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8
9 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

10 **FOR THE COUNTY OF SONOMA**

11
12 DANIELLE MANLEY, an individual and on
behalf of all others similarly situated;

13 Plaintiff,

14 vs.

15 HANGER PROSTHETICS & ORTHOTICS
16 WEST, INC., a California corporation; and
DOES 1 through 50,

17 Defendants.

Case No.: 24CV05962

[Assigned for All Purposes to:
Hon. Jane Gaskell, Dept. 17]

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND
PAGA SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

(Filed concurrently with Supporting
Declarations and [Proposed] Order)

DATE: To Be Assigned

TIME: To Be Assigned

DEPT: 17

Action Filed: October 7, 2024

Trial Date: Not Set

1 TO THE HONORABLE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF
2 RECORD:

3 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court, on a
4 date and time to be assigned by the Court, in Department 17 of the Sonoma County Superior Court,
5 Spring Street Courthouse, located at 3035 Cleveland Avenue, Suite 200, Santa Rosa, Santa Rosa,
6 California 95403, Plaintiff Danielle Manley ("Plaintiff"), individually and on behalf of a class of
7 similarly situated individuals, will and hereby does move this Court for:

8 1. Preliminary approval of the proposed class settlement of this lawsuit;
9 2. Pursuant to section 382 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, provisional
10 certification of the following Class defined as follows:

11 All current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt employees of Defendant Hanger
12 Prosthetics & Orthotics West, Inc. ("Defendant") who worked for Defendant within
13 the State of California at any time during the Class Period of September 9, 2022
through the date of preliminary approval, unless shortened at Defendant's election
in accordance with the Agreement's Escalator Clause.

14 3. Preliminary appointment of Plaintiff as Class Representative;
15 4. Preliminary appointment of William C. Sung, Tiffany L. Luu, and Joseph C. Ramli
16 of Justice for Workers, P.C. as Class Counsel;

17 5. The scheduling of a hearing to consider whether the Settlement should be finally
18 approved and to permit a service award to Plaintiff, civil penalties payable to the LWDA, settlement
19 administration costs, and attorney's fees and costs to Class Counsel;

20 6. Appointment of Phoenix Settlement Administrators as the third-party Administrator
21 for mailing notices and administering the Settlement; and

22 7. Approval of the proposed Class Notice and an order that it be disseminated to the
23 proposed Class as provided in the Settlement Agreement.

24 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion; the attached Memorandum of Points and
25 Authorities; the supporting declarations of William C. Sung, Plaintiff Danielle Manley, and Jodey
26 Lawrence of Phoenix Settlement Administrators, and the exhibits attached thereto; the pleadings,
27 and other papers filed in this Action; and on any further oral or documentary evidence or argument
28 presented at the time of the hearing.

1 DATED: July 30, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

2 **JUSTICE FOR WORKERS, P.C.**

3
4 By: 

5 William C. Sung

6 Tiffany L. Luu

7 Joseph C. Ramli

8 Attorneys for Plaintiff

9 DANIELLE MANLEY

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiff Danielle Manley (“Plaintiff”) brought this wage and hour class and representative
4 action on behalf of a Class of all current and former non-exempt or hourly paid employees who
5 worked for Defendant Hanger Prosthetics & Orthotics West, Inc. (“Defendant”) within the State of
6 California during the Class Period of September 9, 2022 through the date of preliminary approval,
7 unless shortened at Defendant’s election in accordance with the Agreement’s Escalator Clause. The
8 primary issues in this case pertain to Defendant’s alleged unpaid wages due to Defendant’s
9 rounding and regular rate practices and meal and rest period violations. Plaintiff contends
10 Defendant is also liable for inaccurate wage statement penalties, waiting time penalties, and civil
11 penalties under the California Private Attorney’s General Act (“PAGA”). Plaintiff requests that this
12 Court preliminarily approve this non-reversionary, common-fund class action settlement¹, in which
13 Defendant has agreed to pay the Gross Settlement Amount of \$897,710.00 to approximately 470
14 Class Members.

15 After deducting administration costs, Plaintiff’s requested service award, the amount set
16 aside as PAGA penalties, and requested Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fees and litigation costs, the Net
17 Settlement Amount of approximately \$497,973.33 will be distributed to all Class Members who do
18 not opt out of the Settlement based on the proportionate number of Workweeks Worked by each
19 Class Member during the Class Period. Employees with standing for PAGA penalties will receive
20 additional consideration for their release of PAGA claims.

21 Significantly, all Class Members will automatically receive a payment unless they
22 affirmatively opt-out. There are approximately 470 Class Members, and **the average payment to**
23 **participating Class Members is projected to be approximately \$1,059.52.** This is an excellent
24 result for Class Members, who will be releasing only those claims alleged or which could have been
25 alleged in the Action. The proposed Settlement is within the range of possible approval in light of

26
27
28 ¹ The Joint Stipulation of Class Action and PAGA Settlement and Release (“Settlement” or “Agreement”) is
attached to the Declaration of William C. Sung as **Exhibit 1**. The proposed Class Notice is attached to the
Agreement as **Exhibit A**. All defined terms in this motion have the same definition as that in the Agreement.

1 the significant legal and factual obstacles that Plaintiff faced, the risks and costs of further litigation,
2 and the tangible monetary benefits to be received by the Class. For the reasons discussed herein,
3 Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant preliminary approval of the Settlement.

4 **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION**

5 **A. THE PARTIES AND BRIEF PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

6 Defendant owns and operates prosthetic and orthotic care clinics in California. Declaration
7 of William C. Sung (“Sung Decl.”), ¶ 8. Defendant employed Plaintiff as an hourly-paid, non-
8 exempt employee in the position of Office Administrator from approximately August 2023 to
9 August 2024 in Santa Rosa, California. Declaration of Danielle Manley (“Manley Decl.”), ¶ 2.

10 On October 3, 2024, Plaintiff sent a notice letter under PAGA to the Labor and Workforce
11 Development Agency (“LWDA”) and gave notice to Defendant. Sung Decl., ¶ 9, **Exh. 2** (PAGA
12 Notice). On October 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed the Class Action Complaint alleged claims for (1)
13 Minimum Wage Violations; (2) Overtime Wage Violations; (3) Meal Period Violations; (4) Rest
14 Period Violations; (5) Wage Statement Penalties; (6) Waiting Time Penalties; and (7) Unfair
15 Competition. Sung Decl., ¶ 10. On December 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended
16 Complaint (“FAC”) adding a cause of action for Civil Penalties Under the California Private
17 Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) against Defendant. *Id.*, **Exh. 3** (FAC).

18 **B. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AND DEFENDANT’S DEFENSES**

19 **1. Unpaid Wages Due to Rounding**

20 Plaintiff alleged that Defendant unlawfully rounded her clock in and out time punches,
21 resulting in unpaid minimum and overtime wages. Sung Decl., ¶ 11; *see Camp v. Home Depot*
22 *U.S.A., Inc.* (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 638, 644, review granted 304 Cal.Rptr.3d 82. Specifically,
23 Plaintiff’s expert found approximately 60% of shifts were rounded against employees and
24 approximately 40% of shifts were rounded in employees’ favor or were neutral. Sung Decl., ¶ 11.
25 Defendant argued its rounding practices were lawful, since it was both neutral on its face and
26 resulted, over time, in employees being paid for all hours worked, and that multiple Courts of
27 Appeal have found rounding mechanisms to be lawful under similar circumstances. *Ibid*; *see, e.g.,*
28 *Ferra v. Loews Hollywood Hotel, LLC* (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1254; *AHMC Healthcare, Inc.*

1 *v. Superior Court* (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1028.

2 **2. Unpaid Wages Due to Regular Rate of Pay Violations**

3 Regular rate of pay, which can change from pay period to pay period, includes adjustments
4 to the straight time rate, reflecting, among other things, shift differentials and the per-hour value of
5 any nonhourly compensation the employee has earned.” *Alvarado v. Dart Container Corp. of*
6 *California* (2018) 4 Cal.5th 542, 554; *see also Ferra v. Loews Hollywood Hotel, LLC* (2021) 11
7 Cal. 5th 858, 863 (meal and rest period premiums to be paid at regular rate of pay); Lab. Code §
8 246(l)(1) (paid sick leave to be paid at the regular rate of pay or at a rate based on a 90-day
9 lookback of compensation earned). Here, Plaintiff contended that Defendant failed to pay overtime
10 wages, paid sick leave wages, and meal period premiums at the regular rate by failing to correctly
11 factor certain incentive compensation, such as annual bonuses, into the regular rate. Sung Decl., ¶
12 12. In response, Defendant argued that it properly trued up the regular rate on incentives, that it
13 used to manually calculate the regular rate true up which sometimes resulted in overpayment, that
14 any actual damages is minimum because very few incentives at issue were paid to employees, and
15 Plaintiff cannot certify a class based on these defenses. *Ibid.*

16 **3. Meal Period Violations**

17 Plaintiff claimed that Defendant sometimes failed to provide Class Members with compliant
18 meal breaks. Sung Decl., ¶ 13. In response, Defendant argued that it maintained compliant meal
19 period policies and practices throughout the Class Period and always provided compliant meal
20 periods in line with those policies. *Ibid*; *see Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court* (2012) 53 Cal.4th
21 1004, 1040-1041 (holding employers need only “provide” meal periods to employees and are not
22 obligated to “police” meal periods). Defendant pointed to the fact that it paid numerous meal period
23 premiums as evidence of its superior meal period compliance practices (the payroll records showed
24 1,986 meal period premiums paid, totaling \$55,731). Sung Decl., ¶ 13. As such, Defendant
25 maintained that Plaintiff’s meal period claim is not suited for class certification since individual
26 inquiries would be needed to assess which employees, if any, took non-compliant meal periods,
27 how many meal periods were non-compliant, and the reasons why a particular employee did not
28 take a meal period on a particular shift and a meal period premium was not paid. *Ibid.*

1 **4. Rest Period Violations**

2 Plaintiff claimed that Defendant sometimes failed to provide Class Members with compliant
3 rest breaks. Sung Decl., ¶ 14. Defendant countered that it has maintained compliant rest period
4 policies and practices and provided compliant rest periods in line with those policies. *Ibid.*
5 Defendant pointed to the fact that it paid many rest period premiums as evidence of its superior rest
6 period compliance practices (the payroll records showed 327 rest period premiums paid, totaling
7 \$10,275). *Ibid.* Defendant further maintained that Plaintiff’s rest period claim is not suited for class
8 certification since individual inquiries would be needed to assess which employees, if any, took
9 non-compliant rest periods, how many rest periods were non-compliant, and the reasons why a
10 particular employee did not take a rest period on a particular shift. *Ibid.*

11 **5. Waiting Time and Wage Statement Penalties**

12 As a result of the unpaid wages and meal and rest period premium wages described above,
13 Plaintiff contended that Defendant failed to comply with its final pay obligations set forth in Labor
14 Code §§ 201 to 203 to former employees and failed to issue accurate itemized wage statements to
15 Class Members as set forth in Labor Code § 226(a). Sung Decl., ¶ 15. Thus, the claims for waiting
16 time and wage statement penalties are derivative of the underlying claims. *Ibid.*

17 Defendant argued that it possessed strong, good faith defenses to Plaintiff’s underlying
18 claims and these claims cannot meet the willfulness standard in Labor Code § 203 or the knowing
19 and intentional standard in Labor Code § 226(e). Sung Decl., ¶ 16. Notably, Defendant relied on the
20 California Supreme Court decision in *Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc.* (2024) 15 Cal.5th
21 1056, 1065, which held that an employer’s good-faith defenses precludes a “willfulness” finding
22 under Labor Code § 203 and a “knowing and intentional” finding under Labor Code § 226(e) for the
23 imposition of statutory penalties. *Ibid.* Defendant further asserted that Plaintiff’s waiting time and
24 wage statement penalty exposure was inflated as not every employee experienced the alleged Labor
25 Code violations. *Ibid.*

26 **6. PAGA Civil Penalties**

27 Plaintiff further contended that, as a result of the foregoing Labor Code violations,
28 Defendant is liable for civil penalties under the PAGA. Sung Decl., ¶ 17. Since Plaintiff’s PAGA

1 claims are derivative of Plaintiff’s underlying wage claims, Defendant asserted the PAGA claim
2 would fail with those claims. *Ibid*; see *Price v. Starbucks Corp.* (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1147
3 (“Because the underlying causes of action fail, the derivative UCL and PAGA claims also fail.”).
4 Defendant further maintained that, given its good faith defenses, this Court would exercise its
5 discretion to substantially reduce any PAGA penalties if it were to find Defendant liable for any of
6 Plaintiff’s claims. Sung Decl., ¶ 17; see Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2) (pre-2024 amendment); *Thurman v.*
7 *Bayshore Transit Mgmt., Inc.* (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1135 (affirming reduction of PAGA
8 penalties); *Fleming v. Covidien Inc.* (C.D. Cal. 2011) Case No. ED CV10-01487 RGK (OPx), 2011
9 WL 7563047, at *4 (reducing PAGA penalties by over 82% in part because employer “not aware”
10 of violations); *Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.* (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 529 (affirming PAGA
11 civil penalty of just \$5 per pay period where employer made “good faith attempts” to comply with
12 the law).

13 C. DISCOVERY AND MEDIATION

14 In connection with mediation, the Parties engaged in extensive informal discovery. Sung
15 Decl., ¶ 18. Defendant produced (1) class and PAGA demographic information including number of
16 Class Members and PAGA Members, workweek, and pay periods ; (2) time and payroll records for
17 all Class Members; (3) Defendant’s relevant policy documents; and (4) Plaintiff’s personnel records
18 and wage statements. *Ibid*.

19 Plaintiff submits that the Class Members’ time and payroll records are statistically
20 significant and reliable. Sung Decl., ¶ 19. The timekeeping data and payroll data produced for
21 mediation were generated from uniform timekeeping and payroll systems, which allowed Class
22 Counsel to extrapolate their and their expert’s findings with confidence. *Ibid*. Class Members
23 worked in similar job positions and were subject to the same wage and hour policies and
24 procedures. *Ibid*. Given these circumstances, the experiences of a subset of employees – the
25 sampling – can be probative as to the experiences of all Class Members. *Ibid*; see e.g., *Tyson Foods,*
26 *Inc. v. Bouaphakeo* (2016) 136 S.Ct. 1036 (holding that statistical evidence was admissible to prove
27 liability and damages across a class, thereby allowing it to support class certification); *Lubin v. The*
28 *Wackenhut Corp.* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 926, 938 (following *Tyson* and finding that a sampling of

1 class records is probative as to the experience of the entire class).

2 In preparation for mediation, Class Counsel worked with an expert data scientist with prior
3 class action litigation experience and conducted a comprehensive analysis and extrapolation of the
4 payroll and timekeeping data produced by Defendant to create a detailed exposure analysis for all
5 claims at issue. Sung Decl., ¶ 20. This discovery and analysis allowed the Parties to assess the
6 merits and value of Plaintiff's claims, the chances of certification of Plaintiff's claims, and
7 Defendant's potential defenses. *Ibid.*

8 On February 5, 2026, the Parties participated in a full-day mediation with Kelly Knight, Esq.
9 a well-respected wage and hour class action mediator. Sung Decl., ¶ 21. During mediation, the
10 Parties vigorously debated their opposing legal positions, the likelihood of certification of Plaintiff's
11 claims, and the legal basis for the claims and defenses. *Ibid.* The Parties reached a tentative class
12 and PAGA settlement at the mediation. *Ibid.* The Parties then finalized the terms of the Settlement
13 and executed Agreement now before the Court. *Ibid*; see Sung Decl., ¶ 7, **Exh. 1** (Agreement).

14 **III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT**

15 **A. ESSENTIAL TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT**

16 If the Court preliminarily approves the Settlement, Defendant will pay a Gross Settlement
17 Amount of \$897,710.00. Agreement, § 15 (Exh. 1 to Sung Decl.). Significantly, this Settlement is
18 non-reversionary, and no Class Member will have to submit a claim form to receive an Settlement
19 Payment. Agreement, § 50. Each Class Member will automatically receive a Settlement Payment
20 unless they affirmatively opt out of the Settlement. Agreement, § 56.d. The monetary terms of the
21 Settlement are summarized below:

Gross Settlement Amount:	\$897,710.00
Minus Court-approved attorneys' fees:	\$299,236.67
Minus Court-approved verified costs (up to):	\$30,000.00
Minus Court-approved Service Payment:	\$10,000.00
Minus estimated settlement administration costs:	\$10,500.00
Minus amount set aside as PAGA Payment:	\$50,000.00
Net Settlement Amount:	\$497,973.33

26 Sung Decl., ¶ 22.

27 ///

28 ///

1 **1. The Settlement Provides for Reasonable Monetary Payments**

2 After deducting amounts for the Court-approved attorneys' fees and costs, service award to
3 Plaintiff, the amount set aside as PAGA Payment, and settlement administration costs, the
4 Settlement requires Defendant to pay a Net Settlement Amount of at least **\$497,973.33** to all Class
5 Members who do not timely opt-out. Agreement, § 50. The Net Settlement Amount shall be
6 distributed to participating Class Members as Settlement Payments, calculated by (a) dividing the
7 Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks Worked by all Settlement Class
8 Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Settlement Class Member's
9 Workweeks Worked. Agreement, § 50.h. Additionally, \$17,500.00 of the Gross Settlement Amount
10 has been designated as PAGA Payments to PAGA Members and shall be distributed to PAGA
11 Members (including those who submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the class
12 action settlement) who were employed during the PAGA Period proportionally based on the number
13 of PAGA Workweek Worked during the PAGA Period. Agreement, §§ 48, 50.e. In addition to the
14 Gross Settlement Amount, Defendant is obligated to pay the employer's share of payroll taxes on
15 Settlement Payments allocated to settlement of wage claims. Agreement, § 50.

16 According to Defendant, there are approximately 470 Class Members. Sung Decl., ¶ 23.
17 Therefore, the average Settlement Payment from the Net Settlement Amount is projected to be
18 approximately **\$1,059.52**. *Ibid.* There are also approximately 422 PAGA Members during the
19 PAGA Period who will each receive an average of approximately **\$41.17** as PAGA Payments. *Ibid.*
20 Class Members will have 45 calendar days from the mailing of the Class Notice to opt-out or object
21 to the Settlement, thereby providing ample time to review the Class Notice without unduly delaying
22 the Settlement. Agreement, § 11.

23 Effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the Gross Settlement Amount and
24 employer taxes, Settlement Class Members will release all claims that were alleged, or reasonably
25 could have been alleged, based on the facts, allegations, assertions and claims in the FAC, arising
26 during the Class Period; and all PAGA Members, the LWDA, and the State of California are
27 deemed to release all claims for PAGA penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been
28 alleged, based on the PAGA Period facts stated in the operative Complaint in the Action and the

1 corresponding PAGA Notice, arising during the PAGA Period. Agreement, §§ 31, 32. Defendant
2 shall fund the Gross Settlement Amount no later than 30 days after the Effective Date (i.e., 61 days
3 after the Court enters a Judgment on its Order Granting Final Approval. Agreement, §§ 10, 14.

4 No later than 14 days prior to the hearing on preliminary approval, Defendant will verify the
5 number of Workweeks Worked during the Class Period and advise the Court as to whether the
6 Escalator Clause is triggered, and if yes, whether Defendant will modify the Class Period end date
7 or increase the Gross Settlement Amount. Agreement, § 50.g.

8 **2. Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Service Payment, and PAGA Payment**

9 Plaintiff will apply for a service award at the time of seeking final approval of the proposed
10 class action settlement in the amount of \$10,000.00 for Plaintiff's service to the Class (\$5,000.00)
11 and for her general release of all claims (\$5,000.00). Agreement, § 50.d. "[I]ncentive awards are
12 fairly typical in class action cases . . . and are intended to compensate class representatives for work
13 done on behalf of the class [and] to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing
14 the action." *In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1393-94.
15 Plaintiff's requested Service Payment is intended to recognize the time and effort Plaintiff expended
16 on behalf of the Class, including providing substantial information and documents to Class Counsel,
17 discussing the claims at issue in the litigation, actively participating in the prosecution of Plaintiff's
18 claims, the risks Plaintiff undertook by agreeing to serve as the named plaintiff in this case, and her
19 general release of all claims. *See* Manley Decl., ¶¶ 4-6; Agreement § 50.d.

20 Class Counsel will also apply for an attorneys' fees award of 33 1/3% of the Gross
21 Settlement Amount, which is equivalent to \$299,236.67, and up to \$30,000.00 in verified costs
22 reimbursement. Agreement, §§ 50.a., 50.b. The requested fee is fair compensation for undertaking
23 complex, risky, expensive, and time-consuming litigation on a purely contingent fee basis. Sung
24 Decl., ¶ 24. Class Counsel have incurred substantial attorneys' fees and costs conducting pre-filing
25 investigation, analyzing Plaintiff's claims, conducting legal research, working with an expert to
26 analyze Class Members' time and payroll records and create a comprehensive damages model,
27 preparing for and attending mediation, negotiating and preparing the long-form Agreement,
28 preparing this Motion, and otherwise litigating the case. *Ibid.* Class Counsel expect to expend

1 additional attorney time in attending the hearing on this Motion, overseeing the Class Notice
2 process and fielding questions from Class Members, preparing the Final Approval papers, and
3 attending the Final Approval hearing. *Ibid.*

4 California courts recognize that an appropriate method for awarding attorneys' fees in class
5 actions is to award a percentage of the "common fund" created as a result of a settlement. *See, e.g.,*
6 *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 506 (holding "the percentage of fund method
7 survives in California class action cases"). Class Counsel's request for fees of 33 1/3% of the Gross
8 Settlement Amount is well within the range of reasonableness and indeed is considered the typical
9 rate for common fund settlements. Historically, courts have awarded percentage fees in the range of
10 20% to 50%, depending on the circumstances of the case. *See* 4 Newberg on Class Actions § 14.6
11 (4th Ed. 2013). Class Counsel submit that their request for attorneys' fees is reasonable when
12 viewed as an overall percentage of the Settlement and in light of the substantial risks and significant
13 work undertaken, the results obtained, and the efficiency with which the litigation has been
14 conducted. Should the Court grant preliminary approval, Class Counsel will seek an award of
15 attorneys' fees and verified costs upon seeking Final Approval.

16 Additionally, the parties have agreed to designate \$50,000.00 of the Gross Settlement
17 Amount as PAGA civil penalties, of which \$32,500.00 (65%) will be paid to the LWDA, with the
18 remaining \$17,500.00 (35%) for distribution to the PAGA Members pursuant to Labor Code §
19 2699(m) (post-July 1, 2024 PAGA amendment). Agreement, § 50.e. Plaintiff submits this allocation
20 to the LWDA for civil PAGA penalties is appropriate. *See, e.g., Chu v. Wells Fargo Investments,*
21 *LLC* (N.D. Cal. 2011) Case No. C 05-4526 MHP, 2011 WL 672645 at *1 (approving PAGA
22 payment of \$7,500 to LWDA out of \$6.9 million common-fund settlement); *Lazarin v. Pro*
23 *Unlimited, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. 2013) Case No. C11-03609 HRL, 2013 WL 3541217 (approving PAGA
24 payment of \$7,500 to LWDA out of \$1.25 million common-fund settlement).

25 **IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT**

26 **A. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL IS WARRANTED**

27 California Rule of Court 3.769 conditions settlement of a class action on court approval,
28 which is generally evaluated under the federal standards applicable under Rule 23 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. *See Reed v. United Teachers Los Angeles* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 322, 337 (Rule 3.769 requires trial court to determine “that the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned”); *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir. 1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (Rule 23(e) requires the trial court to determine “whether a proposed settlement is fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable”). Settlement is the preferred means of dispute resolution, particularly in complex class action litigation. *See In re Syncor ERISA Litig* (9th Cir. 2008) 516 F.3d 1095, 1101. The Court’s role in evaluating a proposed settlement is limited to ensuring that the agreement taken as a whole is fair. *See e.g., Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1027. There is an initial presumption of fairness where, as here, the Settlement was negotiated at arm’s-length by class counsel and with the assistance of an experienced wage and hour class action mediator. *See e.g., Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 130.

To make a fairness determination, the Court should consider “the strength of Plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, [and] the experience and views of counsel.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801. “The list of factors is not exclusive, and the court is free to engage in a balancing and weighing of the factors depending on the circumstances of each case.” *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 230, 245. Here, the proposed Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable in light of the overall balance of factors in this case.

1. The Strength of Plaintiff’s Case and Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Duration of Further Litigation

Although Plaintiff maintains that Plaintiff’s claims are meritorious, Plaintiff acknowledges that there were substantial risks and uncertainty in proceeding with litigation. Sung Decl., ¶ 25. As described above, Defendant presented multiple defenses to Plaintiff’s claims, both on the merits and with respect to class certification. *Ibid.* Thus, while Plaintiff was prepared to litigate these claims through class certification and ultimately trial, success was far from certain. Although the Parties engaged in significant informal discovery prior to mediation, the Parties still had significant formal discovery to complete if the Action did not resolve. *Ibid.* This would have required the expenditure

1 of substantial time and resources by both Parties that would have very likely spanned several years.
2 *Ibid.* Even if Plaintiff were to certify the class, the Parties would incur considerably more attorneys'
3 fees and costs through a possible decertification motion, trial, and possible appeal. *Ibid.* This
4 Settlement avoids those risks and the accompanying expense. *Ibid.*

5 Plaintiff has not yet filed a motion for class certification, and as such, the extent to which
6 Plaintiff's proposed classes were certifiable is somewhat speculative. Sung Decl., ¶ 26. Absent
7 settlement, there was a risk that there would not be a certified class at the time of trial, or if there
8 were, it would consist of a significantly smaller group of employees than the proposed Class due to
9 a narrowing of the class definition in a Court order on a contested motion for class certification.
10 *Ibid.* Thus, this factor, too, supports preliminary approval of the settlement.

11 **2. Amount Offered in Settlement Given Realistic Value of Claims**

12 The Settlement provides a positive recovery for the Class in the face of disputed claims.
13 Plaintiff conducted a detailed analysis of alleged unpaid wages and meal and rest period premium
14 payments owing, wage statement penalties, waiting time penalties, and PAGA civil penalties. A
15 summary of the results of Plaintiff's exposure analysis are discussed below:

16 Unpaid Wages Due to Rounding. Plaintiff's expert found Defendant's maximum exposure
17 for unpaid minimum and overtime wages due to rounding to be approximately \$134,965.00. Sung
18 Decl., ¶ 27. As discussed above, Defendant argued that its rounding practice was neutral and lawful
19 and other appellate courts have found similar rounding practices to be lawful. *Ibid.* Thus, Plaintiff
20 applied a 20% risk factor to Defendant's maximum exposure (i.e., maximum exposure X 80%) to
21 account for the risk of non-certification and for Defendant's defenses on the merits or failing to
22 recover the full amount sought to arrive at an estimated realistic recovery of approximately
23 **\$107,972.00.** *Ibid.*

24 Unpaid Wages Due to Regular Rate. Plaintiff's expert found Defendant's maximum
25 exposure for unpaid overtime, meal period premiums, rest period premiums, and paid sick leave
26 wages due to its regular rate practices to be approximately \$123,620.00. Sung Decl., ¶ 28. As
27 discussed above, Defendant argued it properly trued up the regular rate, it sometimes overpaid due
28 to its manual practices, and Plaintiff cannot certify a class. *Ibid.* Thus, Plaintiff applied a 20% risk

1 factor to Defendant's maximum exposure to account for the risk of non-certification and for
2 Defendant's defenses on the merits or failing to recover the full amount sought to arrive at an
3 estimated realistic recovery of approximately **\$98,896.00**. *Ibid.*

4 Meal and Rest Period Premiums. Plaintiff's expert found an 8.9% meal period violation rate
5 (i.e., 8.9% of shifts had a non-compliant meal period punch), and after applying meal period
6 premiums paid, found Defendant's maximum exposure for meal period violations to be
7 approximately \$354,760.00. Sung Decl., ¶ 29. Any rest period violation would not be reflected in
8 the records. Estimating a 10% violation rate by shift, Plaintiff's expert found Defendant's maximum
9 exposure for rest period violations to be approximately \$576,309.50. *Ibid.* As discussed above,
10 Defendant argued that it maintained compliant meal and rest period policies and practices
11 throughout the Class Period and always provided compliant meal and rest periods in line with those
12 policies; that it paid numerous meal and rest period premiums as evidence of its superior meal and
13 rest period compliance practices; and Plaintiff's meal and rest period claim is not suited for class
14 certification since individual inquiries predominated. *Ibid.* Thus, Plaintiff applied a 60% risk factor
15 to Defendant's maximum exposure to account for the risk of non-certification and for Defendant's
16 defenses on the merits or failing to recover the full amount sought to arrive at an estimated realistic
17 recovery of approximately **\$141,904.00** for meal period premiums and **\$230,523.80** for rest period
18 premiums. *Ibid.*

19 Waiting Time Penalties: As a result of the regular rate violations described above, Plaintiff
20 contends that Defendant failed to comply with its final pay obligations set forth in Labor Code §§
21 201 to 203 to former employees. Sung Decl., ¶ 30. At 219 former employees, at an average hourly,
22 Plaintiff's expert found Defendant's maximum exposure for waiting time penalties is
23 \$1,468,006.00. *Ibid.* Defendant presented several defenses, including that because it possessed
24 good-faith defenses to the underlying wage claims, any failure to pay wages was not "willful" as a
25 matter of law; Plaintiff's waiting time penalty exposure was grossly inflated as not every former
26 employee experienced the alleged Labor Code violations; and because the waiting time claim is
27 derivative of Plaintiff's underlying wage claims, Plaintiff would need to overcome Defendant's
28 defenses, both as to class certification and on the merits, as to the underlying claims. *Ibid.* Thus,

1 Plaintiff applied an 80% risk factor to Defendant's maximum exposure to account for the risk of
2 non-certification and for Defendant's defenses on the merits or failing to recover the full amount
3 sought to arrive at an estimated realistic recovery of approximately **\$293,601.20**. *Ibid*.

4 Wage Statement Penalties: Plaintiff alleged that Defendant is liable for wage statement
5 penalties as a result of unpaid wages. Sung Decl., ¶ 31. Those penalties are calculated as \$50 for
6 each "initial" violation and \$100 for each "subsequent" violation, with a maximum of \$4,000 per
7 employee. Lab. Code § 226(e). Plaintiff's expert found Defendant's maximum exposure for wage
8 statement penalties to be approximately \$1,131,500.00. *Ibid*. As discussed above, Defendant
9 presented several defenses, most notably their assertion that because they possessed good-faith
10 defenses to the underlying claims for meal period violations and any failure to pay wages was not
11 "knowing and intentional" as a matter of law and because the wage statement claim is derivative of
12 Plaintiff's underlying wage claims, Plaintiff would need to overcome Defendant's defenses, both as
13 to class certification and on the merits, as to his underlying claims. *Ibid*. Thus, Plaintiff applied an
14 80% risk factor to Defendant's maximum exposure to account for the risk of non-certification and
15 for Defendant's defenses on the merits or failing to recover the full amount sought to arrive at an
16 estimated realistic recovery of approximately **\$226,300.00**. *Ibid*.

17 PAGA Penalties: Assuming no stacking of penalties (i.e., the recovery of multiple penalties
18 per pay period), Plaintiff estimated a maximum total PAGA exposure of approximately \$1,531,600
19 (\$100 initial penalty X 15,316 pay periods). Sung Decl., ¶ 32; *Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2* (2008)
20 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1207 (finding "initial" violation rate applies until employer is notified that it
21 is violating a Labor Code provision). However, these penalties derive from the underlying wage and
22 hour violations discussed above, which Defendant disputes vigorously. Sung Decl., ¶ 32; *see e.g.*,
23 *Green v. Lawrence Service Co.* (C.D. Cal. 2013) 2013 WL 3907506, *5, n.5 (explaining that a
24 PAGA claim's success was determined by the merits of its underlying claims). Defendant also
25 assert that the Court would drastically reduce any award of PAGA penalties as "confiscatory." Sung
26 Decl., ¶ 32; *see also Thurman*, 203 Cal.App.4th at 1135 (affirming reduction of PAGA penalties);
27 *Fleming*, 2011 WL 7563047, at *4 (reducing PAGA penalties from \$2.8 million to \$500,000).
28 Therefore, Plaintiff applied an 80% risk factor to maximum penalties to account for the risk of

1 losing on the merits and/or not recovering a PAGA penalty for each and every pay period and for
2 the possibility of this Court reducing penalties, to arrive at an estimated exposure of approximately
3 **\$306,320.00**. Sung Decl., ¶ 32.

4 Conclusion: Using these estimated figures for each of the claims described above, Plaintiff
5 predicted that the potential realistic recovery for the Class would be approximately **\$1,405,517.00**.
6 Sung Decl., ¶ 32. The proposed Settlement of \$897,710.00 represents approximately **63.87%** of the
7 reasonably forecasted recovery for the Class. *Ibid*. Preliminary approval is appropriate since the
8 Settlement will provide significant monetary relief to the Class, which is consistent with what Class
9 Counsel believes could have been recovered had the case proceeded through trial. *Ibid*.

10 **3. The Experience and Views of Counsel**

11 “Parties represented by competent counsel are better positioned than courts to produce a
12 settlement that fairly reflects each party’s expected outcome in litigation.” In *In re Pacific*
13 *Enterprises Securities Litigation* (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 373, 378. Here, Plaintiff is represented by
14 competent, experienced counsel who possess extensive experience prosecuting and defending wage-
15 and-hour class actions and who have been appointed as class counsel. *See* Sung Decl., ¶¶ 2-7. Class
16 Counsel conducted an in-depth review of class records and drew on their extensive experience in
17 similar cases to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s case. The Settlement was reached
18 with the assistance of an experienced and respected wage-and-hour class action mediator. This
19 factor strongly supports preliminary approval of the Settlement. *See Kullar*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 130.

20 **4. The Preliminary Approval Standard Is Met**

21 At this stage, the Court can grant preliminary approval of the Settlement and direct that
22 notice be given if the proposed Settlement: (1) falls within the range of possible approval; (2)
23 appears to be the product of serious, informed, and non-collusive negotiations; and (3) has no
24 obvious deficiencies. *See* Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.41(3rd Ed. 1995); 4 Newberg on
25 Class Actions § 11:24-25 (4th Ed. 2013).

26 The proposed Settlement reflects approximately **63.87%** of the estimated recovery the Class
27 could reasonably expect in light of the significant litigation risks and will provide tangible,
28 substantial monetary compensation for hotly disputed claims. Indeed, the percentage of the liability

1 exposure recovered in this case far exceeds percentages routinely approved by courts. *See, e.g.,*
2 *Glass v. UBS Finan. Servs.* (N.D. Cal. 2007) Case No. C-06-4068 MMC, 2007 WL 221862, *4
3 (approving settlement representing 25% to 35% of potential damages); *Dunleavy v. Nadler* (9th Cir.
4 2000) 213 F.3d 454, 459 (approving settlement representing about one-sixth of potential recovery);
5 *Nat'l Rural Telecomm. Coop. v. DirecTV, Inc.* (C.D. Cal. 2004) 221 F.R.D. 523, 527 (“it is well-
6 settled law that a proposed settlement may be acceptable even though it amounts to only a fraction
7 of the potential recovery that might be available to the Class Members at trial”). The average
8 Settlement Payment of approximately **\$1,059.52** exceeds average payments achieved in other wage
9 and hour class action settlements.² Thus, the proposed settlement is within the range of possible
10 approval, such that notice should be provided to the Class Members so that they can consider the
11 Settlement. The Court will have the opportunity to again assess the reasonableness of the Settlement
12 after the Class Members have had the opportunity to opt-out or object.

13 The Settlement resulted from an exchange of substantial information, arm’s-length
14 negotiations by counsel, a full-day mediation before an experienced wage and hour mediator, and
15 additional months of negotiating the long-form settlement agreement. Thus, the Settlement is
16 entitled to an initial presumption of fairness. *See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 130. As
17 discussed above, Plaintiff carefully vetted the claims at issue, analyzed extensive sampling time and
18 payroll data, and conducted a detailed damages analysis to arrive at the estimated class-wide
19 damages figures. *See Sung Decl.*, ¶¶ 27-33. Thus, this factor supports preliminary approval.

20 Preliminary approval of the Settlement is also warranted because there are no obvious
21 deficiencies. The Settlement will provide substantial monetary relief to the Class. The amounts
22 proposed for Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fees and costs, LWDA payment, and Plaintiff’s service
23 _____

24 ² *See e.g., Bercea v. AE Retail West*, Case No. 34-2012-00123947 (Sacramento County Super. Ct. May 9,
25 2012) (average recovery of approximately \$105); *Ressler v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.*, Case No.
26 BC335018 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2009) (average recovery of approximately \$90); *Palencia*
27 *v. 99 Cents Only Stores*, Case No. 34-2010-00079619 (Sacramento County Super. Ct.) (average recovery of
28 approximately \$80); *Doty v. Costco Wholesale Corp.*, Case No. CV05-3241 FMC-JWJx (C.D. Cal. May 14,
2007) (average recovery of approximately \$65); *Lim v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc.*, Case No. 04CC00213
(Orange County Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2006) (average net recovery of approximately \$35); *Gomez v. Amadeus*
Salon, Inc., Case No. BC392297 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. July 23, 2010) (average net recovery of
approximately \$20); *Sorenson v. PetSmart, Inc.*, Case No. 2:06-CV-02674-JAM-DAD (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17,
2008) (wage and hour class action settlement approved where average recovery was approximately \$60).

award, are all reasonable and appropriate based on the facts of this case. Because the Settlement is devoid of obvious deficiencies, this factor supports preliminary approval.

B. THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY THE CLASS

The Class satisfies the criteria for certification of a settlement class under California law because: (1) the Class is so numerous that joinder would be impractical; (2) common questions of law and fact predominate over individual questions such that class certification is the most efficient and desirable way to maintain this litigation; (3) Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of absent Class Members; and (4) Plaintiff and Class Counsel will fairly and adequately represent Class Members' interest. *See* Code Civ. Proc. § 382.

A class is "ascertainable" where the members "may be readily identified without unreasonable expense or time by reference to official [or business] records." *See Sevidal v. Target Corp.* (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 905, 916 (alterations in original). Here, the Class is defined as "all current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant within the State of California during the Class Period." Therefore, Class Members can be identified from Defendant's personnel and employment records. Defendant represents that the Class consists of approximately 470 current and former non-exempt employees. It would therefore be impracticable to bring all Class Members before the Court or for each Class Member to bring an individual lawsuit. Thus, the proposed Class satisfies numerosity. *See, e.g., Bowles v. Superior Court* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574 (holding a class representing 10 beneficiaries of a trust sufficiently numerous).

The focus in a certification dispute is not on the merits but rather on what types of questions, "common or individual," are likely to arise in the Action. *See Sav-On Drug Store, Inc. v. Superior Court (Rocher)* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 327. Plaintiff's claims are predicated on, among other issues, Defendant's uniform policy and practice regarding provision of meal and rest periods, regular rate of pay, timekeeping, and provision of wage statements and final wages. These types of claims are commonly held to be proper for class certification. *See e.g., Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc.* (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 701, 726 (certifying meal and rest period claims); *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 324 (certifying exemption misclassification and unpaid overtime claim).

1 The typicality requirement is satisfied where class representatives have claims that are
2 typical of those of the rest of the class. *B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.* (1987) 191
3 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1347 (finding typicality satisfied where named Plaintiff purchased the same
4 goods as the putative class in a consumer class action). Here, Plaintiff's claims are typical of those
5 held by the Class Members. First, Defendant employed Plaintiff as non-exempt employee during the
6 Class Period, and Plaintiff was subject to Defendant's wage and hour policies at issue in this case.
7 Manley Decl., ¶¶ 2-3. Second, Plaintiff was injured by the same challenged policies/practices that
8 allegedly injured the Class as a whole: rounding and regular rate violations resulting in
9 underpayment of wages, meal/rest period violations, and derivative statutory and civil penalties.
10 Manley Decl., ¶ 3. Because Plaintiff has suffered the same injuries as the other members of the
11 Class, the typicality requirement is satisfied.

12 The adequacy requirement examines conflicts of interest between named parties and the
13 class(es) they seek to represent. *See Capital People First v. State Dept. of Developmental Services*
14 (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 676, 697. Plaintiff and Class Counsel will adequately represent the Class,
15 as there are no conflicts between Plaintiff and the proposed Class, and Plaintiff possesses claims
16 that are in line with those of the Class. Sung Decl., ¶ 33; Manley Decl., ¶ 5; *see McGhee v. Bank of*
17 *America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 4470, 450-51 (adequacy satisfied where there was no indication that
18 Class Counsel were not qualified and the named plaintiff had no interests antagonistic to those of
19 the proposed class). Class Counsel also have extensive experience in wage and hour class action
20 litigation. *See* Sung Decl., ¶¶ 2-7.

21 **C. THE COURT SHOULD ORDER DISTRIBUTION OF THE CLASS NOTICE**

22 This Court should order distribution to the Class of the proposed Class Notice by U.S. Mail,
23 postage prepaid using the last known mailing address information provided by Defendant. *See*
24 Agreement, §§ 5, 55, **Exhibit A** (Class Notice). The Class Notice will be distributed in English and
25 Spanish. Agreement, § 5. This manner of giving notice is the "best notice practicable" under the
26 circumstances because it provides "individual notice to all members who can be identified through
27 reasonable effort." *See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin* (1974) 417 U.S. 156, 173.

28 ///

1 Here, the Parties have agreed that the Settlement be administered by Phoenix Settlement
2 Administrators (“Administrator”), an experienced class action settlement administrator. *See*
3 *generally* Declaration of Jodey Lawrence (“Administrator Decl.”) and attached exhibits. Class
4 Members’ addresses will be ascertainable through Defendant’s personnel and payroll records,
5 which Defendant will provide to the Administrator within 30 days of preliminary approval of the
6 Settlement. Agreement, § 54.b. Within 14 days of receipt of the Class Members’ addresses, the
7 Administrator will run the names of all Class Members through the National Change of Address
8 database to update addresses and mail the Class Notice to all Class Members. Agreement, §§ 55.a.,
9 55.b. To the extent that any notices are returned, the Administrator will perform a “skip trace” to
10 track any Class Member’s current mailing address and remail the notice within 3 days. Agreement,
11 § 55.d.

12 The content of the proposed Class Notice satisfies California Rule of Court 3.766(d) because
13 it advises Class Members of the nature of the claims, basic contentions and denials of the parties,
14 and the key terms of the Settlement, the 60-day deadline to opt-out or object to the Settlement and
15 the procedures by which to do so, explains the recovery formula and expected recovery amount for
16 each Class Member, and advises them that they will be bound by the terms of the Agreement if they
17 do not opt-out. *See* Agreement, **Exhibit A** (Class Notice). The proposed Class Notice will also
18 notify Class Members of the final approval hearing date and provides the Class contact information
19 for Class Counsel and advises Class Members that they may enter an appearance through counsel if
20 they wish to. *Ibid.* This manner of giving notice satisfies California Rule of Court 3.766(e) as the
21 most reliable and cost-effective method of reaching Class Members.

22 Thus, this Court should set a hearing for Final Approval of the Settlement on a date
23 appropriately scheduled to follow the deadline by which Class Members must file objections to the
24 Settlement or opt-out. *See* California Rule of Court 3.769.

25 **D. SERVICE OF MOVING PAPERS ON LWDA**

26 On July 30, 2026, Class Counsel uploaded a copy of the Motion for Preliminary Approval,
27 the fully executed Agreement, supporting declarations, and Proposed Order on the LWDA. Sung
28 Decl., ¶ 35.

1 **V. CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily approve
3 the proposed Settlement, provisionally certify the Class, and enter the Proposed Order submitted
4 concurrently herewith.

5
6 DATED: July 30, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

7 **JUSTICE FOR WORKERS, P.C.**

8
9 By: 

10 William C. Sung

11 Tiffany L. Luu

12 Joseph C. Ramli

13 Attorneys for Plaintiff DANIELLE MANLEY
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