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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF KERN

DESTINY VASSAR, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, and the
general public,

Plaintiff,

v.

GENESIS HEALTHCARE
MANAGEMENT, LLC, a California limited
liability company; ASPIRE COUNSELING
SERVICES, LLC, a California limited
liability company; GENESIS MEDICAL
MANAGEMENT, LLC, a California
business entity of unknown form; and DOES
1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: BCV-24-102892

CLASS ACTION

*[Assigned for all purposes to Hon. Thomas S.
Clark, Dept. 17]*

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF PAGA
SETTLEMENT UNDER CALIFORNIA
LABOR CODE §§ 2698 et seq.;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

*[Filed concurrently with Declaration of David
Keledjian; and [Proposed] Order]*

Hearing Date: December 03, 2025
Time: 8:30 a.m.

1 **TO THE COURT AND DEFENDANTS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

2 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on December 3, 2025, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 17 of
3 the above Court, located at 1415 Truxtun Avenue, Bakersfield, CA 93301, Plaintiff Destiny Vassar
4 (“Plaintiff” or “PAGA Representative”), on behalf of herself, the State of California, and all
5 aggrieved employees (the “Aggrieved Employees”), will and hereby does move this Court
6 pursuant to California Labor Code § 2698 *et seq.* for an order approving the settlement agreement
7 between Plaintiff and Defendants GENESIS HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT, LLC, a
8 California limited liability company; ASPIRE COUNSELING SERVICES, LLC, a California
9 limited liability company (“Defendants”) which will accomplish the following: approve the
10 representative action settlement embodied in the PAGA Settlement Agreement; approve PAGA
11 Counsel’s application for attorney’s fees and litigation costs and costs for the Administrator; and
12 enter judgment approving the PAGA Settlement Agreement (the “Motion”).

13 The grounds for this Motion, as set forth in the attached Memorandum of Points and
14 Authorities and supporting Declaration, are that this is a fair and reasonable settlement that benefits
15 the Aggrieved Employees and was the product of informed, non-collusive negotiations by the
16 parties who were represented by experienced and able counsel. *See Wershba v. Apple Computer,*
17 *Inc.*, 91 Cal. App 4th 224, 244-45 (1996); *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1802
18 (1996); Manual for Complex Litigation, (Second), § 30.44 (1985).

19 Defendants do not oppose this Motion. Plaintiff bases this Motion on this Notice and the
20 accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of David Keledjian
21 (“Keledjian Decl.”), the complete pleadings, records and files in the case, and such other further
22 oral and documentary evidence which may be submitted at or before the hearing on this Motion.

23 DATED: November 3, 2025

D.LAW, INC.

24 By: /s/ David Keledjian
25 David Yeremian
26 David Keledjian
27 Svetlana Hovhannisyan
Attorneys for Destiny Vassar on behalf of
herself and Aggrieved Employees

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Through this Motion, Plaintiff Destiny Vassar (“Plaintiff”) requests that the Court grant
4 approval of the PAGA Settlement Agreement (“Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”) reached
5 between the parties to resolve claims brought exclusively under the Private Attorneys General Act of
6 2004, Labor Code § 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”) seeking civil penalties for various violations of the
7 California Labor Code and Industrial Wage Commission’s Wage Orders. Pursuant to the Settlement,
8 Defendants GENESIS HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT, LLC, a California limited liability
9 company; ASPIRE COUNSELING SERVICES, LLC, a California limited liability company
10 (“Defendants”) will pay the Gross Settlement Amount of \$150,000.00. (Declaration of David
11 Keledjian (“Keledjian Decl.”), Exhibit 1, “Settlement,” ¶ 3.1.)

12 For purposes of the Settlement, the group of aggrieved employees included in the Settlement
13 is defined as all current and former hourly-paid, non-exempt employees employed by Defendants
14 throughout California any time during the PAGA Period, which is August 26, 2023, through
15 September 15, 2025 (“Aggrieved Employees”). (Keledjian Decl., Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 1.4 and 1.20.) Based
16 on its records, Defendants estimate that there are approximately 190 Aggrieved Employees who
17 collectively worked a total of 4,116 pay periods as of July 15, 2025. (Keledjian Decl., ¶ 12.)

18 As further explained below, Plaintiff and her counsel believe that the Settlement is fair,
19 reasonable, and in the best interests of the Aggrieved Employees and the State. Accordingly, Plaintiff
20 requests that the Court “review and approve” the Settlement pursuant to Labor Code § 2699(1)(2). If
21 the Court deems the Settlement fair and acceptable, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter an order
22 approving the Settlement in the form lodged herewith ordering the parties and Administrator to carry
23 out the terms of the Settlement Agreement and enter a Final Judgment thereon.¹

24
25
26
27 ¹ Plaintiff has submitted the Settlement Agreement and this Motion to the LWDA by uploading it
28 on the LWDA’s website concurrently with the filing of this Motion as required by Labor Code §
2699(1)(2). (Declaration of David Keledjian (“Keledjian Decl.”) ¶ 45, Exhibit 4.)

II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Litigation Overview and Procedural History

On August 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a class-action complaint in the Kern County Superior Court, Case No. BCV-24-102892, against Defendants alleging claims under the California Labor Code (the “Labor Code”) for (1) Failure to Provide Meal Periods (Lab. Code §§ 204, 223, 226.7 and 1198); (2) Failure to Provide Rest Periods (Lab. Code §§ 204, 223, 226.7 and 1198); (3) Failure to Pay Hourly Wages and Overtime (Lab. Code §§ 223, 510, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1 and 1198); (4) Failure to Provide Accurate Written Wage Statements (Lab. Code §§ 226(a)); (5) Failure to Timely Pay All Final Wages (Lab. Code §§ 201, 202 and 203); (6) Failure to Indemnify (Lab. Code § 2802); (7) Unfair Competition (Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.) (the “Action”). (the “Action”). (Keledjian Decl., ¶ 4.)

On or about August 22, 2024, Plaintiff submitted her notice letter to the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and Defendants, alleging that Defendants committed various wage and hour violations under the California Labor Code and were entitled to civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

On or about November 18, 2024, the Parties stipulated that Plaintiff’s individual and class claims in the Action would be dismissed without prejudice and she be granted leave to file a First Amended Complaint to add a cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA against Defendants. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.)

On or about November 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint, adding a cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA against Defendants (“Operative Complaint.”) (*Id.* at ¶ 6.)

On July 15, 2025, the Parties attended an all-day mediation with experienced mediator Hon. Howard R. Broadman (Ret.) and subsequently settled the Action. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) The Settlement Agreement reached between the parties does not constitute, is not intended to constitute, and will not be deemed to constitute, an admission of liability by Defendants as to the merits, validity, or accuracy of any of the allegations or claims made against Defendants in the Action. (Keledjian Decl., Exhibit 1, ¶ 2.4.) Defendants deny all liability in the Action. (*Id.* at ¶ 2.1.)

1 **B. Mediation and Settlement**

2 Prior to mediation, Plaintiff conducted extensive informal discovery and Defendants
3 provided data, numbers, and documents, including electronic payroll and timekeeping data for a
4 sampling of Aggrieved Employees, information and documentation regarding Defendants’ wage
5 and hour policies, expense report data and information, and meal period information. (Keledjian
6 Decl., ¶ 9.) The information and data exchanged by Plaintiff and Defendants prior to and during
7 mediation and settlement negotiations were sufficient to reliably assess the merits of the parties’
8 respective positions, to compromise the issues on a fair and equitable basis, and to devise a formula
9 for distribution of civil penalties among the Aggrieved Employees that took into consideration the
10 strength of the PAGA claims. (*Id.*)

11 With the assistance of a highly respected wage and hour mediator, the parties agreed to a
12 global settlement of the Action. (Keledjian Decl., ¶ 10.) The general terms for settling this Action
13 were memorialized in the long-form Settlement Agreement now before the Court for approval,
14 which was fully executed on October 15, 2025. (*Id.*)

15 The parties believe and agree that the Settlement provides for a fair, adequate, and reasonable
16 resolution of the Action and have arrived at the Settlement in extensive, arm’s length negotiations,
17 considering all relevant factors, present and potential. (Keledjian Decl., ¶ 11.) PAGA Counsel
18 believes that the Settlement confers real benefits upon Plaintiff and the Aggrieved Employees and
19 that an independent review of the Settlement by the Court in the approval process will confirm this
20 conclusion. (*Id.*)

21 **III. PAGA ACTIONS AND THE REQUIREMENTS**

22 **A. The PAGA Statutory Scheme**

23 PAGA creates a means of “deputizing” citizens as private attorney generals to enforce the
24 Labor Code on behalf of the LWDA. *Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co.* (2011) 197 Cal. App. 4th 489,
25 501, *review den.* (Oct. 19, 2011, No. S195850), *cert. denied* 132 S.Ct. 1910 (Apr. 16, 2012). A
26 plaintiff may not — and Plaintiff here does not — bring a PAGA claim simply on his or her own
27 behalf as an individual claim, but “as the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement
28 agencies.” *Id.*, at 986; *see also Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc.* (2011) 202 Cal. App. 4th 1119, 1123-1124;

1 *Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 380. When an aggrieved employee
2 brings a PAGA claim, “the government is always the real party in interest.” *Securitas Sec. Servs.*
3 *USA, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. of San Diego Cnty.* (2015) 234 Cal. App. 4th 1109, 1119; *Montano v. The Wet*
4 *Seal Retail, Inc.* (2015) 232 Cal. App. 4th 1214, 1222 (“[A] PAGA action is a dispute between an
5 employer and the State agency.”). Accordingly, a plaintiff that brings a PAGA claim represents “the
6 same legal right and interest as state labor law enforcement agencies,” in that the plaintiff seeks to
7 recover those civil penalties that the LWDA otherwise would assess and collect. *Arias v. Super. Ct.*
8 (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 986; Labor Code § 2699(a) & (f); *Securitas, supra*, 234 Cal. App. 4th at 1119;
9 *see also Medina v. Vander Poel* (E.D. Cal. 2015) 523 B.R. 820, 825 (holding “PAGA plaintiffs do
10 not have property rights in their cases.”), and *Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v.*
11 *Superior Court* (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003.

12 Therefore, when a plaintiff brings a PAGA claim, he or she is properly viewed as a private
13 attorney general prosecuting violations of California’s labor laws on behalf of the state. An employee
14 may commence a PAGA action by fulfilling the requirements of California Labor Code §
15 2699.3(a)(1), which simply states: “The aggrieved employee or representative shall give written
16 notice by certified mail to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency and the employer of the
17 specific provisions of this code alleged to have been violated, including the facts and theories to
18 support the alleged violation.” Labor Code § 2699.3(a)(1). As explained above, Plaintiff complied
19 with the notice requirements and properly pled a PAGA claim. (Keledjian Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.)

20 **B. The Court Has Discretion When Awarding the Amount of Penalties.**

21 The Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code § 2699 *et seq.*, provides for penalties in the
22 amount of \$100 for each violation per aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and
23 \$200 for each violation per aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent violation. Labor
24 Code § 2699(f)(2). “PAGA penalties...are mandatory, not discretionary” and must be awarded upon
25 a showing that Defendants violated the Labor Code. *Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2* (2008) 163
26 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1213. However, the Private Attorneys General Act provides the Court with
27 discretion when it finds liability and awards these penalties as part of a judgment. Labor Code §
28 2699(e)(2) states that “a court may award a lesser amount than the maximum civil penalty amount

specified by this part if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.”

C. **PAGA Authorizes the Payment of PAGA Counsel’s Fees and Costs**

The Private Attorneys General Act provides for the recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Labor Code § 2699(g)(1) (“Any employee who prevails in any action shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, including any filing fee paid...”). The monetary settlement and programmatic relief make Plaintiff a “prevailing party.” *Folsom v. Butte County Ass’n of Gov’ts* (1982) 32 Cal. 3d 668,671; *Santisas v. Goodin* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 621. Even if Labor Code § 2699(g)(1) did not authorize fees, Plaintiff would be entitled to fees as a Private Attorney General under Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5 because Plaintiff brought this action to, and the action does, benefit the public. *Arias*, 46 Cal.4th at 985–986.

IV. **THE SETTLEMENT**

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Defendants will pay the Gross Settlement Amount of \$150,000.00 in full and final settlement of the PAGA claim alleged in the Action. (Keledjian Decl., Exhibit 1, ¶ 3.1).

Pending Court approval, the Gross Settlement Amount will be allocated as follows: (1) attorneys’ fees of 33% of the Gross Settlement Amount which is **\$50,000.00** (“PAGA Counsel Fees Payment”) (Keledjian Decl., ¶ 13.); (2) actual litigation costs incurred in this matter in the amount of **\$13,736.59** (“PAGA Counsel Costs Payment”) (*Id.*); (3) settlement administration costs of up to **\$5,000.00** to be paid to the Settlement Administrator, Simpluris, Inc., for sending notices and for calculating settlement shares and preparing all checks and mailings (“Administration Expenses Payment”) (*Id.*); (4) Enhancement Payment to the named Plaintiff in the amount of **\$5,000**; and (5) PAGA Penalties in the amount of **\$76,263.41**, with 65% (\$49,571.22) allocated to the LWDA (“LWDA PAGA Payment”) and 35% (\$26,692.19) allocated to the Aggrieved Employees (“Individual PAGA Payments”). (*Id.*) The Individual PAGA Payments will be calculated based on the number of pay periods the Aggrieved Employee worked during the PAGA Period of August 26, 2023, through September 15, 2025 (“PAGA Pay Periods”). (Keledjian Decl., Exhibit 1, ¶ 3.2.4.1.)

Based on its records, Defendants estimate that there are approximately 190 Aggrieved

1 Employees who collectively worked 4,116 PAGA Pay Periods as of July 15, 2025. (*Id.* at ¶ 12.) If
2 the actual number of PAGA Pay Periods in the PAGA Period increases by more than 10% (i.e., an
3 increase of 412 or more), then Defendants will increase the Gross Settlement Amount in the amount
4 of \$36.44 for each PAGA Pay Period in excess of 10%. (Keledjian Decl., Exhibit 1, ¶ 8.)

5 Based on this information, and using a straight average, Plaintiff estimates that on average
6 Aggrieved Employees will receive a payment of approximately \$140.49 (\$26,692.19 divided by 190
7 Aggrieved Employees). (Keledjian Decl., ¶¶ 12, 13.)

8 **V. ARGUMENT**

9 **A. The Court Should Approve the Settlement Agreement.**

10 Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699(l), the parties must obtain Court approval of a settlement of a
11 PAGA action on a representative basis. However, as explained in *Arias v. Superior Ct.* (2009) 46
12 Cal.4th 969, the parties need not follow the class action procedural rules in PAGA cases and therefore
13 need not obtain approval of the PAGA settlement through a motion for preliminary or final approval.
14 Nonetheless, to comply with the requirements of Labor Code section 2699, Plaintiff submits this
15 Motion and the Settlement Agreement for Court approval.

16 **B. The Risks of Moving Forward with Plaintiff's PAGA Claim**

17 To help the Court evaluate the fairness of the Settlement, below is a discussion of the risk
18 evaluation made by Plaintiff and PAGA Counsel. Plaintiff and PAGA Counsel considered the
19 arguments and defenses asserted by Defendants at mediation, assessed the risks of moving forward
20 to trial and what this Court could do in awarding penalties even if Plaintiff prevailed at trial.

21 Plaintiff estimated that the maximum potential exposure on the PAGA claim is \$411,600,
22 calculated by multiplying the total number of PAGA Pay Periods 4,116) by \$100 per violation.
23 (Keledjian Decl., ¶ 19.) Plaintiff's calculation of the total potential exposure on the PAGA claim was
24 based on one PAGA penalty per Pay Period (i.e., Plaintiff did not stack the PAGA penalties in his
25 damages calculation). (*Id.*) Case law supports the notion that it is inappropriate to "stack" penalties
26 for multiple violations, particularly when those violations all stem from the same alleged "injury."
27 (*Id.* at ¶ 18.)

28 The Gross Settlement Amount of \$150,000.00 is approximately 36.44% of the maximum

1 potential exposure of \$411,600.00. (*Id.* at ¶ 22.) The Gross Settlement Amount therefore represents
2 a strong value at approximately \$36.44 per Pay Period. (*Id.*) From PAGA Counsel’s review of the
3 facts, strengths, and weaknesses of the case, the risks and delays posed by further litigation, PAGA
4 Counsel believes that the recovery for each Aggrieved Employee is fair and reasonable. (*Id.*)

5 **C. Trial of Plaintiff’s PAGA Claims Would Have Presented Many Hurdles.**

6 Defendants denied and continue to deny all of the claims made by Plaintiff in this Action and
7 contend that it acted at all relevant times in conformance with the law. (*Id.* at ¶ 17.) Defendants
8 contend that Plaintiff and the Aggrieved Employees were paid for all hours worked, that Defendants
9 prohibited Plaintiff and the Aggrieved Employees from working beyond their scheduled shifts, and
10 that any “off-the-clock” work was performed without Defendants’ knowledge and de minimis; that
11 Defendants provided lawfully compliant meal and rest periods (and in fact provided longer breaks
12 than required by law) and that any deviations were at the voluntary election of Plaintiff and/or the
13 Aggrieved Employees and not at the request of Defendants or due to work requirements; that
14 Defendants paid all requisite meal and rest period premiums; that Defendants paid all wages due on
15 a timely basis and using Labor Code compliant instruments; that Defendants’ wage statements
16 complied with the law; and that neither Plaintiff nor any Aggrieved Employees incurred reasonable
17 business related expenses for which they were not reimbursed. (*Id.*) As a result, PAGA Counsel had
18 to appropriately discount the amount recoverable from Defendants in a settlement. (*Id.*)

19 **D. The Court May Have Exercised Its Discretion to Reduce Civil Penalties.**

20 “PAGA penalties...are mandatory, not discretionary” and the Court must award penalties
21 upon a showing that Defendants violated the Labor Code. *Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2* (2008) 163
22 Cal. App. 4th 1157, 1213; *Moreno v. Autozone, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2007) No. C05-04432 MJJ,
23 2007 WL 1650942, at *3. However, PAGA does provide the Court with discretion when it awards
24 these penalties. In departing from the \$100/pay period calculation to arrive at the \$150,000.00 Gross
25 Settlement Amount in this case, Plaintiff considered various reasons why the Court may reduce any
26 eventual recovery at its discretion and considered that PAGA penalties are not mandatory but
27 permissive. (Keledjian Decl., at ¶ 21.) Labor Code § 2699(e)(2) states that “a court may award a
28 lesser amount than the maximum civil penalty amount specified by this part if, based on the facts and

1 circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary
2 and oppressive, or confiscatory.” (See also *Thurman v. Bayshore* (2012) 203 Cal. App. 4th 1112
3 (reducing PAGA penalties by 30% under this provision).

4 **VI. THE REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS**

5 **A. The Court Should Approve the Requested Attorneys’ Fees and Costs**

6 Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, PAGA Counsel is requesting an award of attorneys’
7 fees in the amount of **\$50,000.00** and an award of litigation costs to PAGA Counsel of **\$13,736.59**.
8 (Keledjian Decl., at ¶ 23.)

9 Prior to enactment of PAGA, when the State had the resources to seek civil penalties on behalf
10 of the public, it paid its employees (including their attorneys) their salaries and benefits for pursuing
11 such penalties. The Legislature enacted PAGA because the Labor Commissioner and other agencies
12 were hampered in their enforcement of civil penalties by inadequate funding and staffing constraints.
13 *Iskanian, supra*, 59 Cal.4th at 379. To facilitate broader enforcement, the Legislature enacted PAGA,
14 authorizing “aggrieved employees” to pursue civil penalties on the state’s behalf. Labor Code §
15 2699(a). In creating PAGA, the Legislature expressly provided that the private counsel retained by
16 the Plaintiff to represent the public’s interest can recover fees if the Plaintiff is the prevailing party.
17 Labor Code § 2699(g)(1).

18 1) PAGA Counsel Are Entitled to Fees from the Civil Penalties Recovered

19 As previously indicated, this is *not* a class action. However, like a class action, it is a
20 representative action where instead of a class, the Plaintiff represents the State and the public. As a
21 matter of law and substance, counsel’s client is the public at large and the State of California. The
22 Plaintiff is simply a “proxy” for the State. On August 11, 2016, the California Supreme Court decided
23 *Laffitte v. Robert Half International*, which addressed, in a class action context, the correct
24 methodology for awarding fees in a representative action settlement. *Laffitte v. Robert Half Intern.*
25 *Inc.* (2016) 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 555, 573. The *Laffitte* Court approved awarding fees as a percentage of
26 the settlement fund:

27 We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state courts in holding that when
28 class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards Class Counsel a fee out

1 of that fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing
2 an appropriate percentage of the fund created.

3 *Id.* at p. 573. Here, the \$150,000.00 common fund created for the benefit of the public is, with
4 Plaintiff as a proxy for the State, not unlike the fund created in class action settlements, with the
5 public the equivalent of the class referenced in *Laffitte*.

6 The Court, in *Laffitte*, pointed out several reasons why the percentage-of-the-fund method is
7 preferred over the alternative lodestar-multiplier approach in California courts:

8 The recognized advantages of the percentage method—including relative ease of
9 calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better
10 approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
11 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging
12 the litigation [citations]—convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that
13 should not be denied our trial courts.

14 *Id.* at 573.

15 An award of one-third of the civil penalties realized in the Settlement is appropriate here under
16 the “substantial benefit” theory. *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1810;
17 *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 254. That theory permits a litigant
18 who has sued in a representative capacity to recover fees from the beneficiaries of that representation.
19 Courts exercise their inherent equitable powers to assess attorneys’ fees against the entire fund,
20 thereby spreading the cost of those fees among the public who benefits from PAGA actions. *Serrano*
21 *v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 35 (*Serrano III*). As this approach “better approximates the workings
22 of the marketplace than the lodestar approach,” there is “a greater judicial willingness to evaluate a
23 fee award as a percentage of the recovery.” *Lealao v. Beneficial Calif., Inc.* (2000) 82 Cal. App. 4th
24 19, 31, 48.

25 2) The Attorneys’ Fees Request Is Within the Range of Reasonable Fees

26 PAGA Counsel at D.Law, Inc. are experienced employment attorneys with expertise in wage
27 and hour class and representative actions. (Keledjian Decl., ¶¶ 32-39). Throughout this case, PAGA
28 Counsel have borne, and continue to bear, the entire risk and cost of litigation associated with this
Action on a purely contingency basis. (Keledjian Decl., ¶ 25.) As a result, PAGA Counsel have yet
to receive any compensation for the amount of time and money invested in the case to date. (*Id.*)

Moreover, courts in this county and others have approved attorneys' fees awards in other PAGA settlements on a common fund basis at higher percentages than the 33% Plaintiff is requesting here. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 26-27.)

For these reasons, PAGA Counsel's requested fee of 33% of the Gross Settlement Amount is well within the range of reasonableness and is fair compensation for undertaking this complex and risky litigation on a contingent basis.

3) PAGA Counsel's Fee Request Is Reasonable Under the Lodestar Crosscheck.

PAGA Counsel's fee request is reasonable when calculated using the lodestar method. Under the lodestar method, a base fee amount is calculated from a compilation of time reasonably spent on the case and the reasonable hourly compensation of the attorney. *Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48. The court then may enhance this lodestar figure by a "multiplier" to account for a range of factors, such as the novelty and difficulty of the case, its contingent nature, and the degree of success achieved. *Id.* at 49; *see also Ketchum v. Moses* (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-36; *Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank* (2001) 92 Cal. App. 4th 819, 834, ("[t]here is no...rule limiting the factors that may justify an exercise of judicial discretion to [adjust the] lodestar").

Here, the lodestar cross check establishes that the fees requested are significantly less than the amount warranted by lodestar analysis; therefore, the factors warranting positive multipliers do not come into play, even though they were apparent in this case.

PAGA Counsel worked at least 71.7 hours on this matter at rates reflecting those currently earned in the marketplace. Attorney David Keledjian's records indicate at least 20.4 hours on this matter with an hourly rate of \$925. (Keledjian Decl. ¶¶ 29-30.) Attorney Svetlana Hovhannisyan's records indicate at least 38.3 hours on this matter with an hourly rate of \$475. (*Id.*) The lodestar for PAGA Counsel is \$37,062.50 (\$18,870.00 for David Keledjian's time and \$18,192.50 for Svetlana Hovhannisyan's time.) This calculation does not account for the time of other attorneys spent on this matter.

Thus, consideration of the lodestar method as a cross-check to the percentage figure sought strongly supports the reasonableness of the requested fee award. PAGA Counsel respectfully request the Court apply a multiplier of 1.35 and grant its request for **\$50,000.00** in fees. (Keledjian Decl., ¶

30.).

4) The Court Should Approve the Reimbursement of PAGA Counsel's Costs.

The litigation expenses incurred by PAGA Counsel in this Action are also to be reimbursed under the Settlement Agreement. PAGA Counsel seek \$13,736.59 in reimbursement for litigation costs (Keledjian Decl., ¶ 23.) The lion's share of these costs were incurred in connection with mediation, and the others listed were all reasonably incurred and necessary to the prosecution of this Action. Thus, PAGA Counsel respectfully request the Court approve their request for reimbursement in the amount of \$13,736.59.

VII. THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE COSTS OF ADMINISTRATION

The parties agreed to use Simpluris, Inc. ("Simpluris") as the third-party settlement administrator in this case. (Keledjian Decl., ¶ 14.) Simpluris will be responsible for updating the addresses for the Aggrieved Employees, mailing the Notice of Settlement (which is attached as Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement) and calculating and distributing the settlement checks, among other duties. (*Id.*, Exhibit 2.) Simpluris capped its fees at \$3,821.00 for administering the Settlement, and based on PAGA Counsel's experience in other class and PAGA settlements, Simpluris' costs for administering this Settlement are fair and reasonable. (Keledjian Decl., ¶ 14, Exhibit 2.)

VIII. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff and PAGA Counsel submit that the proposed Settlement as documented in the Settlement Agreement is fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the best interest of Plaintiff, Defendants, the Aggrieved Employees, and the State of California. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court approve the Settlement and order the Parties to carry out the Settlement according to the terms of the Settlement Agreement and enter the concurrently filed [Proposed] Order Granting Approval and Judgment to that end.

DATED: November 3, 2025

D.LAW, INC

By /s/ David Keledjian
David Yeremian
David Keledjian
Svetlana Hovhannisyan
Attorney for Plaintiff Destiny Vassar on
behalf of herself and Aggrieved Employees

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