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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE**

SYLVIA ZAMORA, individually, and on  
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CAPC, INC., a California corporation; and  
DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants

Case No.: 24STCV24050

REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

**DECLARATION OF KANE MOON IN  
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF  
PAGA SETTLEMENT**

[Filed with (1) Plaintiff's Notice of Motion and Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement, (2) the Declaration of Plaintiff, (3) the Declaration of Jodey Lawrence re: Qualifications and Costs for Settlement Administration, (4) [Proposed] PAGA Approval Order, and (5) [Proposed] Judgment]

PAGA APPROVAL HEARING:

Date: June 24, 2026

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Dept.: 9

Judge: Honorable Elaine Lu

Action filed: September 17, 2024

FAC filed: December 23, 2024

Trial date: Not set

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I, KANE MOON, declare as follows:

1. I am an attorney at law duly licensed to practice as such before all the Courts of the State of California and am one of the attorneys of record for Plaintiff Sylvia Zamora (“Plaintiff”). I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this declaration and if called as a witness, I could and would testify competently to them under oath.

2. This declaration is submitted in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement. Plaintiff seeks approval of a Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (the "Settlement") entered into with Defendant CAPC, Inc. ("Defendant") (collectively, Plaintiff and Defendant are the "Parties"). A true and correct copy of the fully executed Settlement is attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**. Exhibit A to the Settlement contains the Parties' proposed *Court-Approved Notice of PAGA Settlement* to be mailed to Aggrieved Employees with Individual PAGA Payments following settlement approval and Defendant's full settlement funding.

3. The proposed Settlement seeks to resolve all alleged claims for civil penalties pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code sections 2698, *et seq.* (“PAGA”). Plaintiff brought this PAGA action on behalf of herself and all non-exempt, hourly employees who worked for Defendant in California at any time during the PAGA Period (“Aggrieved Employees”). (Settlement, ¶ I.C.) For purposes of settlement, the “PAGA Period” is September 15, 2023, to March 11, 2026.<sup>1</sup> (*Id.* at ¶ I.T.)

## CASE BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

4. Defendant is an organization responsible for providing services to physically and intellectually disabled adults. Plaintiff worked for Defendant from approximately October 2022 to May 2024 as a direct service provider. Throughout her employment, Plaintiff was classified as non-exempt and paid on an hourly basis. Plaintiff contends she and her former coworkers were subjected to the same or similar unlawful labor practices during their employment by Defendant, including failure to pay all wages.

<sup>1</sup> The PAGA Period is defined as September 15, 2023, to whichever date is earlier: (1) the date of preliminary approval; or (2) March 11, 2026. (Settlement, ¶ I.T.). March 11, 2026 is earlier than the date of preliminary approval. Accordingly, the PAGA Period is September 15, 2023 to March 11, 2026.

1           5. Plaintiff's claims for unpaid wages stems from allegations of Defendant's failure to pay  
2 employees all minimum, overtime, and sick pay owed, including due to Defendant's failure to  
3 compensate employees for off-the-clock work, and Defendant's failure to incorporate all remunerations  
4 into the regular rate of pay. Plaintiff's meal and rest period claims are based on allegations that due to the  
5 nature of their work and Defendant's employment practices, employees regularly experienced missed,  
6 untimely, or interrupted breaks, and that Defendant failed to provide any premiums for non-compliant rest  
7 breaks or all premiums for non-compliant meals. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant failed to reimburse  
8 employees for all reasonable and necessary business expenses incurred, including expenses incurred for the  
9 use of employees' personal cellphone for work purposes. Plaintiff further alleges she and other employees  
10 did not receive all wages owed at the time of termination nor accurate itemized wage statements due to  
11 Defendant's failure to pay all wages and premiums. Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges Defendant is liable for civil  
12 penalties under PAGA.

13           6. Because of the foregoing alleged violations of the Labor Code, Plaintiff filed a Class Action  
14 Complaint on September 17, 2024, alleging Defendant systematically: (1) failed to pay minimum wages, (2)  
15 failed to pay overtime compensation, (3) failed to provide meal periods, (4) failed to authorize and permit rest  
16 breaks, (5) failure to indemnify necessary business expenses, (6) failed to timely pay final wages at  
17 termination, (7) failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and (8) engaged in unfair business  
18 practices.

19           7. Pursuant to PAGA, on September 7, 2024, Plaintiff submitted notice of the alleged Labor Code  
20 violations to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (the "LWDA"), with certified mail  
21 service on Defendant, and paid the required filing fee. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff's PAGA Notice is  
22 attached hereto as **Exhibit 2**. The administrative exhaustion period under PAGA expired without the LWDA  
23 indicating any intent to investigate the allegations. On December 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended  
24 Class and Representative Action Complaint to allege a ninth cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA.  
25 Accordingly, Plaintiff is duly authorized to act as a private attorney general with respect to the PAGA  
26 claims involved in this action.

1           8. In compliance with Labor Code section 2699(s)(1), Plaintiff subsequently submitted to the  
2 LWDA a file-stamped copy of the First Amended Complaint containing the Court-assigned case number.  
3 To date, the LWDA has not sought to intervene in this action.

4           9. After this action was filed, Defendant produced an arbitration agreement between Defendant  
5 and Plaintiff containing a class action waiver. Therefore, on January 31, 2025, the Parties filed a  
6 Stipulation and Proposed Order to arbitrate Plaintiff's individual claims, dismiss class claims, and stay  
7 the Action pending arbitration, which the Court granted on February 5, 2025. Thereafter, the Parties  
8 agreed to attend a private mediation to resolve Plaintiff's representative PAGA claims.

9           10. Defendant ardently opposes the merits of this case and denies Plaintiff's factual allegations.  
10 Defendant argues all employees were properly paid for all hours worked and that it did not require or permit  
11 employees to work off-the-clock. As for the regular rate claim, Defendant argues there was no issue with  
12 paying employees the proper regular rate of pay because any additional remuneration was discretionary and  
13 thus, not required to be incorporated into the regular rate of pay. Defendant maintains all employees were  
14 provided with the opportunity to take all their code-compliant meal and rest breaks and that missed breaks, if  
15 any, were solely the result of employees' voluntary choice. As for the unreimbursed business expenses,  
16 Defendant maintains it did not require employees to incur any business-related expenses. To the extent  
17 employees received wage statements that were allegedly inaccurate, Defendant argues penalties are not  
18 warranted because employees suffered no actual damage or harm as a result. (*See, e.g., Angeles v. U.S.*  
19 *Airways, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2013) No. C 12–05860 CRB, 2013 WL 622032, at \*10 [“A plaintiff must  
20 adequately plead an injury arising from an employer's failure to provide full and accurate wage statements,  
21 and the omission of the required information alone is not sufficient.”].) Additionally, Defendant alleges its  
22 good-faith belief that it paid all wages precludes the imposition of waiting time penalties because Plaintiff  
23 would be unable to show Defendant's alleged conduct was done willfully or knowingly. (*See, e.g., Pedroza*  
24 *v. PetSmart, Inc.* (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2012) No. ED CV 11–298 GHK (DTBx), 2012 WL 9506073, \*5.) For  
25 these reasons, Defendant claims it did not engage in any unfair business practices and denies liability under  
26 PAGA. Defendant also maintains the claims are not susceptible to proof on a representative basis because of  
27 the individualized and varying nature of each employee's experience, making this matter unmanageable.

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litigation will lead to inconvenience, distraction, disruption, delay, and expense disproportionate to the potential benefits of litigation. Plaintiff and her Counsel also considered the risk and uncertainty of the outcome inherent in any litigation when determining whether this Settlement was the correct option. In sum, Plaintiff and her Counsel believe the proposed Settlement is in the best interests of Aggrieved Employees and the LWDA.

15. In compliance with Labor Code section 2699(s)(2), notice of settlement and a copy of the proposed Settlement has been submitted to the LWDA along with a copy of Plaintiff's motion and the hearing date. A true and correct copy of the LWDA's email confirming receipt thereof is attached hereto as Exhibit 3. To date, the LWDA has not indicated any objection to the Settlement.

#### KEY TERMS OF SETTLEMENT

16. Gross Settlement Amount, Funding, Disbursement, and Uncashed Checks. The Gross Settlement Amount ("GSA") is a non-reversionary \$130,000.00, subject to potential increase under an Escalator Clause and entry of the Court's Approval Order. (Settlement, ¶¶ I.M, III.A.) Defendant's settlement funding contribution will be wired by Defendant to the settlement administrator within thirty (30) days of the Effective Date. (*Id.* at ¶ III.E.2.b.) Disbursement will occur within 15 days after Defendant fully funds the GSA. (*Id.* at ¶ III.E.2.b.) Any funds remaining uncashed after 200 days from issuance will be transmitted to the California State Controller's Office, to be held pursuant to the Unclaimed Property Law in the name of each individual who failed to cash his or her check prior to the void date. (*Id.* at ¶¶ III.E.6., III.E.6.b.)

17. Escalator Clause. The GSA was negotiated based on an estimate that as of the date of the Parties' mediation, there are 4,372 aggregate PAGA Pay Periods worked by approximately 122 Aggrieved Employees. (*Id.* at ¶ III.A.1.) The Settlement includes an Escalator Clause whereby should the actual number of PAGA Pay Periods increases by more than ten percent (10%) of the estimated count, Defendant agrees to increase proportionately by the number of pay periods worked in excess of 10%. (*Id.*)

18. PAGA Representative Payment. The Settlement includes a Representative Payment to Plaintiff in an amount up to \$2,500.00, payable from the GSA. (*Id.* at ¶ III.C.2.) This payment is in consideration for Plaintiff's efforts in litigating the Action and risks of incurring financial obligations to Defendant in the event Plaintiff was not successful in the Action and held to pay for Defendant's costs and/or attorney's fees.

(*Id.* at ¶ I.V.) If the Court awards less than the amount requested, any amount not awarded will become part of the Net Settlement Amount for distribution to Aggrieved Employees. (*Id.*)

19. Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The Settlement includes attorneys' fees in an amount not to exceed 35% of the GSA (i.e., at least \$45,500.00), plus reimbursement for out-of-pocket litigation costs not to exceed \$25,000.00, payable to Plaintiff's Counsel from the GSA. (*Id.* at ¶ III.C.1.) In the event actual costs are less and/or the amount of fees and costs approved by the Court are less than the amounts requested, the difference will be allocated to the Net Settlement Amount. (*Id.*) My firm has incurred \$21,490.60 in litigation costs. A true and correct copy of a report showing these costs is attached hereto as **Exhibit 4**.

20. Administration Costs. The Settlement provides an Administration Costs to the Settlement Administrator, payable from the GSA, in an amount up to \$6,000.00, for its fees and expenses in administering this Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ III.C.3.) In the event the amount of actual administration costs is less and/or the amount approved by the Court is less than requested, the difference will be allocated to the Net Settlement Amount. (*Id.*) The Parties jointly selected Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions ("Phoenix") as the neutral entity to administer this Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ I.BB.) A true and correct copy of Phoenix's bid for \$3,750.00 is attached hereto as **Exhibit 5**.

21. Net Settlement Amount. After deducting the PAGA Representative Payment, PAGA Counsel Fees and Litigation Expenses Payments, and Administration Expenses Payment from the GSA, in the amounts specifically approved by the Court, any difference in the amounts requested and the amounts awarded will be allocated to the Net Settlement Amount as PAGA Penalties. (*Id.* at ¶ 1.Q.) Accordingly, the Net Settlement Amount is estimated to be no less than **\$56,759.40**,<sup>2</sup> which will be distributed 65% (i.e., no less than  $65\% * \$56,759.40 = \$36,893.61$ ) to the LWDA and 35% (i.e., no less than  $35\% * \$56,759.40 = \$19,865.79$ ) to Aggrieved Employees pursuant to PAGA law governing Plaintiff's claims.

22. Individual PAGA Payments. Each Aggrieved Employee will be entitled to his or her pro rata amount from the 35% share of PAGA Penalties that is directly proportional to the number of pay periods

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<sup>2</sup> The estimated Net Settlement Amount was calculated by deducting the following amounts from the GSA (\$130,000.00): \$2,500.00 for the PAGA Representative Payment, \$21,490.60 for the PAGA Cost Award, \$45,500.00 for the PAGA Attorney Fees Award, and \$3,750.00 for the Administration Costs. (*See* Settlement, ¶ I.Q.)

1 worked in the PAGA Period without having to submit any claim form. (*Id.* at ¶¶ III.B.1, III.B.1.a.1.) This  
2 results in an average Individual PAGA Payment of roughly **\$162.83** for each of the estimated 122  
3 Aggrieved Employees (\$19,865.79 / 122), and a PAGA Pay Period value of **\$4.54** for each of the 4,372  
4 estimated PAGA Pay Periods (\$19,865.79 / 4,372). Individual PAGA Payments will be allocated to 100%  
5 penalties for tax purposes. (*See id.* at ¶ III.B.2.)

6       23. Releases of Claims. Upon full funding of the GSA, Plaintiff and the LWDA shall fully release  
7 and discharge Defendant and the Released Parties from any and all claims that were alleged or could have  
8 been alleged based on the claims, facts, and/or allegations contained in operative Complaint and in the PAGA  
9 Notice submitted by Plaintiff to the LDWA. (*Id.* at ¶ I.Y.) The release shall be for the PAGA Period. (*Id.*)  
10 The “Released Parties” are “Defendant including its past, present, and future divisions, affiliates, parents,  
11 subsidiaries, predecessors, successors, assigns, members, shareholders, owners, officers, directors,  
12 employees, agents, trustees, attorneys, representatives, administrators, fiduciaries, beneficiaries, subrogees,  
13 executors, partners, and privies.” (*Id.* at ¶ I.Z.)

14       24. No Related Cases. To the best of my knowledge, there is no other pending litigation involving  
15 similar claims against Defendant that may be impacted by approval of the Settlement at issue, nor has  
16 Defendant pointed to any. I have come to this conclusion after a reasonable inquiry and review of the  
17 LWDA’s PAGA Case Search website, this Court’s case search website, and other information reasonably  
18 available online.

19                   THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT IS FAIR AND REASONABLE

20       25. There can be no doubt that this Settlement is the result of vigorous, adversarial, non-collusive,  
21 and arm’s-length negotiations between the Parties. Based on Plaintiff’s Counsel’s analysis of the arguments  
22 and information provided by Defendant, on an expert analysis of the time and pay records, and on information  
23 from Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s Counsel evaluated Defendant’s both maximum and risk-adjusted potential exposure  
24 in preparation for mediation. Although the expert’s analysis revealed that the time and pay records supported  
25 several violations by Defendant, those identifiable violations were primarily limited to the regular rate and  
26 meal period claims. The records themselves did not provide strong support for the off-the-clock work, rest  
27 period, and expense reimbursement claims, and derivative penalties for those claims, as these claims are  
28 predominantly testimony based. In other words, Plaintiff’s analysis revealed that certain claims were not as



1 strong as originally believed.

2       26. Because Defendant did not require employees to record rest periods, there are no records to  
3 establish the rest period claim on the merits. Additionally, there are no records to establish the off-the-clock  
4 work claim on the merits. Rather, proof of these claims would need to be supported by declarations from  
5 Aggrieved Employees regarding missed rest periods and off-the-clock work as the records themselves  
6 cannot demonstrate what breaks were missed, when, and why and they cannot demonstrate the time, if any,  
7 Aggrieved Employees spent working off the clock.

8       27. Indeed, the maximum exposure figures that were calculated for mediation were based on  
9 assumed high violation rates that would not likely be demonstrated at trial, as they assume either the  
10 participation of all Aggrieved Employees (which would be difficult given the size of this group), or  
11 alternatively, the use of surveys or statistical data as a surrogate (which would still require the participation  
12 of a majority of Aggrieved Employees to establish a sound representation of all non-exempt employees). The  
13 reality is that many, if not all, employees would be unwilling to participate due to fear of retaliation. However,  
14 even assuming those employees would be willing to participate, obtaining such declarations would  
15 potentially reveal that each Aggrieved Employee had a different experience. The individualized nature of  
16 their employment experience and the numerosity of employees affected present significant risk with  
17 manageability and proof on the merits.

18       28. Even as to the regular rate and meal period claims, our analysis found that Defendant's exposure  
19 is less than initially believed. While a review of the time and pay records shows a 98.7% violation rate for  
20 meal periods, the records also show that nearly each violation was accompanied by a meal waiver. The  
21 records also show that Defendant made some meal premium payments. Defendant argues that its payment  
22 of meal premiums and use of meal waivers indicate that it did not intentionally fail to provide PAGA  
23 Employees with meal breaks. Defendant also argues that many meal breaks were taken and, where a  
24 violation appears, it was a result of the Class Member voluntarily choosing to forego a meal period, to take  
25 it after the end of the fifth hour, or to stop his or her break early to return to work. As to the regular rate issue,  
26 Plaintiff's expert found that only 4.5% of pay periods included overtime and additional compensation and  
27 that only 0.6% of pay periods included sick pay and additional compensation. Accordingly, to the extent  
28 Defendant failed to incorporate any additional remunerations into the regular rate of pay for purposes of

1 paying overtime and sick pay, which Defendant denies, such failure resulted in minimal underpayment to  
2 the Aggrieved Employees. Additionally, the violation rates assume that the bonuses were non-discretionary,  
3 which Defendant disputes.

4 29. The likelihood that Defendant could assert viable legal defenses would likely further reduce its  
5 overall exposure. For example, the individualized and testimony-intensive nature of the claims could bar  
6 manageability of this representative action or otherwise significantly reduce Defendant's overall liability.

7 30. Further, a claim-by-claim penalty calculation is overly optimistic as it presumes Plaintiff  
8 would be able to stack the penalties, although penalty stacking is not expressly permitted by PAGA. Rather,  
9 without either (i) a prior finding by the LWDA or a court within the past five years that the employer violated  
10 PAGA or (ii) evidence that the employer's conduct was malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive, PAGA only  
11 provides for a maximum \$100 penalty for each pay period. (Lab. Code § 2699(f)(2)(A)–(B).) Moreover,  
12 Plaintiff's Counsel believe it would be unrealistic to expect the Court to award the full (penalty-stacked)  
13 exposure given the discretionary nature of awarding penalties and given Defendant's defenses, including that  
14 any failure to pay premiums, regular rate wages, or for off-the-clock work was not knowingly or willfully  
15 done, and additionally, to the extent employees received wage statements that were allegedly inaccurate,  
16 employees suffered no actual resulting damage or harm. Moreover, awarding the full penalties amount would  
17 likely raise Due Process concerns.

18 31. For the foregoing reasons, the *realistic* exposure is thus far below the *optimistic* claim by claim  
19 estimate.

20 32. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Counsel believe it is more reasonable to assess penalties on  
21 a \$100.00 civil penalty per pay period basis pursuant to Labor Code § 2699(f)(2)(A) for each of the  
22 estimated 4,372 pay periods at issue, as opposed to a claim-by-claim approach. Accordingly, Plaintiff's  
23 Counsel estimate Defendant's maximum PAGA exposure to be **\$437,200.00** (\$100.00 x 4,372). However,  
24 based on the discovery, Defendant's arguments at mediations and continued settlement discussions, an  
25 understanding that the claims are heavily dependent on the unlikely participation by Aggrieved Employees  
26 and their varying employment experience, and other important considerations discussed above, it is  
27 reasonable to assume a violation occurred in at most one-third of all pay periods, which results in a realistic  
28 (*risk-adjusted*) exposure of **\$145,733.33** (\$437,200.00 / 3). As a result, the GSA of \$130,000.00 represents

1 approximately **89%** of the realistic exposure (\$130,000.00 / \$145,733.33).

2 33. The proposed Settlement therefore represents a substantial recovery when compared to the  
3 reasonably forecasted recovery. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in  
4 continued litigation, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, and the probability of appeal, it is  
5 clear the GSA of \$130,000.00 is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and that settlement approval is  
6 appropriate. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 133; *see Munoz v. BCI*  
7 *Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A.* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408–09 [holding that *Kullar* does not require  
8 “an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it prevailed on all its  
9 claims,” but instead, only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of  
10 outcomes of the litigation”].)

11 34. The \$130,000.00 GSA amounts to “genuine and meaningful” relief. This is an excellent  
12 result, particularly because, under the Settlement, Aggrieved Employees and the LWDA will receive  
13 timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of not being able to recover anything at all.

14 35. The Settlement is a fair and reasonable resolution that satisfies PAGA’s dual statutory purposes  
15 of deterrence and punishment, on the one hand, and providing Aggrieved Employees with genuine and  
16 meaningful relief, on the other. As a result of this litigation, Defendant has had to hire legal counsel,  
17 engage in employee-wide discovery, and participate in mediation. Assuming approval is granted,  
18 Defendant will also have to pay civil penalties pursuant to PAGA. Not including its own attorneys’ fees  
19 and costs, Defendant will pay at least \$130,000.00 to resolve this matter—of which at least \$56,759.40 is  
20 allocated toward PAGA Penalties and will be distributed as 65% to the LWDA and 35% to Aggrieved  
21 Employees, in compliance with PAGA law governing the claims in this Action. (*See Settlement*, ¶¶  
22 III.B.4., III.B.5.) This amount represents roughly **39%** of the realistic exposure for the claims (\$56,759.40  
23 / \$145,733.33), as discussed above. Additionally, the release obtained under the Settlement does not  
24 preclude Aggrieved Employees from pursuing any individual (non-PAGA) claims they may have against  
25 Defendant or the other Released Parties. (*See id.* at ¶ I.Y.)

26 36. Plaintiff’s Counsel have conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of the allegations.  
27 Based on discovery and on their own independent investigation and evaluation, Plaintiff’s Counsel are of  
28 the opinion that the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Furthermore, considering all

1 known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, trial risk, appellate risk, the defenses that could  
2 be asserted by Defendant on the merits, Plaintiff's Counsel respectfully submit that the Settlement is in the  
3 best interests of the Aggrieved Employees and the State of California.

4 37. Although Plaintiff's Counsel believe there is merit to Plaintiff's allegations, they also  
5 acknowledge a legitimate controversy exists as to each allegation. Plaintiff's Counsel also recognize that  
6 proving the amounts of penalties owed to each Aggrieved Employee would be an expensive, time-consuming,  
7 and uncertain proposition.

8 38. Moreover, Plaintiff's Counsel are also of the opinion that because the issues here are fairly  
9 contested, there is a possibility of the Court not awarding PAGA penalties even if Plaintiff prevailed on the  
10 merits due to the largely discretionary nature of awarding PAGA penalties. In other words, were this matter  
11 to go to trial, any award granted would be at the discretion of the Court and subject to a substantial reduction.

12 39. While Plaintiff's Counsel believe there would be no persuasive grounds to reduce penalties,  
13 they recognize that the Court could determine otherwise and significantly reduce any award of penalties.  
14 This wide range of potential recovery and additional delays and risks of trial provide justification to settle  
15 for a reasonable amount of recovery at this point in the litigation. In all, based on the investigation and  
16 analysis of the claims in preparation for mediation, the maximum exposure did not comport with the  
17 realistic exposure that Defendant faced, as discussed above.

18 40. Plaintiff's Counsel took into account the risk of not being able to proceed on a representative  
19 basis at all due to the potential manageability issues, the risk of not prevailing at trial, and the risk that even  
20 if Plaintiff prevailed at trial, the penalties would be limited due to the largely discretionary nature of  
21 awarding PAGA penalties. The provisions of the Labor Code triggering PAGA penalties in this case  
22 include Labor Code sections 203, 210, 226, 1197.1, and 2802. However, PAGA penalties are not  
23 mandatory, but rather, permissive. (Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2).) Accordingly, it is entirely possible that even  
24 if Plaintiff would be successful at trial, assuming she is first able to win on the merits regarding her  
25 individual claims at arbitration and then defeat the manageability issues presented at litigation by the  
26 large number of Aggrieved Employees in this action, Plaintiff may still be awarded substantially less  
27 than what was obtained through the Settlement.

28 41. The Settlement avoids the significant risks, burdens, and the accompanying expense of further

litigation. Though the Parties have engaged in a significant amount of investigation, informal discovery, and employee data analysis, they have not completed formal discovery procedures. Moreover, Plaintiff would have to proceed with arbitration of her individual claims and win on the merits before proceeding with litigation of the representative PAGA claims. Preparation for trial and the prospect of appeals in the wake of any summary judgment ruling would remain for the Parties. As a result, the Parties would incur considerably more attorneys' fees and costs through trial, a lengthy and uncertain process that could result in recovering less than was settled for.

THE REPRESENTATIVE PAYMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED

42. Throughout this litigation, Plaintiff, who was a former employee of Defendant, has cooperated immensely with my office and has taken many actions to protect the interests of the State of California and the Aggrieved Employees. Plaintiff provided valuable information regarding her hours worked, and what duties were performed during those hours. Plaintiff participated in decisions concerning this action, assisted in preparation for the mediation, and searched for potential witnesses. Before we filed this action, Plaintiff worked with my office to determine the viability of her claims. Plaintiff also provided information and documents relating to her employment with Defendant. The information and documentation provided by Plaintiff was instrumental in establishing the violations alleged in this action, and the recovery provided for under the Settlement would have been impossible to obtain without her participation.

43. At the same time, Plaintiff faced many risks in adding herself as the PAGA Representative in this matter. Plaintiff faces actual risks with her future employment, as putting herself on public record in an employment lawsuit could also very well affect her likelihood for future employment. For example, a search of Plaintiff's name will reveal this action, and as a result, many employers may likely forego hiring Plaintiff upon learning she sued a former employer.

44. In turn, Aggrieved Employees will now be reimbursed civil penalties for wage violations they may have never known about or been willing to pursue on their own. If each Aggrieved Employee would have tried to pursue legal remedies on their own, that would have resulted in each having to expend a significant amount of their own monetary resources and time, not to mention limited judicial resources, which were obviated by Plaintiff putting herself on the line on behalf of the Aggrieved Employees and the LWDA. Further, prior to executing the Settlement, Plaintiff carefully reviewed the document and asked

1 questions to ensure her understanding, including as to the total recovery and releases of claims.

2 45. In the final analysis, this representative action would not have been possible without the aid of  
3 Plaintiff, who put her own time and effort into this litigation and placed herself at risk for the sake of the  
4 State of California and the Aggrieved Employees. The requested enhancement payment to Plaintiff for her  
5 service as the PAGA Representative is a relatively small amount of money considering the time and effort  
6 put into the litigation. For all the foregoing reasons, the requested enhancement to Plaintiff is reasonable.

7 MY EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS

8 46. I received a B.A. in History in 1998 from UCLA, and my J.D. from Loyola Marymount Law  
9 School in 2006. I became an Active Member of the State Bar of California in June 2007 and have been an  
10 Active Member in good standing continuously since then. I have been selected to Super Lawyers each year  
11 from 2019 to 2023.

12 47. I co-founded Moon & Yang, APC—now Moon Law Group, PC—in March 2010. My practice  
13 is focused exclusively on advocating for the rights of employees in wage-and-hour litigation, almost entirely  
14 in class and/or PAGA representative actions.

15 48. For the past decade, I have built my practice to have an emphasis on employment and related  
16 civil litigation cases and have both prosecuted and defended employment-related litigation cases. I have been  
17 heavily, successfully, and continuously involved in active litigation and trial work, and have conducted bench  
18 and jury trials on behalf of both employees and employers in wage-and-hour cases.

19 49. My current billing rate is \$950.00 per hour, which is my usual hourly rate for wage and hour  
20 litigations A \$950 per hour rate is reasonable considering my years of experience practicing in the highly  
21 specialized area of employment and labor law and my Laffey Matrix rate (The Laffey Matrix,  
22 <http://www.laffeymatrix.com/see.html>, [last visited Mar. 23, 2026].) The Laffey Matrix is a “well-  
23 established objective source for rates that vary by experience” used by the District of Columbia. (*In re HPL*  
24 *Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig.* (N.D. Cal. 2005) 366 F. Supp 2d 912, 921.) A true and correct copy of the Laffey  
25 Matrix is attached hereto as **Exhibit 6**. California Courts have adjusted the Laffey Matrix rate upwards  
26 based on “locality pay differentials” and the location of counsel’s office in California to determine whether  
27 counsel’s rates are reasonable. (*See, e.g., id.* [applying a 9% upward adjustment to the Laffey Matrix rate  
28 based on an approximate difference of 9% between the locality pay differential of the District of Columbia

1 and San Francisco, California, where counsel's office was located].) To determine the locality pay  
2 differential, the Court in *In re HPL Technologies, Inc.* utilized the locality pay differentials within the  
3 federal courts. (*Id.* at pp. 921–22.) Using the same method here and based on firm's location in Los Angeles,  
4 California, the current locality pay differential of the Los Angeles-Long Beach area is 36.47% and of the  
5 Washington-Baltimore-Arlington area is 33.94%, which results in a difference of approximately 2.53%.  
6 (*Compare* Judiciary Salary Plan of Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA, Effective January 12, 2026 with Judiciary  
7 Salary Plan of Washington-Baltimore-Arlington, Effective January 12, 2026.) True and correct copies of the  
8 Los Angeles-Long Beach and Washington-Baltimore-Arlington salary plans are attached hereto as **Exhibit**  
9 **7** and **Exhibit 8**, respectively. Based on my 17+ years of experience, my Laffey Matrix rate with a 2.53%  
10 adjustment is \$1,044.78 per hour (\$1,019 Laffey Matrix rate + (2.53% x \$1,019)). (*See* Exh. 6.) Accordingly,  
11 my current billing rate of \$950 per hour is reasonable.

12         50. I am experienced in prosecuting and defending employment matters, particularly class actions  
13 and PAGA representative actions. My firm has focused a substantial percentage of its practice on wage, hour,  
14 and working conditions violations. In addition to the present case, I am also class counsel for other wage and  
15 hour class action lawsuits pending in various California counties, including in state and federal courts. The  
16 following is a list of some of our recent class action settlements that have received preliminary and final  
17 approval: *Aparicio v. Lineage Logistics, LLC* (LASC No. BC722764) (class size approx. 155; lead counsel);  
18 *Black v. Mission Healthcare Servs., Inc.* (LASC No. 19STCV04602) (class size approx. 1,000; lead counsel);  
19 *Campa v. Bloomingdeals, Inc.* (LASC No. BC700366) (class size approx. 1,500; lead counsel); *Garcia v.*  
20 *Comfy U.S.A. Apparel, Inc.* (LASC No. BC709630) (class size approx. 210; lead counsel); *Gomez v. H Mart*  
21 *Cos., Inc.* (LASC No. BC671525) (class size approx. 2,500; co-counsel); *Jones v. Citiguard, Inc.* (LASC No.  
22 BC664890) (class size approx. 587; lead counsel); *Jones v. Fitness Alliance, LLC* (Riverside No.  
23 PSC1404079) (class size approx. 1,000; lead counsel); *Lagos v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Corp.* (LASC No.  
24 BC682972) (\$750,000 for 79 class members; lead counsel); *Mark Brulee et al. v. DAL Global Servs., LLC*  
25 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2018, No. CV 17-6433 JVS(JCGx)) 2018 WL 6616659, at \*10 (class size approx. 2,650;  
26 lead counsel) (in approving my hourly rate in that case, the Court found: "Class Counsel's declarations show  
27 that the attorneys are experienced and successful litigators. Other courts have approved the attorneys' current  
28 rates for the Moon & Yang, APC attorneys"); *Martinez v. Bail Hotline Bail Bonds, Inc.* (LASC No.

BC700131) (class size approx. 173; lead counsel); *Montoya v. Golden 1 Credit Union* (Sacramento No. 34-2018-00228252) (class size approx. 1,900; lead counsel); *Onofre v. Caitac Garment Processing, Inc.* (LASC No. BC702283) (class size approx. 750; lead counsel); *Rodriguez v. Rossmoyne, Inc.* (LASC No. BC699137) (class size approx. 220; lead counsel); *Sison v. Cha Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P.* (LASC No. BC6441 29) (class size approx. 2,100; co-counsel); *Slaughter v. ACA Sec. Stems, LP* (LASC No. BC699137) (class size approx. 300; lead counsel); *Taylor v. Sherman's Delicatessen & Bakery, LLC* (LASC No. BC722765) (class size approx. 515; lead counsel); *Vargas v. AMS Paving, Inc.* (LASC No. BC722767) (case size approx. 260; lead counsel); *Vertti v. Bagcraft Papercon III, LLC* (LASC No. 19STCV12729) (class size approx. 260; lead counsel); and *Wallick v. Campbell Soup Supply Co., LLC* (San Joaquin No. STK-CV-UOE-2021-0000865) (class size 435; lead counsel).

#### LILIT TER-ASTVATSATRYAN'S EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS

51. Lilit Ter-Astvatsatryan is a Partner at Moon Law Group, PC. Since she was admitted to the California Bar, her practice has exclusively focused on labor and employment class action lawsuits involving California and federal labor laws. Prior to her employment at Moon Law Group, PC, she worked at Setareh Law Group, where she worked with Senior Counsel and mentor H. Scott Leviant on over 80 class actions.

52. Ms. Ter-Astvatsatryan received her Juris Doctorate from the University of California, Hastings College of the Law in 2017, where she served as a Symposium Editor for the Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal and a Teaching Assistant to the Legal Research & Writing and Legal Analysis programs. In law school, she served as a Judicial Extern to the Honorable Patrick J. Walsh of the United States District Court, Central District of California.

53. Ms. Ter-Astvatsatryan received her undergraduate degree in 2014 from the University of California, Los Angeles with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Anthropology and a minor in English Literature.

54. Ms. Ter-Astvatsatryan's billing rate is \$850.00 per hour, which is her usual hourly rate in wage and hour litigations. Based on Ms. Ter-Astvatsatryan's nearly 9 years of experience, her Laffey Matrix rate with a 2.53% adjustment is \$924.82 per hour (\$902 Laffey Matrix rate + (2.53% x \$902)). (See Exh. 6.) As compared to the Laffey Matrix rate and when considering her experience, Ms. Ter-Astvatsatryan's billing rate of \$850.00 per hour is reasonable.



1           55. As a Partner working solely on wage and hour class action cases, she has been involved  
2 in all aspects of complex litigation, including assisting in class certification motions in the following  
3 cases:

- 4           (a)     *Macario Gonzalez v. Metcon TI, Inc.*, Alameda Superior Court, Case No.  
5                   RG19015589 [after class certification motion was filed, the parties attended  
6                   mediation and ultimately resolved the matter on a class wide basis];  
7           (b)     *Miguel Angel Lopez Cuadras v. R.C. Wendt Painting, Inc.*, Los Angeles Superior  
8                   Court, Case No. BC705964 [after class certification motion was entirely briefed, the  
9                   parties attended mediation and ultimately resolved the matter on class wide basis];  
10          (c)     *Noe Armendariz v. Kinkisharyo International, LLC*, United States District Court,  
11                   Central District of California, Case No. 2:19-cv-08757-JAK-KS [motion for class  
12                   certification filed, decision pending]

13           56. Additionally, the following is a list of cases where she briefed preliminary and final  
14 approval motions of class action settlements that were ultimately granted by each respective Court:

- 15           (a)     *Ana Rose De Jesus, et al. v. Philippine National Bank, et al*, Los Angeles Superior  
16                   Court, Case No. BC673024;  
17           (b)     *Andres De La Riva Sotelo v. Belfor USA Group, Inc.*, Los Angeles Superior Court,  
18                   Case No. BC688895;  
19           (c)     *Carlos Vertti v. Bagcraft Papercon III, LLC, et al.*, Los Angeles Superior Court,  
20                   Case No. 19STCV12729;  
21           (d)     *Christopher Thurman v. Wanton Group SP, LLC, et al*, Los Angeles Superior Court,  
22                   Case No. 19STCV18772;  
23           (e)     *Francisca Velasco v. Paige, LLC*, Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No.  
24                   19STCV12114;  
25           (f)     *Jose Montoya v. The Golden 1 Credit Union*, Sacramento Superior Court, Case No.  
26                   34-2018-00228252;  
27           (g)     *Malu Vaesau v. Double AA Corporation*, San Francisco Superior Court, Case No.  
28                   CGC-19-572598;

- 1 (h) *Tyler Jones v. Citiguard, Inc.*, Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. BC664890;  
2 and  
3 (i) *Venancio Miranda v. Maximum Nursery, Inc.*, Santa Barbara Superior Court, Case  
4 No. 19STCV06041.

5 57. In addition to her work on complex litigation matters and class actions, she has authored  
6 published articles on California labor laws, including:

- 7 (a) Lilit Ter-Astvatsatryan and H. Scott Leviant, *Where Troester Stops Not Even*  
8 *Troester Knows*, Daily Journal (Los Angeles & San Francisco), July 2, 2019; and  
9 (b) Lilit Ter-Astvatsatryan and H. Scott Leviant, *Unaccounted Time: Reading*  
10 *the Tea Leaves of Troester*, Daily Journal (Los Angeles & San Francisco),  
11 September 12, 2018.

12 MICHAEL CITRIN'S EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS

13 58. Michael Citrin is an associate attorney at Moon Law Group, PC. Mr. Citrin advocates  
14 for employees in both state and federal court in employment and related litigation. Since joining  
15 Moon Law Group, PC, his practice has focused on wage-and-hour actions involving claims related  
16 to unpaid overtime and minimum wages, meal and rest break violations, unreimbursed business  
17 expenses, improper wage statements, and unfair business practices, as well as discrimination claims  
18 rising under California law.

19 59. Mr. Citrin received his B.A. in Literature and Linguistics with honors from The  
20 Macaulay Honors College at Hunter, CUNY. He received his Juris Doctorate and Public Interest  
21 Certificate from University of Southern California, Gould School of Law ("USC"). While in law  
22 school, Mr. Citrin participated in the Hale Moot Court honors program and worked as a student  
23 clinician for USC's Post-Conviction Justice Project. Mr. Citrin also worked as a TA for a Poverty  
24 Law class. Following law school, Mr. Citrin worked as an immigration defense attorney, advocating  
25 for individuals in removal proceedings, and then as a Deputy Federal Public Defender, representing  
26 indigent individuals accused of federal crimes.

27 60. Mr. Citrin became an Active Member of the State Bars of California in 2020 and has  
28 been an Active Member in good standing continuously since then. He is also admitted to practice in

1 the United States District Court for the Eastern, Southern, and Central Districts of California.

2 61. Mr. Citrin's billing rate is \$650.00 per hour, which is his usual hourly rate in wage and  
3 hour litigations. Based on Mr. Citrin's 6 years of experience out of law school, his Laffey Matrix  
4 rate with a 2.53% adjustment is \$640.82 per hour (\$625 Laffey Matrix rate + (2.53% x \$625)). (See  
5 Exh. 6.) As compared to the Laffey Matrix rate and when considering his significant wage-and-hour  
6 class action experience, Mr. Citrin's billing rate of \$650.00 per hour is reasonable.

7 PAGA COUNSEL'S EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS

8 62. As demonstrated by the foregoing, my office is qualified to handle this litigation  
9 because we are experienced in litigating Labor Code and Wage Order violations in individual, class,  
10 and representative actions. The attorneys at my office have been appointed as lead or co-lead counsel  
11 in numerous wage-and-hour class and/or PAGA actions in state and federal courts by way of motion  
12 for settlement approval. Including myself, Moon Law Group, PC is currently comprised of roughly  
13 35 attorneys, all of whom are actively and continuously practicing employment litigation,  
14 representing almost entirely employee-plaintiffs, in both individual and class and/or PAGA actions,  
15 in this Superior Court and other Superior Courts throughout the State, in the Courts of Appeal, and  
16 in various federal courts. The attorneys at my firm have a high level of skill, knowledge, and  
17 experience in areas of wage-and-hour class and PAGA actions, and labor and employment law  
18 generally, the substantive (state and federal) and procedural law of which is frequently.

19 63. Moon Law Group, PC has been engaged in the practice of employment and labor law  
20 for over a decade and presently focuses exclusively on plaintiffs' employment law. The firm and its  
21 lawyers have tried both bench and jury trials (representing both plaintiffs and defendants) in  
22 employment-related matters. As noted above, my firm has been appointed lead or co-lead class  
23 counsel in federal and state courts in California. Also, the firm and its lawyers have successfully  
24 settled hundreds of cases during that time, including wage-and-hour class and/or PAGA actions.

25 64. The foregoing experience of myself and other attorneys of Moon Law Group, PC is  
26 helpful in assessing the reasonableness of settlements, such as the one at issue here, and from this  
27 experience we concluded that this litigation could not have been settled on better terms than  
28 provided under the proposed Settlement.

65. I do not believe that I or any other attorneys of my firm have any conflicts of interest with the named Plaintiff, Aggrieved Employees, or the proposed Administrator. I am not related to Plaintiff. I respectfully submit that Moon Law Group, PC is competent and well suited to act as PAGA Counsel in this action, and we have and will continue to vigorously represent the interests of the Aggrieved Employees.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

66. In line with the Settlement, my firm requests an award of attorneys' fees in an amount of one-third of the GSA (i.e., \$45,500.00), plus reimbursement for actual litigation costs in the amount of \$21,490.60. (See Settlement, ¶ III.C.1.)

67. The requested PAGA Counsel Fees Payment can be justified under either the common fund or lodestar method. However, we base the requested award on the common fund method. Nonetheless, the lodestar method can be used to cross-check the reasonableness of the award calculated under the common fund method.

68. The total current lodestar for Moon Law Group, PC is *not less than* the following:

| Attorney                | Rate          | Hours       | Lodestar           |
|-------------------------|---------------|-------------|--------------------|
| Kane Moon               | \$950.00      | 21.5        | \$20,425.00        |
| Lilit Ter-Astvatsatryan | \$850.00      | 28.1        | \$23,885.00        |
| Michael Citrin          | \$650.00      | 36.7        | \$23,855.00        |
|                         | <b>Total:</b> | <b>86.3</b> | <b>\$68,165.00</b> |

69. There are additional hours devoted to this litigation by the attorneys and legal assistants in my office that are not reflected in the foregoing lodestar, including additional attorney time that will be spent to obtain and monitor approval of the Settlement and requested awards, oversee the settlement administration process and distribution of funds, respond to inquiries, and communicate with Plaintiff regarding the case. I estimate that my office will commit *no less than* 10 hours, although likely more time, to these additional tasks, which are hours not included in the foregoing lodestar total. My office also bears the risk of taking whatever actions are necessary if Defendant fails to pay. At my \$950.00 hourly rate, these additional 10 hours results in a lodestar of **\$9,500.00**.

1           70. “California case law permits fee awards in the absence of detailed time sheets.” (*Wershba v.*  
2 *Apple Comp., Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 255.) The Court “should defer to the winning lawyer’s  
3 professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case.” (*Moreno v. City of*  
4 *Sacramento* (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1106, 1112.) We can provide complete, detailed billing records in the  
5 event the Court requests them but would request the opportunity to redact attorney-client privileged  
6 information and any other privileged information. As discussed below, application of a positive multiplier is  
7 warranted—***but not requested***—in this case.

8           71. The lodestar method requires the Court to determine a “touchstone” or lodestar figure based on  
9 a compilation of time spent and reasonable hourly compensation for each attorney. (*Graham v.*  
10 *DaimlerChrysler Corp.* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 579.) Generally, hours are reasonable if they were “reasonably  
11 expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved in the same manner that an attorney traditionally is  
12 compensated by a fee-paying client.” (*Hensley v. Eckerhart* (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 431.)

13           (a)     Number of Hours Expended by My Office is Reasonable: As set forth in this declaration,  
14 my office expended a significant amount of time litigating the case to achieve an excellent result on  
15 behalf of the Aggrieved Employees. To date, my office has spent no less than **86.3 hours** litigating  
16 this case. In the event the Court grants settlement approval, my office will spend additional time  
17 related to this litigation, including to monitor administration of the settlement after approval,  
18 committing no less, although likely more, than **10** hours to those additional tasks. The number of  
19 hours that my office has and will devote to this case is reasonable. (*See, e.g., Ketchum III v. Moses*  
20 (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133 [fee award should be fully compensatory and, “absent circumstances  
21 rendering the award unjust, an attorney fee award should ordinarily include compensation for *all* the  
22 hours *reasonably spent*”] [emphasis in original]; *Serrano v. Unruh* (1982) 32 Cal. 3d 621, 624  
23 [counsel are entitled to compensation for all hours reasonably expended]; *Hensley, supra*, 461 U.S.  
24 at pp. 435–36; *Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co.* (9th Cir. 2000) 224 F.3d 1014, 1028; *Cabrales v. Cty.*  
25 *of L.A.* (9th Cir. 1991) 935 F.2d 1050, 1052–53.) As discussed above, my office was required to  
26 expend considerable time and resources to investigate, litigate, and successfully settle these claims  
27 for the benefit of the Aggrieved Employees.  
28

1 (b) The Attorneys' Hourly Rates are Reasonable: “[T]he established standard when determining  
2 a reasonable hourly rate is the ‘rate prevailing in the community for similar work performed by  
3 attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.’” (*Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc.* (9th  
4 Cir. 2008) 523 F.3d 973, 979 [quoting *Barjon v. Dalton* (9th Cir. 1997) 132 F.3d 496, 502].) This  
5 rule applies even when, as here, the attorneys representing a named plaintiff perform the work on a  
6 contingent fee basis. (See, e.g., *Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of Cal., Inc.* (2006) 144  
7 Cal.App.4th 785, 818; *Blanchard v. Bergeron* (1989) 489 U.S. 87, 96.) These hourly rates are  
8 reasonable in light of the significant experience, expertise, and skill my firm brought to this action.  
9 Rates are reasonable if they are “within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially  
10 awarded comparable attorneys for comparable work.” (*Children’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Bonta*  
11 (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.) The trial court may “find hourly rates reasonable based on  
12 evidence of other courts approving similar rates.” (*Parkinson v. Hyundai Motor Am.* (C.D. Cal.  
13 2010) 796 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1172.) The attorneys at Moon Law Group, PC are experienced litigators  
14 who specialize in employment law, with a substantial wage-and-hour class action practice. The  
15 hourly rates of each attorney are also reasonable as compared to their respective Laffey Matrix  
16 rates as explained *supra*. Moreover, these rates are not opposed or challenged, and have been  
17 approved by other courts, as explained *supra*.

18 (c) Application of a Multiplier is Warranted (But Not Requested): Once this lodestar figure has  
19 been determined, the Court may take into account other “enhancement” factors to adjust the lodestar  
20 award. As the California Supreme Court has held, contingency fees should be higher than fees for  
21 the same legal services paid concurrently with the provision of the services. (*Ketchum III, supra*, 24  
22 Cal.4th at pp. 1132–33; see also *Fischel v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S.* (9th Cir. 2002)  
23 307 F.3d 997, 1008.) “A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services  
24 is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions.  
25 If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases.” (*Ketchum*, 24  
26 Cal.4th at p. 1133.) Application of that rule is particularly appropriate where the case is brought to  
27 redress important rights of vulnerable persons. (*Id.*) A risk enhancement is “earned compensation;  
28 unlike a windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous. Rather, it is intended to approximate

1 market-level compensation for such services, which typically includes a premium for the risk of  
2 nonpayment or delay in payment of attorney fees.” (*Id.* at p. 1138.) **Multipliers normally range**  
3 **from two to four or higher.** (*Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 255; *see also Vizcaino v.*  
4 *Microsoft Corp.* (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1043, 1051, n.6 [“most” common fund cases apply a  
5 multiplier of 1.0–4.0]; *Been v. O.K. Indus., Inc.* (E.D. Okla. 2011, No. CIV–02–285–RAW) 2011  
6 WL 4478766, \*11 [citing a study “reporting [an] average multiplier of 3.89 in survey of 1,120 class  
7 action cases” and finding that a multiplier of 1.22 would be “per se reasonable”].) Factors considered  
8 in determining whether a lodestar multiplier is appropriate generally include: (1) the risks presented  
9 by the contingent nature of the case; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the  
10 skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the nature of the opposition; (4) the  
11 preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; and (5) the result  
12 obtained and the importance of the lawsuit to the public. (*Serrano v. Ivy Baker Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.  
13 3d 25, 48–49 [hereinafter “*Serrano III*”].) All these factors favor approval of a multiplier along the  
14 lines of those approved in the cases above. To date, my office has incurred no less than **\$68,165.00**  
15 in attorneys’ lodestar fees, anticipates incurring at least another \$9,500.00 in lodestar fees, and has  
16 advanced **\$21,490.60** in actual litigation costs. Thus, after reimbursement of our out-of-pocket  
17 expenses, the fee request of \$45,500.00 represents a **negative** multiplier of the lodestar fees incurred  
18 to-date in prosecuting this case. In other words, we are requesting an amount that is less than what  
19 we would be entitled to under a lodestar check.

20 1) *Risks presented by the contingent nature of the case:* The major  
21 consideration in determining the necessity of a multiplier is the contingent nature of the  
22 award. (*Ketchum III, supra*, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132–33; *see also Fischel, supra*, 307 F.3d at  
23 p. 1008.) In determining what multiplier to award, the probability of success must be  
24 assessed *ex ante*, that is, as viewed from the outset of the case. (*See, e.g., Harman v.*  
25 *Lyphomed, Inc.* (7th Cir. 1991) 945 F.2d 969, 976.) Further, the possibility of no recovery is  
26 only one of the uncertainties involved in taking on such a case. Other uncertainties are the  
27 amount that will be recovered, uncertainty as to the cost, both in effort and expenses, and  
28 uncertainty about how much time will pass before the recovery is obtained. (*See, e.g.,*

1           *Ketchum*, 24 Ca1.4th at pp. 1132–1133, 1138.) My office’s outlay of time and money in this  
2 case has been significant. In all, my office has spent *no less than* **86.3** hours to date  
3 investigating, analyzing, researching, litigating, and negotiating a favorable resolution of this  
4 case, in addition to *a minimum of* **10** hours that will be spent following final settlement  
5 approval, including to monitor settlement administration and distribution of funds, and has  
6 incurred \$21,490.60 in necessary litigation costs. Unsettled legal issues also presented risks  
7 to the claims in this case. My office bore the substantial risk of an uncertain outcome in  
8 agreeing to prosecute this PAGA action on a contingency fee basis, as well as the difficulties  
9 and delay inherent in such litigation. There was the prospect of the enormous cost inherent  
10 in PAGA representative action litigation, as well as extensive negotiations with a corporate  
11 Defendant who vigorously opposed Plaintiff’s claims and right to pursue her individual or  
12 class action claims in state court. My office risked significant time and expense to ensure a  
13 successful settlement. As detailed *supra*, the risks presented in this case were significant, and  
14 Defendant’s defenses posed serious risks to the success of this PAGA matter on the merits,  
15 assuming we were first successful at proving the merits of Plaintiff’s individual claims at  
16 arbitration. These risks illustrate the recognition by the California Supreme Court in  
17 *Ketchum III* that, if multipliers are not awarded to PAGA counsel in the cases that are  
18 successfully settled, counsel’s fees are essentially being cut because the lodestar in and of  
19 itself would not account for contingent risk.

20           2)           *Difficulty of the questions involved and the skill required:* My office is  
21 comprised of skilled attorneys who have had success in wage-and-hour class and PAGA  
22 actions. This case required experienced and competent lawyers, as well as expertise in the  
23 issues presented herein. To obtain such an attorney on the free market, a client must pay the  
24 market rate. While most class/PAGA actions are complex and involve some risk, my office  
25 had to overcome several major obstacles in prosecuting this case, as explained *supra*.  
26 Defendant’s contentions underscore the risk of prevailing at trial, and any of these obstacles  
27 could have prevented recovery completely.  
28



1                   3)               *Vigorous opposition by Defendant:* Counsel who skillfully overcome  
2                   difficult issues or uncompromising opposition in the litigation are entitled to a fee  
3                   enhancement. (*Serrano III, supra*, 20 Cal.3d at 49.) Here, before eventually agreeing to a  
4                   settlement, Defendant asserted a vigorous defense and challenged Plaintiff's ability to  
5                   litigate her individual and class action claims. The settlement effort was protracted, with  
6                   extended discussions and instances in which it appeared the Parties would not reach a  
7                   settlement. Further, proceeding to arbitration, and if successful, then trial would have added  
8                   years to the resolution of this case because of the difficult legal and factual issues raised and  
9                   the likelihood of appeals. Indeed, even if Plaintiff prevailed on the representative PAGA  
10                  claims at trial, assuming she was first successful at arbitration, Defendant would likely have  
11                  mounted an appeal.

12               4)               *The extent to which litigation precluded other employment would justify an*  
13               *enhancement:* There are only so many cases that my office can take at any one time.  
14               Consequently, there were other meritorious cases presented to my office that would have  
15               generated substantial fees, but were declined, during the pendency of this action in order to  
16               devote the attention necessary to achieve favorable results.

17               5)               *The result obtained would justify an enhancement:* The results obtained in  
18               litigation can properly be used to enhance a lodestar calculation where an exceptional effort  
19               produced excellent results. (*Graham, supra*, 34 Cal.4th at p. 582.) Here, the final maximum  
20               settlement figure is **\$130,000.00**, which represents roughly **89%** of the total realistic  
21               recovery. Considered against the size of the Aggrieved Employees, the risks posed by  
22               continued litigation, and the importance of the employment rights and a speedy recovery,  
23               the relief provided under the Settlement represents a very strong result for the Aggrieved  
24               Employees and LWDA.

25               6)               *The use of a multiplier is permitted in PAGA actions:* PAGA provides that  
26               "[a]ny employee who prevails in any action shall be entitled to an award of reasonable  
27               attorney's fees and costs." (Lab. Code § 2699(k)(1).) Although, PAGA does not provide a  
28               specific standard for evaluating attorneys' fees in connection with a settlement of PAGA

1 claims, California Courts have employed a lodestar analysis and use of multipliers for this  
2 purpose. “Where a settlement produces a common fund for the benefit of the entire class,  
3 courts have discretion to employ either the lodestar method or the percentage-of-recovery  
4 method. . . . To guard against an unreasonable result, the Ninth Circuit encourages district  
5 courts to “cross-check[] their calculations against a second method. . . . Accordingly, the  
6 Court calculates attorneys’ fees in the instant case using the percentage-of-recovery method  
7 and then cross-checks its calculations against the lodestar method.” (*Hermosillo v. Davey*  
8 *Tree Surgery Co.* (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2021) No. 18-CV-00393-LHK, 2021 WL 2826697, at  
9 \*1 [quoting *In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.* (9th Cir. 2011) 654 F.3d 935, 942,  
10 944–45].)

11 72. I am informed and believe that the fees and costs provision under the Settlement is reasonable.  
12 My office invested significant time and resources into the case, with payment deferred to the end of the case,  
13 and then, of course, contingent on the outcome.

14 73. The risk to my office has been very significant, particularly if we would not be successful in  
15 pursuing this representative action. In that case, we would have been left with no compensation for all the  
16 time taken in litigating this case. Indeed, I have taken on a number of class and/or PAGA action cases that  
17 have resulted in thousands of attorney hours being expended and ultimately having the defendant company  
18 going bankrupt. The contingent risk in these types of cases is very real and occurs regularly. Furthermore, we  
19 were precluded from focusing on, or taking on, other cases which could have resulted in a larger, and less  
20 risky, monetary gain.

21 74. Because most individuals cannot afford to pay for legal representation on an hourly basis, Moon  
22 Law Group, PC represents virtually all its employment law clients on a contingency fee basis, including  
23 Plaintiff in this action. Pursuant to this arrangement, we are not compensated for our time unless we prevail  
24 at trial or our clients’ cases are successfully settled. Because Moon Law Group, PC is taking the risk that we  
25 will not be reimbursed for our time unless our client settles or wins his or her case, we cannot afford to  
26 represent an individual employee on a contingency basis if, at the end of our representation, all we are to  
27 receive is our regular hourly rate for services. It is essential that we recover more than our regular hourly rate  
28

1 when we win if we are to remain in practice so as to be able to continue representing other individuals in civil  
2 rights employment disputes.

3 75. My office invested significant time and resources into the case, with payment deferred to the end  
4 of the case, and then, of course, contingent on the outcome. My office's efforts have included, and will include  
5 following an approval order, without limitation, the following:

- 6 a. Numerous interviews with Plaintiff and review of documents provided by her;
- 7 b. Legal research and investigation regarding the Defendant's practices at numerous points in  
8 the litigation;
- 9 c. Preparation and submission of Plaintiff's PAGA Notice;
- 10 d. Preparation of multiple drafts of the original class action complaint and subsequent amended  
11 complaint, as well as finalization and filing of said complaints;
- 12 e. Extensive meet-and-confer discussions with Defendant's counsel regarding the arbitration  
13 agreement and the impact on Plaintiff's class action claims;
- 14 f. Informal discovery activity;
- 15 g. Extensive meet-and-confer discussions with Defendant's counsel regarding mediator  
16 selection and production of relevant documents and information in preparation for mediation  
17 through informal discovery;
- 18 h. Analysis of Defendant's informal discovery production and preparation of a damages model  
19 with the aid of a statistics expert;
- 20 i. Contacting witnesses;
- 21 j. Research and preparation of Plaintiff's mediation brief;
- 22 k. Attendance and active participation at a full day of mediation;
- 23 l. Drafting, negotiating, and reviewing multiple drafts of the Settlement and its attachment;
- 24 m. Preparation and submission of the instant motion for settlement approval and accompanying  
25 filings;
- 26 n. Anticipated preparation for and attendance at the hearing on the motion for approval,  
27 monitoring approval of the Settlement and requested awards, and overseeing the  
28 administration process and distribution of funds; and

o. Communications with Plaintiff throughout the case.

76. As of the drafting of this motion, my office has incurred **\$21,490.60** in expenses litigating this action without any reimbursement. These expenses were reasonably necessary to the litigation and were actually incurred by my office. These to-date expenses are summarized as follows:

- (a) “LWDA Fee”: a one-time cost for submitting Plaintiff’s PAGA Notice to the LWDA;
- (b) “Journal- Complaint”: the initial case filing fee for initiating Plaintiff’s action;
- (c) “Berger Consulting Group”: costs of expert review of discovery for mediation;
- (d) “Marc Feder Mediator”: a one-time cost for mediation services;
- (e) “ACE,” “Case Anywhere,” “One Legal,” “LASC,” and “Journal”: costs for purchasing court documents, and for filing and serving various documents during this Action.

77. We anticipate incurring additional costs up to and after Settlement approval, including filing costs for the approval motion and any notice of entry of approval order and judgment. However, at this time, we are only requesting reimbursement of our to-date costs (\$21,490.60). Moreover, because our costs are below the maximum allocation (\$25,000.00) under the Settlement, the difference (\$25,000.00 - \$21,020.75 = \$3,509.40) will revert to PAGA Penalties. (Settlement, ¶ III.C.1.) I respectfully submit that our reimbursement request is fair and reasonable.

78. Through the efforts of my office and Plaintiff in this case, a fair and reasonable resolution has been reached that includes a non-reversionary payment by Defendant of at least \$130,000.00 to compensate Aggrieved Employees for Defendant's alleged employment practices. I am informed and believe that, without the efforts of my office or Plaintiff, the Labor Code and Wage Order violations alleged in this action would have gone completely unremedied.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on March 25, 2026, at Los Angeles, California.

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Kane Moon