

**BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK
DE BLOUW LLP**

Norman B. Blumenthal (State Bar #068687)

Kyle R. Nordrehaug (State Bar #205975)

Aparajit Bhowmik (State Bar #248066)

2255 Calle Clara

La Jolla, CA 92037

Telephone: (858) 551-1223

Facsimile: (858) 551-1232

Email: Kyle@bamlawca.com

Website: www.bamlawca.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO**

DEA LOGSDON, an individual, on
behalf of herself and on behalf of all
persons similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DIGIRAD IMAGING SOLUTIONS,
INC., a Corporation; DIGIRAD
CORPORATION, a Corporation; and
DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 37-2024-00006267-CU-OE-CTL

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
SETTLEMENT AND AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE
AWARD**

Hearing Date: May 29, 2026

Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

*[Hearing scheduled by Order dated December 5,
2025]*

Judge: Hon. Matthew C. Braner

Dept.: 60

Action Filed: February 9, 2024

Trial Date: Not set

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.	-1-
II.	THE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE COURT	-1-
III.	GENERAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS	-2-
IV.	THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE, AND ADEQUATE	-3-
A.	The Settlement Satisfies the California Test for Fairness.	-4-
1.	The Investigation and Analysis of Documents are Sufficient to Allow Counsel and the Court to Act Intelligently	-4-
2.	The Settlement was Reached Through Arm’s Length Bargaining	-4-
3.	Class Counsel Is Experienced in Similar Litigation	-5-
4.	There Are No Objections and No Requests for Exclusion	-5-
5.	The Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case	-6-
6.	The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation.	-9-
7.	The Amount Offered in Settlement.	-9-
V.	THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE AWARD SHOULD BE APPROVED	-11-
A.	The Attorneys’ Fees are Reasonable and Supported by the Percentage of the Fund Method.	-11-
B.	The Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses.	-14-
C.	The Service Award Is Reasonable and Should be Approved	-14-
VI.	CONCLUSION.	-15-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:	Page:
<i>7-Eleven Owners for Fair Fran. v. Southland Corp.</i> , 85 Cal. App. 4 th 1135 (2000)	2,3
<i>Alberto v. GMRI, Inc.</i> , 252 F.R.D. 652 (E.D. Cal. Jun 24, 2008)	5
<i>Andrews v. Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P.</i> , 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172183 (C.D. Cal. 2022).	15
<i>Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.</i> , 297 F.R.D. 431 (E.D. Cal. 2013)	12
<i>Barcia v. Contain-A-Way, Inc.</i> , 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17118 (S. D. Cal. 2009)	8
<i>Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert</i> , 444 U.S. 472 (1980)	11
<i>Brinker v. Superior Court</i> , 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012)	7
<i>Browning v. Yahoo!, Inc.</i> , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86266 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2007)	8
<i>Cellphone Termination Fee Cases</i> , 180 Cal. App. 4th 1110 (2009)	3
<i>Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.</i> , 162 Cal.App.4th 43 (2008)	14
<i>Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.</i> , 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794 (1996)	3
<i>Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.</i> , 59 Cal. 4th 1 (2014)	8,9
<i>Gaskill v. Gordon</i> , 160 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1998)	12
<i>Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.</i> , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476; 15 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1330 (N.D. Cal. 2007); <i>aff'd</i> 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10328 (9 th Cir. May 14, 2009)	5, 9, 11, 15
<i>Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.</i> , 150 F.3d 1011 (9 th Cir. 1998)	6
<i>Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.</i> , 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 (N.D. Cal. 2009).	8
<i>Huens v. Tatum</i> , 52 Cal. App. 4 th 259 (1997).	2

1	<i>In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litigation,</i>	
	80 F. Supp. 2d 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)	6
2	<i>In re Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases,</i>	
3	171 Cal.App.4th 495 (2009)	14
4	<i>Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.,</i>	
	168 Cal. App. 4th 116 (2008)	3
5	<i>Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l,</i>	
6	1 Cal. 5th 480 (2016)	12,13,14
7	<i>Laskey v. Int’l Union,</i>	
	638 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981)	6
8	<i>Louie v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.,</i>	
9	2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78314 (S.D. Cal. 2008)	8, 15
10	<i>Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.,</i>	
	2014 WL 2472316, (C.D. Cal. 2014)	11
11	<i>Mathein v. Pier 1 Imps.,</i>	
12	2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71386, 168 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P36,620 (E.D. Cal. 2018).	15
13	<i>Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles,</i>	
	186 Cal. App. 4th 399 (2010).	3
14	<i>Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.,</i>	
15	15 Cal. 5th 1056 (2024)	7, 11
16	<i>Nordstrom Commission Cases,</i>	
	186 Cal. App. 4th 576 (2010)	10
17	<i>Pellegrino v. Robert Half Intern., Inc.,</i>	
18	182 Cal.App.4th 278 (2010)	13
19	<i>Reynolds v. Direct Flow Med., Inc.,</i>	
	2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149865 (N.D. Cal. 2019)	15
20	<i>Serrano v. Priest,</i>	
21	20 Cal. 3d 25 (1977)	11
22	<i>Stanger v. China Elec. Motor, Inc.,</i>	
	812 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 2016)	13
23	<i>Stetson v. Grissom,</i>	
24	821 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2016)	13
25	<i>Stoetznner v. U.S. Steel Corp.,</i>	
	897 F.2d 115 (3d. Cir. 1990).	6
26	<i>Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.,</i>	
27	2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671 (N.D. Cal. 2015).	11
28	//	

1	<i>Swedish Hospital v. Shalala</i> ,	
	1 F.3d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1993)	13
2	<i>Taylor v. Fedex Freight, Inc.</i> ,	
3	2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142202 (E.D. Cal. 2016).....	14
4	<i>Viceral v. Mistras Grp., Inc.</i> ,	
	2016 WL 5907869 (N.D. Cal. 2016)	11
5	<i>Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.</i> ,	
6	557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1997)	11, 12
7	<i>Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.</i> ,	
	290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002)	13
8	<i>Wershba v. Apple Computer</i> ,	
9	91 Cal. App. 4 th 224 (2001).....	3,11,14
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 The parties to this action have reached a Settlement and the Court preliminarily approved the
3 Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement”), a true and correct copy of which
4 is attached as Exhibit #2 to the Declaration of Norman Blumenthal (“Blumenthal Decl.”).¹ In
5 accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order dated December 5, 2025 (“Preliminary Approval
6 Order”), the approved Class Notice has been disseminated to the Class.²

7 The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether the proposed settlement of the litigation
8 should be finally approved. Plaintiff Dea Logsdon (“Plaintiff”) respectfully moves for final approval,
9 including attorneys’ fees, costs and the service award, and the proposed entry of the Final Approval
10 Order and Judgment, submitted herewith. The settlement represents an excellent result for the Class and
11 avoids the delays, risks, and costs of further litigation. After disseminating the Class Notice to the 66
12 members of the Class, **to date there have been no objections and no requests for exclusion** from the
13 Class, which means that the entire Class (100%) has elected to participate in the Settlement.
14 Blumenthal Decl. ¶4. This is a positive response from the Class evidencing their collective approval
15 of the settlement. As a result, Plaintiff respectfully submits that the settlement should be finally
16 approved for the same reasons that the Court preliminarily approved the settlement as fair, reasonable,
17 and adequate.

18 **II. THE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE COURT**

19 As consideration for this Settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount to be paid by Defendant
20 Digirad Imaging Solutions, Inc. (“Defendant”) is Two Hundred Ten Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents
21 (\$210,000.00). (Agreement at ¶ 1.22.) Under the Settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount consists of
22 the following elements: (1) payment of the Individual Class Payments to the Participating Class
23 Members; (2) Class Counsel Fees Payment and Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment; (3)
24 Administration Expenses Payment; (4) the Class Representative Service Payment to the Plaintiff; and

25
26 ¹ Capitalized terms are defined in the Agreement.

27 ² The “Class” is defined as “all individuals who are or were employed by Defendant as a non-exempt
28 employee in the State of California at any time during the Class Period.” The Class Period is February
29 9, 2020 through December 22, 2023. (Preliminary Approval Order, at ¶5).

(5) the PAGA Penalties payment, which is to be allocated 25% to the Aggrieved Employees and 75% to the LWDA. (Agreement at ¶ 1.22.) The Gross Settlement Amount does not include Defendant's share of employer-side payroll taxes which will be paid separately and not out of the Gross Settlement Amount. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.) The Gross Settlement Amount shall not revert to Defendant. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.) Blumenthal Decl. ¶3(b). The following is a table of the key financial terms of the Settlement and the proposed deductions:

\$210,000 (Gross Settlement Amount)

- \$12,500 (Plaintiff's proposed service award - not to exceed amount)
- \$21,000 (Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment - not to exceed amount)
- \$70,000 (Class Counsel Fees Payment - not to exceed 1/3 of settlement)
- \$15,000 (PAGA Payment - 75% to LWDA / 25% to Aggrieved Employees)
- \$5,000 (Administration Expenses Payment - not to exceed amount)

\$86,500 (Net Settlement Amount)

The specific details of the Settlement were discussed in the Motion for Preliminary Approval and are set forth again in the Declaration of Blumenthal at ¶¶ 3(c)-3(i).

The Settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable to the class and should be finally approved for the same reasons the Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement, agreeing that the settlement is "fair, adequate and reasonable" (Preliminary Approval Order at ¶3.) In sum, the Settlement valued at \$210,000 is an excellent result for the Class. This result is particularly favorable in light of the fact that liability and class certification in this case were far from certain in light of the defenses asserted by Defendant. Given the complexities of this case, the defenses asserted, the uncertainty of class certification, along with the uncertainties of proof at trial and appeal, the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and should be finally approved. Blumenthal Decl. ¶3(j).

III. GENERAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS

Settlements of disputed claims are favored by the courts. *Huens v. Tatum*, 52 Cal.App.4th 259, 265 (1997). In evaluating settlements, the courts have long recognized that compromise is particularly appropriate since such litigation is difficult and notoriously uncertain. *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Fran. v. Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1151 (2000) ("[V]oluntary conciliation and settlement are the preferred means of dispute resolution. This is especially true in complex class action litigation.")

The court must decide whether the proposed settlement falls within the range of reasonable

1 settlements, taking into account that settlements are compromises between the parties reflecting
2 subjective, unquantifiable judgments concerning the risks and possible outcomes of litigation. *See*
3 *Wershba v. Apple Computer*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246 (2001) (“The proposed settlement is not to be
4 judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved had plaintiffs
5 prevailed at trial.”) In *Wershba*, the Court explained that “the merits of the underlying class claims are
6 not a basis for upsetting the settlement of a class action.” *Id.*; *see also 7-Eleven, supra*, at 1150.

7 In these cases, courts have repeatedly emphasized that there is a strong initial presumption that
8 the compromise is fair and reasonable. *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245. Courts should not substitute
9 their judgment for that of the parties who negotiated the settlement. *Id.* at 246. The presumption of
10 fairness exists where: (1) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to
11 act intelligently; (2) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (3) counsel is
12 experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*,
13 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996). Here, the facts and circumstances compel the conclusion that the
14 proposed settlement satisfies that standard and the presumption applies.

15 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE, AND ADEQUATE**

16 The Court must determine whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. *Dunk v. Ford*
17 *Motor Co.*, 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996). The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether
18 the settlement is fair. *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1117 (2009). “The
19 well-recognized factors that the trial court should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a class
20 action settlement agreement include 'the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and
21 likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount
22 offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience
23 and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members
24 to the proposed settlement.’” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008)
25 (internal citations omitted); *see also Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L. A.*, 186 Cal.App.4th
26 399, 408 (2010).

27 The list of factors is not exhaustive and should be tailored to each case. *Dunk, supra*, at 1801.
28 Due regard should be given to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.

1 *Id.* The inquiry “must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement
2 is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that
3 the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” *Id.* “Ultimately, the
4 [trial] court’s determination is nothing more than ‘an amalgam of delicate balancing, gross
5 approximations and rough justice.’ [Citation omitted.]” *Id.*

6 These factors are analyzed seriatim below, and all support final approval of the class action
7 settlement before this Court, consistent with this Court’s Preliminary Approval Order.

8 **A. The Settlement Satisfies the California Test for Fairness**

9 1. The Investigation and Analysis of Documents are Sufficient to Allow Counsel
10 and the Court to Act Intelligently

11 Over the course of more than two years of litigation, the Parties engaged in the investigation of
12 the claims, including the production of documents, class data, and other information, allowing for the
13 full and complete analysis of liabilities and defenses to the claims in this Action. The procedural history
14 and investigation performed was detailed at length in support of the motion for preliminary approval.
15 The Settlement was the product of one arms-length mediation and contentious negotiations through an
16 all-day mediation presided over by Jason Marsili, Esq. The details of the litigation are set forth in the
17 Blumenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 6(a)-6(g).

18 2. The Settlement was Reached Through Arm’s Length Bargaining

19 This settlement is the result of extensive and hard-fought litigation as well as negotiations before
20 an experienced and well-respected mediator. Defendant has expressly denied and continues to deny any
21 wrongdoing or legal liability arising out of the conduct alleged in the Action. Plaintiff and Class
22 Counsel have determined that it is desirable and beneficial to the Class to resolve the Released Class
23 Claims of the Class in accordance with this Settlement, based upon the experience of Class Counsel
24 who has previously litigated similar claims against other employers. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(a).

25 The Parties attended an arms-length mediation session with Jason Marsili, a respected and
26 experienced mediator of wage and hour class and representative actions, in order to reach this
27 Settlement. In preparation for the mediation, Defendant provided Class Counsel with payroll, time and
28 employment data, along with other information regarding the Class Members, various internal

1 documents, and other compensation and employment-related materials. Class Counsel analyzed the
2 data with the assistance of damages expert Berger Consulting and prepared and submitted a mediation
3 brief to the mediator. Following the all-day mediation, the Parties agreed to the Settlement, which was
4 memorialized in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(b).

5 The fact that the settlement was negotiated with the assistance of an experienced mediator
6 supports approval. *Alberto v. GMRI, Inc.*, 252 F.R.D. 652, 666 (E.D. Cal. Jun 24, 2008); *Glass v. UBS*
7 *Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476 at *15 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (where settlement was “negotiated
8 and approved by experienced counsel on both sides of the litigation, with the assistance of a
9 well-respected mediator” this factor supports approval of the settlement).

10 From July of 2025 to November of 2025, the settlement agreement and exhibits thereto were
11 finalized and executed. On December 5, 2025, the Court granted the Motion for Preliminary Approval,
12 and entered the Order granting preliminary approval of the settlement as fair and reasonable to the
13 Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶7(c).

14 3. Class Counsel Is Experienced in Similar Litigation

15 Class Counsel in this matter has extensive class action experience and has represented thousands
16 of persons in class actions including employment litigation, wage and hour class actions, and complex
17 litigation. Class Counsel has previously litigated wage and hour class actions involving employees and
18 claims similar to this case and have been approved as experienced class counsel during contested
19 motions in state and federal courts throughout California. The experience of counsel and class action
20 cases managed and settled by the Class Counsel in this action is provided to the Court in the Blumenthal
21 Decl. at Exhibit #1. Class Counsel have participated in every aspect of the settlement discussions and
22 have concluded the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable and in the best interests of the Class.
23 Blumenthal Decl. ¶ 3(j).

24 4. There Are No Objections and No Requests for Exclusion

25 The reaction of the Class unequivocally supports approval of the Settlement. On January 5,
26 2026, the Administrator mailed the Court-approved Class Notice to the Class Members, which provided
27 each class member with the terms of the Settlement, including notice of the claims at issue and the
28 financial terms of the settlement, including the attorneys’ fees, costs, and service award that were being

1 sought, how individual settlement awards would be calculated, and the specific, estimated payment
2 amount to that individual. See Declaration of Norma Ayala (“Ayala Decl.”) at ¶ 7, Exh. A. In
3 disseminating the notice, the Administrator followed the notice procedures authorized by the Court in
4 its Preliminary Approval Order. The Administrator received no written objections and received no
5 requests for exclusion. Ayala Decl. at ¶¶ 11-12. As such, 100% of the Class will participate in the
6 Settlement and will be sent a settlement check. Ayala Decl. at ¶14; Blumenthal Decl. ¶4.

7 The absence of any objector strongly supports the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the
8 Settlement. See *In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litigation*, 80 F.Supp.2d 164, 175 (S.D.N.Y.
9 2000) (“If only a small number of objections are received, that fact can be viewed as indicative of the
10 adequacy of the settlement.”); *Stoetznner v. U.S. Steel Corp.*, 897 F.2d 115, 118-119 (3d. Cir. 1990) (29
11 objections out of 281 member class “strongly favors settlement”); *Laskey v. Int’l Union*, 638 F.2d 954
12 (6th Cir. 1981) (The fact that 7 out of 109 class members objected to the proposed settlement should
13 be considered when determining fairness of settlement). Here, where there are no objections, the
14 approval of the class is evident.

15 5. The Strength of Plaintiff’s Case

16 The Action generally alleges that Plaintiff and other Class Members were not properly paid all
17 overtime wages for hours worked and at the correct rate, were not provided meal and rest periods, were
18 not timely paid earned wages, were not provided reimbursement for required expenses, were not
19 provided accurate itemized wage statements, were not paid all accrued and used sick pay at the correct
20 rate of pay, and were not paid all wages at the time of termination. The Action seeks unpaid wages,
21 penalties, attorney fees, litigation costs, and any other equitable or legal relief allegedly due and owing
22 to Plaintiff and the other Class Members by virtue of the foregoing claims. Blumenthal Decl. ¶5.

23 Where both sides face significant uncertainty, the attendant risks favor settlement. *Hanlon v.*
24 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, a number of defenses asserted by Defendant
25 present serious threats to the claims of the Plaintiff and the other Class Members. Some of those include
26 the following: Defendant asserted that its wage and hour policies and procedures in effect during the
27 Class Period were legally compliant and easily digestible, with Defendant not only using straightforward
28 language to relay such policies, but also charts (such as for its meal period and rest break policies) to

1 ensure full understanding by its employees. Defendant argued, as to all alleged off-the-clock work, that
2 Class Members were paid for all time worked and that work time was properly recorded. Indeed,
3 Defendant noted that it paid Class Members significant amounts of overtime and doubletime wages
4 during the Class Period, at least circumstantially indicating payment for all time worked and/or that any
5 supposed off-the-clock work was nominal or unknown to it. Defendant also maintained there was no
6 miscalculation of the regular rate resulting in the underpayment of wages, arguing that the bonuses
7 reflected in a handful of Class Members' wage statements were discretionary. Moreover, Defendant
8 contends that its meal and rest period policies fully complied with California law and that Defendant
9 did not fail to provide the opportunity for legally required meal and rest breaks. Defendant also argued
10 that its payment of significant meal period premiums is evidence of its lawful practices, especially with
11 there being an "overpayment" of premiums (with Defendant potentially being able to argue that the
12 premium wages that could not be tethered to meal period violations found in the time records, were
13 actually paid to cover and compensate for rest break violations). Further, Defendant contends that there
14 was no failure to pay for business expenses, arguing that Plaintiff's claim of personal cell phone use not
15 being reimbursed was undermined by Plaintiff's and other Class Members' wage statements reflecting
16 a monthly cellular telephone reimbursement equating to around \$180 per year, that there was uniform
17 reimbursement, and that the Class Members did not drive their personal vehicles to customer locations.
18 Finally, Defendant argued that the Supreme Court decision in *Brinker v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal. 4th
19 1004 (2012), weakened Plaintiff's claims, on liability, value, and class certifiability as to the meal and
20 rest period claims. Defendant also argued that based on its facially lawful practices, Defendant acted
21 in good faith and without willfulness, which if accepted would negate the claims for waiting time
22 penalties and/or inaccurate wage statements. See e.g. *Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal. 5th
23 1056, 1065 (2024) ("if an employer reasonably and in good faith believed it was providing a complete
24 and accurate wage statement in compliance with the requirements of section 226, then it has not
25 knowingly and intentionally failed to comply with the wage statement law.") If successful, Defendant's
26 defenses could eliminate or substantially reduce any recovery to the Class. While Plaintiff believes that
27 these defenses could be overcome, Defendant maintains these defenses have merit and therefore present
28 a serious risk to recovery by the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(a).

1 In a similar wage and hour case, the federal district court in *Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.*, 2009
2 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 (N.D. Cal. 2009), explained in approving an overtime class action settlement:

3 Plaintiffs may have a strong case, but the risks inherent in continued litigation are great.
4 Defendants strongly deny liability for Plaintiffs' principal claim... [...T]he gross
5 settlement amount and the Class Members' expected net recovery, after fees and other
costs are deducted, appear to be a reasonable compromise, in light of the risks of
litigation.

6 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 at *19-20 (N.D. Cal. 2009); *see also Browning v. Yahoo!, Inc.*, 2007
7 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86266, at *30 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“In considering the strength of Plaintiff's case, legal
8 uncertainties at the time of settlement - particularly those which go to fundamental legal issues - favor
9 approval.”). As recognized in a federal decision approving settlement of an overtime wage class action:

10 The potential complexity and possible duration of trial also weigh in favor of granting
11 final approval. Plaintiffs acknowledge the difficulties of proving damages, recognize the
12 uncertainty of outcome, and believe defendant would appeal in the event of adverse
13 judgment. A post-judgment appeal would require many years to resolve and delay
14 payment to class members. Plaintiffs believe the benefits of a guaranteed recovery today
outweigh an uncertain future result. Accordingly, plaintiffs argue, and the Court agrees,
the actual recovery confers substantial benefits on the class that outweigh the potential
recovery through full adjudication.

15 *Barcia v. Contain-A-Way, Inc.*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17118, *9 (S.D. Cal. 2009); *see also Louie v.*
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78314, *14 (S.D. Cal. 2008).

16 There was also a significant risk that, if the Action was not settled, Plaintiff would be unable
17 to certify a class and maintain that certification through trial, and thereby not recover on behalf of any
18 employees other than themselves. At the time of the mediation, Defendant forcefully opposed the
19 propriety of class certification, arguing that individual issues precluded class certification. Further, as
20 demonstrated by the California Supreme Court decision in *Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.*, 59 Cal.
21 4th 1 (2014), there are significant hurdles to overcome for a class-wide recovery even where the class
22 has been certified. While other cases have approved class certification in wage and hour claims, class
23 certification in this action was hotly disputed and the maintenance of a certified class through trial was
24 by no means a foregone conclusion. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(b).

25 In sum, the Settlement is a fair and reasonable result, and provides the Class with a significant
26 recovery, particularly when viewed in light of the fact that the Defendant asserted serious and
27 substantial defenses both to liability and to class certification. Currently, the maximum and average
28 class member allocation are \$3,253.82 and \$1,310.61, respectively. *See Ayala Decl.* ¶ 16. Given the

1 complexities of this case, the defenses, along with the uncertainties of proof and appeal, the proposed
2 Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and should be finally approved. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶8(e).

3 6. The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

4 As demonstrated by the decision in *Duran*, the complexities and duration of further litigation
5 cannot be overstated. There is little doubt that Defendant would post a bond and appeal in the event
6 of an adverse judgment. A post-judgment appeal by Defendant would have required many more years
7 to resolve, assuming the judgment was affirmed. If the judgment was not affirmed in total, then the case
8 could have dragged on for years after the appeal. The benefits of a guaranteed recovery today outweigh
9 an uncertain result three or more years in the future. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(c).

10 Plaintiff and Class Counsel recognize the expense and length of a trial against Defendant
11 through possible appeals which could take at least another two or three years. Class Counsel also have
12 taken into account the uncertain outcome, the risk of litigation, especially in complex actions such as
13 this one. Class Counsel are also mindful of and recognize the inherent problems of proof under, and
14 alleged defenses to, the claims asserted in the Action. Moreover, post-trial motions and appeals would
15 have been inevitable. Costs would have mounted and recovery would have been delayed if not denied,
16 thereby reducing the benefits of an ultimate victory. The Settlement confers substantial benefits upon
17 the Class. Based upon their evaluation, Plaintiff and Class Counsel have determined that the Settlement
18 set forth in the Agreement is in the best interest of the Class. Blumenthal Decl. ¶8(c).

19 Although Plaintiff and Class Counsel believe that their case has merit, which Defendant
20 continues to vigorously deny, they recognized the potential risks both sides would face if litigation of
21 the Action continued. As the court explained in *Glass*, where similar faced uncertainties were faced:

22 In light of the above-referenced uncertainty in the law, the risk, expense, complexity,
23 and likely duration of further litigation likewise favors the settlement. Regardless of how
24 this Court might have ruled on the merits of the legal issues, the losing party likely
25 would have appealed, and the parties would have faced the expense and uncertainty of
26 litigating an appeal. "The expense and possible duration of the litigation should be
27 considered in evaluating the reasonableness of [a] settlement."

28 *Id.* at *12.

 7. The Amount Offered in Settlement

 The Settlement in this case is fair, reasonable and adequate considering Defendant's defenses

1 to Plaintiff's claims. As set forth in the Declaration of Nordrehaug in support of preliminary approval
2 which discussed the value of the class claims in detail, the Gross Settlement Amount compares
3 favorably to the value of the claims. Based upon 66 Class Members who worked an estimated 5,370
4 work weeks (Ayala Decl., at ¶¶ 14-15), the Gross Settlement Amount provides an average value of
5 \$3,181 per Class Member and \$39 per workweek and after deductions the Net Settlement Amount
6 provides an average recovery of \$1,310.60 per Class Member and a recovery of \$16.10 per workweek.
7 Blumenthal Decl. at ¶8(d).

8 The calculations to compensate for the amount due for the Class at the time of the mediation
9 were calculated by Berger Consulting, Plaintiff's damage expert. As to the Class whose claims are at
10 issue in this Action, Plaintiff used this expert to analyze the data and determine the potential unpaid
11 wages for the employees. The maximum potential damages were calculated to be \$286,505 for the
12 alleged unpaid wages for off-the-clock work at 1 hour per week, \$5,616 for the alleged underpaid
13 overtime due to the miscalculation of the regular rate, \$949 for the alleged unpaid meal break premiums
14 and sick pay due to the miscalculation of the regular rate, \$0 for alleged missed meal period damages
15 because the number of premiums paid exceeded the number of potential violations in the time records;
16 \$792,729 for alleged rest period damages based upon a 100% violation rate for each shift worked during
17 the Class Period, \$6,435 for alleged unreimbursed cell-phone expenses at \$5 per month. Decl.
18 Nordrehaug, ¶6. As a result, the total damage valuation was calculated such that Defendant was subject
19 to a maximum damage claim in the amount of \$1,092,234. As to potential penalties, Plaintiff calculated
20 that potential waiting time penalties were a maximum of \$51,300, and potential maximum wage
21 statement penalties were \$300,110.³ Defendant vigorously disputed Plaintiff's calculations and
22 exposure theories. Blumenthal Decl. at ¶ 8(d).

23 Consequently, the Gross Settlement Amount of \$210,000 represents more than 19% of the
24

25 ³ While Plaintiff alleged claims for statutory penalties pursuant to Labor Code Sections 203 and 226,
26 at mediation Plaintiff recognized that these claims were subject to additional, separate defenses asserted
27 by Defendant, including, a good faith dispute defense as to whether any premium wages for meal or rest
28 periods or other wages were owed given Defendant's position that Plaintiff and Class Members were
properly compensated. *See Nordstrom Commission Cases*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 576, 584 (2010) ("There
is no willful failure to pay wages if the employer and employee have a good faith dispute as to whether
and when the wages were due.").

1 maximum value of the alleged damages at issue in this case at the time this Settlement was negotiated.⁴
2 Importantly, the recent decision that good faith belief of compliance by the employer in *Naranjo v.*
3 *Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal. 5th 1056, 1065 (2024), could completely negate the claims for
4 waiting time and wage statement penalties, even if wages were owed to the Class. The above maximum
5 calculations should then be realistically risk-adjusted in consideration for both the risk of class
6 certification and class-wide liability on all claims. Given the amount of the settlement as compared to
7 the potential value of claims in this case and the defenses asserted by Defendant, this settlement is fair
8 and reasonable.⁵ Clearly, the goal of this litigation has been met.

9 **V. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE AWARD SHOULD**
10 **BE APPROVED**

11 **A. The Attorneys' Fees are Reasonable and Supported by the Percentage of the Fund**
12 **Method**

13 Class Counsel seeks a fee award calculated at one-third (1/3) of the total value of the settlement
14 for the successful prosecution and resolution of this action. California state and federal courts have
15 recognized that an appropriate method for determining award of attorneys' fees is based on a percentage
16 of the total value of benefits to class members by the settlement. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91
17 Cal.App.4th 224, 254 (2001); *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 34 (1977); *Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert*, 444
18 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); *Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.*, 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir. 1997). The purpose
19 of this equitable doctrine is to avoid unjust enrichment to the Class and to "spread litigation costs
20 proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden

21 ⁴ Because the PAGA claim is not a class claim and primarily is paid to the State of California,
22 Plaintiff has not included the PAGA claim in her discussion of the value of the class claims. The
23 PAGA claim was addressed in the Declaration of Nordrehaug at ¶33 submitted in support of the Motion
for Preliminary Approval.

24 ⁵ See *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (approving a
25 settlement where the settlement amount constituted approximately 25% of the estimated overtime
26 damages for the class); *Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671, at *12
27 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting final approval where the settlement "represents approximately 10% of what
28 class might have been awarded had they succeeded at trial."); *Viceral v. Mistras Grp., Inc.*, 2016 WL
5907869 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (approving wage and hour class action settlement amounting to 8.1% of full
value); *Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.*, 2014 WL 2472316, (C.D. Cal. 2014) (approving wage and hour
class action settlement worth "somewhere between 9% and 18%" of maximum valuation).

1 alone.” *Vincent*, 557 F.2d at 769.

2 The California Supreme Court has provided guidance regarding the award of attorneys’ fees in
3 wage and hour class action settlements. Under California law, the award of attorneys’ fees in common
4 fund wage and hour class action settlements should start with the percentage method. See *Laffitte v.*
5 *Robert Half Int’l*, 1 Cal. 5th 480, 503 (2016) (“We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state
6 courts in holding that when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class
7 members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court
8 may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund
9 created”). Under the percentage of the fund method, a court’s objective remains to “mimic the market”
10 in fixing a reasonable fee. See *Gaskill v. Gordon*, 160 F.3d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 1998).

11 First, the fee award representing one-third of the fund clearly falls within that range and is
12 consistent with other rulings of other courts and comprehensive surveys of class action settlements and
13 fee awards. Attorneys’ fees awards of one-third of the fund are within the expected range in the market
14 in legal services. In *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l*, 1 Cal.5th 480, 503 (2016), the California Supreme
15 Court both endorsed the award of a fee as a percentage of that fund, and expressly approved one-third
16 (1/3) as a reasonable percentage in a contingent common fund class settlement. Such similar awards by
17 other Courts are set forth in the Blumenthal Decl. ¶11.

18 Second, the results delivered by Class Counsel also support the requested percentage of the fund.
19 Here, Plaintiff and her counsel secured a \$210,000 settlement for the benefit of the Class and none of
20 the Class Members elected to opt out. Similarly, not one Class Member objected. The Settlement was
21 possible only because Class Counsel was (presumably) able to convince Defendant that Plaintiff could
22 potentially prevail on the contested issues regarding liability, maintain class certification, overcome
23 difficulties in proof as to monetary relief and take the case to trial if need be. Blumenthal Decl. ¶10(f).
24 In successfully navigating these hurdles Class Counsel displayed the necessary skills in both wage and
25 hour and class action litigation. Moreover, as discussed above, there were significant risks to the
26 contingent litigation. See *Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.*, 297 F.R.D. 431, 449 (E.D. Cal.
27 2013) (“**Like this case, where recovery is uncertain, an award of one-third of the common fund**
28 **as attorneys' fees has been found to be appropriate.**”)

1 Third, “the response of the class members to attorneys’ fee notice, though not decisive, is
2 relevant to the...reasonable determination” regarding fees. *Swedish Hospital v. Shalala*, 1 F.3d 1261,
3 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1993). A positive response rate tends to suggest that the court’s “approximation of the
4 market” for fees is well supported. *Id.* at 1269. Here, the Class Notice specifically notified the Class that
5 Class Counsel would be seeking a one-third fee award. Again, there were no objections.

6 Fourth, it is recognized that one of the primary factors justifying an enhanced attorney’s fees
7 reward is the attendant risks inherent in the litigation. For Class Counsel, the fees here were wholly
8 contingent in nature and the case presented far more risk than the usual contingent fee case. Among the
9 risks was the cost inherent in class action litigation, as well as a long battle with a corporate Defendant
10 who had retained a premier and highly experienced defense firm. **Counsel retained on a contingency
11 fee basis, whether in private matters or in class action litigation, is entitled to a premium above
12 their hourly rate in order to compensate for both the risks and the delay in payment.** *See e.g.*
13 *Stanger v. China Elec. Motor, Inc.*, 812 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2016) (courts “must” apply a risk
14 enhancement); *Stetson v. Grissom*, 821 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2016) (abuse of discretion not to apply
15 risk multiplier).

16 Fifth, the requested fee award is supported by the lodestar cross-check. The reasonableness of
17 the requested attorneys’ fee of one-third equal to \$70,000 is also established by reference to Class
18 Counsel’s lodestar in this matter. **The contemporaneous billing records for Class Counsel evidence
19 that through May 4, 2026, Class Counsel’s total lodestar is \$132,722.50, with significant
20 additional fees still to be incurred to complete final approval and the settlement process.** (*See*
21 *Blumenthal Decl.* at ¶12 and Exhibit #3.) The requested fee award is therefore currently equivalent to
22 Class Counsel’s total lodestar with a negative multiplier cross-check of less than 0.6, and there will be
23 additional lodestar incurred by Class Counsel to complete the settlement process and manage the
24 settlement distribution and reports. (*Blumenthal Decl.* at ¶12.) Such a lodestar cross-check is well
25 below the positive multipliers approved in other cases such as *Laffitte* and *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*,
26 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002).⁶ Because the multiplier cross-check is below this accepted range

27
28 ⁶ *See Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal. 5th at 487 (approving 1/3 fee award with multiplier of 2.13); *Vizcaino
supra*, at 1051(3.65 multiplier approved); *Pellegrino v. Robert Half Intern., Inc.*, 182 Cal.App.4th 278

1 the requested award is reasonable under *Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal. 5th at 505. For such reasons, Class
2 Counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees in the amount of one-third of the common fund is reasonable and
3 should be approved.

4 **B. The Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses**

5 The Agreement provides at paragraph 3.2(b), that Class Counsel may seek a “Class Counsel
6 Litigation Expenses Payment of not more than \$21,000.” Class Counsel requests reimbursement for
7 incurred litigation expenses and costs in the amount of \$18,803.68. Class Counsel have incurred
8 expenses of \$18,803.68 based upon counsel's billing records; therefore, this requested amount is less
9 than the allocation in the Agreement. These litigation expenses include the expenses incurred for filing
10 fees, FedEx charges, court docket document downloading charges, mediation expenses, expert expenses
11 (Berger Consulting), and attorney service charges (OneLegal and Knox), all of which are costs normally
12 billed to and paid by the client. The details of the litigation expenses incurred are set forth the
13 Blumenthal Decl. at ¶13 and Exhibit #3. These costs were reasonably incurred in the prosecution of the
14 Action. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶13.) Because these costs were reasonable and necessary to the successful
15 prosecution of these claims, the request is reasonable and should be granted.

16 **C. The Service Award Is Reasonable and Should be Approved**

17 Plaintiff respectfully submits that for her service as the sole class representative, Plaintiff should
18 be awarded the agreed service award of \$12,500 in accordance with the Agreement for her time, risk
19 and effort expended on behalf of the Class as the class representative. (Agreement at ¶ 3.2(a).)
20 Defendant has agreed to this payment and there have been no objections to the requested service award.
21 The Blumenthal Decl., at ¶14, provides a long list of equivalent service awards approved in California
22 in similar cases, which further supports the request in this case. The Plaintiff’s Declaration in support
23 of the request is attached as Exhibit #5 to the Blumenthal Decl.

24 As the only representative of the Class, Plaintiff performed her duties to the Class admirably and
25

26 (2010) (in class actions reasonable multipliers of 2.0 to 4.0 are often applied); *Wershba*, 91 Cal. App.
27 4th at 255 ("multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher."); *In re Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing*
28 *Cases*, 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (2009) (affirming multiplier of 2.52 as “fair and reasonable”); *Chavez*
v. Netflix, Inc., 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 (2008) (affirming multiplier of 2.53); *Taylor v. Fedex Freight,*
Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142202 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (2.26 multiplier).

1 without exception. Plaintiff worked extensively with Class Counsel during the course of the litigation,
2 responding to numerous requests, searching for documents, working with counsel, and reviewing the
3 settlement documentation. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶ 14.) As set forth in the Agreement, Plaintiff is also
4 providing a comprehensive release as part of the Settlement, far beyond the class release. The Plaintiff's
5 Declaration details the involvement, stress and risks she undertook as a result of this Action. Plaintiff
6 also assumed the serious risk that she might possibly be liable for costs and fees to Defendant, as well
7 as the reputational risk of being "blacklisted" by other future employers for having filed a class action
8 on behalf of employees. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶15.) Without the Plaintiff's participation, cooperation
9 and information, no other employees would be receiving any benefit. (Blumenthal Decl. at ¶¶ 15-16).

10 The payment of service awards to successful class representatives is appropriate and the amount
11 is within the currently awarded range for similar settlements. *See, e.g., Andrews v. Plains All Am.*
12 *Pipeline L.P.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172183, at *11 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (service awards of \$15,000 each
13 are appropriate); *Reynolds v. Direct Flow Med., Inc.*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149865, at *19 (N.D. Cal.
14 2019) (granting request for \$12,500 service award); *Mathein v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc.*, 2018 U.S. Dist.
15 LEXIS 71386 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (awarding \$12,500 where average class member payment was \$351);
16 *Louie, supra*, 2008 WL 4473183 at *7 (awarding \$25,000 service award to each of six plaintiffs in
17 overtime class action); *Glass, supra*, 2007 WL 221862 at *16-17 (awarding \$25,000 service award).
18 Accordingly, Class Counsel respectfully requests approval of the Class Representative Service Payment
19 in accordance with the Agreement.

20 **VI. CONCLUSION**

21 Plaintiff respectfully submits that the proposed settlement satisfies the standard of fairness
22 established in California law and should therefore be finally approved as fair, reasonable and adequate
23 and requests entry of the Final Approval Order and Judgment, submitted herewith.

24 Respectfully submitted,

25 Dated: May 1, 2026

BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW LLP

By: /s/ Kyle Nordrehaug

Kyle R. Nordrehaug,
Attorneys for Plaintiff