

JAMIE K. SERB, ESQ. (SBN 289601)  
jamie@crosnerlegal.com  
NIKKI TRENNER, ESQ. (SBN 316007)  
nikki@crosnerlegal.com  
ZACHARY M. CROSNER, ESQ. (SBN 272295)  
zach@crosnerlegal.com  
**CROSNER LEGAL, PC**  
9440 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 301  
Beverly Hills, CA 90210  
Tel: 1-866-276-7637  
Fax: 310-510-6429

Attorneys for Plaintiff ALEXANDER COWLEY-  
MALKI

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

**IN THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

ALEXANDER COWLEY-MALKI, as an  
individual and on behalf of all other  
similarly situated Class Members,

Plaintiff,

v.

CENGAGE LEARNING, INC., a Delaware  
Corporation; and DOES 1-100, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 24STCV24576

*Assigned for all purposes to:  
Hon. Carolyn B. Kuhl  
Dept. SSC-12*

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS &  
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION  
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF  
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT**

**Date: March 4, 2026  
Time: 10:30 a.m.  
Dept.: SSC-12**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

|      |                                                                                                                                         |    |
|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| I.   | INTRODUCTION .....                                                                                                                      | 2  |
| II.  | BACKGROUND/LITIGATION HISTORY .....                                                                                                     | 2  |
| III. | INVESTIGATION.....                                                                                                                      | 3  |
| IV.  | TERMS OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT .....                                                                                                  | 4  |
| A.   | Deductions from the Settlement.....                                                                                                     | 4  |
| B.   | Calculation of the Individual Settlement Payments to Class and Aggrieved Employees....                                                  | 5  |
| C.   | Uncashed Funds to State Controller.....                                                                                                 | 5  |
| D.   | Notice and Extended Response Deadline for Re-Mailed Notices .....                                                                       | 6  |
| E.   | Responses to the Settlement and Deadlines .....                                                                                         | 6  |
| F.   | Funding and Distribution of the Settlement.....                                                                                         | 7  |
| G.   | Release of Claims.....                                                                                                                  | 7  |
| H.   | The Class Representative Service Award Is Justified Given the Risks and Should be<br>Preliminarily Approved .....                       | 7  |
| IV.  | ARGUMENT .....                                                                                                                          | 8  |
| A.   | The Settlement was Reached as a Result of Arm’s Length Negotiations.....                                                                | 9  |
| B.   | The Settlement is the Result of Thorough Investigation and Discovery .....                                                              | 9  |
| C.   | Counsel for the Parties are Experienced in Similar Litigation.....                                                                      | 9  |
| D.   | The Proposed Settlement is a Reasonable Compromise of Claims .....                                                                      | 10 |
| E.   | The Settlement is Fair and Reasonable Based on the Strengths of Plaintiff’s Case and the<br>Risks and Costs of Further Litigation ..... | 10 |
| 1.   | The Settlement Amount is Reasonable .....                                                                                               | 11 |
| F.   | Provisional Class Certification Should be Granted.....                                                                                  | 15 |

|    |                                                                        |    |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 1  | 1. The Proposed Class is Sufficiently Numerous and Ascertainable.....  | 16 |
| 2  | 2. The Typicality and Adequacy Requirements Are Met .....              | 16 |
| 3  | 3. The Commonality Requirement is Met.....                             | 17 |
| 4  | G. Simpluris Should be Appointed as the Settlement Administrator ..... | 17 |
| 5  | V. CONCLUSION.....                                                     | 18 |
| 6  |                                                                        |    |
| 7  |                                                                        |    |
| 8  |                                                                        |    |
| 9  |                                                                        |    |
| 10 |                                                                        |    |
| 11 |                                                                        |    |
| 12 |                                                                        |    |
| 13 |                                                                        |    |
| 14 |                                                                        |    |
| 15 |                                                                        |    |
| 16 |                                                                        |    |
| 17 |                                                                        |    |
| 18 |                                                                        |    |
| 19 |                                                                        |    |
| 20 |                                                                        |    |
| 21 |                                                                        |    |
| 22 |                                                                        |    |
| 23 |                                                                        |    |
| 24 |                                                                        |    |
| 25 |                                                                        |    |
| 26 |                                                                        |    |
| 27 |                                                                        |    |
| 28 |                                                                        |    |

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

**Page(s)**

### **Cases**

|                                                                                                           |       |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| <u>7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.</u><br>(2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135 .....        | 15    |
| <i>Aguilar v. Cintas Corp. No. 2</i> ,<br>144 Cal.App.4th 121 (2006).....                                 | 11    |
| <i>Alvarado v Dart Container Corp.</i><br>(2018) 4 Cal.5th 542 .....                                      | 12    |
| <i>Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2</i><br>(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157 .....                                  | 13    |
| <i>Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch.</i><br>(2004) 115 Cal. App. 4th 715 .....                                   | 8     |
| <i>Bowles v. Superior Court</i><br>(1995) 44 Cal. 2d 574 .....                                            | 16    |
| <i>Boyd v. Bechtel Corp.</i><br>(N.D. Cal. 1979) 485 F. Supp. 610 .....                                   | 9     |
| <i>Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.</i><br>(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504 .....                                   | 14    |
| <i>In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases</i><br>(2010) 186 Cal. App. 4th 1380 .....                       | 7     |
| <i>Classen v. Weller</i><br>(1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27.....                                                 | 16    |
| <i>Dunbar v. Albertson's Inc.</i> ,<br>141 Cal.App.4th 1422 (2006).....                                   | 11    |
| <i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i><br>(1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794 .....                                         | 8, 10 |
| <i>Glob. Minerals &amp; Metals Corp. v. Superior Court</i><br>(2013) 113 Cal.App.4th 836 .....            | 16    |
| <i>Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.</i><br>(9th Cir. 1998) 150 F.3d 1011.....                                     | 16    |
| <i>Harris v. Superior Court</i> ,<br>154 Cal.App.4th 164 (2007), review granted, 171 P.3d 545 (2007)..... | 11    |

|    |                                                              |        |
|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| 1  | <i>Hebbard v. Colgrove</i>                                   |        |
| 2  | (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 1017.....                             | 16     |
| 3  | <i>Jennings v. Open Door Mktg. Inc.</i>                      |        |
| 4  | (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018) 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171356.....   | 14     |
| 5  | <u><i>Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exch.</i></u>                    |        |
| 6  | (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 986 .....                             | 17     |
| 7  | <i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i>                    |        |
| 8  | (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116 .....                             | 10     |
| 9  | <i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat., Inc.</i>               |        |
| 10 | (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480 .....                                   | 4      |
| 11 | <u><i>Lane v. Facebook, Inc.</i></u>                         |        |
| 12 | (9th Cir. 2012) 696 F.3d 811.....                            | 15     |
| 13 | <i>McGhee v. Bank of America</i>                             |        |
| 14 | (1976) 70 Cal.App.3d 442.....                                | 17     |
| 15 | <i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles</i>    |        |
| 16 | (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399 .....                             | 10     |
| 17 | <i>Rose v. City of Hayward</i>                               |        |
| 18 | (1981) 126 Cal. App. 3d 926.....                             | 16     |
| 19 | <i>Sav-On v. Superior Court</i>                              |        |
| 20 | (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319 .....                                  | 11     |
| 21 | <i>Slavkov v. First Water Heater Partners I</i>              |        |
| 22 | (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116303 ..... | 14     |
| 23 | <i>In re Taco Bell Wage and Hour Actions</i>                 |        |
| 24 | (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016) 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48557 .....   | 14     |
| 25 | <i>Van Kempen v. Matheson Tri-Gas, Inc.</i>                  |        |
| 26 | (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137182.....  | 14     |
| 27 | <i>Walsh v. IKON Solutions, Inc.,</i>                        |        |
| 28 | 148 Cal.App.4th 1440 (2007).....                             | 11     |
|    | <i>Wershba v. Apple Computer</i>                             |        |
|    | (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224 .....                              | 15, 16 |
|    | <u><i>White v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.</i></u>  |        |
|    | (C.D. Cal. 2011) 803 F.Supp.2d 1086 .....                    | 15     |
|    | <i>White v. Starbucks Corp.</i>                              |        |
|    | (N.D. Cal. 2007) 497 F.Supp.2d 1080 .....                    | 12     |

|    |                                                                                                                                |       |
|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| 1  | <u>Williams v. Superior Court</u>                                                                                              |       |
| 2  | (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1353 .....                                                                                              | 17    |
| 3  | <b>Statutes</b>                                                                                                                |       |
| 4  | Code of Civil Procedure section 382 .....                                                                                      | 8, 16 |
| 5  | Code of Civil Procedure § 384(b) .....                                                                                         | 6     |
| 6  | Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 .....                                                                                    | 10    |
| 7  | FICA.....                                                                                                                      | 5     |
| 8  | FUTA .....                                                                                                                     | 5     |
| 9  | Labor Code sections .....                                                                                                      | 14    |
| 10 | Labor Code § 2699(e)(2).....                                                                                                   | 14    |
| 11 | <b>Other Authorities</b>                                                                                                       |       |
| 12 | California Rule of Court 3.769.....                                                                                            | 6     |
| 13 | California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769 .....                                                                                    | 2     |
| 14 | Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 23(b)(3) .....                                                                                                  | 16    |
| 15 | Federal Judicial Center, <u>Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for</u>                                           |       |
| 16 | <u>Judges</u> (3d ed. 2010), available at <a href="http://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf">http://</a>       |       |
| 17 | <a href="http://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf">www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf</a> ..... | 15    |
| 18 | Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23.....                                                                                  | 16    |
| 19 |                                                                                                                                |       |
| 20 |                                                                                                                                |       |
| 21 |                                                                                                                                |       |
| 22 |                                                                                                                                |       |
| 23 |                                                                                                                                |       |
| 24 |                                                                                                                                |       |
| 25 |                                                                                                                                |       |
| 26 |                                                                                                                                |       |
| 27 |                                                                                                                                |       |
| 28 |                                                                                                                                |       |

1     **I.     INTRODUCTION**

2           Plaintiff Alexander Cowley-Malki respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily  
3     approve the Class and Representative PAGA Action Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) entered  
4     into between Plaintiff and Defendant Cengage Learning, Inc. (“Cengage” or “Defendant”). The  
5     proposed settlement seeks to resolve claims in the above captioned matter in exchange for a non-  
6     reversionary \$554,253 Gross Settlement Amount. The settlement class is comprised of all current  
7     and former non-exempt employees of Cengage Learning, Inc. at any location in California at any  
8     time during the Class Period of September 20, 2020 to July 13, 2025.

9           The Agreement and notice distribution plan are the products of adversarial, arm’s-length  
10    negotiations by informed counsel and parties, facilitated by an experienced mediator. The  
11    settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate to all. Plaintiff has analyzed the strengths and  
12    vulnerabilities of the claims with Defendant’s potential exposure and determined the \$554,253  
13    proposed settlement is well within the range of reasonableness and is in the Class Members’ best  
14    interests. The length and risks of trial and perils of litigation that affect the values of the claims  
15    were all carefully weighed. In addition, the defenses asserted by Defendant, the uncertainty of class  
16    certification, the difficulties of complex litigation, the lengthy process of establishing specific  
17    damages and various possible delays and appeals, were also considered by Plaintiff and counsel in  
18    negotiating the proposed settlement. Further, the proposed settlement satisfies the criteria for  
19    preliminary approval under California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769.

20          Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks: (1) preliminary approval of the settlement; (2) provisional  
21    certification of the Class; (3) appointment of Plaintiff as Class Representative; (4) appointment of  
22    Crosner Legal, PC as Class Counsel; (5) approval of the Parties’ proposed Notice of Class Action  
23    Settlement (“Notice”) and method of notifying the Class Members; (6) a hearing date for Plaintiff’s  
24    Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement; and (7) entry of an Order Granting  
25    Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement.

26     **II.    BACKGROUND/LITIGATION HISTORY**

27          Cengage is an education technology corporation offering courses for instructor and  
28    trainer development, certifications, and online training services. Plaintiff was employed by

1 Cengage as an hourly-paid Enrollment Representative for about 2 years, from September 2022 to  
2 August 2024. (Trenner Decl., ¶ 11.)

3 On September 20, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a class action complaint  
4 alleging causes of action against Cengage for (1) Recovery of Unpaid Minimum Wages and  
5 Liquidated Damages; (2) Recovery of Unpaid Overtime Wages; (3) Failure to Provide Meal Periods  
6 or Compensation in Lieu Thereof; (4) Failure to Provide Rest Periods or Compensation in Lieu  
7 Thereof; (5) Failure to Furnish Accurate Itemized Wage Statements; (6) Failure to Timely Pay All  
8 Wages Due Upon Separation of Employment; (7) Failure to Reimburse Business Expenses; and (8)  
9 Unfair Competition. On November 5, 2024, after notice to Defendant and the LWDA and  
10 exhausting administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint adding a cause of  
11 action under PAGA based on the same alleged Labor Code violations. The First Amended  
12 Complaint is the operative complaint in the Action. (Trenner Decl., ¶ 12; Exh. 4.)

13 Once the case was at issue, and after extensive meeting and conferring over case  
14 management, discovery, and potential law and motion, the Parties eventually agreed to mediation.  
15 In May 2025, the Parties mediated with Steve Mehta, Esq., a respected wage and hour class action  
16 mediator. The mediation lasted a full day and with the mediator's assistance the Parties reached  
17 agreement on all major issues and they then formally reduced the proposed settlement to the  
18 Agreement now before the Court for approval. The Agreement meets the requirements in the LASC  
19 Checklist for Preliminary Approval. (Trenner Decl., ¶ 13.)

### 20 **III. INVESTIGATION**

21 Prior to the mediation, Defendant provided Plaintiff with extensive informal discovery,  
22 including Plaintiff's personnel, time, and payroll records, time and payroll records for all of the  
23 putative class members, wage statement exemplars, Defendant's employee handbooks, including  
24 Defendant's policies and procedures regarding the payment of wages, the provision of meal and  
25 rest breaks, timekeeping policies (including recording hours), issuance of wage statements, and  
26 termination wages, expense reimbursement policies, as well as information regarding the number  
27 of putative Class Members who are current and former employees, the number of Aggrieved  
28 Employees, the number of workweeks throughout the Class Period, and the number of pay periods



1 throughout the PAGA Period. From this information, Plaintiff was able to analyze Defendant's  
2 liability for the claims asserted in this case and the potential exposure and damages. (Trenner Decl.,  
3 ¶ 14.)

4 Based on this informal discovery, Plaintiff contends the Class Members were not paid all  
5 wages due, not provided with legally compliant meal and rest periods, did not receive compliant  
6 wage statements, did not receive required expense reimbursement, and did not receive all wages  
7 due on separation of employment. In considering the reasonableness of the proposed settlement,  
8 Plaintiff considered each of Defendant's counterarguments, which sharply contested Plaintiff's  
9 claims. Plaintiff and counsel weighed the strength of Defendant's arguments, including the risks of  
10 prevailing at class certification and on the merits, and determined that the proposed settlement is in  
11 the best interests of the Class. Although remaining confident in the strength of her claims, these  
12 factors led Plaintiff to discount the exposure analysis, as discussed below. (Trenner Decl., ¶ 15.)

#### 13 **IV. TERMS OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT**

##### 14 **A. Deductions from the Settlement**

15 The Parties have agreed (subject to the Court's approval) to resolve this matter for the non-  
16 reversionary total sum of \$554,253.00 ("Gross Settlement Amount" or "GSA") (Agreement, § 3.1.),  
17 which includes: (a) reasonable attorney's fees of up to \$182,903.49 (33% of the GSA)<sup>1</sup> to  
18 compensate Class Counsel for work already performed and all work remaining to be performed  
19 (Agreement, § 3.2.2.); (b) actual litigation expenses as documented and not to exceed \$25,000.00<sup>2</sup>  
20 (Agreement, § 3.2.2.); (c) an Enhancement Award to Plaintiff in an amount not to exceed  
21 \$10,000.00 (Agreement, § 3.2.1.); (d) Administration Costs to Simpluris, Inc. (the proposed  
22 settlement administrator) in an amount not to exceed \$11,000.00 (Agreement, § 3.2.3.); and  
23 (e) PAGA penalties to the LWDA of \$35,750 (which is 65% of the \$55,000.00 PAGA Payment,  
24 with the remaining 35% or \$19,250.00 to Aggrieved Employees) (Agreement, § 3.2.4.). Employer-

---

26 <sup>1</sup> The percentage method, with or without a lodestar cross-check, may be used in common fund cases like this one.  
27 *Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat., Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 503. In support of their fee request at Final Approval, Class  
28 Counsel will provide the Court with lodestar information to permit the Court to do a lodestar cross-check in connection  
with Class Counsel's request for attorney's fees.

<sup>2</sup> At Final Approval, Class Counsel will provide documentation regarding actual expenses incurred to support Class  
Counsel's request for reimbursement of actual expenses.

side payroll taxes (including FICA, FUTA, and SDI) will be paid by Defendant separate and apart from the GSA. (Agreement, § 3.1.)

**B. Calculation of the Individual Settlement Payments to Class and Aggrieved Employees**

After all Court-approved deductions from the GSA, about \$270,349.51 (“Net Settlement Amount” or “NSA”), less all applicable employee-side taxes, will be distributed to the estimated 221 Class Members, with an average individual settlement amount of around \$1,223.<sup>3</sup> The 35% PAGA Payment (\$19,250.00) will be distributed to the estimated 132 Aggrieved Employees, resulting in an average payment of about \$145<sup>4</sup> per Aggrieved Employees. (Trenner Decl., ¶ 17.) Under no circumstances will any portion of the Settlement revert to Defendant. (Agreement, § 3.1.)

Simpluris will calculate and issue Individual Class Payments to Participating Class Members by “(a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member’s Workweeks.” (Agreement, § 3.2.5.) Additionally, Simpluris will calculate and issue payments to Aggrieved Employees based (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees’ 35% share of PAGA Penalties (\$19,250) by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Aggrieved Employee’s PAGA Period Pay Periods. (Agreement, § 3.2.4.1.)

Each Class Member’s settlement award will be apportioned as follows: seventy percent (70%) wages and thirty percent penalties and interest. (Agreement, § 3.2.5.1.) Simpluris will be responsible for issuing Form W-2s for amounts deemed wages and Form 1099s for the portions allocated to penalties and interest. (Agreement, §§ 3.2.4.2. and 3.2.5.1.)

**C. Uncashed Funds to State Controller**

Settlement checks must be cashed or deposited within 180 days after issuance. (Agreement, § 4.4.1.) In the event a settlement check remains uncashed, such uncashed funds shall be transmitted

---

<sup>3</sup> \$270,349.51 estimated NSA/221 Class Members

<sup>4</sup> \$19,250 (35% PAGA Payment) /132 Aggrieved Employees

1 to the California State Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund, leaving no residual funds subject to  
2 Code of Civil Procedure § 384(b). (Agreement, § 4.4.3)..

3 **D. Notice and Extended Response Deadline for Re-Mailed Notices**

4 Within fifteen (15) calendar days after entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, Defendant  
5 will provide Simpluris with the Class Data, which Simpluris will maintain as private and  
6 confidential. (Agreement, § 4.2.)

7 Prior to mailing, Simpluris will perform a search for updated addresses in the National  
8 Change of Address database, and will use the NCOA database and skip traces to attempt to find  
9 current addresses for any Notice returned as undeliverable. (Agreement, § 8.4.2.) If Simpluris is  
10 unable to obtain a better address for a Class Member, it will be under no obligation to make further  
11 attempts to locate or notice the Class Member. (Agreement, § 8.4.3.) Within fourteen days after  
12 receipt of the Class Data, Simpluris will mail the Notice to all Class Members via First-Class mail.  
13 (Agreement, § 8.4.2.)

14 The contents of the Notice are consistent with the terms of the Agreement and California  
15 Rule of Court 3.769. The Notice informs Class Members how and when to request exclusion from  
16 or object to the settlement and of their estimated payment amount which they will automatically  
17 receive a settlement payment if they do nothing. (Trenner Decl., ¶¶ 23-26; Exh. 3.)

18 **E. Responses to the Settlement and Deadlines**

19 Class Members will have forty-five (45) days from the initial mailing of the Notice to  
20 respond to the settlement by submitting a challenge to the number of weeks or pay periods attributed  
21 to them, objecting, or requesting exclusion. (Agreement, § 1.45.) Class Members can object to the  
22 settlement in writing via mail or fax by submitting a document with their name, the words “Notice  
23 of Objection” or “Formal Objection” and a description of the arguments supporting their objection,  
24 or they may be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. (Agreement, § 8.7.)

25 Class Members can also request for exclusion from the settlement by mailing or faxing a  
26 written request, including his or her name, address, phone number or email address, last four digits  
27 of their Social Security Number or Employment Authorization number, and a statement  
28 demonstrating his or her intent to opt out of the settlement. (Agreement, § 8.5.)

1 The Notice also informs the Class Members/Aggrieved Employees that they can dispute the  
2 number of workweeks/pay periods used to calculate their settlement payments by contacting  
3 Simpluris before the Response Deadline and providing documentation to support their dispute.  
4 Simpluris will investigate the dispute, request additional information from Defendant, and make a  
5 final decision as to the number of eligible work weeks/pay periods. (Agreement, § 8.6.)

6 **F. Funding and Distribution of the Settlement**

7 Defendant will fund the settlement within thirty (30) days of the Effective Date. Simpluris  
8 will disburse all payments required under this Settlement within fourteen (14) calendar days of  
9 receipt of the full GSA. (Agreement, § 4.3-4.)

10 **G. Release of Claims**

11 Upon final approval, Participating Class Members shall forever release the Released  
12 Parties<sup>5</sup> for the Released Claims for the Class Period, including all claims pleaded in the Operative  
13 Complaint, and which could reasonably have been alleged, based on the Class Period facts,  
14 allegations, and/or claims stated in the Operative Complaint, for work performed during the Class  
15 Period, and as specifically detailed in Section 6.2 of the Agreement. Additionally, the Aggrieved  
16 Employees will the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA penalties that were alleged, or  
17 reasonably could have been alleged, based on the PAGA Period facts stated in the Operative  
18 Complaint, and PAGA Notice, and as more specifically detailed in Section 6.3 of the Agreement.

19 **H. The Class Representative Service Award Is Justified Given the Risks and**  
20 **Should be Preliminarily Approved**

21 The Agreement provides for a service payment not to exceed \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff.  
22 (Agreement, § 3.2.1.) Courts routinely approve service payments, or incentive awards, to  
23 compensate named plaintiffs for the services they provide and the risks they incur during class  
24 litigation. *In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases* (2010) 186 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 1393 (“These  
25 awards are discretionary...and are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on

---

26  
27 <sup>5</sup> “Released Parties” means Defendant and its past, present and/or future, direct and/or indirect, officers,  
28 directors, members, managers, employees, agents, representatives, attorneys, insurers, reinsurers, partners,  
investors, shareholders, administrators, parent companies, subsidiaries, sectors, affiliates, divisions,  
predecessors, successors, assigns, and joint venturers. (Agreement, § 1.43.)

1 behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action,  
2 and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.”); *Bell v.*  
3 *Farmers Ins. Exch.* (2004) 115 Cal. App. 4th 715, 725-26 (upholding service payments to class  
4 representatives); Manual § 21.62 n. 971 (noting that service payments are warranted).

5 The requested service award is reasonable in light of the benefits Plaintiff conferred upon  
6 the entire Class, resulting in a benefit to all Class Members and the State of California, the time  
7 spent assisting counsel with the investigation and prosecution of these claims, commitment to  
8 responding to discovery, and consenting to the proposed Agreement. Furthermore, by attaching his  
9 name to this lawsuit, Plaintiff also took on the reputational risk that future employers would learn  
10 of his participation in this case and would unfairly associate them with costly litigation, costing  
11 them future employment opportunities. Any future employer could easily perform a simple Google  
12 search – an unauthorized simple background check unknown to Plaintiff that can still provide a  
13 plethora of information – and conclude that Plaintiff is not worth the risk of hiring given his prior  
14 involvement in a lawsuit against a former employer. This is the kind of reputational risk, borne only  
15 by Plaintiff, that the incentive award is meant to compensate. Furthermore, in pursuing this action  
16 on behalf of the Class, Plaintiff risked a judgment against him for attorney’s fees and costs in the  
17 event this matter should Cengage prevail. For these reasons, at final approval, Plaintiff will request  
18 the Court award him an enhancement payment in an amount that does not exceed \$10,000. (Trenner  
19 Decl., ¶ 29; Declaration of Alexander Cowley-Malki, ¶¶ 2-9.)

#### 20 **IV. ARGUMENT**

21 In deciding whether to approve a proposed class action settlement under Code of Civil  
22 Procedure section 382, the Court must find that a proposed settlement is “fair, adequate and  
23 reasonable.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 [quoting *Officers for*  
24 *Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n* (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615, 625, cert. den. (1983) 459 U.S. 1217].  
25 A proposed class action settlement is **presumed** fair under the following circumstances: (1) the  
26 parties reached settlement after arms-length negotiations; (2) investigation and discovery were  
27 sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar  
28 litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. *Id.* at 1802. As the following shows, all of

1 these elements are present here and the Court should grant preliminary approval.

2 **A. The Settlement was Reached as a Result of Arm's Length Negotiations**

3 The proposed settlement was reached as a result of arm's-length negotiations facilitated by  
4 a respected mediator. Though cordial and professional, the settlement negotiations have been, at all  
5 times, adversarial and non-collusive. Following mediation, counsel for the Parties conducted  
6 further extensive and arm's length negotiations on the settlement terms memorialized in the  
7 Agreement. (Trenner Decl., ¶ 30.)

8 While Plaintiff believes in the merits of her case, she also recognizes the inherent risks of  
9 litigation and understand the benefit of Class Members receiving significant settlement funds  
10 immediately as opposed to risking continued litigation in achieving class certification, the merits  
11 of the case before and after trial, the damages awarded and/or an appeal that can take several more  
12 years to litigate. (Trenner Decl., ¶ 31.)

13 **B. The Settlement is the Result of Thorough Investigation and Discovery**

14 The Parties thoroughly investigated and evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of their  
15 factual and legal arguments before reaching the proposed settlement, and engaged in sufficient  
16 investigation, research and discovery to support the settlement. The proposed settlement was only  
17 possible following significant analysis and evaluation of Defendant's relevant policies and  
18 procedures, as well as the data it produced for the putative Class. (Trenner Decl., ¶¶ 14-15, 32-33.)  
19 This litigation has reached the stage where "the Parties certainly have a clear view of the strengths  
20 and weaknesses of their cases" sufficient to support the Settlement. *Boyd v. Bechtel Corp.* (N.D.  
21 Cal. 1979) 485 F. Supp. 610, 617.

22 **C. Counsel for the Parties are Experienced in Similar Litigation**

23 Counsel for the Parties are particularly experienced in wage and hour employment law,  
24 class actions and PAGA actions. Plaintiff's Counsel has prosecuted numerous cases on behalf of  
25 employees for wage and hour violations and thus are experienced and qualified to evaluate the class  
26 and PAGA claims, evaluate settlement versus trial on a fully informed basis, and to evaluate the  
27 viability of the defenses. This experience informed Plaintiff's Counsel on the risks and uncertainties  
28

1 of further litigation and guided their determination to endorse the proposed settlement.<sup>6</sup> (Trenner  
2 Decl. ¶¶ 4-10.)

3 **D. The Proposed Settlement is a Reasonable Compromise of Claims**

4 An understanding of the amount in controversy is an important factor into whether the  
5 settlement “of the class members’ claims is reasonable in light of the strengths and weaknesses of  
6 the claims and the risks of the particular litigation.” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168  
7 Cal.App.4th 116, 129; *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186  
8 Cal.App.4th 399, 409. The most important factor in this regard is “the strength of the case for  
9 plaintiffs on the merits, balanced against the amount offered in settlement.” *Kullar*, 168  
10 Cal.App.4th at 129.

11 In weighing the strength of Plaintiff’s case, *Kullar* instructs that the court is not to “decide  
12 the merits of the case or to substitute its evaluation of the most appropriate settlement for that of  
13 the attorneys.” 168 Cal.App.4th at 133. Further, this analysis does not require an explicit statement  
14 of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims, provided  
15 there is a record which allows “an understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the  
16 realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.” *Munoz*, 186 Cal. App. 4th at 409. Put differently, “as  
17 the court does when it approves a settlement as in good faith under Code of Civil Procedure section  
18 877.6, the court must at least satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the ‘ballpark’ of  
19 reasonableness.” *Kullar*, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 133 citing *Tech-Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde &*  
20 *Associates* (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 488, 499-500. As shown below, the Parties’ investigation and  
21 discovery revealed several reasons to discount claims and agree to this settlement.

22 **E. The Settlement is Fair and Reasonable Based on the Strengths of Plaintiff’s**  
23 **Case and the Risks and Costs of Further Litigation**

24 The proposed settlement was only possible following significant analysis and evaluation of  
25 Defendant’s relevant policies and procedures, as well as the data that Defendant produced for the  
26 Class. This permitted Plaintiff’s Counsel to engage in a comprehensive analysis of liability and

---

27 <sup>6</sup> The final factor mentioned in *Dunk* - the number of objectors - is not determinable until the Notice of Class Action  
28 Settlement has been provided to the Class and they have had an opportunity to respond. This information will be  
provided to the Court in conjunction with the Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement.

1 potential damages. The discovery conducted resulted in Plaintiff's central theories of liability,  
2 which are based on Plaintiff's claims that Defendant failed to provide compliant meal and rest  
3 periods, failed to pay all minimum and overtime wages, failed to provide accurate, itemized wage  
4 statements and failed to pay all wages due on separation of employment As explained above,  
5 Defendant maintains that the discovery produced demonstrates it likely would prevail on both class  
6 certification and the merits. (Trenner Decl., ¶ 33.)

7 Plaintiff believes this case is suitable for certification as she contends there are company-  
8 wide policies that violate California law and uniformly affect the Class Members. Defendant's  
9 counterarguments, however, raise uncertainties with respect to both class certification and success  
10 on the merits. As the California Supreme Court emphasized in *Sav-On v. Superior Court* (2004) 34  
11 Cal.4th 319, class certification is always a matter of the trial court's sound discretion, and decisions  
12 following *Sav-On* have reached different conclusions with respect to certification of wage and hour  
13 claims.<sup>7</sup> While remaining confident in the strengths of her claims, all of these factors led Plaintiff  
14 to discount the following maximum potential damage claims. (Trenner Decl., ¶ 34.)

#### 15 **1. The Settlement Amount is Reasonable**

16 Defendant provided Plaintiff with class-wide data from which Plaintiff's Counsel  
17 extrapolated a damage analysis in preparation of mediation. For purposes of the mediation, there  
18 were a total of 221 Class Members who worked approximately 26,393 work weeks in the  
19 limitations period, and 132 aggrieved employees and 3,467 pay periods within the PAGA Period.  
20 (Trenner Decl., ¶ 35.)

21 First, Plaintiff contends Defendant failed to pay all wages due because it required Plaintiff  
22 and the Class Members to work off the clock before clocking in for their shifts each day.  
23 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant requires all employees to utilize a 2-step authorization  
24 process when logging into the company's systems at the start of each shift. This process requires  
25

---

26 <sup>7</sup> E.g., *Harris v. Superior Court*, 154 Cal.App.4th 164 (2007) (reversing decertification of class claiming  
27 misclassification and ordering summary adjudication in favor of employees), *review granted*, 171 P.3d 545 (2007) (not  
28 cited as precedent, but rather for illustrative purposes only); *Walsh v. IKON Solutions, Inc.*, 148 Cal.App.4th 1440  
(2007) (affirming decertification of class claiming misclassification); *Aguilar v. Cintas Corp. No. 2*, 144 Cal.App.4th  
121 (2006) (reversing denial of certification); *Dunbar v. Albertson's Inc.*, 141 Cal.App.4th 1422 (2006) (affirming  
denial of certification).



1 Plaintiff and the Class Members to spend 10 minutes at the beginning of each shift logging into the  
2 various programs and completing the 2-step verification process in order to clock in. Per Plaintiff,  
3 this time went unrecorded and uncompensated. On the other hand, Defendant contends it paid class  
4 members all wages due as required under applicable law, and that it accurately tracked and paid for  
5 all employee hours worked at the correct hourly rates. It further argued its policies strictly  
6 prohibited “off the clock” work, and if any employees worked off the clock it was done without the  
7 company’s authorization or knowledge. *White v. Starbucks Corp.* (N.D. Cal. 2007) 497 F.Supp.2d  
8 1080, 1083 (employer must have actual or constructive knowledge of the off the clock work).  
9 Finally, Cengage argued that determining if any off the clock work occurred, and the reasons  
10 therefore, would require innumerable individualized inquiries and therefore class certification  
11 would be improper. Without taking into consideration any of Defendant’s defenses to certification  
12 or on the merits, Plaintiff’s expert calculated Defendant’s maximum exposure for this claim at  
13 about **\$376,100** for unpaid wages. (Trenner Decl., ¶ 36.)

14 Plaintiff next contends Defendant failed to pay for overtime wages at the correct hourly  
15 rate. Plaintiff and the Class Members earned commissions and bonuses on sales made, and  
16 Defendant was required to account for that non-hourly compensation when paying overtime and  
17 sick wages. *Alvarado v Dart Container Corp.* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 542. Plaintiff alleges Defendant  
18 instead paid overtime and sick leave to all employees at their base hourly rates. As a result, by  
19 Plaintiff’s expert’s calculations, the Class Members were underpaid **\$45,000** in overtime and sick  
20 wages. (Trenner Decl., ¶ 37.)

21 Next, Plaintiff alleges Cengage failed to provide legally compliant meal and rest breaks.  
22 Specifically, Plaintiff contends employees regularly had to continue performing work duties during  
23 both meal periods and rest breaks. Here, Plaintiff claims Class Members were required to monitor  
24 the phones during breaks as part of a company-wide culture that discouraged employees from  
25 taking duty-free breaks. Plaintiff and the Class Members routinely accepted phone calls during  
26 break periods in order to meet the stringent sales quotas imposed by Defendant, and failing to meet  
27 those quotas would result in disciplinary action. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant failed to pay  
28 any meal or rest break premiums during the Class Period. (Trenner Decl., ¶ 38.)

1 Defendant denies Plaintiff's contentions, claiming it made meal and rest breaks available to  
2 Class Members in compliance with California law. Defendant contends its meal and rest break  
3 policies are lawful and that Class Members were frequently reminded they were required to take  
4 all meal and rest breaks. Defendant also contends that time records demonstrate that Class Members  
5 took duty-free, timely meal and rest breaks. Defendant also contends its meal and rest break policies  
6 and practices comported with the flexibility the *Brinker* court held was integral to California's meal  
7 and rest period requirements. Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's meal and rest break claims  
8 are not susceptible to common proof, as the claims would require individualized inquiry, including  
9 whether there was an unlawful companywide policy, whether employees had the opportunity to  
10 take meal and rest periods, whether they voluntarily chose to forego their meal and rest periods,  
11 and whether Defendant ever prevented them from taking meal and rest periods. Accordingly,  
12 Defendant contends these claims are vulnerable to a ruling that class treatment is not appropriate.  
13 Without taking into consideration any of Defendant's defenses to certification or on the merits,  
14 Plaintiff estimates Defendant faces around **\$3,135,270** in damages for meal period violations  
15 assuming a 100% violation rate and after accounting for meal period premiums paid. On the rest  
16 period claims, Plaintiff estimates around **\$3,215,650** in damages, again assuming a 100% violation  
17 rate. (Trenner Decl., ¶ 39.)

18 As a result of the above alleged violations, Plaintiff also alleges Defendant failed to provide  
19 accurate wage statements and timely pay all wages that were due and owing upon separation of  
20 employment. Thus, should the primary claims fail, Plaintiff's claims for wage statement violations  
21 and waiting time penalties would also fail. Defendant also contends it would not be liable for  
22 waiting time penalties because a "good faith dispute" exists over the payment of past wages. *Amaral*  
23 *v. Cintas Corp. No. 2* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1201. Further, Defendant contends Plaintiff  
24 would have to prove Defendant "willfully" failed to pay Class Members appropriate wages due  
25 upon separation of employment. Without taking into consideration any of Defendant's defenses to  
26 certification or on the merits, Plaintiff calculated Defendant's maximum exposure for wage  
27 statement violations at about **\$361,200** and exposure for waiting time penalties at about **\$547,680**.  
28 (Trenner Decl., ¶ 40.)

1 As far as potential PAGA liability, the theoretical civil penalties likely are around \$1.4  
2 million should Plaintiff prevail on all claims and establish violations of the multiple Labor Code  
3 sections at issue. (Trenner Decl., ¶ 41.) As with the class claims, Plaintiff discounted the potential  
4 PAGA penalties based on Defendant's various defenses on the merits and also accounted for the  
5 Court's wide discretion to reduce such penalties, or to decline to award penalties at all. Labor Code  
6 § 2699(e)(2); *Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.* (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504 (trial court awarded  
7 penalties of \$5 per pay period after a bench trial, which decision was upheld on appeal); *In re Taco*  
8 *Bell Wage and Hour Actions* (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016) 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48557 (PAGA  
9 penalties denied after trial). Accordingly, the Parties allocated \$55,000 to PAGA penalties.  
10 (Agreement, § 3.2.5.)

11 Plaintiff submits this amount is reasonable under the circumstances and in line with  
12 comparable settlements in other wage and hour class actions in California. *E.g.*, *Van Kempen v.*  
13 *Matheson Tri-Gas, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137182 (granting final  
14 approval of \$5,000 PAGA penalty from \$370,000 settlement, or 1.4 percent of total settlement);  
15 *Slavkov v. First Water Heater Partners I* (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116303  
16 (finding a \$7,500 PAGA payment reasonable when measured against the overall settlement of  
17 \$345,000 and the possible weaknesses in plaintiffs' case, or 2.2 percent of total settlement).  
18 Additionally, the LWDA has been informed of the terms of the PAGA portion of the settlement,  
19 and will be able to weigh in as necessary. *Jennings v. Open Door Mktg. Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3,  
20 2018) 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171356, at \*27 (approving settlement with PAGA penalties of 0.6%  
21 where "[p]laintiffs [have] submitted the settlement agreement to the LWDA, and the LWDA has  
22 not objected to the settlement.

23 Thus, Plaintiff and his counsel discounted the value of the class claims consistent with the  
24 risks discussed above, and carefully weighed the likelihood of the class receiving substantially  
25 greater benefit if the litigation continued. Plaintiff and counsel concluded – in light of these very  
26 real and substantial risks – settlement on the proposed terms and without prolonged and costly  
27 litigation was in the best interests of the class. The overall \$554,253 recovery represents a  
28 significant percentage of Defendant's potential exposure. Given Defendant's multi-layered

1 defenses and all other potential risks of continued litigation, a total recovery for the class of  
2 \$554,253, which will result in average award of at least \$1,223 per class member, plus additional  
3 sums under PAGA, is a significant result well within the range of reasonableness considering all  
4 potential outcomes, and it will provide direct monetary awards to all Class Members without further  
5 delay. [Trenner Decl., ¶¶ 42-43.]

6 Importantly, the mere fact that a settlement does not provide the same recovery as might be  
7 achieved at trial is not a proper indicator of whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.  
8 Wershba, 91 Cal.App.4th at 246, 250 (“Compromise is inherent and necessary in the settlement  
9 process...even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it  
10 would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement because  
11 the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground  
12 in the interest of avoiding litigation”); 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.  
13 (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1150 (“The fact that a proposed settlement may amount to only a  
14 fraction of the potential recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is  
15 grossly inadequate and should be disapproved”); White v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.  
16 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 803 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1098 (rejecting contention settlement was not fair and  
17 reasonable even though it represented 99% discount off the maximum value of the claims); Lane  
18 v. Facebook, Inc. (9th Cir. 2012) 696 F.3d 811, 819 (“[T]he question whether a settlement is  
19 fundamentally fair . . . is different from the question whether the settlement is perfect in the  
20 estimation of the reviewing court”). Importantly as well, the proposed settlement is non-  
21 reversionary and will provide immediate benefits to the Class Members without a claims process.  
22 White, 803 F.Supp.2d at 1098; c.f., Federal Judicial Center, Managing Class Action Litigation: A  
23 Pocket Guide for Judges (3d ed. 2010) at 20, available at [http://](http://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf)  
24 [www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf](http://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd3.pdf) (reversionary provisions and/or cumbersome  
25 claims process may indicate lack of fairness). Plaintiff and her counsel submit the settlement is  
26 within the “range of reasonableness,” and is fair and adequate for the Class.

27 **F. Provisional Class Certification Should be Granted**

28 A class action is appropriate when the class is ascertainable and there is “a well-defined

1 community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be  
2 represented.” Code Civ. Proc. § 382. Class certification requirements under Section 382 follow  
3 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and require: numerosity, typicality of the class  
4 representatives’ claims, adequacy of representation, predominance of common issues, and  
5 superiority. Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 23(b)(3); *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir. 1998) 150 F.3d 1011,  
6 1019. While a court must certify a class for settlement purposes if a class has not already been  
7 certified, “it is well established that trial courts should use different standards to determine the  
8 propriety of a settlement class, as opposed to a litigation class certification. Specifically, a lesser  
9 standard of scrutiny is used for settlement cases.” *Glob. Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court*  
10 (2013) 113 Cal.App.4th 836, 859 citing *Dunk*, Cal.App.4th 1794, 1807, n.19; *Wershba v. Apple*  
11 *Computer* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 237-38.

#### 12 **1. The Proposed Class is Sufficiently Numerous and Ascertainable**

13 First, the class is both sufficiently numerous, consisting of approximately 221 individuals,  
14 and ascertainable by reference to Defendant’s personnel and payroll records. (Trenner Decl., ¶ 44.)  
15 “There is no set number required to maintain a class action, and the statutory test is whether a class  
16 is so numerous that ‘it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.’” *Hebbard v. Colgrove*  
17 (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 1017, 1030 (noting that there is no set minimum to meet the numerosity  
18 prerequisite, but that a class of as few as 28 is acceptable); *Bowles v. Superior Court* (1995) 44 Cal.  
19 2d 574 (upholding a class of ten members); *Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981) 126 Cal. App. 3d 926,  
20 932 (finding that “Class Members are ‘ascertainable’ where they may be readily identified without  
21 unreasonable expense or time by reference to official records.”). Thus, the ascertainability  
22 requirement is met.

#### 23 **2. The Typicality and Adequacy Requirements Are Met**

24 The typicality requirement is met if the claims of the named representative are typical of  
25 those of the Class, though, “they need not be substantially identical.” *Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145  
26 Cal.App.3d 27, 46-47. Here, Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class Members’ claims because  
27 they arise from the same factual basis and are based on the same legal theories applicable to the  
28 Class Members. Plaintiff further contends Defendant’s policies applied to all Class Members and

1 each Class Member is challenging the same policies and practices. As such, typicality is satisfied  
2 for purposes of settlement. (Cowley-Malki Decl., ¶¶ 2-3; Trenner Decl. ¶ 45.)

3 Adequacy requires that the Plaintiff have no interests adverse to the interests of the proposed  
4 Class Members and be committed to vigorously prosecuting the case on behalf of the Class.  
5 *McGhee v. Bank of America* (1976) 70 Cal.App.3d 442, 450-51. Plaintiff has been and will continue  
6 to be committed to vigorously prosecuting this case, and he has no conflicts of interest with the  
7 Class. (Cowley-Malki Decl., ¶¶ 3-7; Trenner Decl., ¶ 45.)

### 8 **3. The Commonality Requirement is Met**

9 Next, common questions of law and fact predominate – particularly for purposes of a  
10 settlement class – as the Class Members all were subject to the same meal and rest break policies  
11 and alleged “de facto” policies resulting in meal period violations, and similarly subject to the same  
12 improper time keeping policies that allegedly failed to accurately record and pay for all hours  
13 worked. Since the focus of the claims against Defendant concerns the legality of common policies  
14 applied uniformly to the entire class, common issues predominate over individualized inquiries  
15 concerning liability. For instance, whether Defendant’s computer systems required pre-shift start  
16 up time is company-wide policy applied equally and consistently to all class members, and this  
17 policy is either compliant with California law or it is not. Regardless of that determination, it will  
18 decide liability for all class members one way or another. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 46.]

19 By now it is well-settled a theory of recovery asserting the existence of a uniform policy  
20 violating California law is sufficient to satisfy the requirements for class certification. Jones v.  
21 Farmers Ins. Exch. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 986, 996 (“Claims alleging that a uniform policy  
22 consistently applied to a group of employees is in violation of the wage and hour laws are of the  
23 sort routinely, and properly, found suitable for class treatment”); Williams v. Superior Court (2013)  
24 221 Cal.App.4th 1353 (“A company-wide practice can sustain a common question of fact or law  
25 that supports commonality for class certification”). Lastly, a class action is superior to other means  
26 for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. [Trenner Decl., ¶ 47.]

### 27 **G. Simpluris Should be Appointed as the Settlement Administrator**

28 The Parties agreed to use Simpluris, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator in this matter.

(Agreement, § 8.1.) Simpluris is highly qualified and experienced as an administrator, committed to the security of data (having experienced no data breaches at all), carries insurance for the theft of money or data, and has no relationship with Counsel. (Declaration of Michael Bui, ¶¶ 2-9, Exhs. A-C; Trenner Decl., ¶ 48.)

**V. CONCLUSION**

Plaintiff respectfully submits that the proposed settlement is in the best interests of the Class Members, as it is fair, adequate, and reasonable. Plaintiff accordingly requests the Court certify the class for settlement purposes, appoint Plaintiff as Class Representative, appoint Plaintiff's Counsel as Class Counsel, appoint Simpluris, Inc. as Settlement Administrator, approve the method of notice and the Notice to be sent to the Class, preliminarily approve the Settlement Agreement, enter the proposed order filed herewith, and set a Final Approval hearing date.

**CROSNER LEGAL, P.C.**

Dated: November 12, 2025

By:



Nikki Trenner  
Attorneys for Plaintiff  
Alexander Cowley-Malki