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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE

AMALIA RODRIGUEZ, an individual,
on behalf of herself and on behalf of all
persons similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

COVIDIEN LP, a Limited Partnership;
MEDTRONIC, INC., a Corporation;
MEDTRONIC USA, INC., a Corporation;
and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: **30-2024-01394865-CU-OE-CXC**

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT**

Hearing Date: June 11, 2026

Hearing Time: 2:00 p.m.

Reservation No. 74810728

Judge: Hon. Melissa R. McCormick
Dept.: CX105

Action Filed: April 18, 2024

Trial Date: Not Set

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25% to the Aggrieved Employees. (Agreement at ¶ 1.22.) Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶3. Issues which this Court has previously requested to be addressed in other cases are set forth in the Decl. Nordrehaug. The following is a table of the key financial terms of the Settlement and the proposed deductions:

\$1,610,000 (Gross Settlement Amount)

- \$15,000 (proposed Class Representative Service Payment - not to exceed amount)
- \$50,000 (Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment - not to exceed amount)
- \$536,666 (Class Counsel Fees Payment - not to exceed 1/3 of settlement)
- \$100,000 (PAGA Payment - 75% to LWDA / 25% to Aggrieved Employees)
- \$12,950 (Administration Expenses Payment - not to exceed amount)

\$895,384 (Net Settlement Amount)

Based upon 956 Class Members who collectively worked 127,758 workweeks (Declaration of Jody Landry at ¶ 4), the Gross Settlement Amount provides an average value of \$1,684 per Class Member and \$12.60 per workweek and after deductions the Net Settlement Amount provides an average recovery of \$936.59 per Class Member and a recovery of \$7.00 per workweek. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶6.

On September 10, 2025, the Parties participated in an all-day mediation session presided over by Brandon McKelvey, esq., a respected and experienced mediator of wage and hour class actions. Following the mediation, the Parties agreed on the basic terms of a settlement pursuant to a mediator's proposal which was memorialized in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶5. The Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and should be preliminarily approved because there is a substantial monetary payment, and there are significant litigation and class-certification risks. Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant preliminary approval of the Agreement and enter the proposed order submitted herewith.

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE SETTLEMENT

The Gross Settlement Amount is One Million Six Hundred Ten Thousand Dollars (\$1,610,000). (Agreement at ¶ 1.22.) Under the Settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount consists of the following elements: (1) payment of the Individual Class Payments to the Participating Class Members; (2) Class Counsel Fees Payment and Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment; (3) Administration Expenses Payment; (4) the Class Representative Service Payment to the Plaintiff; and (5) the PAGA Penalties payment. (Agreement at ¶ 1.22.) The Gross Settlement Amount does not include Defendant's share of payroll taxes. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.) The Gross Settlement Amount shall be all-in with no reversion to Defendant. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.) Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶15.

1 Defendant shall fully fund the Gross Settlement Amount, and also fund the amounts necessary
2 to fully pay Defendant's share of payroll taxes by transmitting the funds to the Administrator no later
3 than fifteen (15) days business after the Effective Date. (Agreement at ¶ 4.3.) The distribution of
4 Individual Class Payments to Participating Class Members along with the other Court-approved
5 distributions shall be made by the Administrator fourteen (14) days after Defendant funds the Gross
6 Settlement Amount. (Agreement at ¶ 5.1.) Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶16.

7 The amount remaining in the Gross Settlement Amount after the deduction of Court-approved
8 amounts for Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, the Class Representative Service
9 Payment, the Class Counsel Fees Payment, the Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the
10 Administration Expenses Payment (called the "Net Settlement Amount") shall be allocated to Class
11 Members as their Individual Class Payments. (Agreement at ¶¶ 1.28 and 3.2.) The amount that each
12 Participating Class Member will be eligible to receive under the Settlement will be determined by
13 converting the Net Settlement Amount into a Workweek value. The Workweek value will be
14 established by dividing the Net Settlement Amount by all workweeks actually worked by the
15 Participating Class Members during the Class Period. The Individual Class Payment for each
16 Participating Class Member will be determined by multiplying the Workweek value by the number of
17 Workweeks they individually worked during the Class Period. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(e).) Workweeks will
18 initially be based on Defendant's records, however, Class Members can challenge their number of
19 Workweeks allocated to them. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶17.

20 Class Members may choose to opt-out of the Settlement by following the directions in the Class
21 Notice. (Agreement at ¶ 8.5, Ex. A.) All Class Members who do not submit a valid and timely
22 Request for Exclusion will be deemed Participating Class Members who will be bound by the
23 Settlement and will be entitled to receive an Individual Class Payment. (Agreement at ¶ 8.5(c).) All
24 Aggrieved Employees, including those who submit an opt-out request, will be paid their allocation of
25 the PAGA Penalties and will remain subject to the release of the Released PAGA Claims regardless of
26 their request for exclusion. (Agreement at ¶¶ 6.3 and 8.5(d).) Finally, the Class Notice will advise the
27 Class Members of their right to object to the Settlement and/or dispute their Workweeks. (Agreement
28 at ¶¶ 8.6 and 8.7, Ex. A.) Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶18.

1 A Participating Class Member must cash his or her Individual Class Payment check within 180
2 days after it is mailed. (Agreement at ¶ 5.2.) Any settlement checks not cashed within 180 days will
3 be voided and any funds represented by such checks will be sent to a Court-approved Cy Pres Recipient
4 under C.C.P. § 384(b). The Parties propose Legal Aid at Work to be the Cy Pres Recipient, and
5 representa they have no interest in this Cy Pres Recipient. (Agreement at ¶ 5.4.) Decl. Nordrehaug at
6 ¶19.

7 Subject to Court approval, the Parties have agreed on ILYM Group, Inc. to administer the
8 settlement in this action (“Administrator”). (Agreement at ¶ 1.2.) The Administrator will be paid for
9 settlement administration in an amount not to exceed \$12,950. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(c).) Decl.
10 Nordrehaug at ¶20. A declaration from ILYM Group, Inc. as to their qualifications and their estimate
11 for this settlement is submitted herewith.

12 Subject to Court approval, the Agreement provides for Class Counsel to be awarded a sum not
13 to exceed one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount, as the Class Counsel Fees Payment. (Agreement
14 at ¶ 3.2(b).) Class Counsel will also be allowed to apply separately for an award of Class Counsel
15 Litigation Expenses Payment in an amount not to exceed \$50,000. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(b).) Subject
16 to Court approval, the Agreement provides for a payment of no more than \$15,000 to the Plaintiff as
17 her Class Representative Service Payment. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(a).) Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶21.

18 Subject to Court approval, the PAGA Penalties will be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount
19 for PAGA penalties under the California Private Attorneys General Act, Cal. Labor Code Section 2698,
20 *et seq.* (“PAGA”). The PAGA Penalties are \$100,000. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(d).) Pursuant to the
21 express requirements of Labor Code § 2699(i), the PAGA Payment shall be allocated as follows: 75%
22 shall be allocated to the Labor Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") as its share of the civil
23 penalties and 25% allocated to the Individual PAGA Payments to be distributed to the Aggrieved
24 Employees based on the number of their respective PAGA Pay Periods. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(d).) As
25 set forth in the accompany proof of service, the LWDA has been served with this entire motion and the
26 Agreement. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶22.

27 **III. CASE BACKGROUND**

28 The description of the case and claims, along with the procedural history, is set forth in the

1 Declaration of Kyle Nordrehaug at ¶¶ 7-14. The Parties engaged in thorough investigation and the
2 exchange of documents and information in connection with the Action over two years which permitted
3 Class Counsel to perform a thorough analysis of the claims. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶¶ 10 and 14. The
4 Parties participated in mediation on September 10, 2025 with Brandon McKelvey, which after arms'
5 length negotiations, resulted in this Settlement. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶12.

6 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT MEETS THE CRITERIA NECESSARY FOR THIS COURT TO**
7 **GRANT PRELIMINARY APPROVAL**

8 California "[p]ublic policy generally favors the compromise of complex class action litigation."
9 *Nordstrom Comm'n Cases*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 576, 581 (2010) quoting *Cellphone Termination Fee*
10 *Cases*, 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1117-18 (2009). Class action settlements are approved where the
11 proposed settlement is "fair, adequate and reasonable." *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794,
12 1801 (1996) (citing *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
13 denied, 459 U.S. 1217 (1983)).

14 Preliminary approval is the first of three steps that comprise the approval procedure for
15 settlements of class actions. The second step is the dissemination of notice of the settlement to all class
16 members. The third step is a final settlement approval hearing, at which evidence and argument
17 concerning the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the settlement may be presented, and class
18 members may be heard regarding the settlement. *See Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794,
19 1801 (1996); *Manual for Complex Litigation, Second* §30.44 (1993); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769.

20 The primary question presented on an application for preliminary approval of a proposed class
21 action settlement is whether the proposed settlement is "within the range of possible approval." *Manual*
22 *for Complex Litigation, Second* §30.44 at 229; *Gautreaux v. Pierce*, 690 F.2d 616, 621 n.3 (7th Cir.
23 1982).² Preliminary approval is merely the prerequisite to giving notice so that "the proposed
24 settlement... may be submitted to members of the prospective Class for their acceptance or rejection."

25
26 ² California courts look to federal authority on class actions. *Vasquez v. Superior Court*, 4 Cal.3d
27 800, 821 (1971). "It is well established that in the absence of relevant state precedents trial courts are
28 urged to follow the procedures prescribed in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
conducting class actions." *Frazier v. City of Richmond*, 184 Cal. App.3d 1491, 1499 (1986), citing
Green v. Obledo, 29 Cal.3d 126, 145-146 (1981).

1 *Sayaman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151997, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2010). There is
2 "a presumption of fairness . . . where . . . [a] settlement is reached through arms-length bargaining."
3 *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245 (2001) (citation omitted); see also *Cho v.*
4 *Seagate Tech. Holdings, Inc.*, 177 Cal. App. 4th 734, 742-45 (2009) (upholding trial court's
5 determination that settlement was "fair, reasonable and adequate" where the settlement "provided
6 valuable benefits to the class . . . that were 'particularly valuable in light of the risks plaintiff would have
7 faced if she proceeded to litigate her case.'"); *Newberg*, 3d Ed., §11.41, p.11-88. However, the ultimate
8 question of whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate is made after notice of the
9 settlement is given to the class members and a final settlement hearing is held by the Court.

10 **A. The Role Of The Court In Preliminary Approval Of A Class Action Settlement**

11 The approval of a proposed settlement of a class action is a matter within the broad discretion
12 of the trial court. *Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 234-235; *Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794. In
13 considering a potential settlement for preliminary approval purposes, the trial court does not have to
14 reach any ultimate conclusions on the issues of fact and law which underlie the merits of the dispute,
15 and need not engage in a trial on the merits. *Wershba, supra*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 239-40; *Dunk, supra*,
16 48 Cal.App. 4th at 1807. The Ninth Circuit explains, "the very essence of a settlement is compromise,
17 'a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes.'" *Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 624.
18 Thus, when analyzing the settlement, the amount is "not to be judged against a hypothetical or
19 speculative measure of what might have been achieved by the negotiators." *Officers for Justice*, 688
20 F.2d at 625, 628.

21 With regard to class action settlements, the opinions of counsel should be given considerable
22 weight both because of counsel's familiarity with this litigation and previous experience with cases such
23 as these. *Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 625. As a result, courts hold that the recommendation of
24 counsel is entitled to significant weight. *Nat'l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, 221 F.R.D.
25 523, 528 (C.D. Cal. 2004).

26 **B. Factors To Be Considered In Granting Preliminary Approval**

27 A number of factors are to be considered in evaluating a settlement for purposes of preliminary
28 approval. In determining whether to grant preliminary approval, the court considers whether the "(1)

1 the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations, (2)
2 has no obvious deficiencies, (3) does not improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives
3 or segments of the class, and (4) falls within the range of possible approval." *In re Tableware Antitrust*
4 *Litig.*, 484 F.Supp. 2d 1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Courts hold that "a presumption of fairness exists
5 where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery
6 are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar
7 litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small." *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.
8 App. 4th 116, 128 (2008). Here, the Settlement meets all of these criteria for preliminary approval and
9 therefore the presumption applies, subject to the response of the Class.

10 **1. The Settlement is the Product of Serious, Informed and**
11 **Arm's Length Negotiations by Experienced Counsel**

12 This settlement is the result of extensive and hard-fought litigation as well as negotiations before
13 an experienced and well-respected mediator. Defendant has expressly denied and continues to deny any
14 wrongdoing or legal liability arising out of the conduct alleged in the Action. Plaintiff and Class
15 Counsel have determined that it is desirable and beneficial to the Class to resolve the Released Class
16 Claims of the Class in accordance with this Settlement.³

17 Class Counsel are experienced and qualified to evaluate the class claims, the defenses asserted,
18 and the risks and benefits of trial and settlement, and Class Counsel are particularly experienced in wage

19 ³ The release applicable to the Class is appropriately tethered to allegations in the Action and the
20 "Released Class Claims" are defined as "all claims arising at any time during the Class Period that were
21 or reasonably could have been asserted in the Action based on the facts alleged in the Operative
22 Complaint. This includes claims for wages, statutory and civil penalties, damages and liquidated
23 damages, interest, fees and costs that were alleged or could have been alleged under California law
24 based on the facts of the First Amended Class Action and Representative Action Complaint filed on
25 October 23, 2024, including, the following claims during the Class Period: (1) claims for failure to pay
26 minimum wage and/or overtime compensation for all hours worked based on any theory, including but
27 not limited to off-the-clock work and failure to correctly calculate the regular rate of pay; (2) failure to
28 provide meal periods or pay a premium in lieu thereof; (3) failure to authorize and permit rest periods
or pay a premium in lieu thereof; (4) failure to timely pay final wages at the time of termination/end of
employment; (5) inaccurate wage statements; (6) failure to reimburse employees for business expenses;
(7) unfair business practices; (8) failure to pay out all owed vacation wages at termination; (9) failure
to pay sick leave in compliance with California law; and (10) claims for the attorney's fees and costs
incurred in the prosecution of the lawsuit on behalf of the Class." (Agreement at ¶ 1.40). The Released
Class Claims expressly exclude all other claims. (Agreement at ¶ 1.40).

1 and hour employment class actions, as Class Counsel has previously litigated and certified similar
2 claims against other employers. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶31. The view of qualified and well-informed
3 counsel that a class action settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable is entitled to significant weight.
4 *See Kullar v. Foot Locker*, 168 Cal. App. 4th 116, 133 (2008) (the trial court "undoubtedly should
5 continue to place reliance on the competence and integrity of counsel, the involvement of a qualified
6 mediator, and the paucity of objectors to the settlement."); *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1802.

7 The Parties attended an arms-length mediation session with Brandon McKelvey, esq., a
8 respected and experienced mediator of wage and hour class actions, in order to reach this Settlement.
9 In preparation for the mediation, Defendant provided Class Counsel with payroll and employment data
10 and other information regarding the Class Members, various internal documents, and other
11 compensation and employment-related materials. Class Counsel analyzed the data with the assistance
12 of damages expert Berger Consulting and prepared and submitted a mediation brief to the mediator. The
13 final settlement terms were negotiated and set forth in the Agreement now presented for this Court's
14 approval. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶ 5. Importantly, Plaintiff and Class Counsel believe that this Settlement
15 is fair, reasonable and adequate.

16 Class Counsel has conducted an investigation into the facts of the class and PAGA action. Both
17 formal and informal discovery was performed along with the production of thousands of pages of
18 relevant documents. Class Counsel engaged in a thorough review and analysis of the relevant
19 documents and data with the assistance of an expert. Accordingly, the agreement to settle did not occur
20 until Class Counsel possessed sufficient information to make an informed judgment regarding the
21 likelihood of success on the merits and the results that could be obtained through further litigation. In
22 addition, Class Counsel previously negotiated settlements with other employers in actions involving
23 nearly identical issues and analogous defenses. Based on the foregoing data and their own independent
24 investigation, evaluation and experience, Class Counsel believes that the settlement with Defendant on
25 the terms set forth in the Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interest of the
26 Class in light of all known facts and circumstances, including the risk of significant delay, defenses
27 asserted by Defendant, and potential appellate issues. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶ 14.

28 Plaintiff and Class Counsel recognize the expense and length of continuing to litigate and trying

1 class claims against Defendant through possible appeals which could take several years. Class Counsel
2 has also taken into account the uncertain outcome and risk of litigation, especially in complex class
3 actions such as this action. Class Counsel is also mindful of and recognize the inherent problems of
4 proof under, and alleged defenses to, the alleged claims. Based upon their evaluation, Plaintiff and
5 Class Counsel have determined that the Settlement set forth in the Agreement is in the best interest of
6 the Class Members. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶ 23.

7 Here, there can be no dispute that the litigation has been hard-fought with aggressive and
8 capable advocacy on both sides. The Parties were represented by experienced counsel who zealously
9 advocated their positions. Accordingly, “[t]here is likewise every reason to conclude that settlement
10 negotiations were vigorously conducted at arms’ length and without any suggestion of undue influence.”
11 *In re Wash. Public Power Supply System Sec. Litig.*, 720 F. Supp. 1379, 1392 (D. Ariz. 1989).

12 **2. The Settlement Has No "Obvious Deficiencies" and Falls Well Within**
13 **the Range for Approval**

14 The proposed Settlement herein has no “obvious deficiencies” and is well within the range of
15 possible approval. All Class Members will receive an opportunity to participate in the Settlement and
16 receive payment according to the same formula. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(e).) Based upon 956 Class
17 Members who collectively worked 127,758 workweeks (Declaration of Jody Landry at ¶ 4), the Gross
18 Settlement Amount provides an average value of \$1,684 per Class Member and \$12.60 per workweek
19 and after deductions the Net Settlement Amount provides an average recovery of \$936.59 per Class
20 Member and a recovery of \$7.00 per workweek.⁴ Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶6.

21 The calculations to compensate for the amount due for the Class at the time of the mediation
22 were calculated by Berger Consulting, Plaintiff’s damages expert. As to the Class whose claims are at
23 issue, Plaintiff used the expert to analyze the data and determine the potential unpaid wages for the
24 employees. The maximum potential damages as calculated by Plaintiff’s expert were calculated to be
25 \$5,289,445 for the alleged unpaid wages due to off-the-clock work based upon 1 hour per workweek,
26 \$135,458 for the alleged underpayment of overtime due to the miscalculation of the regular rate,

27 ⁴ The Declaration of Jody Landry verifies these final class figures, and is attached as Exhibit #4 to
28 the Decl. Nordrehaug.

1 \$63,971 for the alleged underpayment of meal premiums and sick pay due to the miscalculation of the
2 regular rate, \$0 for alleged meal period damages based upon a 1.6% potential violation rate observed
3 in the time records for shifts worked and after deducting meal premiums already paid by Defendant
4 which exceeded the number of violations, \$273,244 for alleged rest period damages based upon the
5 1.6% violation rate observed for meal periods, and \$148,700 for alleged unreimbursed business
6 expenses for personal cell phone usage at \$5 per month. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶6. As a result, the total
7 damage valuation was calculated that Defendant was subject to a maximum damage claim in the
8 amount of \$6,010,817. As to potential penalties, Plaintiff calculated that potential waiting time
9 penalties were a maximum of \$2,042,958, and potential wage statement penalties were \$2,317,000.
10 Defendant vigorously disputed Plaintiff's calculations and exposure theories. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶6.

11 Consequently, the Gross Settlement Amount of \$1,610,000 represents more than 26% of the
12 maximum value of the alleged damages at issue in this case at the time this Settlement was negotiated.⁵
13 In addition, the valuation was performed based on workweeks which turned out to be more than the
14 final count of 127,758, which likely means the above valuations were inflated by at least 20%.
15 Importantly, the recent decision that good faith belief of compliance by the employer in *Naranjo v.*
16 *Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal. 5th 1056, 1065 (2024), could completely negate the claims for
17 waiting time and wage statement penalties, even if wages were owed to the Class. The above maximum
18 calculations should then be adjusted in consideration for both the risk of class certification and the risk
19 of establishing class-wide liability on all claims. Given the amount of the settlement as compared to
20 the potential value of claims in this case and the defenses asserted by Defendant, this settlement is fair
21 and reasonable.⁶ Clearly, the goal of this litigation has been met. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶6.

22
23 ⁵ Because the PAGA claim is not a class claim and primarily is paid to the State of California,
24 Plaintiff has not included the PAGA claim in this discussion of the value of the class claims. The
PAGA claim is addressed in the Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶33.

25 ⁶ See *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (approving a
26 settlement where the settlement amount constituted approximately 25% of the estimated overtime
27 damages for the class); *Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671, at *12
28 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting final approval where "the proposed Total Settlement Amount represents
approximately 10% of what class might have been awarded had they succeeded at trial."); *Dunleavy v.*
Nadler (In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.), 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming approval of

1 Where both sides face significant uncertainty, the attendant risks favor settlement. *Hanlon v.*
2 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, a number of defenses asserted by
3 Defendant present serious threats to the claims of the Plaintiff and the other Class Members. Defendant
4 asserted that Defendant's practices complied with all applicable Labor laws. Defendant argued that
5 Class Members were paid for all time worked and that all work time was properly recorded. Defendant
6 moved time clocks to the outside to ensure they captured all work time. Defendant argued that there
7 was no miscalculation of the regular rate. Defendant contended that its meal and rest period policies
8 fully complied with California law and Defendant did not fail to provide the opportunity for legally
9 required meal and rest breaks. In 2024, Defendant began attestation practices where employees
10 affirmatively verified they received their breaks, which could end liability from that time altogether.
11 Defendant's payment of meal premiums could be used as evidence of their lawful practices. Defendant
12 contended that there was no failure to pay for business expenses, and that any cell phone usage was
13 merely convenient and voluntary such that reimbursement was not legally required. Finally, Defendant
14 could argue that the Supreme Court decision in *Brinker v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012),
15 weakened Plaintiff's claims, on liability, value, and class certifiability as to the meal and rest period
16 claims. Defendant also argued that based on its facially lawful practices, Defendant acted in good faith
17 and without willfulness, which if accepted would negate the claims for waiting time penalties and/or
18 inaccurate wage statements. See e.g. *Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal. 5th 1056, 1065
19 (2024) ("if an employer reasonably and in good faith believed it was providing a complete and accurate
20 wage statement in compliance with the requirements of section 226, then it has not knowingly and
21 intentionally failed to comply with the wage statement law.") If successful, Defendant's defenses could
22 eliminate or substantially reduce any recovery to the Class. While Plaintiff believes that these defenses
23 could be overcome, Defendant maintains these defenses have merit and therefore present a serious risk
24 to recovery by the Class. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶ 24.

25 _____
26 a class settlement which represented "roughly one-sixth of the potential recovery".) See also *Viceral v.*
27 *Mistras Grp., Inc.*, 2016 WL 5907869 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (approving wage and hour class action
28 settlement amounting to 8.1% of full value); *Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.*, 2014 WL 2472316, (C.D.
Cal. 2014) (approving wage and hour class action settlement worth "somewhere between 9% and 18%"
of maximum valuation).

1 There was also a significant risk that, if the Action was not settled, Plaintiff would be unable
2 to obtain a certified class and maintain the certified class through trial, and thereby not recover on behalf
3 of any other employees. At the time of the mediation, Defendant forcefully opposed the propriety of
4 class certification, arguing that individual issues precluded class certification. Further, as demonstrated
5 by the California Supreme Court decision in *Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.*, 59 Cal. 4th 1 (2014),
6 there are significant hurdles to overcome for a class-wide recovery even where the class has been
7 certified. While other cases have approved class certification in wage and hour claims, class
8 certification in this action was hotly disputed and the maintenance of a certified class through trial was
9 by no means a foregone conclusion. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶ 25.

10 After arm's length negotiations between experienced and informed counsel, the Parties
11 recognized the potential risks and agreed on the Settlement with a Gross Settlement Amount of
12 \$1,610,000. As the Court held in *Glass*, where the parties faced uncertainties similar to those here:

13 In light of the above-referenced uncertainty in the law, the risk, expense, complexity,
14 and likely duration of further litigation likewise favors the settlement. Regardless of how
15 this Court might have ruled on the merits of the legal issues, the losing party likely
16 would have appealed, and the parties would have faced the expense and uncertainty of
17 litigating an appeal. 'The expense and possible duration of the litigation should be
18 considered in evaluating the reasonableness of [a] settlement.'"

19 2007 WL 221862, at *4 (quoting *In re Mego Financial Corp. Securities Litigation*, 213 F.3d 454, 458
20 (9th Cir. 2000)).

21 **3. The Settlement Does Not Improperly Grant Preferential Treatment To** 22 **Class Representatives or Segments Of The Class**

23 The relief provided in the Settlement will benefit all members of the Class. The Settlement does
24 not grant preferential treatment to Plaintiff or segments of the Class in any way. Payments to the Class
25 Members are all determined under a neutral methodology. Each Participating Class Member will
26 receive the same opportunity to participate in and receive payment through a neutral formula that is
27 based upon the Workweeks worked by that individual. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶4.

28 At final approval, Plaintiff will apply to the Court for a Class Representative Service Payment
in consideration for her service and for the risks undertaken on behalf of the Class. (Agreement at ¶
3.2(a).) Plaintiff performed her duties admirably by working with Class Counsel for over two years.
The Declaration of the Plaintiff is submitted herewith in support. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶27. At this

1 stage, the requested service award amount not to exceed \$15,000 is within the accepted range of awards
2 for purposes of preliminary approval. *See e.g. Andrews v. Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P.*, 2022 U.S. Dist.
3 LEXIS 172183, at *11 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (the requested service awards of \$15,000 each are appropriate);
4 *Reynolds v. Direct Flow Med., Inc.*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149865, at *19 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (granting
5 request for \$12,500 service award); *Mathein v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc.*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71386
6 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (awarding \$12,500); *Louie v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.*, 2008 WL 4473183,
7 *7 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (awarding \$25,000 service award to each of six plaintiffs); *Glass v. UBS Fin.*
8 *Servs.*, 2007 WL 221862, *16-17 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (awarding \$25,000 service award in overtime class
9 action). As explained in *Glass*, service awards are routinely awarded to class representatives to
10 compensate the employees for the time and effort expended on the case, for the risk of litigation, for
11 the fear of suing an employer and retaliation there from, and to serve as an incentive to vindicate the
12 statutory rights of all employees. 2007 WL 221862 at *16-17.

13 **4. The Stage Of The Proceedings Are Sufficiently Advanced To Permit** 14 **Preliminary Approval Of The Settlement**

15 The stage of the proceedings at which this Settlement was reached also militates in favor of
16 preliminary approval and ultimately, final approval of the Settlement. Class Counsel has conducted a
17 thorough investigation into the facts of the class action. Class Counsel began investigating the Class
18 Members' claims before the Action was filed, and during the course of litigation, Class Counsel
19 performed both formal and informal discovery which included the production of thousands of pages of
20 documents and data. Class Counsel conducted a review and analysis of the relevant documents and
21 data. Class Counsel was also experienced with the claims at issue here, as Class Counsel previously
22 litigated and settled similar claims in other actions. Accordingly, the agreement to settle did not occur
23 until Class Counsel possessed sufficient information to make an informed judgment regarding the
24 likelihood of success on the merits and the results that could be obtained through further litigation.
25 Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶28.

26 Based on the foregoing data and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class
27 Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement with Defendant for the consideration and on the terms set
28 forth in the Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interest of the Class in light

1 of all known facts and circumstances, including the risk of significant delay, defenses asserted by
2 Defendant, and numerous potential appellate issues. There can be no doubt that Counsel for both
3 Parties possessed sufficient information to make an informed judgment regarding the likelihood of
4 success on the merits and the results that could be obtained through further litigation. Decl. Nordrehaug
5 at ¶29.

6 **V. THE CLASS IS PROPERLY CERTIFIED FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY**

7 Plaintiff contends that the proposed settlement meets all of the requirements for class
8 certification under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 as demonstrated below, and therefore, the
9 Court may appropriately approve the Class as defined in the Agreement. This Court should
10 conditionally certify the Class for settlement purposes only, defined as:

11 All current and former non-exempt employees of Defendant who worked for and were
12 paid by Defendant in the state of California during the Class Period.

13 (Agreement at ¶ 1.5).

14 The Class Period is September 16, 2021 through November 11, 2025. (Agreement at ¶ 1.13).

15 **A. California Code of Civil Procedure § 382**

16 Plaintiff seeks certification of this Class for settlement purposes under California Code of Civil
17 Procedure § 382. The California Supreme Court has summarized the standard for determining whether
18 class certification is appropriate as follows:

19 Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 authorizes class actions “when the question is one
20 of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and
21 it is impracticable to bring them all before the court....” The party seeking certification
22 has the burden to establish the existence of both an ascertainable class and a well-
defined community of interest among class members. (*citations omitted*). The
“community of interest” requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common
questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the
class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.

23 *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal. 4th 319, 326 (2004).

24 While Defendant reserves all rights to dispute that the Plaintiff can satisfy these requirements,
25 the Parties agree that Defendant will not dispute that these requirements may be satisfied in this case
26 for purposes of settlement only and therefore, the proposed Class should be certified for purposes of
27 settlement only. (Agreement at ¶ 2.5.)
28

1 **B. The Proposed Class Is Ascertainable and Numerous**

2 Plaintiff brings this Action on behalf of a Class of employees of Defendant during the Class
3 Period. Plaintiff asserts that all of these individuals are ascertainable because the class members can
4 readily be determined through examination of Defendant's files. Given that the Class consists of
5 approximately 934 members, Plaintiff maintains that numerosity is clearly satisfied. *See Bowles v.*
6 *Superior Court*, 44 Cal.2d 574 (1955) (class with 10 members sufficiently numerous); *Rose v. City of*
7 *Hayward*, 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934 (1981) (class of 48 members satisfies numerosity requirement.)
8 Here, Plaintiff assert that the 934 current and former employees that comprise the Class can be
9 identified based on Defendant's records and are sufficiently numerous for class certification. Decl.
10 Nordrehaug at ¶30.

11 **C. Common Issues of Law and Fact Predominate**

12 Predominance of common issues of law or fact does not require that the common issues be
13 dispositive of the entire controversy or even that they be dispositive of all liability issues. 1 *Newberg*
14 *on Class Actions*, Section 4.25 at 4-82, 4-83 (1992). "Predominance is a comparative concept, and 'the
15 necessity for class members to individually establish eligibility and damages does not mean individual
16 fact questions predominate.'" *Sav-On*, 34 Cal. 4th at 334.

17 Commonality exists if there is a predominant common legal question regarding how an
18 employer's policies impact its employees. *Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd.*, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524,
19 1536 (2008) ("[T]he common legal question remains the overall impact of Diva's policies on its
20 drivers.") Whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on their theory of recovery is irrelevant at the
21 certification stage since the question is "essentially a procedural one that does not ask whether an action
22 is legally or factually meritorious." *Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.*, 23 Cal. 4th 429, 439-440 (2003).

23 Here, Plaintiff contends that common questions of law and fact are present, specifically the
24 common questions of whether Defendant's employment practices were lawful, whether Defendant
25 failed to provide meal and rest periods to Class Members, whether Class Members were lawfully
26 compensated for all hours worked, whether Defendant failed to provide required expense
27 reimbursements, and whether Class Members are entitled to damages and penalties as a result of these
28 practices. Plaintiff contends that certification of this Class is appropriate because Defendant allegedly

1 engaged in uniform practices with respect to the Class Members. As a result, these common questions
2 of liability could be answered on a class wide basis. Decl. Nordrehaug, ¶30. Defendant disputes that
3 common questions predominate but will not oppose such a finding for purposes of this Settlement only.

4 **D. The Claims of the Plaintiff Are Typical of the Class Claims**

5 The typicality requirement requires the Plaintiff to demonstrate that the members of the Class
6 have the same or similar claims as the Plaintiff. “The typicality requirement is met when the claims of
7 the [p]laintiff arise from the same event or are based on the same legal theories.” *Tate v. Weyerhaeuser*
8 *Co.*, 723 F.2d 598, 608 (8th Cir. 1983). In *Hanlon*, *supra*, 150 F.3d at 1020, the Ninth Circuit held that
9 “[u]nder the rule's permissive standards, representative claims are ‘typical’ if they are reasonably
10 coextensive with those of absent class members; they need not be substantially identical.”

11 In this case, Plaintiff contends that the typicality requirement is fully satisfied. Plaintiff, like
12 every other member of the Class, was employed by Defendant as a non-exempt employee during the
13 Class Period, and, like every other member of the Class, was subject to the same employment practices.
14 Plaintiff, like every other member of the Class, also claims owed compensation as a result of the
15 Defendant’s uniform company policies and practices. Thus, the claims of Plaintiff and the members
16 of the Class arise from the same course of conduct by Defendant, involve the same issues, and are based
17 on the same legal theories. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶30. For purposes of settlement, Plaintiff assert that
18 the typicality requirement is met as to the common issues presented in this case. Defendant does not
19 oppose a finding of typicality for purposes of this Settlement only.

20 **E. The Class Representation Fairly and Adequately Protected the Class**

21 Plaintiff contends that the Class Members are adequately represented here because Plaintiff and
22 representing counsel (a) do not have any conflicts of interest with other class members, and (b) will
23 prosecute the case vigorously on behalf of the class. *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1020. This requirement is
24 met here. First, Plaintiff is well aware of her duties as the representative of the Class and has actively
25 participated in the prosecution of this case to date. Plaintiff effectively communicated with Class
26 Counsel, provided documents and information to Class Counsel, and participated in the investigation
27 and resolution of the class claims. The personal involvement of the Plaintiff was essential to the
28 prosecution of the claims and the monetary settlement reached. Second, Plaintiff retained competent

1 counsel who are experienced in employment class actions and who have no conflicts. Decl. Nordrehaug
2 at ¶ 31. Third, there is no antagonism between the interests of the Plaintiff and those of the Class. Both
3 the Plaintiff and the Class Members seek monetary relief under the same set of facts and legal theories.
4 Under such circumstances, there can be no conflicts of interest, and adequacy of representation is
5 satisfied. *Reaves v. Ketoro, Inc.*, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 167926, *23 (C.D. Cal. 2020). Defendant
6 disputes that the adequacy requirement is satisfied but will not oppose such a finding for purposes of
7 this Settlement only.

8 **F. The Superiority Requirement Is Met**

9 To certify a class, the Court must also determine that a class action is superior to other available
10 methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. “Where classwide litigation of
11 common issues will reduce litigation costs and promote greater efficiency, a class action may be
12 superior to other methods of litigation.” *Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc.*, 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir.
13 1996). As courts have previously observed:

14 Absent class treatment, each individual plaintiff would present in separate, duplicative
15 proceedings the same or essentially the same arguments and evidence, including expert
16 testimony. The result would be a multiplicity of trials conducted at enormous expense
to both the judicial system and the litigants.

17 *Sav-On*, 34 Cal. 4th at 340.

18 Here, Plaintiff contends that a class action is the superior mechanism for resolution of the claims
19 as pled by the Plaintiff. While Defendant disputes that class treatment is superior, Defendant does not
20 dispute a finding of superiority in this action for purposes of this Settlement only.

21 **VI. THE PROPOSED METHOD OF CLASS NOTICE IS APPROPRIATE**

22 The Court has broad discretion in approving a practical notice program. The Parties have agreed
23 upon procedures by which the Class Members will be provided with written notice of the Settlement
24 similar to that approved and utilized in hundreds of class action settlements. In accordance with the
25 Agreement, Defendant will provide to the Administrator a confidential electronic spreadsheet
26 containing the Class Data. (Agreement at ¶ 4.2.) Within 14 days after receiving the Class Data, the
27 Administrator will mail the Class Notice Packet to all Class Members via first-class U.S. Mail using
28 the most current mailing address information available. (Agreement at ¶ 8.4(b).) The Class Notice

1 Packet will include a Request for Exclusion form, an Objection form and a Dispute form in the mailing.
2 (Agreement at ¶ 1.12.) The Class Notice Packet will also include a Spanish translation. (Agreement at
3 ¶ 1.11.)

4 The Class Notice, drafted jointly and agreed upon by the Parties through their respective counsel
5 and to be approved by the Court, includes all relevant information. (See Exhibit "A" to the Agreement.)
6 The Class Notice will include, among other information: (i) information regarding the Action; (ii) the
7 impact on the rights of the Class Members if they do not opt out, including a description of the
8 applicable release; (iii) information to the Class Members regarding how to opt out and how to object
9 to the Settlement; (iv) the estimated Individual Class Payment for each of the Class Members; (iii) the
10 amount of attorneys' fees and expenses to be sought; (v) the amount of the Plaintiff's service award
11 request; and (vi) the anticipated expenses of the Administrator. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶32.

12 The Class Notice will state that the Class Members shall have sixty (60) days from the date that
13 the Class Notice is mailed to them (the "Response Deadline") to request exclusion (opt-out) or to
14 submit a written objection. (Agreement at ¶¶ 1.42, 8.5, 8.7.) Class Members shall be given the
15 opportunity to object to the Settlement and/or requests for attorneys' fees and expenses and to appear
16 at the Final Approval Hearing. (Agreement at ¶ 8.7.) Class Members who do not submit a timely and
17 proper request to opt-out will automatically receive a payment of their Individual Class Payment. This
18 notice program was designed to meaningfully reach the Class Members and it advises them of all
19 pertinent information concerning the Settlement. Decl. Nordrehaug at ¶32. The mailing and
20 distribution of the Class Notice satisfies the requirements of due process and is the best notice
21 practicable under the circumstances and complies with Rules of Court 3.766 and 3.769(f).

22 **VII. CONCLUSION**

23 Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed settlement and
24 sign the proposed Preliminary Approval Order, and schedule the final approval hearing for November
25 5, 2026, which is at least one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of Preliminary Approval.

26 Dated: March 27, 2026

**BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK
DE BLOUW LLP**

27 By: /s/ Kyle Nordrehaug
28 Kyle R. Nordrehaug, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs