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**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

**IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TEHAMA**

CHRISTOPHER VANDERBEEK, an individual,  
on behalf of himself, and on behalf of all persons  
similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

OUTBACK CONTRACTORS, INC., a  
California corporation; and DOES 1-50,  
Inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 24CI-000225

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND  
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION  
FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF  
CLASS ACTION AND PAGA  
SETTLEMENT**

Date: September 9, 2026  
Time: 8:30 a.m.

Judge: Hon. Matthew C. McGlynn  
Dept.: 5

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff CHRISTOPHER VANDERBEEK (“Plaintiff”) seeks preliminary approval of the Stipulation of Settlement of Class and PAGA Action Claims and Release of Claims (“Agreement”)<sup>1</sup>, which if approved, would provide valuable monetary relief for approximately 85 Class Members. The basic terms of the Agreement provide for the following:

1. The “**Class Members**” and “**Class Period**” shall mean all persons who are or previously were employed by Outback Contractors, Inc. (“Defendant”) in California and classified as non-exempt employees at any time beginning August 30, 2020 through July 31, 2026 (“Class Period”). Agreement at §§ I(J), I(H). The Settlement Class Members are all Class Members who have not submitted a timely and valid request for exclusion. (Agreement at § I(LL)).

2. The “**Aggrieved Employees**” and “**PAGA Period**” shall mean all individuals who are or previously were employed by Defendant in California and classified as a non-exempt employee during the period beginning August 30, 2023 through July 31, 2026 (“PAGA Period”). (Agreement at §§ I(C), I(Y)).

3. The “**Gross Settlement Amount**” is Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$255,000.00). (Agreement at § I(O)). The Gross Settlement Amount is non-reversionary and includes the following:

a. A “**Service Award**” in the amount of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff for his services on behalf of the Class Members and in exchange for a broad general release. (Agreement at §§ I(II), III(E), and III(O)(9));

b. A payment of a “**Class Counsel Award**” consisting of attorneys’ fees not to exceed thirty-three percent (33%) of the Gross Settlement Amount estimated to be \$84,150.00 out of \$255,000.00 plus costs of up to \$30,000.00, to be paid to Class Counsel. (Agreement at §§ I(E), III(O)(10));

c. A “**PAGA Payment**” of \$20,000.00 shall be allocated from the Gross Settlement Amount for settlement of claims for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004.

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<sup>1</sup> The Agreement is attached as Ex. “1” to the Declaration of Sydney Castillo-Johnson (“SCJ Dec.”) at ¶ 3. All citations to the Agreement incorporate by this reference a citation to the SCJ Dec., ¶ 3. Further, unless indicated otherwise, capitalized terms used herein have the same meaning as those defined by the Agreement.



The Settlement Administrator shall pay seventy-five percent (65%) of the PAGA Payment (\$13,000.00) to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA Payment”). Thirty-five percent (35%) of the PAGA Payment (\$7,000.00) will be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees by the Settlement Administrator (“Aggrieved Employee Payment”). (Agreement at §§ I(X), III(O)(11)); and

d. **“Settlement Administration Costs”** not to exceed \$5,490.00 payable to the Settlement Administrator, Apex Class Action LLC, for, *inter alia*, the administration of the Notice Packet and Individual Settlement Payments. (Agreement at §§ I(JJ), III(O)(12)).

4. The **“Net Settlement Amount”** of approximately \$105,360.00 (Gross Settlement Amount less Class Counsel Award, Service Award, PAGA Payment, and Settlement Administration Costs) which will be allocated to all Settlement Class Members based on the respective Workweeks for each Class Member divided by the total Workweeks for all Class Members. The Net Settlement Amount will be paid to all Settlement Class Members resulting in an average Individual Settlement Payment of **\$1,239.53**. (Agreement at § III(M)(1); SCJ Dec., ¶ 5).

An objective evaluation of the Settlement confirms that the relief negotiated on behalf of the Class is fair, reasonable, and adequate. The Settlement was negotiated by the Parties at arm’s length. The Settlement confers substantial benefits to the Class Members. The relief offered by the Settlement is particularly impressive when viewed against the difficulties encountered by plaintiffs pursuing wage and hour cases (*see infra*). Indeed, by settling now rather than proceeding to trial, Settlement Class Members will not have to wait (possibly years) for relief, nor will they have to bear the risk of class certification being denied or of Defendant prevailing at trial. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 5).

As discussed below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all criteria for preliminary settlement approval and falls within the range of reasonableness. The average Individual Settlement Payment to the Settlement Class Members meets or exceeds awards in similar wage and hour class actions. Moreover, the proposed Class is appropriate for provisional certification. Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court grant preliminary approval of the Settlement. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 6).

## **II. FACTS AND PROCEDURE**

### **A. Overview of the Litigation and Mediated Settlement**

Defendant operates a construction company in the state of California, including the county of

1 Tehama, where Plaintiff worked. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a non-exempt employee  
2 from June 2023 to September 2023 as a non-exempt employee. At all times during his employment,  
3 Plaintiff was classified by Defendant as a non-exempt employee, paid at an hourly rate, and was  
4 entitled to legally compliant meal and/or rest periods, and minimum, regular and overtime wages for  
5 all hours worked. Throughout his employment, Plaintiff was subject to Defendant’s written policies  
6 and procedures contained in, among other documents, the Employee Handbook. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 7;  
7 Declaration of Christopher Vanderbeek (“CV Dec.”) at ¶ 4).

8 On August 30, 2024, Plaintiff served Defendant and the Labor and Workforce Development  
9 Agency (“LWDA”) with a Notice of Violations (“PAGA Notice”). Plaintiff’s PAGA Notice set forth  
10 the facts and theories supporting Defendant’s alleged violations of various provisions of the California  
11 Labor Code and applicable Industrial Welfare Commissions (“IWC”) Wage Order and of his intent to  
12 pursue claims under California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, Cal. Lab. Code Sections  
13 2698 *et seq.* (“PAGA”). (SCJ Dec., ¶ 8).

14 On August 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a class action complaint in the Tehama Superior Court  
15 alleging eight causes of action against Defendant for: (1) Unfair Competition in Violation of Cal. Bus.  
16 & Prof. Code §17200 *et seq.*; (2) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages in Violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§  
17 1194, 1197 & 1197.1; (3) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages in Violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510, *et*  
18 *seq.*; (4) Failure to Provide Required Meal Periods in Violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7 & 512 and  
19 the Applicable IWC Wage Order; (5) Failure to Provide Required Rest Periods in Violation of Cal.  
20 Lab. Code §§ 226.7 & 512 and the Applicable IWC Wage Order; (6) Failure to Reimburse Employees  
21 for Required Expenses in Violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 2802; (7) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized  
22 Statements in Violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 226; and (8) Failure to Provide Wages When Due in  
23 Violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201, 202 and 203 (the “Class Action”). (SCJ Dec., ¶ 9).

24 On December 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a separate representative action in the Tehama County  
25 Superior Court, Case No. 24CI-000327, alleging a single cause of action for violations of PAGA (the  
26 “PAGA Action”). (SCJ Dec., ¶ 10).

27 On July 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint to include an additional  
28 cause of action for violations of PAGA. On July 14, 2026, Plaintiff dismissed the PAGA Action. (SCJ

Dec., ¶ 10).

Generally, Plaintiff claims that Defendant failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements, failed to provide meal and rest breaks, failed pay for all hours worked, failed to reimburse employees for mandatory business expenses, and failed to timely pay all wages due upon separation of employment. Defendant denies liability for each of Plaintiff's claims. Further, Defendant asserts that it fully complied with all applicable employment laws and raised several other significant defenses to Plaintiff's claims, including but not limited to, asserting that it provided compliant wage statements, maintained facially compliant meal and rest period policies, paid for all hours worked, reimbursed its employees for business expenses, and timely payment of all wages due upon separation of employment. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 11).

Plaintiff propounded written discovery in December 2024. Such discovery included special interrogatories, and requests for production regarding Defendant's time and payroll records as well as relevant employment policies. Defendant served its responses on January 28, 2025, and supplemented its responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Production, Set 1, on April 24, 2026, producing time and payroll records for a sample of employees. Plaintiff used the discovery produced to evaluate the claims and Defendant's potential liability in preparation for mediation. As discussed infra, Plaintiff's counsel retained the forensic consultants at Berger Consulting Group ("BCG") to analyze Defendant's time and payroll data. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 12).

On June 1, 2026, the Parties participated in a full day mediation with Sonya Goodwin, Esq. ("Mediator"), a mediator of class and PAGA actions. The Parties engaged in arms-length settlement negotiations with the Mediator's assistance. Specifically, the Mediator helped manage the Parties' expectations and provided a useful, neutral analysis of the issues and risks to both sides. The Parties made substantial progress with the Mediator's assistance. Namely, the Parties exchanged information regarding their respective claims and defenses, including their respective evaluation of the damages. The mediation was successful and the Parties subsequently memorialized the agreement in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU"). After reaching an agreement in principle, the Parties drafted and negotiated a long-form settlement agreement, which is the subject of the instant motion. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 13).

1     **B. Class Counsel Thoroughly Investigated the Factual and Legal Issues**

2             Months before filing the Action, Class Counsel began its pre-filing investigation into Plaintiff's  
3     complaints. Class Counsel's investigation started with several lengthy interviews with Plaintiff. As  
4     part of the interview process, Plaintiff produced documents related to his employment, including,  
5     among other things, copies of his wage statements, offer letters, termination letter, and tax statements.  
6     At the conclusion of the interviews, Class Counsel determined that each Plaintiff's complaints justified  
7     further inquiry. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 14).

8             Class Counsel subsequently requested Plaintiff's personnel file from Defendant. In response,  
9     Defendant produced documents, including but not limited to, Plaintiff's hiring and separation  
10    documents, payroll records, and time records. Class Counsel reviewed and analyzed the documents  
11    and determined the documents appeared to substantiate Plaintiff's claim that Defendant failed to,  
12    among other things, failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements, failed to provide meal and  
13    rest breaks, failed to pay for all hours worked, failed to reimburse employees for mandatory business  
14    expenses, and failed to timely pay all wages due upon separation of employment. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 15).

15            Considering the many anticipated factual disputes and the high cost of litigation, the Parties  
16    agreed that it would be in the best interest of both Parties to mediate the matter. As part of the Parties'  
17    dual-track approach to formal discovery and mediation, Class Counsel requested documents and data  
18    to further evaluate Plaintiff's claims and Defendant's potential liability exposure to the Class Members.  
19    Defendant produced time and payroll records for the Class Members, aggregate workweek and pay  
20    period data for the Class Members, aggregate meal premiums paid to the Class Members, average  
21    hourly rate for the Class Members, and copies of applicable handbooks, policies, and agreements. In  
22    total, Defendant produced thousands of pages of pertinent payroll data for Class Counsel to analyze.  
23    (SCJ Dec., ¶ 16).

24            Class Counsel then retained the statisticians and economists at BCG to evaluate the Class  
25    Members' payroll and time data. BCG provides data analysis and damage modeling consulting services  
26    specializing in wage and hour class actions. BCG's team of financial and data analysts are credentialed  
27    and experienced experts in their fields and have provided their expertise on thousands of cases. Stated  
28    differently, BCG is uniquely qualified to analyze Defendant's time and payroll data. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 17).

1 BCG analyzed Defendant's time and payroll data to assist in the development of various damage  
2 models. Among other things, BCG determined the approximate number of work shifts, workweeks,  
3 pay periods during the Class Period, and the average length of shift and average number of hours  
4 worked per week and per pay period during the Class Period. BCG also estimated Defendant's potential  
5 exposure for wage statement violations, meal and rest period violations, the amount of unpaid wages  
6 owed, the amount of unreimbursed business expenses, and the amount of untimely payments upon  
7 separation of employment during the Class Period. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 18).

8 In advance of mediation, Class Counsel created several damage models predicated on the BCG  
9 analysis. Class Counsel's models calculated Defendant's potential liability exposure while accounting  
10 for the uncertainties of continued litigation. These damage models informed and guided Class Counsel  
11 during the mediated settlement discussions. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 19).

12 Overall, Class Counsel thoroughly investigated the claims at issue, including: (1) determining  
13 Plaintiff's suitability as a putative class representative through interviews, background investigations,  
14 and analysis of his employment files; (2) evaluating all of Plaintiff's potential claims; (3) propounding,  
15 reviewing, and analyzing formal discovery; (4) researching similar wage and hour class actions as to  
16 the claims brought, the nature of the positions, and the type of employer; (5) analyzing the Class's time  
17 and payroll records; (6) analyzing Defendant's labor policies and practices; (7) researching settlements  
18 in similar cases as well as outstanding issues which could affect settlement approval; (8) evaluating  
19 Plaintiff's claims and estimating Defendant's liability for purposes of settlement; (9) drafting the  
20 mediation brief; and (10) participating in the mediation. This investigation allowed Class Counsel to  
21 fully assess the nature and magnitude of the claims being settled, as well as the impediments to  
22 recovery, such as to make an independent assessment of the reasonableness of the terms to which the  
23 Parties have agreed. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 20).

#### 24 **C. The Proposed Settlement Fully Resolves Plaintiff's Claims**

##### 25 1. The Composition of the Class

26 The proposed Class consists of all persons who are or previously were employed by Defendant  
27 in California and classified as non-exempt employees at any time beginning August 30, 2020 through  
28 July 31, 2026. Agreement at §§ I(J), I(H). The Settlement Class Members are all Class Members who

1 have not submitted a timely and valid request for exclusion. (Agreement at § I(LL)). In the data  
2 exchanged for mediation, there were approximately 85 Class Members that worked an estimated 7,200  
3 workweeks during the Class Period. (Agreement at § III(A)(2)).

4 2. The Settlement Consideration

5 The Parties agreed to settle the underlying class claims in exchange for the Gross Settlement  
6 Amount of \$255,000.00. The Gross Settlement Amount includes: (1) Individual Settlement Payments  
7 to the Settlement Class; (2) a Service Award of \$10,000.00 to Plaintiff for his services on behalf of the  
8 Settlement Class and in exchange for a broad general release; (3) a PAGA Payment in the amount of  
9 \$20,000.00; (4) Settlement Administration Costs estimated at \$5,490.00; and the (5) Class Counsel  
10 Award in the amount of \$114,150.00, comprised of attorneys' fees equal to thirty-three percent (33%)  
11 of the Gross Settlement Amount estimated to be \$84,150.00 and an estimated \$30,000.00 for actually  
12 incurred litigation expenses. (See generally Agreement at § III(O)).

13 Subject to the Court approving the Service Award, Class Counsel Award, PAGA Payment, and  
14 the Settlement Administration Costs, the Net Settlement Amount will be distributed to Settlement Class  
15 Members. (Agreement at § III(O)(1)). There is no reversion to Defendant and Defendant must  
16 separately pay for their share of the employer payroll taxes. (Agreement at § III(A)(1)).

17 3. Formula for Calculating Individual Settlement Payments

18 Each Settlement Class Member will receive an Individual Settlement Payment. The Individual  
19 Settlement Payment will be proportional to the number of Workweeks each Settlement Class Member  
20 worked for Defendant in California during the Class Period. Using the Class Data, the Settlement  
21 Administrator shall add up the total number of Workweeks for all Class Members. The respective  
22 Workweeks for each Class Member will be divided by the total Workweeks for all Settlement Class  
23 Members, resulting in the Payment Ratio for each Settlement Class Member. Each Settlement Class  
24 Member's Payment Ratio will then be multiplied by the Net Settlement Amount to calculate each  
25 Settlement Class Member's estimated Individual Settlement Payment. (Agreement at § III(O)(1)).

26 Each Individual Settlement Payment will be reduced by any legally mandated employee tax  
27 withholdings (e.g., employee payroll taxes, etc.). Individual Settlement Payments for Class Members  
28 who submit valid and timely requests for exclusion will be redistributed to Settlement Class Members

1 who do not submit valid and timely requests for exclusion on a pro rata basis based on their respective  
2 Payment Ratios. (Agreement at § III(O)(1)).

3 Given that there are approximately 85 Class Members, the average gross recovery is  
4 approximately \$1,239.53 (Net Settlement Amount divided by Class Members). (SCJ Dec., ¶ 5). This  
5 average net recovery exceeds many wage and hour class action settlements approved by California state  
6 and federal courts. (See, e.g., *Shachno et al. v. KT Hotels, LLC*, et al., San Diego Superior Court Case  
7 No. 37-2018-00043601 (average net recovery of \$283.35); *Almanza v. The Express Group Inc.*, San  
8 Bernardino Superior Court Case No. CIVDS1722542 (average net recovery \$174.68); *Macaspac v. San*  
9 *Antonio Regional Hospital*, San Bernardino Superior Court Case No. CIVDS1512625 (average net  
10 recovery \$715.97) and *Crawford et al. v. Outlook Amusements, Inc.*, Los Angeles Superior Court Case  
11 No. BC617160 (average net recovery \$333.98)).

#### 12 4. Release by Class Members

13 Generally, as of the Funding Date, Plaintiff and the Settlement Class Members will agree to  
14 release the Released Parties from all class claims alleged, or reasonably could have been alleged based  
15 on the facts alleged, in the Operative Complaint in the Action which occurred during the Class Period,  
16 and expressly excluding all of other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination,  
17 unemployment insurance, disability, social security, workers' compensation, and class claims outside  
18 of the Class Period. (Agreement at §I(EE); III(C)).

#### 19 5. PAGA Release by the State of California on behalf of the Aggrieved Employees

20 Generally, upon the Funding Date, Plaintiff, the LWDA, and the State of California will release  
21 the Released Parties from all PAGA claims alleged in the Operative Complaint in the Action and  
22 Plaintiff's PAGA Notice to the LWDA, which occurred during the PAGA Period, and expressly  
23 excluding all other claims, including claims for vested benefits, wrongful termination, unemployment  
24 insurance, disability, social security, worker's compensation, and PAGA claims outside of the PAGA  
25 Period. (Agreement at §§ I(FF); III(D)).

### 26 III. ARGUMENT

#### 27 A. The Court Should Preliminarily Approve the Proposed Class Action Settlement

28 The proposed Settlement, including a Gross Settlement Amount of \$255,000.00 meets the

standards for preliminary approval. Pre-trial settlement of complex class actions is a judicially favored remedy. (*Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n* (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615, 625 (“Voluntary conciliation and settlement are the preferred means of dispute resolution.”)). Class action settlement approval requires an early “preliminary” review by the trial court and a subsequent “final” review after notice of the settlement has been distributed to class members for their comments and objections. (C.R.C. 3.769(c)-(g); *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 180 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1118 (2010) (the court first “preliminarily approves the settlement” and later “conducts a final approval hearing to inquire into the fairness of the proposed settlement”)).

Although Rule of Court Rule 3.769 does not provide detail as to the scope of review of the proposed settlement, preliminary approval is warranted if the settlement falls within a “reasonable range.” (*See North County Contractor’s Assn., Inc. v. Touchstone Ins. Services* (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1089-90; Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions*, §§ 11.26 (4th ed. 2002)). Reasonableness and fairness are presumed where: (1) the settlement is reached through “arms-length bargaining;” (2) investigation and discovery are “sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently;” (3) counsel is “experienced in similar litigation. . . .” (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1802.) The presumption of fairness is consistent with California’s public policy goal of favoring settlements. (*Stambaugh v. Super. Ct* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236 (“the law wisely favors settlements”); *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases* (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1118 (“public policy generally favors the compromise of complex class action litigation”); *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1151 (“voluntary conciliation and settlement are the preferred means of dispute resolution ... [t]his is especially true in complex class action litigation”)).

Additionally, in reviewing the fairness of a class action settlement, due regard should be given to what is “otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties.” (*Cellphone Termination Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1389). The inquiry “must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” (*Id.*).



1           1. The Parties Reached the Settlement Through Arm's-Length Bargaining Led by Experienced  
2           Counsel.

3           “[W]hat transpires in settlement negotiations is highly relevant to the assessment of a proposed  
4 settlement’s fairness.” (*State v. Levi Strauss & Co.* (1986) 41 Cal.3d 460, 482.). Courts presume the  
5 absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement, unless evidence to the contrary is  
6 offered; thus, there is a presumption that settlement negotiations are conducted in good faith. (Newberg,  
7 § 11.51).

8           The Parties participated in mediation with a Mediator Sonya Goodwin, an experienced mediator  
9 of wage and hour class and PAGA actions. The Mediator managed the Parties’ expectations and  
10 provided a useful, neutral analysis of the issues and risks to both sides. (*In re Apple Computer, Inc.*  
11 *Derivative Litig*, No. C 06-4128 JF (HRL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108195 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2008)  
12 (mediator’s participation weighs considerably against any inference of a collusive settlement);  
13 *D’Amato v. Deutsche Bank* (2d. Cir. 2001) 236 F.3d 78, 85 (a “mediator’s involvement in pre-  
14 certification settlement negotiations helps to ensure that the proceedings were free of collusion and  
15 undue pressure.”)). At all times, the Parties’ negotiations were at an arm’s length, adversarial and non-  
16 collusive. The matter resolved only after the Mediator heard arguments, reviewed evidence, evaluated  
17 the Parties’ respective claims and defenses, and issued a Mediator’s Proposal. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 21).

18           Once the Parties agreed to the Mediator’s Proposal, the Parties engaged in protracted  
19 negotiations regarding the written terms of the class action and PAGA settlement. The Parties  
20 maintained the arm’s length, non-collusive and adversarial negotiations while arriving at the final terms  
21 of the Settlement. The Agreement is the final product of these mediated negotiations. Objectively, the  
22 Settlement terms are fair, adequate and represent a reasonable compromise of the claims at issue. (SCJ  
23 Dec., ¶ 22).

24           2. Class Counsel’s Thorough Investigation Provided an Objective Measurement of the  
25           Settlement’s Reasonableness.

26           As set forth in greater detail above, Class Counsel conducted a very thorough investigation into  
27 the factual and legal issues in dispute. In addition to formal and informal discovery, document review,  
28 data analysis and legal research, Class Counsel also researched similar wage and hour actions.

1 Although no two cases are identical, this research provided Class Counsel with a marker to inform  
2 settlement discussions and, ultimately, to measure this settlement against. The investigation allowed  
3 Class Counsel to realistically assess the value of the claims and intelligently engage defense counsel in  
4 settlement discussions that culminated in the proposed settlement now before the Court. (SCJ Dec., ¶  
5 23).

6 Class Counsel only agreed to enter the Settlement following this thorough investigation and  
7 evaluation of Plaintiff's claims. Based on this investigation of the facts, applicable law, and  
8 marketplace for similar settlements, and considering the risk of significant delay, uncertainty associated  
9 with litigation, and the various defenses asserted by Defendant, Class Counsel firmly believes this  
10 Agreement to be in the best interests of the Class Members. Because the Settlement's terms are fair,  
11 reasonable, and adequate, the Court should preliminarily approve the Settlement. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 24).

12 3. The Settlement Falls Within the Recognized Range of Reasonableness.

13 The Gross Settlement Amount of \$255,000.00 is within the range of reasonable settlement for  
14 preliminary approval. To determine whether a settlement is fair and reasonable, the court should  
15 "consider enough information about the nature and magnitude of the claims being settled, as well as  
16 the impediments to recovery, to make an independent assessment of the reasonableness of the terms to  
17 which the parties have agreed." (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 133).  
18 In making this determination, the court is "not to try the case" but rather "satisfy itself that the class  
19 action settlement is within the 'ballpark of reasonableness.'" (*Id.* (emphasis added)). For this analysis,  
20 courts do "not require any such explicit statement of value; [they] require[] a record which allows an  
21 understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation."  
22 (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co.* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 409 (internal citation omitted)).  
23 The reasonableness of a settlement is not dependent upon its actual value approaching the potential  
24 recovery plaintiffs might have received if they had succeeded at trial. Indeed, "[t]he determination  
25 whether a settlement is reasonable does not involve the use of a 'mathematical equation yielding a  
26 particularized sum.'" (*Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 FRD. 174, 186 (quoting *In*  
27 *re Michael Milken and Assoc. Sec. Litig.* (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 150 F.R.D. 57, 66)).

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**B. The Gross Settlement Amount Meets the Recognized Range of Reasonableness.**

The Gross Settlement Amount of \$255,000.00 is well within the range of reasonableness considering the nature and magnitude of the claims being settled and the various potential impediments to recovery. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 25). To determine whether a settlement is fair and reasonable, the court should “consider enough information about the nature and magnitude of the claims being settled, as well as the impediments to recovery, to make an independent assessment of the reasonableness of the terms to which the parties have agreed.” (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 133). In making this determination, the court is “not to try the case” but rather “satisfy itself that the class action settlement is within the ‘ballpark of reasonableness.’” (*Id.*) For this analysis, courts do “not require any such explicit statement of value; [they] require[] a record which allows an understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation.” (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co.* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 409 (internal citation omitted)). The reasonableness of a settlement is not dependent upon its actual value approaching the potential recovery plaintiffs might have received if they had succeeded at trial.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, “[t]he determination whether a settlement is reasonable does not involve the use of a ‘mathematical equation yielding a particularized sum.’” (*Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 FRD. 174, 186 (*quoting In re Michael Milken and Assoc. Sec. Litig.* (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 150 F.R.D. 57, 66)).

Class Counsel retained BCG to develop economic damage models measuring Defendant’s potential liability exposure with respect to the Class and PAGA claims. The damage models were informed by Class Counsel’s investigation, including the analysis of the time and payroll data Defendant produced. Regarding Defendant’s liability for class claims, Class Counsel projected

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<sup>2</sup> Federal district courts recognize that there is an inherent “range of reasonableness” in determining whether to approve a settlement “which recognizes the uncertainties of law and fact in any particular case and the concomitant risks and costs necessarily inherent in taking any litigation to completion.” *Newman v. Stein* (2d. Cir. 2002) 464 F.2d 689, 693; *see In re Omnivision Tech, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. 2008) 559 F.Supp.2d 1036; *see also Nat’l Rural Telecomm. Coop. v. Directv. Inc.* (C.D. Cal. 2004) 221 F.R.D. 523, 527 (“well settled law that a proposed settlement may be acceptable even though it amounts to only a fraction of the potential recovery”); *In re Global Crossing Sec. and ERISA Litig.* (S.D.N.Y 2004) 225 F.R.D. 436, 460 (“settlement amount’s ratio to the maximum potential recovery need not be the sole, or even dominant, consideration when assessing settlements fairness”); *In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc Sec Litig.* (E.D. Pa. 2000) 194 F.R.D. 166, 184 (“the fact that a proposed settlement constitutes a relatively small percentage of the most optimistic estimate does not, in itself, weigh against the settlement; rather the percentage should be considered in light of strength of the claims”); *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm.* (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615, 628 (it is “the complete package, taken as a whole rather than the individual component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness”).

1 Defendant's liability exposure (excluding penalties) at \$394,390.13 ("Conservative Model") and  
2 Defendant's *total* exposure for class claims (including waiting time and wage statement penalties, but  
3 exclusive of PAGA penalties) at \$1,129,713.00 ("Aggressive Model"). Thus, the Gross Settlement  
4 Amount of \$255,000.00 represents approximately 64.66% of Defendant's *total* liability exposure and  
5 22.57% of Defendant's *maximum* class-wide exposure. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 26).

6 (1) Estimated Exposure for Defendant's Meal Period Violations

7 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to provide compliant meal periods. Plaintiff alleges that  
8 Defendant's meal break violations result from the Class Members' artificial time records. Specifically,  
9 Class Members' meal periods were handwritten and always exactly 30-minutes in length which creates  
10 a rebuttable presumption of meal period violations under *Donohue v. AMN Servs., LLC*. 11 Cal. 5th 58,  
11 74-75 (2021). Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to maintain accurate time records  
12 because some timesheets do not reflect employees' start times, end times, or meal periods. Instead,  
13 those records reflect only the total hours worked. The absence of meal period entries makes it  
14 impossible to determine whether Defendant provided compliant meal periods and gives rise to the  
15 rebuttable presumption that meal periods were not provided in accordance with California law. (*Id.*;  
16 SCJ Dec., ¶ 27).

17 Defendant argues that it provided legally compliant meal periods throughout the Class Period.  
18 Specifically, Defendant argues that it had in place timekeeping policies that required Class Members to  
19 accurately record their meal periods. Defendant argues that Class Members certified the accuracy of  
20 these time entries every pay period and, more importantly, Defendant was entitled to rely on the  
21 accuracy of the time entries made by its employees. Therefore, Defendant contends that the facts here  
22 are sufficient to distinguish it from the employer in *Donohue*. Thus, Defendant argues that there was no  
23 potential liability for Plaintiff's alleged meal period violations and any claimed violations required a  
24 highly individualized inquiry not suitable to class treatment. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 28).

25 However, considering the immediate challenges related to certification, the asserted defenses,  
26 and the probability of success on the merits, Plaintiff applied a 25% risk discount and estimate that  
27 Defendant's exposure ranged from \$167,801.63 to \$223,735.50. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 29).

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1                                   (2) Estimated Exposure for Defendant's Rest Period Violations

2           Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant failed to provide compliant rest periods. Specifically,  
3 Plaintiff argues that because of their heavy workloads, Class Members were unable to take timely and  
4 duty-free rest periods. Specifically, Plaintiff argued that he was required to work through his rest periods  
5 to finish work-related tasks. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 30).

6           Defendant argues that it maintained legally compliant rest period practices throughout the Class  
7 period. Moreover, Plaintiff recognizes the evidentiary burdens establishing this claim. Establishing  
8 Plaintiff's rest period claim would rely, almost entirely, on Class Member testimony, making it a riskier  
9 claim at class certification and liability stages. Certification likely would have required depositions of  
10 Class Members who provided declarations, and Defendant would have obtained opposing declarations  
11 stating either rest breaks were taken, or rest breaks were voluntarily waived. (See, e.g., *Ordonez v. Radio*  
12 *Shack, Inc.* (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013) 2013 WL 210223, at \*11 ("Because of the competing testimony  
13 before the Court, plaintiff's evidence that defendant may have an illegal, written rest break policy is  
14 insufficient for this Court to find that common issues predominate."); *Villa v. United Site Servs. of*  
15 *California, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2012) 2012 WL 5503550, at \*8 ("Indeed, Plaintiff's own evidence  
16 confirms that the written policy does not generate uniform practices"); SCJ Dec., ¶ 31).

17           In light of Defendant's defenses, Plaintiff discounted these claims by 50% and estimated that  
18 Defendant's exposure for this claim ranged from approximately \$111,867.75 to \$223,735.50. (SCJ  
19 Dec., ¶ 32).

20                                   (3) Estimated Exposure for Unpaid Wages

21           Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges  
22 that throughout the entire Class Period, Defendants failed to record the actual time the Plaintiff and  
23 Class Members worked. Rather, Plaintiff alleges Defendant implemented a practice requiring Class  
24 Members to fill out electronic or handwritten timecards reflecting either their scheduled start and stop  
25 times, or the amount of time they were scheduled to work that day without any regard to the actual time  
26 Class Members worked, and without regard to Class Members' actual break schedule. As a result,  
27 Plaintiff and Class Members forfeited compensation for all the hours they spent working under  
28 Defendant's control. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 33).

1 Defendant asserts that its written policies directed employees to accurately record all hours  
2 worked. Further, Defendant argues that this claim was not suitable for class treatment because  
3 individualized issues predominated. Defendant argues that there is no common policy or practice of  
4 requiring employees to perform work off-the-clock. Moreover, Defendant argue that Class members  
5 were responsible for managing their own time. Accordingly, proof of liability would necessarily  
6 require individualized evidence as to whether any time was spent working off-the-clock, and whether  
7 Defendant knew or should have known that such work was allegedly being performed. Liability cannot,  
8 according to Defendant, be established by common proof. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 34). As a result, Plaintiff applied  
9 a 75% discount for this claim and estimated Defendant's exposure for unpaid wages ranged from  
10 \$29,976.75 to \$119,907.00. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 35).

11 (4) Estimated Exposure for Defendant's Failure to Reimburse Necessary  
12 Business Expenses

13 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to reimburse their employees for mandatory business  
14 expenses. Specifically, Defendant required Class Members use their personal cell phones to receive  
15 and respond to work-related communications with supervisors, subcontractors, architects, engineers,  
16 design teams, and/or coworkers. Further, Class Members were required to use their personal vehicles  
17 to drive from the office to work sites. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 36).

18 Defendant denies liability and asserts that its employees were paid for all mandatory business  
19 expenses. Furthermore, Defendant argues that, even if successful, this claim resulted in minimal actual  
20 damage to the Class Members. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 37).

21 Accordingly, Plaintiff applied an 85% discount and estimated Defendant's exposure for this  
22 claim ranged from \$9,931.50 to \$66,210.00. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 38).

23 (5) Estimated Exposure for Defendant's Wage Statement Violations

24 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to furnish its employees with accurate itemized wage  
25 statements. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendant's failure to provide meal and rest  
26 periods as required by the California Labor Code and pay for all wages, Plaintiff and other Class  
27 Members are entitled to derivative wage statement penalties. (*See Naranjo v. Spectrum Security*  
28 *Services*, 13 Cal. 5th 93 (2022) (concluding that meal premiums are "wages" entitling employees to

1 derivative wage statement penalties); SCJ Dec., ¶ 39).

2 Defendant denies liability for this claim. When there is an objectively reasonable, good faith  
3 defense presented by Defendant, Defendants argues that even if they failed to furnish accurate wage  
4 statements, Plaintiff could not establish the injury requirement on a class-wide basis. Considering  
5 Defendant's defenses and the fact that all of Defendant's wage statement violations were all derivative,  
6 Plaintiff discounted this claim 75% to account for this risk. Plaintiffs estimated that Defendant's  
7 exposure on this claim ranged between \$42,000.00 and \$168,000.00. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 40).

8 (6) Estimated Exposure for Waiting Time Penalties

9 Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendant's Labor Code violations resulted in derivative liability  
10 for waiting time penalties. Although these penalties represent one of Defendant's largest dollar amount  
11 of exposure, this is an uncertain claim. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot prove the  
12 "willful" prong needed to obtain waiting time penalties under Labor Code section 203. Additionally,  
13 for the reasons stated above, *Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc.*, 15 Cal. 5th 1056 (2024),  
14 creates difficulty in Plaintiff succeeding in a purely derivative waiting time penalty claim.  
15 Notwithstanding the uncertain nature of the claims, Plaintiff discounted this claim by 90% and  
16 estimated that Defendant's exposure for this claim ranged from \$32,812.50 and \$328,125.00. (SCJ  
17 Dec., ¶ 41).

18 (7) Defendant's PAGA Exposure

19 Class Counsel's damage models also estimate Defendant's exposure for PAGA penalties arising  
20 from the aforementioned violations. At the time of mediation, Plaintiff estimated Defendant's PAGA  
21 exposure to be approximately \$15,850.00 and \$974,600.00. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 42).

22 Here, the Parties negotiated a good faith PAGA Payment in the amount of \$20,000.00 which is  
23 approximately 7.84% of the Gross Settlement Amount. This amount falls well within the range of  
24 approved PAGA penalties. Sixty-Five percent (65%) of the PAGA Payment (\$13,000.00) will be paid  
25 to the LWDA ("LWDA Payment") with the remaining thirty-five percent (35%) of the PAGA Payment  
26 (\$7,000.00) will be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees, which is within the range of PAGA  
27 penalties approved by courts and should be approved. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 43).

28 ///

1 Under PAGA, Courts have considerable discretion to reduce the penalty award. In *Fleming v.*  
2 *Covidien*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154590 (C.D. Cal. 2011), a federal court reduced PAGA penalties  
3 from \$2,800,000 to \$500,000, a reduction of 82.2%, because the court found maximum penalties  
4 "unjust" because the employees had suffered no injuries. Some trial courts have actually awarded no  
5 civil penalties, even when Labor Code violations are established. (See *In re Nordstrom Com. Cases*, 186  
6 Cal.App.4th 576, 589 (2010) (affirming an award of \$0 in PAGA penalties in a wage and hour class  
7 action); *In re Taco Bell Wage & Hour Actions*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48557, \*40-43 (E.D. Cal. Apr.  
8 6, 2016) (PAGA penalties denied after trial)).

9 *Carrington v. Starbucks Corp.*, 30 Cal. App. 5th 504 (2018), illustrates the risk of PAGA claims.  
10 In *Carrington*, while the plaintiff prevailed on his PAGA claim upon trial, the trial court reduced the  
11 maximum PAGA penalty amount by 90%, citing the employer's good faith attempt at complying with  
12 the law. (*Id.* at 517). Upon review, the Court of Appeal found such reduction to be proper. (*Id.* at 539).  
13 Again, the *Carrington* decision was after Plaintiff actually prevailed at trial, and even then, the PAGA  
14 penalties were reduced by 90%. Thus, the PAGA claims likewise face significant uncertainty. (SCJ Dec.,  
15 ¶ 44). There is a risk that the Court would consider the maximum civil penalty available to be  
16 confiscatory. (*Carrington*, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 524).

17 For the aforementioned reasons, the PAGA allocation of the Gross Settlement Amount is fair,  
18 just, and reasonable. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 45).

### 19 **C. Inherent Risks of Continued Litigation Support Preliminary Approval.**

20 "It can be difficult to ascertain with precision the likelihood of success at trial. The Court cannot  
21 and need not determine the merits of the contested facts and legal issues at this stage, [Citation], and to  
22 the extent courts assess this factor, it is to 'determine whether the decision to settle is a good value for a  
23 relatively weak case or a sell-out of an extraordinary strong case.'" (*Misra v. Decision One Mortg. Co.*  
24 (C.D. Cal. 2009) 2009 WL 4581276, at \*7).

25 With respect to the most immediate challenge, i.e., class certification, the risks attendant to the  
26 certification of similar wage and hour claims are demonstrated by *Ali v. U.S.A. Cab Ltd.* (2009) 176  
27 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1341. There, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Trial Court's denial of class  
28 certification because employees' declarations attesting to having taken meal and rest breaks



1 demonstrated that individualized inquiries were required to show harm. (*See also Campbell v. Best Buy*  
2 *Stores, L.P.*, (C.D. Cal. 2013) 2013 WL 5302217 at \*11-13 (following *Brinker* and denying certification  
3 of proposed off-the-clock and rest and meal break classes due to lack of uniform policy); *Brown v. Fed*  
4 *Express Corp.* (C.D. Cal. 2008) 249 F.R.D. 580, 587-88 (denying certification of driver meal and rest  
5 period claims based on the predominance of individual issues); (SCJ Dec., ¶ 46).

6 Further, even if a class is certified, liability remains uncertain. The risks attendant to the issue of  
7 Defendant’s liability in similar wage and hour actions are demonstrated by *Duran v. U.S. Bank National*  
8 *Association* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1, 31. There, the Court reversed a trial verdict in favor plaintiffs in a  
9 wage and hour class action. (*See also Tien v. Tenet Healthcare Corp.* (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1077,  
10 1088 (“[T]he reason, if any, that employees might not take their breaks were predominantly  
11 individualized questions of fact not susceptible to class treatment.”); SCJ Dec., ¶ 47.).

12 Finally, even if a class is certified and Defendant is found liable for the class claims alleged,  
13 post-certification risks remain, including a reversal of a favorable judgment for Plaintiff and  
14 decertification of the class. These post-certification risks are demonstrated by *Magadia v. Wal-Mart*  
15 *Associates, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2021) 999 F.3d 668. There, the Ninth Circuit vacated reversed and remanded  
16 a \$110 million judgement against an employer for, *inter alia*, inaccurately paying overtime, and  
17 directed the trial court to enter judgement in favor of the employer. (*See also O’Conner v. Uber*  
18 *Technologies, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2018) 904 F.3d 1087 (decertification of wage and hour misclassification  
19 action); SCJ Dec., ¶ 48)

20 Collectively, the examples cited above illustrate the uncertain nature of class litigation.  
21 Consequently, the uncertainty of obtaining certification through a contested motion is a significant risk  
22 factor favoring settlement. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 49).

23 “The Settlement eliminates these and other risks of continued litigation, including the very real  
24 risk of no recovery after several years of litigation.” (*In re Nvidia Derivs. Litig.* (N.D. Cal. 2008) 2008  
25 WL 5382544, at \*3.). Indeed, potential appeals aside, litigating a complex case through trial is  
26 inherently perilous regardless of the strengths of merits of the claims:

27 [N]othing is assured when litigating against commercial giants with vast  
28 litigative resources, particular in such complex litigation as this, which

1 would strain the cognitive capacities of any jury. Defense judgments were  
2 hardly beyond the realm of possibility. Accordingly, this factor weighs in  
3 favor of preliminary approval.

4 (*Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1140, *opinion modified* (June 18, 1990).).

5 Finally, continuing to litigate this action would require continued and extensive resources  
6 coupled with significant Court time to proceed through trial and post-trial motions; which can often  
7 take years. Furthermore, wage and hour litigation is complex and expensive, as it often necessitates  
8 extensive expert testimony, particularly with regards to damages. But even if Plaintiff is successful at  
9 trial, Plaintiff is acutely aware that a judgment does not end the litigation. Plaintiff fully expects that  
10 Defendant would appeal any favorable judgment. As demonstrated by *Magadia, supra*, 999 F.3d 668,  
11 the risk of an appeal and subsequent reversal is real. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 50). “Avoiding such a trial and the  
12 subsequent appeals in this complex case strongly militates in favor of settlement rather than further  
13 protracted and uncertain litigation.” (*Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop v. DirecTV* (C.D. Cal. 2004) 221  
14 F.R.D. 523, 527). Thus, “unless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its acceptance and approval are  
15 preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain results.” (*Id.* at 526).

16 In this matter, Class Counsel negotiated a Gross Settlement Amount of \$255,000.00 that is  
17 between 64.66% and 22.57% of Defendant’s liability exposure for class damages. Given the amount of  
18 the settlement here, as compared to potential value of the claims, offset by the various inherent risks to  
19 continued litigation, the settlement is fair and reasonable. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 51).

#### 20 **D. The Proposed Notice Informs the Class about the Case and Settlement**

21 The Settlement Class is entitled to the best practical notice under the circumstances. (*Kass v.*  
22 *Young* (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 100, 106). The purpose of the notice is to give class members sufficient  
23 information to decide whether they should accept the benefits offered, opt out and pursue their own  
24 remedies, or object to the settlement. (*Trotsky v. Los Angeles Fed Savings & Loan Assn.* (1975) 48 Cal.  
25 App. 3d 143, 151-52). The notice must advise class members “that they may be excluded from the class  
26 if they so request and that they will be bound by the judgment, whether favorable or not, if they do not  
27 request exclusion.” (*Kass*, 67 Cal.App.3d at 106.). Authorities generally require service of the class  
28 notice by mail or similar reliable means. (*Chance v. Super. Ct.* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 275, 290; *Cart v.*

1 *Super. Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 972).<sup>3</sup>

2 The Parties jointly drafted the Notice Packet which fairly and neutrally informs the Class  
3 Members of their rights and remedies. The Settlement Administrator will first verify addresses, then  
4 mail the proposed Notice Packet to all Class Members. The Notice Packet will include information  
5 regarding the nature of the lawsuit, a summary of the substance of the Settlement’s terms, the class  
6 definition, the procedure and time period within which to requests for exclusions or objections to the  
7 Settlement, the date for the final approval hearing, the formula used to calculate settlement payments,  
8 and the terms and scope of the Released Class Claims. (Agreement at § III(L)(1)). This method was  
9 negotiated by the Parties to ensure delivering the most reasonable method of notice to the Class  
10 Members while ensuring cost effective administration of the Settlement. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 52).

11 Accordingly, both the method of disseminating the Notice Packet and content of the Notice  
12 Packet satisfy due process and the requirements of California law. (See C.R.C. 3.776(e)-(f); *State of*  
13 *Cal. v. Levi Strauss* (1986) 41 Cal.3d 460,485 (the class notice must “fairly apprise the class members  
14 of the terms of the proposed compromise and of the options open to dissenting class members.”); SCJ  
15 Dec., ¶ 53).

#### 16 **E. The Court Should Preliminarily Approve the Service Award**

17 Enhancement payments “are fairly typical in class action cases.” (*Cellphone Termination Fee*  
18 *Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1393; *Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp.* (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d  
19 948, 958, *citing* 4 Newberg on Class Actions (4th ed. 2002) § 1 1:38, and Eisenberg & Miller, *Incentive*  
20 *Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study*, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303 (2006).). Enhancement  
21 payments “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to  
22 make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to  
23 recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” (*Rodriguez*, 563 F.3d at 958-59.).  
24 “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be  
25 compensated for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the

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26 <sup>3</sup> Due process does not require that each class member actually receive a notice, but rather a procedure reasonably certain to  
27 reach class members. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 1789, at 253 (2d ed. 1986). If  
28 appropriate notice is given, class members will be bound by the judgment even if they never actually receive the notice.  
*Fontana v. Elrod* (7th Cir. 1987) 826 F.2d 729, 732.

class.” (*Clark v. American Residential Services LLC* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785.).

Approximately 85 Class Members will share in the Net Settlement Amount due entirely to the effort and commitment of Plaintiff. Subject to Court approval, therefore, the Settlement provides for a Service Award of \$10,000.00 for Plaintiff. The service award is fair and reasonable compensation for the Plaintiff’s efforts bringing the action, assisting Class Counsel with the litigation and settlement, regularly conferring with Class Counsel on the status of his case and the strategies for prosecuting the claims, reviewing the proposed Settlement to ensure that its terms are fair and provide adequate relief for the Settlement Class Members. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 54).

Class Counsel on behalf of Plaintiff will file a formal motion for the negotiated Service Award once preliminary approval of the Settlement is granted. Plaintiff respectfully submits that the above showing is sufficient for preliminary approval of the negotiated Service Award. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 55).

#### **F. The Court Should Preliminarily Approve the Payment of the Class Counsel Award**

The purpose of a payment of the Class Counsel Award in class action litigation is to reward counsel who took the risk of non-payment and invested in a case that achieved a substantial positive result for the class. California courts routinely award attorneys’ fees equaling one-third or more of the potential value of the common fund, the amount requested under this settlement. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 n.11 (“Empirical studies show that regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, *Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study*, *J. of Empirical Legal Studies*, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 27-78, March 2004, at 35 (independent studies of class action litigation nationwide have come to a similar conclusion that a one-third fee is consistent with market rates)).

Class Counsel took this matter on a contingency fee basis and invested significant time and expense successfully prosecuting Plaintiff’s claims. As discussed *supra*, the estimated average Individual Settlement Payment illustrates the demonstrably positive outcome for the Class Members. The Agreement provides for a payment of Class Counsel Award and in the amount of thirty-three percent (33%) of the Gross Settlement Amount (\$84,150.00) and reimbursable litigations costs in an amount not to exceed \$30,000.00. (Agreement § III(O)(10)). Considering the positive outcome for the

Class Members, and in light of the supporting authority, the proposed Class Counsel Award is fair and reasonable. Plaintiff will file a formal motion for the negotiated Class Counsel Award once preliminary approval of the Settlement is granted. Plaintiff respectfully submits that the above showing is sufficient for preliminary approval of the negotiated attorneys' fees. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 56).

#### **G. Provisional Certification for Settlement Purposes Is Appropriate**

For Settlement, Plaintiff contends, and Defendant does not dispute, that provisional certification of the Class is appropriate. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 57).

##### **1. The Standard for Class Certification**

Class actions are statutorily authorized “when the question is one of common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court” (*Cal.Civ.Proc.* Code § 382; *Lee v. Dynamex, Inc.* (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1332). Class certification is appropriate when there is an “ascertainable class and a well-defined community of interest among class members.” (*Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc.* (2014) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326.). Class treatment is appropriate even if class members at some point may be required to make an individual showing as to eligibility for recovery. (*Bufile v. Dollar Financial Group, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207; *Sav-On*, 34 Cal.4th at 333).

##### **2. The Proposed Settlement Class is Ascertainable and there is a Well-Defined Community of Interest Among the Class Members.**

Whether a class is “ascertainable” within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 is “determined by examining (1) the class definition, (2) the size of the class, and (3) the means available for identifying class members.” (*Lee*, 166 Cal.App.4th at 1334). Class members are ascertainable where they may be readily identified without unreasonable expense or time by reference to official records. (*Id.*).

The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) a class representative with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) a class representative and counsel who can adequately represent the class. (*Cal. Civ. Proc. Code* § 382).

In April 2012, the Supreme Court expounded on the element of predominance: The “ultimate question” the element of predominance presents is whether “the issues which may be jointly tried, when

1 compared with those requiring separate adjudication, are so numerous or substantial that the  
2 maintenance of a class action would be advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants.”  
3 (*Brinker*, 53 Cal. 4th at 1021-1022 (citations omitted)).

4 Because all Class Members are Defendant’s current and former employees, the class is readily  
5 ascertainable from Defendant’s regular business records, i.e., payroll records. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 58).

6 The California statutes relating to each of Plaintiff’s claims apply with equal force and effect to  
7 the entire Settlement Class. Factually, Defendant’s policies and practices apply class-wide and  
8 Defendant’s liability can be determined by facts common to all members of the class. The wage and  
9 hour issues are both numerous and substantial, and a class action is the most advantageous method of  
10 dealing with the claims of the Settlement Class Members. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 59).

11 Plaintiff’s wage and hour claims are typical of the proposed Class because they arise from the  
12 same factual basis and are based on the same legal theories applicable to the other Class Members.  
13 Likewise, Plaintiff’s interests are entirely coextensive with the interests of the Class. Plaintiff alleges  
14 that he was injured by the same company-wide practices to which the proposed Class Members were  
15 subject to and seek the same relief. Plaintiff has already demonstrated his ability to advocate for the  
16 interests of the Class Members by initiating this litigation, undertaking extensive class discovery, and  
17 evaluating the proposed settlement to assure that it is fair. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 60).

18 A class action is superior to a multitude of individual lawsuits. Given the size and amount of  
19 each individual claim, the Class Members likely have little incentive to litigate their claims on an  
20 individual basis because the out-of-pocket expense and personal commitment necessary to litigate each  
21 claim outweighs any potential recovery. In sum, class treatment is superior to individual, case-by-case  
22 adjudication. (SCJ Dec., ¶ 61).

23 Additionally, Plaintiff is represented by competent Class Counsel who have extensive experience  
24 in litigating wage and hour class action cases. Class Counsel successfully briefed, argued, certified, and  
25 gained state court settlement approval of the same class-wide causes of action that are at issue in this  
26 case. Class Counsel’s wage and hour class action experience establishes that they are well qualified to  
27 represent the interests of this Class. (SCJ Dec., ¶¶ 62-66; Declaration of Jean-Claude Lapuyade at ¶¶  
28 1-8; Declaration of Shani O. Zakay at ¶¶ 1-3).

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Dated: August 12, 2026

By: Sydney Castillo-Johnson  
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