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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO**

BARTOLO NARANJO, an individual, on
behalf of himself and on behalf of all persons
similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

APEM, INC., a Corporation; IDEC
CORPORATION, a Corporation; and DOES
1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: **24CU029650C**

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS SETTLEMENT**

Hearing Date: May 29, 2026
Hearing Time: 10:15 a.m.

Judge: Hon. Wendy M. Behan
Dept.: 66

Date Action Filed: December 19, 2024
Trial Date: Not set

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	DESCRIPTION OF THE SETTLEMENT.....	2
III.	CASE BACKGROUND.....	3
IV.	THE SETTLEMENT MEETS THE CRITERIA NECESSARY FOR THIS COURT TO GRANT PRELIMINARY APPROVAL	3
A.	The Role Of The Court In Preliminary Approval Of A Class Action Settlement	4
B.	Factors To Be Considered In Granting Preliminary Approval.....	5
1.	The Settlement is the Product of Serious, Informed and Arm's Length Negotiations by Experienced Counsel.....	5
2.	The Settlement Has No "Obvious Deficiencies" and Falls Within the Range for Approval.....	7
3.	The Settlement Does Not Improperly Grant Preferential Treatment To Class Representatives or Segments Of The Class	10
4.	The Stage Of The Proceedings Are Sufficiently Advanced To Permit Preliminary Approval Of The Settlement	11
V.	THE CLASS IS PROPERLY CERTIFIED FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES	11
A.	California Code of Civil Procedure § 382	11
B.	The Proposed Class Is Ascertainable and Numerous	12
C.	Common Issues of Law and Fact Predominate.....	12
D.	The Claims of the Plaintiff Are Typical of the Class Claims	13
E.	The Class Representation Fairly and Adequately Protected the Class	14
F.	The Superiority Requirement Is Met	14
VI.	THE PROPOSED METHOD OF CLASS NOTICE IS APPROPRIATE	14
VII.	CONCLUSION.....	15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

<u>Cases:</u>	<u>Page:</u>
<i>Andrews v. Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P.</i> , 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172183 (C.D. Cal. 2022)	10
<i>Brinker v. Superior Court</i> , 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012)	9
<i>Bowles v. Superior Court</i> , 44 Cal.2d 574 (1955)	12
<i>Cellphone Termination Fee Cases</i> , 180 Cal.App.4th 1110 (2009)	3
<i>Cho v. Seagate Tech. Holdings, Inc.</i> , 177 Cal. App. 4th 734 (2009)	4
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> , 48 Cal.App.4th 1794 (1996)	3, 4, 6
<i>Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.</i> , 59 Cal. 4th 1 (2014)	9
<i>Frazier v. City of Richmond</i> , 184 Cal.App.3d 1491 (1986)	4
<i>Gautreaux v. Pierce</i> , 690 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982)	4
<i>Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.</i> , 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524 (2008)	2
<i>Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.</i> , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476 (N.D.Cal. 2007)	8, 9, 10
<i>Green v. Obledo</i> , 29 Cal.3d 126 (1981)	4
<i>Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.</i> , 150 F.3d 1011 (9 th Cir. 1998)	8, 13, 14
<i>In re Tableware Antitrust Litig.</i> , 484 F.Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2007)	5
<i>In re Wash. Public Power Supply System Sec. Litig.</i> , 720 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Ariz. 1989)	6
<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker</i> , 168 Cal. App. 4th 116 (2008)	5, 6
<i>Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.</i> , 23 Cal. 4th 429 (2003)	13

1	<i>Louie v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.,</i>	
2	2008 WL 4473183 (S.D.Cal. 2008)	10
3	<i>Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.,</i>	
4	2014 WL 2472316, (C.D. Cal. 2014)	8
5	<i>Mathein v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc.,</i>	
6	2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71386 (E.D. Cal. 2018).....	10
7	<i>Nat'l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc.,</i>	
8	221 F.R.D. 523 (C.D. Cal. 2004).....	5
9	<i>Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.,</i>	
10	15 Cal. 5th 1056 (2024)	8, 9
11	<i>Nordstrom Comm'n Cases,</i>	
12	186 Cal. App. 4th 576 (2010)	3, 8
13	<i>Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com'n, etc.,</i>	
14	688 F.2d. 615 (9th Cir. 1982)	3, 4, 5
15	<i>Reynolds v. Direct Flow Med., Inc.,</i>	
16	2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149865 (N.D. Cal. 2019)	10
17	<i>Rose v. City of Hayward,</i>	
18	126 Cal.App.3d 926 (1981)	12
19	<i>Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court,</i>	
20	34 Cal. 4th 319 (2004)	12, 14
21	<i>Sayaman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,</i>	
22	2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151997 (C.D. Cal. 2010).....	4
23	<i>Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.,</i>	
24	2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671 (N.D. Cal. 2015)	8
25	<i>Tate v. Weyerhaeuser Co.,</i>	
26	723 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1983)	13
27	<i>Vasquez v. Superior Court,</i>	
28	4 Cal.3d 800 (1971)	4
	<i>Viceral v. Mistras Grp., Inc.,</i>	
	2016 WL 5907869 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2016).....	8
	<i>Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.,</i>	
	91 Cal.App.4th 224 (2001)	4
	<u>Statutes, Rules and Regulations:</u>	
	California Code of Civil Procedure §382	11, 12
	California Labor Code §203	7

1	California Labor Code §226	7
2	California Rules of Court, rule 3.766	15
3	California Rules of Court, rule 3.769	4, 15

Secondary Sources:

2 H. Newberg & A. Conte, <i>Newberg on Class Actions</i> (3d ed. 1992)	4, 12
<i>Manual For Complex Litigation</i> , (Second), §30.44, 41.43 (1993).....	4

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Plaintiff Bartolo Naranjo (“Plaintiff”) respectfully submits this memorandum in support of the
3 unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the proposed class action and Private Attorney General
4 Act (“PAGA”) settlement with Defendants APEM, Inc. and IDEC Corporation (“Defendants”), and
5 seeks entry of an order: (1) preliminarily approving the proposed settlement of this class action with
6 Defendants; (2) for settlement purposes only, conditionally certifying the Class, which is comprised of
7 “all individuals who are or previously were employed by Defendants who were classified as non-exempt
8 in the State of California at any time during the Class Period”, which is December 19, 2020 through
9 December 9, 2025; (3) provisionally appointing Plaintiff as the representative of the Class; (5)
10 provisionally appointing Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP as Class Counsel; (6)
11 approving the form and method for providing class-wide notice; (7) directing that notice of the proposed
12 settlement be given to the Class; (8) appointing ILYM Group, Inc. as Administrator, and (9) scheduling
13 a final approval hearing date, proposed for October 16, 2026, to consider Plaintiff’s motion for final
14 approval of the settlement and for approval of attorneys’ fees, expenses and the representative service
15 award. Plaintiff and Defendants (collectively the “Parties”) have reached a full and final settlement of
16 the above-captioned action (the “Settlement”), which is set forth in the Class Action and PAGA
17 Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) filed concurrently with the Court.¹ A copy of the fully executed
18 Agreement is attached as Exhibit #1 to the Declaration of Kyle Nordrehaug (“Decl. Nordrehaug”),
19 served and filed herewith. The form of the Agreement is based upon the Los Angeles County Superior
20 Court model form for a class and PAGA settlement.

21 As consideration for this Settlement, the non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of One
22 Million Nine Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars (\$1,950,000) (the “Gross Settlement Amount”) is to be
23 paid by Defendants, as set forth in the Agreement. The Gross Settlement Amount will settle all issues
24 pending in the Action between the Parties and will be made in full and final settlement of the Released
25 Class Claims and Released PAGA Claims in exchange for the payments to Participating Class Members
26 and payment of the PAGA Penalties (65% to the LWDA and 35% to the Aggrieved Employees) from

27 _____
28 ¹ Capitalized terms shall have the same meaning as defined in the Agreement.

1 the Gross Settlement Amount. The Gross Settlement Amount shall also be used to pay: (a) the costs
2 of administration of the settlement, (b) Class Counsel's attorneys' fees and costs requests, and (c) Class
3 Representative Service Payment. (Agreement at ¶ 1.22.) Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶3. The following is a
4 table of the key Settlement terms and the proposed deductions:

5 **\$1,950,000** (Gross Settlement Amount)
6 - \$15,000 (Plaintiff's proposed service award - not to exceed amount)
7 - \$31,000 (Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment - not to exceed amount)
8 - \$650,000 (Class Counsel Fees Payment - not to exceed 1/3 of settlement)
9 - \$50,000 (PAGA Payment - 65% to LWDA / 35% to Aggrieved Employees)
10 - \$10,000 (Administration Expenses Payment - not to exceed amount)
11 **\$1,194,000** (Net Settlement Amount)

12 Based upon 423 Class Members who worked an estimated 33,000 work weeks (Agreement at ¶ 4.1),
13 the Gross Settlement Amount provides an average value of \$4,609 per Class Member and \$59 per
14 workweek and after deductions the Net Settlement Amount provides an average recovery of \$2,822.69
15 per Class Member and a recovery of \$36.18 per workweek. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶6.

16 On September 9, 2025, the Parties participated in an all-day mediation with Deborah Saxe, a
17 respected and experienced mediator of wage and hour class and representative actions. Following the
18 mediation, the Parties agreed on the basic terms of a settlement pursuant to a mediator's proposal,
19 memorialized in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶5. The Settlement
20 is fair, reasonable and adequate, and should be preliminarily approved, because there is a fair monetary
21 payment, and there are significant litigation risks. Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant
22 preliminary approval of the Agreement and enter the proposed order submitted herewith.

23 **II. DESCRIPTION OF THE SETTLEMENT**

24 The Gross Settlement Amount is One Million Nine Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars
25 (\$1,950,000). (Agreement at ¶ 1.22.) Under the Settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount consists of
26 the following elements: (1) payment of the Individual Class Payments to the Participating Class
27 Members; (2) Class Counsel Fees Payment and Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment; (3)
28 Administration Expenses Payment; (4) the Class Representative Service Payment to the Plaintiff; and
29 (5) the PAGA Penalties payment, which is to be allocated 35% to the Aggrieved Employees and 65%
30 to the LWDA. (Agreement at ¶ 1.22.) The Gross Settlement Amount does not include Defendants'
31 share of employer-side payroll taxes which will be paid separately and not out of the Gross Settlement

1 Amount. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.) The Gross Settlement Amount shall not revert to Defendants.
2 (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.) Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶15.

3 The Agreement contains appropriate terms which have been previously approved by this Court
4 and Courts throughout California. (See Agreement at ¶¶ 1.28, 1.39, 3.2, 4.3, 5.1.) The proposed Class
5 Notice also provides the required protections for the Class to opt out, object or dispute their weeks
6 worked. (See Agreement at ¶¶ 8.5, 8.6, 8.7, and Exhibit A.) The additional details of the Settlement
7 are addressed in the Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶¶ 16-22. As set forth in the accompanying proof of service,
8 the LWDA has been served with this motion and the Agreement.

9 **III. CASE BACKGROUND**

10 The description of the case and claims, along with the procedural history is set forth in the
11 Declaration of Kyle Nordrehaug at ¶¶ 7-14. The Parties engaged in thorough investigation and the
12 exchange of documents and information in connection with the Action for more than one year which
13 permitted Class Counsel to perform a thorough analysis of the claims. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶¶ 10, 14.
14 The Parties participated in a mediation on September 9, 2025 with Deborah Saxe, which after arms'
15 length negotiations during and after the mediation, resulted in this Settlement. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶12.

16 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT MEETS THE CRITERIA NECESSARY FOR THIS COURT TO GRANT PRELIMINARY APPROVAL**

17 California “[p]ublic policy generally favors the compromise of complex class action litigation.”
18 *Nordstrom Comm'n Cases*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 576, 581 (2010) quoting *Cellphone Termination Fee*
19 *Cases*, 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1117-18 (2009). Class action settlements are approved where the
20 proposed settlement is “fair, adequate and reasonable.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794,
21 1801 (1996) (citing *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
22 denied, 459 U.S. 1217 (1983)).

23 Preliminary approval is the first of three steps that comprise the approval procedure for
24 settlements of class actions. The second step is the dissemination of notice of the settlement to all class
25 members. The third step is a final settlement approval hearing, at which evidence and argument
26 concerning the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the settlement may be presented, and class
27 members may be heard regarding the settlement. *See Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794,
28

1801 (1996); *Manual for Complex Litigation, Second* §30.44 (1993); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769.

The primary question presented on an application for preliminary approval of a proposed class action settlement is whether the proposed settlement is “within the range of possible approval.” *Manual for Complex Litigation, Second* §30.44 at 229; *Gautreaux v. Pierce*, 690 F.2d 616, 621 n.3 (7th Cir. 1982).² Preliminary approval is merely the prerequisite to giving notice so that “the proposed settlement... may be submitted to members of the prospective Class for their acceptance or rejection.” *Sayaman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151997, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2010). There is “a presumption of fairness . . . where . . . [a] settlement is reached through arms-length bargaining.” *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 245 (2001) (citation omitted); *see also Cho v. Seagate Tech. Holdings, Inc.*, 177 Cal. App. 4th 734, 742-45 (2009) (upholding trial court’s determination that settlement was “fair, reasonable and adequate” where the settlement “provided valuable benefits to the class . . . that were ‘particularly valuable in light of the risks plaintiff would have faced if she proceeded to litigate her case.’”); *Newberg*, 3d Ed., §11.41, p.11-88. However, the ultimate question of whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate is made after notice of the settlement to the class members and a final settlement hearing is held by the Court.

A. The Role Of The Court In Preliminary Approval Of A Class Action Settlement

The approval of a proposed settlement of a class action suit is a matter within the broad discretion of the trial court. *Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal. App.4th at 234-235; *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794. In considering a potential settlement for preliminary approval purposes, the trial court does not have to reach any ultimate conclusions on the issues of fact and law which underlie the merits of the dispute, and need not engage in a trial on the merits. *Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 239-40; *Dunk, supra*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1807. The Ninth Circuit explained that, “the very essence of a settlement is compromise, ‘a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes.’” *Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 624. Thus, when analyzing the settlement, the amount is “not to be judged against

² California courts look to federal authority on class actions. *Vasquez v. Superior Court*, 4 Cal.3d 800, 821 (1971). “It is well established that in the absence of relevant state precedents trial courts are urged to follow the procedures prescribed in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for conducting class actions.” *Frazier v. City of Richmond*, 184 Cal. App.3d 1491, 1499 (1986), *citing Green v. Obledo*, 29 Cal.3d 126, 145-146 (1981).

1 a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved by the negotiators.” *Officers*
2 *for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 625, 628.

3 With regard to class action settlements, the opinions of counsel should be given considerable
4 weight both because of counsel’s familiarity with this litigation and previous experience with cases such
5 as these. *Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 625. As a result, courts hold that the recommendation of
6 counsel is entitled to significant weight. *Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, 221 F.R.D.
7 523, 528 (C.D. Cal. 2004).

8 **B. Factors To Be Considered In Granting Preliminarily Approval**

9 A number of factors are to be considered in evaluating a settlement for purposes of preliminary
10 approval. In determining whether to grant preliminary approval, the court considers whether “(1) the
11 proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations, (2) has
12 no obvious deficiencies, (3) does not improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives or
13 segments of the class, and (4) falls within the range of possible approval.” *In re Tableware Antitrust*
14 *Litig.*, 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Courts hold that “a presumption of fairness exists
15 where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery
16 are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar
17 litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.
18 App. 4th 116, 128 (2008). Here, the Settlement meets all of the applicable criteria for preliminary
19 approval and therefore the presumption applies.

20 **1. The Settlement is the Product of Serious, Informed and**
21 **Arm’s Length Negotiations by Experienced Counsel**

22 This settlement is the result of hard-fought litigation negotiations before an experienced and well-
23 respected mediator. Defendants have expressly denied and continue to deny any wrongdoing or legal
24 liability arising out of the conduct alleged in the Action. Plaintiff and Class Counsel have determined
25 that it is desirable and beneficial to the Class to resolve the Released Class Claims of the Class in
26 accordance with this Settlement. The Class release is appropriately tethered to factual allegations in the
27 Operative Complaint. (Agreement at ¶¶ 1.39 and 6.2.)

28 Class Counsel are experienced and qualified to evaluate the class claims, the defenses asserted,

1 and the risks and benefits of trial and settlement, and Class Counsel are particularly experienced in wage
2 and hour employment class actions, as Class Counsel has previously litigated and certified similar claims
3 against other employers. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶31. The view of qualified and well-informed counsel
4 that a class action settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable is entitled to significant weight. *See*
5 *Kullar v. Foot Locker*, 168 Cal. App. 4th 116, 133 (2008) (the trial court "undoubtedly should continue
6 to place reliance on the competence and integrity of counsel, the involvement of a qualified mediator,
7 and the paucity of objectors to the settlement."); *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1802.

8 The Parties attended an arms-length mediation session with Deborah Saxe, a respected and
9 experienced mediator of wage and hour class and representative actions, in order to reach this
10 Settlement. In preparation for the mediation, Defendants provided Class Counsel with payroll, time and
11 employment data, along with other information regarding the Class Members, various internal
12 documents, and other compensation and employment-related materials. Class Counsel analyzed the data
13 with the assistance of damages expert Berger Consulting and prepared and submitted a mediation brief
14 to the mediator. The final settlement terms were negotiated and set forth in the Agreement now
15 presented for this Court's approval. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶ 5. Importantly, Plaintiff and Class Counsel
16 believe that this Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate.

17 Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of the class action as detailed
18 in the Declaration of Kyle Nordrehaug. Based on the Class data and their own independent
19 investigation, evaluation and experience, Class Counsel believes that the settlement with Defendants on
20 the terms set forth in the Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interest of the
21 Class in light of all known facts and circumstances, including the risk of significant delay, defenses
22 asserted by Defendants, and potential appellate issues. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶ 14. Plaintiff and Class
23 Counsel recognize the risks, expense and length of continuing to litigate and trying this Action against
24 Defendants and then litigating possible appeals which could take several years. Plaintiff and Class
25 Counsel have determined that the Settlement set forth in the Agreement is in the best interest of the
26 Class Members. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶ 23.

27 Here, there can be no dispute that the litigation has been hard-fought with aggressive and capable
28 advocacy on both sides. The Parties were represented by experienced and capable counsel who zealously

1 advocated their positions. Accordingly, “[t]here is likewise every reason to conclude that settlement
2 negotiations were vigorously conducted at arms’ length and without any suggestion of undue influence.”
3 *In re Wash. Public Power Supply Sec. Litig.*, 720 F. Supp. 1379, 1392 (D. Ariz 1989).

4 **2. The Settlement Has No "Obvious Deficiencies" and Falls Well Within**
5 **the Range for Approval**

6 The proposed Settlement herein has no “obvious deficiencies” and is well within the range of
7 possible approval. All Class Members will receive an opportunity to participate in the Settlement and
8 receive payment according to the same formula. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(e).) Based upon 423 Class
9 Members who worked an estimated 33,000 work weeks (Agreement at ¶ 4.1), the Gross Settlement
10 Amount provides an average value of \$4,609 per Class Member and \$59 per workweek and after
11 deductions the Net Settlement Amount provides an average recovery of \$2,822.69 per Class Member
12 and a recovery of \$36.18 per workweek. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶6.

13 The calculations to compensate for the amount due for the Class at the time of the mediation
14 were calculated by Berger Consulting, Plaintiff’s damage expert. As to the Class whose claims are at
15 issue in this Action, Plaintiff used this expert to analyze the data and determine the potential unpaid
16 wages for the employees. The maximum potential damages were calculated to be \$119,173 for the
17 alleged unpaid overtime, \$1,082,694 for the alleged unpaid wages for off-the-clock work at 1 hour per
18 week, \$17,683 for the alleged underpaid overtime due to the miscalculation of the regular rate, \$24,040
19 for the alleged unpaid sick pay due to the miscalculation of the regular rate, \$2,530,105 for alleged
20 missed meal period damages based upon a 77.2% violation rate observed in the time records, \$2,530,105
21 for alleged rest period damages based upon the same 77.2% violation rate observed in the meal period
22 records, \$40,379 for alleged unreimbursed cell-phone expenses at \$5 per month. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶6.
23 As a result, the total damage valuation was calculated such that Defendants were subject to a maximum
24 damage claim in the amount of \$6,344,179. As to potential penalties, Plaintiffs calculated that potential
25 waiting time penalties were a maximum of \$254,479, and potential maximum wage statement penalties
26 were \$669,780.³ Defendants vigorously disputed Plaintiff’s calculations and exposure theories. Decl.

27 _____
28 ³ While Plaintiff alleged claims for statutory penalties pursuant to Labor Code Sections 203 and 226,
at mediation Plaintiff recognized that these claims were subject to additional, separate defenses asserted

1 Nordrehaug, ¶6.

2 Consequently, the Gross Settlement Amount of \$1,950,000 represents more than 30% of the
3 maximum value of the alleged damages at issue in this case at the time this Settlement was negotiated.⁴
4 Importantly, the recent decision that good faith belief of compliance by the employer in *Naranjo v.*
5 *Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal. 5th 1056, 1065 (2024), could completely negate the claims for
6 waiting time and wage statement penalties, even if wages were owed to the Class. The above maximum
7 calculations should then be realistically risk-adjusted in consideration for both the risk of class
8 certification and class-wide liability on all claims. Given the amount of the settlement as compared to
9 the potential value of claims in this case and the defenses asserted by Defendants, this settlement is fair
10 and reasonable.⁵ Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶6.

11 Where both sides face significant uncertainty, the attendant risks favor settlement. *Hanlon v.*
12 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, a number of defenses asserted by
13 Defendants present serious threats to the claims of the Plaintiff and the other Class Members. Defendants
14 asserted that Defendants' practices complied with all applicable Labor laws. Defendants argued that
15 Class Members were paid for all time worked and that all work time was properly recorded and
16 compensation for that time was correctly compensated. Defendants contend that its meal and rest period

17 _____
18 by Defendants, including, a good faith dispute defense as to whether any premium wages for meal or rest
19 periods or other wages were owed given Defendants' position that Plaintiff and Class Members were
20 properly compensated. *See Nordstrom Commission Cases*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 576, 584 (2010) ("There
21 is no willful failure to pay wages if the employer and employee have a good faith dispute as to whether
22 and when the wages were due.").

23 ⁴ Because the PAGA claim is not a class claim and primarily is paid to the State of California,
24 Plaintiff has not included the PAGA claim in this discussion of the value of the class claims. The PAGA
25 claim is addressed in the Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶33.

26 ⁵ See *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (approving a
27 settlement where the settlement amount constituted approximately 25% of the estimated overtime
28 damages for the class); *Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671, at *12
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting final approval where the settlement "represents approximately 10% of what
class might have been awarded had they succeeded at trial."); *Viceral v. Mistras Grp., Inc.*, 2016 WL
5907869 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (approving wage and hour class action settlement amounting to 8.1% of full
value); *Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.*, 2014 WL 2472316, (C.D. Cal. 2014) (approving wage and hour
class action settlement worth "somewhere between 9% and 18%" of maximum valuation).

1 policies fully complied with California law and Defendants did not fail to provide the opportunity for
2 legally required meal and rest breaks. Defendants contend that there was no failure to pay for business
3 expenses and any cell phone usage was merely convenient and voluntary such that reimbursement was
4 not legally required. Finally, Defendants could argue that the Supreme Court decision in *Brinker v.*
5 *Superior Court*, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012), weakened Plaintiff's claims, on liability, value, and class
6 certifiability as to the meal and rest period claims. Defendants also argue that based on their facially
7 lawful practices, Defendants acted in good faith and without willfulness, which if accepted would negate
8 the claims for waiting time penalties and/or inaccurate wage statements. See e.g. *Naranjo v. Spectrum*
9 *Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal. 5th 1056, 1065 (May 6, 2024) ("if an employer reasonably and in good faith
10 believed it was providing a complete and accurate wage statement in compliance with the requirements
11 of section 226, then it has not knowingly and intentionally failed to comply with the wage statement
12 law.") Defendants' defenses could eliminate or substantially reduce any recovery to the Class. While
13 Plaintiff believes that these defenses could be overcome, Defendants maintain these defenses have merit
14 and therefore present a serious risk to recovery by the Class. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶ 24.

15 There was also a significant risk that, if the Action was not settled, Plaintiff would be unable to
16 certify a class and maintain that certification through trial, and thereby not recover on behalf of any
17 employees other than themselves. At the time of the mediation, Defendants forcefully opposed the
18 propriety of class certification, arguing that individual issues precluded class certification. Further, as
19 demonstrated by the California Supreme Court decision in *Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.*, 59 Cal.
20 4th 1 (2014), there are significant hurdles to overcome for a class-wide recovery even where the class
21 has been certified. While other cases have approved class certification in wage and hour claims, class
22 certification in this action was hotly disputed and the maintenance of a certified class through trial was
23 by no means a foregone conclusion. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶ 25.

24 After arm's length negotiations between experienced and informed counsel, the Parties
25 recognized the potential risks and agreed on the Settlement with a Gross Settlement Amount of
26 \$1,950,000. As the Court held in *Glass*, where the parties faced uncertainties similar to those here:

27 In light of the above-referenced uncertainty in the law, the risk, expense, complexity, and
28 likely duration of further litigation likewise favors the settlement. Regardless of how this
Court might have ruled on the merits of the legal issues, the losing party likely would

1 have appealed, and the parties would have faced the expense and uncertainty of litigating
2 an appeal.

3 2007 WL 221862, at *4.

4 **3. The Settlement Does Not Improperly Grant Preferential Treatment To
Class Representatives or Segments Of The Class**

5 The relief provided in the Settlement will benefit all members of the Class. The Settlement does
6 not grant preferential treatment to Plaintiff or segments of the Class in any way. Payments to the Class
7 Members are all determined under a neutral methodology. Each Participating Class Member will receive
8 the same opportunity to participate in and receive payment through a neutral formula that is based upon
9 the Workweeks for that individual. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶4.

10 Plaintiff will apply to the Court for a Class Representative Service Payment in consideration for
11 his service and for the risks undertaken on behalf of the Class. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(a).) Plaintiff
12 performed his duties admirably by working with Class Counsel over the course of litigation, and
13 undertook the risks of litigation for the Class. The Declaration of the Plaintiff is submitted herewith in
14 support. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶27. At this stage, the requested service award is within the range of
15 reasonableness for purposes of preliminary approval. *See e.g. Andrews v. Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P.*,
16 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172183, at *11 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (service awards of \$15,000 each are
17 appropriate); *Louie v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.*, 2008 WL 4473183, *7 (S.D.Cal. 2008)
18 (awarding \$25,000 service award); *Reynolds v. Direct Flow Med., Inc.*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149865,
19 at *19 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (granting request for \$12,500 service award); *Mathein v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.)*,
20 *Inc.*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71386 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (awarding \$12,500). As explained in *Glass*,
21 service awards are routinely awarded to compensate for the time and effort expended on the case, for
22 the risk of litigation, for the fear of suing an employer and retaliation there from, and to serve as an
23 incentive to vindicate the statutory rights of all employees. 2007 WL 221862 at *16-17.

24 **4. The Stage Of The Proceedings Are Sufficiently Advanced To Permit
25 Preliminary Approval Of The Settlement**

26 The stage of the proceedings at which this Settlement was reached also militates in favor of
27 preliminary approval and ultimately, final approval of the Settlement. Class Counsel has conducted a
28 thorough investigation into the facts of the class action. Class Counsel engaged in informal discovery

1 to obtain necessary information. Class Counsel conducted a review and analysis of the relevant
2 documents and data with the assistance of an expert. Class Counsel was also experienced with these
3 claims. Accordingly, the agreement to settle did not occur until Class Counsel possessed sufficient
4 information to make an informed judgment regarding the likelihood of success on the merits and the
5 results that could be obtained through further litigation. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶28.

6 Based on the foregoing data and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
7 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement with Defendants for the consideration and on the terms set
8 forth in the Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interest of the Class in light
9 of all known facts and circumstances, including the risk of significant delay, defenses asserted by
10 Defendants, and numerous potential appellate issues. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶29.

11 **V. THE CLASS IS PROPERLY CERTIFIED FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY**

12 Plaintiff contends that the proposed settlement meets all of the requirements for class certification
13 under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 as demonstrated below, and therefore, the Court may
14 appropriately approve the Class as defined in the Agreement. This Court should conditionally certify the
15 Class for settlement purposes only, defined as follows:

16 All individuals who are or previously were employed by Defendants who were classified
17 as non-exempt in the State of California at any time during the Class Period.

18 (Agreement at ¶ 1.5.)

19 The Class Period is from December 19, 2020 through December 9, 2025. (Agreement at ¶ 1.13).

20 **A. California Code of Civil Procedure § 382**

21 Plaintiff seeks certification of this Class for settlement purposes under California Code of Civil
22 Procedure § 382. The California Supreme Court explained the standard for determining whether class
23 certification is appropriate as follows:

24 Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 authorizes class actions “when the question is one
25 of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and
26 it is impracticable to bring them all before the court...” The “community of interest”
requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact;
(2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class
representatives who can adequately represent the class.

27 *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal. 4th 319, 326 (2004).

28 While Defendants reserve all rights to dispute that the Plaintiff can satisfy these requirements,

1 the Parties agree that Defendants will not dispute that these requirements may be satisfied in this case
2 for purposes of settlement only and therefore, the proposed Class should be certified for purposes of
3 settlement only. (Agreement at ¶ 2.9.)

4 **B. The Proposed Class Is Ascertainable and Numerous**

5 Plaintiff brings this Action on behalf of a Class of non-exempt employees of the Defendants
6 during the Class Period. Plaintiff asserts that all of these individuals are ascertainable because the Class
7 Members can readily be determined through examination of Defendants' files. Given that the Class
8 consists of approximately 423 individuals, Plaintiff maintains that numerosity is clearly satisfied. *See*
9 *Bowles v. Superior Court*, 44 Cal.2d 574 (1955) (class with 10 members); *Rose v. City of Hayward*, 126
10 Cal.App.3d 926, 934 (1981) (class of 48 members satisfies numerosity requirement.) Plaintiff asserts
11 that the 423 current and former employees that comprise the Class can be identified based on
12 Defendants' records and are sufficiently numerous for class certification. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶30.

13 **C. Common Issues of Law and Fact Predominate**

14 Predominance of common issues of law or fact does not require that the common issues be
15 dispositive of the entire controversy or even that they be dispositive of all liability issues. 1 *Newberg on*
16 *Class Actions*, Section 4.25 at 4-82, 4-83 (1992). "Predominance is a comparative concept, and 'the
17 necessity for class members to individually establish eligibility and damages does not mean individual
18 fact questions predominate.'" *Sav-On*, 34 Cal. 4th at 334.

19 Commonality exists if there is a predominant common legal question regarding how an
20 employer's policies impact its employees. *Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.*, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524,
21 1536 (2008) ("[T]he common legal question remains the overall impact of Diva's policies on its
22 drivers.") Whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on their theory of recovery is irrelevant at the
23 certification stage since the question is "essentially a procedural one that does not ask whether an action
24 is legally or factually meritorious." *Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal. 4th 429, 439-440 (2003).

25 Here, Plaintiff contends that common questions of law and fact are present, specifically the
26 common questions of whether Defendants' practices were lawful, whether Defendants failed to provide
27 meal and rest periods to Class Members, whether Class Members were lawfully compensated for all
28 hours worked, whether Defendants miscalculated the regular rate when paying overtime and/or sick pay,

1 whether Defendants failed to provide required expense reimbursement, and whether Class Members are
2 entitled to damages and penalties as a result of these practices. Plaintiff contends that certification of
3 this Class is appropriate because Defendants allegedly engaged in uniform practices with respect to the
4 Class Members. As a result, these common questions of liability could be answered on a class wide
5 basis. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶30. Defendants dispute that common questions predominate but will not
6 oppose such a finding for purposes of this Settlement only.

7 **D. The Claims of the Plaintiff Are Typical of the Class Claims**

8 The typicality requirement requires the Plaintiff to demonstrate that the members of the Class
9 have the same or similar claims as the Plaintiff. “The typicality requirement is met when the claims of
10 the [p]laintiff arise from the same event or are based on the same legal theories.” *Tate v. Weyerhaeuser*
11 *Co.*, 723 F.2d 598, 608 (8th Cir. 1983). In *Hanlon*, *supra*, 150 F.3d at 1020, the Ninth Circuit held that
12 “[u]nder the rule’s permissive standards, representative claims are ‘typical’ if they are reasonably
13 coextensive with those of absent class members; they need not be substantially identical.”

14 In this Action, Plaintiff contends that the typicality requirement is fully satisfied. Plaintiff, like
15 every other member of the Class, was employed by Defendants as a non-exempt employee, and, like
16 every other member of the Class, was subject to the same employment policies and practices. Plaintiff,
17 like every other member of the Class, also claims owed compensation as a result of the Defendants’
18 allegedly uniform company policies and practices. Thus, the claims of Plaintiff and the members of the
19 Class arise from the same course of conduct by Defendants, involve the same issues, and are based on
20 the same legal theories. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶30. Plaintiff asserts that the typicality requirement is met
21 as to the common issues presented in this case. Defendants dispute that the typicality requirement is
22 satisfied but do not oppose a finding of typicality for purposes of this Settlement only.

23 **E. The Class Representation Fairly and Adequately Protected the Class**

24 Plaintiff contends that the Class Members are adequately represented here because Plaintiff and
25 Class Counsel (a) do not have any conflicts of interest with other class members, and (b) will prosecute
26 the case vigorously on behalf of the class. *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1020. This requirement is met here.
27 First, Plaintiff is well aware of his duties as the representative of the Class and has actively participated
28 in the prosecution of this case to date. Plaintiff effectively communicated with Class Counsel, provided

documents and information to Class Counsel, and participated in the investigation and resolution of the Action. The personal involvement of the Plaintiff was essential to the prosecution of the Action and the monetary settlement reached. Second, Plaintiff retained competent counsel who are experienced in employment class and representative actions and who have no conflicts. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶ 31. Third, there is no antagonism between the interests of the Plaintiff and those of the Class. Both the Plaintiff and the Class Members seek monetary relief under the same set of facts and legal theories. Under such circumstances, there can be no conflicts of interest, and adequacy of representation is satisfied. *Reaves v. Ketoro, Inc.*, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 167926, *23 (C.D. Cal. 2020).

F. The Superiority Requirement Is Met

To certify a class, the Court must also determine that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. As the Supreme Court has explained:

Absent class treatment, each individual plaintiff would present in separate, duplicative proceedings the same or essentially the same arguments and evidence, including expert testimony. The result would be a multiplicity of trials conducted at enormous expense to both the judicial system and the litigants.

Sav-On, 34 Cal. 4th at 340.

Here, Plaintiff contends that a class action is the superior mechanism for resolution of the claims as pled by the Plaintiff. While Defendants dispute that the superiority requirement is satisfied, Defendants do not dispute a finding of superiority for purposes of this Settlement only.

VI. THE PROPOSED METHOD OF CLASS NOTICE IS APPROPRIATE

The Court has broad discretion in approving a practical notice program. *7- Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1164 (2000). The Parties have agreed upon procedures by which the Class Members will be provided with written notice of the Settlement similar to that approved and utilized in hundreds of class action settlements and the Class Notice includes all relevant information. (See Exhibit “A” to the Agreement.) Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶32. The Class Notice will explain that the Class Members shall have sixty (60) days from the date that the Class Notice is mailed to them (the “Response Deadline”) to request exclusion (opt-out) or to submit a written objection. (Agreement at ¶¶ 1.43, 8.5, 8.7.) Class Members shall be given the opportunity to object to the Settlement and/or the attorneys’ fees and expenses, and to appear at the Final Approval Hearing.

1 (Agreement at ¶ 8.7.) This notice program was designed to meaningfully reach the Class Members
2 providing notice of all pertinent information concerning the Settlement, and is the best notice practicable
3 in compliance with Rules of Court 3.766 and 3.769(f).. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶32.

4 **VII. CONCLUSION**

5 Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed settlement and
6 sign the proposed Preliminary Approval Order, which is submitted herewith, and schedule the final
7 approval hearing for the proposed date of October 16, 2026.

8 Dated: May 4, 2026 **BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW LLP**

9 By: /s/ Kyle Nordrehaug
10 Kyle R. Nordrehaug, Esq.,
11 Attorney for Plaintiff
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