Benjamin H. Haber (SBN 315664)
benjamin.haber@wilshirelawfirm.com
Daniel J. Kramer (SBN 314625)
daniel.kramer@wilshirelawfirm.com
Chase M. Stern (SBN 290540)
chase.stern@wilshirelawfirm.com
Alan Wilcox (SBN 287476)
alan.wilcox@wilshirelawfirm.com
WILSHIRE LAW FIRM, PLC
660 S. Figueroa St., Sky Lobby
Los Angeles, California 90017
Telephone: (213) 381-9988
Facsimile: (213) 381-9989

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DIONDRE EDWARDS and FRANCISCO PONCE, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated and other aggrieved persons,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, a corporation; JUST TIRES, an unknown entity; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 24STCV16291

CLASS & REPRESENTATIVE ACTION

[*Assigned to: Hon. Samantha P. Jessner, Dept. 7*]

PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS AND PAGA ACTION SETTLEMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL HEARING
Date: January 27, 2026
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Dept: 7

Complaint filed: June 28, 2024
FAC filed: September 4, 2025
Trial date: Not set

TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 27, 2026 at 10:00 a.m., in Department 7 of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, located at 312 Noth Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 382 and California Rules of Court 3.769, *et seq*., Plaintiffs Diondre Edwards and Francisco Ponce ("Plaintiffs") will move the Court for an Order granting preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiffs and Defendant The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company ("Defendant"). Plaintiffs further move the Court for an Order:

1. Granting preliminary approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement;
2. Certifying a Class for settlement purposes;
3. Approving the Notice and the plan for distribution of the Notice;
4. Appointing Plaintiffs Diondre Edwards and Francisco Ponce as Class Representatives for settlement purposes;
5. Appointing Plaintiffs' Counsel, Benjamin Haber, Daniel J. Kramer, Chase M. Stern, and Alan Wilcox of Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, as Class Counsel for settlement purposes;
6. Appointing Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions as the Settlement Administrator; and
7. Scheduling a final approval hearing.

The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and authorities, the Declarations of Benjamin H. Haber, Diondre Edwards and Francisco Ponce, filed concurrently herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: September 5, 2025

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

By: ______________________

Benjamin H. Haber
Daniel J. Kramer
Chase M. Stern
Alan Wilcox
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Diondre Edwards and Francisco Ponce ("Plaintiffs") seek preliminary approval of a proposed $1,700,000.00 non-reversionary, wage and hour class and PAGA action settlement with Defendant The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company ("Defendant," and together with Plaintiffs, the "Parties"). The Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement ("Settlement" or "Settlement Agreement") will provide substantial monetary payments to approximately 1,562 class members. And, as set forth more fully below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all the criteria for settlement approval under California law. The Settlement was reached after extensive investigation, discovery, and negotiations. The negotiations were at arms-length and were facilitated by an experienced class action mediator, Jill Sperber, over the course of a full day of mediation that was conducted via Zoom. After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached a settlement on August 21, 2025. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Court preliminarily approve the proposed Settlement, certify the proposed settlement class, approve the proposed notice, and set a final approval hearing.

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT

A. Plaintiffs' Claims

This is a wage and hour class and Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2699, *et seq.*) representative action. Plaintiffs and the putative class members worked in California as current and former non-exempt employees for Defendant during the class period. Defendant is a global tire manufacturing and retailing company (Declaration of Benajamin Haber in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement ["Haber Decl."], ¶ 2.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant's payroll, timekeeping, and wage and hour practices resulted in Labor Code violations. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant failed to: pay all sick time; provide employees with legally compliant meal and rest periods; and Defendant failed to reimburse business expenses. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert related claims for failure to pay wages during employment, failure to pay all final wages at termination, failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to keep requisite payroll records, unfair business practices, and civil penalties under PAGA. (Haber Decl., ¶ 3.)

On June 28, 2024, Plaintiff Edwards filed a putative wage and hour class action complaint against Defendant for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages (Labor Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197); (2) failure to pay overtime wages (Labor Code §§ 1194 and 1198); (3) failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512); (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods (Labor Code § 226.7); (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination (Labor Code §§ 201-203); (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Labor Code § 226); (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures (Labor Code § 2802); and (8) unfair business practices (Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, *et seq*.). On August 2, 2024, Defendant removed this action to California Central District Court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), Central District of California Case No. 2:24-cv- 06534-DSF-AJR.

On October 8, 2024, Plaintiff Edwards filed a separate civil action in Los Angeles Superior Court against Defendant asserting a single cause of action for civil penalties pursuant to PAGA, Case No. 24TRCV03366. Plaintiff Edwards sent a notice to Defendant and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") alleging similar wage and hour violations pursuant to the PAGA on July 17, 2024. (Haber Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs Edwards and Ponce sent an amended notice to Defendant and the LWDA on January 31, 2025. (*Id.* at ¶ 5.)

On March 21, 2025, the Parties Joint Stipulation to Remand was granted and the Federal Class Action was remanded back to state court for settlement purposes. (Haber Decl., ¶ 4.)

On September 4, 2025, Plaintiff Edwards filed a First Amended Complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. 24STCV16291, adding Plaintiff Ponce to the action and the following alleged claims: violation of California Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), Labor Code Section 2698 *et seq*., failure to pay California paid sick leave, illegal deductions from wages, failure to pay vacation pay, failure to provide suitable seating, failure to pay split shift premiums, and failure to pay reporting time pay. (Haber Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs sent an amended notice to Defendant and the LWDA on January 31, 2025. (*Id.*)

B. Discovery and Investigation

Following the filing of the initial complaint, the Parties exchanged documents and information before mediating this action. Defendant produced a sample of time and pay records for class members. Defendant also provided documents of its wage and hour policies and practices during the class period, and information regarding the total number of current and former employees in its informal discovery responses. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.)

After reviewing documents regarding Defendant's wage and hour policies and practices and analyzing Defendant's timekeeping and payroll records, Class Counsel was able to evaluate the probability of class certification, success on the merits, and Defendant's maximum monetary exposure for all claims. (*Id.* at ¶ 7.) Class Counsel also investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Class Counsel reviewed these records and prepared a damage analysis prior to mediation. (*Id.*) This extensive investigation and discovery allowed Class Counsel to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the Settlement.

C. Settlement Negotiations

On February 3,2025, the Parties participated in private mediation with experienced class action mediator Jill Sperber. (*Id.* at ¶ 8.) The mediation was conducted via Zoom. The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs' claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached a settlement that was fully executed on August 21, 2025, the material terms of which are encompassed within the Settlement. (*Id.* at ¶ 9, Ex. 1, Settlement Agreement.)

Class Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of this case. Based on the foregoing discovery and their own independent investigation and evaluation, Class

Counsel is of the opinion that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interests of the Settlement Class Members in light of all known facts and circumstances, the risk of significant delay, the defenses that could be asserted by Defendant both to certification and on the merits, trial risk, and appellate risk. (*Id.* at ¶ 15.)

Indeed, the $1,700,000.00 Settlement represents approximately **61%** of the **realistic maximum recovery** of $2,794,615.46. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Although Class Counsel estimated that Defendant's maximum potential liability for all claims was approximately $8 million, when the risk of prevailing at certification and trial are factored into the equation, Class Counsel believes that Defendant's realistic exposure was $2,794,615.46, meaning the Settlement achieves a significant recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 15-29.) Considering the risk and uncertainty of prevailing at class certification and at trial, this is an excellent result for the Class. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Indeed, because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment.

D. Key Terms of the Proposed Settlement

The Settlement's key terms include:

1. Class Definition: For settlement purposes only, the Parties agree to the certification of a class pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382 defined as: "means all current and former non-exempt employees of Defendant who worked in the State of California at any time during the Class Period." (Settlement, § 1.5.)

2. Class Period: "means the period commencing on January 2, 2020, and ending on the date of preliminary approval of the Settlement by the Court, except for Defendant's hourly non-exempt employees in California who were part of the settlement class in the action entitled *Luis Franco v. The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company*, Santa Clara Superior Court Case No. 22CV393403 ("*Franco*") the Class Period begins on July 31, 2022 and ends on the date of preliminary approval of the Settlement by the Court." (Settlement, § 1.12.)

3. Participating Class Members: "means a Class Member who does not submit a valid and timely Request for Exclusion from the Settlement." (Settlement, § 1.35.)

4. Aggrieved Employees: "means all current and former non-exempt employees of Defendant who worked in the State of California at any time during the PAGA Period." (Settlement, § 1.4.)

5. Gross Settlement Amount: "means $1,700,000.00, which is the total amount Defendant agrees to pay under the Settlement except as provided in Paragraph 9 below. The Gross Settlement Amount is non-reversionary and will be used to pay Individual Class Payments, Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Counsel Fees, Class Counsel Expenses, Class Representative Service Payment and the Administrator's Expenses. The Gross Settlement Amount is exclusive of the employer share of any applicable payroll taxes, and any such employer-side payroll taxes shall be paid by Defendant separately and in addition to the Gross Settlement Amount." (Settlement, § 1.22.)

6. Uncashed Checks: "For any Class Member whose Individual Class Payment check or Individual PAGA Payment check is uncashed and cancelled after the void date, the Administrator shall transmit the funds represented by such checks to the California Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund in the name of the Class Member thereby leaving no "unpaid residue" subject to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 384, subd. (b). The Parties, Class Counsel and Defense Counsel represent that they have no interest or relationship, financial or otherwise, with the intended Cy Pres Recipient." (Settlement, § 4.4.3.)

7. Release by Participating Class Members: "Upon the full funding of the Gross Settlement Amount and all applicable employer-side payroll taxes, the Participating Class Members shall release Defendant and the Released Parties from all claims, rights, demands, liabilities and causes of actions that are alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts stated in the Operative Complaint and ascertained in the course of the Action, including claims regarding Defendant's alleged: (i) failure to pay all regular wages, minimum wages, straight time wages, and overtime wages due (including off- the-clock and rounding claims); (ii) failure to pay all wages at the correct rate of pay (including premium pay such as, meal period premiums, rest break premiums, and California Paid Sick Leave, vacation wages, and reporting time pay); (iii) failure to provide meal periods or compensation in lieu thereof; (iv) failure to provide rest periods or compensation in lieu thereof; (v) failure to correctly pay bonus or incentive pay and compensation; (vi) failure to pay wages timely at time of termination or resignation; (vii) failure

to provide timely payment of wages during employment; (viii) failure to maintain complete, accurate records (including payroll records and records of work periods, meal periods, total daily hours, hours per pay period, and applicable pay rates); (ix) failure to provide complete, accurate wage statements; (x) failure to pay reporting time pay; (xii) failure to pay accrued vacation; (xiii) failure to reimburse for necessary business-related expenses; (xiv) unlawful deductions of wages; (xv) failure to pay overtime and double time at the regular rate; (xvi) failure to pay California Paid Sick Leave; (xvii) failure to pay vacation wages; (xviii) split shift premiums; (xix) illegal deductions from wages; and (xx) unfair business practices. This release includes any and all claims pursuant to: California Labor Code sections §§ 201, 202, 203, 204, 207, 210, 218.5, 218.6, 221, 226, 226(a), 226.3, 226.7, 227.3, 245, 245.5, 246, 246.5, 247, 247.5, 248, 248.1, 248.2, 248.3, 248.5, 248.6, 248.7, 249, 256, 510, 512, 551, 552, 558, 1174, 1174.5, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 1199, 2800, and 2802; the California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.; the California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5; and the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders, Sections 4, 5, and 14(A-B). This release shall apply to claims arising during the Class Period." (Settlement, § 6.2.)

8. Release by Aggrieved Employees: "Upon the full funding of the Gross Settlement Amount, Named Plaintiffs, as the PAGA Representatives, PAGA Members, and the State of California Labor and Workforce Development Agency shall fully release and discharge Defendant and the Released Parties from all claims under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (California Labor Code § 2698, *et seq*.) for civil penalties that are alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged, based on the facts stated in the Operative Complaint, ascertained in the course of the Action, and premised on the facts alleged in both Named Plaintiffs' PAGA Letter and subsequent PAGA Letters if any, to the LWDA, including PAGA claims for alleged violations of Labor Code sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 207, 210, 218.5, 218.6, 221, 226, 226(a), 226.3, 226.7, 227.3, 245, 245.5, 246, 246.5, 247, 247.5, 248, 248.1, 248.2, 248.3, 248.5, 248.6, 248.7, 249, 256, 510, 512, 551, 552, 558, 1174, 1174.5, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 1199, 2800, 2802, 2699, and the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders, Sections 4, 5, and 14(A-B), and including but not limited to penalties that could have been awarded pursuant to Labor Code sections 210, 225.5, 226, 226.3, 558, 1174.5, 1197.1, and 2698 *et seq*." (Settlement, § 6.3.)

9. No Reversion: "None of the Gross Settlement Amount will revert to Defendant." (Settlement, § 3.1.)

10. PAGA Allocation: "PAGA Penalties in the amount of $100,000.00 to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount, with 65% ($65,000.00) allocated to the LWDA PAGA Payment and 35% ($35,000.00) allocated to the Individual PAGA Payments." (Settlement, § 3.2.5.) Class Counsel submitted the proposed settlement to the LWDA before filing this Motion for Preliminary Approval." (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 4-5.)

11. Net Settlement Amount: "means the Gross Settlement Amount, less the following payments in the amounts approved by the Court: Individual PAGA Payments, the LWDA PAGA Payment, Class Representative Service Payment, Class Counsel Fees Payment, Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment, and the Administration Expenses Payment. The remainder is to be paid to Participating Class Members as Individual Class Payments." (Settlement, § 1.28.)

12. Distribution Formula: "The Administrator will calculate each Individual PAGA Payment by (a) dividing the amount of the Aggrieved Employees' 35% share of PAGA Penalties ($35,000) by the total number of PAGA Pay Periods worked by all Aggrieved Employees during the PAGA Period and (b) multiplying the result by the number of PAGA Period Pay Periods worked by each individual Aggrieved Employee. Aggrieved Employees assume full responsibility and liability for any taxes owed on their Individual PAGA Payment." (Settlement, § 3.2.5.1.)

13. Tax Allocation: "33.33% of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of wage claims (the "Wage Portion"). The Wage Portions are subject to tax withholding and will be reported on an IRS W-2 Form. 66.67% of each Participating Class Member's Individual Class Payment will be allocated to settlement of claims for interest and penalties (the "Non-Wage Portion(s)")." (Settlement, § 3.2.4.1.)

14. Class Representative Service Awards: "Class Representative Service Payments to the Class Representatives of not more than $10,000.00 to each of the Plaintiffs (in addition to any Individual Class Payment and any Individual PAGA Payment the Class Representative is entitled to receive as a Participating Class Member). Defendant will not oppose Plaintiffs' request for a Class Representative Service Payment that does not exceed this amount. As part of the motion for Class Counsel Fees Payment and Class Litigation Expenses Payment, Plaintiffs will seek Court approval for any Class Representative Service Payments no later than 16 court days prior to the

Final Approval Hearing. If the Court approves a Class Representative Service Payment less than the amount requested, the Administrator will retain the remainder in the Net Settlement Amount. The Administrator will pay the Class Representative Service Payment using IRS Form 1099. Plaintiffs assumes full responsibility and liability for employee taxes owed on the Class Representative Service Payment. Any reduction by the Court of the Class Representative Service Payment shall not be sufficient grounds on its own to void the Settlement or appeal the Judgment." (Settlement, § 3.2.1.)

15. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: "A Class Counsel Fees Payment of not more than one third (33 1/3%) of the Gross Settlement Amount which is currently estimated to be $566,666.67 and a Class Counsel Litigation Expenses Payment of not more than $30,000.00." (Settlement, § 3.2.2.)

16. Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement: The Notice sets forth in plain terms, a statement of the case, the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the approximate amount of attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards being sought, and an explanation of how the settlement allocations are calculated. (Settlement, Ex. A, Class Notice.) Class Members will be notified by first-class mail of the settlement. (Settlement, § 4.4.1.) Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions, the proposed Settlement Administrator, will undertake its best efforts to ensure that the notice is provided to the current addresses of class members, including conducting a national change of address search and re-mailing the notice to updated addresses. (*Id.*; Haber Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. 2 [Settlement Administrator Bid].)

III. DISCUSSION

To prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class, the settlement of a class action requires court approval. (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1800-01.) This Court has wide discretion to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair. (*Mallick v. Super. Ct.* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 434, 438.) Fairness is presumed when: (1) the settlement is reached through arm's-length bargaining; (2) investigation is sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. (*Dunk*, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1800.)

In considering whether a settlement is reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, which may include the strength of plaintiffs' case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc*. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128.) In order to approve a class action settlement, the court must satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the "ballpark" of reasonableness. (*Id*. at p. 133.) The record need not contain an explicit statement of the maximum theoretical recovery. (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 408-9 [holding that *Kullar* does not require "an explicit statement of the maximum amount the plaintiffs class could recover if it prevailed on all its claims", but instead, only an "understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation."].)

As discussed below, Class Counsel has provided information exceeding the threshold required to provide this Court with materials and information necessary to determine that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

A. <u>The Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, Adequate, and the Product of Investigation, Litigation, and Negotiation</u>

1. The Settlement Is the Product of Discovery, Investigation, and Informed and Non-Collusive Arm's-Length Negotiations

Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption here that the negotiations were conducted in good faith. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 11.51.) Settlement is favored, and settlement agreements are realistically assessed. (*Stamburgh v. Super. Ct.* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236; *Priddy v. Edelman* (6th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 438, 447 ["The fact that a plaintiffs might have received more if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not to approve the settlement."].)

The Settlement was reached following extensive negotiations following one day of mediation with experienced employment mediator, Jill Sperber, Esq. (Haber Decl., ¶ 8.) The settlement negotiations were at arm's length and, although conducted in a professional manner, were adversarial. (*Id*.) The Parties went into the mediation willing to explore the potential for a settlement of the dispute, but each side was also prepared to litigate their or its position through trial and appeal if a settlement had not been reached. (*Id.*) After extensive negotiations and discussions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiffs' claims and Defendant's defenses, the Parties reached an agreement. (Haber Decl., ¶ 9.)

Prior to reaching this settlement, Class Counsel conducted informal discovery concerning the claims set forth in the litigation, such as a sample of class member timekeeping and payroll records, Defendant's policies and procedures concerning the payment of wages, the provision of meal and rest breaks, issuance of wage statements, and providing all wages at separation, as well as information regarding the number of putative class members and the mix of current versus former employees, the wage rates in effect, and the amount of meal and rest period premium wages paid to class members. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 6-7.) In conjunction with their extensive factual investigation, Class Counsel investigated the applicable law regarding the claims and defenses asserted in the litigation. (*Id.*) Thus, Plaintiffs and their counsel were able to act intelligently and effectively in negotiating the proposed Settlement. (*Id.*)

Class Counsel also has considerable experience and has demonstrated competence with litigating wage and hour class actions. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 40-48.) Again, this supports the position that the terms of the Settlement are premised on objective evidence that has been considered and weighed in light of the risks, expenses, and time consumption to both sides of continued litigation of this action.

2. The Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable in Light of the Parties' Respective Legal Positions

A settlement is not judged against what might plaintiffs recover had he prevailed at trial, nor does the settlement have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be fair and reasonable. (*Wershba v. Apple Computers, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 246, 250 ["Compromise is inherent and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated, this is no bar to a class settlement because the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation."].)

This settlement avoids the risks and the accompanying expense of further litigation. (Haber Decl., ¶ 27.) While Plaintiffs are confident in the merits of their claims, a legitimate controversy exists as to each cause of action. (*Id.* at ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs also recognize that proving the amount of wages due to each class member would be an expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition. (*Id.*)

The proposed settlement of $1,700,000.00 therefore represents a substantial recovery when compared to Plaintiffs' reasonably forecasted recovery. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 15-29.) Because of the proposed Settlement, class members will receive timely, guaranteed relief and will avoid the risk of an unfavorable judgment. When considering the risks of litigation, the uncertainties involved in achieving class certification, the burdens of proof necessary to establish liability, the probability of appeal of a favorable judgment, it is clear that the settlement amount of $1,700,000.00 is within the "ballpark" of reasonableness, and preliminary settlement approval is appropriate. (*Id.*) ***Indeed, each Settlement Class Member is eligible to receive an average net benefit of approximately $642.34.*** (*Id.* at ¶ 28.)

3. Class Counsel Has Extensive Experience in Class Action Litigation

The settlement negotiations were conducted by highly capable and experienced counsel. Class Counsel have a strong record of vigorous and effective advocacy for their clients and are experienced in handling complex wage and hour class action litigation. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 40-49.) Although Plaintiffs and their counsel were prepared to litigate the claims alleged in the litigation, they support the proposed Settlement as being in the best interests of the class.

B. <u>The Proposed Class Notice of Settlement Should Be Approved</u>

The proposed Notice, in the form attached to the Settlement Agreement, should be approved for dissemination to the class. The Notice informs the class of the terms of the settlement and of their rights to be excluded from the settlement. And if there are class members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Accordingly, the proposed Notice meets all the requirements of Rule 3.769(f) of the California Rules of Court.

C. <u>The Proposed Attorneys' Fees and Costs Are Reasonable</u>

Under the Settlement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant agrees to pay Class Counsel reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of $566,666.67, which is 1/3 of the Gross Settlement Amount, and up to $30,000.00 in costs. These amounts are disclosed to all class members in the proposed Notice and are reasonable.

1. Class Counsel Request an Award of Fees Based on the "Common Fund" Method

California courts have long awarded attorneys' fees as a percentage of the benefit created by counsel in creating a common fund. The California Supreme Court held that "when a number of persons is entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs may be awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund." (*Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 34, quoting *D'Amico v. Bd. of Medical Examiners* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1.)

Class Counsel seeks an award of attorneys' fees on the "percentage of recovery/common fund" theory. The purpose of this approach is to "spread litigation costs proportionally among all the beneficiaries so that the active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone." (*Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc*. (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 759, 769.) In *Quinn v. State of California* (1995) 15 Cal.3d 162, the California Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who expends attorneys' fees in winning a suit which creates a fund from which others derive benefits may require those passive beneficiaries to bear a fair share of the litigation costs." (*Id.* at p. 167.) Similarly, in *City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, the California Supreme Court recognized that the common fund doctrine has been applied "consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share." (*Id.* at p. 110.)

The California Supreme Court affirmed in *Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc*. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480 that, "when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund created." (*Id*. at p. 503.) The court explained: "The recognized advantages of the percentage method—including relative ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation—convince us the percentage method is a valuable tool that should not be denied our trial courts." (*Id*. [internal citations omitted].)

2. The Requested Fee Award Is in Line with Typical Cases

According to a leading treatise on class actions, "[n]o general rule can be articulated on what is a reasonable percentage of a common fund. Usually 50% of the fund is the upper limit on a reasonable fee award from a common fund in order to assure that the fees do not consume a disproportionate part of the recovery obtained for the class, although somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented." (*See* Conte & Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions (3rd Ed.) § 14.03.) Attorneys' fees that are fifty percent of the fund are typically considered the upper limit, with thirty to forty percent commonly awarded in cases where the settlement is relatively small. (*Id.*; *see also Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company* (N.D. Cal. 1995) 901 F. Supp. 294 [stating that most cases where 30-50 percent was awarded involved "smaller" settlement funds of under $10 million].)

Here, Plaintiffs requests attorneys' fees equal to 1/3 of the Gross Settlement Amount, which is in line with the prevailing guidelines established in California case law and academic literature and is consistent with awards in California. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, n.11 ["Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery."].) Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully requests that the Court approve the attorneys' fees as negotiated by the Parties and requested herein.

3. This Matter Involves A "Fee-Shifting" Provision of the Labor Code

Labor Code § 1194 (a) provides for the recovery of "minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs of suit." Under this section, Plaintiffs would be permitted to recover their actual attorneys' fees, even if those fees were larger than the total class recovery at the conclusion of this case. This settlement is beneficial in that it limits the risk of continued expenses and consumption of time, energy, and resources facing Defendant while at the same time rewarding Class Counsel for their decision to assume risk by taking on this matter. In fact, prosecution of this action involved significant financial risk for Class Counsel. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 38-39.) Class Counsel undertook this matter solely on a contingent basis, with no guarantee of recovery. (*Id.*) Once counsel undertook this litigation on behalf of the Class, Class Counsel committed to pursue it to its conclusion, placing its fiduciary duty to the Class ahead of all other concerns.

4. The Experience, Reputation and Ability of Class Counsel Support the Requested Fee Award

As demonstrated by their past experience in pursuing class actions on behalf of consumers and employees, Class Counsel possess considerable expertise in litigating class actions. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 40-49.) Class Counsel has been involved as lead counsel or co-counsel in several class actions that resulted in millions in recovery. (*Id.*) Because it is reasonable to compensate class counsel commensurate with their skill, reputation and experience, Class Counsel's requested fee award is supported here.

Class Counsel's experience in wage and hour class actions was integral in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Defendant and the reasonableness of the settlement. Practice in the narrow field of wage and hour litigation requires skill and knowledge concerning the rapidly evolving substantive law (state and federal), as well as the procedural law of class action litigation. Based on these and other factors, Class Counsel has frequently received fee awards of this percentage from the gross recovery for the class. Therefore, the requested fee award is reasonable and fair.

D. <u>The PAGA Allocation is Reasonable</u>

Where settlements negotiate a good faith amount for PAGA penalties and "there is no indication that this amount was the result of self-interest at the expense of other" class members, such amounts are generally considered reasonable. (*Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) No. CV-08-0844 EDL, 2009 WL 928133 at *1, 9.) Courts have approved amounts for PAGA penalties in the range of zero to two percent of the total maximum amount of the Settlement. (*Id*. [approving a PAGA payment of 0.3%, or $1,500]; *see also Jack v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.* (S.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011) 2011 WL 4899942 at *6 [approving a PAGA payment of 0.25%]; *McKenzie v. Fed. Express Corp*. (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) 2012 WL 12882124 at *5 [acknowledging that courts approve PAGA claim settlements in the range of zero to two percent of the total settlement].) Here, the amount to be paid to the LWDA is larger than many other PAGA settlement amounts approved by the courts where seemingly nominal amounts were allocated for such claims. (*See, e.g., Zubia v. Shamrock Foods Co*. (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) No. CV1603128ABAGRX, 2017 WL 10541431, at *14 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.1%]; *Hopson, supra*, 2008 WL 3385452, at *1 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.3% or $1,500]; *Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc*. (E.D. Cal.

Oct. 31, 2012) No. 1:10-CV-0324 AWI SKO, 2012 WL 5364575, at *3 [approving a PAGA settlement of 0.27%].) Here, the Parties negotiated a good faith amount of $100,000.00, 65% percent of which ($65,000.00) will be paid to the LWDA and 35% ($35,000.00) to be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees. (Settlement, § 3.2.5.) The $100,000 apportioned to PAGA equates to approximately 5.9% of the Gross Settlement Amount, which far exceeds amounts that are routinely approved. The Parties negotiated to allocate 5.9% of the Settlement to PAGA penalties in good faith and this amount is reasonable considering that the maximum PAGA penalties were estimated at $5,173,100.00 (which assumed $100 per pay period). (Haber Decl., ¶ 24.)

E. <u>The Service Awards to Named Plaintiffs Are Reasonable</u>

Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits "are eligible for reasonable incentive payments to compensate them for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class." (*Munoz, supra,* 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Courts routinely grant approval of class action settlement agreements containing enhancements for the class representatives, which are necessary to provide incentive to represent the class, and are appropriate given the benefit the class representatives help to bring about for the class. (*See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp*. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-59.)

Service awards are particularly important to plaintiffs in wage and hour cases because they promote the important public policies underlying the wage and hour laws. This strong policy is codified in California Labor Code § 90.5, which provides, "it is the policy of this state to vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required or permitted to work under substandard unlawful conditions . . . ." Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has noted that "retaliation against employees for asserting statutory rights under the Labor Code is widespread," despite anti-retaliation statutes designed to protect employees. (*Gentry v. Super. Ct.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 460-61.) In this context, class representatives should be rewarded for assuming the risk of retaliation for the sake of class members. (*See Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 F.R.D. 174, 187.)

Under the settlement agreement, subject to the Court's approval, Defendant agreed to pay Service Awards in the amount of $10,000.00 to each named Plaintiff Diondre Edwards and Francisco Ponce. This amount is also in exchange for Plaintiffs' general release of all claims against Defendant. Courts routinely approve enhancement awards in excess of $10,000.00 for plaintiffs represented by Class Counsel. (*See, e.g., Moreno v. Pretium Packaging, L.L.C.* (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) 2021 WL 3673845, *3 ["The Court concludes a $10,000 incentive award is appropriate."]; *Suarez v. Bank of America, National Association* (N.D. Cal., Jan. 11, 2024, No. 18-CV-01202-LB) 2024 WL 150721, at *4 ["The court approves awards of $10,000 for each class representative."].) Class Counsel represent that Plaintiffs devoted a great deal of time and work assisting counsel in the case, communicated with counsel very frequently for litigation and to prepare for mediation, and were frequently in contact with Class Counsel during the mediation. (*See generally* Plaintiffs' declarations; Haber Decl., ¶¶ 30-34.) This amount is reasonable particularly in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiffs generated for all class members. (*Id.*)

When compared with the amounts awarded in typical class action cases, the amount requested here is particularly reasonable. Indeed, a 2006 study examining the average incentive award given to class action plaintiffs from 1993 to 2002 found that the "average award per class representative was $15,992 and the median award per class representative was $4,357." (Eisenberg & Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study* (2006) 53 UCLA L.Rev. 1303, 1308.) That same study found that named plaintiffs in employment discrimination class actions received an average award of $69,850 and a median award of $31,081, while named plaintiffs in other employment class actions received an average award of $12,121 and a median award of $13,059. (*Id.* at p. 1334.) The authors of the study found that higher awards in employment cases reflected the "courts' wish to make representative plaintiffs whole by compensating them for the high costs of their service to the class, including risks of stigmatization or retaliation on the job." (*Id.* at p. 1308.)

IV. CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES IS WARRANTED

A. Legal Standard

The proposed Settlement Class is well suited for class certification. All of the claims derive from a core set of alleged violations of California's wage and hour laws and regulations. For the reasons set forth more fully below, for purposes of settlement only, the Class satisfies the prerequisites for certification under Code of Civil Procedure § 382. Section 382 provides: "when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all." (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) There are two requirements to section 382: "(1)

[t]here must be an ascertainable class; and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented." (*Daar v. Yellow Cab Co*. (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 695, 704 [citations omitted].) To clarify these requirements, the California Supreme Court has looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to explain that the community-of-interest requirement itself embodies three factors: "(1) predominant questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class." (*Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc*. (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470.)

California law and policy favor the fullest and most flexible use of the class action device. (*Id.* at pp. 469-73.) Indeed, "Courts long have acknowledged the importance of class actions as a means to prevent a failure of justice in our judicial system" particularly where the rights of consumers are at issue. (*Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co*. (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 429, 434.) Any doubt as to the appropriateness of class treatment should be resolved in favor of certification. (*Richmond*, *supra,* 29 Cal.3d at pp. 473-75.)

B. <u>The Criteria for Class Certification Is Satisfied for Settlement Purposes.</u>

1. The Class is Ascertainable and Numerous

The proposed class that Plaintiffs seek to represent is easily ascertainable and includes approximately 1,562 employees of Defendant.

Plaintiffs maintain that there is an easily ascertainable class, defined by objective and precise criteria. Because class members are identified using specific criteria in the regular business records of Defendant, i.e., job position, the class is ascertainable. (*Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co*. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952, 959-60 [class membership defined by ownership of product that is the subject of the lawsuit is sufficient to make the class ascertainable].)

"The requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 that there be 'many' parties to a class action suit is indefinite and has been construed liberally." (*Rose v. City of Hayward* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.) "Where a question is of common interest to 'many' persons, an action may be maintained as a class action even where the parties are numerous and it is in fact practicable to join them all." (*Id.*) "No set number is required as a matter of law for the maintenance of a class action." (*Id.*) "Thus, our Supreme Court has upheld a class representing the 10 beneficiaries of a trust in an action for removal of the trustees." (*Id.*, citing *Bowles v. Super. Ct.* (1955) 44 Cal.2d

574; *see also Collins v. Rocha* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232 [upholding a 35 member class.]) Therefore, Plaintiffs contend that numerosity is plainly satisfied.

2. Common Issues of Law and Fact Predominate

The Court should grant conditional class certification for settlement purposes here on the grounds that questions of law and fact common to all class and subclass members predominate over any individual questions. This inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. (*See, e.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp*. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605.)

Here, the employment practices at issue include: whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices for all hours worked, including overtime wages; whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices for pay sick time properly; whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices to provide employees with meal periods; whether Defendant had legally compliant policies and practices authorizing and permitting its employees to take rest periods; whether Defendant reimbursed employees for business expenses; whether payment of wages during employed was timely; whether final payment of wages was untimely and excluded unpaid wages, including meal and rest period premium wages; whether wage statements were consequently non-compliant; and whether Defendant failed to keep requisite payroll records. Plaintiffs contend that the factual and legal issues are the same for all of the identified class members, including Plaintiffs. Further, all class members suffered from, and seek redress for, the same alleged injuries.

3. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Typical of the Claims of the Class

The typicality requirement does not focus on the individual characteristics or circumstances of the representative plaintiffs compared to those of the remainder of the class, but rather upon the typicality of the proposed representative's claims as they relate to the defendant's conduct and activities. (*Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 47 ["[t]he only requirements are that common questions of law and fact predominate and that the class representative be similarly situated" vis-à-vis the class.].) A representative plaintiffs' claims are typical of the class if they arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct, and if the claims rest on the same legal theories. (*Id.*) That is precisely the case here. Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendant and allege that they were subject to the same policies and practices as other employees.

4. Plaintiffs and Their Counsel Meet the Adequacy Requirement

The adequacy of representation requirements is met by fulfilling two conditions: first, named plaintiffs must be represented by counsel qualified to conduct the pending litigation; second, a named plaintiffs' interests cannot be antagonistic to those of the class. (*McGhee v. Bank of America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 451.)

All of these requirements are met here for settlement purposes. Plaintiffs retained counsel with extensive experience in prosecuting complex class actions, including similar class actions that previously settled. (Haber Decl., ¶¶ 40-49.) Class Counsel unquestionably is "qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation." (*Miller v. Woods* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 875.) In addition, Plaintiffs have no conflicts, and Plaintiffs have, with counsel, litigated this case and diligently reviewed the settlement terms, showing their dedication. Plaintiffs' willingness to serve as a representative demonstrates their serious commitment to bringing about the best results possible for the class. (*McGhee*, *supra,* 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)

5. A Class Action is Superior to a Multiplicity of Litigation

Finally, in making its class certification decision, the Court must determine that a class action would be superior to alternative means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation. By consolidating many potential individual actions into a single proceeding, this Court's use of the class action device enables it to manage this litigation in a manner that serves the economics of time, effort and expense for the litigants and the judicial system. Absent class treatment, similarly-situated employees with small but nevertheless meritorious claims for damages would, as a practical matter, have no means of redress because of the time, effort and expense required to prosecute individual actions. (*Gentry, supra,* 42 Cal.4th at pp. 457-62; *Leyva v. Medline Ind.* (9th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3d 510, 515.) Moreover, in the context of settlement, the superiority concerns are essentially non-existent.

V. <u>THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND</u>

A. <u>The Proposed Notice Plan Satisfies Due Process</u>

Notice requirements are set forth in the California Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.766 (e), (f).) California law vests the Court with broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate notice program. (*Cartt v. Super Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 973-74.) There is no statutory or due process requirement that all class members receive actual notice, but in this matter, the class members will receive direct mailed notice. As the Court of Appeals has explained, "[t]he notice given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the Class Members . . . ." (*Id.* at p. 974.) In this case, notice of the proposed settlement will be provided by direct mailing, the best possible form of notice.

B. <u>The Notice is Accurate and Informative</u>

The proposed Notice should be approved. It will be disseminated through direct U.S. first class mail to the last known address for each Class Member. It informs the Class Members of the terms of the settlement and their right to be excluded from the Settlement. And if there are Class Members who wish to object to this proposed class action settlement, they will have the opportunity to file their objections and be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

The Notice also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class notices. (Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions* (3rd Ed.) § 8.39.) It summarizes the proceedings to date and the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement, in an informative and coherent manner. It makes clear that the settlement agreement does not constitute an admission of liability by the Defendant, who denies all liability, and it recognizes that this Court has not ruled on the merits of the action. It also states that the final settlement approval decision has yet to be made. The Notice thus complies with the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a combined settlement-certification class notice.

VI. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant preliminary approval of the proposed settlement and set a Final Approval Hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: September 5, 2025

WILSHIRE LAW FIRM

By: ______________________

Benjamin Haber
Daniel J. Kramer
Chase M. Stern
Alan Wilcox

Attorneys for Plaintiffs