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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ORANGE

JOSE CARRANZA RODRIGUEZ, as an
individual and on behalf of all others similarly
situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

EKEDAL CONCRETE, INC., a California
corporation; and DOES 1 through 100,

Defendants.

Case No. 30-2024-01423908-CU-OE-CXC

*[Assigned for all purposes to the Hon.
David A. Hoffer, Dept. CX103]*

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT**

Date: May 4, 2026
Time: 1:30 p.m.
Dept.: CX103

Reservation Number: 74775986

Complaint Filed: September 6, 2024
Trial Date: None Set

1 **TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:**

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court,
3 on May 4, 2026, at 1:30 p.m. in Department CX103 of the above-entitled Court, located at 751
4 W. Santa Ana Blvd., Santa Ana, California 92701, Plaintiff Jose Carranza Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”),
5 individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, will and hereby does move
6 this Court for:

- 7 1. Preliminary approval of the proposed class settlement of this lawsuit;
- 8 2. Pursuant to section 382 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, provisional
9 certification of the following Settlement Class defined as follows:
10 All current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant
11 Ekedal Concrete, Inc. in California from September 6, 2020 through August
12 4, 2025 (“Class Period”).
- 13 3. Preliminary appointment of Plaintiff Jose Carranza Rodriguez as Class
14 Representative;
- 15 4. Preliminary appointment of Paul K. Haines and Sean M. Blakely of Haines Law
16 Group, APC as Class Counsel;
- 17 5. The scheduling of a hearing to consider whether the Settlement should be finally
18 approved and to permit a Class Representative Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff,
19 civil penalties payable to the Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”),
20 settlement administration costs, and attorneys’ fees and costs to Class Counsel;
- 21 6. Appointment of ILYM Group, Inc. as the third-party Settlement Administrator for
22 mailing notices; and
- 23 7. Approval of the proposed Class Notice and an order that is to be disseminated to the
24 Settlement Class as provided in the Stipulation of Settlement.

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1 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion; the attached Memorandum of Points and
2 Authorities; the supporting declarations of Paul K. Haines, Sean M. Blakely, Plaintiff Jose
3 Carranza Rodriguez, and Anthony Rogers of ILYM Group, Inc., and the exhibits attached thereto;
4 the pleadings, and other papers filed in this Action; and on any further oral or documentary
5 evidence or argument presented at the time of the hearing.

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7 Dated: February 13, 2026

Respectfully submitted,
HAINES LAW GROUP, APC

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10 By:



Paul K. Haines
Sean M. Blakely
Attorneys for Plaintiff

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiff Jose Carranza Rodriguez (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) brought this class and
4 representative action for various wage and hour violations on behalf of current and former non-
5 exempt employees who worked for Defendant Ekedal Concrete, Inc. (“Ekedal”) in California
6 from September 6, 2020 until August 4, 2025 (the “Class Period”). Plaintiff’s primary allegations
7 are that Ekedal failed to pay all minimum and overtime wages due to its allegedly unlawful
8 timekeeping policies/practices, failed to provide all legally compliant meal periods, and failed to
9 authorize and permit all required rest periods. As a result of these alleged violations, Plaintiff also
10 brought derivative claims for Ekedal’s alleged failure to issue accurate and compliant wage
11 statements, its failure to pay all final wages owed, and for civil penalties under the Private
12 Attorneys’ General Act (“PAGA”).¹

13 Plaintiff now respectfully requests that this Court preliminarily approve this non-
14 reversionary, common-fund class action settlement,² in which Ekedal has agreed to pay Five
15 Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$525,000.00) to the following
16 Settlement Class:

17 All current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant
18 Ekedal Concrete, Inc. in California from September 6, 2020 until August
19 4, 2025 (“Class Period”).

20 If the Settlement is approved, Ekedal will pay a non-reversionary Gross Settlement
21 Amount of \$525,000.00. After deducting administration costs, Plaintiff’s requested Class

22 ¹ The operative First Amended Class and Representative Action Complaint (“FAC”) pleads the
23 following causes of action: (1) minimum wage violations; (2) failure to pay all overtime wages;
24 (3) meal period violations; (4) rest period violations; (5) failure to reimburse for all necessary
25 business expenditures; (6) waiting time penalties; (7) wage statement violations; (8) unfair
26 competition in violation of Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17200, *et seq.*; and (9) civil
penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act, Cal. Labor Code § 2698 *et seq.* (“PAGA”).

27 ² The Stipulation of Settlement (“Settlement”) is attached to the Declaration of Sean M. Blakely
28 as **Exhibit A**. The proposed Class Notice, Notice of Estimated Settlement Award, Request for
Exclusion Form, and Objection Form are attached to the Settlement as **Exhibits 1-4**, respectively.
All defined terms in this motion have the same definition as that in the Settlement.

1 Representative Enhancement Payment, the amount set aside as PAGA civil penalties, and
2 requested attorneys’ fees and costs, the Net Settlement Amount of approximately \$293,000.00
3 will be distributed to all Settlement Class members who do not opt out of the Settlement based
4 on the proportionate number of workweeks worked by each Settlement Class member during the
5 Class Period. Additionally, all non-exempt employees who worked for Ekedal in California from
6 September 6, 2023 until August 4, 2025 (the “PAGA Period”) will also receive a portion of the
7 \$7,000.00 PAGA Amount based on the proportionate number of pay periods worked during the
8 PAGA Period.

9 Significantly, Settlement Class members do not need to file a claim to reap the financial
10 benefits of the Settlement, as all Settlement Class members will automatically receive a payment
11 unless they affirmatively opt out. There are approximately 285 Settlement Class members, and
12 **the average payment to participating Settlement Class members is projected to be**
13 **approximately \$1,028.08**, an excellent result for the Settlement Class.

14 The proposed Settlement is well within the range of possible approval in light of the
15 significant legal and factual obstacles that Plaintiff faced, the risks and costs of further litigation,
16 and the tangible monetary benefits to be received by Plaintiff and the Settlement Class. For the
17 reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant preliminary approval
18 of the Settlement.

19 **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION**

20 **A. THE PARTIES AND BRIEF PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

21 Founded more than 40 years ago, Ekedal is a family-owned, multi-generational concrete
22 contractor based in Orange County that specializes in complex high-end residential projects. *See*
23 Declaration of Sean M. Blakely (“Blakely Decl.”), ¶ 8. Plaintiff was initially hired by Ekedal in
24 approximately 1987 and worked there for over 35 years until October 2023. *See* Declaration of
25 Plaintiff Jose Carranza Rodriguez (“Rodriguez Decl.”), ¶ 2. For the past 15 years of his
26 employment with Ekedal, Plaintiff was a non-exempt “chauffeur” in which he would transport
27 materials to job sites from Ekedal’s yard and building suppliers. *Id.*

28 On September 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed this class action asserting causes of action for: (1)

1 minimum wage violations; (2) failure to pay all overtime wages; (3) meal period violations; (4)
2 rest period violations; (5) failure to reimburse for all necessary business expenditures; (6) wage
3 statement penalties; (7) waiting time penalties; and (8) unfair competition in violation of
4 California Business & Professions Code § 17200 *et seq.* Blakely Decl., ¶ 9. On September 6,
5 2024, Plaintiff Rodriguez also sent his PAGA notification letter to the LWDA. *Id.*; Exhibit B
6 (Rodriguez LWDA Letter). Subsequently, on November 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed his First
7 Amended Class and Representative Action Complaint (“FAC”) adding a cause of action for civil
8 penalties under the PAGA. Blakely Decl., ¶ 9.

9 **B. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AND EKEDAL’S DEFENSES**

10 **1. Unpaid Wages Due to Unlawful Timekeeping Policies/Practices**

11 Plaintiff contends that Ekedal utilized a timekeeping system that systematically underpaid
12 wages to Settlement Class members. Blakely Decl., ¶ 14. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that
13 throughout the Class Period, Plaintiff and other non-exempt employees did not clock in or out for
14 their shifts as employees were compensated based on their scheduled shift, rather than the actual
15 hours they worked, resulting in an underpayment of wages to Settlement Class members. *Id.*
16 Plaintiff also contends that he and other non-exempt employees were required to report to
17 Ekedal’s yard or other job sites before the start of their scheduled shifts to prepare the job site and
18 load up work trucks with various materials, but Ekedal did not pay them for this off-the-clock
19 time. *Id.*

20 Ekedal counters that its timekeeping policies/practices complied with California law and
21 that it has always properly compensated Settlement Class members for all hours worked
22 throughout the Class Period. Blakely Decl., ¶ 14. Ekedal argues that employees were required to
23 accurately record their hours worked through written time sheets, and that Ekedal paid putative
24 class members for all hours recorded. *Id.* Ekedal further contends that no off-the-clock work was
25 actually being performed prior to the scheduled start or end of shifts. *Id.* Finally, Ekedal asserts
26 that Plaintiff would be unable to certify this claim since its timekeeping policies/practices are
27 facially neutral and individualized inquiries would be necessary as to whether employees were in
28 fact underpaid for each workday in question (including whether they were actually working when

they were clocked in), resulting in an unmanageable series of mini-trials. *Id*

2. Meal Period Claims

Plaintiff alleges Ekedal failed to provide legally compliant first meal periods such that first meal periods were regularly late and/or less than 30-minutes. Blakely Decl., ¶ 15. Plaintiff alleges that Ekedal required employees to input a meal period from 12:00 p.m. – 12:30 p.m. into their time sheets for each shift during the Class Period, whether or not a compliant first meal period was in fact provided. *Id*.

Ekedal counters that it always maintained compliant written meal period policies/practices throughout the Class Period and provided compliant meal periods in line with those policies. Blakely Decl., ¶ 15. Ekedal further argues that it provided employees the opportunity to take meal periods and is not required to ensure they are taken. *Id.*; see *Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Sup. Ct.*, 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1034 (2012) (rejecting “ensure” standard). Thus, Ekedal argues that any missed, late or short meal periods resulted from lawful employee waiver or choice rather than any policy and/or practice of Ekedal. Blakely Decl., ¶ 15. Finally, Ekedal argues that these claims are not suited for class treatment, as individual inquiries would be needed to assess which employees took non-compliant meal periods or missed meal periods, how many meal periods were non-compliant or missed, whether there was a valid waiver, and the reasons why a particular employee did not take a compliant meal period on a particular shift. *Id*.

3. Rest Period Claims

Plaintiff alleges that Ekedal’s policies/practices failed to provide for legally compliant off-duty rest periods. Blakely Decl., ¶ 16. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff and other non-exempt employees were not authorized and permitted to take all legally compliant rest periods, due to the work demands imposed upon them by Ekedal and the nature of its operations. *Id*. Plaintiff reports that supervisors regularly forced employees to work through their rest periods when employees were pouring cement or when cement was delivered to the job sites. *Id*.

Ekedal counters that it maintained and enforced lawful rest period policies/practices throughout the Class Period, and has, in fact, authorized and permitted all required rest periods to Settlement Class members. Blakely Decl., ¶ 16. Furthermore, Ekedal argues that Plaintiff’s rest

1 period claim is not amenable to class treatment, since individual inquiries would be required to
2 determine which employees failed to take rest periods, how many rest periods they failed to take,
3 and the reasons why each employee failed to take rest period(s) on a particular shift. *Id.* These
4 manageability concerns are especially pertinent with respect to rest period claims, Ekedal argues,
5 given that rest periods are not recorded. *Id.*

6 **4. Failure to Reimburse For Necessary Business Expenses**

7 Plaintiff alleges that he and other employees were required to purchase tools such as
8 hammers, saw, drills, and levelers, but was not reimbursed for these necessary business expenses
9 in violation of California Labor Code §§ 2802 and 2804. Blakely Decl., ¶ 17. In response, Ekedal
10 argues that employees were not required to use their personal tools in the performance of their
11 job duties and that Ekedal provided its employees with all tools needed to perform their duties.
12 *Id.* Ekedal further contends that this claim would require individual inquiries into whether Class
13 Members actually used their personal tools for work purposes, how much expense they incurred,
14 whether they submitted a request for reimbursement, and the reasonableness of that expense, thus
15 precluding class certification. *Id.*; see also, e.g., *Gattuso v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc.*, 42
16 Cal.4th 554, 568 (2007) (“In calculating the reimbursement amount due under section 2802, the
17 employer may consider not only the actual expenses that the employee incurred, but also whether
18 each of those expenses was ‘necessary,’ which in turn depends on the reasonableness of the
19 employee’s choices”).

20 **5. Wage Statement Claims**

21 As a result of the unpaid wages and unpaid meal and rest period premium wages described
22 above, Plaintiff alleges that Ekedal is liable for wage statement penalties pursuant to Labor Code
23 § 226. Blakely Decl., ¶ 18. Ekedal argues any alleged wage statement violations were not
24 “knowing and intentional,” and Plaintiff cannot show that he or other employees “suffer[ed]
25 injury” due to the alleged wage statement violations, as required by Labor Code § 226(e) for the
26 imposition of penalties. Blakely Decl., ¶ 18. Further, Ekedal contends its wage statements always
27 accurately reflected hours worked and amounts paid as well as all other required information,
28 precluding liability for wage statement penalties under *Maldonado v. Epsilon Plastics, Inc.*, 22

1 Cal.App.5th 1308, 1336-37 (2018) (agreeing with employer’s “commonsense position that the
2 pay stubs were accurate in that they correctly reflected the hours worked and the pay
3 received...The purpose of section 226 is to *document* the *paid wages* to ensure the employee is
4 fully informed regarding the calculation of those wages.”) (Italics in original). Blakely Decl., ¶
5 18.

6 **6. Waiting Time Penalties**

7 As a further result of the unpaid wages and unpaid meal and rest period premium wages
8 described above, Plaintiff alleges that Ekedal failed to comply with its final pay obligations set
9 forth in Labor Code §§ 201-203. Blakely Decl., ¶ 19.

10 Ekedal argues that it possesses strong, good-faith defenses to Plaintiff’s underlying
11 claims, thus precluding recovery of waiting time penalties, which are only available for the
12 “willful” failure to pay wages. Blakely Decl., ¶ 19; see *also* 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 13520 (“[A]
13 good faith dispute that any wages are due will preclude imposition of waiting time penalties under
14 Section 203 . . . A ‘good faith’ dispute that any wages are due occurs when an employer presents
15 a defense, based in law or fact which, if successful, would preclude any recovery on the part of
16 the employee”). Ekedal further asserts that Plaintiff’s waiting time penalty exposure was grossly
17 inflated as not every former employee experienced the alleged Labor Code violations. Blakely
18 Decl., ¶ 19.

19 **7. PAGA Civil Penalties**

20 As a result of the foregoing Labor Code violations, Plaintiff alleges that Ekedal is liable
21 for civil penalties under the PAGA. Blakely Decl., ¶ 20. Since Plaintiff’s PAGA claim is
22 derivative of Plaintiff’s underlying wage claims, Ekedal asserts the PAGA claim would fail with
23 those claims. *Id.*; see *Price v. Starbucks Corp.* 192 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1147 (2011) (“Because the
24 underlying causes of action fail, the derivative UCL and PAGA claims also fail.”). Ekedal further
25 maintains that, given its good-faith defenses, this Court would exercise its discretion to
26 substantially reduce any PAGA penalties if it were to find Ekedal liable for any of Plaintiff’s
27 claims. Blakely Decl., ¶ 20; see Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2); *Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Mgmt.,*
28 *Inc.* 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1135 (2012) (affirming reduction of PAGA penalties); *Fleming v.*

1 *Covidien Inc.*, Case No. ED CV10-01487 RGK (OPx), 2011 WL 7563047, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
2 (reducing PAGA penalties by over 82% in part because employer “not aware” of violations);
3 *Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.*, 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 529 (2018) (affirming PAGA civil penalty
4 of just \$5 per pay period where employer made “good faith attempts” to comply with the law).

5 **C. DISCOVERY AND MEDIATION**

6 In connection with mediation, the Parties engaged in extensive informal discovery.
7 Blakely Decl., ¶ 10. Ekedal provided Plaintiff with timekeeping and payroll records for
8 approximately 10% of the non-exempt employees during the Class Period. *Id.* Ekedal also
9 provided a number of relevant data points, including the total number of putative class members
10 (as well as the size of the putative waiting time and wage statement classes), the putative class
11 members’ average hourly rate of pay, the number of aggregate workweeks worked by putative
12 class members during the Class Period, the size of the putative PAGA group, and the number of
13 aggregate pay periods worked during the PAGA/wage statement period. *Id.* Ekedal also provided
14 its relevant written policies and employee handbooks used during the Class Period. *Id.* Plaintiff
15 conducted a comprehensive analysis and extrapolation of the data produced by Ekedal to calculate
16 Ekedal’s potential classwide exposure for each of Plaintiff’s claims. *Id.* This discovery allowed
17 the Parties to assess the merits and value of Plaintiff’s claims, the chances of certification of
18 Plaintiff’s claims, and Ekedal’s potential defenses. *Id.*

19 On June 5, 2025, the Parties participated in a full-day mediation with Steven G. Mehta,
20 Esq., a well-respected wage and hour class action mediator. Blakely Decl., ¶ 11. During
21 mediation, the Parties vigorously debated their opposing legal positions, the likelihood of
22 certification of Plaintiff’s claims, and the legal basis for the claims and defenses. *Id.* At the
23 conclusion of mediation, Mr. Mehta issued a mediator’s proposal for a class-wide settlement,
24 which was ultimately accepted by both sides. *Id.* During the months that followed, the Parties
25 finalized the terms of the Settlement and executed the long-form Stipulation of Settlement now
26 before the court. *Id.*

27 ///

28 ///

1 **III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT**

2 **A. ESSENTIAL TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT**

3 If the Court preliminarily approves the Settlement, Ekedal will pay a Gross Settlement
4 Amount of \$525,000.00. *See* Settlement, § 3. Significantly, this Settlement is non-reversionary,
5 and no Settlement Class member will have to submit a claim form to receive a Settlement Award.
6 *Id.*, at §§ 3-4. Each Settlement Class member will automatically receive a Settlement Award
7 unless they affirmatively opt out of the Settlement. *Id.* The monetary terms of the Settlement are
8 summarized below:

9	• Gross Settlement Amount:	\$525,000.00
10	• Minus Court-approved attorneys' fees:	\$175,000.00
11	• Minus Court-approved verified costs (up to):	\$25,000.00
12	• Minus Court-approved Enhancement Payment:	\$5,000.00
13	• Minus amount set aside as PAGA penalties:	\$20,000.00
14	• <u>Minus estimated settlement administration costs:</u>	<u>\$7,000.00</u>
15	Net Settlement Amount:	\$293,000.00
16	• Plus 35% "PAGA Amount" to Settlement Class:	\$7,000.00
17	Total Amount Paid to Settlement Class members:	\$300,000.00

18 **1. The Settlement Provides for Reasonable Monetary Payments**

19 After deducting amounts for the Court-approved attorneys' fees and costs, Class
20 Representative Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff, the amount set aside as PAGA civil penalties,
21 and settlement administration costs, the Settlement requires Ekedal to pay a Net Settlement
22 Amount of at least \$293,000.00 to all Settlement Class members who do not timely opt-out. *See*
23 Settlement, § 4(A). The Net Settlement Amount shall be distributed to participating Settlement
24 Class members based on each participating Settlement Class member's proportionate workweeks
25 worked during the Class Period, which will be calculated by multiplying the Net Settlement
26 Amount by a fraction, the numerator of which is the participating Settlement Class member's
27 workweeks worked during the Class Period, and the denominator of which is the total workweeks
28 worked by all participating Class Members during the Class Period. *See* Settlement, § 4(B)(i). In
addition to the Net Settlement Amount, each Aggrieved Employee who was employed by Ekedal
at any time during the PAGA Period (including those who submit a valid and timely Request for
Exclusion from the class action settlement) shall receive a portion of the Gross Settlement

Amount that has been designated as the “PAGA Amount” (i.e., \$7,000.00) proportionate to the number of pay periods worked during the PAGA Period. *Id.*, at § 4(B)(ii).

According to Ekedal, there are approximately 285 Settlement Class members. Blakely Decl., ¶ 13. Therefore, the average Individual Settlement Payment from the Net Settlement Amount is projected to be approximately \$1,028.08. *Id.* There are also approximately 141 Aggrieved Employees employed during the PAGA Period who will each receive an average of approximately \$49.64 from the PAGA Amount. *Id.*

Settlement Class members will have sixty (60) calendar days from the mailing of the Class Notice to opt out or object to the Settlement, thereby providing ample time to review the Class Notice without unduly delaying the Settlement. *See* Settlement, §§ 9(D)-(E). Those Settlement Class members who do not opt out of the Settlement will be bound by its terms and will release all claims against Ekedal included within the Settlement. *See Id.*, at § 2(A).

2. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Enhancement Payment, and PAGA Payment

Plaintiff will apply for a Class Representative Enhancement Payment at the time of seeking final approval of the proposed class action settlement in the amount of \$5,000.00 for his service to the Settlement Class. *See* Settlement, §§ 3(C)(3), 6; Blakely Decl., ¶ 24. “[I]ncentive Payments are fairly typical in class action cases . . . and are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class [and] to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action.” *In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases*, 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1393-94 (2010). As will be fully briefed at the time of final approval, Plaintiff’s requested Enhancement Payment is intended to recognize the time and effort Plaintiff expended on behalf of the Settlement Class, including providing substantial factual information and documents to Class Counsel, discussing the claims and theories at issue in the litigation, actively participating in the prosecution of his claims, as well as the significant risks Plaintiff undertook by agreeing to serve as the named plaintiff in this case. *See* Blakely Decl., ¶ 24; *see also* Rodriguez Decl., ¶¶ 5-6.

Class Counsel will also apply for an attorneys’ fees award of one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount, which is currently estimated to be \$175,000.00, and up to \$25,000.00 in

1 verified costs reimbursement. *See* Settlement, §§ 3(C)(4), 5; Blakely Decl., ¶ 23. Plaintiff submits
2 that the requested fee is fair compensation for undertaking a complex, risky, expensive, and time-
3 consuming litigation on a purely contingent fee basis. Blakely Decl., ¶ 23. Class Counsel has
4 incurred substantial attorneys’ fees conducting pre-filing investigation, analyzing Plaintiff’s
5 claims, conducting legal research, conducting extensive informal discovery, analyzing Settlement
6 Class members’ timekeeping and payroll records, creating a comprehensive damages model,
7 preparing for and attending mediation, negotiating and preparing the long-form Stipulation of
8 Settlement, preparing this Motion, and otherwise litigating the case. *Id.* Class Counsel expects to
9 expend additional attorney time in attending the hearing on this Motion, overseeing the Notice
10 process and fielding questions from Settlement Class members, preparing the Final Approval
11 papers, and attending the Final Approval hearing. *Id.*

12 California courts recognize that an appropriate method for awarding attorneys’ fees in
13 class actions is to award a percentage of the “common fund” created as a result of a settlement.
14 *See, e.g., Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc.*, 1 Cal.5th 480, 506 (2016) (holding “the percentage of
15 fund method survives in California class action cases”). Class Counsel’s request for fees of one-
16 third of the Gross Settlement Amount is well within the range of reasonableness and indeed is
17 considered the typical rate for common fund settlements. Historically, courts have awarded
18 percentage fees in the range of 20% to 50%, depending on the circumstances of the case. *See* 4
19 Newberg on Class Actions § 14.6 (4th Ed. 2013).

20 Class Counsel submit that their request for attorneys’ fees is reasonable when viewed as
21 an overall percentage of the Settlement and in light of the substantial risks and significant work
22 undertaken, the results obtained, and the efficiency with which the litigation has been conducted.
23 Should the Court grant preliminary approval, Class Counsel will seek an award of attorneys’ fees
24 and verified costs upon seeking final approval.

25 Additionally, the parties have agreed to designate \$20,000.00 of the Gross Settlement
26 Amount as PAGA civil penalties, of which \$13,000.00 (65%) will be paid to the LWDA, with
27 the remaining \$7,000.00 (35%) for distribution to the Aggrieved Employees, as the PAGA
28 requires such penalties to be allocated per Labor Code § 2699(i). *See* Settlement, § 3(C)(5).

Plaintiff submits this allocation to the LWDA for civil PAGA penalties is appropriate. *See, e.g., Chu v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC*, Case No. C 05-4526 MHP, 2011 WL 672645 at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (approving PAGA payment of \$7,500 to LWDA out of \$6.9 million common-fund settlement); *Lazarin v. Pro Unlimited, Inc.*, Case No. C11-03609 HRL, 2013 WL 3541217 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (approving PAGA payment of \$7,500 to LWDA out of \$1.25 million common-fund settlement).

IV. ARGUMENT

A. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL IS WARRANTED

California Rule of Court 3.769 conditions settlement of a class action on court approval, which is generally evaluated under the federal standards applicable under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. *See Reed v. United Teachers Los Angeles*, 208 Cal.App.4th 322, 337 (2012) (Rule 3.769 requires trial court to determine “that the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned”); *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) (Rule 23(e) requires the trial court to determine “whether a proposed settlement is fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable”). Settlement is the preferred means of dispute resolution, particularly in complex class action litigation. *See In re Syncor ERISA Litig.*, 516 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008). The Court’s role in evaluating a proposed settlement is limited to ensuring that the agreement taken as a whole is fair. *See e.g., Hanlon, supra*, 150 F.3d at 1027. There is an initial presumption of fairness where, as here, the Settlement was negotiated at arm’s-length by class counsel and with the assistance of an experienced wage and hour class action mediator. *See e.g., Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 130 (2008).

1. Standard for Preliminary Approval

To make a fairness determination, the Court should consider several factors, including: “the strength of Plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, [and] the experience and views of counsel.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996). “The list of factors is not exclusive, and the court is free to engage in a balancing and weighing

of the factors depending on the circumstances of each case.” *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245 (2001). As discussed below, the proposed Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable in light of the overall balance of factors in this case.

a. The Strength of Plaintiff’s Case

Although Plaintiff steadfastly maintains that his claims are meritorious, Plaintiff acknowledges that there were substantial risks and uncertainty in proceeding with litigation. As described above, Ekedal presented multiple defenses to Plaintiff’s claims, both on the merits and with respect to class certification. Thus, while Plaintiff was prepared to litigate these claims through class certification and ultimately trial, success was far from certain.

b. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Duration of Further Litigation

Although the Parties engaged in significant informal discovery prior to mediation, the Parties still had significant formal discovery to complete had the matter not been settled. Blakely Decl., ¶ 22. This would have required the expenditure of substantial time and resources by both Parties that would have very likely spanned several years. *Id.* Even if Plaintiff were to certify the proposed classes, the Parties would incur considerably more attorneys’ fees and costs through a possible decertification motion, trial, and possible appeal. *Id.* This Settlement avoids those risks and the accompanying expense. *Id.*

c. Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status

Plaintiff has not yet filed his motion for class certification, and as such, the extent to which Plaintiff’s proposed classes were certifiable is somewhat speculative. Absent settlement, there was a risk that there would not be a certified class at the time of trial, or if there were, it would consist of a significantly smaller group of employees than the proposed Settlement Class (either due to a narrowing of the class definition in a Court order on a contested motion for class certification, or through individual settlements entered into by Ekedal with class members by way of *Pick Up Stix* type settlement agreements³), and the expected recovery could be significantly

³ In *Chindarah v. Pick Up Stix, Inc.*, 171 Cal.App.4th 796 (2009), the Court of Appeal held an employer may enter into pre-certification settlement agreements with individual putative class members in which the putative class members release claims for past unpaid wages and penalties

1 reduced, given the settlement amounts that are typically offered through the *Pick Up Stix* process.
2 Thus, this factor, too, supports preliminary approval of the settlement.

3 **d. Amount Offered in Settlement Given Realistic Value of Claims**

4 The Settlement provides a positive recovery for the Settlement Class in the face of
5 disputed claims. Plaintiff conducted a detailed analysis of alleged unpaid wages, meal and rest
6 period premium payments owing, unreimbursed business expenses, wage statement penalties,
7 waiting time penalties, and PAGA civil penalties. A summary of the results of Plaintiff's exposure
8 analysis is discussed below:

9 **Unpaid Wages Due to Unlawful Timekeeping Policies/Practices: \$137,375**

10 Plaintiff alleges Ekedal underpaid Settlement Class members due to timekeeping
11 policies/practices that compensate employees for scheduled hours, as opposed to all hours
12 actually worked. Blakely Decl., ¶ 14. Based on Plaintiff's analysis of Ekedal's timekeeping and
13 payroll data, Plaintiff estimates that Settlement Class members were underpaid by approximately
14 15 minutes per shift, or 20,260 hours during the Class Period. *Id.* Because employees generally
15 worked shifts of at least 8.0 hours, Plaintiff contends these unpaid wages should be paid at an
16 overtime rate of pay. *Id.* Based on an average overtime rate of \$37.67, Plaintiff calculated
17 Ekedal's maximum exposure on this claim at approximately \$763,194 (15 unpaid minutes per
18 shift * \$37.67 average overtime rate of pay * 81,040 shifts). *Id.*

19 As noted above, however, Ekedal contends that it maintained lawful timekeeping policies
20 and/or practices and compensated Settlement Class members for all hours actually worked.
21 Blakely Decl., ¶ 14. Ekedal also asserts that this claim is not amenable to class certification as
22 individualized inquiries would be required to determine whether each Settlement Class member
23 performed pre-shift and post-shift work on a particular shift, and whether Ekedal was aware that
24 such work was being performed. *Id.* In light of Ekedal's arguments and defenses, Plaintiff
25 discounted the maximum recovery on this claim by 55% to account for the risk of non-

26
27
28 in exchange for consideration. The Court further held that such settlements could preclude those
individual employees from recovery in class action litigation against the employer for the same
wage claims.

1 certification and an additional 60% to account for being unsuccessful on the merits or failure to
2 recover the full amount sought, for a projected total of approximately \$137,375. *Id.*

3 **Meal Period Violations: \$142,444**

4 Plaintiff estimated that he and other non-exempt employees were provided with non-
5 compliant first meal periods on approximately 50% of all shifts over 6.0 hours during the Class
6 Period. Blakely Decl., ¶ 15. Therefore, Plaintiff calculated Ekedal's maximum exposure for meal
7 period violations at approximately \$1,017,457 (40,520 non-compliant first meal periods * \$25.11
8 average meal period premium). *Id.*

9 However, as noted above, Ekedal contends that it maintained compliant meal period
10 policies throughout the Class Period, and that under *Brinker* it is only required to "provide" the
11 opportunity to take meal periods, not "ensure" meal periods are taken, and that, as described
12 above, it has always done so, and any non-complaint meal periods in the timekeeping records
13 were the result of lawful employee waiver or choice. Blakely Decl., ¶ 15. Ekedal also maintains
14 that the meal period claim is not suited for class certification, since individual inquiries would be
15 needed to assess which employees took non-compliant meal periods or missed meal periods, how
16 many meal periods were non-compliant or missed, and the reasons why a particular employee did
17 not take a compliant meal period on a particular shift. *Id.* In light of these defenses and arguments,
18 Plaintiff discounted Ekedal's maximum exposure by 60% for the risk of non-certification, and an
19 additional 65% to account for Ekedal's defenses on the merits or failing to recover the full amount
20 sought, to arrive at an estimated total of approximately \$142,444. *Id.*

21 **Rest Period Violations: \$106,833**

22 Plaintiff estimates that employees were not authorized and permitted to take all legally
23 compliant rest periods on approximately 50% of all shifts during the Class Period. Blakely Decl.,
24 ¶ 16. As such, Plaintiff calculates Ekedal's maximum exposure for rest period violations at
25 \$1,017,457 (40,520 shifts * \$25.11 average rest period premium). *Id.*

26 However, Ekedal contends it has maintained and enforced compliant written rest period
27 policies/practices and has always authorized and permitted employees a 10-minute rest period for
28 every four hours worked, or major fraction thereof, and that any failure to take rest periods was

as a result of employee choice, rather than any Ekedal policy and/or practice. Blakely Decl., ¶ 16. Ekedal further argues that Plaintiff's rest period claim is not amenable to class treatment, since individual inquiries would be required to determine which employees failed to take rest periods, how many rest periods they failed to take, and the reasons why each employee failed to take rest period(s) on a particular shift. *Id.* These manageability concerns are especially present with respect to rest period claims, Ekedal argues, given that rest periods are not recorded. *Id.* Given these defenses, Plaintiff discounted this maximum amount by 70% for risk of non-certification, and an additional 65% for the risk of being unsuccessful on the merits or of failing to recover the full amount sought, to arrive at an estimated realistic exposure of approximately \$106,833. *Id.*

Unreimbursed Business Expenses: \$23,394

Plaintiff alleges that Ekedal failed to reimburse him and other putative class members for all reasonable and necessary work expenditures, including the use of personal tools. Blakely Decl., ¶ 17. Plaintiff estimates Ekedal's maximum liability for its failure to reimburse employees for usage of their personal tools at approximately \$93,575 (3,743 aggregate months in Class Period * \$25.00 per month in expenditures). *Id.*

As noted above, Ekedal maintains that Settlement Class members were not required to use their personal tools as part of their job. Blakely Decl., ¶ 17. Ekedal further argues that this claim would require individual inquiries into whether Settlement Class members actually used their personal tools for work purposes, how much expense they incurred, whether they submitted a request for reimbursement, and the reasonableness of that expense, thus precluding class certification. *Id.* Based on these defenses, Plaintiff discounted the estimated maximum amount by 50% for risk of non-certification and potential inability to proceed on a classwide basis due to the arbitration agreements, and by an additional 50% to account for risk of losing on the merits or failure to recover the maximal amount sought, to arrive at an estimated exposure of approximately \$23,394. *Id.*

Wage Statement Penalties: \$78,960

Plaintiff alleges that Ekedal is liable for wage statement penalties as a result of the unpaid wages and unpaid meal and rest period premiums. Blakely Decl., ¶ 18. Those penalties are

1 calculated as \$50 for each “initial” violation and \$100 for each “subsequent” violation, with a
2 maximum of \$4,000 per employee. *Id.*; see Labor Code § 226(e). Plaintiff’s analysis reflected
3 that there were approximately 141 unique employees and approximately 6,630 pay periods
4 worked during the liability period applicable to Plaintiff’s wage statement claim. *Id.* Plaintiff,
5 therefore, assumed the maximum \$4,000 penalty for each employee and calculated Ekedal’s
6 maximum potential wage statement exposure at approximately \$564,000 (141 employees *
7 \$4,000 maximum penalty). *Id.*; see also Labor Code § 226(e).

8 In light of Ekedal’s arguments that no violations occurred, that employees suffered no
9 “injury,” that any alleged violations were not “knowing and intentional,” that wage statements
10 always accurately reflected hours worked and amounts paid, as well as risks associated with
11 Plaintiff’s underlying claims discussed above, Plaintiff discounted the maximum exposure by
12 60% for risk of non-certification, and by an additional 65% for risk of being unsuccessful on the
13 merits, for an estimated realistic exposure of approximately \$78,960. Blakely Decl., ¶ 18.

14 Waiting Time Penalties: \$67,491

15 Ekedal’s records show approximately 128 Settlement Class members who are eligible for
16 waiting time penalties. Blakely Decl., ¶ 19. Based on an hourly rate of \$25.11, Plaintiff estimated
17 the average waiting time penalty per former employee to be approximately \$6,026 ($\$25.11 * 8$
18 $\text{hours per day} * 30 \text{ days}$). *Id.* Therefore, Plaintiff calculated Ekedal’s maximum exposure for
19 potential waiting time penalties to be approximately \$771,328 (128 former employees * \$6,026
20 average penalty). *Id.*

21 However, Ekedal presented several defenses to this claim, most notably their assertion
22 that because they possessed good-faith defenses to the underlying claims, any failure to pay wages
23 was not “willful” as a matter of law. Blakely Decl., ¶ 19. Ekedal further asserts that Plaintiff’s
24 waiting time penalty exposure was grossly inflated as not every former employee experienced the
25 alleged Labor Code violations. *Id.* Moreover, because the waiting time claim is derivative of
26 Plaintiff’s underlying wage claims, Plaintiff would need to overcome Ekedal’s defenses, both as
27 to class certification and on the merits, as to his underlying claims. *Id.* To account for Ekedal’s
28 defenses, Plaintiff discounted the maximum exposure by 65% for the risk of non-certification and

1 an additional 75% for the risk of losing on the merits and/or not receiving the maximum penalties
2 sought, to arrive at an estimated exposure of approximately \$67,491. *Id.*

3 **PAGA Penalties: \$24,862**

4 Plaintiff estimated a maximum total PAGA exposure of approximately \$663,000 (6,630
5 pay periods * \$100 “initial” penalty). Blakely Decl., ¶ 20; *Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2*, 163
6 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1207 (2008) (finding “initial” violation rate applies until employer is notified
7 that it is violating a Labor Code provision). However, these penalties derive from the underlying
8 wage and hour violations discussed above, which Ekedal disputes vigorously. Blakely Decl., ¶
9 20; *see e.g., Green v. Lawrence Service Co.* 2013 WL 3907506, *5, n.5 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
10 (explaining that a PAGA claim’s success was determined by the merits of its underlying claims).
11 Ekedal also asserts that the Court would drastically reduce any award of PAGA penalties as
12 “confiscatory.” Blakely Decl., ¶ 20; *see also Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Mgmt., Inc.*, 203
13 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1135 (2012) (affirming reduction of PAGA penalties); *Fleming v. Covidien*
14 *Inc.* (C.D. Cal. 2011) Case No. ED CV10-01487 RGK (OPx), 2011 WL 7563047, at *4 (reducing
15 PAGA penalties from \$2.8 million to \$500,000). Therefore, Plaintiff discounted the maximum
16 figure by 75% for the risk of losing on the merits and/or not recovering a PAGA penalty for each
17 and every pay period, and an additional 85% to account for the possibility of this Court reducing
18 penalties, to arrive at an estimated exposure of approximately \$24,862. Blakely Decl., ¶ 20.

19 Using these estimated figures for each of the claims described above, Plaintiff predicted
20 that the potential realistic recovery for the Settlement Class would be approximately \$581,359.
21 Blakely Decl., ¶ 21. The proposed Settlement of \$525,000.00 represents approximately 90.3% of
22 the reasonably forecasted recovery for the Settlement Class. *Id.* Preliminary approval is
23 appropriate since the Settlement will provide significant monetary relief to the Settlement Class,
24 which is consistent with what Plaintiff’s counsel believes could have been recovered had the case
25 proceeded through trial.

26 **e. The Experience and Views of Counsel**

27 “Parties represented by competent counsel are better positioned than courts to produce a
28 settlement that fairly reflects each party’s expected outcome in litigation.” *In re Pacific*

1 *Enterprises Securities Litigation* 47 F.3d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, Plaintiff is represented
2 by competent, experienced counsel who possess extensive experience prosecuting and defending
3 wage-and-hour class actions and who have been appointed as class counsel in numerous cases
4 alleging similar claims. *See* Blakely Decl., ¶¶ 2-6; *see also* Declaration of Paul K. Haines (“Haines
5 Decl.”), ¶¶ 2-8. Class Counsel conducted an in-depth review of Ekedal’s timekeeping and payroll
6 records and drew on their extensive experience in similar cases to assess the strengths and
7 weaknesses of Plaintiff’s case. *See* Blakely Decl., ¶¶ 14-21. The Settlement was also reached with
8 the assistance of an experienced and respected wage-and-hour class action mediator. *Id.*, at ¶ 11.
9 This factor strongly supports preliminary approval of the Settlement. *See Kullar, supra*, 168
10 Cal.App.4th at 130.

11 **2. The Preliminary Approval Standard Is Met**

12 At this stage, the Court can grant preliminary approval of the Settlement and direct that
13 notice be given if the proposed Settlement: (1) falls within the range of possible approval; (2)
14 appears to be the product of serious, informed, and non-collusive negotiations; and (3) has no
15 obvious deficiencies. *See* Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.41(3rd Ed. 1995); 4 Newberg on
16 Class Actions § 11:24-25 (4th Ed. 2013).

17 **a. The Settlement Is Within the Range of Possible Approval**

18 The proposed Settlement reflects approximately 90.3% of the estimated recovery the
19 Settlement Class could reasonably expect in light of the significant litigation risks and will
20 provide tangible, substantial monetary compensation for hotly disputed claims. Indeed, the
21 percentage of the liability exposure recovered in this case far exceeds percentages routinely
22 approved by courts. *See, e.g., Glass v. UBS Finan. Servs.*, Case No. C-06-4068 MMC, 2007 WL
23 221862, *4 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (approving settlement representing 25% to 35% of potential
24 damages); *Dunleavy v. Nadler*, 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000) (approving settlement
25 representing about one-sixth of potential recovery); *Nat’l Rural Telecomm. Coop. v. DirecTV,*
26 *Inc.*, 221 F.R.D. 523, 527 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“it is well-settled law that a proposed settlement may
27 be acceptable even though it amounts to only a fraction of the potential recovery that might be
28 available to the Settlement Class members at trial”). Further, the average Individual Settlement

1 Payment of approximately \$1,028.08 exceeds average payments achieved in other wage and hour
2 class action settlements.⁴ Thus, Plaintiff submits that the proposed settlement is within the range
3 of possible approval, such that notice should be provided to the Settlement Class members so that
4 they can consider the Settlement. The Court will have the opportunity to again assess the
5 reasonableness of the Settlement after the Settlement Class members have had the opportunity to
6 opt-out or object.

7 **b. The Settlement Resulted from Serious, Informed Negotiations**

8 The Settlement resulted from extensive informal discovery and a full-day mediation.
9 Thus, it is entitled to a presumption of fairness *See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 130. As
10 discussed above, Plaintiff carefully vetted the claims at issue, reviewed extensive timekeeping
11 and payroll data, and conducted a detailed statistical analysis of the data to arrive at his estimated
12 class-wide damages figures. *See Blakely Decl.*, ¶¶ 14-21. Thus, this factor supports preliminary
13 approval.

14 **c. The Settlement Is Devoid of Obvious Deficiencies**

15 Preliminary approval of the Settlement is also warranted because there are no obvious
16 deficiencies. The Settlement will provide substantial monetary relief to Settlement Class
17

18 ⁴ *See e.g., Bercea v. AE Retail West*, Case No. 34-2012-00123947 (Sacramento County Super. Ct.
19 May 9, 2012) (average net recovery of approximately \$105); *Ressler v. Federated Department*
20 *Stores, Inc.*, Case No. BC335018 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2009) (average net
21 recovery of approximately \$90); *Palencia v. 99 Cents Only Stores*, Case No. 34-2010-00079619
22 (Sacramento County Super. Ct.) (average net recovery of approximately \$80); *Doty v. Costco*
23 *Wholesale Corp.*, Case No. CV05-3241 FMC-JWJx (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2007) (average recovery
24 of approximately \$65); *Lim v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc.*, Case No. 04CC00213 (Orange
25 County Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2006) (average net recovery of approximately \$35); *Gomez v. Amadeus*
26 *Salon, Inc.*, Case No. BC392297 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. July 23, 2010) (average net
27 recovery of approximately \$20); *Sorenson v. PetSmart, Inc.*, Case No. 2:06-CV-02674-JAM-
28 DAD (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008) (wage and hour class action settlement approved where average
recovery was approximately \$60); *Schiller v. David's Bridal, Inc.*, Case No. 1:10-cv-00616-AWI-
SKO, 2012 WL 2117001 at *17 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2012) ("Class Members will receive an
average of approximately \$198.70...[T]his is a substantial recovery where Defendants asserted
compelling defenses to liability; Plaintiff also notes several similar actions where the gross
recoveries per class member were less than \$90...[T]he Court finds that the results achieved are
good"); and *Williams v. Centerplate, Inc.*, Case Nos. 11-CV-2159-H-KSC, 12-CV-0008-H-KSC,
2013 WL 4525428 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2013) (average recovery of approximately \$108).

1 members. The amounts proposed for Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fees and costs, LWDA payment,
2 Plaintiff’s Class Representative Enhancement Payment, and settlement administration costs are
3 all reasonable and appropriate based on the facts of this case. Because the Settlement is devoid of
4 obvious deficiencies, this factor supports preliminary approval.

5 **B. THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY THE SETTLEMENT CLASS**

6 The Settlement Class satisfies the criteria for certification because: (1) it is sufficiently
7 numerous; (2) common questions of law and fact predominate; (3) Plaintiff’s claims are typical;
8 and (4) Plaintiff and his counsel will adequately represent them. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 382.

9 **1. The Proposed Class Is Ascertainable and Numerous**

10 A class is “ascertainable” where the members “may be readily identified without
11 unreasonable expense or time by reference to official [or business] records.” *See Sevidal v. Target*
12 *Corp.* 189 Cal.App.4th 905, 916 (2010) (alterations in original). Here, the proposed class is
13 defined as all current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Ekedal in California
14 during the Class Period. *See* Settlement, § 1. Therefore, Settlement Class members can be
15 identified from Ekedal’s personnel and employment records. Ekedal represents that the
16 Settlement Class consists of approximately 285 current and former non-exempt employees. *See*
17 Blakely Decl., ¶ 13. It would therefore be impracticable to bring all Settlement Class members
18 before the Court or for each Settlement Class member to bring an individual lawsuit. Thus, the
19 proposed Settlement Class satisfies numerosity. *See, e.g., Bowles v. Sup. Ct.*, 44 Cal.2d 574 (1955)
20 (holding a class representing 10 beneficiaries of a trust sufficiently numerous).

21 **2. Common Issues of Law and Fact Predominate**

22 The focus in a certification dispute is not on the merits but rather on what types of
23 questions, “common or individual,” are likely to arise in the Action. *See Sav-On Drug Store, Inc.*
24 *v. Superior Court (Rocher)* 34 Cal.4th 319, 327 (2004). Plaintiff’s claims are predicated on,
25 among other issues, Ekedal’s uniform timekeeping and meal and rest period policies/practices.
26 These types of claims are commonly held to be proper for class certification. *See e.g., Benton v.*
27 *Telecom Network Specialists, Inc.*, 220 Cal.App.4th 701, 726 (2013) (certifying meal and rest
28 period claims).

1 **3. The Claims of the Named Plaintiff Are Typical**

2 The typicality requirement is satisfied where class representatives have claims that are
3 typical of those of the rest of the class. *B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.* 191
4 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1347 (1987) (finding typicality satisfied where named plaintiff purchased the
5 same goods as the putative class in a consumer class action). Here, Plaintiff's claims are typical
6 of those held by the Settlement Class members. First, Ekedal employed Plaintiff as a non-exempt
7 employee during the Class Period, and Plaintiff was subject to Ekedal's wage and hour policies
8 at issue in this case. *See* Rodriguez Decl., ¶ 2. Second, Plaintiff was injured by the same
9 challenged policies/practices that allegedly injured the Settlement Class as a whole. For example,
10 Plaintiff asserts that he was deprived of wages and contends that he was deprived of all legally
11 compliant meal and rest periods. *Id.*, at ¶ 3. Plaintiff further asserts that he was not reimbursed for
12 all necessary business expenses, did not receive accurate and compliant wage statements and did
13 not receive all wages at the time of separation of employment. *Id.*, at ¶ 4. Because Plaintiff
14 suffered the same injuries as the other members of the Settlement Class, the typicality requirement
15 is satisfied.

16 **4. Plaintiff and Class Counsel Will Fairly and Adequately Represent the**
17 **Class**

18 The adequacy requirement examines conflicts of interest between named parties and the
19 class(es) they seek to represent. *See Capital People First v. State Dept. of Developmental Services*
20 155 Cal.App.4th 676, 697 (2007). Plaintiff and his counsel will adequately represent the
21 Settlement Class, as there are no conflicts between Plaintiff and the proposed Settlement Class,
22 and Plaintiff possess claims that are in line with those of the Settlement Class. *See McGhee v.*
23 *Bank of America* 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450-51 (1976) (adequacy satisfied where there was no
24 indication that Class Counsel were not qualified and the named plaintiff had no interests
25 antagonistic to those of the proposed class). Class Counsel also have extensive experience in wage
26 and hour class action litigation. *See* Haines Decl., ¶¶ 2-8; Blakely Decl., ¶¶ 2-6.

27 **C. THE COURT SHOULD ORDER DISTRIBUTION OF THE NOTICE**

28 This Court should order distribution to the Settlement Class of the proposed Class Notice

1 by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, in English and Spanish, using the last known mailing address
2 information provided by Ekedal *See* Settlement, § 9. This manner of giving notice is the “best
3 notice practicable” under the circumstances because it provides “individual notice to all members
4 who can be identified through reasonable effort.” *See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin* 417 U.S. 156,
5 173 (1974). Here, Plaintiff proposes the settlement be administered by ILYM Group, Inc.
6 (“ILYM”), an experienced class action settlement administrator. *See* Declaration of Anthony
7 Rogers (“Rogers Decl.”) and attached exhibits. Settlement Class members’ addresses will be
8 ascertainable through Ekedal’s personnel and payroll records, which Ekedal will provide to ILYM
9 within ten (10) business days of preliminary approval of the Settlement. *See* Settlement, § 9(A).
10 Within ten (10) business days of receipt of the Settlement Class members’ addresses, ILYM will
11 run the names of all Settlement Class members through the National Change of Address database
12 to update addresses and mail the Class Notice to all Settlement Class members via First Class
13 U.S. mail. *Id.*, at § 9(C). To the extent that any notices are returned, ILYM will perform a “skip
14 trace” to track any Settlement Class member’s current mailing address. *Id.*, at § 9(G).

15 The proposed Class Notice satisfies Cal. Rule of Court 3.766(d) because it advises
16 Settlement Class members of the nature of the claims, basic contentions and denials of the parties,
17 and the key terms of the Settlement, the 60-day deadline to opt out or object to the Settlement and
18 the procedures by which to do so, explains the recovery formula and expected recovery amount
19 for each Settlement Class member, and advises them that they will be bound by the terms of the
20 Settlement if they do not opt-out. *See* Blakely Decl., Exhs. 1-4 to Exh. A. The proposed Class
21 Notice will also notify Settlement Class members of the final approval hearing date and provides
22 the Settlement Class contact information for Class Counsel and advises Settlement Class members
23 that they may enter an appearance through counsel if they wish to. *Id.* This manner of giving
24 notice satisfies California Rule of Court 3.766(e) as the most reliable and cost-effective method
25 of reaching Settlement Class members.

26 **D. THE COURT SHOULD SET A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING**

27 Finally, this Court should set a hearing for Final Approval of the Settlement on a date
28 appropriately scheduled to follow the deadline by which Settlement Class members must file

1 objections to the Settlement or opt-out. *See* California Rule of Court 3.769.

2 **V. CONCLUSION**

3 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily
4 approve the proposed Settlement, provisionally certify the Settlement Class, and enter the
5 Proposed Order submitted concurrently herewith.

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7 Dated: February 13, 2026

Respectfully submitted,
HAINES LAW GROUP, APC

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9 By:



10 Paul K. Haines
11 Sean M. Blakely
12 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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