

1 **JUSTICE FOR WORKERS, P.C.**

William C. Sung SB# 280792

2 E-Mail: william@justiceforworkers.com

Tiffany L. Luu SB# 335127

3 E-Mail: tluu@justiceforworkers.com

Joseph C. Ramli SB# 339491

4 E-Mail: jramli@justiceforworkers.com

9575 Bolsa Ave,

5 Westminster, CA 92683

Tel: 323-922-2000

6 Fax: 323-922-2000

7 Attorneys for Plaintiff ROSEANNA MAGDALENO

8
9 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

10 **FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

11
12 ROSEANNA MAGDALENO, an individual
and on behalf of all others similarly situated;

13 Plaintiff,

14 vs.

15 MILKY WAY INTERNATIONAL TRADING
16 CORPORATION, a California corporation;
and DOES 1 through 50,

17 Defendants.

Case No.: 24STCV32622

[Assigned for All Purposes to:
Hon. Laura A. Seigle, Dept. 17]

**PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND
PAGA SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

(Filed concurrently with Supporting
Declarations and [Proposed] Order)

DATE: June 23, 2026

TIME: 9:00 a.m.

DEPT: 17

Action Filed: December 11, 2024

Trial Date: Not Set

1 TO THE HONORABLE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF
2 RECORD:

3 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Rule 3.769 of the California Rules of Court, on
4 June 23, 2026 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 17 of the Los Angeles Superior Court, Spring Street
5 Courthouse, located at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, Plaintiff Roseanna
6 Magdaleno ("Plaintiff"), individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, will
7 and hereby does move this Court for:

8 1. Preliminary approval of the proposed class settlement of this lawsuit;
9 2. Pursuant to section 382 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, provisional
10 certification of the following Class defined as follows:

11 All current and former non-exempt or hourly paid employees who worked for
12 Defendant Milky Way International Trading Corporation in California at any time
during the Class Period of December 11, 2020 through March 10, 2026.

13 3. Preliminary appointment of Plaintiff as Class Representative;
14 4. Preliminary appointment of William C. Sung, Tiffany L. Luu, and Joseph C. Ramli
15 of Justice for Workers, P.C. as Class Counsel;
16 5. The scheduling of a hearing to consider whether the Settlement should be finally
17 approved and to permit a Class Representative Service Payment to Plaintiff, civil penalties payable
18 to the LWDA, settlement administration costs, and attorney's fees and costs to Class Counsel;
19 6. Appointment of Apex Class Action LLC as the third-party Administrator for mailing
20 notices and administering the Settlement; and
21 7. Approval of the proposed Class Notice and an order that it be disseminated to the
22 proposed Class as provided in the Settlement Agreement.

23 This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion; the attached Memorandum of Points and
24 Authorities; the supporting declarations of William C. Sung, Plaintiff Roseanna Magdaleno, Rachel
25 L. Marko, Anson To, and Kimberly Sutherland of Apex Class Action LLC, and the exhibits
26 attached thereto; the pleadings, and other papers filed in this Action; and on any further oral or
27 documentary evidence or argument presented at the time of the hearing.

28 ///

1 DATED: May 1, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

2 **JUSTICE FOR WORKERS, P.C.**

3
4 By: 

5 William C. Sung

6 Tiffany L. Luu

7 Joseph C. Ramli

8 Attorneys for Plaintiff

9 ROSEANNA MAGDALENO

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION..... 2

 A. THE PARTIES AND BRIEF PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2

 B. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AND DEFENDANT’S DEFENSES 2

 1. Unpaid Wages Due to Off-the-Clock Work 2

 2. Meal Period Violations 3

 3. Rest Period Violations 3

 4. Failure to Reimburse Necessary Business Expenses..... 4

 5. Waiting Time and Wage Statement Penalties 4

 6. PAGA Civil Penalties 4

 C. DISCOVERY AND MEDIATION 5

III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT 6

 A. ESSENTIAL TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT..... 6

 1. The Settlement Provides for Reasonable Monetary Payments..... 6

 2. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Service Payment, and PAGA Payment 8

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT 9

 A. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL IS WARRANTED 9

 1. The Strength of Plaintiff’s Case and Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Duration of Further
Litigation 10

 2. Amount Offered in Settlement Given Realistic Value of Claims 11

 3. The Experience and Views of Counsel 14

 4. The Preliminary Approval Standard Is Met 15

 B. THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY THE CLASS..... 16

 C. THE COURT SHOULD ORDER DISTRIBUTION OF THE CLASS NOTICE..... 18

 D. NO OTHER PENDING MATTERS 19

 E. THE COURT SHOULD SET A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING 19

V. CONCLUSION 19

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

State Cases

<i>Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2</i> (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157	14
<i>B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.</i> (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1341	17
<i>Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc.</i> (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 701	17
<i>Bowles v. Superior Court</i> (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574	17
<i>Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court</i> (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004	3
<i>Capital People First v. State Dept. of Developmental Services</i> (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 676	17
<i>Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.</i> (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504	5
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794	10
<i>In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases</i> (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380	8
<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.</i> (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116	10, 15
<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc.</i> (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480	9
<i>Lubin v. The Wackenhut Corp.</i> (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 926	5
<i>McGhee v. Bank of America</i> (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442	18
<i>Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc.</i> (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1056	4
<i>Price v. Starbucks Corp.</i> (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1136	4
<i>Reed v. United Teachers Los Angeles</i> (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 322	9
<i>Sav-On Drug Store, Inc. v. Superior Court (Rocher)</i> (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319	17
<i>Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court</i> (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319,	17
<i>Sevidal v. Target Corp.</i> (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 905	16
<i>Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Mgmt., Inc.</i> (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112	5, 14
<i>Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.</i> (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 230	10
<i>Williams v. Superior Court</i> (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1353	3

Federal Cases

<i>Chu v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC</i> (N.D. Cal. 2011) Case No. C 05-4526 MHP, 2011 WL 672645	9
<i>Doty v. Costco Wholesale Corp.</i> , Case No. CV05-3241 FMC-JWJx (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2007)	15
<i>Dunleavy v. Nadler</i> (9th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 454	15

1	<i>Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin</i> (1974) 417 U.S. 156	18
2	<i>Fleming v. Covidien Inc.</i> (C.D. Cal. 2011) Case No. ED CV10-01487 RGK (OPx), 2011 WL 7563047	5, 14
3	<i>Glass v. UBS Finan. Servs.</i> (N.D. Cal. 2007) Case No. C-06-4068 MMC, 2007 WL 221862.....	15
4	<i>Green v. Lawrence Service Co.</i> (C.D. Cal. 2013) 2013 WL 3907506	14
5	<i>Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.</i> (9th Cir. 1998) 150 F.3d 1011	9, 10
6	<i>In re Pacific Enterprises Securities Litigation</i> (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 373	14
7	<i>In re Syncor ERISA Litig</i> (9th Cir. 2008) 516 F.3d 1095	10
8	<i>Lazarin v. Pro Unlimited, Inc.</i> (N.D. Cal. 2013) Case No. C11-03609 HRL, 2013 WL 3541217.....	9
9	<i>Nat’l Rural Telecomm. Coop. v. DirecTV, Inc.</i> (C.D. Cal. 2004) 221 F.R.D. 523	15
10	<i>Sorenson v. PetSmart, Inc.</i> , Case No. 2:06-CV-02674-JAM-DAD (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008)	15
11	<i>Troester v. Starbucks Corporation</i> (C.D. Cal., Jan. 27, 2020, No. CV1207677CJCPJWX) 2020 WL 553572	3
12	<i>Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo</i> (2016) 136 S.Ct. 1036	5
13	Statutes	
14	Code Civ. Proc. § 382.....	16
15	Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2)	5
16	Labor Code § 203	4
17	Labor Code § 226(e).....	4
18	Labor Code § 2699(i)	9
19	Regulations and Court Rules	
20	California Rule of Court 3.766(d)	18
21	California Rule of Court 3.769	9, 19
22	Unpublished Cases	
23	<i>Bercea v. AE Retail West</i> , Case No. 34-2012-00123947 (Sacramento County Super. Ct. May 9, 2012).....	15
24	<i>Gomez v. Amadeus Salon, Inc.</i> , Case No. BC392297 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. July 23, 2010)	15
25	<i>Lim v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc.</i> , Case No. 04CC00213 (Orange County Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2006).....	15
26	<i>Palencia v. 99 Cents Only Stores</i> , Case No. 34-2010-00079619 (Sacramento County Super. Ct.) .	15
27		
28		

<i>Ressler v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.</i> , Case No. BC335018 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2009)	15
--	----

Treatises

4 Newberg on Class Actions § 11:24-25	15
4 Newberg on Class Actions § 14.6 (4th Ed. 2013)	9
Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.41(3rd Ed. 1995)	15

1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 Plaintiff Roseanna Magdaleno (“Plaintiff”) brought this wage and hour class and
4 representative action on behalf of a Class of all current and former non-exempt or hourly paid
5 employees who worked for Defendant Milky Way International Trading Corporation (“Defendant”)
6 within the State of California during the Class Period of December 11, 2020 through March 10,
7 2026. The primary issues in this case pertain to Defendant’s alleged unpaid wages due to off-the-
8 clock work, meal and rest period violations, and unreimbursed business expenses. Plaintiff contends
9 Defendant is also liable for inaccurate wage statement penalties, waiting time penalties, and civil
10 penalties under the California Private Attorney’s General Act (“PAGA”). Plaintiff requests that this
11 Court preliminarily approve this non-reversionary, common-fund class action settlement¹, in which
12 Defendant has agreed to pay the Gross Settlement Amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars
13 and Zero Cents (\$250,000.00) to approximately 42 Class Members.

14 After deducting administration costs, Plaintiff’s requested Class Representative Service
15 Payment, the amount set aside as PAGA Payment, and requested Class Counsel Fees Payment and
16 Litigation Expense Payment, the Net Settlement Amount of approximately \$120,196.67 will be
17 distributed to all Class Members who do not opt out of the Settlement based on the proportionate
18 number of Pay periods worked by each Class Member during the Class Period. Employees with
19 standing for PAGA Payment will receive additional consideration for their release of PAGA claims.

20 Significantly, all Class Members will automatically receive a payment unless they
21 affirmatively opt-out. There are approximately 42 Class Members, and **the average payment to**
22 **participating Class Members is projected to be approximately \$2,861.83.** This is an excellent
23 result for Class Members, who will be releasing only those claims alleged or which could have been
24 alleged in the Action. The proposed Settlement is within the range of possible approval in light of

25 _____
26
27 ¹ The Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement and Class Notice (“Settlement” or “Agreement”) is
28 attached to the Declaration of William C. Sung as **Exhibit 1**. The proposed Class Notice is attached to the
Agreement as **Exhibit A**. All defined terms in this motion have the same definition as that in the Agreement.
A redlined copy of the Agreement is attached as **Exhibit 2** and a redlined copy of the Class Notice is
attached as **Exhibit A** to the redlined Agreement.

1 the significant legal and factual obstacles that Plaintiff faced, the risks and costs of further litigation,
2 and the tangible monetary benefits to be received by the Class. For the reasons discussed herein,
3 Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant preliminary approval of the Settlement.

4 **II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION**

5 **A. THE PARTIES AND BRIEF PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

6 Defendant owns and operates a canned foods distribution company in Norwalk, California.
7 Declaration of William C. Sung (“Sung Decl.”), ¶ 9. Defendant employed Plaintiff as an hourly-
8 paid, non-exempt employee from approximately October 3, 2023 to approximately October 10,
9 2024 as a receptionist. Declaration of Roseanna Magdaleno (“Magdaleno Decl.”), ¶ 2.

10 On December 11, 2024, Plaintiff sent a notice letter under PAGA to the Labor and
11 Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and gave notice to Defendant. Sung Decl., ¶ 10, **Exh.**
12 **3** (PAGA Notice). Also on December 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed the Class Action Complaint alleged
13 claims for (1) Minimum Wage Violations; (2) Overtime Wage Violations; (3) Meal Period
14 Violations; (4) Rest Period Violations; (5) Wage Statement Penalties; (6) Waiting Time Penalties;
15 (7) Failure to Reimburse Necessary Business Expenses; and (8) Unfair Competition. Sung Decl., ¶
16 11. On February 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“Operative
17 Complaint”) adding a cause of action for Civil Penalties Under the California Private Attorneys
18 General Act (“PAGA”) against Defendant. *Id.*, **Exh. 4** (Operative Complaint).

19 **B. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AND DEFENDANT’S DEFENSES**

20 **1. Unpaid Wages Due to Off-the-Clock Work**

21 Plaintiff alleged that she often worked off the clock without pay, such as answering calls
22 during her meal breaks, and she and the Class experienced unpaid minimum and overtime wages as
23 a result of the off-the-clock work. Sung Decl., ¶ 12. Defendant argued it has compliant policies that
24 prohibit working off the clock and require all employees to receive wages for all hours worked.
25 *Ibid.* During the Class Period, Defendant paid Class Members over \$14,000.00 in overtime wages.
26 *Ibid.* Defendant thus contended that Plaintiff’s off-the-clock work claim is individualized and not
27 suited for class certification since there is no evidence of a common policy or practice forcing Class
28 Members to work off the clock and numerous individual inquiries would be needed to assess which

1 Class Members, if any, worked off the clock, how often, the reasons why a particular Class Member
2 worked off the clock, and whether Defendant knew or should have known that Class Members
3 worked off the clock for the imposition of classwide liability. *Ibid*; see, e.g., *Troester v. Starbucks*
4 *Corporation* (C.D. Cal., Jan. 27, 2020, No. CV1207677CJCPJWX) 2020 WL 553572, at *9
5 (denying certification of off-the-clock work claim because of individualized inquiries); *Williams v.*
6 *Superior Court* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1369, as modified (Dec. 24, 2013) (standard for
7 liability for off-the-clock work).

8 **2. Meal Period Violations**

9 Plaintiff claimed that Defendant failed to provide Class Members with compliant meal
10 breaks. Sung Decl., ¶ 13. In response, Defendant argued that it maintained compliant meal period
11 policies and practices throughout the Class Period and always provided compliant meal periods in
12 line with those policies. *Ibid*; see *Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004,
13 1040-1041 (holding employers need only “provide” meal periods to employees and are not
14 obligated to “police” meal periods). Defendant pointed to the fact that it paid \$1,088.00 in meal
15 period premiums as evidence of its superior meal period compliance practices. Sung Decl., ¶ 13. As
16 such, Defendant maintained that Plaintiff’s meal period claim is not suited for class certification
17 since individual inquiries would be needed to assess which employees, if any, took non-compliant
18 meal periods, how many meal periods were non-compliant, and the reasons why a particular
19 employee did not take a meal period on a particular shift and a meal period premium was not paid.
20 *Ibid*.

21 **3. Rest Period Violations**

22 Plaintiff claimed that Defendant failed to provide Class Members with compliant rest
23 breaks. Sung Decl., ¶ 14. Defendant countered that it has maintained compliant rest period policies
24 and practices and provided compliant rest periods in line with those policies. *Ibid*. Defendant further
25 maintained that Plaintiff’s rest period claim is not suited for class certification since individual
26 inquiries would be needed to assess which employees, if any, took non-compliant rest periods, how
27 many rest periods were non-compliant, and the reasons why a particular employee did not take a
28 rest period on a particular shift. *Ibid*.

1 **4. Failure to Reimburse Necessary Business Expenses**

2 Plaintiff alleged that she was required to use her personal cellphone for work purposes, such
3 as to download applications for communication with customers out of the country. Sung Decl., ¶ 15.
4 In response, Defendant argued that it does not require employees to use their personal cellphones
5 and Plaintiff used her personal cellphone out of her own convenience. *Ibid.* Defendant further
6 maintained that Plaintiff’s reimbursement claim is not suited for class certification since individual
7 inquiries would be needed to assess which employees, if any, used their personal cellphone and
8 whether such usage was necessary to perform their duties. *Ibid.*

9 **5. Waiting Time and Wage Statement Penalties**

10 As a result of the unpaid wages and meal and rest period premium wages described above,
11 Plaintiff contended that Defendant failed to comply with its final pay obligations set forth in Labor
12 Code §§ 201 to 203 to former employees and failed to issue accurate itemized wage statements to
13 Class Members as set forth in Labor Code § 226(a). Sung Decl., ¶ 16. Thus, the claims for waiting
14 time and wage statement penalties are derivative of the underlying claims. *Ibid.*

15 Defendant argued that it possessed strong, good faith defenses to Plaintiff’s underlying
16 claims and these claims cannot meet the willfulness standard in Labor Code § 203 or the knowing
17 and intentional standard in Labor Code § 226(e). Sung Decl., ¶ 16. Notably, Defendant relied on the
18 California Supreme Court decision in *Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc.* (2024) 15 Cal.5th
19 1056, 1065, which held that an employer’s good-faith defenses precludes a “willfulness” finding
20 under Labor Code § 203 and a “knowing and intentional” finding under Labor Code § 226(e) for the
21 imposition of statutory penalties. *Ibid.* Defendant further asserted that Plaintiff’s waiting time and
22 wage statement penalty exposure was inflated as not every employee experienced the alleged Labor
23 Code violations. *Ibid.*

24 **6. PAGA Civil Penalties**

25 Plaintiff further contended that, as a result of the foregoing Labor Code violations,
26 Defendant is liable for civil penalties under the PAGA. Sung Decl., ¶ 17. Since Plaintiff’s PAGA
27 claims are derivative of Plaintiff’s underlying wage claims, Defendant asserted the PAGA claim
28 would fail with those claims. *Ibid*; see *Price v. Starbucks Corp.* (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1147

1 (“Because the underlying causes of action fail, the derivative UCL and PAGA claims also fail.”).
2 Defendant further maintained that, given its good faith defenses, this Court would exercise its
3 discretion to substantially reduce any PAGA penalties if it were to find Defendant liable for any of
4 Plaintiff’s claims. Sung Decl., ¶ 17; *see* Lab. Code § 2699(e)(2) (pre-2024 amendment); *Thurman v.*
5 *Bayshore Transit Mgmt., Inc.* (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1135 (affirming reduction of PAGA
6 penalties); *Fleming v. Covidien Inc.* (C.D. Cal. 2011) Case No. ED CV10-01487 RGK (OPx), 2011
7 WL 7563047, at *4 (reducing PAGA penalties by over 82% in part because employer “not aware”
8 of violations); *Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.* (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 529 (affirming PAGA
9 civil penalty of just \$5 per pay period where employer made “good faith attempts” to comply with
10 the law).

11 C. DISCOVERY AND MEDIATION

12 Plaintiff initiated pre-certification written discovery prior to the Parties agreeing to
13 mediation. Sung Decl., ¶ 18. In connection with mediation, the Parties engaged in extensive
14 informal discovery. *Ibid.* Defendant produced (1) a class list with employee numbers, dates of
15 employment, positions, and the number of Class Workweeks and PAGA Pay Periods; (2) time and
16 payroll records for all Class Members; (3) Defendant’s employee handbooks and standalone policy
17 documents; and (4) Plaintiff’s personnel records and wage statements. *Ibid.*

18 Plaintiff submits that the Class Members’ time and payroll records are statistically
19 significant and reliable. Sung Decl., ¶ 19. The timekeeping data and payroll data produced for
20 mediation were generated from uniform timekeeping and payroll systems, which allowed Class
21 Counsel to extrapolate his and his expert’s findings with confidence. *Ibid.* Class Members worked
22 in similar job positions and were subject to the same wage and hour policies and procedures. *Ibid.*
23 Given these circumstances, the experiences of a subset of employees – the sampling – can be
24 probative as to the experiences of all Class Members. *Ibid*; *see e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v.*
25 *Bouaphakeo* (2016) 136 S.Ct. 1036 (holding that statistical evidence was admissible to prove
26 liability and damages across a class, thereby allowing it to support class certification); *Lubin v. The*
27 *Wackenhut Corp.* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 926, 938 (following *Tyson* and finding that a sampling of
28 class records is probative as to the experience of the entire class).

1 In preparation for mediation, Class Counsel worked with an expert data analyst and
2 conducted a comprehensive analysis and extrapolation of the payroll and timekeeping data
3 produced by Defendant to create a detailed exposure analysis for all claims at issue. Sung Decl., ¶
4 20. This discovery and analysis allowed the Parties to assess the merits and value of Plaintiff's
5 claims, the chances of certification of Plaintiff's claims, and Defendant's potential defenses. *Ibid.*

6 On January 9, 2026, the Parties participated in a full-day mediation with Steven Pearl, Esq. a
7 well-respected wage and hour class action mediator. Sung Decl., ¶ 21. During mediation, the Parties
8 vigorously debated their opposing legal positions, the likelihood of certification of Plaintiff's
9 claims, and the legal basis for the claims and defenses. *Ibid.* The Parties reached a tentative class
10 and PAGA settlement at the mediation. *Ibid.* The Parties then finalized the terms of the Settlement
11 and executed Agreement now before the Court. *Ibid*; see Sung Decl., ¶ 7, **Exh. 1** (Agreement).

12 **III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT**

13 **A. ESSENTIAL TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT**

14 If the Court preliminarily approves the Settlement, Defendant will pay a Gross Settlement
15 Amount of \$250,000.00. Agreement, § 1.22 (Exh. 1 to Sung Decl.). Significantly, this Settlement is
16 non-reversionary, and no Class Member will have to submit a claim form to receive an Individual
17 Settlement Payment. Agreement, § 3.1. Each Class Member will automatically receive an
18 Individual Settlement Payment unless they affirmatively opt out of the Settlement. Agreement, §
19 7.5. The monetary terms of the Settlement are summarized below:

Gross Settlement Amount:	\$250,000.00
Minus Court-approved attorneys' fees:	\$83,333.33
Minus Court-approved verified costs (up to):	\$20,000.00
Minus Court-approved Service Payment:	\$7,500.00
Minus estimated settlement administration costs:	\$3,970.00
Minus amount set aside as PAGA Payment:	\$15,000.00
Net Settlement Amount:	\$120,196.67
35% PAGA Payment to Aggrieved Employees:	\$5,250.00

24
25 Sung Decl., ¶ 22.

26 **1. The Settlement Provides for Reasonable Monetary Payments**

27 After deducting amounts for the Court-approved attorneys' fees and costs, Class
28 Representative Service Payment to Plaintiff, the amount set aside as PAGA Payment, and

1 settlement administration costs, the Settlement requires Defendant to pay a Net Settlement Amount
2 of at least **\$120,196.67** to all Class Members who do not timely opt-out. Agreement, § 3.2. The Net
3 Settlement Amount shall be distributed to participating Class Members as Individual Class
4 Payment, calculated by (a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of Pay periods
5 worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b) multiplying the result by
6 each Participating Class Member's Pay periods. Agreement, § 3.2.4. Additionally, \$5,250.00 of the
7 Gross Settlement Amount has been designated as Individual PAGA Payments to Aggrieved
8 Employees and shall be distributed to Aggrieved Employees (including those who submit a valid
9 and timely Request for Exclusion from the class action settlement) who were employed during the
10 PAGA Period proportionally based on the number of Pay Periods worked during the PAGA Period.
11 Agreement, §§ 3.2.5, 7.5.4. In addition to the Gross Settlement Amount, Defendant is obligated to
12 pay the employer's share of payroll taxes on Individual Class Payments allocated to settlement of
13 wage claims. Agreement, § 3.1.

14 According to Defendant, there are approximately 42 Class Members. Sung Decl., ¶ 23.
15 Therefore, the average Individual Class Payment from the Net Settlement Amount is projected to be
16 approximately **\$2,861.83**. *Ibid.* There are also approximately 22 Aggrieved Employees during the
17 PAGA Period who will each receive an average of approximately **\$238.64** as Individual PAGA
18 Payments. *Ibid.* Class Members will have 45 calendar days from the mailing of the Class Notice to
19 opt-out or object to the Settlement, thereby providing ample time to review the Class Notice without
20 unduly delaying the Settlement. Agreement, §§ 1.43, 7.5, 7.7.

21 Effective on the date when Defendant fully funds the Gross Settlement Amount and
22 employer taxes, Participating Class Members will release any and all claims that were alleged, or
23 reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts stated in the Operative Complaint that arose
24 during the Class Period; and all Aggrieved Employees are deemed to release all claims for PAGA
25 penalties that were alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on facts stated in the
26 Operative Complaint and the PAGA Notice that arose during the PAGA Period. Agreement, §§ 5,
27 5.2, 5.3. Defendant shall fund the Gross Settlement Amount no later than 30 days after the Effective
28 Date (i.e., the date the Court enters a Judgment on its Order Granting Final Approval and the

Judgment is final). Agreement, §§ 1.18, 4.3.

Prior to the hearing on Preliminary Approval, Defendant will verify the number of Pay periods during the Class Period and advise the Court as to whether the Escalator Clause is triggered, and if yes, whether Defendant will modify the Class Period end date. Agreement, § 8.

2. Attorneys' Fees and Costs, Service Payment, and PAGA Payment

Plaintiff will apply for a Class Representative Service Payment at the time of seeking final approval of the proposed class action settlement in the amount of \$7,500.00 for Plaintiff's service to the Class. Agreement, § 3.2.1. "[I]ncentive awards are fairly typical in class action cases . . . and are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class [and] to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action." *In re Cellphone Fee Termination Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1393-94. Plaintiff's requested Service Payment is intended to recognize the time and effort Plaintiff expended on behalf of the Class, including providing substantial information and documents to Class Counsel, discussing the claims at issue in the litigation, actively participating in the prosecution of Plaintiff's claims, as well as the risks Plaintiff undertook by agreeing to serve as the named plaintiff in this case. *See* Magdaleno Decl., ¶¶ 4-6.

Class Counsel will also apply for an attorneys' fees award of 33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount, which is equivalent to \$83,333.33, and up to \$20,000.00 in verified costs reimbursement. Agreement, § 3.2.2. The requested fee is fair compensation for undertaking complex, risky, expensive, and time-consuming litigation on a purely contingent fee basis. Sung Decl., ¶ 24. Class Counsel have incurred substantial attorneys' fees and costs conducting pre-filing investigation, analyzing Plaintiff's claims, conducting legal research, conducting discovery, analyzing Class Members' time and payroll records, creating a comprehensive damages model, preparing for and attending mediation, negotiating and preparing the long-form Agreement, preparing this Motion, and otherwise litigating the case. *Ibid.* Class Counsel expect to expend additional attorney time in attending the hearing on this Motion, overseeing the Class Notice process and fielding questions from Class Members, preparing the Final Approval papers, and attending the Final Approval hearing. *Ibid.*

1 California courts recognize that an appropriate method for awarding attorneys' fees in class
2 actions is to award a percentage of the "common fund" created as a result of a settlement. *See, e.g.,*
3 *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc.* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 506 (holding "the percentage of fund method
4 survives in California class action cases"). Class Counsel's request for fees of 33 1/3% of the Gross
5 Settlement Amount is well within the range of reasonableness and indeed is considered the typical
6 rate for common fund settlements. Historically, courts have awarded percentage fees in the range of
7 20% to 50%, depending on the circumstances of the case. *See* 4 Newberg on Class Actions § 14.6
8 (4th Ed. 2013). Class Counsel submit that their request for attorneys' fees is reasonable when
9 viewed as an overall percentage of the Settlement and in light of the substantial risks and significant
10 work undertaken, the results obtained, and the efficiency with which the litigation has been
11 conducted. Should the Court grant preliminary approval, Class Counsel will seek an award of
12 attorneys' fees and verified costs upon seeking Final Approval.

13 Additionally, the parties have agreed to designate \$15,000.00 of the Gross Settlement
14 Amount as PAGA civil penalties, of which \$9,750.00 (65%) will be paid to the LWDA, with the
15 remaining \$5,250.00 (35%) for distribution to the Aggrieved Employees pursuant to Labor Code §
16 2699(i) (pre-July 1, 2024 PAGA amendment). Agreement, § 3.2.5. Plaintiff submits this allocation
17 to the LWDA for civil PAGA penalties is appropriate. *See, e.g., Chu v. Wells Fargo Investments,*
18 *LLC* (N.D. Cal. 2011) Case No. C 05-4526 MHP, 2011 WL 672645 at *1 (approving PAGA
19 payment of \$7,500 to LWDA out of \$6.9 million common-fund settlement); *Lazarin v. Pro*
20 *Unlimited, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. 2013) Case No. C11-03609 HRL, 2013 WL 3541217 (approving PAGA
21 payment of \$7,500 to LWDA out of \$1.25 million common-fund settlement).

22 **IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT**

23 **A. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL IS WARRANTED**

24 California Rule of Court 3.769 conditions settlement of a class action on court approval,
25 which is generally evaluated under the federal standards applicable under Rule 23 of the Federal
26 Rules of Civil Procedure. *See Reed v. United Teachers Los Angeles* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 322,
27 337 (Rule 3.769 requires trial court to determine "that the settlement is fair, reasonable and
28 adequate to all concerned"); *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* (9th Cir. 1998) 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (Rule

23(e) requires the trial court to determine “whether a proposed settlement is fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable”). Settlement is the preferred means of dispute resolution, particularly in complex class action litigation. *See In re Syncor ERISA Litig* (9th Cir. 2008) 516 F.3d 1095, 1101. The Court’s role in evaluating a proposed settlement is limited to ensuring that the agreement taken as a whole is fair. *See e.g., Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1027. There is an initial presumption of fairness where, as here, the Settlement was negotiated at arm’s-length by class counsel and with the assistance of an experienced wage and hour class action mediator. *See e.g., Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 130.

To make a fairness determination, the Court should consider “the strength of Plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, [and] the experience and views of counsel.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801. “The list of factors is not exclusive, and the court is free to engage in a balancing and weighing of the factors depending on the circumstances of each case.” *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 230, 245. Here, the proposed Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable in light of the overall balance of factors in this case.

1. The Strength of Plaintiff’s Case and Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Duration of Further Litigation

Although Plaintiff maintains that Plaintiff’s claims are meritorious, Plaintiff acknowledges that there were substantial risks and uncertainty in proceeding with litigation. Sung Decl., ¶ 25. As described above, Defendant presented multiple defenses to Plaintiff’s claims, both on the merits and with respect to class certification. *Ibid.* Thus, while Plaintiff was prepared to litigate these claims through class certification and ultimately trial, success was far from certain. Although the Parties engaged in significant informal discovery prior to mediation, the Parties still had significant formal discovery to complete if the Action did not resolve. *Ibid.* This would have required the expenditure of substantial time and resources by both Parties that would have very likely spanned several years. *Ibid.* Even if Plaintiff were to certify the class, the Parties would incur considerably more attorneys’ fees and costs through a possible decertification motion, trial, and possible appeal. *Ibid.* This

1 Settlement avoids those risks and the accompanying expense. *Ibid.*

2 Plaintiff has not yet filed a motion for class certification, and as such, the extent to which
3 Plaintiff's proposed classes were certifiable is somewhat speculative. Sung Decl., ¶ 26. Absent
4 settlement, there was a risk that there would not be a certified class at the time of trial, or if there
5 were, it would consist of a significantly smaller group of employees than the proposed Class due to
6 a narrowing of the class definition in a Court order on a contested motion for class certification.
7 *Ibid.* Thus, this factor, too, supports preliminary approval of the settlement.

8 **2. Amount Offered in Settlement Given Realistic Value of Claims**

9 The Settlement provides a positive recovery for the Class in the face of disputed claims.
10 Plaintiff conducted a detailed analysis of alleged unpaid wages and meal and rest period premium
11 payments owing, wage statement penalties, waiting time penalties, and PAGA civil penalties. A
12 summary of the results of Plaintiff's exposure analysis are discussed below:

13 Unpaid Wages. Any instance of off-the-clock work would not be reflected in the records.
14 Sung Decl., ¶ 27. Estimating that Class Members worked on average 3 hours off the clock per pay
15 period, at an average hourly rate of \$24.28, and extrapolated to 2,391 pay periods, Defendant's
16 maximum exposure for unpaid wages, including overtime, is \$261,240.66. *Ibid.* As discussed
17 above, Defendant argued it has compliant policies that prohibit working off the clock and require all
18 employees to receive wages for all hours worked; during the Class Period, Defendant paid Class
19 Members over \$14,000.00 in overtime wages; and that Plaintiff's off-the-clock work claim is
20 individualized and not suited for class certification. *Ibid.* Thus, Plaintiff discounted Defendant's
21 maximum exposure by 50% to account for the risk of non-certification and for Defendant's
22 defenses on the merits or failing to recover the full amount sought to arrive at an estimated realistic
23 recovery of approximately **\$130,620.33**. *Ibid.*

24 Meal Period Premiums. Plaintiff's expert found, out of 10,282 shifts and 1,143 pay periods:
25 2,255 shifts or 21.93% had missed meal periods, 3,470 shifts or 33.75% had late meal periods,
26 1,273 shifts or 12.38% had short meal periods, 1,290 shifts or 12.55% had missed second meal
27 periods, and after accounting for meal period premiums paid, there were 5.7 meal period violations
28 per pay period. Sung Decl., ¶ 28. Extrapolating 5.7 violations per pay period to 2,391 pay periods

1 and at an average hourly rate of \$24.28, Defendant's maximum exposure for unpaid meal period
2 premiums is \$330,848.97. *Ibid.* As discussed above, Defendant argued that it maintained compliant
3 meal period policies and practices throughout the Class Period and always provided compliant meal
4 periods in line with those policies; that it paid \$1,088.00 in meal period premiums as evidence of its
5 superior meal period compliance practices; and Plaintiff's meal period claim is not suited for class
6 certification since individual inquiries predominated. *Ibid.* Thus, Plaintiff discounted Defendant's
7 maximum exposure by 50% to account for the risk of non-certification and for Defendant's
8 defenses on the merits or failing to recover the full amount sought to arrive at an estimated realistic
9 recovery of approximately **\$165,424.49**. *Ibid.*

10 Rest Period Premiums. Defendant had Class Members record their rest breaks on timesheets
11 and Plaintiff's expert analyzed the rest break entries and found 34.54% of shifts had a rest period
12 violation, or 2.82 rest period violations per pay period. Sung Decl., ¶ 29. Extrapolating 2.82 rest
13 period violations per pay period to 2,391 pay periods and at an average hourly rate of \$24.28,
14 Defendant's maximum exposure for unpaid meal period premiums is \$163,915.71 *Ibid.* As
15 discussed above, Defendant argued that it maintained compliant rest period policies and practices
16 throughout the Class Period and always provided compliant rest periods in line with those policies;
17 and Plaintiff's rest period claim is not suited for class certification since individual inquiries
18 predominated. *Ibid.* Thus, Plaintiff discounted Defendant's maximum exposure by 50% to account
19 for the risk of non-certification and for Defendant's defenses on the merits or failing to recover the
20 full amount sought to arrive at an estimated realistic recovery of approximately **\$81,957.86**. *Ibid.*

21 Unreimbursed Expenses: Estimating a cellphone reimbursement rate of \$25 per pay period,
22 extrapolated over 2,391 pay periods, Defendant's maximum exposure for unreimbursed business
23 expenses is \$59,775.00. Sung Decl., ¶ 30. As discussed above, Defendant argued that Class
24 Members were not required to use their personal cellphone to perform their duties and Plaintiff's
25 reimbursement claim is not suited for class certification since individual inquiries predominated.
26 *Ibid.* Thus, Plaintiff discounted Defendant's maximum exposure by 50% to account for the risk of
27 non-certification and for Defendant's defenses on the merits or failing to recover the full amount
28 sought to arrive at an estimated realistic recovery of approximately **\$29,887.50**. *Ibid.*

1 Waiting Time Penalties: As a result of the regular rate violations described above, Plaintiff
2 contends that Defendant failed to comply with its final pay obligations set forth in Labor Code §§
3 201 to 203 to former employees. Sung Decl., ¶ 31. At 24 former employees, at an average hourly
4 rate of \$24.28 and average hours worked of 8.05 hours, and over 30 days, Defendant’s maximum
5 exposure for waiting time penalties is \$140,726.88. *Ibid.* Defendant presented several defenses,
6 including that because it possessed good-faith defenses to the underlying wage claims, any failure to
7 pay wages was not “willful” as a matter of law; Plaintiff’s waiting time penalty exposure was
8 grossly inflated as not every former employee experienced the alleged Labor Code violations; and
9 because the waiting time claim is derivative of Plaintiff’s underlying wage claims, Plaintiff would
10 need to overcome Defendant’s defenses, both as to class certification and on the merits, as to the
11 underlying claims. *Ibid.* Thus, Plaintiff discounted Defendant’s maximum exposure by 80% to
12 account for the risk of non-certification and Defendant’s defenses on the merits or failing to recover
13 the full amount sought, to arrive at an estimated realistic recovery of approximately **\$28,145.38**.
14 *Ibid.*

15 Wage Statement Penalties: Plaintiff alleged that Defendant is liable for wage statement
16 penalties as a result of unpaid wages. Sung Decl., ¶ 32. Those penalties are calculated as \$50 for
17 each “initial” violation and \$100 for each “subsequent” violation, with a maximum of \$4,000 per
18 employee. Lab. Code § 226(e). Class Counsel found in the payroll records approximately 38.39% of
19 pay periods had a regular rate violation, and at \$50 for the initial violation and \$100 for each
20 subsequent violation per employee, Defendant’s maximum exposure for wage statement penalties is
21 \$80,812.29. Sung Decl., ¶ 32. As discussed above, Defendant presented several defenses, most
22 notably their assertion that because they possessed good-faith defenses to the underlying claims for
23 meal period violations and any failure to pay wages was not “knowing and intentional” as a matter
24 of law and because the wage statement claim is derivative of Plaintiff’s underlying wage claims,
25 Plaintiff would need to overcome Defendant’s defenses, both as to class certification and on the
26 merits, as to his underlying claims. *Ibid.* Thus, Plaintiff discounted Defendant’s maximum exposure
27 by 80% to account for the risk of non-certification and Defendant’s defenses on the merits or failing
28 to recover the full amount sought, to arrive at an estimated realistic recovery of approximately

1 **\$16,162.46. *Ibid.***

2 PAGA Penalties: Plaintiff estimated a maximum total PAGA exposure of approximately
3 \$83,100.00 (\$100 initial penalty X 8,310 pay periods). Sung Decl., ¶ 33; *Amaral v. Cintas Corp.*
4 *No. 2* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1207 (finding “initial” violation rate applies until employer is
5 notified that it is violating a Labor Code provision). However, these penalties derive from the
6 underlying wage and hour violations discussed above, which Defendant disputes vigorously. Sung
7 Decl., ¶ 33; *see e.g., Green v. Lawrence Service Co.* (C.D. Cal. 2013) 2013 WL 3907506, *5, n.5
8 (explaining that a PAGA claim’s success was determined by the merits of its underlying claims).
9 Defendant also assert that the Court would drastically reduce any award of PAGA penalties as
10 “confiscatory.” Sung Decl., ¶ 33; *see also Thurman*, 203 Cal.App.4th at 1135 (affirming reduction
11 of PAGA penalties); *Fleming*, 2011 WL 7563047, at *4 (reducing PAGA penalties from \$2.8
12 million to \$500,000). Therefore, Plaintiff discounted the maximum figure by 80% for the risk of
13 losing on the merits and/or not recovering a PAGA penalty for each and every pay period and to
14 account for the possibility of this Court reducing penalties, to arrive at an estimated exposure of
15 approximately **\$16,620.00**. Sung Decl., ¶ 33.

16 Conclusion: Using these estimated figures for each of the claims described above, Plaintiff
17 predicted that the potential realistic recovery for the Class would be approximately **\$468,818.00**.
18 Sung Decl., ¶ 34. The proposed Settlement of \$250,000.00 represents approximately **53.33%** of the
19 reasonably forecasted recovery for the Class. *Ibid.* Preliminary approval is appropriate since the
20 Settlement will provide significant monetary relief to the Class, which is consistent with what Class
21 Counsel believes could have been recovered had the case proceeded through trial. *Ibid.*

22 **3. The Experience and Views of Counsel**

23 “Parties represented by competent counsel are better positioned than courts to produce a
24 settlement that fairly reflects each party’s expected outcome in litigation.” In *In re Pacific*
25 *Enterprises Securities Litigation* (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 373, 378. Here, Plaintiff is represented by
26 competent, experienced counsel who possess extensive experience prosecuting and defending wage-
27 and-hour class actions and who have been appointed as class counsel. *See* Sung Decl., ¶¶ 2-7. Class
28 Counsel conducted an in-depth review of class records and drew on their extensive experience in

1 similar cases to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's case. The Settlement was reached
2 with the assistance of an experienced and respected wage-and-hour class action mediator. This
3 factor strongly supports preliminary approval of the Settlement. *See Kullar*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 130.

4 **4. The Preliminary Approval Standard Is Met**

5 At this stage, the Court can grant preliminary approval of the Settlement and direct that
6 notice be given if the proposed Settlement: (1) falls within the range of possible approval; (2)
7 appears to be the product of serious, informed, and non-collusive negotiations; and (3) has no
8 obvious deficiencies. *See* Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.41(3rd Ed. 1995); 4 Newberg on
9 Class Actions § 11:24-25 (4th Ed. 2013).

10 The proposed Settlement reflects approximately **53.33%** of the estimated recovery the Class
11 could reasonably expect in light of the significant litigation risks and will provide tangible,
12 substantial monetary compensation for hotly disputed claims. Indeed, the percentage of the liability
13 exposure recovered in this case far exceeds percentages routinely approved by courts. *See, e.g.,*
14 *Glass v. UBS Finan. Servs.* (N.D. Cal. 2007) Case No. C-06-4068 MMC, 2007 WL 221862, *4
15 (approving settlement representing 25% to 35% of potential damages); *Dunleavy v. Nadler* (9th Cir.
16 2000) 213 F.3d 454, 459 (approving settlement representing about one-sixth of potential recovery);
17 *Nat'l Rural Telecomm. Coop. v. DirecTV, Inc.* (C.D. Cal. 2004) 221 F.R.D. 523, 527 ("it is well-
18 settled law that a proposed settlement may be acceptable even though it amounts to only a fraction
19 of the potential recovery that might be available to the Class Members at trial"). The average
20 Individual Class Payment of approximately **\$2,861.83** exceeds average payments achieved in other
21 wage and hour class action settlements.² Thus, the proposed settlement is within the range of
22 possible approval, such that notice should be provided to the Class Members so that they can

23 _____
24 ² *See e.g., Bercea v. AE Retail West*, Case No. 34-2012-00123947 (Sacramento County Super. Ct. May 9,
25 2012) (average recovery of approximately \$105); *Ressler v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.*, Case No.
26 BC335018 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2009) (average recovery of approximately \$90); *Palencia*
27 *v. 99 Cents Only Stores*, Case No. 34-2010-00079619 (Sacramento County Super. Ct.) (average recovery of
28 approximately \$80); *Doty v. Costco Wholesale Corp.*, Case No. CV05-3241 FMC-JWJx (C.D. Cal. May 14,
2007) (average recovery of approximately \$65); *Lim v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc.*, Case No. 04CC00213
(Orange County Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2006) (average net recovery of approximately \$35); *Gomez v. Amadeus*
Salon, Inc., Case No. BC392297 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. July 23, 2010) (average net recovery of
approximately \$20); *Sorenson v. PetSmart, Inc.*, Case No. 2:06-CV-02674-JAM-DAD (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17,
2008) (wage and hour class action settlement approved where average recovery was approximately \$60).

1 consider the Settlement. The Court will have the opportunity to again assess the reasonableness of
2 the Settlement after the Class Members have had the opportunity to opt-out or object.

3 The Settlement resulted from an exchange of substantial information, arm's-length
4 negotiations by counsel, a full-day mediation before an experienced wage and hour mediator, and
5 additional months of negotiating the long-form settlement agreement. Thus, the Settlement is
6 entitled to an initial presumption of fairness. *See Kullar, supra*, 168 Cal.App.4th at 130. As
7 discussed above, Plaintiff carefully vetted the claims at issue, analyzed extensive sampling time and
8 payroll data, and conducted a detailed damages analysis to arrive at the estimated class-wide
9 damages figures. *See Sung Decl.*, ¶¶ 27-33. Thus, this factor supports preliminary approval.

10 Preliminary approval of the Settlement is also warranted because there are no obvious
11 deficiencies. The Settlement will provide substantial monetary relief to the Class. The amounts
12 proposed for Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and costs, LWDA payment, and Plaintiff's Class
13 Representative Service Payment, are all reasonable and appropriate based on the facts of this case.
14 Because the Settlement is devoid of obvious deficiencies, this factor supports preliminary approval.

15 **B. THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY THE CLASS**

16 The Class satisfies the criteria for certification of a settlement class under California law
17 because: (1) the Class is so numerous that joinder would be impractical; (2) common questions of
18 law and fact predominate over individual questions such that class certification is the most efficient
19 and desirable way to maintain this litigation; (3) Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of absent
20 Class Members; and (4) Plaintiff and Class Counsel will fairly and adequately represent Class
21 Members' interest. *See Code Civ. Proc. § 382.*

22 A class is "ascertainable" where the members "may be readily identified without
23 unreasonable expense or time by reference to official [or business] records." *See Sevidal v. Target*
24 *Corp.* (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 905, 916 (alterations in original). Here, the Class is defined as "all
25 current and former non-exempt employees who worked for Defendant within the State of California
26 during the Class Period." Therefore, Class Members can be identified from Defendant's personnel
27 and employment records. Defendant represents that the Class consists of approximately 42 current
28 and former non-exempt employees. It would therefore be impracticable to bring all Class Members

1 before the Court or for each Class Member to bring an individual lawsuit. Thus, the proposed Class
2 satisfies numerosity. *See, e.g., Bowles v. Superior Court* (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574 (holding a class
3 representing 10 beneficiaries of a trust sufficiently numerous).

4 The focus in a certification dispute is not on the merits but rather on what types of questions,
5 “common or individual,” are likely to arise in the Action. *See Sav-On Drug Store, Inc. v. Superior*
6 *Court (Rocher)* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 327. Plaintiff’s claims are predicated on, among other issues,
7 Defendant’s uniform policy and practice regarding provision of meal and rest periods, regular rate
8 of pay, timekeeping, and provision of wage statements and final wages. These types of claims are
9 commonly held to be proper for class certification. *See e.g., Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists,*
10 *Inc.* (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 701, 726 (certifying meal and rest period claims); *Sav-On Drug Stores,*
11 *Inc. v. Superior Court* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 324 (certifying exemption misclassification and
12 unpaid overtime claim).

13 The typicality requirement is satisfied where class representatives have claims that are
14 typical of those of the rest of the class. *B.W.I. Custom Kitchen v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.* (1987) 191
15 Cal.App.3d 1341, 1347 (finding typicality satisfied where named Plaintiff purchased the same
16 goods as the putative class in a consumer class action). Here, Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those
17 held by the Class Members. First, Defendant employed Plaintiff as non-exempt employee during the
18 Class Period, and Plaintiff was subject to Defendant’s wage and hour policies at issue in this case.
19 Magdaleno Decl., ¶¶ 2-3. Second, Plaintiff was injured by the same challenged policies/practices
20 that allegedly injured the Class as a whole: meal/rest period violations, regular rate violations
21 resulting in underpayment of wages, and derivative statutory and civil penalties. Magdaleno Decl.,
22 ¶ 3. Because Plaintiff has suffered the same injuries as the other members of the Class, the typicality
23 requirement is satisfied.

24 The adequacy requirement examines conflicts of interest between named parties and the
25 class(es) they seek to represent. *See Capital People First v. State Dept. of Developmental Services*
26 (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 676, 697. Plaintiff and Class Counsel will adequately represent the Class,
27 as there are no conflicts between Plaintiff and the proposed Class, and Plaintiff possesses claims
28 that are in line with those of the Class. Sung Decl., ¶ 33; Magdaleno Decl., ¶ 5; *see McGhee v. Bank*

1 *of America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450-51 (adequacy satisfied where there was no indication
2 that Class Counsel were not qualified and the named plaintiff had no interests antagonistic to those
3 of the proposed class). Class Counsel also have extensive experience in wage and hour class action
4 litigation. *See* Sung Decl., ¶¶ 2-7.

5 **C. THE COURT SHOULD ORDER DISTRIBUTION OF THE CLASS NOTICE**

6 This Court should order distribution to the Class of the proposed Class Notice by U.S. Mail,
7 postage prepaid using the last known mailing address information provided by Defendant. *See*
8 Agreement, §§ 1.8, 7.4.2, **Exhibit A** (Class Notice). The Class Notice will be distributed in English
9 because all of Defendant’s employees and read and comprehend English. Agreement, § 1.11;
10 Declaration of Anson To, ¶ 2. This manner of giving notice is the “best notice practicable” under
11 the circumstances because it provides “individual notice to all members who can be identified
12 through reasonable effort.” *See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin* (1974) 417 U.S. 156, 173.

13 Here, the Parties have agreed that the Settlement be administered by Apex Class Action
14 LLC (“Administrator”), an experienced class action settlement administrator. *See generally*
15 Declaration of Jodey Lawrence (“Administrator Decl.”) and attached exhibits. Class Members’
16 addresses will be ascertainable through Defendant’s personnel and payroll records, which
17 Defendant will provide to the Administrator within 15 days of preliminary approval of the
18 Settlement. Agreement, § 4.2. Within 14 days of receipt of the Class Members’ addresses, the
19 Administrator will run the names of all Class Members through the National Change of Address
20 database to update addresses and mail the Class Notice to all Class Members. Agreement, § 7.4.2.
21 To the extent that any notices are returned, the Administrator will perform a “skip trace” to track
22 any Class Member’s current mailing address and remail the notice within 3 business days.
23 Agreement, § 7.4.3.

24 The content of the proposed Class Notice satisfies California Rule of Court 3.766(d) because
25 it advises Class Members of the nature of the claims, basic contentions and denials of the parties,
26 and the key terms of the Settlement, the 45-day deadline to opt-out or object to the Settlement and
27 the procedures by which to do so, explains the recovery formula and expected recovery amount for
28 each Class Member, and advises them that they will be bound by the terms of the Agreement if they

1 do not opt-out. *See* Agreement, **Exhibit A** (Class Notice). The proposed Class Notice will also
2 notify Class Members of the final approval hearing date and provides the Class contact information
3 for Class Counsel and advises Class Members that they may enter an appearance through counsel if
4 they wish to. *Ibid*. This manner of giving notice satisfies California Rule of Court 3.766(e) as the
5 most reliable and cost-effective method of reaching Class Members.

6 **D. NO OTHER PENDING MATTERS**

7 The Parties are not aware of any other pending matter or action asserting claims that will be
8 extinguished or adversely affected by this Settlement. Sung Decl., ¶ 36; Declaration of Rachel L.
9 Marko, ¶ 3.

10 **E. THE COURT SHOULD SET A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING**

11 Finally, this Court should set a hearing for Final Approval of the Settlement on a date
12 appropriately scheduled to follow the deadline by which Class Members must file objections to the
13 Settlement or opt-out. *See* California Rule of Court 3.769.

14 **V. CONCLUSION**

15 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily approve
16 the proposed Settlement, provisionally certify the Class, and enter the Proposed Order submitted
17 concurrently herewith.

18
19 DATED: May 1, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

20 **JUSTICE FOR WORKERS, P.C.**

21
22 By: 

23 William C. Sung
24 Tiffany L. Luu
25 Joseph C. Ramli
26 Attorneys for Plaintiff
27 ROSEANNA MAGDALENO
28