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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

CONNOR ANGEL, as an individual and on
behalf of all other similarly situated Class
Members,

Plaintiff,

v.

ELLIOTT HOMES, INC., an Arizona
Corporation; and DOES 1-100, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 24CV019402 (Lead Case)
24CV023595 (Consolidated Case)

Assigned for All Purposes to:
Hon. Lauri A. Damrell
Dept. 22

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS &
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENT

Date: February 20, 2026
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept.: 22

Reservation No.: A-19402-001

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Pursuant to Local Rule 2.99.05, Plaintiff Connor Angel hereby moves the Court for an order
3 granting preliminary approval to a proposed non-reversionary class action settlement to resolve
4 wage and hour claims on behalf of approximately 61 individuals employed by Defendant Elliott
5 Homes, Inc. (“Elliott” or “Defendant”) as current and former non-exempt employees at any location
6 in California at any time during the Class Period of September 26, 2020 to April 16, 2025. The
7 proposed \$225,000.00 settlement will provide about \$91,500 in cash payments to the class, with an
8 average award currently estimated at about \$1,500. The balance of approximately \$133,500 will
9 cover reasonable attorney’s fees and actual litigation costs, settlement administration costs, civil
10 penalties under PAGA, and a reasonable enhancement award to Plaintiff. The settlement is the
11 product of Plaintiff’s pre-filing investigation, formal discovery, and a pre-mediation exchange of
12 information, and arms-length negotiations overseen by experienced mediator Scott Radovich, Esq.

13 The proposed settlement is within the “range of reasonableness” for approval and Plaintiff’s
14 counsel submit the settlement is a fair result given the substantial risks inherent in this matter.
15 Accordingly, Plaintiff requests the Court enter an order: (1) granting preliminary approval to the
16 proposed class action settlement; (2) conditionally certifying the settlement class as defined below;
17 (3) appointing Crosner Legal, PC as Class Counsel; (4) appointing Plaintiff Connor Angel as the
18 Class Representative; (5) appointing Simpluris, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator; (6) approving
19 the form of notice to the class and the notice procedure; and (7) scheduling a final fairness hearing.

20 **II. BACKGROUND**

21 Defendant Elliott Homes is an Arizona corporation operating as a residential home builder
22 and developer in California. Defendant maintains its principal place of business in Folsom,
23 California, and conducts operations across multiple California locations. Plaintiff worked for Elliott
24 as a non-exempt detailer from February 4, 2020 to February 16, 2024. During his employment,
25 Plaintiff worked at various locations including Rancho, Folsom, Galt, and Elk Grove. Plaintiff
26 began his employment at a wage rate of \$27.00 per hour and received increases over time, reaching
27 a final rate of \$32.00 per hour. [Declaration of Nikki Trenner (“Trenner Decl.”), ¶ 4.]

28 On September 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against Defendant alleging

1 various wage and hour violations. First, Plaintiff alleged Elliott failed to pay minimum and
2 overtime wages by requiring "off the clock" work and paying employees per schedule rather than
3 actual hours worked and requiring Plaintiff and the Class Members to perform work off the clock
4 during unpaid meal periods. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant underpaid wages by failing to
5 incorporate non-discretionary bonuses in Plaintiff's and the Class Members' regular rate of pay
6 and thus paid for overtime and sick pay at the incorrect rate of pay. Plaintiff also claimed Defendant
7 failed to provide all required meal and rest breaks on a fully-compliant basis, and failed to
8 reimburse expenses incurred for the use of personal vehicles, personal cell phones, and the tools
9 necessary to perform the job. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff's class action complaint alleged
10 claims for minimum wage violations, overtime violations, meal and rest break violations, failure to
11 reimburse expenses, failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay all wages due on
12 separation of employment, and unfair competition under Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. After
13 exhausting administrative remedies, on November 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed a separate PAGA-only
14 complaint against Elliott based on the same alleged violations. The Court later consolidated both
15 matters. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 5; Exh. 2.]

16 In response, Elliott denied Plaintiff's allegations in their entirety. Elliott argued its meal
17 break and payroll policies and procedures comply with California law, that it provided its
18 employees with required meal and rest breaks, that it properly tracked employee time and paid
19 Plaintiff and all other employees all wages due at the correct hourly and overtime rates, and
20 reimbursed all reasonable and necessary expenses. Additionally, Elliott strongly contended the case
21 cannot be maintained as any kind of class or representative action, arguing that to the extent class
22 members missed meal breaks, that such breaks were non-compliant, or that any unpaid "off the
23 clock" work occurred, it was intermittent and infrequent and evidence of such violations would be
24 purely anecdotal, and therefore individualized issues predominate and trial would be
25 unmanageable. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 6.]

26 After the matter was at issue, both sides began engaging in meet and confer discussions
27 regarding case management, discovery and potential law and motion, and ultimately agreed to
28 attempt early mediation. The Parties also agreed on a protocol for an exchange of additional

documents and information before the mediation to facilitate the settlement discussions. Consequently, Plaintiff's counsel reviewed payroll records, compensation plans, personnel policies/handbooks, meal and rest break policies, personnel files, and a random of sampling of Class Member paystubs and time records. Defendant also provided data regarding the total number of putative class members, the estimated total amount of workweeks and pay periods they worked, average pay rates, and information regarding other non-hourly compensation, among other relevant data. Plaintiff had that information reviewed and analyzed by a consulting expert to assist with evaluating potential liability and creating a damages model. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 7.]

The Parties then engaged Scott Radovich, Esq., a respected professional neutral with substantial wage and hour and class action experience. In April 2025, the Parties participated in a mediation with Mr. Radovich. Throughout the day, the arms-length negotiations were hard-fought and adversarial as the Parties exchanged extensive information on their legal and factual positions, and made numerous offers and counter-offers, and ultimately reached agreement on all major issues. The Parties then collaboratively drafted the Class and Representative PAGA Action Settlement Agreement ("Settlement Agreement") setting forth the settlement terms now before the Court for approval. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 8.] A fully-executed, true and correct copy of the Settlement Agreement is attached to the Trenner Declaration as Exhibit 1. Finally, in order to fully implement the proposed settlement, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint incorporating the PAGA claims and otherwise conforming the complaint the terms of the proposed settlement. The FAC is the operative complaint for settlement purposes.

III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT TERMS

Under the settlement, Elliott will pay \$225,000 into a common fund, the Gross Settlement Amount ("GSA"). Attorney's fees of up to \$75,000 (33.3% of the GSA), litigation costs of up to \$30,000, settlement administration costs of no more than \$8,500, a service award to Plaintiff of no more than \$10,000, and PAGA civil penalties of \$10,000 (of which 65%, or \$6,500 will go to the LWDA and 35%, or \$3,500, will go to the Aggrieved Employees on a pro rata basis), all will be paid from the GSA. The balance of around \$91,500 will be allocated pro rata to the Class Members based on their weeks worked during the Class Period. No portion of the GSA will revert to Elliott.

1 [Trenner Decl., ¶ 9.]

2 **A. Certification of the Settlement Class**

3 The settlement provides for conditional certification of a settlement class including all
4 current and former non-exempt employees of Elliott at any location in California at any time during
5 the Class Period of September 26, 2020 to April 16, 2025. The Settlement Class consists of about
6 61 individuals. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 10.]

7 **B. The Benefit Conferred on the Settlement Class**

8 As noted, the settlement obligates Elliott to pay \$225,000 to resolve the Settlement Class's
9 claims, inclusive of attorney's fees and costs. At least \$91,500 from the GSA will be distributed
10 to the Participating Class Members. This is a cash settlement that does not require Participating
11 Class Members to submit a claim form to receive their settlement share. Participating Class
12 Members will receive their settlement checks automatically via First Class U.S. Mail. One-third of
13 each settlement share will be allocated to wages and the remaining two-thirds percent will be
14 allocated to penalties, expenses, and interest, which allocation is consistent with Elliott's potential
15 liability. Elliott will pay any and all applicable employer-side payroll taxes separately and in
16 addition to the GSA. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 11.]

17 Each Participating Class Member will receive a share of the Net Settlement Amount based
18 on his or her total pay periods worked in California as a non-exempt employee during the Class
19 Period. Thus, each Class Member's Individual Settlement Payment will be calculated using criteria
20 typically used in determining appropriate amounts of unpaid wages, unpaid premium wages for
21 missed meal and rest breaks, and potential statutory penalties under applicable law. These methods
22 are intended to ensure each Class Member receives a settlement award corresponding to the relative
23 value of their potential claims. The proposed allocation provides a reasonable way to compensate
24 Class Members based on the amount of time they worked for Elliott in California and the amount
25 unpaid/underpaid overtime, the number of missed or non-compliant meal breaks and rest breaks,
26 etc. The average class award is estimated to be around \$1,500, based on approximately \$9.36 per
27 work week (net), and the average PAGA award is estimated at about \$70, based on approximately
28 \$1.83 per pay period (net). [Trenner Decl., ¶ 12.]

1 **C. Settlement Administration**

2 Subject to the Court’s approval, the Parties have agreed on Simpluris, Inc. (“Simpluris”) as
3 the Settlement Administrator. Simpluris is qualified and has significant experience administering
4 class action settlements, including numerous wage and hour matters. Simpluris’s fees and costs will
5 not exceed \$8,500.00. If the Court approves less than the above amount, the difference will remain
6 in the Net Settlement Amount for distribution to the Participating Class Members. [Trenner Decl.,
7 ¶ 13; Declaration of Michael Bui, ¶¶ 2-9; Exhs. A-C.]

8 **D. The Class Notice**

9 The proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement (Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement)
10 sets out information about this case and explains the basic settlement terms in plain language.
11 The proposed Class Notice will be available in Spanish in addition to English. The Notice also
12 sets forth the individualized information used to calculate Class Members’ Individual Settlement
13 Payments and each Class Member’s estimated settlement award. The Notice likewise details the
14 procedures for Class Members to dispute their individual information, the procedure for
15 submitting an objection to the Settlement, the procedure to request exclusion, and the fact that
16 any final judgment will bind all class members who do not opt out. Cal. Rules of Court 3.769(f)
17 and 3.766(d). In sum, the Notice provides the Class Members with the information necessary to
18 evaluate the Settlement and decide to participate in, opt out of, or object to the proposed
19 Settlement, and meets all requirements under the California Rules of Court. Coupled with the
20 notice procedure, the Notice provides the best notice practicable. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 14.; Exh. 2.]

21 **E. Right to Correct Information, Opt Out, or Object**

22 Class Members will have sixty (60) days to dispute the information in their Notice used to
23 calculate their settlement award, and also have 60 days to submit any objections to the settlement
24 or to request exclusion. If a Class Member disputes their individual information, the Settlement
25 Administrator will review the Class Member’s records and any other information submitted, and
26 make a final determination. PAGA Members may not opt out or otherwise exclude himself or
27 herself from the release of PAGA claims. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 15.]

28 /////

1 **F. Release of Claims**

2 All Participating Class Members will release Elliott from all claims alleged in the
3 operative complaint, or that could have been brought based on the factual allegations in the
4 complaint during the Class Period. The release is limited to the claims that were actually pleaded
5 or could have been pleaded based on the alleged facts in the FAC. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 16.]

6 **G. Plaintiff's Enhancement Award**

7 A modest incentive award for Plaintiff is appropriate under applicable law. He devoted time
8 and resources to the litigation, provided documents, assisted Class Counsel with investigating the
9 claims asserted and in preparing for the mediations. The service payments provided to Plaintiff as
10 the class representatives is typical in class action cases and reasonable. Rodriguez v. W Publ'g Corp.
11 (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59 (incentive awards are “intended to compensate class
12 representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk
13 undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private
14 attorney general.”). Defendant will not oppose a request for an enhancement award to Plaintiff of
15 not more than \$10,000.00 in recognition of his time spent on this matter, the risks he undertook on
16 behalf of the class, and the benefit conferred to the class, as addressed in his respective declarations
17 filed herewith. See Staton v. Boeing (9th Cir. 2003) 327 F.3d 938, 977 (collecting cases awarding
18 class representatives service and incentive payments ranging from \$2,000 to \$25,000). If the Court
19 approves less than the above amounts, the difference will remain in the Net Settlement Amount for
20 distribution to the Participating Class Members. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 17; Declaration of Connor Angel,
21 ¶¶ 2-9.]

22 **H. Attorney's Fees and Costs**

23 The terms of the Parties' settlement also allow Plaintiff's counsel to apply for an award of
24 attorney's fees of up to 33.3% of the MSA, or \$75,000, and reimbursement of actual costs and
25 expenses of up to \$30,000.00. In Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l., Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 489;
26 Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 254, disapproved on other
27 grounds, Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260, the California
28 Supreme Court approved calculating attorney's fees using the percentage-of-the-common-

1 fund method in wage-and-hour cases, and further approved an award of 1/3 of the total
2 common fund in that matter. Further, counsel's requested 1/3 fee is justified in this matter
3 considering the amount of work performed and the excellent result achieved. The percentage
4 requested likewise comports with fee awards calculated on a percentage-of-the-benefit
5 basis as a review of class action settlements shows that courts have historically awarded fees
6 in the range of 20 to 50 percent, depending upon the circumstances of the case. In re Warner
7 Communications Sec. Litig. (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 618 F.Supp. 735, 749-50 (concluding that
8 percentage fees in common fund cases range from 20 to 50 percent); Newberg, Newberg on
9 Class Actions (3d ed.) § 14.03, pp. 13-14 ("Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a
10 reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
11 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger
12 percentages are not unprecedented.").

13 Plaintiff's counsel will submit a request for attorney's fees and actual litigation costs at
14 final approval per the terms of the Settlement Agreement and applicable law, will provide the
15 Court with appropriate information and evidence regarding hourly rates, tasks performed, and
16 time expended on the case, and further argument supporting the fees requested. If the Court
17 approves less than the above amounts, the difference will remain in the Net Settlement Amount
18 for distribution to the Participating Class Members. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 18.]

19 **I. PAGA and Notice to the LWDA**

20 As noted, the Parties allocated \$10,000 to resolution of Plaintiff's alleged claims under
21 PAGA, and respectfully submit that amount is fair, reasonable and adequate, and consistent with
22 PAGA's underlying purposes. Consistent with PAGA, \$6,500 of that amount will go to the
23 LWDA for the State's share of the civil penalties, while the remaining \$3,500 will be distributed
24 pro rata to eligible PAGA Members. Prior to filing this motion, Plaintiff provided notice of the
25 proposed settlement of the PAGA claims and the approval hearing to the LWDA. [Trenner Decl.,
26 ¶ 19; Exh. 5.]

27 **J. Uncashed Funds**

28 Class Members and PAGA Members have one hundred and eighty (180) days to cash

1 Individual Settlement Payments. Any Settlement checks not cashed after 180 days from the date of
2 mailing of Individual Settlement Payments shall be sent to the State of California Unclaimed
3 Property Fund in the Class Members' or PAGA Members' name. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 20.]

4 **IV. ARGUMENT**

5 **A. Standard of Review for a Class Action Settlement**

6 The law favors settlement, particularly in class actions where substantial resources can be
7 conserved by avoiding the time, costs and rigors of formal litigation. H. Newberg & A. Conte, 4
8 Newberg on Class Actions (4th ed. 2002) § 11.41; Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle (9th Cir.
9 1992) 955 F.2d 1268, 1276, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953; Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co.
10 (1951) 37 Cal.2d 592, 602. Nevertheless, to ensure the rights of absent class members are not
11 unjustly compromised, settlement of a class action requires court approval. Cal. Rule of Court.
12 3.769; Wershba v. Apple Computer (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245; Dunk v. Elliott Motor Co.
13 (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801. This judicial review protects against fraud or collusion, and
14 ensures fairness to the absent class members. Dunk, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1800-01. Judicial review
15 occurs via a two-step process to determine, under all of the circumstances, if the proposed
16 settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate. Id. at 1801; Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245.

17 The first step is a motion for preliminary approval, through which the parties present the
18 court with the proposed settlement and seek a determination that it is sufficiently fair and
19 reasonable to warrant notice to the class and further proceedings as to its fairness and adequacy.
20 Cal. Rule of Court 3.769(c). This preliminary evaluation determines if the proposed settlement is
21 within the "range of reasonableness" and if notice should be provided to the class regarding the
22 settlement's proposed terms and conditions, and whether a final fairness hearing should be
23 scheduled. Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 234-35; North County Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v.
24 Touchstone Ins. Servs. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1089-90. Considering the strong judicial
25 policy favoring settlement of class actions, courts generally apply a presumption of fairness to
26 class action settlements when (1) the settlement results from arms-length bargaining, (2)
27 investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently, (3)
28 counsel is experienced in similar litigation, and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. Dunk, 48

1 Cal.App.4th at 1802; Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245.

2 If the court grants preliminary approval, it then orders the class be given notice in an
3 appropriate manner, establishes a schedule and procedures for class members to request exclusion
4 or object, and sets the matter for a final fairness hearing. Typically, any motion for attorney's
5 fees and costs is filed subsequent to preliminary approval and heard with the motion for final
6 approval, as part of the second step of the two-step approval process. Dunk, 48 Cal.App.4th at
7 1800; Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 232. The proposed settlement in this matter warrants
8 preliminary approval under the liberal standard discussed above, as it is fair, reasonable and
9 adequate under all the circumstances, and represents a favorable result for the class.

10 **B. The Proposed Settlement Class Should Be Conditionally Certified**

11 The purpose of conditional class certification for purposes of settlement is to facilitate
12 provision of notice of the proposed settlement's terms, and the date and time of the final fairness
13 hearing. In this context, courts apply lesser scrutiny than they would otherwise in the context of
14 certifying a class. Dunk, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1807, n.19; Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v.
15 Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 836, 839 ("[I]t is well established that trial courts should
16 use different standards to determine the propriety of a settlement class.")

17 In the present matter, conditional certification is proper since this matter satisfies all
18 requirements for class certification under Code of Civil Procedure section 382. First, the class is
19 both sufficiently numerous, consisting of approximately 61 individuals, and ascertainable by
20 reference to Defendant's personnel and payroll records. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 21.] Next, Plaintiff is an
21 adequate class representative, as his claims do not conflict with and are not antagonistic to the
22 claims of other class members. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 22; Angel Decl., ¶¶ 2-4.] Further, his claims are
23 typical as he is a member of the class and his claims arise from the same employment practices and
24 course of conduct giving rise to the claims of the other class members. [Id.] Lastly, his counsel are
25 experienced and adequate class counsel. [Trenner Decl., ¶¶ 39-45.]

26 Next, common questions of law and fact predominate – particularly for purposes of a
27 settlement class – as the Class Members all were paid via substantially similar company-wide
28 policies that resulting alleged off the clock work, underpaid overtime, missed/non-compliant meal

1 and rest breaks, etc. Since the focus of the claims against Elliott concerns the legality of common
2 policies applied uniformly to the entire class, common issues predominate over individualized
3 inquiries concerning liability. For instance, Elliott’s compensation scheme either properly paid the
4 class members for overtime hours worked or it did not. Regardless of that determination, it will
5 decide liability for all Class Members one way or another. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 23.]

6 By now it is well-settled a theory of recovery asserting the existence of a uniform policy
7 violating California law is sufficient to satisfy the requirements for class certification. Jones v.
8 Farmers Ins. Exch. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 986, 996 (“Claims alleging that a uniform policy
9 consistently applied to a group of employees is in violation of the wage and hour laws are of the
10 sort routinely, and properly, found suitable for class treatment”); Williams v. Superior Court
11 (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1353 (“A company-wide practice can sustain a common question fact or
12 law that supports commonality for class certification”). Lastly, a class action is superior to other
13 means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 24.]

14 **C. The Proposed Settlement Meets the Dunk and Kullar Factors and is**
15 **within the Range of Reasonableness**

16 The proposed settlement resulted from serious, arms-length negotiations facilitated by
17 respected mediator Scott Radovich, who has extensive experience mediating wage and hour class
18 actions. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 8.] Plaintiff’s counsel Zach Crosner, Jamie Serb and Nikki Trenner have
19 years of litigation experience, including litigating dozens of wage and hour class/PAGA actions.
20 Plaintiff’s counsel are well-qualified to evaluate the risks and benefits of pursuing further litigation
21 or settling the matter. [Trenner Decl., ¶¶ 39-45.]

22 California law recognizes several factors bearing on the fairness, adequacy, and
23 reasonableness of a proposed class settlement. Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168
24 Cal.App.4th 116, 128. In relevant part, these factors include: 1) the amount offered in settlement
25 2) the strength of plaintiff’s case; 3) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further
26 litigation; 4) the risk of maintaining class action status throughout trial; 5) the experience and views
27 of counsel; and 6) the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. Id. As
28 demonstrated below, the proposed settlement satisfies these requirements.

1 Prior to mediation, the parties engaged in extensive informal discovery to facilitate
2 settlement discussions. As a result, Plaintiff reviewed documents and information regarding
3 Elliott's payroll practices, pay stubs and time records for a sampling of about 65% of the class
4 members, meal and rest break policies, etc., and information from Defendant regarding class size
5 and breakdown of job positions, work weeks, rates of pay, and other information used to formulate
6 a damages model. Plaintiff's counsel are confident they obtained sufficient information to enable
7 them to understand the law and facts of this case and make an informed decision regarding the
8 proposed settlement and whether it is in the best interests of the class. [Trenner Decl., ¶¶ 7, 25.]

9 Using that data, Plaintiff ran various calculations and estimated Elliott's likely maximum
10 exposure on the class claims at approximately \$3,545,800, including about \$139,308,750 on the
11 off the clock/unpaid wage claims, around \$35,580 on the regular rate claims, approximately
12 \$1,396,74600 on the meal period claims, about \$1,396,746 on the rest period claims, about
13 \$305,400 on the expense reimbursement claims, around \$188,200 on the wage statement claims,
14 and \$83,820 on the waiting time penalty claims. [Trenner Decl., ¶¶ 26-27.] Plaintiff and counsel
15 substantially discounted the value of these claims, however, in light of Defendant's multi-layered
16 defenses on both class certification and on the merits, and the multiple and considerable risks
17 posed by proceeding with the litigation.

18 The unpaid wage claims focus primarily on Elliott's alleged failure to pay Class Members
19 at least minimum wages and/ or overtime wages for all of their hours worked. Plaintiff alleges,
20 for example, that employees regularly performed pre-shift and post-shift work which time was
21 not always recorded or paid for because Defendant paid based on their scheduled hours only
22 rather than actual hours worked. Per Plaintiff, employees also frequently had to work during
23 unpaid meal breaks depending on the press of business and need to meet project deadlines.
24 Plaintiff alleges all of this off the clock work resulted in the loss of at least 1 hour of compensable
25 time per workweek. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 28.]

26 Plaintiff also alleged Defendant failed to incorporate all forms of compensation into their
27 regular rate of pay calculations when paying overtime as required by Alvarado v. Dart Container
28 Corp. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 542 (the "regular rate of pay, which can change from pay period to pay

1 period, includes adjustments to the straight time rate, reflecting, among other things, shift
2 differentials and the per-hour value of any non-hourly compensation the employee has earned.”)
3 Here, Plaintiff alleges class members regularly received performance-based bonuses but that
4 Elliott failed to pay the required overtime on those payments. Plaintiff’s analysis suggested about
5 that over 7,000 hours of overtime and sick time were underpaid due to Elliott’s alleged
6 miscalculation of the regular rate of pay. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 29.]

7 In response, Elliott argued its payroll policies are fully compliant, that it properly tracked
8 and paid for all hours worked at the appropriate hourly wage. Defendant also argued that, if any
9 class members failed to record and report time it was in violation of company policy and would
10 have occurred on a haphazard and individual basis. Accordingly Defendant argued the issue
11 would not be certifiable since it would require individualized inquiries whether any compensable
12 “off the clock” work occurred and why it was or was not documented and paid for. White v.
13 Starbucks Corp., 497 F.Supp.2d 1080, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (employer must have actual or
14 constructive knowledge of the off the clock work for liability to attach). [Trenner Decl., ¶ 30.]

15 On the meal and rest break claims, Plaintiff contends Elliott’s written policies are not fully
16 compliant, and regardless the time and pay records show substantial “de facto” violations for non-
17 compliant meal breaks. For example, Plaintiff argued Defendant’s policies failed to inform
18 employees that a first meal break must start before the end of the fifth hour of work, that
19 employees were entitled to a second meal break on shifts over ten hours, or that employees are
20 owed premium pay for a missed or non-compliant meal period. Regardless of the policies, per
21 Plaintiff Elliott also failed to track the start/stop times for lunch breaks for much of the class
22 period, and accordingly violations will be presumed unless Defendant can affirmatively rebut the
23 presumption. Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 58. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 31.]

24 In response, Elliott argued its written policies are fully compliant, and that it provided
25 employees with the opportunity to receive all required meal breaks and thereby met its
26 obligations under the Labor Code and applicable Wage Order. Further, Defendant argued to the
27 extent employees missed a break or took a non-compliant break, any such discrepancies were
28 aberrational and against company policy and a myriad of individual issues would be required to

1 determine whether the potential violation resulted from employee choice or some other reason.
2 Consequently, per Defendant, individualized inquiries would dominate on this issue and render
3 class certification of the meal break claim inappropriate. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 32.]

4 For rest breaks, Plaintiff again argued that there were numerous “de facto” violations
5 where class members didn’t receive a break (especially third breaks), or didn’t receive a
6 compliant break/had their breaks interrupted by supervisors. As with meal breaks, Defendant
7 argued the applicable rest break policies complied with California law, and that it authorized and
8 permitted employees to take all required breaks. Defendant further contended that, in light of the
9 fact that it is not required to maintain a record of rest periods, any evidence of failure to authorize
10 rest periods and/or discouragement from taking rest periods would be purely anecdotal and
11 individual issues would predominate on liability. This arguably would once again make class
12 certification and a trial unmanageable since the number of instances an employee missed a rest
13 break, or had a break interrupted, would have to be tested on a case by case basis to determine
14 compliance. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 33.]

15 Plaintiff also alleged that he and the class members incurred substantial business expenses
16 that went unreimbursed. First, he alleged employees had to use their personal cell phones for
17 work purposes without any reimbursement. As such, employees are entitled to unreimbursed
18 costs for the use of their cell phones. Cochran v. Schwan's Home Service, Inc. (2014) 228
19 Cal.App.4th 1137. Plaintiff also claims employees used personal vehicles for work but did not
20 receive full reimbursement as required under Gattuso v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc. (2007) 42
21 Cal.4th 554. Here, while Plaintiff acknowledges he received a set monthly amount for
22 gas/automobile expense he also claims that amount was insufficient to fully reimburse for the
23 number of miles driven for work purposes. Finally, Plaintiff alleges he and other employees had
24 to purchase and maintain the tools necessary to complete home construction projects, such as
25 drills, saws, screwdrivers, measuring tapes, nail guns, palm sanders, and other hand tools (totaling
26 over \$1,000 per employee) even though the class members didn't always receive at least two
27 times the applicable minimum wage. Wage Order 16-2001, § 8(B). Defendant on the other hand
28 argued that its policies prohibited use of cell phones while working for safety reasons,

1 particularly given the class members performed physical labor, used power tools, etc. Elliott
2 argued that any use of personal mobile devices was unnecessary to perform the job and therefore
3 was purely for personal convenience. If so, then the expense was neither reasonable nor
4 necessary, and no reimbursement was required. Labor Code § 2802. On the mileage issue,
5 Defendant argued the mileage allowance it paid adequately and fully reimbursed for all
6 reasonable and necessary business travel. Finally, Defendant argued that any tools not provided
7 were simply basic hand tools ordinarily used in the trade, and therefore no reimbursement was
8 owed as the employees were paid appropriately. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 34.]

9 The claims under Labor Code section 226 are derivative violations, as are the claims
10 under Labor Code sections 201, *et seq.*, and which claims are subject to the same risks and
11 uncertainties posed by the merits claims address above. These claims further are subject to the
12 “good faith” and other defenses available to Defendant. Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163
13 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1203-4 (employer did not willfully fail to pay wages under Labor Code § 203
14 even though class prevailed on underlying claim for failure to pay living wages). Thus, while
15 these claims largely are derivative of the unpaid wage claims, they also are subject to additional
16 defenses. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 35.]

17 As far as potential PAGA liability, the allegedly aggrieved employees theoretically are
18 entitled to penalties totaling around \$970,000 in civil penalties should Plaintiff prevail on all claims
19 and establish violations of the multiple Labor Code sections for every single pay period at issue,
20 and recover the maximum allowable penalties. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 36.] As with the class claims,
21 Plaintiff discounted the potential PAGA penalties based on Defendant’s various defenses on the
22 merits and also accounted for the Court’s wide discretion to reduce such penalties, or to decline to
23 award penalties at all. Labor Code § 2699(e)(2); Carrington v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 30
24 Cal.App.5th 504 (trial court awarded penalties of \$5 per pay period after a bench trial, which
25 decision was upheld on appeal); In re Taco Bell Wage and Hour Actions (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016)
26 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48557 (PAGA penalties denied after trial).

27 Accordingly, the Parties allocated \$10,000 to PAGA penalties, and Plaintiff submits this
28 amount is reasonable under the circumstances and in line with comparable settlements in other

1 wage and hour class actions in California. *E.g.*, Van Kempen v. Matheson Tri-Gas, Inc. (N.D. Cal.
2 Aug. 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137182 (granting final approval of \$5,000 PAGA penalty
3 from \$370,000 settlement, or 1.4 percent of total settlement); Slavkov v. First Water Heater
4 Partners I (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116303 (finding a \$7,500 PAGA
5 payment reasonable when measured against the overall settlement of \$345,000 and the possible
6 weaknesses in Plaintiffs' case, or 2.2 percent of total settlement). Additionally, the LWDA has been
7 informed of the terms of the PAGA portion of the settlement, and will be able to weigh in as
8 necessary. Jennings v. Open Door Mktg. Inc. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018) 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9 171356, at *27 (approving settlement with PAGA penalties of 0.6% where "[p]laintiffs [have]
10 submitted the settlement agreement to the LWDA, and the LWDA has not objected to the
11 settlement.

12 The settlement obviates the significant risk that this Court may find any kind of class or
13 representative resolution unachievable or deny certification of all or some of Plaintiff's claims.
14 Furthermore, even if Plaintiff obtained certification of all or some of the claims, continued
15 litigation would be lengthy and expensive as the parties pursued merits discovery, a probable
16 motion to decertify, as well as trial and possible appeals, and would further and substantially
17 delay any recovery by the class with no assurance of recovering significantly more than the
18 proposed settlement. While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of these claims, legitimate
19 controversies exist regarding each one of them. Plaintiff also recognized proving the amount of
20 wages and penalties due each Class Member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and
21 uncertain proposition. [Trenner Decl., ¶¶ 37-38.]

22 Plaintiff and counsel discounted the value of the class claims consistent with the risks
23 discussed above, and carefully weighed the likelihood of the class receiving substantially greater
24 benefit if the litigation continued. They concluded – in light of these very real and substantial
25 risks – settlement on the proposed terms and without prolonged and costly litigation was in the
26 best interests of the class, and the overall \$225,000 recovery represents a significant percentage
27 of Defendant's potential exposure. Given these risks, a total recovery for the class of \$225,000,
28 which will result in average award of some \$1,500 per class member, is a significant result well

1 within the range of reasonableness considering all potential outcomes, and it will provide direct
2 monetary awards to all Class Members without further delay. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 38.]

3 Importantly, the mere fact that a settlement does not provide the same recovery as might
4 be achieved at trial is not a proper indicator of whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and
5 adequate. Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 246, 250 (“Compromise is inherent and necessary in the
6 settlement process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially
7 narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class
8 settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which
9 each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation”); Lane v. Facebook, Inc. (9th Cir.
10 2012) 696 F.3d 811, 819 (“[T]he question whether a settlement is fundamentally fair . . . is
11 different from the question whether the settlement is perfect in the estimation of the reviewing
12 court”); 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135,
13 1150 (“The fact that a proposed settlement may amount to only a fraction of the potential
14 recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly inadequate and
15 should be disapproved”); White v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2011) 803
16 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1098 (rejecting contention settlement was not fair and reasonable even though it
17 represented 99% discount off the maximum value of the claims). Importantly as well, the
18 proposed settlement is non-reversionary and will provide timely benefits to the Class Members
19 without a claims process. White, 803 F.Supp.2d at 1098; c.f., Federal Judicial Center, Managing
20 Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges (3d ed. 2010) at 20, available at [http://](http://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf)
21 www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf (reversionary provisions and/or cumbersome
22 claims process may indicate lack of fairness). Plaintiff and his counsel submit the settlement is
23 within the “range of reasonableness,” and is fair and adequate for the Class.

24 **V. CONCLUSION**

25 For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant this motion,
26 conditionally certify the settlement class, grant preliminary approval to the proposed class action
27 settlement, and enter the [Proposed] Order filed herewith.

1 Dated: January 20, 2026

CROSNER LEGAL, PC

2 

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