plaintiff Huerta”), Wiliam Rhoades (“Plaintiff Rhoades”), Raheem Cooper (“Plaintiff Cooper”), Brandon Ruiz (“Plaintiff Ruiz”), and Francisca Rincon (“Plaintiff Rincon”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) seek preliminary approval of a proposed \$1,312,064.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant Wido Pizza, Inc. (“Defendant,” and together with Plaintiffs, the “Parties”). This motion for preliminary approval is unopposed. The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 1,416 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arm’s length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Todd Smith, Esq., over the course of a full day of mediation. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a settlement. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiffs’ Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiffs and putative class members worked for Defendant in California as non-exempt, hourly-paid employees during the class period. (Declaration of Arrash T. Fattahi in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement (“Fattahi Decl.”) at ¶ 2.) Defendant is a California-incorporated pizza retail company based in Redlands that operates Domino’s Pizza outlets under its corporate umbrella. (*Id.*)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiffs alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and

1 rest periods. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert related claims for failure to provide accurate
2 wage statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil
3 penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

4 On May 17, 2024, Plaintiff Huerta filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint
5 against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay
6 overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest
7 periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate
8 itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; and (8) unfair
9 business practices (Case No. CIVSB2422482) (the “*Huerta* Action”). (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 4.) On
10 July 12, 2024, Plaintiff Rincon filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint against
11 Defendant for: (1) Failure to Provide Rest Periods or Compensation in Lieu of; (2)
12 Reimbursement of Business Expenses; (3) Failure to Furnish Accurate Itemized Wage
13 Statements; (4) Waiting Time Penalties; and (5) Violations of the Unfair Competition Law (Case
14 No. CIVSB2422482) (the “*Rincon* Action”). (*Id.*)

15 On June 21, 2024, Plaintiffs Huerta, Ruiz, and Cooper sent a notice to Defendant and the
16 California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour
17 violations pursuant to PAGA. Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 5 On July 17, 2024, Rincon sent a notice to
18 Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging
19 similar wage and hour violations pursuant to PAGA. *Id.* On May 14 2025, Plaintiff Rhoades
20 sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency
21 (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to PAGA. (*Id.*) On October 10,
22 2025, the Parties filed a stipulation in this action requesting Plaintiff Huerta be granted leave to
23 file a first amended complaint adding (1) a PAGA claim; and (2) class representatives, Plaintiffs
24 Rhoades, Cooper, Ruiz and Rincon to the *Huerta* Action. The *Rincon* Action will be dismissed
25 without prejudice. (*Id.*)

26 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

27 Following the filing of the initial complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and
28 information before mediating this action. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 6.) Defendant produced a sampling

1 of timekeeping and pay records for the class members. (*Id.*) Defendant also provided documents
2 of its wage and hour policies and practices during the class period, and information regarding
3 the total number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.*)

4 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant's wage and hour policies and practices
5 and analyzing Defendant's timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate
6 the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant's maximum monetary
7 exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding
8 the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these records
9 and utilized an expert to prepare a damages analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

10 C. Settlement Negotiations

11 On May 14, 2025, the Parties participated in a private mediation with experienced class
12 action mediator, Todd Smith, Esq. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) The settlement negotiations were at arm's length
13 and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. The Parties went into the
14 mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also
15 prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached.
16 (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of
17 Plaintiffs' claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached a settlement, the material terms
18 of which are encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 9, **Ex. 2**, Class Action and PAGA
19 Settlement Agreement and Class Notice.)

20 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
21 on the Parties' informal exchange of documents and information and Class Counsel's own
22 independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is
23 fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members in
24 light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could
25 be asserted by Defendant both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk.
26 (*Id.* at ¶ 14.)

27 Indeed, the \$1,312,064 Settlement represents approximately **98.5%** of the **realistic**
28 **maximum recovery** of \$1,332,107.93. (*Id.* at ¶ 22.) Although Class Counsel estimated that

Defendant’s maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$12,987,883.43, when the risk of prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that Defendant’s realistic exposure was \$1,332,107.93, meaning the Settlement achieves a significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 14-26.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 22.) Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. (*Id.*)

D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

The Settlement’s key terms include:

1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “all persons employed by Defendant in California and classified as a nonexempt employee who worked for Defendant during the Class Period.” (Settlement, § 1.3.)
2. Class Period: “means the period from November 21, 2019, to July 13, 2025, or the date of preliminary approval, whichever is earlier.” (Settlement, § 1.12.)
3. Class Member or Settlement Class Member: “member of the Class, as either a Participating Class Member or Non-Participating Class Member (including a Non- Participating Class Member who qualifies as an Aggrieved Employee).” (Settlement, § 1.7.)
4. Aggrieved Employee: “all persons employed by Defendant in California and classified as a non-exempt employee who worked for Defendant during the PAGA Period” (Settlement, § 1.2.)
5. PAGA Period: “means the period from June 21, 2023, to July 13, 2025, or date of preliminary approval, whichever is earlier.” (Settlement, § 1.31.)
6. Gross Settlement Amount: means “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Paragraph 8 below Defendant promises to pay \$1,312,064.00 and no more as the Gross Settlement Amount and t separately pay any and all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portions of the Individua Class Payments. Defendant has no obligation to pay the Gross Settlement Amount (or any payroll taxes) prior to the deadline stated in Paragraph 4.2 of this Agreement. The Administrator will

disburse the entire Gross Settlement Amount without asking or requiring Participating Class Members or Aggrieved Employees to submit any claim as a condition of payment. None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant” (Settlement, § 3.1.)

7. Uncashed Checks: For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date, the Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such checks to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no "unpaid residue" subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b)(Settlement, §§ 4.4.1, 4.4.3.)

8. Release by Participating Class Members Who Are Not Aggrieved Employees: All Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, release Released Parties from (i) all claims that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the Class Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint. Except as set forth in Section 5.3 of this Agreement, Participating Class Members do not release any other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers’ compensation, or claims based on facts occurring outside the Class Period. (Settlement, § 5.2.)

9. Release by Non-Participating and Participating Class Members Who Are Aggrieved Employees: All Non-Participating and Participating Class Members who are Aggrieved Employees are deemed to release, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the PAGA Period facts stated in the Operative Complaint, and the PAGA Notices. (Settlement, § 5.3.)

10. No Reversion, No Claims Made: means that “[n]one of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant.” (Settlement, § 3.1.)

11. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$30,000.00 allocated to Plaintiffs claims

1 under PAGA, with 65% (\$19,500.00) being paid to the LWDA and 35% (\$10,500.00) being paid
2 to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 3.2.5.) Class Counsel submitted the proposed
3 settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶
4 10.)

5 12. Net Settlement Amount: the Gross Settlement Amount, less the following
6 payments in the amounts approved by the Court: Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA
7 Payment, Class Representative Service Payments, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel
8 Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Expenses Payment. The remainder is to be
9 paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments.” (Settlement, § 1.28.)

10 13. Distribution Formula: The Individual Class Payment will be “by (a) dividing the
11 amount of the Aggrieved Employees’ 35% share of PAGA Penalties \$10,500.00 by the total
12 number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA
13 Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved Employee’s PAGA Period Pay Periods.
14 Aggrieved Employees assume full responsibility and liability for any taxes owed on their
15 Individual PAGA Payment.” (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

16 14. Tax Allocation: 20% of each Participating Class Member’s Individual Class
17 Payment will be allocated to settlement of wage claims (the “Wage Portion”). The Wage Portions
18 are subject to tax withholding and will be reported on an IRS W-2 Form. In addition, 80% of
19 each Participating Class Member’s Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of
20 claims for interest and penalties (the “Non-Wage Portion”). (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

21 15. Class Representative Service Payment: Defendant agrees not to oppose Plaintiffs’
22 request for a service payment to Plaintiffs of up to \$10,000.00 each (totalling \$50,000).
23 (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This payment shall be in addition to the *pro rata* recovery received by
24 Plaintiffs as part of the settlement. (*Id.*)

25 16. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose
26 a fee application of up to 35% of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently estimated to be
27 \$459,222.40), plus out-of-pocket costs not to exceed \$35,000.00. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

28 17. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a

statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys’ fees, costs, and service payment being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 7.4.2.) Phoenix Settlement Administrators. (“Phoenix”), the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 11, Ex. 4, Phoenix’s Bid.)

III. DISCUSSION

To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super. Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, which may include the strength of Plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not require “an explicit statement of the maximum amount the Plaintiffs class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims”, but instead, only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy

and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.”].)

As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation

1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations

Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.) Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super. Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The fact that a Plaintiffs might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not to approve the settlement.”].)

The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of mediation with experienced class action employment mediator, Todd Smith, Esq. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 8.) The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached an agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 9.)

Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning the claims set forth in the litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll records, Defendant’s policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of meal and rest breaks, and issuance of wage statements, as well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect,

1 and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 6-7, 14.)
2 In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable
3 law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiffs and their
4 counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement.

5 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
6 litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 37-51; *see generally* Declaration of Sam Kim
7 (“Kim Decl”). Again, this supports the position that the terms of the Settlement are premised
8 on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed in light of the risks, expenses, and
9 time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this action.

10 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’** 11 **Respective Legal Positions**

12 A settlement is not judged against what Plaintiffs might recover had Plaintiffs prevailed at
13 trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
14 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
15 and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement
16 is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no
17 bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement
18 in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

19 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation. (Fattahi
20 Decl. at ¶ 24.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of her claims, a legitimate controversy
21 exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs also recognizes that proving the amount of
22 wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain
23 proposition. (*Id.*)

24 The proposed settlement of \$1,312,064.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
25 compared to Plaintiffs’ reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 14-26.) Because of the proposed
26 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
27 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
28 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability

1 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$1,312,064.00 is well
2 within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*)
3 *Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of*
4 *approximately \$508.72. (Id. at ¶ 25.)*

5 **3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

6 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
7 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
8 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 37-51;
9 *see generally* Kim Decl), Although Plaintiffs and their counsel were prepared to litigate the claims
10 alleged in the litigation, they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the
11 class.

12 **B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

13 The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved
14 for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the settlement and of
15 their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members who wish to object
16 to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and
17 be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice meets all the
18 requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

19 **C. The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

20 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, the Parties agreed to allocate
21 reasonable attorneys’ fees in an amount currently estimated to be \$459,222.40, and up to
22 \$35,000.00 in costs. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.) These amounts are disclosed to all class members in the
23 proposed Notice and are reasonable.

24 **1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the “Common Fund”** 25 **Method**

26 California courts have long awarded attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the benefit created
27 by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that “when a number
28 of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a Plaintiffs or

1 Plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such Plaintiffs or
2 Plaintiffs may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25,
3 34, quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

4 Class Counsel seeks an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/common
5 fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all
6 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." (*Vincent v.*
7 *Hughes Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995)
8 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in
9 winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive
10 beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs." (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and*
11 *County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized
12 that the common fund doctrine has been applied "consistently in California when an action brought
13 by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share." (*Id.* at p. 110.)

14 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
15 480 that, "when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
16 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
17 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
18 fund created." (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: "The recognized advantages of the percentage
19 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
20 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
21 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
22 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts."
23 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

24 2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases

25 According to a leading treatise on class actions, "[n]o general rule can be articulated on what
26 is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually, 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a
27 reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
28 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages

are not unprecedented.” (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

Here, Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees equal to not more than 35% of the Settlement Amount, which is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees as negotiated by the Parties and requested herein.

3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code

Labor Code § 1194 (a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this section, Plaintiffs would be permitted to recover their actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class Counsel. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 35-36.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class ahead of all other concerns.

4. Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award

As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers and employees, Class Counsel possesses considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Fattahi

Decl. at ¶¶ 37-51; *see generally* Kim Decl.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel’s requested fee award is supported here.

Class Counsel’s experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement. Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

D. The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable

Where settlements negotiate a good faith amount for PAGA penalties and “there is no indication that this amount was the result of self-interest at the expense of other” class members, such amounts are generally considered reasonable. (*Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133 at *1, 9.) Courts have approved amounts for PAGA penalties in the range of zero to two percent of the total maximum amount of the Settlement. (*Id.* [approving a PAGA payment of 0.3%, or \$1,500]; *see also Jack v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.* (S.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) 2011 WL 4899942 at *6 [approving a PAGA payment of 0.25%]; *McKenzie v. Fed. Express Corp.* (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) 2012 WL 12882124 at *5 [acknowledging that courts approve PAGA claim settlements in the range of zero to two percent of the total settlement].) Here, the amount to be paid to the LWDA is larger than many other PAGA settlement amounts approved by the courts where seemingly nominal amounts were allocated for such claims. (*See, e.g., Zubia v. Shamrock Foods Co.* (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) No. CV1603128ABAGRX, 2017 WL 10541431, at *14 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.1%]; *Hopson*, 2008 WL 3385452, at *1 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.3% or \$1,500]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.* (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012) No. 1:10-CV-0324 AWI SKO, 2012 WL 5364575, at *3 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.27%].) Here, the Parties negotiated a good faith amount of \$30,000.00, 65% percent of which

1 (\$19,500) will be paid to the LWDA and 35% (\$10,500) to be distributed to the Aggrieved
2 Employees. (Settlement, § 3.2.5.) The \$30,000.00 allocation equates to 3% of the Gross Settlement
3 Amount, which exceeds amounts that are routinely approved. The Parties negotiated to allocate
4 2.3% of the Settlement to PAGA penalties in good faith and this amount is reasonable considering
5 that the maximum PAGA penalties were estimated at \$1,200,300.00 (which assumed \$100 per pay
6 period). (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 21.)

7 **E. The Service Payment to Named Plaintiffs Is Reasonable**

8 Named Plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
9 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
10 members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval
11 of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which
12 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the
13 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir.
14 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

15 Service awards are particularly important to Plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they
16 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is
17 codified in California Labor Code § 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to vigorously
18 enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to
19 work under substandard unlawful conditions” Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has
20 noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is
21 widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.*
22 (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should be rewarded for
23 assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.*
24 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

25 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay a Service
26 Payment in the amount of \$10,000.00 to each Plaintiff (totaling \$50,000). (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)
27 Courts routinely approve a \$10,000 enhancement award for Plaintiffs represented by Class
28 Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) 2021 WL

3673845, *3 [“The Court concludes a \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez v. Bank of America, National Association* (N.D. Cal., Jan. 11, 2024, No. 18-CV-01202-LB) 2024 WL 150721, at *4 [“The court approves awards of \$10,000 for each class representative.”].) Class Counsel represent that Plaintiffs devoted a great deal of time and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated with counsel very frequently for litigation and to prepare for mediation, and were frequently in contact with Class Counsel during the mediation. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 27-31; *see generally* Declaration of Amorina Huerta, Declaration of Wiliam Rhoades, Declaration of Raheem Cooper, Declaration of Brandon Ruiz, and Declaration of Francisca Rincon). This amount is reasonable particularly in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiffs generated for all class members. (*Id.*)

When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a 2006 study examining the average incentive award given to class action Plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the “average award per class representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Eisenberg & Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study* (2006) 53 UCLA L.Rev. 1303, 1308.) That same study found that named Plaintiffs in employment discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081, while named Plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121 and a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative Plaintiffs whole by compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED

A. Legal Standard

The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the prerequisites for certification under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382

1 provides: “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when
2 the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more
3 may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to
4 section 382: “(1) There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined
5 community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be
6 represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify
7 these requirements, the California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8 23 to explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1)
9 predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of
10 the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart*
11 *Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.)

12 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.
13 (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “[c]ourts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a
14 means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of
15 consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to the
16 appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond, supra*,
17 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

18 **B. Plaintiffs Maintain That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for**
19 **Settlement Purposes.**

20 **1. The Class is Ascertainable and Numerous**

21 The proposed class that Plaintiffs seek to represent is easily ascertainable and includes
22 approximately 1,416 employees of Defendant.

23 Plaintiffs maintain that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and
24 precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business
25 records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.*
26 (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the
27 subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

28 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a

1 class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981) 126
2 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action may
3 be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable to
4 join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a class
5 action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries of a trust
6 in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574; *see*
7 *also Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore, Plaintiffs
8 contend that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

9 **2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate**

10 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the
11 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass predominate over any
12 individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to
13 warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191
14 Cal.App.3d 605.)

15 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant
16 policies and practices for all hours worked, including overtime wages; whether Defendant had
17 legally compliant policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether
18 Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees
19 to take rest periods; whether Defendant consequently paid final wages timely at termination; and
20 whether Defendant consequently failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements. Plaintiffs
21 contend that the factual and legal issues are the same for all of the identified class members,
22 including Plaintiffs. Further, all class members suffered from, and seek redress for, the same
23 alleged injuries.

24 **3. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

25 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or
26 circumstances of the representative Plaintiffs compared to those of the remainder of the class,
27 but rather upon the typicality of the proposed representative’s claims as they relate to the
28 defendant’s conduct and activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 “[t]he

1 only requirements are that common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class
2 representative be similarly situated” vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative Plaintiff’s claims
3 are typical of the class if they arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if
4 the claims rest on the same legal theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiffs are
5 former employees of Defendant; as such, they allege that they were subject to the same policies
6 and practices as other similarly situated employees.

7 **4. Plaintiffs and Their Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement**

8 The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a
9 named Plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second,
10 a named Plaintiff’s interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of*
11 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

12 All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiffs retained counsel
13 with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that
14 previously settled. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 37-51; *see generally* Kim Decl.) Class Counsel
15 unquestionably is “qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.”
16 (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiffs have no conflicts, and
17 Plaintiffs have, with counsel, litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms,
18 showing their dedication. Plaintiffs’ willingness to serve as representatives demonstrates their
19 serious commitment to bringing about the best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60
20 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

21 **5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation**

22 Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class
23 action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.
24 By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court’s use of the
25 class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of
26 time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly
27 situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a
28 practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to

1 prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 457-62; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.* (9th
2 Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the superiority concerns are
3 essentially non-existent.

4 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

5 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

6 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court,
7 Rule 3.766 (e), (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
8 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
9 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter,
10 the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he
11 notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class
12 Members . . .” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by
13 direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

14 **B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative**

15 The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first
16 class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the
17 terms of the Settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class
18 Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the
19 opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

20 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg,
21 *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the terms
22 and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It makes
23 clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the
24 Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits
25 of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The
26 Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a
27 combined settlement-certification class notice.

1 **VI. CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant preliminary
3 approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing.

4
5 Dated: October 13, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

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6
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