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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

JANE EG DOE, an individual,

Plaintiff,

vs.

EMPOWER MANAGEMENT, LLC, a
California corporation; L3 OASIS HOTEL, a
business entity of unknown form; KELLY
WOO, an individual; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 24STCV22311

CLASS ACTION

[Assigned for all purposes to the
Honorable Elihu M. Berle, Dept. 6]

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND
PROVISIONAL CLASS
CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT
PURPOSES ONLY; DECLARATION
OF SANDRA M. FALCHETTI IN
SUPPORT THEREOF**

DATE: June 24, 2026
TIME: 10:00 a.m.
DEPT: 6

Complaint Filed: August 30, 2024
Trial Date: None set yet

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on June 24, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. in Department 6 of the
Superior Court of the State of California, Plaintiff, Erika Gonzalez, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, will move and hereby does move for Preliminary Approval of the
proposed Class Settlement in this case. This motion is unopposed and based on the Joint

1 Stipulation for Class Action Settlement ("Settlement Agreement"), which is submitted herewith.
2 This motion will be based on this Notice of Motion, the Memorandum of Points and
3 Authorities filed herewith, the Declaration of Sandra M. Falchetti, exhibits attached thereto,
4 argument of counsel and upon such other material contained in the file and pleadings of this
5 action.

6
7 Date: May 18, 2026

FALCHETTI LAW FIRM, PC

8
9 By: _____
10 SANDRA M. FALCHETTI
11 Attorneys for Plaintiff
12 ERIKA GONZALEZ, individually, and on
13 behalf of others similarly situated
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	Introduction.....	9
II.	Factual And Procedural Background	10
A.	The Parties.....	10
B.	Procedural History.....	10
C.	Investigation and Informal Discovery.....	11
D.	Settlement Negotiations.....	11
III.	Summary of Settlement.....	11
A.	The Class.....	11
B.	Settlement Terms	11
C.	The Release.....	14
D.	Notice and Settlement Administration.....	15
E.	Contents of the Settlement Notice.....	16
IV.	Argument.....	17
A.	The Court Should Grant Preliminary Approval of the Proposed Settlement.....	17
1.	The Proposed Settlement is Entitled to a Presumption of Fairness.....	17
a.	The Proposed Settlement was Reached Through Arm’s Length Bargaining.....	17
b.	Plaintiff Conducted Sufficient Investigation and Informal Discovery to Allow the Court and the Parties to Act Intelligently.....	18
2.	The Proposed Settlement is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable	18
B.	The Proposed Class Notice is an Appropriate Form of Giving Notice to the Class and Satisfies Due Process	20
C.	The Court Should Certify the Class for Settlement Purposes Only.....	21
1.	The Class is Ascertainable and Sufficiently Numerous.....	21
2.	The Proposed Class Shares a Well-Defined Community of Interest.....	21
a.	Common Issues of Law and Fact Predominate Over Individual Issues....	22

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

b.	Plaintiff’s Claims Are Typical of the Class’s Claims.....	22
c.	Plaintiff and Falchetti Law Firm Will Fairly and Adequately Represent the Class.	23
3.	Proceeding as a Class Action Is Superior to Individual Actions.....	23
D.	Plaintiff’s Incentive Award is Reasonable.....	24
E.	The Requested Attorneys’ Fees and Costs are Reasonable.....	25
V.	Conclusion.....	28

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

State Cases

<i>7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.,</i>	
(2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135.....	17
<i>B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.</i>	
(1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1341.....	22
<i>Cartt v. Superior Court</i>	
(1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960.....	20
<i>Cellphone Fee Termination Cases,</i>	
(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380.....	18
<i>City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet</i>	
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 105.....	25
<i>Clark v. American Residential Services, LLC</i>	
(2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785.....	18
<i>Consumer Privacy Cases</i>	
(2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545.....	26
<i>Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.</i>	
(1967) 67 Cal.2d 695.....	22
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i>	
(1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794.....	21
<i>Fireside Bank v. Superior Court</i>	
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 1069.....	21
<i>Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court</i>	
(2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 836, 859.....	21
<i>Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.</i>	
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 260.....	19
<i>In Microsoft I-V Cases</i>	

1	(2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 706.....	17
2	<i>In Vitamin Cases</i>	
3	(2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 820.....	20
4	<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i>	
5	(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116	18-19
6	<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern, Inc.</i>	
7	(2016) 1 Cal.4th 480.....	26
8	<i>Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.</i>	
9	(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19.....	27
10	<i>Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.</i>	
11	(2000) 23 Cal.4th 429.....	23
12	<i>McGee v. Bank of America</i>	
13	(1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 422.....	23
14	<i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles</i>	
15	(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399.....	24
16	<i>Reyes v. Board of Supervisors of San Diego County,</i>	
17	(1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1263.....	21
18	<i>Richmond v. Dart Indus. Inc.</i>	
19	(1981) 29 Cal.3d 462.....	21
20	<i>Rose v. City of Hayward</i>	
21	(1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926.....	21
22	<i>Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court</i>	
23	(2004) 34 Cal.4th 319.	21
24	<i>Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.</i>	
25	(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1496.....	23
26	<i>Serrano v. Priest</i>	
27	(1977) 20 Cal.3d 25.....	25
28	<i>Sevidal v. Target Corp.</i>	

1	(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 905.....	21
2	<i>Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.</i>	
3	(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224.....	19
4	Federal Cases	
5	<i>Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of City of Milwaukee,</i>	
6	(7th Cir. 1980) 616 F.2d 305.....	17
7	<i>Boeing v. Van Gemert</i>	
8	(1980) 444 U.S. 47.....	27
9	<i>Camden I Condominium Ass’n v. Dunkle</i>	
10	(11th Cir. 1991) 946 F.2d 768.....	27
11	<i>In Re Activision Securities Litigation</i>	
12	(N.D. Cal. 1989) 723 F. Supp. 1373.....	26
13	<i>Corp. v. Shalala</i>	
14	(D.C. Cir. 1993) 1 F.3d 1261.....	27
15	<i>Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Gaulty</i>	
16	(9th Cir. 1989) 886 F.2d 268.....	27
17	<i>Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala,</i>	
18	(D.C. Cir. 1993) 1 F.3d 1261.....	27
19	<i>Vincent v. Schwartz Air West, Inc.</i>	
20	(9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759.....	25
21	<i>Williams v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co.,</i>	
22	(9th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 1026.....	25
23	<u>State Statutes</u>	
24	Business & Professions Code section 17200.....	14
25	Code of Civil Procedure 382.....	21
26	Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.....	14
27	Cal. Code tit. 5 section 11050 (California Wage Order 5-2001)	14
28	Labor Code 201.....	14

1	Labor Code 202.....	14
2	Labor Code 203.....	14
3	Labor Code 204.....	14
4	Labor Code 218.5.....	14
5	Labor Code 218.6.....	14
6	Labor Code 221.....	14
7	Labor Code 226.....	14
8	Labor Code 226.3.....	14
9	Labor Code 226.6.....	14
10	Labor Code 226.7.....	14
11	Labor Code 450.....	14
12	Labor Code 510.....	14
13	Labor Code 512.....	14
14	Labor Code 558.....	14
15	Labor Code 1174.....	14
16	Labor Code 1174.5.....	14
17	Labor Code 1175.....	14
18	Labor Code 1194.....	14
19	Labor Code 1194.2.....	14
20	Labor Code 1197.....	14
21	Labor Code 1198.....	14
22	Labor Code 2699.....	17
23	Labor Code 2802.....	14
24	Labor Code 2698.....	14
25	State Rules	
26	California Rules of Court, Rule 3.766.....	20
27	California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769.....	20
28		

1

2 **Memorandum Of Points And Authorities**

3 **II. Introduction**

4 Plaintiff Erika Gonzalez (“Plaintiff”) brought this putative class and representative action
5 individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated to remedy alleged wage and hour
6 violations of Empower Management, LLC, Ms. Kelly Woo, and Mr. Aleksander Dyo
7 (“Defendants”)¹. Plaintiff contends that Defendants systematically violated California’s labor
8 laws and Business and Professions Code by carrying out a uniform practice and procedure of
9 failing to provide timely, uninterrupted, and duty-free meal breaks and rest breaks, pay premium
10 payments for non-provision of compliant meal and rest breaks, reimburse employees for the
11 uniform/work-attire costs, compensate employees for all hours worked, and provide compliant
12 itemized wage statements. Plaintiff now seeks preliminary approval of the Joint Stipulation of
13 Class and Representative Action Settlement and Release (“Settlement Agreement” or
14 “Stipulation”), which will resolve the litigation in its entirety.²

15 The proposed Settlement creates a non-reversionary Gross Fund Value in the amount of
16 One Hundred Sixty-Six Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-Four Dollars (**\$166,224.00**) resulting in
17 an average approximate payment of **\$874.00** for each of the approximately 81 putative Class
18 Members and aggrieved employees if none opt out of the Settlement. A presumption of fairness
19 exists as: (1) the Settlement was reached through extensive, mediated arm’s-length negotiations;
20 (2) sufficient investigation and discovery was conducted, which allowed Class Counsel, Falchetti
21 Law Firm, PC (“Falchetti Law Firm”) to act intelligently; and (3) Falchetti Law Firm is
22 experienced in similar wage-and-hour class litigation.

23 Additionally, preliminary settlement approval is appropriate as the proposed Settlement is

24 ¹ Plaintiff initially named and served additional defendant entities based on information then
25 available concerning the employment relationship and related operations. Those entities
26 were later provisionally dismissed without prejudice pursuant to stipulation and order on
27 September 18, 2025. They are not parties to the proposed Settlement and their prior
inclusion does not affect the Settlement approval analysis.

28 ² The Settlement Agreement is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Sandra M. Falchetti
 (“Falchetti Decl.”).

1 within the “ballpark” of reasonableness and is fair and adequate to the Settlement Class Members.
2 Therefore, the court should authorize the mailing of the Class Notice to the Class Members. The
3 Class Notice complies with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.766 and 3.769, and direct mailing
4 of the Class Notice to the Class Members at their last known addresses is an appropriate form of
5 giving notice.

6 Finally, provisional certification of the Class for settlement purposes is appropriate
7 because the proposed Class is ascertainable, common questions of law and fact predominate over
8 any individualized questions, Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class Members,
9 Plaintiff and Falchetti Law Firm have adequately represented, and will continue to adequately
10 represent, the Class, and proceeding as a class action is a superior means of resolving this dispute.

11 **III. Factual And Procedural Background**

12 **A. The Parties**

13 Defendant Empower Management, LLC is a 101-room hotel in Palm Springs, California.
14 (Falchetti Dec . ¶ 4). Defendants Kelly Woo and Aleksander Dyo are its principals and managing
15 agents. Plaintiff worked for Defendants as an hourly paid non-exempt Housekeeper from
16 approximately May 18, 2022 until March 28, 2024. Based on information provided by
17 Defendants and from their records, the hotel property was not operational until January 1, 2022,
18 and there are approximately 81 current and former non-exempt employees in California during
19 the Class Period.

20 **B. Procedural History**

21 Plaintiff submitted her PAGA notice on Defendants and the Labor & Workforce
22 Development Agency (LWDA) on June 3, 2024. (Falchetti Dec . ¶ 6). The LWDA declined to
23 investigate Plaintiff’s claims and therefore Plaintiff filed a wage and hour putative class action
24 complaint against Defendants on August 30, 2024 in this Court alleging, *inter alia*, that
25 Defendants failed to (a) provide required meal and rest periods; (b) pay overtime wages,
26 minimum wages, all wages due to discharged and quitting employees; (c) maintain required
27 records; (d) furnish accurate itemized wage statements; and (e) indemnify employees for
28 necessary expenditures incurred in discharge of duties; and engaged in unfair and unlawful

1 business practices and owes civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys' General Act
2 of 2004 (PAGA). Plaintiff amended her PAGA notice and civil complaint on or around
3 September 23, 2024 and November 15, 2024, respectively, to include a claim of failure to pay
4 accrued and unused vacation. (Falchetti Dec . ¶ 7).

5 **C. Investigation and Informal Discovery**

6 Prior to mediation, Falchetti Law Firm investigated and researched Plaintiff's claims and
7 Defendants' defenses, interviewed Plaintiff and a number of current and former employees
8 concerning Defendants' policies and practices, obtained Defendants' policy documents and the
9 full set of the Class's time and payroll records, and retained an expert to analyze their data which
10 served as the damages analysis for the mediation. (Falchetti Dec . ¶ 8). Based on this
11 information, Falchetti Law Firm was able to act intelligently and effectively in negotiation the
12 proposed settlement.

13 **D. Settlement Negotiations**

14 On January 23, 2026, the Parties held an all-day mediation session with Gail A. Glick,
15 Esq., at the conclusion of which the Parties did not reach a settlement. The Parties continued to
16 meet and confer and reached a settlement on or around March 6, 2026. The terms of the
17 agreement are outlines in the proposed Settlement Agreement. A true and correct copy is hereby
18 attached as "**Exhibit 1.**" The settlement discussions were conducted at arm's length, and the
19 Settlement is the result of an informed analysis of Defendant's potential liability exposure in
20 relation to the costs and risks associated with continued litigation. The Parties went into
21 mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also
22 prepared to litigate its position through trial and appeal if a settlement was not reached.

23 **IV. Summary of Settlement**

24 **A. The Class**

25 The proposed Class and aggrieved employees consist of approximately 81 current and
26 former non-exempt employees who were employed by Defendant Empower Management, LLC
27 in California during the Class Period of January 1, 2022 through January 23, 2026.

28 **B. Settlement Terms**

1 The proposed Settlement is comprised of a Gross Fund Value of One Hundred Sixty-Six
2 Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-Four Dollars (**\$166,224.00**), from which all Individual
3 Settlement Awards to Participating Class Members, the Class Counsel Award, the Class
4 Representative Service Award, PAGA Payment, Settlement Administration Costs and a PAGA
5 payment to the LWDA would be paid. (Stipulation ¶ 26.)

6 The Gross Fund Value will be Allocated as Follows:

7 1. Class Representative Incentive Award. In exchange for executing a general release of
8 her claims and in recognition of her efforts and risks in prosecuting this matter, Plaintiff will
9 receive no more than \$5,000 as a class representative incentive award. (Stipulation ¶ 62.)

10 2. Attorneys' Fees and Litigation Costs. Falchetti Law Firm PC will receive an
11 attorney fee award of 33.33 percent of the Gross Fund Value or \$55,402.46. (Stipulation ¶ 58.)

12 3. PAGA Payment. Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00) from the Gross Fund Value will
13 be allocated as penalties under PAGA, of which Three Thousand Seven Hundred and Fifty
14 Dollars (\$3,750.00) will be paid to the LWDA. (Stipulation ¶ 69.)

15 4. Settlement Administration Costs. CPT Group the settlement administrator
16 ("Settlement Administrator") will receive expenses estimated not to exceed \$6,250.00, for
17 administering the Settlement. (Stipulation ¶ 44.)

18 5. The "Net Settlement Amount" is the net amount paid as Individual Settlement
19 Payments and constitutes the Gross Fund Value less the Administrative Costs, attorneys' fees and
20 litigation costs, Class Representative Incentive Award and the PAGA Allocation. (Stipulation ¶
21 13.)

22 6. The Individual Settlement Award will be allocated twenty-five percent (25%) as
23 unpaid wages and seventy-five percent (75%) as civil penalties and interest. Defendant will pay
24 the employer's share of payroll taxes separate and apart from the Gross Fund Value. (Stipulation
25 ¶ 67.)

26 The Gross Fund will be Funded as Follows:

27 Defendant will fund the Gross Settlement Amount of \$166,224, as well as its share of
28 employer-side payroll taxes, in installments. Specifically, Defendant will make an initial

1 payment of \$55,408 within thirty (30) days after the Court enters the Order Granting Preliminary
2 Approval, followed by two (2) equal installment payments of the remaining balance, each due
3 one hundred eighty (180) days after the preceding payment, until the Gross Settlement Amount is
4 fully funded. (Stipulation, ¶ 54.)

5 The Parties agreed to this installment structure based on Defendant's financial
6 circumstances, and Defendant represents that it is solvent and capable of satisfying its obligations
7 under the Agreement. In support of preliminary approval, Defendant will provide a declaration
8 attesting to its financial condition, and, if requested by the Court, will submit additional financial
9 information for in camera review. (Stipulation, ¶ 54.)

10 To facilitate administration, the Settlement Administrator may request that Defendant
11 advance reasonable administrative costs necessary to implement notice and related activities prior
12 to full funding, and Defendant has agreed to cooperate in good faith with such requests.
13 (Stipulation, ¶ 54.)

14 The Agreement includes meaningful enforcement mechanisms that protect the Settlement
15 Class. If Defendant fails to timely make any required payment, it will have ten (10) days after
16 written notice to cure the default. If the default is not cured, the entire unpaid balance will become
17 immediately due and payable, and Plaintiff may seek enforcement of the Agreement, including
18 entry of judgment for the unpaid balance. (Stipulation, ¶ 54.) Additionally, if Defendant becomes
19 insolvent or files for bankruptcy before fully funding the settlement, Plaintiff may seek immediate
20 entry of judgment and assert the Settlement Class's rights in any bankruptcy proceeding. (*Id.*)

21 The Gross Fund will be Distributed as Follows:

22 Distribution of settlement funds will occur only after the Gross Settlement Amount has
23 been fully funded and the Effective Date has occurred. Within ten (10) business days thereafter,
24 the Settlement Administrator will distribute Individual Settlement Payments, any Court-approved
25 service award, attorneys' fees and costs, Administrative Costs, and the PAGA allocation in
26 accordance with the Agreement and the Court's orders. (Stipulation, ¶ 55.) The Settlement
27 Administrator may, however, pay reasonable administrative costs incurred in connection with
28 notice and administration prior to full funding, as necessary to implement the settlement. (*Id.*)

1 If a check is returned to the Settlement Administrator as undeliverable, the Settlement
2 Administrator will promptly attempt to obtain a valid mailing address by performing a skip trace
3 search and, if another address is identified, will mail the check to the newly identified address.
4 (Stipulation, ¶55.) Individual Settlement Payment checks will be valid and negotiable for at one
5 hundred eighty (180) calendar days from the date they are issued. (Stipulation, ¶56.) After the
6 expiration of the 180 days, the Settlement Administrator will void the checks and the amount of
7 any unpaid residue or unclaimed or abandoned funds will be transmitted to the Controller
8 Unclaimed Property Fund pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 384. (Stipulation, ¶56.)

9 C. The Release

10 Upon the Effective Date (defined in the Stipulation), all Participating Settlement Class
11 Members, including Plaintiff, will waive and release all claims, rights, demands, damages,
12 liabilities and causes of action, whether known or unknown, contingent or vested, in law or in
13 equity, arising at any time during the Class Period for unpaid wages or other compensation,
14 and/or related penalties, interest, costs, attorneys' fees, punitive damages, and/or injunctive or
15 other equitable remedies, allegedly owed or available, against Defendant and its respective
16 former, current and future parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, shareholders, Members,
17 agents (including, without limitation, any investment bankers, accountants, insurers, reinsurers,
18 attorneys and any past, present or future officers, directors and employees) predecessors,
19 successors, and assigns, allegedly owed or available, arising out of, or related to the claims,
20 allegations and operative facts asserted in the operative complaint, including that Defendant: (1)
21 failed to provide a required full, timely and uninterrupted meal periods; (2) failed to provide a
22 required full, timely and uninterrupted rest periods; (3) failed to pay all earned wages and/or
23 overtime payments (4) failed to keep accurate payroll records and/or failed to provide accurate
24 wage statements; (5) failed to pay earned an unpaid wages upon ending of employment; and/or
25 (6) in engaging in any or all of the aforementioned conduct, violated, or is liable under the
26 California Labor Code, including, but not limited to, sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 218.5, 218.6,
27 221, 226, 226.3, 226.6, 226.7, 450, 510, 512, 558, 1174, 1174.5, 1175, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1198,
28 2802, 2698 et seq., Cal. Code tit. 5 section 11050 (California Wage Order 5-2001), Business &

1 Professions Code section 17200 et seq., and/or Code of Civil Procedure section 1021. Stipulation
2 ¶ 42. Plaintiff will also provide a general release of claims after the Effective Date in connection
3 with the Incentive Award. (Stipulation, ¶42.) Lastly, all PAGA Group Members who worked
4 during the PAGA Period will release all PAGA claims during the PAGA Period. (Stipulation, ¶
5 43.)

6 **D. Notice and Settlement Administration**

7 Within fifteen (15) calendar days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, Defendant
8 will provide the Settlement Administrator with the Class List for purposes of mailing the
9 Settlement Notices to Class Members and the PAGA Group. (Stipulation ¶ 45.) The List will
10 contain names, social security numbers, dates of employment, number of Compensable
11 Workweeks during the Class Period and PAGA Period, last known addresses and phone numbers.
12 (Stipulation, ¶ 45.) Within fourteen (14) calendar days after receiving the Class List from
13 Defendant, the Settlement Administrator will mail copies of the Class Notice to the Settlement
14 Class and PAGA Group via regular First Class U.S. Mail after running all addresses through the
15 United States Postal Service NCOA database to obtain current addresses. (Stipulation, ¶ 46.)

16 Any Class Notices returned to the Settlement Administrator as non-deliverable on or before
17 the Response Deadline will be sent promptly via regular first-class U.S. mail to the forwarding
18 address affixed thereto and the Settlement Administrator will indicate the date of such re-mailing
19 on the Class Notice. (Stipulation, ¶ 48.) If no forwarding address is provided, the Settlement
20 Administrator will promptly attempt to determine the correct address using a skip-trace or other
21 search and then perform a single re-mailing. (Stipulation, ¶ 48.)

22 Class Member may object to the Settlement by submitting a Notice of Objection to the
23 Settlement Administrator by the Response Deadline in compliance with the Class Notice.
24 (Stipulation, ¶ 49.) A Class Member may exclude him or herself from the Settlement by sending
25 a Request for Exclusion to the Settlement Administrator by the Response Deadline in compliance
26 with the Class Notice. (Stipulation, ¶ 50.)

27 The Settlement Administrator will determine the Individual Settlement Payment for each
28 Participating Settlement Class Member and the PAGA Distribution for each Member of the

1 PAGA Group according to the following formulas:

- 2 a. **The Settlement Class.** The Net Settlement Amount will be divided among all
3 Participating Settlement Class Members. Each Participating Settlement Class
4 Member will receive a proportionate share that is equal to (a) the number of
5 Compensable Workweeks he or she worked during Class Period, divided by
6 (b) the total number of Compensable Workweeks worked by all Participating
7 Settlement Class Members during the Class Period (Stipulation, ¶ 52a);
- 8 b. **The PAGA Group.** The PAGA Distribution will be divided among all
9 Members of the PAGA Group. Each PAGA Group Member will receive a
10 proportionate share that is equal to (a) the number of Compensable Workweeks
11 he or she worked during the PAGA Period, divided by (b) the total number of
12 Compensable Workweeks worked by all PAGA Group Members during the
13 PAGA Period (Stipulation, ¶ 52b.).

14 The Settlement Administrator will determine the gross wages for each Class Member.
15 (Stipulation, ¶ 46.) Any dispute over a Class or PAGA Group Member's Compensable
16 Workweeks that is not resolved by the Settlement Administrator will be resolved by the court at
17 the Final Approval hearing. (Stipulation, ¶ 53.)

18 **E. Contents of the Settlement Notice**

19 The Settlement Notice includes the following information: (1) information regarding the
20 nature of the Action; (2) a summary of the Settlement's principal terms; (3) The Settlement
21 Class and PAGA Group definitions; (4) the total number of Compensable Workweeks each
22 Member of the Settlement Class and PAGA Group worked during their respective periods;
23 (5) the formula for calculating Individual Settlement Payments and PAGA Distributions for each
24 Member of the Settlement Class and PAGA Group; (6) the estimated Individual Settlement
25 Payment and PAGA Distribution for each Member of the Settlement Class and PAGA Group;
26 the dates comprising the Class Period and PAGA Period; (8) instructions on how to submit a
27 Request for Exclusion or Notice of Objection; (9) the Response Deadline by which the Members
28 of the Settlement Class must postmark a Request for Exclusion or a Notice of Objection; and

(10) a statement that Settlement Class Members will not be required to submit a claim form in order to receive their individual share of the Settlement. (Stipulation, ¶ 46.)

V. Argument

A. The Court Should Grant Preliminary Approval of the Proposed Settlement

Review of a proposed class action settlement is a two-step process. The first step is a preliminary, pre-notification hearing to determine whether the proposed settlement is “within the range of possible approval.” (*Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of City of Milwaukee* (7th Cir. 1980) 616 F.2d 305, 314, overruled on other grounds by *Felzen v. Andreas* (7th Cir. 1998) 134 F.3d 873, 875.) This hearing is not a fairness hearing; rather, its purpose is to ascertain whether there is any reason to notify the class members of the proposed settlement and to proceed with a fairness hearing. *Id.* Additionally, Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (1)(2) requires court approval of a PAGA settlement. As the proposed Settlement is within the range of possible approval, the court should grant preliminary approval.

1. The Proposed Settlement is Entitled to a Presumption of Fairness

A presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*In re Microsoft I-V Cases* (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 706, 723; *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1146.) As the proposed Settlement was reached through arm’s-length negotiations, sufficient investigation and discovery allowed Falchetti Law Firm to act intelligently, and Falchetti Law Firm is experienced in such actions, the proposed Settlement is entitled to a presumption of fairness.³

a. The Proposed Settlement was Reached Through Arm’s Length Bargaining.

The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following a full-day private

³ At preliminary approval, the fourth factor – the percentage of objectors – is not applicable, as notice has not yet been provided to the Class and the Class Members have not yet had an opportunity to object.

1 mediation with an experienced mediator. (Falchetti Decl. ¶ 9.) The settlement negotiations were
2 at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.* at ¶11)
3 The Parties went into mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but
4 each side was also prepared to litigate its position through trial and appeal if a settlement was not
5 reached. *Ibid.*

6 b. Plaintiff Conducted Sufficient Investigation and Informal Discovery to
7 Allow the Court and the Parties to Act Intelligently.

8 Prior to mediation, Falchetti Law Firm interviewed Plaintiff at length and investigated,
9 researched Plaintiff's claims and the potential defenses, obtained, inter alia, defendant's wage and
10 hour policies, meal and rest break policies, settlement class members' payroll information and
11 wage statements, and a representative sampling of class members' time and payroll records,
12 which was analyzed by Plaintiff's expert and formed the basis of a damages model for use at the
13 mediation. (*Id.* at ¶8.) Based on this work, Falchetti Law Firm was able to act intelligently and
14 effectively in negotiating the proposed settlement. (*Ibid.*)

15
16 c. Falchetti Law Firm Has Extensive Experience in Class Action
17 Litigation

18 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
19 Ms. Falchetti is a respected members of the bar with a strong record of vigorous and effective
20 advocacy for her clients, experienced in handling complex wage-and-hour class action litigation.
21 Although Plaintiff and Falchetti Law Firm were prepared to litigate this Action, they support the
22 proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the Class Members. (*Id.* at ¶ 26.)

23 **2. The Proposed Settlement is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable**

24 The trial court has "broad discretion to determine "whether a settlement [is] fair and
25 reasonable." *In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1389. In
26 order to determine whether a class settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, courts must be
27 provided with "basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and
28 the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims

1 represents a reasonable compromise.” (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th
2 116, 133; *Clark v. American Residential Services, LLC* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 802-803.) A
3 settlement is not judged against what might have been recovered had a plaintiff prevailed at trial,
4 nor does the settlement need to recoup the maximum amount of damages available to be found
5 fair and reasonable. (*Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250,
6 disapproved on other grounds in *Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260,
7 270.)

8 In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant
9 factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff’s case, the risk, expense, complexity and
10 likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the
11 amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings,
12 the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction
13 of the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 128.) In order to
14 approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself that the class settlement is within
15 the “ballpark” of reasonableness. (*Id.* at 133.) Falchetti Law Firm has satisfied the so-called
16 “*Kullar* analysis” by providing the court with a detailed evaluation of the maximum potential
17 damages and penalties of the claims that were alleged in this matter: \$1,233,733.01, as well as the
18 material litigation risks and considerations that support the reasonableness of the proposed
19 settlement. (Falchetti Decl. ¶23.)

20 The proposed Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable based on a number of factors:
21 (1) proving the amount of wages due to each Class Member would be an expensive, time-
22 consuming, and uncertain proposition; (2) the court may deny class certification; (3) the court
23 may reduce the amount of PAGA penalties under Labor Code section 2699(e)(1), which
24 authorizes a court to exercise discretion in assessing a civil penalty; (4) continued litigation would
25 very likely reduce and substantially delay recovery by Class Members; (5) a legitimate
26 controversy exists as to each cause of action; and (6) Class Members will receive timely relief,
27 substantial compensation, and avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment and the likelihood of an
28 appeal which would delay resolution of the Action for approximately one and one-half years. (*Id.*

1 at ¶ 13.)

2 The Settlement Agreement yields approximately 81 Class Members with a significant
3 average financial recovery of approximately \$874.34. (*Id.* at ¶13.) In sum, when the risks of
4 litigation, the uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof
5 necessary to establish liability, and the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment are
6 considered, it is clear that the \$166, 224.00 non-reversionary Settlement is within the “ballpark”
7 of reasonableness and in the best interests of the Class and PAGA Members. (*Id.* at ¶17.)

8 **B. The Proposed Class Notice is an Appropriate Form of Giving Notice to the**
9 **Class and Satisfies Due Process**

10 The proposed Class Notice will be sent to Class Members in a timely fashion via first-class
11 United States mail and provides all the information a reasonable person would need to make a
12 fully informed decision about the Settlement Agreement. (Stipulation, ¶47; Ex. A.) The Class
13 Notice summarizes the Action, explains the terms and conditions of the Settlement, informs Class
14 Members of their rights and options and that each Class Member will receive an Individual
15 Settlement Payment unless he or she opts out of the settlement. Stipulation, Ex. A. As such, the
16 Class Notice comports with the requirements of California Rules of Court, Rules 3.769 and 3.766.
17 “The principal purpose of notice to the class is the protection of the integrity of the class action
18 process.” (*Cartt v. Superior Court* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 970.) The notice ““must fairly
19 apprise the class members of the terms of the proposed compromise and of the options open to the
20 dissenting class members.”” (*Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 224, 251.) Additionally, the notice
21 given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the class members.
22 (*Cartt* 50 Cal.App.3d at 974.) However, there is no statutory or due process requirement that all
23 class members receive action notice. (*Ibid.*)

24 The proposed notice plan in this matter is consistent with class notices approved in state
25 courts, is the best notice practicable, and the method of dissemination is likely to give the best
26 actual notice to the greatest number of Class Members. Individual notice by mail is preferred
27 when possible and dissemination of combined certification/settlement notice is a common and
28 accepted practice. (*In re Vitamin Cases* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 820, 828.) Accordingly, the

1 proposed Class Notice is an appropriate form of giving notice to the greatest number of class
2 members and should be approved by the Court.

3 **C. The Court Should Certify the Class for Settlement Purposes Only**

4 Code of Civil Procedure section 382 provides that three basic requirements must be met in
5 order to sustain any class action: (1) there must be an ascertainable class; (2) there must be a well-
6 defined community of interest in the question of law or fact affecting the parties to be
7 represented; and (3) certification will provide substantial benefits to litigants and the courts, i.e.,
8 proceeding as a class is superior to other methods. (*Fireside Bank v. Superior Court* (2007) 40
9 Cal.4th 1069, 1089; *see also Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319,
10 326.) Courts utilize a less stringent standard for class certification during settlement. (*Global*
11 *Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 836, 859.) The reason: “no
12 trial is anticipated in a settlement class case, so the case management issues inherent in the
13 ascertainable class determination need not be confronted.” (*Id.*)

14 **1. The Class is Ascertainable and Sufficiently Numerous.**

15 To determine whether a class is ascertainable, courts look at: (1) the class definition; (2) the
16 size of the class; and (3) the means available for identifying class members. (*Reyes v. Board of*
17 *Supervisors of San Diego County* (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1263, 1271; *Sevidal v. Target Corp.* (2010)
18 189 Cal.App.4th 905, 919 (class members are ascertainable where “they may be readily identified
19 without unreasonable expense or time by reference to official [or business] records.”).) Here, the Class
20 is objectively defined, and Class Members can be identified through Defendant’s personnel records.
21 (Falchetti Decl. ¶ 5; Stipulation, ¶¶ 27, 51.) The Class is also sufficiently numerous. In California, no
22 set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a class action. (*Rose v. City of*
23 *Hayward* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934 [finding that class of 42 was sufficiently numerous].)
24 Here, the Class is comprised of approximately 81 persons. (Falchetti Decl. ¶ 5.) Thus, the
25 ascertainability requirement is satisfied and the Class is sufficiently numerous.

26 **2. The Proposed Class Shares a Well-Defined Community of Interest.**

27 The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant questions
28 of law and fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class

1 representatives who can adequately represent the class. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48
2 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1806; *Richmond v. Dart Indus. Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 473-475.) In this
3 case, all three factors are met.

4 a. Common Issues of Law and Fact Predominate Over Individual
5 Issues.

6 The commonality criterion requires the existence of common question of law or fact and
7 is generally established with the issues of predominance and typicality. (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.*
8 (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713-14.) All that is required is a common question of fact or law exists
9 which predominates over issues unique to individual plaintiffs. The existence of individual issues
10 or facts is not a bar to class certification as long as they do not render class litigation
11 unmanageable or predominate over the common issues. (*B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-*
12 *Illinois, Inc.* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1354 (“presence of individual damages issues cannot
13 bar certification”).)

14 Plaintiff’s claims present common issues of law and fact that predominate over individual
15 issues and thus warrant class certification. Among other things, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
16 failed to provide timely, uninterrupted, and duty-free meal breaks and rest breaks, particularly in
17 their systemic failure to provide any rest breaks at all or set forth any policy thereto according to
18 our interviews of a number of current and former employees. (Falchetti Decl. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff
19 further alleges that Defendants failed to pay premium payments for non-provision of compliant
20 meal and rest breaks, failed to reimburse employees for shoes and pants as part of their uniform
21 as well as the use of their cell phones to communicate during work hours, failed to compensate
22 for all hours worked, and failed to provide compliant itemized wage statements. Plaintiff further
23 alleges that these violations were the result of policies and practices that were applied uniformly
24 to Plaintiff and other non-exempt employees. (Falchetti Decl. ¶8.) Thus, class treatment is
25 appropriate.

26 b. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Typical of the Class’s Claims.

27 To satisfy the typicality requirement, California law does not require that Plaintiff have
28 claims identical to the other class members. Rather, the test of typicality for a class representative

1 is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct
2 which is not unique to the named plaintiff, and whether other class members have been injured by
3 the same course of conduct. (*Seastrom v. Neways, Inc.* (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502.) The
4 typicality requirement for a class representative refers to the nature of the claim or defense of the
5 representative, and not to the specific facts from which it arose or the relief sought. *Id.* As
6 Plaintiff and other Class Members' claims are based on the same legal theories as stated above,
7 and arise out of the same unlawful policies and practices, the typicality requirement is satisfied.

8 c. Plaintiff and Falchetti Law Firm Will Fairly and Adequately
9 Represent the Class.

10 The question of adequacy of representation "depends on whether the plaintiff's attorney is
11 qualified to conduct the proposed litigation in the plaintiff's interest or not antagonistic to the
12 interests of the class." (*McGee v. Bank of America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 422, 450.) Here,
13 Falchetti Law Firm and its attorney Sandra Falchetti are well-qualified and experienced in wage-
14 and-hour class action litigation. (Falchetti Decl. ¶¶ 26.) Furthermore, because Plaintiff's claims
15 are typical of those of the other Class Members, and are not based on unique circumstances that
16 might jeopardize the Class's claims, there is no antagonism of interests between Plaintiff and the
17 Class. Therefore, the adequacy requirement is satisfied.

18 **3. Proceeding as a Class Action Is Superior to Individual Actions.**

19 Under the circumstances, proceeding as a class action is a superior means of resolving this
20 dispute, as the Class Members will derive substantial benefits. (Falchetti Decl. ¶ 20.) Class
21 certification would serve as the only practical means to deter and redress the alleged Labor Code
22 violations. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 434 (relevant considerations include
23 the probability that each class member will come forward ultimately to prove his or her separate
24 claim to a portion of the total recovery and whether the class approach would actually serve to
25 deter and redress the alleged wrongdoing).) In the absence of a class mechanism, it is unlikely
26 that Class Members would pursue their claims individually or have sufficient resources to do so
27 given the relatively modest potential recovery compared to the burden and expense of litigation.
28 Furthermore, individual actions arising out of the same operative facts would unduly burden the

1 courts and could produce inconsistent results, which may be avoided by proceeding on a
2 collective basis.

3 **D. Plaintiff's Incentive Award is Reasonable**

4 Plaintiffs in class action lawsuits are eligible for reasonable service payments as
5 compensation "for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
6 members of the class." (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles* (2010) 186
7 Cal.App.4th 399, 412.) Here, the Settlement Agreement provides for a Class Representative
8 Incentive Award not to exceed \$5,000.00 to Plaintiff. (Stipulation, ¶¶62-63.) The requested award
9 is reasonable according to controlling and persuasive case law. (*See Clark*, 175 Cal.App.4th at
10 805-806.) The payment is intended to recognize the time, effort, risks and waiver of rights that
11 Plaintiff undertook on behalf of the Class. (Falchetti Decl. ¶¶ 19-22.)

12 Throughout the litigation, Plaintiff cooperated with her counsel and took actions to protect the
13 interests of the Class. (*Id.* at ¶19.) Plaintiff provided valuable information and documents
14 regarding Defendants' meal period and rest period practices, potential witnesses, Defendants'
15 reimbursement practices, and Defendants' failure to pay all wages. *Ibid.* Plaintiff remained in
16 regular and consistent contact with her counsel throughout the pre-litigation investigation, the
17 litigation itself, and the settlement process, collecting and providing responsive documents in her
18 possession, reviewing documents, coordinating with potential witnesses, furnishing salient
19 information to assist in the prosecution of the Action, keeping informed of developments in the
20 Action, making herself available to her attorneys and for the mediation, and reviewing the
21 Settlement Agreement. (*Ibid.*; Declaration of Erika Gonzalez, ¶ 7.) The information and
22 documentation provided by Plaintiff was instrumental in establishing the wage and hour
23 violations alleged in this action, and the recovery provided for in the Settlement Agreement
24 would have been impossible to obtain without her active participation. (*Ibid.*)

25 Plaintiff also faced many risks in bringing this lawsuit as a class action, given the efforts
26 and time off she has taken to pursue this case. (*Id.* at ¶ 20; Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 13.) Additionally, as
27 a result of acting as the Class Representative, Plaintiff may face reputational risk among potential
28 future employers that could adversely impact her future job opportunities because she may be

1 viewed as litigious. (*Id.* at ¶ 21 Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 13.) Because of her efforts, approximately 81
2 Class Members will now have the opportunity to participate in a settlement and to recover
3 substantial payments for wage violations they may have never known about on their own or been
4 willing to pursue on their own. (*Ibid.*) If each Class Member attempted to pursue his or her legal
5 remedies individually, each person would have been required to expend a significant amount of
6 his or her own monetary resources and time. (*Ibid.*)

7 Furthermore, Plaintiff will agree to a broader release than other Class Members and a
8 waiver of Civil Code section 1542. (Stipulation, ¶45; Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 10.) This release is not
9 intended to release claims in a separate FEHA-related matter that has already been resolved and
10 for which payment is still pending. In sum, this action would not have been possible without the
11 aid of Plaintiff, who put her own time and efforts into the litigation, and placed herself at risk for
12 the sake of the other Class Members. (Falchetti Decl. ¶ 21.) The requested award is therefore
13 reasonable to compensate Plaintiff for her instrumental participation in this Action. *Ibid.*

14 **E. The Requested Attorneys' Fees and Costs are Reasonable**

15 The Settlement Agreement provides for attorney fees to Falchetti Law Firm in an amount
16 not to exceed one-third of the Gross Fund Value for a maximum fee award of \$55,402.46, plus an
17 award of actual costs which are currently estimated to be under \$25,000.00. (Stipulation, ¶54;
18 Falchetti Decl. ¶23.) Plaintiff requests attorney fees pursuant to the “common fund theory.”

19 A request for attorneys' fees as a percentage of the settlement amount is supported by the
20 common fund theory, where “one who expends attorneys' fees in winning a suit which creates a
21 fund from which others derive benefits, may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair
22 share of the litigation costs.” (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 35 [quoting *Quinn v. State of*
23 *California* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 162, 167].) The percentage is properly based upon the gross
24 settlement rather than on the amount of claims made. (*Williams v. MGM-Pathe Communications*
25 *Co.* (9th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 1026, 1027.)

26 The purpose of the common fund/percentage approach is to “spread litigation costs
27 proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire
28 burden alone.” (*Vincent v. Schwartz Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769. In *Quinn*,

1 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: “one who expends attorneys’ fees in winning
2 a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive
3 beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs. *Id.* at 167.) Similarly, in *City and County*
4 *of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, 110, the California Supreme Court recognized
5 that the common fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an action
6 brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share.” (fn. omitted.)

7 The lodestar analysis may be used to cross-check percentage-of-recovery award. (*See In*
8 *re Consumer Privacy Cases* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 556-558.) However, in a recent case
9 involving an objection to a one-third percentage-based recovery in a \$19 million employment
10 class action lawsuit, the Supreme Court of California clarified that:

11 [W]hen an attorney fee is awarded out of the common fund
12 preserved or recovered by means of litigation
13 [citation], the award is not per se unreasonable merely
because it is calculated as a percentage of the common fund.

14 (*Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern, Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.4th 480, 486.) The Court further held that
15 “. . . trial courts have discretion to conduct a lodestar cross-check on a percentage fee . . . [and]
16 also retain the *discretion to forego a lodestar cross-check* and use other means to evaluate the
17 reasonableness of a requested percentage fee.” (*Id.* at 506, emphasis added.)

18 Indeed, several courts have expressed frustration with the alternative “lodestar” approach
19 for deciding fees, which usually involves wading through voluminous and often indecipherable
20 time records. (See, e.g., *In re Activision Securities Litigation* (N.D. Cal. 1989) 723 F. Supp. 1373,
21 1375.) The percentage approach is preferable to the lodestar because: (1) it provides predictability
22 to class counsel and class members; (2) encourages efficient resolution of the litigation by
23 providing an incentive for early, yet reasonable, settlement; and (3) reduces the demands on
24 judicial records. (*Id.* at 1378-79.)

25 In fact, “[a] task force commissioned by the Third Circuit concluded that the lodestar
26 approach” had numerous deficiencies including “(1) increas[ing] the workload of an already
27 overtaxed judicial system, (2) is insufficiently objective and produces results that are far from
28 homogenous, (3) creates a sense of mathematical precision that is unwarranted in terms of the

1 realities of the practice of law, (4) is subject to manipulation by judges who prefer to calibrate
2 fees in terms of percentages of the settlement fund or the amounts recovered by the Claimants or
3 of an overall dollar amount, (5) encourages lawyers to expend excessive hours, and engage in
4 duplicative and unjustified work, (6) creates a disincentive for the early settlement of cases, (7)
5 deprives trial courts of flexibility to reward or deter lawyers so that desirable objectives, such as
6 early settlement, will be fostered, (8) works to the particular disadvantage of the public interest
7 bar, and (9) results in confusion and lack of predictability.” (*Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.*
8 (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 28 (citations and quotation marks omitted).) As the *Lealo* court noted,
9 the Third Circuit Task Force concluded that “the lodestar technique is a ‘cumbersome, enervating,
10 and often surrealistic process of preparing and evaluating fee petitions that now plagues the
11 Bench and Bar’ and recommended a return to the percentage of the recovery fee formula in cases
12 involving a settlement fund.” (*Id.* at 28.)

13 The percentage of attorneys’ fees set forth in the Settlement Agreement, 33.33% of the
14 Gross Fund Value or common fund, is reasonable. Historically, courts have awarded percentage
15 fees in the range of 20% to 50%, depending on the circumstances of the case. Newberg on Class
16 Actions (4th Ed. 2002) §14:6. California and federal courts have long recognized that a
17 percentage of recovery for attorneys’ fees is properly awarded on the basis of the total value.
18 (*Boeing v. Van Gemert* (1980) 444 U.S. 472, 480-481; see also *Consumer Privacy Cases*, 175
19 Cal.App.4th at 558, fn.) 13 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage
20 method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around **one-third** of
21 the recovery.” (emphasis added.)]⁴

22 The requested fee percentage is less than that charged by Falchetti Law Firm for other
23 employment cases and is in line with the one-third recovery that has been recognized as standard
24 for class actions in California. (Falchetti Decl. ¶ 23) Additionally, Falchetti Law Firm invested
25

26 ⁴ Attorney fee applications in California class actions based upon a percentage of the common
27 fund also have substantial support in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and other federal
28 courts. See, e.g., *Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Gaulty* (9th Cir. 1989) 886 F.2d 268,
272; *Camden I Condominium Ass’n v. Dunkle* (11th Cir. 1991) 946 F.2d 768, 774;
Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala (D.C. Cir. 1993) 1 F.3d 1261, 1271.

1 significant time into the Action – over one and one-half years since the date that Plaintiff retained
2 Falchetti Law Firm in April 2024 – with payment deferred to the end of the case, and then, of
3 course, contingent on the outcome. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 24-25.) Falchetti Law Firm’s work has resulted in
4 substantial benefits to Class Members in the form of a significant settlement fund established to
5 compensate Class Members for Defendants’ alleged unlawful wage and hour practices. (*Ibid.*) It
6 is a virtual certainty that without Falchetti Law Firm’s efforts, Class Members would not have
7 received any monetary recovery. (*Ibid.*)

8 **VI. Conclusion**

9 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the court: (1) grant
10 preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement; (2) provisionally certify the Class for
11 settlement purposes only; (3) appoint Plaintiff as the Class Representative; (4) appoint Falchetti
12 Law Firm PC as Class Counsel; (5) appoint CPT Group as the Settlement Administrator; (6)
13 approve the proposed Class Notice and the plan for distribution; and (7) schedule a final fairness
14 hearing.

15
16 **Note Regarding Execution:** The parties have finalized the Settlement Agreement through
17 counsel. At the time of filing, Defendants’ signature is pending. Plaintiff will promptly
18 lodge the fully executed version upon receipt.

19
20
21 Date: May 18, 2026

Respectfully submitted,
FALCHETTI LAW FIRM, PC

24 By: _____
25 SANDRA M. FALCHETTI

26 Attorneys for Plaintiff
27 ERIKA GONZALEZ, individually, and on
28 behalf of others similarly situated