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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE

JUDAEA BREAUX, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

FACE HAUS, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 24STCV22981
[Related Case No. 24STCV27305]

*[Assigned for All Purposes to the Hon.
Carolyn B. Kuhl, Dept. 12]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND
PAGA SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

Preliminary Approval Hearing:

Date: June 16, 2026

Time: 10:30 a.m.

Dept: 12

Action Filed: September 6, 2024

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on June 16, 2026, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department 12 of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Spring Street Courthouse, located at 312 N. Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, Plaintiff Judaea Breau (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) will and hereby does move this Court for an Order:

1. Granting preliminary approval of the proposed Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Settlement”);
2. Conditionally certifying the proposed Class for settlement purposes only;
3. Appointing Plaintiff Judaea Breau as the Class Representative;
4. Appointing John G. Yslas, Diego Aviles, Harry Erganyan, Mariam Nazaretyan, Emily K. Borman, and Courtney M. Miller of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel;
5. Appointing Apex Class Action as the Settlement Administrator; and
6. Setting a final approval hearing date.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.769(d) and (e), this Motion is made on the grounds that the proposed Settlement satisfies all criteria for preliminary approval and falls well within the range of reasonableness. The Settlement was reached through informed, arm’s length bargaining between experienced attorneys with the assistance of an experienced neutral, and Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Class.

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This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of John G. Yslas, the Declaration of Judaea Breaux, the Declaration of Sean Hartranft, and on all records and documents on file, together with such oral and documentary evidence that may be presented at the hearing on this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: April 20, 2026

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

By: /s/ Courtney M. Miller

Courtney M. Miller

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.769(d) and (e), Plaintiff Judaea Breaux (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of a class action settlement of wage and hour claims, including representative claims brought under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”), against Defendant Face Haus, LLC (hereinafter “Defendant”). The proposed Class is defined as all persons who worked for Defendant in California as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee (“Class Members”) at any time from September 6, 2020, through September 8, 2025 (“Class Period”). The main terms of the Settlement are as follows:

1. A Gross Settlement Amount of \$325,000.00, which will be distributed to approximately 112 Class Members on a pro rata basis according to the total Workweeks worked by each Class Member during the Class Period;
2. Attorneys’ fees of up to one third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently estimated to be \$108,333.33) and up to \$25,000.00 in reimbursement of litigation costs to Plaintiff’s Counsel;
3. A Class Representative Service Payment of up to \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff;
4. Costs of settlement administration of up to \$5,500.00;¹ and
5. Allocation of \$15,000.00 to PAGA penalties, sixty-five percent (65%) of which (\$9,750.00) will be paid to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”), and thirty-five percent (35%) of which (\$5,250.00) will be paid to all persons who worked for Defendant in California as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee (“Aggrieved Employees”) at any time during the period from June 21, 2023, through September 8, 2025 (“PAGA Period”).

The Settlement meets all criteria for preliminary approval and falls within the range of

¹ In this Motion, Plaintiff seeks approval of up to \$4,750.00 for the costs of settlement administration in light of Defense Counsel’s representation that the Class Members read English, and that a translation of the Class Notice to any other language is therefore unnecessary. *See* Yslas Decl. at ¶ 39; Hartranft Decl. at ¶ 7, Exhibit B.

1 reasonableness given the risks and expenses of further litigation. The Settlement was reached
2 through informed, arm's length bargaining between experienced attorneys with the assistance of
3 an experienced neutral. As such, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant preliminary approval of the
4 Settlement, conditionally certify the Class for settlement purposes only, appoint Plaintiff as the
5 Class Representative, appoint Plaintiff's Counsel as Class Counsel, appoint Apex Class Action as
6 the Administrator, authorize the Administrator to administer notice of the Settlement to the Class,
7 and set a final approval hearing date.

8 **II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

9 On June 21, 2024, Plaintiff provided written notice to the LWDA and Defendant of the
10 specific provisions the Labor Code alleged to have been violated, including the facts and theories
11 in support. Declaration of John G. Yslas in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval
12 of Class Action and PAGA Settlement ("MPA") ("Yslas Decl.") at ¶ 3, Exhibit 1. The LWDA did
13 not notify Plaintiff that it intended to investigate within 65 days of this written notice. Yslas Decl.
14 at ¶ 3.

15 On September 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed this putative class action against Defendant alleging:
16 (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure
17 to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay
18 final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to
19 indemnify employees for expenditures; (8) failure to produce requested employment records; and
20 (9) unfair business practices ("Class Action"). Yslas Decl. at ¶ 4. On October 18, 2024, Plaintiff
21 filed a separate representative action against Defendant for civil penalties under PAGA in the
22 Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. 24STCV27305 ("PAGA Action").
23 *Id.*

24 On December 6, 2024, the Court deemed the Class Action and PAGA Action related within
25 the meaning of the California Rules of Court and designated the Class Action as the lead case.
26 Yslas Decl. at ¶ 5.

27 On July 10, 2025, the Parties participated in a private full-day mediation with mediator,
28 Anthony F. Pantoni. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 6. The negotiations were adversarial, conducted at arm's

length, and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interests of their clients. *Id.* With the help of the mediator, the Parties were able to reach an agreement on general settlement terms. *Id.* The Parties memorialized their agreement in a Memorandum of Understanding in August 2025. *Id.*

The Parties negotiated the terms of the Settlement over the next several months and fully executed the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement in March 2026. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 7, Exhibit 2 (“Settlement Agreement”). On April 20, 2026, Plaintiff submitted a copy of the Settlement Agreement to the LWDA. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 8, Exhibit 4.

III. SUMMARY OF THE SETTLEMENT TERMS

A. Terms of the Proposed Settlement

The parties have agreed to settle the claims alleged in this Class Action and PAGA Action for a Gross Settlement Amount of \$325,000.00. Settlement Agreement at § 3.1. Subject to Court approval, the following payments will be deducted from the Gross Settlement Amount: (1) a Class Representative Service Payment of up to \$7,500.00 to Plaintiff; (2) attorneys’ fees of up to one third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently estimated to be \$108,333.33) and reimbursement of litigation costs of up to \$25,000.00 to Plaintiff’s Counsel; (3) costs of settlement administration of up to \$4,750.00 to Apex Class Action; (4) individual class payments to Class Members; and (5) PAGA penalties in the amount of \$15,000.00, which will be allocated 65% to the LWDA (\$9,750.00) and 35% to Aggrieved Employees (\$5,250.00). *Id.* at § 3.2. After all requested deductions are made, the remaining Net Settlement Amount is currently estimated to be \$164,416.67. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 21; Declaration of Sean Hartranft of Apex Class Action in Support of Plaintiff’s MPA (“Hartranft Decl.”) at ¶ 7, Exhibit B.

Individual class payments will be calculated based on the number of workweeks worked by each Class Member during the Class Period. Settlement Agreement at § 3.2.4. For tax purposes, the individual class payments will be allocated 10% to wages and 90% to interest, reimbursement, and penalties. *Id.* at § 3.2.4.1. Defendant will separately pay any and all employer payroll taxes owed on the wage positions of the individual class payments separate from the Gross Settlement Amount. *Id.* at 3.1.

1 Individual PAGA Payments to Aggrieved Employees will be calculated based on the
2 number of PAGA Pay Periods worked by each Aggrieved Employee during the PAGA Period. *Id.*
3 at § 3.2.5.1. For tax purposes, the Individual PAGA Payments will be allocated 100% to penalties.
4 *Id.* at § 3.2.5.2.

5 Any deductions not approved by the Court will be retained by the Settlement Administrator
6 in the Net Settlement Amount. *Id.* at §§ 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.5.2. Funds from any uncashed checks
7 will be transmitted by the Settlement Administrator to the California Controller's Unclaimed
8 Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no "unpaid residue." *Id.* at § 4.4.3.
9 None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant. *Id.* at § 3.1.

10 **B. Proposed Settlement Administration**

11 The parties' proposed Class Notice complies with the requirements of California Rules of
12 Court, rule 3.766(d). *See* Exhibit A to Settlement Agreement. It provides information regarding
13 the nature of this lawsuit, a summary of the settlement terms, the formula used for calculating
14 individual class and PAGA payments and instructions to dispute the calculations, instructions on
15 how to opt-out of or object to the Settlement, the date, time, and location of the final approval
16 hearing, and the amounts sought for the class representative service payment, attorneys' fees and
17 litigation costs, and settlement administration costs. *See generally, id.* The Class Notice also
18 notifies Class Members that they do not need to submit a claim to participate in the Settlement and
19 receive a payment. *See id.* The Settlement Administrator will mail Class Members the Class Notice
20 by first-class mail.² Settlement Agreement at § 7.4.2.

21 If a Class Notice is returned as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator will re-mail the
22 Class Notice within five (5) days to the forwarding address provided by the U.S. Postal Service.
23 *Id.* at § 7.4.3. If no forwarding address is provided, the Settlement Administrator will conduct a
24 Class Member Address Search and re-mail the Class Notice to the most current address obtained.
25 *Id.* The deadline to opt-out of the Settlement or to submit an objection or dispute will be extended
26 _____

27 ² Defense Counsel represented to Plaintiff's Counsel that the Class Members read
28 English, and that a translation of the Class Notice to any other language is therefore unnecessary.
Yslas Decl. at ¶ 39.

by 14 days for all Class Members whose Class Notice was remailed. *Id.* at § 7.4.4.

C. Proposed Releases

Effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the entire Gross Settlement Amount and all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portion of the Individual Class Payments, Plaintiff, Class Members, and Class Counsel will release claims against all Released Parties as follows:

Released Class Claims:

All Participating Class Members will release all claims, rights, demands, liabilities, and causes of action, alleged or which could have reasonably been alleged based on the facts alleged in the operative Complaint. The enumeration of these specific claims shall neither enlarge nor narrow the scope of res judicata based on the claims that were asserted in the Class Action or could have been asserted in the Class Action based on the facts and circumstances alleged in the Operative Class Complaint. The Released Class Claims are those that accrued during the Class Period.

Settlement Agreement at § 5.2.

Released PAGA Claims:

All Aggrieved Employees will release all claims for PAGA civil penalties that are alleged or reasonably could have been alleged based on the facts alleged in the Operative PAGA Complaint and in Plaintiff's June 21, 2024 PAGA Notice. The Released PAGA Claims are those that accrued during the PAGA Period.

Settlement Agreement at § 5.3.

"Released Parties" means Defendant. Settlement Agreement at § 1.43.

Only Plaintiff will agree to a general release and a waiver of Civil Code § 1542. *Id.* at §§ 5.1, 5.1.1.

IV. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT MEETS ALL CRITERIA FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL

A. Provisional Certification of the Class is Appropriate

Class certification is appropriate when there is: (1) an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class; (2) a well-defined community of interest among class members; and (3) substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives. *Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021 (2012). Although courts still need to review and consider each element for certification, a lesser standard can be used to provisionally certify a settlement class. *Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court*, 113 Cal.App.4th

836, 859 (2003).

1. The Proposed Class is Numerous and Ascertainable

“Ascertainability” is determined by examining the class definition and the size of the class, and may also involve examining the means available to identify class members. *Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.*, 7 Cal.5th 955, 980-981, 985-986 (2019). As the settlement eliminates the need for trial, “the case management issues inherent in the ascertainable class determination need not be confronted.” *Global Minerals*, 113 Cal.App.4th at 859. Further, under California law, there is no minimum number of class members for maintenance of a class action. *Hendershot v. Ready to Roll Transp., Inc.*, 228 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1222 (2014). Class sizes as small as 10 have been permitted. *Rose v. City of Hayward*, 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934 (1981), disapproved on other grounds by *Noel*, 7 Cal.5th at 986.

The Class here consists of all persons who worked for Defendant in California as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee at any time during the Class Period. *See* Settlement Agreement at § 1.5. The Class is also readily ascertainable from Defendant’s business records, because all Class Members are or were employees of Defendant. *Id.* Defendant’s records show there are approximately 112 Class Members, making joinder of all Class Members impracticable. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 10.

2. A Well-Defined Community of Interest Exists

The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. *Brinker*, 53 Cal.4th at 1021.

a. Common Questions Predominate

In determining whether common issues “predominate,” courts consider both plaintiff’s legal theories and defendant’s affirmative defenses. *Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n*, 59 Cal.4th 1, 28-29 (2014). The “predominate common questions” factor does not require that all class members have identical claims. *Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc.*, 59 Cal.4th 522, 530 (2014). Rather, the focus is on whether issues shared by the class members are sufficiently uniform to permit class-wide assessment, and whether individual variations in proof on those issues are

manageable. *Id.*

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant maintained common employment policies and/or practices that unlawfully deprived Class Members of wages, meal periods, rest periods, reimbursements for business expenses, accurate wage statements, timely payment of wages upon separation of employment, and timely production of employment records. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 11. These allegations present common factual and legal questions of, *inter alia*, whether Defendant applied the same scheduling, timekeeping, pay, meal period, rest period, reimbursement, and employment record production policies to all Class Members, whether these policies and practices resulted in Labor Code violations, whether Defendant's conduct was intentional, and whether Class Members are entitled to damages and/or penalties. *Id.* These common questions could be resolved using Class Members' time records, payroll records, testimony from Defendant's designated representative(s), and Class Members' testimony. *Id.* Therefore, the Court can and should exercise its discretion to grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes.

b. Plaintiff is Typical of the Class

Typicality does not require that the representative plaintiff's claims and those of the class members be identical or perfectly aligned. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 228 (2001), disapproved on other grounds by *Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.*, 4 Cal.5th 260, 269-280 (2018). Typicality does not require that a plaintiff's claims be identical to those of other class members, only that their claims and the defenses applicable to them are sufficiently similar to those of other class members that a named plaintiff is able to adequately represent the class and focus on common issues. *Medrazo v. Honda of North Hollywood*, 166 Cal.App.4th 89, 99 (2008).

Plaintiff has alleged that she and Class Members were employed by the same Defendant and injured by Defendant's common wage and hour policies and practices, including Defendant's scheduling, timekeeping, pay, meal period, rest period, reimbursement, and employment record production policies. *See* Yslas Decl. at ¶ 11. Through informal discovery, Plaintiff confirmed that these challenged policies and practices applied to Plaintiff and other Class Members alike. *See id.* at ¶ 9. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims and Class Members' claims arise from the same challenged

1 employment policies and practices and are based on the same legal theories.

2 **c. Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Counsel Will Adequately Represent the**
3 **Class**

4 Certification requires adequacy of both the proposed class representative and of the
5 proposed class counsel. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 382. "Only a conflict that goes to the very subject
6 matter of the litigation will defeat a party's claim of representative status." *Richmond v. Dart*
7 *Industries*, 29 Cal.3d 462, 470 (1981). Only conflicts that are "irreconcilable" can defeat adequacy.
8 *Nat'l Solar Equip. Owners' Ass'n v. Grumman Corp.*, 235 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1286 (1991). The
9 proposed representative Plaintiff and proposed Class Counsel present no such conflict.

10 Plaintiff's interests are coextensive with Class Members' interests. Declaration of Judaea
11 Breaux in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA
12 Settlement ("Breux Decl.") at ¶ 6. Plaintiff has demonstrated an ability to advocate for the
13 interests of Class Members by initiating this lawsuit, providing information and documentation to
14 her attorneys, meeting with her attorneys regarding the claims, making herself available the day of
15 mediation to answer questions, and reviewing the proposed Settlement. Breux Decl. at ¶ 11.

16 Likewise, Wilshire Law Firm, PLC has expended considerable time and effort on this case
17 and will continue to do so through final approval. *See generally*, Yslas Decl. Therefore, Plaintiff
18 should be appointed Class Representative, and her counsel should be appointed Class Counsel.

19 **3. A Class Action is Superior to a Multitude of Individual Lawsuits**

20 Courts have held that class treatment of wage and hour claims is clearly "superior to the
21 other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." *Dean Witter*
22 *Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 211 Cal.App.3d 758, 772-773 (1989). This is so because "[p]ublic
23 policy has long favored the 'full and prompt payment of wages due an employee.'" *Sav-On Drug*
24 *Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.4th 319, 340 (2004). Here, a class action is superior to a
25 multitude of individual lawsuits. Given the size and amount of each Class Members' claim, Class
26 Members have little incentive to litigate their claims on an individual basis because the out-of-
27 pocket expenses and personal commitment necessary to litigate each claim likely outweigh any
28 potential recovery. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 10. Therefore, a class action is the superior method for seeking

1 relief.

2 **B. The Settlement Meets the Standards for Preliminary Approval**

3 The moving party must demonstrate that “the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable.”
4 *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 126 (2008). “In determining whether a
5 class settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors,
6 such as the strength of plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further
7 litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement,
8 the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of
9 counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the
10 proposed settlement.” *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 244-245 (internal quotations and citations
11 omitted).

12 **1. The Settlement is Entitled to a Presumption of Fairness**

13 A settlement is entitled to “a presumption of fairness . . . where: (1) the settlement is reached
14 through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel
15 and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the
16 percentage of objectors is small.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996).
17 The Settlement here satisfies the first three factors. Plaintiff will analyze the fourth factor at final
18 approval after Class Members have been notified of the Settlement and provided with an
19 opportunity to object.

20 **a. The Settlement is the Result of Arm’s Length Negotiation**

21 Courts have recognized that the involvement of a respected mediator provides a high degree
22 of assurance that the settlement is the result of arm’s length bargaining. *See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*,
23 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 52-53 (2008). The Settlement in this matter was the product of a full-day
24 mediation session with a respected mediator. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 6. The negotiations were adversarial,
25 conducted at arm’s length, and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interests of their
26 clients. *Id.*

27 **b. Sufficient Investigation and Discovery Have Been Conducted**

28 Prior to attending mediation, Plaintiff’s Counsel thoroughly investigated the claims,

1 applicable law, and potential defenses. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 9. Plaintiff's Counsel assessed the value to
2 the class claims using the data and documents Defendant produced in informal discovery. *Id.* The
3 data and documents produced by Defendant included the number of Class Members and Aggrieved
4 Employees, the number of workweeks in the Class Period, and the number of pay periods in the
5 PAGA Period, the average rate of pay, Defendant's schedules, a sampling of Class Members' time
6 and payroll records, and documents concerning Defendant's financial condition from
7 approximately 2022 to April 2025. *Id.* Plaintiff's Counsel engaged an expert to quantify the
8 potential exposure using the time and payroll records, and then assessed the risks associated with
9 each claim meriting reductions in the likely success at class certification and likely recovery at
10 trial. *Id.*

11 **c. Plaintiff's Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation**

12 Plaintiff is represented by Wilshire Law Firm, PLC. *Id.* at ¶ 1. Plaintiff's Counsel has
13 extensive experience litigating wage-and-hour class actions on behalf of employees. *See id.* at
14 ¶¶ 23-36. Plaintiff's Counsel has been involved as counsel in numerous class actions that have
15 resulted in millions of dollars in recovery. *See id.*

16 **2. The Settlement is Reasonable Given the Strengths of Plaintiff's**
17 **Claims and the Risks and Expense of Further Litigation**

18 A settlement does not have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be considered fair
19 and reasonable. *See Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1139 (1991). Although
20 the exposure Plaintiff's Counsel calculated is substantial, the various risks at succeeding at class
21 certification and through trial affected the valuation of the claims for settlement purposes. Yslas
22 Decl. at ¶ 12. Based on an analysis of the facts and legal contentions in this case, documents and
23 information from Defendant, Plaintiff's Counsel evaluated Defendant's maximum exposure. *Id.*
24 Plaintiff's Counsel took into account the risk of not having the claims certified and the risk of not
25 having prevailed at trial, even if the claims are certified. *Id.* After using the data Defendant
26 provided, including class member timekeeping and payroll records, as well as class member
27 demographics, with the assistance of a statistics expert, Plaintiff's Counsel created a damages
28 model to evaluate the realistic range of potential recovery for the class. *Id.*

1 Minimum and Overtime Wages: Plaintiffs' unpaid minimum and overtime wage claims
2 were based on the allegation that Defendant failed to properly pay minimum wages and overtimes
3 wages. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 13. For example, Plaintiff alleged that when she and other Class Members
4 worked overtime, Defendant failed to pay her and other Class Members at the overtime rate of pay.
5 *Id.* Plaintiff's Counsel's expert found determined that approximately 700 overtime hours were paid
6 at Class Members' hourly rate instead of their overtime rate. Therefore, potential exposure for
7 these claims is approximately \$6,422.50 (700 hours x \$18.35 average hourly rate of pay x 0.50).
8 *Id.* Plaintiffs' Counsel applied a risk discount based on a 50% chance of succeeding at class
9 certification and a 40% chance of succeeding at trial on the merits, yielding a realistic damage
10 estimate of approximately \$1,284.50 (\$6,422.50 x 50% x 40%). *Id.*

11 Meal Periods: Plaintiff's meal period claim was based on the allegation that Defendant
12 failed to provide Class Members with legally compliant meal periods or pay meal period premiums
13 in lieu thereof. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 14. For example, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant implemented
14 policies and practices requiring her and other Class Members to remain available and take
15 appointments and provide customer service during their meal periods which resulted in meal
16 periods that were not uninterrupted and duty-free. *Id.* Additionally, Plaintiff's Counsel's expert
17 found a facial violation rate of approximately 11.7% in Defendant's time and payroll records for
18 shifts greater than five (5) hours. *Id.* Based on these allegations, Plaintiff's Counsel applied a 60%
19 violation rate to all shifts of five (5) hours or longer. *Id.* Therefore, potential liability for the meal
20 period claims is approximately \$209,663.43 (19,043 shifts greater than 5 hours x \$18.35 hourly
21 rate x 60% violation rate). *Id.* However, Defendant argued that Class Members were covered by
22 meal period waivers. *Id.* Accordingly, Plaintiff's Counsel applied a risk discount based on a 50%
23 chance of succeeding at class certification and a 40% chance of succeeding at trial on the merits,
24 yielding a realistic damage estimate of approximately \$41,932.69 (\$209,663.43 x 50% x 40%). *Id.*

25 Rest Periods: Plaintiff's rest period claim was based on the allegation that Defendant failed
26 to provide Class Members with legally compliant rest periods or pay rest period premiums in lieu
27 thereof. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 15. For example, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant implemented policies
28 and practices requiring her and other Class Members to remain available and take appointments

1 and provide customer service during their meal periods which resulted in rest periods that were not
2 uninterrupted and duty-free. *Id.* Based on these allegations, Plaintiff's Counsel applied a 100%
3 violation rate to all shifts of 3.5 hours or longer. *Id.* Therefore, potential liability for the rest period
4 claims is approximately \$430,601.10 (73,439 shifts of 3.5 hours or longer x \$18.35 hourly rate x
5 100% violation rate). *Id.* However, Plaintiff's Counsel discounted this figure to account for the
6 difficulty of certifying and proving rest period claims, particularly because rest periods do not have
7 to be recorded, and to account for the possibility of Class Members voluntarily choosing to forego
8 a rest period. *Id.* Because this claim would have relied exclusively on Class Member testimony,
9 Plaintiff's Counsel discounted this claim based on a 30% chance of succeeding at class certification
10 and a 20% chance of succeeding at trial, yielding a realistic damage estimate of approximately
11 \$25,836.07 (\$430,601.10 x 30% x 20%). *Id.*

12 Reimbursements: Plaintiff's reimbursement claim was based on the allegation that
13 Defendant failed to indemnify Class Members for expenses incurred as a direct result of performing
14 their job duties for Defendant. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 16. For example, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant
15 required her and other Class Members to use their personal cell phones on a daily basis as the
16 primary method of contact to respond to work inquiries, schedule appointments, and access
17 Defendant's point-of-sale system, however Defendant never reimbursed them for these costs. *Id.*
18 For purposes of calculating Defendant's liability based on a best-case scenario for Plaintiff and the
19 Class, Plaintiff's Counsel estimated that Defendant were liable to each class member for \$25 per
20 pay period, or \$12.50 per workweek, in unreimbursed expenses, for a total amount of
21 approximately \$102,862.50 (\$12.50 x 8,229 workweeks). *Id.* Plaintiff's Counsel discounted this
22 figure based on an evaluation of a 30% chance of succeeding at class certification and a 30%
23 chance of succeeding at trial to account for the difficulty of certifying and proving expense
24 reimbursement claims, yielding a realistic damage estimate of approximately \$9,257.63
25 (\$102,862.50 x 30% x 30%). *Id.*

26 In sum, Plaintiff's Counsel estimated that Plaintiff's maximum recovery for the off-the-
27 clock claim, meal period violations, and rest period violations (i.e., the wage claims) is
28 approximately \$646,687.03, but after factoring in the risk and uncertainty of certification and

1 prevailing at trial, Plaintiff's Counsel estimates that Plaintiff's realistic estimated recovery for
2 these non-penalty wage claims is approximately \$69,053.26. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 17.

3 Employment Records: Plaintiff's employment records claim was based on the allegation
4 that Defendant failed to timely produce requested employment records to Class Members. Yslas
5 Decl. at ¶ 18. For purposes of calculating Defendant's liability based on a best-case scenario for
6 Plaintiff and the Class, Plaintiff's Counsel calculated Defendant's maximum potential liability to
7 be approximately \$84,000.00 (112 Class Members x \$750.00). *Id.* Plaintiff's Counsel discounted
8 this figure based on an evaluation of a 30% chance of succeeding at class certification and a 60%
9 chance of succeeding at trial to account for the difficulty of certifying and proving the claims,
10 yielding a realistic damage estimate of approximately \$15,120.00 (\$84,000.00 x 30% x 60%). *Id.*

11 Derivative Penalties: Plaintiff alleged that as a result of Defendant's failure to pay all wages
12 owed, Defendant owed waiting time penalties and wage statement penalties. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 19.
13 With respect to Plaintiff's derivative claims for statutory penalties, Plaintiff's Counsel estimated
14 that Defendant's realistic potential liability is approximately \$26,105.01. *Id.* Defendant's
15 maximum potential liability for waiting time penalties is approximately \$312,133.50 (90
16 employees x \$18.35 hourly rate x 6.30 hours/day x 30 days) based on approximately 90 formerly
17 employed class members during the 3-year statute of limitations period and an average shift length
18 of 6.30 hours. *Id.* Defendant's maximum potential liability for inaccurate wage statements is
19 approximately \$122,950.00 ([61 employees x 1 initial violation/employee x \$50 for an initial
20 violation] + [(1,260 pay periods - 61 initial violations) x \$100 for each subsequent violation]) based
21 on approximately 61 class members who worked during the 1-year statute of limitations period
22 and approximately 1,260 pay periods in that statutory timeframe. *Id.* In light of the foregoing,
23 Plaintiff's Counsel believes that it would be unrealistic to expect the Court to award the full
24 \$435,083.50 in statutory penalties given Defendant's defenses, the contested nature of Plaintiff's
25 claims, the challenges of establishing willfulness as applicable, and the discretionary nature of
26 penalties. *Id.* Considering that the underlying wage claims are realistically estimated to be
27 approximately \$69,053.26, such a disproportionate award would also raise due process concerns.
28 *Id.* As such, Plaintiff's counsel discounted these figures to account for the risk and uncertainty of

1 obtaining class certification and prevailing at trial, resulting in a realistic evaluation of
2 approximately \$18,728.01 for waiting time penalty claims ($\$312,133.50 \times 30\% \times 20\%$), and
3 approximately \$7,377.00 for wage statement penalty claims ($\$122,950.00 \times 30\% \times 20\%$), or
4 approximately \$26,105.01 total for statutory penalties. *Id.*

5 PAGA: For the PAGA claim, Plaintiff's Counsel determined that Defendant's potential
6 exposure could potentially reach \$150,000.00, assuming the initial \$100 penalty would apply for
7 each of the 1,500 pay periods in the PAGA Period. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 20. However, even assuming
8 success on the merits of each claim, PAGA gives the Court discretion to reduce penalties for a
9 variety of reasons, including where to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary
10 and oppressive, or confiscatory. *Id.* As such, Plaintiff's counsel discounted this figure to account
11 for the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at trial, resulting in a realistic evaluation of approximately
12 \$45,000.00 for PAGA penalties ($\$150,000.00 \times 30\%$). *Id.* The settlement allocates \$15,000.00 of
13 the Gross Settlement Amount to PAGA, therefore the PAGA allocation amounts to approximately
14 4.6% of the Gross Settlement Amount and approximately 33% of the realistic maximum damages
15 for PAGA penalties ($\$15,000.00 / \$45,000.00$). *Id.*

16 Using these estimated figures, Plaintiff's Counsel predicted that the realistic maximum
17 recovery for all claims, including penalties, would be approximately \$164,535.90. Yslas Decl. at
18 ¶ 21. This means that the realistic maximum recovery represents approximately 51% of the gross
19 settlement figure ($\$164,535.90 / \$325,000.00$). *Id.* Considering the risk and uncertainty of
20 prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. *Id.* Indeed,
21 because of the proposed Settlement, Class Members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will
22 avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. *Id.*

23 Based on the figures in the Settlement Agreement, the Net Settlement Amount available for
24 class settlement payments is currently estimated to be \$164,416.67 for approximately 112 Class
25 Members. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 22. As a result, each Settlement Class Member would be eligible to
26 receive an average net benefit of approximately \$1,468.01. *Id.* Based on the estimated Net
27 Settlement Amount available for individual class payments and there being approximately 8,229
28 workweeks in the Class Period, the estimated weekly valuation for individual class payments is

1 \$19.98 (\$164,416.67 / 8,229 workweeks). *Id.*

2 **C. The Requested Service Payment is Reasonable**

3 Plaintiff seeks a class representative service payment of up to \$7,500.00 for accepting the
4 responsibilities of representing the interests of the Class and potential costs that were not borne by
5 any other Class Members. Settlement Agreement at § 3.2.1. A named plaintiff is eligible for
6 payment that reasonably compensates him or her for undertaking and fulfilling a fiduciary duty to
7 represent absent class members. *See Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 186 Cal.App.4th 1380,
8 1393 (2010); *Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 115 Cal.App.4th 715, 726 (2004).

9 Throughout this case, Plaintiff assisted counsel in providing information necessary to
10 prosecute the claims, meeting with counsel regarding the claims, maintaining regular contact with
11 counsel, making herself available the day of mediation to answer questions, and reviewing the
12 Settlement to ensure it was fair to the Class. Breaux Decl. at ¶ 11. No action would likely have
13 been taken by Class Members individually and no compensation would have been recovered for
14 them, but for Plaintiff's services on behalf of the Class. By actively pursuing this action, Plaintiff
15 furthered the California public policy goal of enforcing the State's wage and hour laws. *See Sav-*
16 *On*, 34 Cal.4th at 340. The requested class representative service payment is reasonable and should
17 be preliminarily approved. Plaintiff has provided a declaration regarding her work performed to
18 date and will provide additional information as requested or required by the Court at final approval.

19 **D. The Requested Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

20 The purpose of an attorneys' fee award in class action litigation is to reward counsel who
21 invested in a case despite the risk of non-payment and achieved a substantial positive result for the
22 class. California courts routinely award attorneys' fees equaling one third or more of the potential
23 value of the common fund. *See Chavez*, 162 Cal.App.4th at 66, fn. 11 ("Empirical studies show
24 that, regardless of whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in
25 class actions average around one-third of the recovery.").

26 Additionally, courts utilize "multipliers" to account for the risk of taking on cases where
27 there is no guarantee of recovery, uncertainties as to the amount that will be recovered, uncertainty
28 as to the cost of litigating the case (both in effort and expenses), and uncertainty about how much

1 time will pass before the recovery is obtained. *Ketchum v. Moses*, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-33 (2001);
2 *see also Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 48-49 (1977) (approving the adjustment of the lodestar
3 figure based on factors specific to the case to ensure fair market value for legal services provided
4 on a contingency basis). Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is
5 brought to redress important rights of vulnerable persons. *Ketchum*, 24 Cal.4th at 1133.

6 Generally, “[m]ultipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher.” *Wershba v. Apple*
7 *Computers, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255 (2001); *see also Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases*,
8 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (2009) (applying a 2.52 multiplier on a cross-check in an antitrust class
9 action); *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 60 (2008) (applying a 2.5 multiplier on a
10 lodestar cross-check); *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002)
11 (“most” common fund cases apply a multiplier of 1.0-4.0); *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l*, 231
12 Cal.App.4th 860, 881-82 (2004) (affirming a 2.13 multiplier after finding that “2 to 4” is a
13 reasonable range for multipliers on a cross-check). *See also Bronshteyn v. State of California –*
14 *Department of Consumer Affairs*, 114 Cal.App.5th 537 (2025) (court did not abuse its discretion
15 by awarding 1.75 multiplier for fees incurred up to and including the jury verdict and a 1.25
16 enhancement for hours worked after the verdict where hourly rates for plaintiff’s five senior
17 attorneys were \$1,100.00 and \$1,000.00); *Tran v. Golden State FC LLC, et al.* (LASC Case No.
18 BC699931), Fee Order filed April 8, 2022 (approving hourly rate of \$1,300.00 for plaintiff’s 32-
19 year attorney).

20 Plaintiff seeks appointment of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel. The attorneys
21 performed significant work and expended litigation costs in prosecuting this matter with no
22 guarantee of payment. Yslas Decl. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff’s Counsel seeks preliminary approval of up to
23 one third (1/3) of the Gross Settlement Amount, currently estimated to be \$108,333.33, and up to
24 \$25,000.00 in reimbursement of litigation costs. Given the work performed in this matter, the
25 extensive information exchange, and the substantial recovery obtained on behalf of the Class,
26 Plaintiff’s Counsel achieved a settlement through efficient and diligent work. *See generally*, Yslas
27 Decl. At final approval, Plaintiff’s Counsel will fully brief the merits of its request for the award
28 of attorneys’ fees and litigation costs.

The Parties have agreed upon using Apex Class Action to administer this Settlement Agreement at § 1.2. Plaintiff seeks preliminary approval of \$4,750.00 for Apex Class Action to administer this Settlement pursuant to Apex Class Action's will-not-exceed bid. *See* Hartranft Decl. at ¶ 7, Exhibit B.

The Parties have negotiated a fair and reasonable settlement of the class claims in light of the risks presented in this case. Plaintiff has presented the materials and information necessary to demonstrate that the requirements for preliminary approval have been met, and therefore respectfully request that the Court preliminarily approve the Settlement and schedule a date for the final approval hearing.

Dated: April 20, 2026

Courtney M. Miller
Attorneys for Plaintiff