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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA

EVAN ROMER, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SNAP ONE, LLC, a North Carolina limited
liability company; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 24CV455135

Assigned for all purposes to:
Hon. Theodore C. Zayner
Dept. 19

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION AND PAGA
SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING

Date: March 18, 2026

Time: 1:30 p.m.

Dept.: 19

1 **TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:**

2 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on **March 18, 2026 at 1:30 p.m.**, in Department 19 of the
3 Santa Clara County Superior Court, located at 191 North First Street, San Jose, California 95113,
4 pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court, Rule 3.769,
5 *et seq.*, Plaintiff Evan Romer (“Plaintiff”) on behalf of himself, the State of California as a private
6 attorney general, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, will and hereby does move the Court
7 for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action and PAGA settlement on
8 the terms and conditions set forth in the Joint Stipulation of Settlement (“Settlement” or
9 “Settlement Agreement”) between Plaintiff and Defendant Snap One, LLC (“Defendant” or “Snap
10 One”) (collectively, “Parties”), a copy of which is attached to the Declaration of Arrash T. Fattahi
11 as **Exhibit 1**. Plaintiff further moves the Court for an Order:

- 12 1. Granting preliminary approval of the proposed Settlement Agreement;
- 13 2. Conditionally certifying the proposed Class for settlement purposes only pursuant to
14 California Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and California Rules of Court, rule
15 3.769;
- 16 3. Approving the proposed Class Notice and the plan for distribution of the Class Notice
17 as provided by the Settlement Agreement;
- 18 4. Appointing Plaintiff as class representative for settlement purposes;
- 19 5. Appointing Plaintiff’s Counsel, John G. Yslas, Arrash T. Fattahi, Lisa B. Iturriaga, and
20 Arman A. Salehi of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
- 21 6. Appointing Phoenix Class Action Administration (“Phoenix”) as the Settlement
22 Administrator and authorizing Phoenix to send notice of the Settlement to the Class
23 Members and proceed as provided by the Settlement Agreement;
- 24 7. Approving the proposed deadlines for the notice and administration process as
25 reflected in this Motion and in the Settlement Agreement; and
- 26 8. Scheduling a Final Approval Hearing.

27 Pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.769(d) and (e), the Motion for Preliminary
28 Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement (“Motion”) is made on the grounds that the

1 proposed Settlement Agreement satisfies all criteria for preliminary approval under California law
2 and falls well within the range of reasonableness; the Agreement was reached through informed,
3 arm's-length bargaining between experienced attorneys, and Plaintiff and Class Counsel will fairly
4 and adequately represent the Class Members.

5 The Motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and
6 authorities, the [Proposed] Order Granting Preliminary Approval, the accompanying declarations,
7 filed concurrently herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or
8 argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

9
10
11 Dated: March 2, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

12 By: *Lisa B. Iturriaga*
13 Arrash T. Fattahi
14 Lisa B. Iturriaga
15 Arman A. Salehi

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Evan Romer (“Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of a proposed \$120,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class action settlement with Defendant Snap One, LLC (“Defendant” or “Snap One”, and together with Plaintiff, the “Parties”). This motion for preliminary approval is unopposed. The Settlement will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 24 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arm’s length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Louis Marlin, over the course of a full day of mediation. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses, the Parties reached a settlement. As discussed below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all criteria for preliminary settlement approval under California law and falls within the range of reasonableness. Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiff and putative class members worked as non-exempt, hourly-paid employees for Defendant in the state of California during the class period. (Declaration of Arrash T. Fattahi in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement [“Fattahi Decl.”], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods, and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts related claims for failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay all final wages

1 at termination, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (*Id.* at ¶ 3.) Defendant
2 denies the allegations.

3 On December 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint
4 against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay
5 overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest
6 periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate
7 itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; and (8) violation
8 of Unfair Business Practices (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, *et seq.*) (“Class Action”).
9 (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 4.) On the same date, Plaintiff sent a notice to Defendant and the California
10 Labor & Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) alleging similar wage and hour violations
11 pursuant to the PAGA. (*Id.*, **Exhibit 2**). On March 3, 2025, Plaintiff separately filed a
12 representative action complaint (Case No. 24STCV15702) for penalties pursuant to PAGA
13 (“PAGA Action”). (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 5.) On March 20, 2025, Defendant filed Notices of Related
14 Cases in the Class Action and PAGA Action. (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 6.)

15 **B. Discovery and Investigation**

16 Following the filing of the Plaintiff’s complaints, but prior to the July 9, 2025 mediation,
17 the Parties exchanged documents and information. (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 7.) Defendant produced a
18 50% sampling of timekeeping and pay records for the class members. (*Id.*) Defendant also
19 provided a significant number of documents of its wage and hour policies and practices during
20 the class and PAGA periods, exemplar wage statements, Plaintiff’s personnel file, information
21 regarding the total number of current and former employees, and total number of workweeks
22 and pay periods during the relevant period, and other requested information in its informal
23 discovery responses. (*Id.*)

24 After reviewing documents regarding Defendant’s wage and hour policies and practices
25 and analyzing Defendant’s timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel were able to
26 evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant’s maximum
27 monetary exposure for all claims. (Fattahi Decl., at ¶ 8.) Class Counsel also investigated the
28 applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel

1 reviewed these records and utilized an expert to prepare a damages analysis prior to mediation.
2 (*Id.*)

3 **C. Settlement Negotiations**

4 On July 9, 2025, the Parties participated in a private mediation with experienced class
5 action mediator, Louis Marlin (Fattahi Decl., at ¶ 9.) The settlement negotiations were at arm's
6 length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. The Parties went
7 into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side
8 was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been
9 reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and
10 weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached a settlement, the
11 material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 10, **Ex. 1** [Joint
12 Stipulation of Settlement].) The Parties spent the next several months negotiating the terms of
13 the Settlement, which was finalized in February of 2026. (*Id.*) The negotiations were adversarial,
14 conducted at arm's length and tempered by the efforts of both sides to serve the interests of their
15 clients.

16 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based
17 on the Parties' informal exchange of documents and information and Class Counsel's own
18 independent investigation and evaluation, Class Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is
19 fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members in
20 light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could
21 be asserted by Defendant both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk.
22 (Fattahi Decl., at ¶ 15.)

23 Indeed, the \$120,000.00 Settlement represents approximately **98.6%** of the **realistic**
24 **maximum recovery** of \$121,672.50. (*Id.* at ¶ 24.) Although Class Counsel estimated that
25 Defendant's maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately \$445,587.32, when
26 the risk of prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel
27 believes that Defendant's realistic exposure was \$121,672.50, meaning the Settlement achieves
28 a significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-28.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at

1 class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 24.) Indeed,
2 because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and
3 will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. (*Id.*)

4 **D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement**

5 The Settlement’s key terms include:

6 1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification
7 of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: “all former remote
8 hourly employees of Snap One in California during the Class Period.” (Settlement, § 1.4.)

9 2. Class Period: means “the period from December 27, 2020 to December 24, 2024.”
10 (Settlement, § 1.11.)

11 3. Class Member or Settlement Class Member: “means a member of the Class, as either
12 a Participating Class Member or Non-Participating Class Member (including a Non- Participating
13 Class Member who qualifies as a PAGA Member)” (Settlement, § 1.8.)

14 4. PAGA Member: means “all former remote hourly employees of Snap One in
15 California during the PAGA Period.” (Settlement, § 1.28.)

16 5. PAGA Period: “means the period from December 27, 2023 through December 24,
17 2024” (Settlement, § 1.30.)

18 6. Gross Settlement Amount: means “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Paragraph 8
19 below, Snap One promises to pay \$120,000.00 and no more as the Gross Settlement Amount, and
20 to separately pay any and all employer payroll taxes owed on the Wage Portions of the Individual
21 Class Payments. Snap One has no obligation to pay the Gross Settlement Amount (or any payroll
22 taxes) prior to the deadline stated in Paragraph 4.3 of this Agreement. The Administrator will
23 disburse the entire Gross Settlement Amount without asking or requiring Participating Class
24 Members or PAGA Members to submit any claim as a condition of payment.” (Settlement, § 3.1.)

25 7. Funding of Gross Settlement Amount: “Snap One shall fully fund the Gross
26 Settlement Amount, and also fund the amounts necessary to fully pay Snap One’s share of payroll
27 taxes by transmitting the funds to the Administrator no later than 14 calendar days after the
28 Effective Date.” (Settlement, § 4.3.)

1 8. Uncashed Checks: Any settlement checks remaining uncashed after one hundred
2 and eighty (180) days shall be transmitted to the California Controller’s Unclaimed Property Fund
3 in the name of the Class Member. (Settlement, §§ 4.4.1., 4.4.3.)

4 9. Release by Participating Class Members Who Are Not PAGA Members: “All
5 Participating Class Members, on behalf of themselves and their respective former and present
6 representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs, administrators, successors and assigns, release Released
7 Parties from all claims that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the Class
8 Period facts stated or ascertained in the Class Action, including pursuant to Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201,
9 202, 203, 204, 218.5, 218.6, 226, 226.7, 510, 512, 1174, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2802,
10 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 *et seq.*, and all applicable Wage Orders. Except as set forth in
11 Section 5.3 of this Agreement, Participating Class Members do not release any other claims,
12 including claims for vested benefits, unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, or claims
13 based on facts occurring outside the Class Period.” (Settlement, § 5.2.)

14 10. Release by Non-Participating Class Members Who Are PAGA Members: “All Non-
15 Participating Class Members who are PAGA Members are deemed to release, on behalf of
16 themselves and their respective former and present representatives, agents, attorneys, heirs,
17 administrators, successors and assigns, the Released Parties from all claims for PAGA penalties
18 that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the PAGA Period facts stated
19 or ascertained in the PAGA Action and the PAGA Notice, including claims for civil penalties
20 pursuant to Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2698 *et seq.*, and the alleged underlying violations of Cal. Lab. Code
21 §§ 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 213, 226, 226.6, 226.7, 510, 512, 558.1, 1174, 1174.5, 1194, 1194.2,
22 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 1199, 2699, 2802, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 *et. seq.*, and all applicable
23 Wage Orders.” (Settlement, § 5.3.)

24 11. No Reversion, No Claims Made: means that “[n]one of the Gross Settlement
25 Amount will revert to Snap One.” (Settlement, § 3.1.)

26 12. To the LWDA and Aggrieved Employees: The Settlement includes \$5,000.00
27 allocated to Plaintiffs’ claims under PAGA, with 65% of which (\$3,250.00) being paid to the
28 LWDA and 35% (\$1,750.00) being paid to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 3.2.5.) Class

Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval. (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 11, **Exhibit 3.**)

13. Net Settlement Amount: “means the Gross Settlement Amount, less the following payments in the amounts approved by the Court: Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Representative Service Payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Expenses Payment. The remainder is to be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments.” (Settlement, §1.26.)

14. Distribution Formula: The Individual Class Payment will be “calculated by (a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member’s Workweeks.” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.) As to PAGA: “The Administrator will calculate each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees’ 35% share of PAGA Penalties (\$1,750.00) by the total number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by all PAGA Members during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by each PAGA Member’s PAGA Period Pay Periods. PAGA Members assume full responsibility and liability for any taxes owed on their Individual PAGA Payment.” (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

15. Tax Allocation: “Any settlement money paid to Settlement Class members will be allocated as 20% to wages and 80% to interests and penalties.” (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

16. Class Representative Service Payment: “Class Representative Service Payment to the Class Representative of not more than \$10,000.00 (in addition to any Individual Class Payment and any Individual PAGA Payment the Class and PAGA Representative is entitled to receive). Snap One will not oppose Plaintiff’s request for a Class Representative Service Payment that does not exceed this amount. As part of the motion for Class Counsel Fees Payment and Class Litigation Expenses Payment, Plaintiff will seek Court approval for any Class Representative Service Payments no later than 16 court days prior to the Final Approval Hearing. If the Court approves a Class Representative Service Payment less than the amount requested, the Administrator will retain the remainder in the Net Settlement Amount. The Administrator will pay the Class Representative

1 Service Payment using IRS Form 1099. Plaintiff assumes full responsibility and liability for
2 employee taxes owed on the Class Representative Service Payment.” (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) This
3 payment shall be in addition to the *pro rata* recovery received by Plaintiff as part of the settlement.

4 17. Class Counsel Fees Payment and Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment: “[a]
5 Class Counsel Fees Payment of not more than 1/3 of the Gross Settlement Amount, which is
6 currently estimated to be \$40,000.00, and a Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment of not
7 more than \$20,000.00. Snap One will not oppose requests for these payments provided that they do
8 not exceed these amounts. Plaintiff and/or Class Counsel will file a motion for Class Counsel Fees
9 Payment and Class Litigation Expenses Payment no later than 16 court days prior to the Final
10 Approval Hearing. If the Court approves a Class Counsel Fees Payment and/or a Class Counsel
11 Litigation Expenses Payment less than the amounts requested, the Administrator will allocate the
12 remainder to the Net Settlement Amount. Released Parties shall have no liability to Class Counsel
13 or any other Plaintiff’s Counsel arising from any claim to any portion of any Class Counsel Fee
14 Payment and/or Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment. The Administrator will pay the Class
15 Counsel Fees Payment and Class Counsel Expenses Payment using one or more IRS 1099 Forms.
16 Class Counsel assumes full responsibility and liability for taxes owed on the Class Counsel Fees
17 Payment and the Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment and holds Snap One harmless, and
18 indemnifies Snap One, from any dispute or controversy regarding any division or sharing of any
19 of these Payments.” (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

20 18. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a
21 statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys’
22 fees, costs, and service payment being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations
23 are calculated. (*See generally* Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by
24 first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 7.4.2.) Phoenix Class Action Administration, the
25 proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the notice is
26 provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of
27 address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*)

1 **III. DISCUSSION**

2 To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action
3 requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This
4 Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super.*
5 *Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached
6 through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
7 act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors
8 is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

9 In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant
10 factors, which may include the strength of plaintiff’s case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely
11 duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount
12 offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the
13 experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of
14 the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168
15 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself
16 that the class settlement is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness. (*Id.* at p. 133.) The record need
17 not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola*
18 *Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not
19 require “an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiff class could recover if it
20 prevailed on all its claims”, but instead, only an “understanding of the amount that is in controversy
21 and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.”].)

22 As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold
23 required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the
24 proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

25 **A. The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of** 26 **Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation**

27 **1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed** 28 **and Non-Collusive Arm’s-Length Negotiations**

1 Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless
2 evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were
3 conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.)
4 Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stambaugh v. Super.*
5 *Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 [“The
6 fact that a plaintiff might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not
7 to approve the settlement.”].)

8 The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of
9 mediation with experienced class action employment mediator, Louis Marlin (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 9.)
10 The settlement negotiations were at arm’s length and, although conducted in a professional manner,
11 were adversarial. (*Id.*) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a
12 settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through
13 trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and
14 discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s claims and Defendant’s defenses,
15 the Parties reached an agreement. (*Id.* at ¶ 10.)

16 Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning
17 the claims set forth in the litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll
18 records, Defendant’s policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of
19 meal and rest breaks, and issuance of wage statements, as well as information regarding the number
20 of putative class members and the mix of current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect,
21 and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 7, 8.) In
22 conjunction with their extensive factual investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable
23 law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) Thus, Plaintiff and his
24 counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement.

25 Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with
26 litigating wage and hour class actions. (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 39-52.) Again, this supports the
27 position that the terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been
28

1 considered and weighed in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of
2 continued litigation of this action.

3 **2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties’** 4 **Respective Legal Positions**

5 A settlement is not judged against what a plaintiff might recover had he or she prevailed at
6 trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable.
7 (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 [“Compromise is inherent
8 and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement
9 is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no
10 bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement
11 in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.”].)

12 This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation. (Fattahi
13 Decl., ¶ 26.) While Plaintiff is confident in the merits of his claims, a legitimate controversy exists
14 as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Plaintiff also recognizes that proving the amount of wages
15 due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

16 The proposed settlement of \$120,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when
17 compared to Plaintiffs’ reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 16-28.) Because of the proposed
18 Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an
19 unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in
20 achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability
21 of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of \$120,000.00 is well
22 within the “ballpark” of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*)
23 ***Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of***
24 ***approximately \$1,677.08.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 27.)

25 **3. Class Counsel Have Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation**

26 The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel.
27 Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are
28 experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 39-52.)

1 Although Plaintiff and his counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the litigation,
2 they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

3 **B. The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved**

4 Class Members are entitled to the best practical notice under the circumstances. (*Kass v.*
5 *Young*, 67 Cal. App. 3d 100, 106 (1977).) The purpose of the notice is to give class members
6 sufficient information to decide whether they should accept the benefits offered, opt out and pursue
7 their own remedies, or object to the settlement. (*Trotsky v. Los Angeles Fed. Savings & Loan Assn.*,
8 48 Cal. App. 3d 143, 151-52 (1975).) The notice must advise class members “that they may be
9 excluded from the class if they so request and that they will be bound by the judgment, whether
10 favorable or not, if they do not request exclusion.” (*Kass*, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 106.) In a case such
11 as this involving a significant number of class members, California authorities generally require
12 service of the class notice by mail or similar reliable means. (*Chance v. Super. Ct.*, 58 Cal. 2d 275,
13 290 (1962); *Cartt v. Super. Ct.*, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 972 (1975).)

14 The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved
15 for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the settlement and of
16 their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members who wish to object
17 to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and
18 be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice meets all the
19 requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

20 **C. The Proposed Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Are Reasonable**

21 Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, the Parties agreed to allocate
22 reasonable attorneys’ fees in an amount currently estimated to be \$40,000.00, and up to \$20,000.00
23 in costs. (Settlement, § 3.2.2.) These amounts are disclosed to all class members in the proposed
24 Notice and are reasonable.

25 **1. Class Counsel Requests an Award of Fees Based on the “Common**
26 **Fund” Method**

27 California courts have long awarded attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the benefit created
28 by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that “when a number

1 of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs
2 for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs
3 may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34,
4 quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

5 Class Counsel seeks an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/common
6 fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all
7 the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." (*Vincent v.*
8 *Hughes Air West, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995)
9 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in
10 winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive
11 beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs." (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and*
12 *County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized
13 that the common fund doctrine has been applied "consistently in California when an action brought
14 by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share." (*Id.* at p. 110.)

15 The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th
16 480 that, "when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
17 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the
18 court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the
19 fund created." (*Id.* at p. 503.) The court explained: "The recognized advantages of the percentage
20 method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the
21 class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement
22 it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—
23 convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts."
24 (*Id.* [internal citations omitted].)

25 2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases

26 According to a leading treatise on class actions, "[n]o general rule can be articulated on what
27 is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually, 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a
28 reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a

disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented.” (See Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys’ fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; see also *Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved “smaller” settlement funds of under \$10 million].)

Here, Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees equal to one-third (1/3) of the Settlement Amount, which is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. (See *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 [“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”].) Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys’ fees as negotiated by the Parties and requested herein.

3. This Matter Involves A “Fee-Shifting” Provision of the Labor Code

Labor Code § 1194 (a) provides for the recovery of “minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Under this section, Plaintiff would be permitted to recover their actual attorneys’ fees, even if those fees were larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class Counsel. (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 35-38.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class ahead of all other concerns.

4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award

As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers

1 and employees, Class Counsel possesses considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Fattahi
2 Decl., ¶¶ 39-52.) Class Counsel have been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class
3 actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class
4 counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsels' requested fee
5 award is supported here.

6 Class Counsels' experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the
7 strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement.
8 Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning
9 the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class
10 action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel have frequently received fee
11 awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award
12 is reasonable and fair.

13 **D. The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable**

14 Where settlements negotiate a good faith amount for PAGA penalties and "there is no
15 indication that this amount was the result of self-interest at the expense of other" class members,
16 such amounts are generally considered reasonable. (*Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Apr.
17 3, 2009) No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133 at *1, 9.) Courts have approved amounts for
18 PAGA penalties in the range of zero to two percent of the total maximum amount of the Settlement.
19 (*Id.* [approving a PAGA payment of 0.3%, or \$1,500]; *see also Jack v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.* (S.D.
20 Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) 2011 WL 4899942 at *6 [approving a PAGA payment of 0.25%]; *McKenzie v.*
21 *Fed. Express Corp.* (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) 2012 WL 12882124 at *5 [acknowledging that courts
22 approve PAGA claim settlements in the range of zero to two percent of the total settlement].) Here,
23 the amount to be paid to the LWDA is larger than many other PAGA settlement amounts approved
24 by the courts where seemingly nominal amounts were allocated for such claims. (*See, e.g., Zubia*
25 *v. Shamrock Foods Co.* (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) No. CV1603128ABAGRX, 2017 WL 10541431,
26 at *14 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.1%]; *Hopson*, 2008 WL 3385452, at *1 [approving a
27 PAGA settlement of 0.3% or \$1,500]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc.* (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012)
28 No. 1:10-CV-0324 AWI SKO, 2012 WL 5364575, at *3 [approving a PAGA settlement of

0.27%].) Here, the Parties negotiated a good faith amount of \$5,000.00, 65% percent of which (\$3,250.00) will be paid to the LWDA and 35% (\$1,750.00) to be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 3.2.5.) The \$5,000.00 allocation equates to 4.2% of the Gross Settlement Amount, which exceeds amounts that are routinely approved. The Parties negotiated to allocate 4.2% of the Settlement to PAGA penalties in good faith and this amount is reasonable considering that the maximum PAGA penalties were estimated at \$36,200 (which assumed \$100 per pay period). (Fattahi Decl., ¶ 23.)

E. The Service Payment to Named Plaintiff Is Reasonable

Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits “are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (*Munoz, supra*, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is codified in California Labor Code § 90.5, which provides, “it is the policy of this state to vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions” Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has noted that “retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is widespread,” despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court’s approval, Defendant agreed to pay a Service Payment in the amount of \$10,000.00 to plaintiff. (Settlement, § 3.2.1.) Courts routinely approve a \$10,000 enhancement award for plaintiffs represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v.*

1 *Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) 2021 WL 3673845, *3 [“The Court concludes
2 a \$10,000 incentive award is appropriate.”]; *Suarez v. Bank of America, National Association* (N.D.
3 Cal., Jan. 11, 2024, No. 18-CV-01202-LB) 2024 WL 150721, at *4 [“The court approves awards
4 of \$10,000 for each class representative.”].) Class Counsel represents that Plaintiff devoted a great
5 deal of time and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated with counsel very frequently
6 for litigation and to prepare for mediation, and was frequently in contact with Class Counsel during
7 the mediation. (*See generally* Declaration of Plaintiff Evan Romer in Support of Motion for
8 Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement [“Romer Decl.”].) This amount is
9 reasonable particularly in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiff generated for all class members.
10 (*Id.*)

11 When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount
12 requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a 2006 study examining the average incentive
13 award given to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the “average award per class
14 representative was \$15,992 and the median award per class representative was \$4,357.” (Eisenberg
15 & Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study* (2006) 53 UCLA L.Rev.
16 1303, 1308.) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment discrimination class
17 actions received an average award of \$69,850 and a median award of \$31,081, while named
18 plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of \$12,121 and a median
19 award of \$13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in
20 employment cases reflected the “courts’ wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by
21 compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization
22 or retaliation on the job.” (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

23 **IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED**

24 **A. Legal Standard**

25 The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive
26 from a core set of alleged violations of California’s wage and hour laws and regulations. For the
27 reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the
28 prerequisites for certification under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382

1 provides: “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when
2 the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more
3 may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to
4 section 382: “(1) There must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined
5 community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be
6 represented.” (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify
7 these requirements, the California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8 23 to explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: “(1)
9 predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of
10 the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (*Richmond v. Dart*
11 *Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.)

12 California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device.
13 (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, “Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a
14 means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system” particularly where the rights of
15 consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to the
16 appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond, supra*,
17 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

18 **B. Plaintiff Maintains That the Criteria for Class Certification Are Satisfied for**
19 **Settlement Purposes.**

20 **1. The Class is Ascertainable and Numerous**

21 The proposed class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is easily ascertainable and includes
22 approximately 24 employees of Defendant.

23 Plaintiff maintains that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and
24 precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business
25 records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co.*
26 (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the
27 subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

28 “The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be ‘many’ parties to a class

1 action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally.” (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d
2 926, 934.) “Where a question is of common interest to ‘many’ persons, an action may be maintained as a
3 class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable to join them all.” (*Id.*) “No set
4 number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a class action.” (*Id.*) “Thus, our Supreme Court
5 has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees.” (*Id.*,
6 citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574; *see also Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding
7 a 35 member class.]) Therefore, Plaintiff contends that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

8 **2. There are Many Common Issues of Law and Fact Which Predominate**

9 The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the
10 grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass predominate over any
11 individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to
12 warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.* (1987) 191
13 Cal.App.3d 605.)

14 Here, the employment practices at issue are: whether Defendant had legally compliant
15 policies and practices for all hours worked, including overtime wages; whether Defendant had
16 legally compliant policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether
17 Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees
18 to take rest periods; whether Defendant reimbursed employees for business expenses; and whether
19 the wage statements were consequently non-compliant. Plaintiff contends that the factual and legal
20 issues are the same for all of the identified class members, including Plaintiff. Further, all class
21 members suffered from, and seek redress for, the same alleged injuries.

22 **3. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class**

23 The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or
24 circumstances of the representative plaintiff compared to those of the remainder of the class,
25 but rather upon the typicality of the proposed representative’s claims as they relate to the
26 defendant’s conduct and activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 “[t]he
27 only requirements are that common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class
28 representative be similarly situated” vis-à-vis the class.]) A representative plaintiffs’ claims

are typical of the class if they arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant; as such, he alleges that he was subject to the same policies and practices as other similarly situated employees.

4. Plaintiff and His Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement

The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, a named plaintiff must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second, a named plaintiff's interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiff retained counsel with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that previously settled. (Fattahi Decl., ¶¶ 39-52.) Class Counsel unquestionably is "qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation." (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiff has no conflicts, and Plaintiff has, with counsel, litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing their dedication. Plaintiff's willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates their serious commitment to bringing about the best results possible for the class. (*McGhee, supra*, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation

Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation. By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court's use of the class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry, supra*, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 457-62; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

1 **V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND**

2 **A. The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process**

3 Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court,
4 Rule 3.766 (e), (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an
5 appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no
6 statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter,
7 the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he
8 notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class
9 Members . . .” (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by
10 direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

11 **B. The Notice is Accurate and Informative**

12 The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first
13 class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the
14 terms of the Settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class
15 Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the
16 opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

17 The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg,
18 *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the terms
19 and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It makes
20 clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the
21 Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits
22 of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The
23 Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a
24 combined settlement-certification class notice.

25 **VI. CONCLUSION**

26 The Parties have negotiated a fair and reasonable Settlement of the class claims in light of
27 the risks present in this case. Plaintiff has appropriately presented the materials and information
28

1 necessary for preliminary approval, and therefore respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily
2 approve the Settlement and schedule a date to conduct the Final Approval Hearing.

3
4 Respectfully submitted,

5 Dated: March 2, 2026

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC

6 By: 

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10 Attorneys for Plaintiff
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