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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE

JOSE RAMIRO LOBATO BARCENAS,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

BAMBUZA OC VENTURES LLC, a California
limited liability company; BAMBUZA SMF
VENTURES LLC, a California limited liability
company; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 30-2024-01415928-CU-OE-CXC

Assigned for all purposes to:
Hon. Melissa R. McCormick
Dept. CX105

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION AND PAGA
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: June 11, 2026
Time: 2:00 p.m.
Dept: CX105

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on **June 11, 2026 at 2:00 p.m.**, in the Orange County
3 Superior Court, located at 751 West Santa Ana Blvd., Santa Ana, CA 92701, pursuant to California
4 Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769, *et seq.*, Plaintiffs Jose
5 Ramiro Lobato Barcenas (individually, “Plaintiff Barcenas”) and Kaitlyn Horton (individually,
6 “Plaintiff Horton”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) on behalf of themselves, the State of California, as
7 a private attorney general, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, will and hereby do move
8 the Court for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed Class action and PAGA
9 settlement on the terms and conditions set forth in the Class Action and PAGA Settlement
10 Agreement and Class Notice (“Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”) between Plaintiffs and
11 Defendants Bambuza OC Ventures LLC and Bambuza SMF Ventures LLC (“Defendants,” and
12 together with Plaintiffs, the “Parties”), a copy of which is attached to the Declaration of Arrash T.
13 Fattahi as **Exhibit 4**. Plaintiffs further move the Court for an Order:

- 14 1. Granting preliminary approval of the proposed Settlement Agreement;
- 15 2. Conditionally certifying the proposed Class for settlement purposes only pursuant to
16 California Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and California Rules of Court, rule
17 3.769;
- 18 3. Approving the proposed Class Notice and the plan for distribution of the Class Notice
19 as provided by the Settlement Agreement;
- 20 4. Appointing Plaintiffs as class representatives for settlement purposes;
- 21 5. Appointing Plaintiffs’ Counsel, Arrash T. Fattahi, Lisa B. Iturriaga, and Arman A.
22 Salehi of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
- 23 6. Appointing APEX Class Action Administrators (“APEX”) as the Settlement
24 Administrator and authorizing APEX to send notice of the Settlement to the Class
25 Members and proceed as provided by the Settlement Agreement;
- 26 7. Approving the proposed deadlines for the notice and administration process as
27 reflected in this Motion and in the Settlement Agreement; and
- 28 8. Scheduling a Final Approval Hearing.

1 Pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.769(d) and (e), the Motion for Preliminary
2 Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement (“Motion”) is made on the grounds that the
3 proposed Settlement Agreement satisfies all criteria for preliminary approval under California law
4 and falls well within the range of reasonableness; the Agreement was reached through informed,
5 arms-length bargaining between experienced attorneys, and Plaintiffs and Class Counsel will fairly
6 and adequately represent the Class Members.

7 The Motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and
8 authorities, the [Proposed] Order Granting Preliminary Approval, the accompanying declarations
9 filed concurrently herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or
10 argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

11
12
13 Dated: April 1, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

14 By: *Lisa Iturriaga*

15 Arrash T. Fattahi
16 Lisa B. Iturriaga
Arman A. Salehi

17 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Jose Ramiro Lobato Barcenas (individually, “Plaintiff Barcenas”) and Kaitlyn Horton (individually, “Plaintiff Horton”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) seek preliminary approval of a proposed \$425,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendants Bambuza OC Ventures LLC and Bambuza SMF Ventures LLC (“Defendants,” and together with Plaintiffs, the “Parties”). This motion for preliminary approval is unopposed. The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 139 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arm’s length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Phillip K. Cha, Esq., over the course of a full day of mediation. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendants’ defenses, the Parties reached a settlement. As discussed below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all criteria for preliminary settlement approval under California law and falls within the range of reasonableness. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiffs’ Claims

This is a wage and hour Class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiffs and putative class members worked as non-exempt, hourly-paid employees for Defendants in the state of California during the Class Period. (Declaration of Arrash T. Fattahi in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement [“Fattahi Decl.”], ¶ 2.) Defendants operate numerous restaurants and retail locations, including franchise partners like The Coffee Bean & Tea Leaf and Sambazon. (*Id.*)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted

1 in Labor Code violations. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to pay for all hours worked.
2 Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and
3 rest periods, and Defendants failed to reimburse business expenses. Based on these allegations,
4 Plaintiffs assert related claims for failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay all final
5 wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.)

6 On June 20, 2024, Plaintiff Barcenas sent a notice to Defendants and the California Labor
7 & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant
8 to the PAGA. (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 4.) On July 30, 2024, Plaintiff Barcenas filed a putative wage and
9 hour class action complaint against Defendants for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time
10 wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to
11 authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (6)
12 failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; and (7) violation of Unfair Business Practices
13 (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, *et seq.*) (Case No. 30-2024-01415928-CU-OE-CXC) (“Class
14 Action”). (*Id.*) On October 16, 2024, Plaintiff Barcenas separately filed a PAGA Representative
15 Action Complaint (Case No. 30-2024-01433210-CU-OE-CXC) (“PAGA Action”). (*Id.*) On
16 October 18, 2024, Plaintiff Horton sent a notice to Defendants and the LWDA alleging similar
17 wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA. (*Id.*) On February 13, 2025, Plaintiff Barcenas
18 filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint adding additional facts to the Class Action
19 complaint. (*Id.*)

20 Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Plaintiff Barcenas will file a Second Amended
21 Class & Representative Action Complaint (“SAC”) which will add Plaintiff Horton as a named
22 plaintiff in this Action and add additional claims for Defendants’ failure to timely pay final
23 wages and civil penalties under PAGA, prior to the hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
24 Approval. (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 5.) Attached as **Exhibit 3** to the Declaration of Arrash T. Fattahi is
25 the proposed SAC that Plaintiff Barcenas requests leave of Court to file. (*Id.*) Once filed, the
26 SAC will become the Operative Complaint. (*Id.*) After the SAC is filed, Plaintiff Barcenas will
27 dismiss the PAGA Action. (*Id.*)
28

1 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

2 Following the filing of the initial complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and
3 information before mediating this action. (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 6.) Defendants produced a sampling
4 of timekeeping and pay records for the class members. (*Id.*) Defendants also provided a
5 significant number of documents of its wage and hour policies and practices during the class
6 and PAGA periods, exemplar wage statements, Plaintiffs’ personnel file, information regarding
7 the total number of current and former employees, and total number of workweeks and pay
8 periods during the relevant period, and other requested information in its informal discovery
9 responses. (*Id.*)

10 After reviewing documents regarding Defendants’ wage and hour policies and practices
11 and analyzing Defendants’ timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate
12 the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendants’ maximum monetary
13 exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding
14 the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these records
15 and utilized an expert to prepare a damages analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*)

16 **C. Settlement Negotiations**

17 On March 7, 2025, the Parties participated in a private mediation with experienced class
18 action mediator, Phillip K. Cha, Esq. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) The settlement negotiations were at arm’s
19 length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. The Parties went
20 into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side
21 was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been
22 reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and
23 weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendants’ defenses, the Parties reached a settlement, the
24 material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 9, **Ex. 4** [Class Action
25 and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice].) The Parties spent the next several months
26 negotiating the terms of the Settlement, which was finalized in March of 2026. (*Id.*) The
27 negotiations were adversarial, conducted at arm’s length and tempered by the efforts of both
28 sides to serve the interests of their clients.

1 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
2 on the Parties' informal exchange of documents and information and Class Counsel's own
3 independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is
4 fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members in
5 light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could
6 be asserted by Defendants both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk.
7 (*Id.* at ¶ 14.)

8 Indeed, the \$425,000.00 Settlement represents approximately **94%** of the **realistic**
9 **maximum recovery** of \$451,218.19. (*Id.* at ¶ 23.) Although Class Counsel estimated that
10 Defendants' maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$1.93 million, when
11 the risk of prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel
12 believes that Defendants' realistic exposure was approximately \$451,218.19, meaning the
13 Settlement achieves a significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 15-27.) Considering the risk and
14 uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class.
15 (*Id.* at ¶ 23.) Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely,
16 guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. (*Id.*)

17 **D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

18 The Settlement's key terms include:

19 1. Settlement Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the
20 certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: "all persons
21 employed by BAMBUZA in California and classified as an hourly-paid non-exempt employee who
22 worked for BAMBUZA during the Class Period." (Settlement, § 1.5.)

23 2. Class Period: means "the period from March 29, 2021 to May 6, 2025." (Settlement, §
24 1.12.)

25 3. Settlement Class Members: means "a member of the Class, as either a Participating
26 Class Member or Non-Participating Class Member (including a Non- Participating Class Member
27 who qualifies as an Aggrieved Employee)." (Settlement, § 1.9.)
28

1 4. Aggrieved Employees: means “a person employed by BAMBUZA in California and
2 classified as an hourly-paid non-exempt employee who worked for BAMBUZA during the PAGA
3 Period.” (Settlement, § 1.4.)

4 5. PAGA Period: means “the period from June 20, 2023 to May 6, 2025.” (Settlement, §
5 1.31.)

6 6. Gross Settlement Amount: “Except as otherwise provided by Paragraph 8 below,
7 BAMBUZA promises to pay \$425,000.00 and no more as the Gross Settlement Amount and to
8 separately pay any and all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portions of the Individual
9 Class Payments. BAMBUZA has no obligation to pay the Gross Settlement Amount (or any
10 payroll taxes) prior to the deadline stated in Paragraph 4.2 of this Agreement. The Administrator
11 will disburse the entire Gross Settlement Amount without asking or requiring Participating Class
12 Members or Aggrieved Employees to submit any claim as a condition of payment. None of the
13 Gross Settlement Amount will revert to BAMBUZA.” (Settlement, § 3.1.)

14 7. Cy Pres: For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check or Individual
15 PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date, the Administrator shall
16 transmit the funds to The KABA Foundation pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure
17 section 384. The Parties have selected The KABA Foundation as the *cy pres* recipient. If the
18 Court does not approve the *cy pres* designee, the Parties shall select a new *cy pres* designee, with
19 approval by the Court. (Settlement, § 4.3.3.)

20 8. Release by Participating Class Members Who Are Not Aggrieved Employees: All
21 class members who do not opt-out will release Defendants from any and all claims asserted in the
22 Operative Complaint, and any future amendments to the Operative Complaint, including, but not
23 limited to, all claims pleaded in the Operative Complaint and which could have been alleged
24 under the same or similar facts, allegations and/or claims pleaded in the Operative Complaint,
25 against the Defendants, for work performed during the Class Period, including but not limited to
26 the following:

27 a. The claims set forth in the Operative Complaint, specifically: alleged
28 unfair competition in violation of California Business and Professions Code section 17200;

1 failure to provide required meal periods in violation of California Labor Code sections 226.7 and
2 512 and the applicable IWC Wage Order; failure to authorize and permit rest periods in violation
3 of California Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512; failure to provide wages when due in violation
4 of California Labor Code sections 201 - 203; failure to provide accurate itemized wage
5 statements in violation of California Labor Code section 226; failure to indemnify employees for
6 expenditures in violation of California Labor Code section 2802; violation of California Labor
7 Code section 204; and violation of the Private Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code
8 sections 2698, et seq., including but not limited to alleged violations of California Labor Code
9 sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 215, 226, 226.3, 226.4, 226.6, 226.7, 510, 512, 558, 1194,
10 1198, 2802 and the applicable Industrial Wage Order(s);

11 b. or premiums in connection therewith, as well as any claims under the
12 California Labor Code and California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders that were
13 alleged or which could have been alleged under the same or similar facts, allegations and/or
14 claims pleaded in the Operative Complaint;

15 c. Any claims for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, restitution, fraudulent
16 business practices or punitive damages alleged or which could have been alleged under the facts,
17 allegations and/or claims pleaded in the complaints filed as part of the lawsuit; and

18 d. Any and all other claims under California common law, the California
19 Labor Code, including but not limited to the Private Attorneys General Act, the Fair Labor
20 Standards Act, California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders, and the California
21 Business and Professions Code, that reasonably could have been alleged based on the facts stated
22 in the Operative Complaint and ascertained in the course of the action, as it applies to non-
23 exempt, hourly-paid employees that worked for Defendants in California only. In addition, to the
24 extent required by law, the cashing of the settlement check by the Settlement Class Member shall
25 be deemed to be an opt-in for purposes of releasing Defendants from any claims predicated under
26 the FLSA that could have been alleged under the same or similar facts, allegations and/or claims
27 pleaded in the Operative Complaint. The Settlement Administrator shall include a legend on the
28 settlement check stating, "By cashing this check, I am opting into the settlement in Jose Ramiro

1 Lobato Barcenas, et al. v. Bambuza OC Ventures LLC, et al., Orange County Superior Court,
2 Case Nos. 30-2024-01415928-CU-OE-CXC, under FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and releasing the
3 Released Claims described in the Settlement Agreement.” (Settlement, § 5.2)

4 9. Release by Non-Participating Class Members Who Are Aggrieved Employees: All
5 Non-Participating Class Members who are Aggrieved Employees are deemed to release, on
6 behalf of themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys,
7 heirs, administrators, successors, and assigns, the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA
8 penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts stated in
9 the Operative Complaint and the PAGA Notice, and ascertained in the course of the Action
10 including the failure to pay minimum and straight time wages, failure to pay overtime wages,
11 failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and permit rest periods, failure to timely pay
12 final wages at termination, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and failure to
13 indemnify employees for expenditures. (Settlement, § 5.3)

14 10. PAGA Penalties & PAGA Payment: “PAGA Penalties in the amount of \$35,000.00 to
15 be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount, with 65% (\$22,750.00) allocated to the LWDA PAGA
16 Payment and 35% (\$12,250.00) allocated to the Individual PAGA Payments.” (Settlement, § 3.2.5)
17 “The Administrator will calculate each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of
18 the Aggrieved Employees’ 35% share of PAGA Penalties by the total number of PAGA Period
19 Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the
20 result by each Aggrieved Employee’s PAGA Period Pay Periods. Aggrieved Employees assume
21 full responsibility and liability for any taxes owed on their Individual PAGA Payment.”
22 (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1) Class Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing
23 this Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 10.)

24 11. Net Settlement Amount & Distribution Formula: The Net Settlement Amount means
25 “the Gross Settlement Amount, less the following payments in the amounts approved by the Court:
26 Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Representative Service Payments,
27 Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration
28 Expenses Payment. The remainder is to be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class

Payments.” (Settlement, §§ 1.28., 3.2.) The Net Settlement Amount shall be fully distributed, as follows:

“An Individual Class Payment calculated by (a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member’s Workweeks.” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.)

12. Tax Allocation: “10% of each Participating Class Member’s Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of wage claims (the “Wage Portion”). The Wage Portions are subject to tax withholding and will be reported on an IRS W-2 Form. The 90% of each Participating Class Member’s Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of claims for interest and penalties (the “Non-Wage Portion”). The Non-Wage Portions are not subject to wage withholdings and will be reported on IRS 1099 Forms. Participating Class Members assume full responsibility and liability for any employee taxes owed on their Individual Class Payment.” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

13. Class Representative Service Payments: “Class Representative Service Payments to the Class Representatives of not more than \$5,000.00 to Plaintiff Barcenas and not more than \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff Horton (totaling \$15,000.00) (in addition to any Individual Class Payment and any Individual PAGA Payment the Class Representatives are entitled to receive as Participating Class Members). BAMBUZA will not oppose Plaintiffs’ request for Class Representative Service Payments that do not exceed this amount. As part of the Motion for Final Approval, Plaintiffs will seek Court approval for any Class Representative Service Payments no later than 16 court days prior to the Final Approval Hearing. If the Court approves a Class Representative Service Payment less than the amount requested, the Administrator will retain the remainder in the Net Settlement Amount. The Administrator will pay the Class Representative Service Payments using IRS Form 1099s. Plaintiffs assume full responsibility and liability for employee taxes owed on the Class Representative Service Payments.” (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This payment shall be in addition to the *pro rata* recovery received by Plaintiffs as part of the settlement.

1 14. Class Counsel Fees and Costs: “A Class Counsel Fees Payment of not more than 1/3 of
2 the Gross Settlement Amount, which is currently estimated to be \$141,666.66 and a Class Counsel
3 Litigation Expenses Payment of not more than \$20,000.00. BAMBUZA will not oppose requests
4 for these payments provided they do not exceed these amounts. Plaintiffs and/or Class Counsel
5 will file a Motion for Final Approval no later than 16 court days prior to the Final Approval
6 Hearing. If the Court approves a Class Counsel Fees Payment and/or a Class Counsel Litigation
7 Expenses Payment less than the amounts requested, the Administrator will allocate the remainder
8 to the Net Settlement Amount. Released Parties shall have no liability to Class Counsel or any
9 other Plaintiffs’ Counsel arising from any claim to any portion any Class Counsel Fee Payment
10 and/or Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment. The Administrator will pay the Class Counsel
11 Fees Payment and Class Counsel Expenses Payment using one or more IRS 1099 Forms. Class
12 Counsel assumes full responsibility and liability for taxes owed on the Class Counsel Fees Payment
13 and the Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment and holds BAMBUZA harmless, and
14 indemnifies BAMBUZA, from any dispute or controversy regarding any division or sharing of any
15 of these Payments.” (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

16 15. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a
17 statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys’
18 fees, costs, and service payment being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations
19 are calculated. (*See generally* Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by
20 first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 7.4.2.) APEX Class Action Administration
21 (“APEX”), the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the
22 notice is provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national
23 change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*)

24 **III. DISCUSSION**

25 To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action
26 requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This
27 Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super.*
28 *Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached

1 through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
2 act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors
3 is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

4 In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant
5 factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff's case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely
6 duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount
7 offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the
8 experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of
9 the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168
10 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself
11 that the class settlement is within the "ballpark" of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record need
12 not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola*
13 *Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not
14 require "an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it
15 prevailed on all its claims", but instead, only an "understanding of the amount that is in controversy
16 and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation."].)

17 As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold
18 required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the
19 proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

20 **A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of**
21 **Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

22 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed**
23 **and Non-Collusive Arm's-Length Negotiations**

24 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
25 evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were
26 conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.)
27 Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super.*
28 *Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 ["The

fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not to approve the settlement.”].)

The Settlement was reached as a result of extensive negotiations during a mediation with experienced class action employment mediator, Phillip K. Cha, Esq. (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 8.) The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their respective positions through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendants’ defenses, the Parties reached an agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 9.)

Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning the claims set forth in the litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll records, Defendants’ policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of meal and rest breaks, and issuance of wage statements, as well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 6-7.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) Thus, Plaintiffs and their counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement.

Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 38-46.) Again, this supports the position that the terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this action.

2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’ Respective Legal Positions

A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had he prevailed at trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.

1 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
2 and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement
3 is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no
4 bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement
5 in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

6 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation. (Fattahi
7 Decl., ¶ 25.) While Plaintiffs are confident in the merits of their claims, a legitimate controversy
8 exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 24.) Plaintiffs also recognize that proving the amount of
9 wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain
10 proposition. (*Id.*)

11 The proposed settlement of \$425,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
12 compared to Plaintiffs’ reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 14-27.) Because of the proposed
13 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
14 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
15 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
16 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$425,000.00 is well
17 within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*)
18 ***Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of***
19 ***approximately \$1,488.01.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 26.)

20 **3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

21 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
22 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
23 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 38-46.)
24 Although Plaintiffs and their counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the litigation,
25 they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

26 **B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

27 Class Members are entitled to the best practical notice under the circumstances. (*Kass v.*
28 *Young*, 67 Cal. App. 3d 100, 106 (1977).) The purpose of the notice is to give class members

sufficient information to decide whether they should accept the benefits offered, opt out and pursue their own remedies, or object to the settlement. (*Trotsky v. Los Angeles Fed. Savings & Loan Assn.*, 48 Cal. App. 3d 143, 151-52 (1975).) The notice must advise class members “that they may be excluded from the class if they so request and that they will be bound by the judgment, whether favorable or not, if they do not request exclusion.” (*Kass*, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 106.) In a case such as this involving a significant number of class members, California authorities generally require service of the class notice by mail or similar reliable means. (*Chance v. Super. Ct.*, 58 Cal. 2d 275, 290 (1962); *Cartt v. Super. Ct.*, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 972 (1975).)

The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the settlement and of their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice meets all the requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

C. The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, the Parties agreed to allocate reasonable attorneys’ fees in an amount currently estimated to be \$141,666.66, and up to \$20,000.00 in costs. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.) These amounts are disclosed to all class members in the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the “Common Fund” Method

California courts have long awarded attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the benefit created by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that “when a number of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs may be awarded attorneys’ fees out of the fund.” (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34, quoting *D’Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

Class Counsel seeks an award of attorneys’ fees on the “percentage of recovery/common

1 fund” theory. The purpose of this approach is to “spread litigation costs proportionally among all
2 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone.” (*Vincent v.*
3 *Hughes Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1975)
4 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: “[O]ne who expends attorneys’ fees in
5 winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive
6 beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs.” (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and*
7 *County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized
8 that the common fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought
9 by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share.” (*Id.* at p. 110.)

10 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
11 480 that, “when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
12 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
13 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
14 fund created.” (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: “The recognized advantages of the percentage
15 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
16 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
17 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
18 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts.”
19 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

20 2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases

21 According to a leading treatise on class actions, “[n]o general rule can be articulated on what
22 is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually, 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a
23 reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
24 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
25 are not unprecedented.” (*See Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
26 Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty
27 to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also*
28

1 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most
2 cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

3 Here, Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees equal to one-third (1/3) of the Settlement Amount,
4 which is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic
5 literature and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162
6 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method
7 or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the
8 recovery.”].) Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees
9 as negotiated by the Parties and requested herein.

10 **3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code**

11 Labor Code § 1194 (a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime
12 compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this
13 section, Plaintiffs would be permitted to recover their actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were
14 larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in
15 that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing
16 Defendants while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by
17 taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class
18 Counsel. (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 36-37.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent
19 basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the
20 Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class
21 ahead of all other concerns.

22 **4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the** 23 **Requested Fee Award**

24 As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers
25 and employees, Class Counsel possesses considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Fattahi
26 Decl., ¶¶ 38-46.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class
27 actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class
28 counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel’s requested fee

award is supported here.

Class Counsel's experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendants and the reasonableness of the settlement. Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

D. The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable

Where settlements negotiate a good faith amount for PAGA penalties and "there is no indication that this amount was the result of self-interest at the expense of other" class members, such amounts are generally considered reasonable. (*Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133 at *1, 9.) Courts have approved amounts for PAGA penalties in the range of zero to two percent of the total maximum amount of the Settlement. (*Id.* [approving a PAGA payment of 0.3%, or \$1,500]; *see also Jack v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.* (S.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) 2011 WL 4899942 at *6 [approving a PAGA payment of 0.25%]; *McKenzie v. Fed. Express Corp.* (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) 2012 WL 12882124 at *5 [acknowledging that courts approve PAGA claim settlements in the range of zero to two percent of the total settlement].) Here, the amount to be paid to the LWDA is larger than many other PAGA settlement amounts approved by the courts where seemingly nominal amounts were allocated for such claims. (*See, e.g., Zubia v. Shamrock Foods Co.* (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) No. CV1603128ABAGRX, 2017 WL 10541431, at *14 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.1%]; *Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2008) 2008 WL 3385452, at *1 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.3% or \$1,500]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.* (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012) No. 1:10-CV-0324 AWI SKO, 2012 WL 5364575, at *3 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.27%].) Here, the Parties negotiated a good faith amount of \$35,000.00, 65% percent of which (\$22,750.00) will be paid to the LWDA and 35% (\$12,250.00) to be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, §§ 3.2.5., 3.2.5.1.) The \$35,000.00 allocation equates to 8.2% of the Gross Settlement Amount, which far exceeds amounts

1 that are routinely approved. The Parties negotiated to allocate 8.2% of the Settlement to PAGA
2 penalties in good faith and this amount is reasonable considering that the maximum PAGA
3 penalties were estimated at \$207,900.00 (which assumed \$100 per pay period). (Fattahi Decl., ¶
4 22.)

5 **E. The Service Payments to Named Plaintiffs Are Reasonable**

6 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
7 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
8 members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval
9 of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which
10 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the
11 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir.
12 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

13 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they
14 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is
15 codified in California Labor Code § 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to vigorously
16 enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to
17 work under substandard unlawful conditions” Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has
18 noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is
19 widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.*
20 (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should be rewarded for
21 assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.*
22 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

23 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendants agreed to pay Class
24 Representative Service Payments in the amount of up to \$5,000.00 to Plaintiff Jose Ramiro Lobato
25 Barcenas and \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff Kaitlyn Horton. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) Courts routinely
26 approve a \$10,000 enhancement award for plaintiffs represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g.,*
27 *Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [“The Court
28 concludes a \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez v. Bank of America, National*

1 *Association* (N.D. Cal., Jan. 11, 2024, No. 18-CV-01202-LB) 2024 WL 150721, at *4 [“The court
2 approves awards of \$10,000 for each class representative.”].) Class Counsel represent that
3 Plaintiffs devoted a great deal of time and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated with
4 counsel very frequently for litigation and to prepare for mediation, and were frequently in contact
5 with Class Counsel during the mediation. (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 28-32; *see generally* Declaration of
6 Jose Ramiro Lobato Barcenas in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and
7 PAGA Settlement [“Barcenas Decl.”]; *see generally* Declaration of Kaitlyn Horton in Support of
8 Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement [“Horton Decl.”].) This
9 amount is reasonable particularly in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiffs generated for all
10 class members. (*Id.*)

11 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
12 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a 2006 study examining the average incentive
13 award given to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the “average award per class
14 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Eisenberg
15 & Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study* (2006) 53 UCLA L.Rev.
16 1303, 1308.) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment discrimination class
17 actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081, while named
18 plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121 and a median
19 award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in
20 employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by
21 compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization
22 or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

23 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED**

24 **A. Legal Standard**

25 The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive
26 from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the
27 reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the
28 prerequisites for certification under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382

provides: “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to section 382: “(1) There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1) predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.)

California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device. (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond, supra*, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

B. Plaintiffs Maintain That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for Settlement Purposes.

1. The Class is Ascertainable and Numerous

The proposed class that Plaintiffs seek to represent is easily ascertainable and includes approximately 139 employees of Defendants.

Plaintiffs maintain that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business records of Defendants, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

“The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a class

1 action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d
2 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action may be maintained as a
3 class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set
4 number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court
5 has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*,
6 citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574; *see also Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding
7 a 35 member class.]) Therefore, Plaintiffs contend that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

8 **2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate**

9 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the
10 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass predominate over any
11 individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to
12 warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191
13 Cal.App.3d 605.)

14 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendants had legally compliant
15 policies and practices for all hours worked, including overtime wages; whether Defendants had
16 legally compliant policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether
17 Defendants had legally compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees
18 to take rest periods; whether Defendants reimbursed employees for business expenses; and whether
19 the wage statements were consequently non-compliant. Plaintiffs contend that the factual and legal
20 issues are the same for all of the identified class members, including Plaintiffs. Further, all class
21 members suffered from, and seek redress for, the same alleged injuries.

22 **3. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

23 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or
24 circumstances of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class,
25 but rather upon the typicality of the proposed representative’s claims as they relate to the
26 defendant’s conduct and activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 “[t]he
27 only requirements are that common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class
28 representative be similarly situated” vis-à-vis the class.]) A representative plaintiff’s claims

are typical of the class if they arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendants; as such, they allege that they were subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated employees.

4. Plaintiffs and Their Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement

The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second, a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiffs retained counsel with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that previously settled. (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 38-46.) Class Counsel unquestionably is "qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation." (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiffs have no conflicts, and Plaintiffs have, with counsel, litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing their dedication. Plaintiffs' willingness to serve as representatives demonstrates their serious commitment to bringing about the best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation

Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation. By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court's use of the class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 457-62; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

1 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

2 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

3 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court,
4 Rule 3.766 (e), (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
5 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
6 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter,
7 the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he
8 notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class
9 Members . . .” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by
10 direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

11 **B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative**

12 The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first
13 class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the
14 terms of the Settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. If there are Class
15 Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the
16 opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

17 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg,
18 *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the terms
19 and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It makes
20 clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the
21 Defendants, who deny all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits
22 of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The
23 Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a
24 combined settlement-certification class notice.

25 **VI. CONCLUSION**

26 The Parties have negotiated a fair and reasonable Settlement of the class claims in light of
27 the risks present in this case. Plaintiffs have appropriately presented the materials and information
28

1 necessary for preliminary approval, and therefore, respectfully request that the Court preliminarily
2 approve the Settlement and schedule a date to conduct the Final Approval Hearing.

3 Respectfully submitted,

4 Dated: April 1, 2026

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

5
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