

**BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK  
DE BLOUW LLP**

Kyle R. Nordrehaug (State Bar #205975)  
Aparajit Bhowmik (State Bar #248066)  
Jeffrey S. Herman (State Bar #280058)  
2255 Calle Clara  
La Jolla, CA 92037  
Telephone: (858) 551-1223  
Facsimile: (858) 551-1232  
Email: [Kyle@bamlawca.com](mailto:Kyle@bamlawca.com)  
Website: [www.bamlawca.com](http://www.bamlawca.com)

Attorneys for Plaintiff

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

SHERRY RUMPH, as an individual,  
on behalf of herself and those similarly  
situated and on behalf of the State of  
California, as a private attorney  
general,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

SEDGWICK CLAIMS  
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., a  
Corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,  
inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE No. **24LBCV01324**

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND  
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION  
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS  
SETTLEMENT AND AWARD OF  
ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE  
AWARD (UNOPPOSED)**

Hearing Date: August 13, 2026  
Hearing Time: 8:30 a.m.  
[Hearing scheduled by Order dated March 19,  
2026]

Judge: Hon. Nicole M. Heeseman  
Dept: S25

Action Filed: June 26, 2024  
Trial Date: Not set

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1     **I.     INTRODUCTION**

2             The parties to this action have reached a Settlement and the Court preliminarily approved the  
3     Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement”), a true and correct copy of which  
4     is attached as Exhibit #2 to the Declaration of Kyle Nordrehaug (“Nordrehaug Decl.”).<sup>1</sup> In accordance  
5     with the Preliminary Approval Order dated March 19, 2026, (“Preliminary Approval Order”), the  
6     approved Class Notice has been disseminated to the Class.<sup>2</sup>

7             The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether the proposed settlement of the litigation  
8     should be finally approved. Plaintiff Sherry Rumph (“Plaintiff”) respectfully moves for final approval,  
9     including attorneys’ fees, costs and the service award, and the proposed entry of the Final Approval  
10    Order and Judgment, submitted herewith. The settlement represents an excellent result for the Class  
11    and avoids the delays, risks, and costs of further litigation. After disseminating the notice to the 84  
12    members of the Class, there were **no objections and no requests for exclusion**, which means that the  
13    entire Class (100.00%) has elected to participate in the Settlement. Nordrehaug Decl. ¶4. This is a  
14    positive response from the Class evidencing their collective approval of the settlement. As a result,  
15    Plaintiff respectfully submits that the class settlement should be finally approved for the same reasons  
16    that the Court preliminarily approved the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate.

17    **II.    THE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE COURT**

18            As consideration for this Settlement, the Gross Settlement Amount to be paid by Defendant  
19    Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. (“Defendant”) is Eight Hundred Forty Thousand Dollars  
20    (\$840,000) (the “Gross Settlement Amount”). (Agreement at ¶¶ 1.21 and 3.1.) Under the Settlement,  
21    the Gross Settlement Amount consists of the following elements: (1) payment of the Individual Class  
22    Payments to the Participating Class Members; (2) Class Counsel Fees Payment and Class Counsel  
23    Litigation Expenses Payment; (3) Administration Expenses Payment; (4) the Class Representative

---

25            <sup>1</sup> Capitalized terms are defined in the Agreement.

26            <sup>2</sup> The “Class” is defined as “all individuals who are or previously were employed by Defendant as  
27    Field Case Managers and who were classified as exempt from overtime wages in California at any time  
28    during the Class Period.” (Preliminary Approval Order, ¶ 6.) The “Class Period” is defined as “May  
24, 2020 through August 24, 2025.” *Id.*

1 Service Payment to the Plaintiff; and (5) the PAGA Penalties payment. (Agreement at ¶ 1.21.)  
2 Nordrehaug Decl. ¶3(a). The Gross Settlement Amount does not include Defendant's share of payroll  
3 taxes. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.) The Gross Settlement Amount shall be all-in with no reversion to  
4 Defendant. (Agreement at ¶ 3.1.) Nordrehaug Decl. ¶3(b). The following is a table of the key financial  
5 terms of the Settlement and the proposed deductions:

6 **\$840,000** (Gross Settlement Amount)

- 7 - \$15,000 (Plaintiff's proposed service awards - not to exceed amount)
- 8 - \$36,000 (Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment - not to exceed amount)
- 9 - \$280,000 (Class Counsel Fees Payment - not to exceed 1/3 of settlement)
- \$20,000 (PAGA Payment - 75% to LWDA / 25% to Aggrieved Employees)
- \$4,500 (Administration Expenses Payment)

9 **\$484,500** (Net Settlement Amount)

10 The specific details of the Settlement were discussed in the Motion for Preliminary Approval and are  
11 set forth again in the Declaration of Nordrehaug at ¶¶ 3(c)-3(i).

12 The Settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable to the class and should be finally approved for  
13 the same reasons the Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement, agreeing that the settlement  
14 is "fair, adequate, and reasonable." (Preliminary Approval Order at ¶ 3.) In sum, the Settlement valued  
15 at \$840,000 is an excellent result for the Class. This result is particularly favorable in light of the fact  
16 that liability and class certification in this case were far from certain in light of the defenses asserted  
17 by Defendant. Given the complexities of this case, the defenses asserted, the uncertainty of class  
18 certification, along with the uncertainties of proof at trial and appeal, the proposed settlement is fair,  
19 reasonable and adequate, and should be finally approved. Nordrehaug Decl. ¶3(j).

20 **III. GENERAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL**  
21 **OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS**

22 Settlements of disputed claims are favored by the courts. *Huens v. Tatum*, 52 Cal.App.4th 259,  
23 265 (1997). In evaluating settlements, the courts have long recognized that compromise is particularly  
24 appropriate since such litigation is difficult and notoriously uncertain. *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Fran.*  
25 *v. Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1151 (2000) ("[V]oluntary conciliation and settlement are  
26 the preferred means of dispute resolution. This is especially true in complex class action litigation.")

27 The court must decide whether the proposed settlement falls within the range of reasonable  
28 settlements, taking into account that settlements are compromises between the parties reflecting

1 subjective, unquantifiable judgments concerning the risks and possible outcomes of litigation. *See*  
2 *Wershba v. Apple Computer*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 246 (2001) (“The proposed settlement is not to be  
3 judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved had plaintiffs  
4 prevailed at trial.”) In *Wershba*, the Court explained that “the merits of the underlying class claims are  
5 not a basis for upsetting the settlement of a class action.” *Id.*; *see also 7-Eleven, supra*, at 1150.

6 In these cases, courts have repeatedly emphasized that there is a strong initial presumption that  
7 the compromise is fair and reasonable. *Wershba*, 91 Cal.App.4th at 245. Courts should not substitute  
8 their judgment for that of the parties who negotiated the settlement. *Id.* at 246. The presumption of  
9 fairness exists where: (1) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to  
10 act intelligently; (2) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (3) counsel is  
11 experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*,  
12 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801 (1996). Here, the facts and circumstances compel the conclusion that the  
13 proposed settlement satisfies that standard and the presumption applies.

#### 14 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE**

15 The Court must determine whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. *Dunk*, 48  
16 Cal.App.4th at 1801; *see also Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com'n*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir.  
17 1982). The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether the settlement is fair. *Cellphone*  
18 *Termination Fee Cases*, 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1117 (2009). “The well-recognized factors that the trial  
19 court should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a class action settlement agreement include  
20 'the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation,  
21 the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of  
22 discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the  
23 presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed  
24 settlement.” *Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.*, 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (2008); *see also Munoz v.*  
25 *BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L. A.*, 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408 (2010).

26 The list of factors is not exhaustive and should be tailored to each case. *Dunk, supra*, at 1801.  
27 Due regard should be given to what is otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.  
28 *Id.* The inquiry “must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the



1 agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties,  
2 and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” *Id.*  
3 “Ultimately, the [trial] court's determination is nothing more than 'an amalgam of delicate balancing,  
4 gross approximations and rough justice.' [Citation omitted.]” *Id.*

5 These factors are analyzed seriatim below, and all support final approval of the class action  
6 settlement before this Court, consistent with this Court’s Preliminary Approval Order.

7 **A. The Settlement Satisfies the California Test for Fairness**

8 1. The Investigation and Analysis of Documents are Sufficient to Allow Counsel  
9 and the Court to Act Intelligently

10 Over the course of more than a year of litigation, the Parties engaged in the investigation of the  
11 claims, including the production of documents, class data, and other information, allowing for the full  
12 and complete analysis of liabilities and defenses to the claims in this Action. The procedural history  
13 and investigation performed was detailed at length in support of the motion for preliminary approval.  
14 The Settlement was the product of one arms-length mediation and contentious negotiations, both during  
15 and after mediation, presided over by mediator Steve Serratore, Esq. The details of the litigation are  
16 set forth in the Nordrehaug Decl. at ¶¶ 6(a)-6(g).

17 2. The Settlement was Reached Through Arm’s Length Bargaining

18 This settlement is the result of extensive and hard-fought litigation as well as negotiations  
19 before an experienced and well-respected mediator. Defendant has expressly denied and continues to  
20 deny any wrongdoing or legal liability arising out of the conduct alleged in the Action. Plaintiff and  
21 Class Counsel have determined that it is desirable and beneficial to the Class to resolve the Released  
22 Class Claims of the Class in accordance with this Settlement, based upon the experience of Class  
23 Counsel who has previously litigated similar claims against other employers. Nordrehaug Decl. ¶7(a).

24 The Parties attended an arms-length mediation session with Steve Serratore, Esq., a respected  
25 and experienced mediator of wage and hour class actions, in order to reach this Settlement. In  
26 preparation for the mediation, Defendant provided Plaintiff and Class Counsel with payroll and  
27 employment data and other information regarding the Class Members, various internal documents, and  
28 other compensation and employment-related materials. Class Counsel analyzed the data with the

1 assistance of damages expert Berger Consulting and prepared and submitted a mediation brief to the  
2 mediator. Following the all-day mediation session, with after arms' length negotiations both during and  
3 after the mediation, the Parties agreed to this Settlement based upon a mediator's proposal. Nordrehaug  
4 Decl. ¶7(b).

5 The fact that the settlement was negotiated with the assistance of an experienced mediator  
6 supports approval. *Alberto v. GMRI, Inc.*, 252 F.R.D. 652, 666 (E.D. Cal. Jun 24, 2008); *Glass v. UBS*  
7 *Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476; 15 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1330, at \*15 (N.D. Cal.  
8 2007) ("The settlement was negotiated and approved by experienced counsel on both sides of the  
9 litigation, with the assistance of a well-respected mediator with substantial experience in employment  
10 litigation[, and] this factor supports approval of the settlement").

11 From July 2025 to November 2025, the settlement agreement and exhibits thereto were drafted,  
12 finalized and executed. On March 19, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary  
13 Approval and entered the Preliminary Approval Order that same date, preliminarily finding the  
14 settlement to be fair, adequate, and reasonable to the Class. Nordrehaug Decl. ¶7(c).

15 3. Class Counsel is Experienced in Similar Litigation

16 Class Counsel in this matter has extensive class action experience and has represented thousands  
17 of persons in class actions including employment litigation, wage and hour class actions, and complex  
18 litigation. Class Counsel has previously litigated wage and hour class actions involving employees and  
19 claims similar to this case and have been approved as experienced class counsel during contested  
20 motions in state and federal courts throughout California. The experience of counsel and class action  
21 cases managed and settled by the Class Counsel in this action is provided to the Court in the  
22 Nordrehaug Decl. at Exhibit #1. Class Counsel have participated in every aspect of the settlement  
23 discussions and have concluded the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable and in the best interests  
24 of the Class. Nordrehaug Decl. ¶ 3(j).

25 4. There Are No Objections and No Requests for Exclusion

26 The reaction of the Class unequivocally supports approval of the Settlement. On April 23, 2026,  
27 the Administrator mailed the Court-approved Class Notice to the Class Members, which provided each  
28 class member with the terms of the Settlement, including notice of the claims at issue and the financial

1 terms of the settlement, including the attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards that were being sought,  
2 how individual settlement awards would be calculated, and the specific, estimated payment amount to  
3 that individual. *See* Declaration of Madely Nava (“Nava Decl.”) ¶ 7, Exh. A. In disseminating the  
4 notice, the Administrator followed the notice procedures authorized by the Court in its Preliminary  
5 Approval Order. Significantly, there have been **no objections and no requests for exclusion**. Nava  
6 Decl. at ¶¶ 11-13. As such, the entire Class (100%) will participate in the Settlement and will be sent  
7 a settlement check. *See* Nava Decl. at ¶¶ 11-14; Nordrehaug Decl. ¶4.

8 The absence of any objector strongly supports the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the  
9 Settlement. *See In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litigation*, 80 F.Supp.2d 164, 175 (S.D.N.Y.  
10 2000) (“If only a small number of objections are received, that fact can be viewed as indicative of the  
11 adequacy of the settlement.”); *Stoetznner v. U.S. Steel Corp.*, 897 F.2d 115, 118-119 (3d. Cir. 1990) (29  
12 objections out of 281 member class “strongly favors settlement”); *Laskey v. Int’l Union*, 638 F.2d 954  
13 (6th Cir. 1981) (The fact that 7 out of 109 class members objected to the proposed settlement should  
14 be considered when determining fairness of settlement). Here, where there are no objections, the  
15 approval of the class is evident.

#### 16 5. The Strength of Plaintiff’s Case

17 The Action generally alleges that Plaintiff and other Class Members were misclassified as  
18 exempt and, therefore, not properly paid all overtime wages for hours worked and at the correct rate  
19 of pay, were not provided meal and rest periods or paid premiums at the correct rate of pay in lieu  
20 thereof, were not timely paid earned wages, were not provided reimbursement for required expenses,  
21 were not provided accurate itemized wage statements, and that Defendant did not properly maintain  
22 accurate records. The Action seeks unpaid wages, penalties, attorney fees, litigation costs, and any other  
23 equitable or legal relief allegedly due and owing to Plaintiff and the other Class Members by virtue of  
24 the foregoing claims. Nordrehaug Decl. ¶5.

25 Where both sides face significant uncertainty, the attendant risks favor settlement. *Hanlon v.*  
26 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, a number of defenses asserted by Defendant  
27 present serious threats to the claims of the Plaintiff and other Class Members. The Action alleges that  
28 Case Manager employees were misclassified as “exempt” under Labor Code ¶515. Therefore,

1 Defendant's primary defense was that the Class Members were properly classified as exempt under the  
2 administrative exemption. Courts have been split on this issue with regard to other employers.  
3 Defendant asserted that Defendant's practices complied with all applicable Labor laws. Defendant also  
4 contends that its meal and rest period policies fully complied with California law and Defendant did  
5 not fail to provide the opportunity for legally required meal and rest breaks. Defendant could argue that  
6 the Supreme Court decision in *Brinker v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012), weakened Plaintiff's  
7 claims, on liability, value, and class certifiability as to the meal and rest period claims. Defendant  
8 contends that there was no failure to pay for business expenses. Defendant further contends that any  
9 cell phone usage was merely convenient and voluntary such that reimbursement was not legally  
10 required. Finally, Defendant also argues that based on its facially lawful practices, Defendant acted  
11 in good faith and did not willfully misclassify the Class Members as exempt as Plaintiff contends,  
12 which could negate the claims for waiting time penalties and/or inaccurate wage statements altogether.  
13 See e.g. *Naranjo v. Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal.5th 1056, 1065 (May 6, 2024) ("if an employer  
14 reasonably and in good faith believed it was providing a complete and accurate wage statement in  
15 compliance with the requirements of section 226, then it has not knowingly and intentionally failed to  
16 comply with the wage statement law.") If successful, Defendant's defenses could eliminate or  
17 substantially reduce any recovery to the Class. While Plaintiff believes that these defenses could be  
18 overcome, Defendant maintains these defenses have merit and therefore present a serious risk to  
19 recovery by the Class. Nordrehaug Decl. ¶8(a).

20 In a similar wage and hour case, the federal district court in *Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.*, 2009  
21 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 (N.D. Cal. 2009), explained in approving an overtime class action settlement:

22 Plaintiffs may have a strong case, but the risks inherent in continued litigation are great.  
23 Defendants strongly deny liability for Plaintiffs' principal claim... [..T]he gross  
24 settlement amount and the Class Members' expected net recovery, after fees and other  
costs are deducted, appear to be a reasonable compromise, in light of the risks of  
litigation.

25 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33900 at \*19-20 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see also *Browning v. Yahoo!, Inc.*, 2007  
26 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86266, at \*30 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("In considering the strength of Plaintiff's case, legal  
27 uncertainties at the time of settlement - particularly those which go to fundamental legal issues - favor  
28 approval."). As recognized in a federal decision approving settlement of an overtime wage class action:

1 The potential complexity and possible duration of trial also weigh in favor of granting  
2 final approval. Plaintiffs acknowledge the difficulties of proving damages, recognize the  
3 uncertainty of outcome, and believe defendant would appeal in the event of adverse  
4 judgment. A post-judgment appeal would require many years to resolve and delay  
5 payment to class members. Plaintiffs believe the benefits of a guaranteed recovery today  
6 outweigh an uncertain future result. Accordingly, plaintiffs argue, and the Court agrees,  
7 the actual recovery confers substantial benefits on the class that outweigh the potential  
8 recovery through full adjudication.

9 *Barcia v. Contain-A-Way, Inc.*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17118, \*9 (S.D. Cal. 2009); *see also Louie v.*  
10 *Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.*, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78314, \*14 (S.D. Cal. 2008).

11 There was also a significant risk that, if the Action was not settled, Plaintiff would be unable  
12 to obtain a certified class and maintain the certified class through trial, and thereby not recover on  
13 behalf of any employees other than themselves. At the time of the mediation, Defendant forcefully  
14 opposed the propriety of class certification, arguing that individual issues precluded class certification.

15 Class Counsel has previously litigated class certification in a similar Case Manager misclassification  
16 case where the trial court denied class certification and this denial of class certification was upheld on  
17 appeal. Further, as demonstrated by the California Supreme Court decision in *Duran v. U.S. Bank*  
18 *National Assn.*, 59 Cal. 4th 1 (2014), there are significant hurdles to overcome for a class-wide recovery  
19 even where the class has been certified. While other cases have approved class certification in wage  
20 and hour claims, class certification in this action was hotly disputed and the maintenance of a certified  
21 class through trial was by no means a foregone conclusion. Nordrehaug Decl. ¶8(b).

22 In sum, the Settlement is a fair and reasonable result, and provides the Class with a significant  
23 recovery, particularly when viewed in light of the fact that the Defendant asserted serious and  
24 substantial defenses both to liability and to class certification. The maximum and average class  
25 member allocation (in addition to their Individual PAGA Payment) are \$15,246.70 and \$5,767.86,  
26 respectively. *See Nava Decl.* at ¶16. Given the complexities of this case, the defenses, along with the  
27 uncertainties of proof and appeal, the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and should  
28 be finally approved. Nordrehaug Decl. at ¶8(e).

#### 29 6. The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

30 As demonstrated by the decision in *Duran*, the complexities and duration of further litigation  
31 cannot be overstated. There is little doubt that Defendant would post a bond and appeal in the event of  
32

1 an adverse judgment. A post-judgment appeal by Defendant would have required many more years to  
2 resolve, assuming the judgment was affirmed. If the judgment was not affirmed in total, then the case  
3 could have dragged on for years after the appeal. The benefits of a guaranteed recovery today outweigh  
4 an uncertain result three or more years in the future. Nordrehaug Decl. ¶8(c).

5 Plaintiff and Class Counsel recognize the expense and length of a trial against Defendant  
6 through possible appeals which could take at least another two or three years. Class Counsel also have  
7 taken into account the uncertain outcome, the risk of litigation, especially in complex actions such as  
8 this one. Class Counsel are also mindful of and recognize the inherent problems of proof under, and  
9 alleged defenses to, the claims asserted in the Action. Moreover, post-trial motions and appeals would  
10 have been inevitable. Costs would have mounted and recovery would have been delayed if not denied,  
11 thereby reducing the benefits of an ultimate victory. The Settlement confers substantial benefits upon  
12 the Class. Based upon their evaluation, Plaintiff and Class Counsel have determined that the Settlement  
13 set forth in the Agreement is in the best interest of the Class. Nordrehaug Decl. ¶8(c).

14 Although Plaintiff and Class Counsel believe that their case has merit, which Defendant  
15 continue to vigorously deny, they recognized the potential risks both sides would face if litigation of  
16 the Action continued. As the federal court held in *Glass*, where the parties faced uncertainties similar  
17 to those in this litigation:

18 In light of the above-referenced uncertainty in the law, the risk, expense, complexity,  
19 and likely duration of further litigation likewise favors the settlement. Regardless of  
20 how this Court might have ruled on the merits of the legal issues, the losing party likely  
21 would have appealed, and the parties would have faced the expense and uncertainty of  
22 litigating an appeal. "The expense and possible duration of the litigation should be  
23 considered in evaluating the reasonableness of [a] settlement."

24 *Id.* at \*12.

#### 25 7. The Amount Offered in Settlement

26 The Settlement in this case is fair, reasonable and adequate considering Defendant's defenses  
27 to Plaintiff's claims. As set forth in the Declaration of Nordrehaug in support of preliminary approval  
28 which discussed the value of the class claims in detail, the Gross Settlement Amount compares  
favorably to the value of the claims. Based upon 84 Participating Class Members who collectively  
worked an estimated 8,707 Workweeks (Nava Decl., at ¶¶ 14-15), the Gross Settlement Amount

1 provides an average value of \$10,000 per Class Member and \$96 per workweek and, after deductions,  
2 the Net Settlement Amount provides an average recovery of \$5,767.85 per Class Member and a  
3 recovery of \$55.64 per workweek. Nordrehaug Decl. at ¶8(d).

4 The calculations to compensate for the amount due for the Class at the time of the mediation  
5 were calculated by Berger Consulting, Plaintiff's damage expert. As to the Class whose claims are at  
6 issue in this Action, Plaintiff used the expert to analyze the data and determine the potential unpaid  
7 wages for the employees. The maximum potential damages were calculated to be \$2,021,989 for the  
8 alleged unpaid overtime wages due to off-the-clock work at 3.25 hour per week, \$425 for the alleged  
9 underpaid PTO wage based on the alleged miscalculation of the regular rate, \$637,535 for the alleged  
10 meal period damages based upon a 50% potential violation rate, and \$637,535 for alleged rest period  
11 damages based upon a 50% potential violation rate, \$9,925 for alleged unreimbursed business expenses  
12 for personal cell phone usage at \$5 per month. As a result, the total damage valuation was calculated  
13 that Defendant was subject to a maximum damage claim in the amount of \$3,307,409. As to potential  
14 penalties, Plaintiff calculated that potential waiting time penalties were a maximum of \$452,046, and  
15 potential maximum wage statement penalties were \$192,900.<sup>3</sup> Defendant vigorously disputed Plaintiff's  
16 calculations and exposure theories. Nordrehaug Decl. ¶8(d).

17 Consequently, the Gross Settlement Amount of \$840,000 represents more than 22% of the  
18 maximum value of the alleged damages at issue in this case at the time this Settlement was negotiated.<sup>4</sup>  
19 Importantly, the recent decision that good faith belief of compliance by the employer in *Naranjo v.*  
20 *Spectrum Sec. Servs., Inc.*, 15 Cal. 5th 1056, 1065 (2024), could completely negate the claims for  
21

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22 <sup>3</sup> While Plaintiff alleged claims for statutory penalties pursuant to Labor Code Sections 203 and  
23 226, at mediation these claims are subject to additional, separate defenses asserted by Defendant,  
24 including, a good faith dispute defense as to whether any wages were owed given Defendant's position  
25 that Plaintiff and Class Members were properly compensated. *See Nordstrom Commission Cases*, 186  
26 Cal. App. 4th 576, 584 (2010) ("There is no willful failure to pay wages if the employer and employee  
27 have a good faith dispute as to whether and when the wages were due.").

28 <sup>4</sup> Because the PAGA claim is not a class claim and primarily is paid to the State of California,  
Plaintiff did not included the PAGA claim in this discussion of the value of the class claims. The PAGA  
claim was addressed in the Declaration of Kyle Nordrehaug at ¶33 filed in support of Plaintiff's Motion  
for Preliminary Approval.

1 waiting time and wage statement penalties, even if wages were owed to the Class. The above maximum  
2 calculations should then be adjusted in consideration for both the risk of class certification and the risk  
3 of establishing class-wide liability on all claims. Given the amount of the settlement as compared to  
4 the potential value of claims in this case and the defenses asserted by Defendant, this settlement is fair  
5 and reasonable.<sup>5</sup> Clearly, the goal of this litigation has been met. Nordrehaug Decl. ¶8(d).

6 **V. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND SERVICE AWARD**  
7 **SHOULD BE APPROVED**

8 **A. The Attorneys' Fees are Reasonable and Supported by the Percentage of the**  
9 **Fund Method**

10 Class Counsel seeks a fee award calculated at one-third (1/3) of the total value of the settlement  
11 for the successful prosecution and resolution of this action. California state and federal courts have  
12 recognized that an appropriate method for determining award of attorneys' fees is based on a  
13 percentage of the total value of benefits to class members by the settlement. *Wershba v. Apple*  
14 *Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 254 (2001); *Serrano v. Priest*, 20 Cal.3d 25, 34 (1977); *Boeing Co.*  
15 *v. Van Gemert*, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); *Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.*, 557 F.2d 759, 769 (9th Cir.  
16 1997). The purpose of this equitable doctrine is to avoid unjust enrichment to the Class and to "spread  
17 litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear  
18 the entire burden alone." *Vincent*, 557 F.2d at 769.

19 The California Supreme Court has provided guidance regarding the award of attorneys' fees in  
20 wage and hour class action settlements. Under California law, the award of attorneys' fees in common  
21 fund wage and hour class action settlements should start with the percentage method. *See Laffitte v.*  
22 *Robert Half Int'l*, 1 Cal. 5th 480, 503 (2016) ("We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state

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23 <sup>5</sup> See *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8476 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (approving a  
24 settlement where the settlement amount constituted approximately 25% of the estimated overtime  
25 damages for the class); *Stovall-Gusman v. W.W. Granger, Inc.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78671, at \*12  
26 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting final approval where "the proposed Total Settlement Amount represents  
27 approximately 10% of what class might have been awarded had they succeeded at trial."); *Viceral v.*  
28 *Mistras Grp., Inc.*, 2016 WL 5907869 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (approving wage and hour class action  
settlement amounting to 8.1% of full value); *Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc.*, 2014 WL 2472316, (C.D.  
Cal. 2014) (approving wage and hour class action settlement worth "somewhere between 9% and 18%"  
of maximum valuation).



1 courts in holding that when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the  
2 class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund,  
3 the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the  
4 fund created”). Under the percentage of the fund method, a court’s objective remains to “mimic the  
5 market” in fixing a reasonable fee. *See Gaskill v. Gordon*, 160 F.3d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 1998).

6 First, the fee award representing one-third of the fund clearly falls within that range and is  
7 consistent with other rulings of other courts and comprehensive surveys of class action settlements and  
8 fee awards. Attorneys’ fees awards of one-third of the fund are within the expected range in the market  
9 in legal services. *See Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Award*,  
10 7 J. Empirical Leg. Stud. 811, 833 (2010) (analyzing 444 cases between 2006-2007 and concluding that  
11 “[m]ost fee awards were between 25 percent and 35 percent”). In *Laffitte*, the Court expressly approved  
12 of a one-third fee award. Such similar awards by other Courts are set forth in the Nordrehaug Decl.  
13 ¶11.

14 Second, the results delivered by Class Counsel also support the requested percentage of the  
15 fund. Here, Plaintiff and her counsel secured a \$840,000 settlement for the benefit of the Class, and not  
16 one Class Member objected. The Settlement was possible because Defendant recognized the risks that  
17 Plaintiff could potentially prevail on any or all of the contested issues regarding liability, and obtain  
18 class certification. Nordrehaug Decl. ¶10(f). In successfully navigating these hurdles Class Counsel  
19 displayed the necessary skills in both wage and hour and class action litigation. Moreover, as discussed  
20 above, there were significant risks to the contingent litigation. *See Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions*  
21 *Corp.*, 297 F.R.D. 431, 449 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“**Like this case, where recovery is uncertain, an award**  
22 **of one-third of the common fund as attorneys' fees has been found to be appropriate.**”)

23 Third, “the response of the class members to attorneys’ fee notice, though not decisive, is  
24 relevant to the ... reasonable determination” regarding fees. *Swedish Hospital v. Shalala*, 1 F.3d 1261,  
25 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1993). A positive response rate tends to suggest that the court’s “approximation of the  
26 market” for fees is well supported. *Id.* at 1269. Here, the Class Notice specifically notified the Class  
27 that Class Counsel would be seeking a one-third fee award. Again, there were no objections.  
28

1 Fourth, it is recognized that one of the primary factors justifying an enhanced attorney's fees  
2 reward is the attendant risks inherent in the litigation. Here, it is clear that a settlement fund of \$840,000  
3 has been created. For Class Counsel, the fees here were wholly contingent in nature and the case  
4 presented far more risk than the usual contingent fee case. Among the risks was the cost inherent in  
5 class action litigation, as well as a long battle with a corporate Defendant who had retained a premier  
6 and highly experienced defense firm. **Counsel retained on a contingency fee basis, whether in**  
7 **private matters or in class action litigation, is entitled to a premium above their hourly rate in**  
8 **order to compensate for both the risks and the delay in payment.** See e.g. *Stanger v. China Elec.*  
9 *Motor, Inc.*, 812 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2016) (courts "must" apply a risk enhancement); *Stetson v.*  
10 *Grissom*, 821 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2016) (abuse of discretion not to apply risk multiplier).

11 Fifth, the requested fee award is supported by the lodestar cross-check. The reasonableness of  
12 the requested attorneys' fee of one-third equal to \$280,000 is also established by reference to Class  
13 Counsel's lodestar in this matter. **The contemporaneous billing records for Class Counsel evidence**  
14 **that through July 20, 2026, Class Counsel's total lodestar is \$144,505.00, with significant**  
15 **additional fees still to be incurred to complete final approval and the settlement process.** See  
16 Nordrehaug Decl. at ¶12 and Exhibit #3. The requested fee award is therefore currently equivalent to  
17 Class Counsel's total lodestar with a reasonable multiplier cross-check of less than 2, and there will be  
18 additional lodestar incurred by Class Counsel to complete the settlement process and manage the  
19 settlement distribution and reports. Nordrehaug Decl. at ¶12. In *Buccellato v. At&T Operations, Inc.*,  
20 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85699, at \*4 (N.D. Cal. 2011), the Court explained that a multiplier of 4.3 is  
21 reasonable in such a contingent class action. Here, the multiplier cross-check is below the range of  
22 reasonable multipliers approved in other cases.<sup>6</sup> As noted in *Laffitte*, the lodestar multiplier cross-check

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24 <sup>6</sup> See *Johnson v. Brennan*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105775 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("Courts regularly  
25 award lodestar multipliers from two to six times lodestar"); *Buccellato v. At&T Operations, Inc.*, 2011  
26 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85699, at \*4 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (4.3 multiplier is reasonable); *Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal.  
27 5th at 487 (approving 1/3 fee award with multiplier of 2.13); *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d  
28 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002) (3.65 multiplier approved); *Pellegrino v. Robert Half Intern., Inc.*, 182  
Cal.App.4th 278 (2010) (in class actions reasonable multipliers of 2.0 to 4.0 are often applied);  
*Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 255 ("multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher."); *In re Sutter*  
*Health Uninsured Pricing Cases*, 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 512 (2009) (affirming multiplier of 2.52 as "fair

1 “does not override the trial court's primary determination of the fee as a percentage of the common  
2 fund” and Courts may only consider adjustment when the “cross-check is extraordinarily high or low”.  
3 *Laffitte, supra*, 1 Cal.5th at 505. For such reasons, Class Counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees in the  
4 amount of one-third of the common fund is fair and reasonable, and should be approved.

5 **B. The Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses**

6 The Agreement provides at paragraph 3.2(b), that Class Counsel may seek a “Class Counsel  
7 Litigation Expenses Payment of not more than 36,000.” Class Counsel requests reimbursement for  
8 incurred litigation expenses and costs in the amount of \$24,722.88 based upon counsel’s billing records,  
9 which is less than the “not to exceed” amount. These litigation expenses include filing fees, mediation  
10 expenses, expert expenses (Berger Consulting), attorney service charges (OneLegal, Knox), and  
11 delivery charges (FedEx), all of which are costs normally billed to the client.<sup>7</sup> The details of the  
12 litigation expenses incurred are set forth the Nordrehaug Decl. at ¶13 and Exhibit #3. These costs were  
13 reasonably incurred in the prosecution of the Action. Because these incurred expenses were necessary  
14 to the successful prosecution of these claims, the request should be granted.

15 **C. The Service Award Is Reasonable and Should be Approved**

16 Plaintiff respectfully submits that for her service as the class representative, Plaintiff should be  
17 awarded the agreed service award of \$15,000 for Plaintiff in accordance with the Agreement for their  
18 time, risk and effort expended on behalf of the Class as the class representatives. (Agreement at ¶  
19 3.2(a).) Notably, the requested award compares favorable to the recover by the Class Members in this  
20 settlement, some of whom are receiving in excess of \$15,000. Defendant has agreed to this payment  
21 and there have been no objections to the requested service award. The Nordrehaug Decl., at ¶14,  
22 provides a long list of equivalent service awards approved in California in similar cases, which further  
23

24 and reasonable); *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 (2008) (affirming multiplier of 2.53);  
25 *Taylor v. Fedex Freight, Inc.*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142202 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (2.26 multiplier).

26 <sup>7</sup> Nontaxable costs are properly awarded where authorized by the parties’ agreement. *Stetson*, 821  
27 F.3d at 1165. Accordingly, “[e]xpenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging, photocopying,  
28 long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service, mediation, exhibits,  
documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.” *Rutti v. Lojack Corp., Inc.*, 2012  
WL 3151077, at \*12 (C.D. Cal. 2012).

1 supports the request in this case. Plaintiff's Declaration in support of this request is attached as Exhibit  
2 #5 to the Nordrehaug Decl.

3 As the sole representative of the Class, Plaintiff performed her duties to the Class admirably  
4 and without exception. Plaintiff worked extensively with Class Counsel during the course of the  
5 litigation, responding to numerous requests, searching for documents, working with counsel, and  
6 reviewing the settlement documentation. Nordrehaug Decl. at ¶ 14. Plaintiff's Declaration details the  
7 involvement, stress and risks she undertook as a result of this Action. Plaintiff also assumed the serious  
8 risk that she might possibly be liable for costs and fees to Defendant, as well as the reputational risk  
9 of being "blacklisted" by other future employers for having filed a class action on behalf of employees.  
10 Nordrehaug Decl. at ¶15. Without Plaintiff's participation, cooperation and information, no other  
11 employees would be receiving any benefit. Nordrehaug Decl. at ¶¶ 15-16.

12 The payment of service awards to successful class representatives is appropriate and the amount  
13 of \$15,000 is well within the currently awarded range for similar settlements. *See, e.g., Andrews v.*  
14 *Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172183, at \*11 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (finding that the  
15 requested service awards of \$15,000 each are appropriate); *Reynolds v. Direct Flow Med., Inc.*, 2019  
16 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149865, at \*19 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (granting request for \$12,500 service award);  
17 *Mathein v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc.*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71386 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (awarding \$12,500  
18 where average class member payment was \$351); *Louie v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.*, 2008  
19 WL 4473183, \*7 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (awarding \$25,000 service award to each of six plaintiffs in  
20 overtime class action); *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.*, 2007 WL 221862, \*16-17 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (awarding  
21 \$25,000 service award in overtime class action).

## 22 **VI. CONCLUSION**

23 Plaintiff respectfully requests that the settlement be finally approved as fair, reasonable and  
24 adequate and requests entry of the Final Approval Order and Judgment, submitted herewith.

25 Respectfully submitted,

26 Dated: July 20, 2026

**BLUMENTHAL NORDREHAUG BHOWMIK DE BLOUW LLP**

By: /s/ Kyle Nordrehaug

Kyle R. Nordrehaug

Attorneys for Plaintiff