

Arrash T. Fattahi (SBN 333676)
arrash.fattahi@wilshirelawfirm.com
Emily Borman (SBN 303180)
emily.borman@wilshirelawfirm.com
Arman A. Salehi (SBN 351112)
arman.salehi@wilshirelawfirm.com
WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
660 S. Figueroa Street, Sky Lobby
Los Angeles, California 90017
Telephone: (213) 381-9988
Facsimile: (213) 381-9989

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SOLANO

ANDREW MARTINEZ and AARON FOWLER,
individually, on behalf of all others similarly
situated, and on behalf of the State of California
and other aggrieved persons,

Plaintiffs,

v.

AUTOMATIC BAR CONTROLS, INC., a
corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: CU24-06154

CLASS ACTION

[Assigned to: Hon. Stephen Gizzi, Dept. 3,
Room 301]

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND
PAGA SETTLEMENT;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: October 30, 2026

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Dept.: 3

Complaint filed: August 15, 2024

Trial date: Not set

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on October 30, 2026, at 9:00 a.m., in Department 3 of
3 the Superior Court of California, County of Solano, located 600 Union Avenue, Fairfield, CA
4 94533, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court, Rule
5 3.769, *et seq.*, Plaintiff Andrew Martinez and Plaintiff Aaron Fowler (“Plaintiffs”) will move the
6 Court for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement between
7 Plaintiffs and Defendant Automatic Bar Controls, Inc. (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs further move the
8 Court for an Order:

- 9 1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement
10 and Class Notice;
11 2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
12 3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
13 4. Appointing Plaintiffs Andrew Martinez and Aaron Fowler as Class Representatives for
14 settlement purposes;
15 5. Appointing Plaintiffs’ Counsel, Arrash T. Fattahi, Emily Borman, and Arman A. Salehi
16 of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
17 6. Appointing APEX Settlement Administration as the Settlement Administrator; and
18 7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

19 The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and
20 authorities, the Declaration of Arrash T. Fattahi filed concurrently herewith, the Declaration of
21 Plaintiff Andrew Martinez, the Declaration of Plaintiff Aaron Fowler, the records and files in this
22 action, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before
23 the hearing.

24
25 Respectfully submitted,

26 Dated: April 6, 2026

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC


27 By: 
28 Emily Borman
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT.....	1
A.	Plaintiffs’ Claims	1
B.	Discovery and Investigation.....	2
C.	Settlement Negotiations	3
D.	Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement.....	4
III.	DISCUSSION	8
A.	The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation	9
1.	The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations.....	9
2.	The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’ Respective Legal Positions.....	10
3.	Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation.....	11
B.	The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved	11
C.	The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable	11
1.	Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the “Common Fund” Method	11
2.	The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases	12
3.	This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code	13
4.	The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award	13
D.	The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable.....	14
E.	The Service Payments to Named Plaintiffs Are Reasonable	15
IV.	CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED	16
A.	Legal Standard	16

1	B.	Plaintiffs Maintain That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for	
2		Settlement Purposes.....	17
3	1.	The Class is Ascertainable and Numerous.....	17
4	2.	There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate.....	18
5	3.	Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class	18
6	4.	Plaintiffs and Their Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement.....	19
7	5.	A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation.....	19
8	V.	THE PROPOSED CLASS NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND	20
9	A.	The Proposed Class Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process.....	20
10	B.	The Class Notice is Accurate and Informative	20
11	VI.	CONCLUSION	20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATE CASES

Bowles v. Super. Ct.,

(1955) 44 Cal.2d 57418

Cartt v. Super Ct.,

(1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960.....20

Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.,

(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43.....13

City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet,

(1995) 12 Cal.4th 10512

Classen v. Weller,

(1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 2718, 19

Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.,

(1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605.....18

Collins v. Rocha,

(1972) 7 Cal.3d 23218

D’Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners,

(1974) 11 Cal.3d 112

Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.,

(1967) 67 Cal. 2d 69517

Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.,

(1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794.....8

Gentry v. Super. Ct.,

(2007) 42 Cal.4th 44315

Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.,

(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116.....8

Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.,

(2016) 1 Cal.5th 48012

1	<i>Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.,</i>	
2	(2000) 23 Cal.4th 429	17
3	<i>Mallick v. Super. Ct.,</i>	
4	(1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434.....	8
5	<i>McGhee v. Bank of America,</i>	
6	(1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442.....	19
7	<i>Miller v. Woods,</i>	
8	(1983) 148 Cal. App. 3d 862.....	19
9	<i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles,</i>	
10	(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399.....	9, 15
11	<i>Quinn v. State of California,</i>	
12	(1995) 15 Cal.3d 162	12
13	<i>Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.,</i>	
14	(1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462	17
15	<i>Rose v. City of Hayward,</i>	
16	(1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926.....	18
17	<i>Serrano v. Priest,</i>	
18	(1977) 20 Cal.3d 25	12
19	<i>Stamburgh v. Super. Ct,</i>	
20	. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231.....	9
21	<i>Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.,</i>	
22	(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224.....	10
23	<i>Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.,</i>	
24	(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952.....	17
25	FEDERAL CASES	
26	<i>Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.,</i>	
27	(W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174	15
28		

1	<i>Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.</i>	
2	(E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012) No. 1:10-CV-0324 AWI SKO, 2012 WL 5364575.....	14
3	<i>Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.</i>	
4	(N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009)No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133.....	13
5	<i>Jack v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.</i>	
6	(S.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) 2011 WL 4899942	14
7	<i>Leyva v. Medline Ind.,</i>	
8	(9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510.....	19
9	<i>McKenzie v. Fed. Express Corp.</i>	
10	(C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) 2012 WL 12882124.....	14
11	<i>Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.</i>	
12	(C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) 2021 WL 3673845	15
13	<i>Priddy v. Edelman,</i>	
14	(6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438.....	8
15	<i>Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.,</i>	
16	(9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948.....	14
17	<i>Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company,</i>	
18	(N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F.Supp. 294.....	12
19	<i>Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.,</i>	
20	(9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759.....	11
21	<i>Zubia v. Shamrock Foods Co.</i>	
22	(C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) No. CV1603128ABAGRX, 2017 WL 10541431.....	14
23	STATUTES	
24	Code of Civil Procedure § 382.....	16, 17
25	Labor Code § 1194	12
26	Labor Code § 90.5	14
27	REGULATIONS	
28	California Rules of Court, Rule 3.766.....	19

1	California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769(f).....	10
---	---	----

2 **TREATISES**

3	Conte & Newberg, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3rd Ed.)	8, 12, 20
---	--	-----------

4 **OTHER SOURCES**

5	Eisenberg & Miller, <i>Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study</i> ,	
6	(2006) 53 UCLA L.Rev. 1303	15

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Andrew Martinez and Plaintiff Aaron Fowler (“Plaintiffs”) seek preliminary approval of a proposed \$285,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant Automatic Bar Controls, Inc. (“Defendant,” and together with Plaintiffs, the “Parties”). This motion for preliminary approval is unopposed. The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 83 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arm’s length and were facilitated by experienced class action mediator Steve Serratore on September 2, 2025. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a settlement. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed Class Notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiffs’ Claims

This is a wage and hour class and representative action pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) Plaintiffs, putative class members, and aggrieved employees were current and former hourly non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant in California at any time during the class period. (Declaration of Arrash T. Fattahi in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement [“Fattahi Decl.”] at ¶ 2.) Defendant designs and manufactures beverage and food dispensing systems—such as bar guns (or handheld beverage dispensers), beverage towers, condiment dispensers, sauce applicators, and pizza preparation equipment—serving the foodservice industry. (*Id.*)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. (*Id.*) Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant failed to provide employees with

legally compliant meal and rest periods, and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. (*Id.*) Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert related claims for failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay all final wages at termination, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.*)

On August 15, 2024, Plaintiff Andrew Martinez filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures, and (8) unfair business practices. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 4.)

On August 21, 2024, Plaintiff Martinez sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to PAGA. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 4, **Ex. 1.**) On August 1, 2025, Plaintiff Fowler also sent a notice to Defendant and the LWDA alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to PAGA. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 4, **Ex. 2.**)

On April 1, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint in this action adding a cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA and adding Plaintiff Aaron Fowler as a named plaintiff. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 4.)

B. Discovery and Investigation

Following the filing of the initial complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and information before mediating this action. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 5.) Defendant produced a 30% random sampling of timekeeping and pay records for the class members. (*Id.*) Defendant also provided its handbook in effect during the class period and information regarding the total number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.*)

After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s employment policies and practices and analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification and success on the merits and assess Defendant’s maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 6.) Class Counsel also investigated the

1 applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel
2 reviewed these records and utilized an expert to prepare a damages analysis prior to mediation.
3 (*Id.*)

4 C. Settlement Negotiations

5 On September 2, 2025, the Parties participated in a private mediation with experienced
6 class action mediator Steve Serratore. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were
7 at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The
8 Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute,
9 but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement
10 had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths
11 and weaknesses of Plaintiffs' claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties were able to reach a
12 settlement and accepted the mediator's proposal on September 4, 2025, the material terms of
13 which are encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8, **Ex. 3** [Class Action and PAGA
14 Settlement Agreement and Class Notice].)

15 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. (Fattahi
16 Decl. at ¶ 13.) Based on the Parties' informal exchange of documents and information and Class
17 Counsel's own independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of the opinion that
18 the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement
19 Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the
20 defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and on the merits, trial risk,
21 and appellate risk. (*Id.*)

22 Indeed, the \$285,000.00 Settlement represents approximately **99.16%** of the **realistic**
23 **maximum recovery** of \$287,399.80. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 22.) Although Class Counsel estimated
24 that Defendant's maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$1,776,030.34,
25 when the risk of prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel
26 believes that Defendant's realistic exposure was approximately \$287,399.80, meaning the
27 Settlement achieves a significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 13-26.) Considering the risk and
28 uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class.

(*Id.* at ¶ 22.) Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. (*Id.*)

D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

The Settlement's key terms include:

1. Class Definition: "For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: "all non-exempt employees of Defendant in the State of California at any time between August 15, 2020 through November 1, 2025 ('Class Period')." (Settlement, § 1.3.)

2. Class Period: "refers to August 15, 2020 through November 1, 2025." (Settlement, §§ 1.3, 1.8.)

3. Class Member: "The term 'Class Member' refers to both Participating and Non-Participating Class Members, including Non-Participating Class Members who qualify as Aggrieved Employees. It shall be an opt-out class." (Settlement, § 1.3.)

4. Aggrieved Employee: "all Class Members employed by Defendant at any time between August 21, 2023 through November 1, 2025 ('PAGA Period')." (Settlement, § 1.2.)

5. PAGA Period: "refers to August 21, 2023 through November 1, 2025." (Settlement, §§ 1.2, 1.24.)

6. Gross Settlement Amount: "(also referred to herein as 'GSA') refers to the maximum settlement payment Defendant shall be obligated to make except as provided in Paragraph 19 [of the Settlement Agreement]: Two Hundred Eighty-Five Thousand Dollars And No Cents (\$285,000.00) plus all employer-side payroll taxes. The GSA shall include all Individual Class Payments, the Court-approved Service Awards to the Class Representatives, the Court-approved Settlement Administration Costs, the Court-approved PAGA Payment, and the Court-approved Class Counsel Fees and Costs Award. The GSA is nonreversionary. (Settlement, § 1.13, 5.1.)

7. Uncashed Checks: "In the event that a Class Member Payment check is not cashed within 180 calendar days from the date initially mailed by the Settlement Administrator, such funds shall escheat to the State and shall be sent by the Settlement Administrator to the State Controller's

Office, Unclaimed Property Division, thereby leaving no 'unpaid residue' subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b). In such event, release of Released Claims will remain binding upon the affected Settlement Class Member. The Settlement Administrator will cancel all checks not cashed by the void date. All uncashed Individual PAGA Payments will be distributed to the L WDA. The requirement that any uncashed Class Member checks be distributed to the State of California's Unclaimed Property Fund to be held in the name of each expired check payee pursuant to applicable unclaimed property laws is not a material term of this Settlement and an order from the Court requiring the Parties to distribute unclaimed funds to a *cy pres* shall not give rise to a basis on which to abrogate the settlement provided that no 'unpaid residue' remains within the meaning of California Code of Civil Procedure section 384." (Settlement, § 10.5.)

8. Release by Participating Class Members:

By operation of the entry of the Court's Final Approval Order and judgment, each Participating Class Member and each of their respective executors, administrators, representatives, agents, heirs, successors, assigns, trustees, spouses, or guardians will release the Released Parties from any and all claims, rights, demands, charges, complaints, causes of action, obligations, or liability of any and every kind or nature, contingent or accrued, and irrespective of theory of recovery, that arose during the Class Period and which were or could have been brought based on the facts or claims alleged in any version of the complaints filed in the Action or enumerated in Plaintiffs' letters to the L WDA requesting authorization to be deputized as private attorney generals for the purposes of pursuing a PAGA claim (the "LWDA Letter"). The released claims means any and all claims arising during the Class Period that were pled or could have been pled based on the factual allegations in the Operative Complaint, including, but not limited to, any claims for failure to pay wages, including minimum wages and overtime and including but not limited to wages due based on alleged time rounding and/or off-the-clock work, failure to pay wages (including overtime wages) at the regular rate of pay, failure to provide meal periods, failure to authorize and permit rest periods, short/late meal and rest periods, failure to relieve employees of all duties during meal and/or rest periods, failure to pay for time worked off the clock during meal periods, failure to properly compensate meal or rest break premiums at the regular rate of pay, failure to furnish accurate wage statements, failure to timely pay wages during employment, failure to reimburse for all necessary expenses, failure to timely pay wages at separation, as well as claims derivative and/or related to these claims, liquidated damages, conversion of wages, claims under California Labor

Code §§ 201-204, 210, 218.5, 218.6, 226, 226.7, 510, 512, 1021.5, 1174, 1174.5, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2802, claims under the applicable IWC Wage Order, and claims arising under Business and Professions Code section 17200 arising from the Labor Code violations released herein. Participating Class Members shall further waive their right to pursue individual lawsuits as to any of the claims released herein against the Released Parties to the extent such claims accrued during the Class Period.

(Settlement, § 12.1.)

9. Release by Aggrieved Employees:

As to claims for civil or statutory penalties for violation of PAGA, the State of California and all Aggrieved Employees, including Plaintiffs, shall release the Released Parties for all claims for penalties under PAGA during the PAGA Period that were or could have been alleged in the Action based on the facts or claims alleged in any version of the Complaint (for the PAGA cause of action) and/or the LWDA Letter irrespective of the underlying theory of recovery supporting the claim for PAGA penalties.

(Settlement, § 12.2.)

10. No Reversion, No Claims Made: “This Settlement shall be made on a non-claims-made basis and will be non-reversionary.” (Settlement, § 5.2.)

11. PAGA Allocation: The settlement includes \$10,000.00 allocated to Plaintiffs’ claims under PAGA, with 65% (\$6,500.00) being paid to the LWDA and 35% (\$3,500.00) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 6.2.) Class Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 9. Ex. 4.)

12. Net Settlement Amount: “(also referred to herein as ‘NSA’) shall be defined as the GSA minus the Court-approved Service Awards to the Class Representatives, the Court-approved Settlement Administration Costs, the Court-approved Class Counsel Fees and Costs Award, and the PAGA Payment. The NSA is the maximum amount that shall be available for distribution to and on behalf of Class Members for Class Member Payments.” (Settlement, § 1.18.)

13. Distribution Formula: “Each Participating Class Member will be paid a portion of the NSA in accordance with the following formula: The pro rata portion of the NSA to be

distributed to each Settlement Class Member shall be determined by dividing the total number of workweeks worked during the Class Period into the NSA to arrive at a value per workweek for each eligible Settlement Class Member. The value per workweek shall be multiplied by the number of workweeks worked by each Settlement Class Member during the Class Period. For purposes of payment, workweeks shall be determined based on hire dates, termination dates, and re-hire dates, as applicable.” (Settlement, § 6.1.1.)

14. Tax Allocation: Ten percent (10%) of the Net Settlement Amount attributable to the Class Settlement Award will be allocated to the settlement of disputed claims for wages (the ‘Wage Portion’), and ninety percent (90%) of the Net Settlement Amount attributable to the Class Settlement Award will be allocated to the settlement of disputed non-wage claims - *i.e.* penalties and interest (the ‘Non-Wage Portion’). All of the PAGA Payment will be allocated to the settlement of disputed non-wage claims. The Settlement Administrator will issue to Class Members a Form W-2 for the Wage Portion of all Settlement Payments and a Form 1099 for the Non-Wage Portion of all Settlement Payments. Class Members shall assume full responsibility and liability for the payment of taxes due on such amounts. (Settlement, § 11.1.)

15. Class Representative Service Payments: “Class Counsel shall file a motion requesting Service Awards, to which Defendant agree not to object, of up to \$10,000.00 to each of the respective Plaintiffs from the GSA in consideration for serving as Class Representatives and in exchange for Plaintiffs' Released Claims. Defendant retains the right to object to a request for Service Awards in excess of this amount. If the Court awards a lower amount for the Service Awards requested by Plaintiffs' counsel, the other terms of [the Settlement Agreement] shall apply. Should the Court approve Service Awards in an amount less than that set forth herein, the unapproved portion or portions shall revert to the NSA and be apportioned to Settlement Class Members as described in Paragraph 6.1.1 of [the Settlement Agreement]. The award of any Service Award in the amount sought is not a material term of [the Settlement Agreement] and the award of an amount less than requested by Plaintiffs do not give rise to a basis to abrogate [the Settlement Agreement].” (Settlement, § 8.) This payment shall be in addition to the *pro rata* recovery received by Plaintiffs as part of the Settlement.

1 16. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs: The Settlement provides that Defendant will not oppose
2 a fee application of up to thirty-five percent (35%) of the Gross Settlement Amount (currently
3 estimated to be \$99,750.00), plus out-of-pocket costs up to \$25,000.00. (Settlement, § 7.)

4 17. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Class Notice sets forth in plain
5 terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of
6 attorneys’ fees, costs, and service payment being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement
7 allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified of the
8 settlement by mail. (Settlement, § 13.3.4.) APEX Class Action Administration (“APEX”), the
9 proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the class notice is
10 provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of
11 address search and re-mailing the class notice to updated addresses. (Settlement, §§ 1.38, 9; Fattahi
12 Decl. at ¶ 10, Ex. 5.)

13 **III. DISCUSSION**

14 To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action
15 requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This
16 Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super.*
17 *Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached
18 through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
19 act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors
20 is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

21 In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant
22 factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff’s case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely
23 duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount
24 offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the
25 experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of
26 the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, (2008) 168
27 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself
28 that the class settlement is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record need

not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not require “an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims”, but instead, only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.”].)

As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation

1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations

Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.) Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super. Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not to approve the settlement.”].)

The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following a private mediation session, with experienced class action employment mediator, Steve Serratore (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 7.) The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties were able to reach a settlement, the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.)

1 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
2 the claims set forth in the litigation, such as a sampling of timekeeping and payroll records for the
3 class members, Defendant’s handbook in effect during the class period, and information regarding
4 the total number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (Fattahi
5 Decl. at ¶¶ 5-6.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation, Class Counsel
6 investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.* at
7 ¶ 6.) Thus, Plaintiffs and Class Counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating
8 the proposed Settlement.

9 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
10 litigating wage and hour class actions. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 38-48.) Again, this supports the
11 position that the terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been
12 considered and weighed in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of
13 continued litigation of this action.

14 2. *The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’ Respective*
15 *Legal Positions*

16 A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiff recover had plaintiff prevailed at
17 trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
18 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
19 and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement
20 is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no
21 bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement
22 in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

23 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation. (Fattahi
24 Decl. at ¶ 24.) While Plaintiffs are confident in the merits of their claims, a legitimate controversy
25 exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs also recognize that proving the amount of
26 wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain
27 proposition. (*Id.*)

28 The proposed settlement of \$285,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when

1 compared to Plaintiffs’ reasonably forecasted recovery. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 13-26.) Because of the
2 proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk
3 of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
4 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
5 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$285,000.00 is well
6 within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*)
7 ***Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of***
8 ***approximately \$1,515.18.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 25.)

9 3. *Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation*

10 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
11 Class Counsel has a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
12 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 37-47.)
13 Although Plaintiffs and Class Counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the litigation,
14 they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

15 **B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

16 The proposed Class Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be
17 approved for distribution to the class. The Class Notice informs the class of the terms of the
18 settlement and of their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members
19 who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to submit
20 their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Class
21 Notice meets all the requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

22 **C. The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

23 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, the Parties agreed to allocate
24 reasonable attorneys’ fees in an amount currently estimated to be \$99,750.00, and up to an
25 estimated \$25,000.00 in costs. (Settlement, § 7.) These amounts are disclosed to all class members
26 in the proposed Class Notice and are reasonable.

27 1. *Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the “Common Fund”*
28 *Method*

1 California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created
2 by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that "when a number
3 of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs
4 for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs
5 may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34,
6 quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

7 Class Counsel seeks an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/common
8 fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all
9 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." (*Vincent v.*
10 *Hughes Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995)
11 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in
12 winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive
13 beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs." (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and*
14 *County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized
15 that the common fund doctrine has been applied "consistently in California when an action brought
16 by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share." (*Id.* at p. 110.)

17 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
18 480 that, "when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
19 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
20 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
21 fund created." (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: "The recognized advantages of the percentage
22 method – including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
23 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
24 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation –
25 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts."
26 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

27 2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases

28 According to a leading treatise on class actions, "[n]o general rule can be articulated on what

1 is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a
2 reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a
3 disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages
4 are not unprecedented.” (See Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.)
5 Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty
6 to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; see also
7 *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most
8 cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

9 Here, Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees that are equal to or less than 35% of the Gross
10 Settlement Amount, which is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case
11 law and academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. (See *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*
12 (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the
13 percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-
14 third of the recovery.”].) Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court approve the
15 attorneys’ fees as negotiated by the Parties and requested herein.

16 3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code

17 Labor Code § 1194 (a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime
18 compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this
19 section, Plaintiffs would be permitted to recover their actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were
20 larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in
21 that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing
22 Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by
23 taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class
24 Counsel. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 36-37.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent
25 basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the
26 Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class
27 ahead of all other concerns.

28 4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the

1 *Requested Fee Award*

2 As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers
3 and employees, Class Counsel possesses considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Fattahi
4 Decl. at ¶¶ 38-48.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class
5 actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class
6 counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel's requested fee
7 award is supported here.

8 Class Counsel's experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the
9 strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement.
10 Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning
11 the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class
12 action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee
13 awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award
14 is reasonable and fair.

15 **D. The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable**

16 Where settlements negotiate a good faith amount for PAGA penalties and "there is no
17 indication that this amount was the result of self-interest at the expense of other" class members,
18 such amounts are generally considered reasonable. (*Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Apr.
19 3, 2009) No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133 at *1, 9.) Courts have approved amounts for
20 PAGA penalties in the range of zero to two percent of the total maximum amount of the Settlement.
21 (*Id.* [approving a PAGA payment of 0.3%, or \$1,500]; *see also Jack v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.* (S.D.
22 Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) 2011 WL 4899942 at *6 [approving a PAGA payment of 0.25%]; *McKenzie v.*
23 *Fed. Express Corp.* (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) 2012 WL 12882124 at *5 [acknowledging that courts
24 approve PAGA claim settlements in the range of zero to two percent of the total settlement].) Here,
25 the amount to be paid to the LWDA is larger than many other PAGA settlement amounts approved
26 by the courts where seemingly nominal amounts were allocated for such claims. (*See, e.g., Zubia*
27 *v. Shamrock Foods Co.* (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) No. CV1603128ABAGRX, 2017 WL 10541431,
28 at *14 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.1%]; *Hopson*, 2008 WL 3385452, at *1 [approving a

1 PAGA settlement of 0.3% or \$1,500]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.* (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012)
2 No. 1:10-CV-0324 AWI SKO, 2012 WL 5364575, at *3 [approving a PAGA settlement of
3 0.27%.] Here, the Parties negotiated a good faith amount of \$10,000.00, 65% percent of which
4 (\$6,500.00) will be paid to the LWDA and 35% (\$3,500.00) to be distributed to the Aggrieved
5 Employees. (Settlement, § 6.2.1.) The Parties negotiated to allocate the portion of the Settlement
6 to PAGA penalties in good faith and the \$10,000.00 allocation equates to approximately 3.5% of
7 the Gross Settlement Amount, which is larger than amounts that are routinely approved. Moreover,
8 the \$10,000.00 allocation for PAGA penalties represents approximately 43.9% of the realistic
9 maximum recovery for PAGA penalties (\$10,000.00 / \$22,790.00). (Fattahi Decl. at ¶ 22.)

10 **E. The Service Payments to Named Plaintiffs Are Reasonable**

11 Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to
12 compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other
13 members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval
14 of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which
15 are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the
16 class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.* (9th Cir.
17 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

18 Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they
19 promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is
20 codified in California Labor Code § 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to vigorously
21 enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to
22 work under substandard unlawful conditions” Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has
23 noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is
24 widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.*
25 (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should be rewarded for
26 assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.*
27 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

28 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay a Class

Representative Service Payment of not more than \$10,000.00 per named plaintiff. (Settlement, § 8.) Courts routinely approve \$5,000 and greater enhancement awards for plaintiffs represented by Class Counsel. (See, e.g., *Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [“The Court concludes a \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez v. Bank of America, National Association* (N.D. Cal., Jan. 11, 2024, No. 18-CV-01202-LB) 2024 WL 150721, at *4 [“The court approves awards of \$10,000 for each class representative.”].) Class Counsel represents that Plaintiffs devoted a great deal of time and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated with counsel very frequently for litigation and mediation. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 27-32; see generally Plaintiffs’ Declarations.) These amounts are reasonable particularly in light of the substantial benefits that Plaintiffs generated for all class members. (*Id.*)

When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a 2006 study examining the average incentive award given to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the “average award per class representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Eisenberg & Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study* (2006) 53 UCLA L.Rev. 1303, 1308.) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment discrimination class actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081, while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121 and a median award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED

A. Legal Standard

The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All the claims derive from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the prerequisites for certification under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382

1 provides: “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when
2 the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more
3 may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to
4 section 382: “(1) There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined
5 community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be
6 represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify
7 these requirements, the California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8 23 to explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1)
9 predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of
10 the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart*
11 *Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.)

12 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.
13 (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a
14 means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of
15 consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to the
16 appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond, supra*,
17 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

18 **B. Plaintiffs Maintain That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for**
19 **Settlement Purposes.**

20 *1. The Class is Ascertainable and Numerous*

21 The proposed class that Plaintiffs seek to represent is easily ascertainable and includes
22 approximately 83 employees of Defendant.

23 Plaintiffs maintain that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and
24 precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business
25 records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.*
26 (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the
27 subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

28 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a

1 class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981) 126
2 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action may
3 be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable to
4 join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a class
5 action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries of a trust
6 in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574; *see*
7 *also Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore, Plaintiffs
8 contend that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

9 2. *There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate*

10 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the
11 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class predominate over any individual
12 questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
13 adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d
14 605.)

15 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant
16 policies and practices for all hours worked, including overtime wages; whether Defendant had
17 legally compliant policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether
18 Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees
19 to take rest periods; whether Defendant reimbursed employees for business expenses; whether
20 Defendant consequently paid final wages timely at termination; and whether Defendant
21 consequently failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements. Plaintiffs contend that the
22 factual and legal issues are the same for all the identified class members, including Plaintiffs.
23 Further, all class members suffered from, and seek redress for, the same alleged injuries.

24 3. *Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class*

25 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or
26 circumstances of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class,
27 but rather upon the typicality of the proposed representative’s claims as they relate to the
28 defendant’s conduct and activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 “[t]he

only requirements are that common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly situated” vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class if they arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendant. As such, they allege that they were subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated employees.

4. *Plaintiffs and Their Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement*

The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second, a named plaintiff’s interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiffs retained counsel with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that previously settled. (Fattahi Decl. at ¶¶ 38-48.) Class Counsel unquestionably is “qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation.” (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiffs have no conflicts, and Plaintiffs have, with counsel, litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing their dedication. Plaintiffs’ willingness to serve as representatives demonstrates their serious commitment to bringing about the best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

5. *A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation*

Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation. By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court’s use of the class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 457-62; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.* (9th

1 Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the superiority concerns are
2 essentially non-existent.

3 **V. THE PROPOSED CLASS NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

4 **A. The Proposed Class Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

5 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court,
6 Rule 3.766 (e), (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
7 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
8 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter,
9 the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he
10 notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class
11 Members . . .” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by
12 direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

13 **B. The Class Notice is Accurate and Informative**

14 The proposed Class Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S.
15 first class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of
16 the terms of the Settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are
17 Class Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the
18 opportunity to submit their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

19 The Class Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte &
20 Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date
21 and the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent
22 manner. It makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability
23 by the Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the
24 merits of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made.
25 The Class Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality
26 required of a combined settlement-certification class notice.

27 **VI. CONCLUSION**


28 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant preliminary

1 approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing.

2 Respectfully submitted,

3 Dated: April 6, 2026

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

4 

5 By: _____

Arrash T. Fattahi

Emily Borman

Arman A. Salehi

Attorneys for Plaintiffs