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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

LOUIS CARABETTA, an individual, on behalf of himself, and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MITCHELL REPAIR INFORMATION COMPANY, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; SNAP-ON INCORPORATED, a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1-50, Inclusive, Defendants.	Case No. 37-2024-00020244-CU-OE-CTL **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND PAGA SETTLEMENT** Date: January 23, 2026 Time: 1:30 p.m. Judge: Hon. Katherine Bacal Dept.: C-63

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I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff LOUIS CARABETTA ("Plaintiff") seeks preliminary approval of the Stipulation of Settlement of Class and PAGA Action Claims and Release of Claims ("Agreement")[1], which if approved, would provide valuable monetary relief for approximately 408 Class Members. The basic terms of the Agreement provide for the following:

1. The **"Class Members" and "Class Period"** shall mean all individuals who currently or formerly worked for Mitchell Repair Information Company, LLC and Snap-On Incorporated (hereafter, collectively "Mitchell") as an hourly non-exempt employee in California at any time during the period beginning April 30, 2020, through July 31, 2025 ("Class Period"). Agreement at §§ I(E), I(J). The Settlement Class Members are all Class Members who have not submitted a timely and valid request for exclusion. Agreement at § I(II).

2. The **"Aggrieved Employees"** and **"PAGA Period"** shall mean all persons who are or previously were employed by Mitchell in California and classified as non-exempt employees at any time during the period beginning April 30, 2023, through July 31, 2025 ("PAGA Period"). Agreement at §§ I(C), I(W).

3. The "**Gross Settlement Amount**" is Nine Hundred Eighty Thousand Dollars and Zero

4. Cents ($980,000.00). Agreement at § I(M). The Gross Settlement Amount is non-reversionary and includes the following:

a. A "**Service Award**" in the amount of $10,000 to Plaintiff or in an amount that the Court authorizes to be paid to the Class Representative, in addition to his Individual Settlement Payment and his individual Aggrieved Employee Payment, in recognition of his efforts and risks in assisting with the prosecution of the Action. Agreement at §§ I(EE), and III(B)(14);

b. A payment of a "**Class Counsel Award**" consisting of attorneys' fees not to exceed one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount estimated to be $326,666.67 out of $980,000 plus attorneys' expenses of up to $35,000, to be paid to Class Counsel. Agreement at §§ I(G), III(B)(13);

c. A "**PAGA Payment**" of $50,000.00 shall be allocated from the Gross Settlement

[1] The Agreement is attached as Ex. "1" to the Declaration of Jean-Claude Lapuyade ("JCL Dec.") at ¶ 3. All citations to the Agreement incorporate by this reference a citation to the JCL Dec., ¶ 3. Further, unless indicated otherwise, capitalized terms used herein have the same meaning as those defined by the Agreement.

Amount for settlement of claims for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. The Settlement Administrator shall pay seventy-five percent (75%) of the PAGA Payment ($37,500) to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA Payment"). Twenty-five percent (25%) of the PAGA Payment ($12,500) will be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees by the Settlement Administrator ("Aggrieved Employee Payment"). Agreement at §§ I(X), III(B)(15); and

d. **"Settlement Administration Costs"** not to exceed $7,490.00 payable to the Settlement Administrator, Apex Class Action LLC, for, *inter alia,* the administration of the Notice Packet and Individual Settlement Payments. Agreement at §§ I(GG), III(B)(16).

4. The "**Net Settlement Amount**" of approximately $550,843.33 (Gross Settlement Amount less Class Counsel Award, Service Award, PAGA Payment, and Settlement Administration Costs) which will be allocated to all Settlement Class Members based on the respective Workweeks for each Class Member divided by the total Workweeks for all Class Members. Agreement at § III(B)(17).

An objective evaluation of the Settlement confirms that the relief negotiated on behalf of the Class is fair, reasonable, and adequate. The Settlement was negotiated by the Parties at arm's length. The Settlement confers substantial benefits to the Settlement Class. The relief offered by the Settlement is particularly impressive when viewed against the difficulties encountered by plaintiffs pursuing wage and hour cases (*see infra).* Indeed, by settling now rather than proceeding to trial, Settlement Class Members will not have to wait (possibly years) for relief, nor will they have to bear the risk of class certification being denied or of Mitchell prevailing at trial. JCL Dec., ¶ 6.

As discussed below, the proposed Settlement satisfies all criteria for preliminary settlement approval and falls within the range of reasonableness. The Net Settlement Amount will be paid to all Settlement Class Members resulting in an average Individual Settlement Payment of ***$1,350.11***. The average Individual Settlement Payment to the Settlement Class meets or exceeds awards in similar wage and hour class actions. Moreover, the proposed Class is appropriate for provisional certification. Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court grant preliminary approval of the Settlement. JCL Dec., ¶ 7.

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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

A. Overview of the Litigation and Mediated Settlement

Mitchell produces software for automobile repair shops throughout the state of California, including San Diego County, where Plaintiff worked. Plaintiff was employed by Mitchell from September 2020 to November 2024. At all times during his employment, Plaintiff was classified by Mitchell as a non-exempt employee, paid on an hourly basis, and was entitled to legally compliant meal and/or rest periods, and minimum, regular and overtime wages for all hours worked. Throughout his employment, Plaintiff was subject to Mitchell's written policies and procedures. JCL Dec., ¶ 8; Declaration of Louis Carabetta ("LC Dec.") at ¶ 4.

On April 30, 2024, Plaintiff served Mitchell and the Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") with a Notice of Violations ("PAGA Notice"). Plaintiff's PAGA Notice set forth the facts and theories supporting Mitchell's alleged violations of various provisions of the California Labor Code and applicable Industrial Welfare Commissions ("IWC") Wage Order and of his intent to pursue claims under California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, Cal. Lab. Code Sections 2698 *et seq*. ("PAGA"). JCL Dec., ¶ 9.

On April 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a class action complaint in the San Diego Superior Court alleging eight causes of action against Mitchell for: (1) Unfair Competition in Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 *et seq*.; (2) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages in Violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1194, 1197 & 1197.1; (3) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages in Violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510, *et seq*.; (4) Failure to Provide Required Meal Periods in Violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7 & 512 and the Applicable IWC Wage Order; (5) Failure to Provide Required Rest Periods in Violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7 & 512 and the Applicable IWC Wage Order; (6) Failure to Reimburse Employees for Required Expenses in Violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 2802; (7) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Statements in Violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 226; and (8) Failure to Provide Wages When Due in Violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201, 202 and 203 (the "Action"). JCL Dec., ¶ 10.

On June 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a separate representative action complaint in the San Diego Superior Court alleging one cause of action for violations of PAGA. On September 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint in the Action ("Operative Complaint") to add a 9th cause of action for

Violation of the Private Attorneys General Act [Labor Code §§ 2698 *et seq*.] Plaintiff subsequently dismissed the separate PAGA action. JCL Dec., ¶ 11.

Generally, Plaintiff claims that Mitchell failed pay for all hours worked, failed to provide meal and rest breaks, failed to reimburse employees for mandatory business expenses, and failed to timely pay all wages due upon separation of employment. Mitchell forcefully denies liability for each of Plaintiff's claims. Further, Mitchell asserts that they fully complied with all applicable employment laws and raised several other significant defenses to Plaintiff's claims, including but not limited to, asserting that it paid for all hours worked, maintained facially compliant meal and rest period polices, reimbursed its employees for business expenses, and timely payment of all wages due upon separation of employment. JCL Dec., ¶ 12.

After engaging in formal discovery, the Parties agreed to attend private mediation. To facilitate settlement negotiations, Mitchell agreed to informally produce documents and data points subject to the mediation privilege, including but not limited to, a sampling of the Class Members' time and payroll data, and pertinent written wage and hour policies. As discussed *infra,* Plaintiff's counsel retained the forensic consultants at Berger Consulting Group ("BCG") to analyze Mitchell 's time and payroll data. JCL Dec., ¶ 13.

On July 31, 2025, the Parties mediated the Action with Steven J. Rottman, Esq. ("Mediator"), a mediator of class and PAGA actions. The Parties engaged in arms-length settlement negotiations with the Mediator's assistance. Specifically, the Mediator helped manage the Parties' expectations and provided a useful, neutral analysis of the issues and risks to both sides. The Parties made substantial progress with the Mediator's assistance. Namely, the Parties exchanged information regarding their respective claims and defenses, including their respective evaluation of the damages. The mediation concluded without a settlement. However, the Parties continued to meet and confer regarding negotiations, and the Parties tentatively reached a settlement, which was subsequently memorialized in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU"). After reaching an agreement in principle, the Parties drafted and negotiated a long-form settlement agreement, which is the subject of the instant motion. JCL Dec., ¶ 14.

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B. Class Counsel Thoroughly Investigated the Factual and Legal Issues

Months before filing the Action, Class Counsel began its pre-filing investigation into Plaintiff's complaints. Class Counsel's investigation started with several lengthy interviews with Plaintiff. As part of the interview process, Plaintiff produced documents related to his employment, including, among other things, copies of his wage statements, Mitchell's written policies and procedures, and work-related communications. At the conclusion of the interviews, Class Counsel determined that each Plaintiff's complaints justified further inquiry. JCL Dec., ¶ 15.

Class Counsel subsequently requested Plaintiff's employee file from Mitchell. In response, Mitchell produced documents, including but not limited to, Plaintiff's hiring documents and payroll records. Class Counsel reviewed and analyzed the documents and determined the documents appeared to substantiate Plaintiff's claim that Mitchell failed to, among other things, failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements, failed to provide meal and rest breaks, failed to pay for all hours worked, failed to reimburse employees for mandatory business expenses, and failed to timely pay all wages due upon separation of employment. JCL Dec., ¶ 16.

Considering the many anticipated factual disputes and the high cost of litigation, the Parties agreed that it would be in the best interest of both Parties to mediate the matter. To prepare for mediation, Class Counsel requested documents and data points to further evaluate Plaintiff's claims and Mitchell's liability exposure to the Class Members. In response to Class Counsel's request, Mitchell produced a sampling of Class Member time and payroll records, aggregate workweek and pay period data, and copies of applicable policies, and agreements. In total, Mitchell produced thousands of pages of pertinent policy documents and payroll data for Class Counsel to analyze. JCL Dec., ¶ 17.

Class Counsel then retained the statisticians and economists at BCG to evaluate the Class Members' payroll and time data. BCG provides data analysis and damage modeling consulting services specializing in wage and hour class actions. BCG's team of financial and data analysts are credentialed and experienced experts in their fields and have provided their expertise on thousands of cases. Stated differently, BCG is uniquely qualified to analyze Mitchell's time and payroll data. JCL Dec., ¶ 18.

BCG analyzed Mitchell's time and payroll data to assist in the development of various damage models. Among other things, BCG determined the approximate number of work shifts, workweeks, pay periods during the Class Period, and the average length of shift and average number of hours worked per week and per pay period during the Class Period. BCG also estimated Mitchell's potential exposure for wage statement violations, meal and rest period violations, the amount of unpaid wages owed, the amount of unreimbursed business expenses, and the amount of untimely payments upon separation of employment during the Class Period. JCL Dec., ¶ 19.

In advance of mediation, Class Counsel created several damage models predicated on the BCG analysis. Class Counsel's models calculated Mitchell's potential liability exposure while accounting for the uncertainties of continued litigation. These damage models informed and guided Class Counsel during the mediated settlement discussions. JCL Dec., ¶ 20.

Overall, Class Counsel thoroughly investigated the claims at issue, including: (1) determining Plaintiff's suitability as a putative class representative through interviews, background investigations, and analysis of his employment files; (2) evaluating all of Plaintiff's potential claims; (3) researching similar wage and hour class actions as to the claims brought, the nature of the positions, and the type of employer; (4) analyzing the Class time and payroll records; (5) analyzing Mitchell's labor policies and practices; (6) researching settlements in similar cases as well as outstanding issues which could affect settlement approval; (7) evaluating Plaintiff's claims and estimating Mitchell's liability for purposes of settlement; (8) drafting the mediation brief; and (9) participating in the mediation. This investigation allowed Class Counsel to fully assess the nature and magnitude of the claims being settled, as well as the impediments to recovery, such as to make an independent assessment of the reasonableness of the terms to which the Parties have agreed. JCL Dec., ¶ 21.

C. The Proposed Settlement Fully Resolves Plaintiff's Claims

1. <u>The Composition of the Class</u>

The proposed Class consists of all individuals who currently or formerly worked for Mitchell as an hourly non-exempt employee in California at any time during the period beginning April 30, 2020, through July 31, 2025. The Settlement Class excludes any person who submits a timely and valid request for exclusion. Agreement at §§ I(E), I(J), and I(II). The total number of Workweeks worked by all putative class members in the aggregate during the Class Period has been represented by Mitchell to be approximately 49,600. Agreement at § III(A)(18).

2. The Settlement Consideration

The Parties agreed to settle the underlying class claims in exchange for the Gross Settlement Amount of $980,000.00. The Gross Settlement Amount includes: (1) Individual Settlement Payments to the Settlement Class; (2) a Service Award of $10,000.00 to Plaintiff for his services on behalf of the Settlement Class; (3) a PAGA Payment in the amount of $50,000.00; (4) Settlement Administration Costs estimated at $7,490.00; and the (5) Class Counsel Award in the amount of $361,666.67, comprised of attorneys' fees equal to one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount estimated to be $326,666.67 and an estimated $35,000.00 for actually incurred litigation expenses. *See* generally Agreement at § III(B).

Subject to the Court approving the Service Award, Class Counsel Award, PAGA Payment, and the Settlement Administration Costs, the Net Settlement Amount will be distributed to Settlement Class Members. Agreement at § III(B)(17). There is no reversion to Mitchell and Mitchell must separately pay for their share of the employer payroll taxes. Agreement at § I(M).

3. Formula for Calculating Individual Settlement Payments

Each Settlement Class Member will receive an Individual Settlement Payment. The Individual Settlement Payment will be proportional to the number of Workweeks each Settlement Class Member worked for Mitchell in California during the Class Period. Using the Class Data, the Settlement Administrator shall add up the total number of Workweeks for all Class Members. The respective Workweeks for each Class Member will be divided by the total Workweeks for all Class Members, resulting in the Payment Ratio for each Class Member. Each Class Member's Payment Ratio will then be multiplied by the Net Settlement Amount to calculate each Class Member's estimated Individual Settlement Payment. Agreement at § III(B)(19).

Each Individual Settlement Payment will be reduced by any legally mandated employee tax withholdings (e.g., employee payroll taxes, etc.). Individual Settlement Payments for Class Members who submit valid and timely requests for exclusion will be redistributed to Settlement Class Members who do not submit valid and timely requests for exclusion on a pro rata basis based on their respective Payment Ratios. Agreement at § III(B)(19).

Given that there are approximately 408 Class Members, ***the average gross recovery is***

approximately $1,350.11 (Net Settlement Amount divided by Class Members). JCL Dec., ¶ 7. This average net recovery exceeds many wage and hour class action settlements approved by California state and federal courts. (See, e.g., *Shachno et al. v. KT Hotels, LLC*, et al., San Diego Superior Court Case No. 37-2018-00043601 (average net recovery of $283.35); *Almanza v. The Express Group Inc.*, San Bernardino Superior Court Case No. CIVDS1722542 (average net recovery $174.68); *Macaspac v. San Antonio Regional Hospital*, San Bernardino Superior Court Case No. CIVDS1512625 (average net recovery $715.97) and *Crawford et al. v. Outlook Amusements, Inc.*, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC617160 (average net recovery $333.98).

4. Release by Class Members

Generally, as of the Funding Date, Plaintiff and the Settlement Class Members will agree to release the Released Parties from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, guarantees, costs, expenses, attorney's fees, damages, action or causes of action, contingent or accrued for, which would reasonably arise from the factual allegations or legal claims asserted in the class claims in Operative Complaint in the Action and which occurred during the Class Period. Agreement at §I(AA).

5. PAGA Release by Plaintiff, the LWDA and the State of California

Generally, upon the Funding Date, Plaintiff, the LWDA and the State of California, will release the Released Parties from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, guarantees, costs, expenses, attorney's fees, damages, action or causes of action, contingent or accrued for, which would reasonably arise from the factual allegations or legal claims asserted under PAGA in the Operative Complaint in the Action and in Plaintiff's PAGA notice to the LWDA and which occurred during the PAGA Period. Agreement at §§ I(BB).

III. ARGUMENT

A. The Court Should Preliminarily Approve the Proposed Class Action Settlement

The proposed Settlement, including a Gross Settlement Amount of $980,000.00 meets the standards for preliminary approval. Pre-trial settlement of complex class actions is a judicially favored remedy. (*Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n* (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615, 625 ("Voluntary conciliation and settlement are the preferred means of dispute resolution.").) Class action settlement approval requires an early "preliminary" review by the trial court and a subsequent "final" review after notice of the settlement has been distributed to class members for their comments and objections. (C.R.C. 3.769(c)-(g); *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases,* 180 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1118 (2010) (the court first "preliminarily approves the settlement" and later "conducts a final approval hearing to inquire into the fairness of the proposed settlement").)

Although Rule of Court Rule 3.769 does not provide detail as to the scope of review of the proposed settlement, preliminary approval is warranted if the settlement falls within a "reasonable range." (*See North County Contractor's Assn., Inc. v. Touchstone Ins. Services* (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1089-90; Conte & Newberg, *Newberg on Class Actions,* §§ 11.26 (4th ed. 2002).) Reasonableness and fairness are presumed where: (1) the settlement is reached through "arms-length bargaining;" (2) investigation and discovery are "sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently;" (3) counsel is "experienced in similar litigation. . . . ." (*Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1802.) The presumption of fairness is consistent with California's public policy goal of favoring settlements. (*Stambaugh v. Super. Ct* (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236 ("the law wisely favors settlements"); *Cellphone Termination Fee Cases* (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1118 ("public policy generally favors the compromise of complex class action litigation"); *7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1151 ("voluntary conciliation and settlement are the preferred means of dispute resolution ... [t]his is especially true in complex class action litigation").)

Additionally, in reviewing the fairness of a class action settlement, due regard should be given to what is "otherwise a private consensual agreement between the parties." (*Cellphone Termination Fee Cases* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1389.) The inquiry "must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned." (*Id.*)

1. <u>The Parties Reached the Settlement Through Arm's-Length Bargaining Led by Experienced Counsel.</u>

"[W]hat transpires in settlement negotiations is highly relevant to the assessment of a proposed settlement's fairness." (*State v. Levi Strauss & Co.* (1986) 41 Cal.3d 460, 482.) Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in the negotiation of a settlement Plaintiff, the LWDA and the State of California, unless evidence to the contrary is offered; thus, there is a presumption that settlement negotiations are conducted in good faith. (Newberg, § 11.51.)

The Parties participated in mediation with a Mediator Steven J. Rottman, Esq., an experienced mediator of wage and hour class and PAGA actions. The Mediator managed the Parties' expectations and provided a useful, neutral analysis of the issues and risks to both sides. (*In re Apple Computer, Inc. Derivative Litig,* No. C 06-4128 JF (HRL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108195 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2008) (mediator's participation weighs considerably against any inference of a collusive settlement); *D'Amato v. Deutsche Bank* (2d. Cir. 2001) 236 F.3d 78, 85 (a "mediator's involvement in pre-certification settlement negotiations helps to ensure that the proceedings were free of collusion and undue pressure.").) At all times, the Parties' negotiations were at an arm's length, adversarial and non-collusive. The matter resolved only after the Mediator heard arguments, reviewed evidence, and evaluated the Parties' respective claims and defenses. JCL Dec., ¶ 22.

Once the Parties reached a settlement, the Parties engaged in protracted negotiations regarding the written terms of the class action and PAGA settlement. The Parties maintained the arm's length, non-collusive and adversarial negotiations while arriving at the final terms of the Settlement. The Agreement is the final product of these mediated negotiations. Objectively, the Settlement terms are fair, adequate and represent a reasonable compromise of the claims at issue. JCL Dec., ¶ 23.

2. <u>Class Counsel's Thorough Investigation Provided an Objective Measurement of the Settlement's Reasonableness.</u>

As set forth in greater detail above, Class Counsel conducted a very thorough investigation into the factual and legal issues in dispute. In addition to formal and informal discovery, document review, data analysis and legal research, Class Counsel also researched similar wage and hour actions. Although no two cases are identical, this research provided Class Counsel with a marker to inform settlement discussions and, ultimately, to measure this settlement against. The investigation allowed Class Counsel to realistically assess the value of the claims and intelligently engage defense counsel in settlement discussions that culminated in the proposed settlement now before the Court. JCL Dec., ¶ 24.

Class Counsel only agreed to enter the Settlement following this thorough investigation and evaluation of Plaintiff's claims. Based on this investigation of the facts, applicable law, and marketplace for similar settlements, and considering the risk of significant delay, uncertainty associated with litigation, and the various defenses asserted by Mitchell, Class Counsel firmly believes this Agreement to be in the best interests of the Class Members. Because the Settlement's terms are fair, reasonable, and adequate, the Court should preliminarily approve the Settlement. JCL Dec., ¶ 25.

3. <u>The Settlement Falls Within the Recognized Range of Reasonableness.</u>

The Gross Settlement Amount of $980,000.00 is within the range of reasonable settlement for preliminary approval. To determine whether a settlement is fair and reasonable, the court should "consider enough information about the nature and magnitude of the claims being settled, as well as the impediments to recovery, to make an independent assessment of the reasonableness of the terms to which the parties have agreed." (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 133.) In making this determination, the court is "not to try the case" but rather "satisfy itself that the class action settlement is within the 'ballpark of reasonableness.'" (*Id.* (emphasis added).) For this analysis, courts do "not require any such explicit statement of value; [they] require[] a record which allows an understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation." (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co.* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 409 (internal citation omitted).) The reasonableness of a settlement is not dependent upon its actual value approaching the potential recovery plaintiffs might have received if they had succeeded at trial. Indeed, "[t]he determination whether a settlement is reasonable does not involve the use of a 'mathematical equation yielding a particularized sum.'" (*Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 FRD. 174, 186 (*quoting In re Michael Milken and Assoc. Sec. Litig.* (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 150 F.R.D. 57, 66).)

B. The Gross Settlement Amount Meets the Recognized Range of Reasonableness.

The Gross Settlement Amount of $980,000.00 is well within the range of reasonableness considering the nature and magnitude of the claims being settled and the various potential impediments to recovery. JCL Dec., ¶ 26. To determine whether a settlement is fair and reasonable, the court should "consider enough information about the nature and magnitude of the claims being settled, as well as the impediments to recovery, to make an independent assessment of the reasonableness of the terms to which the parties have agreed." (*Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 133.) In making this determination, the court is "not to try the case" but rather "satisfy itself that the class action settlement is within the 'ballpark of reasonableness.'" (*Id.*) For this analysis, courts do "not require any such explicit statement of value; [they] require[] a record which allows an understanding of the amount that is in controversy and the realistic range of outcomes of the litigation." (*Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co.* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 409 (internal citation omitted).) The reasonableness of a settlement is not dependent upon its actual value approaching the potential recovery plaintiffs might have received if they had succeeded at trial.[2] Indeed, "[t]he determination whether a settlement is reasonable does not involve the use of a 'mathematical equation yielding a particularized sum.'" (*Frank v. Eastman Kodak Co.* (W.D.N.Y. 2005) 228 FRD. 174, 186 (*quoting In re Michael Milken and Assoc. Sec. Litig.* (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 150 F.R.D. 57, 66).)

Class Counsel retained BCG to develop economic damage models measuring Mitchell's potential liability exposure with respect to the Class and PAGA claims. The damage models were informed by Class Counsel's investigation, including the analysis of the time and payroll data Mitchell produced. Regarding Mitchell's liability for class claims, Class Counsel projected Mitchell's liability exposure (excluding PAGA penalties) at $5,502,847.95 ("Conservative Model") and Mitchell 's *total* exposure for class claims (excluding PAGA penalties) at $11,906,789.81 ("Aggressive Model"). Thus, the Gross Settlement Amount of $980,000.00 represents approximately 17.81% of Mitchell 's *total* liability exposure and 8.23% of Mitchell 's *maximum* class-wide exposure. JCL Dec., ¶ 26.

(1) <u>Estimated Exposure for Mitchell's Meal Period Violations</u>

Plaintiff alleges that Mitchell failed to provide compliant meal periods. Specifically, Plaintiff

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[2] Federal district courts recognize that there is an inherent "range of reasonableness" in determining whether to approve a settlement "which recognizes the uncertainties of law and fact in any particular case and the concomitant risks and costs necessarily inherent in taking any litigation to completion." *Newman v. Stein* (2d. Cir. 2002) 464 F.2d 689, 693; *see In re Omnivision Tech, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. 2008) 559 F.Supp.2d 1036; *see also Nat'l Rural Telecomm. Coop. v. Directv. Inc.* (C.D. Cal. 2004) 221 F.R.D. 523, 527 ("well settled law that a proposed settlement may be acceptable even though it amounts to only a fraction of the potential recovery"); *In re Global Crossing Sec. and ERISA Litig.* (S.D.N.Y 2004) 225 F.R.D. 436, 460 ("settlement amount's ratio to the maximum potential recovery need not be the sole, or even dominant, consideration when assessing settlements fairness"); *In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc Sec Litig.* (E.D. Pa. 2000) 194 F.R.D. 166, 184 ("the fact that a proposed settlement constitutes a relatively small percentage of the most optimistic estimate does not, in itself, weigh against the settlement; rather the percentage should be considered in light of strength of the claims"); *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm.* (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615, 628 (it is "the complete package, taken as a whole rather than the individual component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness").

alleges that Mitchell failed to record the actual time that Class Members worked. Instead, prior to November of 2023, Mitchell failed to record Class Members' meal periods. After November of 2023, Mitchell required Class Members to manually fill out time records reflecting their scheduled hours, including a 30-minute meal period. Plaintiff contends that these records do not accurately record the start and stop times for meal periods and, more importantly, do not reflect missed, late or short meal periods. As a result, nearly all of the *recorded* meal periods reflected exactly thirty (30) minutes, which Plaintiff argued creates a presumption of a meal period violation. JCL Dec., ¶ 28.

Mitchell raised a number of defenses to this claim. Mitchell argued that it maintained complaint meal period policies and, in practice, provided its employees with the opportunity to take compliant meal periods. Mitchell argued, and the documents in fact reflect, that the time records evidence nearly a 100% meal period compliance rate. Thus, Mitchell argued that there was no potential liability for Plaintiff's alleged meal period violations, and any claimed violations required a highly individualized inquiry not suitable to class treatment. Consequently, Plaintiff applied a 25% discount to this claim and estimated Mitchell's exposure for this claim ranged from $3,704,906.99 to approximately $4,939,875.99. JCL Dec., ¶ 29.

(2) <u>Estimated Exposure for Unpaid Wages</u>

Plaintiff further alleges that Mitchell failed to pay its employees for all hours worked. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that throughout the Class Period, Mitchell failed to record the actual time Plaintiff and Class Members worked. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that prior to November 2023, Mitchell failed to use any timekeeping system and only tracked "total hours worked" consistent with employees' schedules, rather than actual time worked. Further, Plaintiff alleges that in November 2023, Mitchell implemented a new timekeeping system wherein Mitchell required Class Members to manually fill out time records consistent with the Class Members' schedules, without any regard to the amount of time employees actually worked. Plaintiff contends that the time records produced by Mitchell show that a majority of all recorded shifts were rounded to quarter-hour intervals. As a result, Plaintiff, Class Members, and Aggrieved Employees forfeited compensation, including overtime wages, for all the time they spent working under Mitchell's control, including but not limited to time spent performing work-related tasks. Based on Plaintiff's testimony and Class Counsel's investigation, Plaintiff assumed

5 minutes of unpaid compensable time per workweek by the Class Members during the Class Period. JCL Dec., ¶ 30.

Mitchell vigorously denied liability for this claim. As a preliminary matter, Mitchell maintains that they paid Class Members for all of their time worked. Further, Mitchell maintains that for a significant portion of the Class Period, all hours worked were entered on timecards by the employees and not the employer. Mitchell argued that they instructed employees to accurately fill out their timecards to accurately reflect all hours worked, and that employees certified the accuracy of these time entries. Further, Mitchell argued that it was entitled to rely on the accuracy of the time entries made by its employees and that it paid employees for all of their time worked. Considering Mitchell's defenses, Plaintiff applied 75% discount to this claim. Plaintiff estimated Mitchell's exposure for this claim ranged between approximately $67,253.54 and $269,014.16. JCL Dec., ¶ 31.

(3) Estimated Exposure for Mitchell's Rest Period Violations

Plaintiff also alleges that Mitchell failed to provide compliant rest periods. Plaintiff alleges that because of their rigorous work schedules, Plaintiff and Class Members were not able to take timely and duty-free rest periods. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that he was required to work through his rest periods in order to finish work-related tasks. JCL Dec., ¶ 32.

Again, Mitchell denied liability and asserted that the workload is not such that it prevented employees from taking a break. Moreover, Plaintiff recognizes the evidentiary burdens establishing this claim. Establishing Plaintiff's rest period claim would rely, almost entirely, on Class Member testimony, making it a riskier claim at class certification and liability stages. Certification likely would have required depositions of Class Members who provided declarations, and Mitchell argued that they obtained opposing declarations stating either rest breaks were taken, or rest breaks were voluntarily waived. *See, e.g., Ordonez v. Radio Shack, Inc.* (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013) 2013 WL 210223, at *11 ("Because of the competing testimony before the Court, plaintiff's evidence that Defendants may have an illegal, written rest break policy is insufficient for this Court to find that common issues predominate."); *Villa v. United Site Servs. of California, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2012) 2012 WL 5503550, at *8 ("Indeed, Plaintiff's own evidence confirms that the written policy does not generate uniform practices"). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Conservative Model applied a 75% discount to the rest break claim. Plaintiff estimated the range of potential outcomes for this claim was between approximately $1,529,250.42 to approximately $6,117,001.66. JCL Dec., ¶ 33.

(4) Estimated Exposure for Mitchell's Regular Rate Violations

Plaintiff alleges that Mitchell failed to include certain non-discretionary compensation when calculating the regular rate of pay when paying overtime wages, meal period premiums, and redeemed sick pay. Specifically, Mitchell paid Class Members non-discretionary bonuses but failed to properly calculate these into Class Members' regular rates of pay for purposes of overtime, sick pay, and meal period premiums. Mitchell vigorously denied liability and asserted that all incentive compensation was either properly calculated into the regular rate of pay or properly excluded as discretionary compensation. Consequently, Plaintiff applied a 50% discount to this claim and estimated Mitchell's exposure for this claim ranged from $163,289.00 to approximately $326,578.00. JCL Dec., ¶ 34.

(5) Estimated Exposure for Mitchell 's Failure to Reimburse Necessary Business Expenses

Plaintiff alleges that Mitchell failed to reimburse Class Members for use of their personal cell phones in furtherance of their job duties. California employers who require employees to incur personal business expenses for work purposes must reimburse the employee for the cost incurred. (See Cal. Lab. Code § 2802(a), providing that "[a]n employer shall indemnify his or her employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties, or of his or her obedience to the directions of the employer…."). JCL Dec., ¶ 35.

Again, Mitchell vigorously denied any liability for this claim, arguing that there was no mandatory cell phone use and, in any event, Mitchell provided avenues for reimbursement of legitimate business expenses. Considering Mitchell's defenses, Plaintiff applied an 85% discount to this claim. Plaintiff estimated Mitchell's exposure for this claim ranged between approximately $38,148.00 and $254,320.00. JCL Dec., ¶ 36.

(6) Estimated Exposure for Wage Statement Violations and Waiting Time Penalties

Plaintiff alleges that Mitchell's violations resulted in *derivative* violations of Labor Code sections 203 and 226(a). Class Counsel weighed the potential recoveries against the strength and defenses of the underlying claims as outlined above. JCL Dec., ¶ 37.

Mitchell denied that it violated California law regarding wage statements or waiting time penalties. Mitchell argued that Plaintiff could not prove the required "willful" prong under Labor Code section 203 and that Plaintiff could not establish the necessary "injury" element to successfully recover derivative wage statement penalties, as required by Labor Code section 226. See, e.g., *Howard v. CVS Caremark Corp.,* 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172406 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2014) (denying class certification for the same penalty claims); *Alonzo v. Maximus, Inc*. (C.D. Cal. 2011) 832 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1134-1137 (finding insufficient evidence of bad faith or actual injury). Plaintiff could not give the penalty claims great weight given that they depended on proving the underlying claims, which had their own risks. Consequently, Plaintiff applied a 90% discount to the waiting time penalties claim and estimated that Mitchell's exposure for this claim ranged from $101,114.50 and $1,011,145.00. Further, Plaintiff applied a 50% discount to the wage statement penalties claim and estimated that Mitchell's exposure for this claim ranged from $526,000.00 to $1,052,000.00. JCL Dec., ¶ 38.

(7) <u>Mitchell's PAGA Exposure</u>

Class Counsel's damage models also estimate Mitchell's exposure for PAGA penalties arising from the aforementioned violations. At the time of mediation, Plaintiff estimated Mitchell's PAGA exposure to be $2,165,750 if successful at trial. JCL Dec., ¶ 39.

Here, the Parties negotiated a good faith PAGA Payment in the amount of $50,000.00 which is 5.10% of the Gross Settlement Amount. This amount falls well within the range of approved PAGA penalties. Seventy-Five percent (75%) of the PAGA Payment ($37,500.00) will be paid to the LWDA ("LWDA Payment") with the remaining twenty-five percent (25%) of the PAGA Payment ($12,500.00) will be distributed to the Aggrieved Employees, which is within the range of PAGA penalties approved by courts and should be approved. JCL Dec., ¶ 40.

Under PAGA, Courts have considerable discretion to reduce the penalty award. In *Fleming v. Covidien*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154590 (C.D. Cal. 2011), a federal court reduced PAGA penalties from $2,800,000 to $500,000, a reduction of 82.2%, because the court found maximum penalties "unjust" because the employees had suffered no injuries. Some trial courts have actually awarded no civil penalties, even when Labor Code violations are established. *See In re Nordstrom Com. Cases*, 186

Cal.App.4th 576, 589 (2010) (affirming an award of $0 in PAGA penalties in a wage and hour class action); *In re Taco Bell Wage & Hour Actions*, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48557, *40-43 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2016) (PAGA penalties denied after trial).

Carrington v. Starbucks Corp., 30 Cal. App. 5th 504 (2018), illustrates the risk of PAGA claims. In *Carrington*, while the plaintiff prevailed on his PAGA claim upon trial, the trial court reduced the maximum PAGA penalty amount by 90%, citing the employer's good faith attempt at complying with the law. *Id.* at 517. Upon review, the Court of Appeal found such reduction to be proper. *Id.* at 539. Again, the *Carrington* decision was after Plaintiff actually prevailed at trial, and even then, the PAGA penalties were reduced by 90%. Thus, the PAGA claims likewise face significant uncertainty. There is a risk that the Court would consider the maximum civil penalty available to be confiscatory. *Id*.

For the aforementioned reasons, the PAGA allocation of the Gross Settlement Amount is fair, just, and reasonable. JCL Dec., ¶ 41.

C. Inherent Risks of Continued Litigation Support Preliminary Approval.

"It can be difficult to ascertain with precision the likelihood of success at trial. The Court cannot and need not determine the merits of the contested facts and legal issues at this stage, [Citation], and to the extent courts assess this factor, it is to 'determine whether the decision to settle is a good value for a relatively weak case or a sell-out of an extraordinary strong case.'" (*Misra v. Decision One Mortg. Co.* (C.D. Cal. 2009) 2009 WL 4581276, at *7.)

With respect to the most immediate challenge, i.e., class certification, the risks attendant to the certification of similar wage and hour claims are demonstrated by *Ali v. U.S.A. Cab Ltd.* (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1341. There, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Trial Court's denial of class certification because employees' declarations attesting to having taken meal and rest breaks demonstrated that individualized inquiries were required to show harm. *See also Campbell v. Best Buy Stores, L.P.*, (C.D. Cal. 2013) 2013 WL 5302217 at *11-13 (following *Brinker* and denying certification of proposed off-the-clock and rest and meal break classes due to lack of uniform policy); *Brown v. Fed Express Corp.* (C.D. Cal. 2008) 249 F.R.D. 580, 587-88 (denying certification of driver meal and rest period claims based on the predominance of individual issues). JCL Dec., ¶ 42.

Further, even if a class is certified, liability remains uncertain. The risks attendant to the issue of

Mitchell 's liability in similar wage and hour actions are demonstrated by *Duran v. U.S. Bank National Association* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1, 31. There, the Court reversed a trial verdict in favor plaintiffs in a wage and hour class action. *See also Tien v. Tenet Healthcare Corp.* (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088 ("[T]he reason, if any, that employees might not take their breaks were predominantly individualized questions of fact not susceptible to class treatment."). JCL Dec., ¶ 43.

Finally, even if a class is certified and Mitchell is found liable for the class claims alleged, post-certification risks remain, including a reversal of a favorable judgment for Plaintiff and decertification of the class. These post-certification risks are demonstrated by *Magadia v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2021) 999 F.3d 668. There, the Ninth Circuit vacated reversed and remanded a $110 million judgement against an employer for, *inter alia*, inaccurately paying overtime, and directed the trial court to enter judgement in favor of the employer. *See also O'Conner v. Uber Technologies, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2018) 904 F.3d 1087 (decertification of wage and hour misclassification action). JCL Dec., ¶ 44.

Collectively, the examples cited above illustrate the uncertain nature of class litigation. Consequently, the uncertainty of obtaining certification through a contested motion is a significant risk factor favoring settlement. JCL Dec., ¶ 45.

"The Settlement eliminates these and other risks of continued litigation, including the very real risk of no recovery after several years of litigation." (*In re Nvidia Derivs. Litig*. (N.D. Cal. 2008) 2008 WL 5382544, at *3.) Indeed, potential appeals aside, litigating a complex case through trial is inherently perilous regardless of the strengths of merits of the claims:

> [N]othing is assured when litigating against commercial giants with vast litigative resources, particular in such complex litigation as this, which would strain the cognitive capacities of any jury. Defense judgments were hardly beyond the realm of possibility. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of preliminary approval.

(Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1140, *opinion modified* (June 18, 1990).)

Finally, continuing to litigate this action would require continued and extensive resources coupled with significant Court time to proceed through trial and post-trial motions; which can often take years. Furthermore, wage and hour litigation is complex and expensive, as it often necessitates extensive expert testimony, particularly with regards to damages. But even if Plaintiff is successful at trial, Plaintiff is acutely aware that a judgment does not end the litigation. Plaintiff fully expects that Mitchell would appeal any favorable judgment. As demonstrated by *Magadia, supra,* 999 F.3d 668, the risk of an appeal and subsequent reversal is real. JCL Dec., ¶ 46. "Avoiding such a trial and the subsequent appeals in this complex case strongly militates in favor of settlement rather than further protracted and uncertain litigation." (*Nat'l Rural Telecomms. Coop v. DirecTV* (C.D. Cal. 2004) 221 F.R.D. 523, 527.) Thus, "unless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its acceptance and approval are preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain results." (*Id*. at 526.)

In this matter, Class Counsel negotiated a Gross Settlement Amount of $980,000.00 that is between 17.81% and 8.23% of Mitchell's liability exposure for class damages. Given the amount of the settlement here, as compared to potential value of the claims, offset by the various inherent risks to continued litigation, the settlement is fair and reasonable. JCL Dec., ¶ 47.

D. The Proposed Notice Informs the Class about the Case and Settlement

The Settlement Class is entitled to the best practical notice under the circumstances. (*Kass v. Young* (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 100, 106.). The purpose of the notice is to give class members sufficient information to decide whether they should accept the benefits offered, opt out and pursue their own remedies, or object to the settlement. (*Trotsky v. Los Angeles Fed Savings & Loan Assn.* (1975) 48 Cal. App. 3d 143, 151-52.) The notice must advise class members "that they may be excluded from the class if they so request and that they will be bound by the judgment, whether favorable or not, if they do not request exclusion." (*Kass,* 67 Cal.App.3d at 106.) Authorities generally require service of the class notice by mail or similar reliable means. (*Chance v. Super. Ct.* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 275, 290; *Cart v. Super. Ct.* (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 972.)[3]

The Parties jointly drafted the Notice Packet which fairly and neutrally informs the Class Members of their rights and remedies. The Settlement Administrator will first verify addresses, then mail the proposed Notice Packet to all Class Members. The Notice Packet will include information

[3] Due process does not require that each class member actually receive a notice, but rather a procedure reasonably certain to reach class members. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 1789, at 253 (2d ed. 1986). If appropriate notice is given, class members will be bound by the judgment even if they never actually receive the notice. *Fontana v. Elrod* (7th Cir. 1987) 826 F.2d 729, 732.

regarding the nature of the lawsuit, a summary of the substance of the Settlement's terms, the class definition, the procedure and time period within which to requests for exclusions or objections to the Settlement, the date for the final approval hearing, the formula used to calculate settlement payments, and the terms and scope of the Released Class Claims. Agreement at § IV. This method was negotiated by the Parties to ensure delivering the most reasonable method of notice to the Class Members while ensuring cost effective administration of the Settlement. JCL Dec., ¶ 48.

Accordingly, both the method of disseminating the Notice Packet and content of the Notice Packet satisfy due process and the requirements of California law. (*See* C.R.C. 3.776(e)-(f); *State of Cal. v. Levi Strauss* (1986) 41 Cal.3d 460,485 (the class notice must "fairly apprise the class members of the terms of the proposed compromise and of the options open to dissenting class members.").) JCL Dec., ¶ 54.

E. The Court Should Preliminarily Approve the Service Award

Enhancement payments "are fairly typical in class action cases." (*Cellphone Termination Fee* Cases (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1393; *Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp.* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958, *citing* 4 Newberg on Class Actions (4th ed. 2002) § 1 1:38, and Eisenberg & Miller, *Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study,* 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1303 (2006).) Enhancement payments "are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general." (*Rodriguez,* 563 F.3d at 958-59.) "[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class." (*Clark v. American Residential Services LLC* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785.)

Approximately 408 Class Members will share in the Net Settlement Amount due entirely to the effort and commitment of Plaintiff. Subject to Court approval, therefore, the Settlement provides for a Service Award of $10,000.00 for Plaintiff. The service award is fair and reasonable compensation for the Plaintiff's efforts bringing the action, assisting Class Counsel with the litigation and settlement, regularly conferring with Class Counsel on the status of his case and the strategies for prosecuting the claims, reviewing the proposed Settlement to ensure that its terms are fair and provide adequate relief for the Settlement Class. JCL Dec., ¶ 50.

Class Counsel on behalf of Plaintiff will file a formal motion for the negotiated Service Award once preliminary approval of the Settlement is granted. Plaintiff respectfully submits that the above showing is sufficient for preliminary approval of the negotiated Service Award. JCL Dec., ¶ 56.

F. The Court Should Preliminarily Approve the Payment of the Class Counsel Award

The purpose of a payment of the Class Counsel Award in class action litigation is to reward counsel who took the risk of non-payment and invested in a case that achieved a substantial positive result for the class. California courts routinely award attorneys' fees equaling one-third or more of the potential value of the common fund, the amount requested under this settlement. (*See Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 n.11 ("Empirical studies show that regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery."); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, *Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, J. of Empirical Legal Studies*, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 27-78, March 2004, at 35 (independent studies of class action litigation nationwide have come to a similar conclusion that a one-third fee is consistent with market rates).)

Class Counsel took this matter on a contingency fee basis and invested significant time and expense successfully prosecuting Plaintiff's claims. As discussed *supra*, the estimated average Individual Settlement Payment illustrates the demonstrably positive outcome for the Class Members. The Agreement provides for a payment of Class Counsel Award and in the amount of one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount ($326,666.67) and reimbursable litigations costs in an amount not to exceed $35,000.00. Agreement § III(B)(13). Considering the positive outcome for the Class Members, and in light of the supporting authority, the proposed Class Counsel Award is fair and reasonable. Plaintiff will file a formal motion for the negotiated Class Counsel Award once preliminary approval of the Settlement is granted. Plaintiff respectfully submits that the above showing is sufficient for preliminary approval of the negotiated attorneys' fees. JCL Dec., ¶ 52.

G. Provisional Certification for Settlement Purposes Is Appropriate

For Settlement, Plaintiff contends, and Mitchell does not dispute, that provisional certification of the Class is appropriate. JCL Dec., ¶ 53.

1. <u>The Standard for Class Certification</u>

Class actions are statutorily authorized "when the question is one of common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court" (*Cal.Civ.Proc*. Code § 382; *Lee v. Dynamex, Inc.* (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1332.) Class certification is appropriate when there is an "ascertainable class and a well-defined community of interest among class members." (*Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc.* (2014) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326.) Class treatment is appropriate even if class members at some point may be required to make an individual showing as to eligibility for recovery. (*Bufil v. Dollar Financial Group, Inc.* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207; *Sav-On,* 34 Cal.4th at 333.)

2. <u>The Proposed Settlement Class is Ascertainable and there is a Well-Defined Community of Interest Among the Class Members.</u>

Whether a class is "ascertainable" within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 is "determined by examining (1) the class definition, (2) the size of the class, and (3) the means available for identifying class members." (*Lee,* 166 Cal.App.4th at 1334.) Class members are ascertainable where they may be readily identified without unreasonable expense or time by reference to official records. (*Id.*)

The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) a class representative with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) a class representative and counsel who can adequately represent the class. (*Cal. Civ. Proc. Code* § 382.)

In April 2012, the Supreme Court expounded on the element of predominance: The "ultimate question" the element of predominance presents is whether "the issues which may be jointly tried, when compared with those requiring separate adjudication, are so numerous or substantial that the maintenance of a class action would be advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants." (*Brinker,* 53 Cal. 4th at 1021-1022 (citations omitted).)

Because all Class Members are Mitchell's current and former employees, the class is readily ascertainable from Mitchell's regular business records, i.e., payroll records. JCL Dec., ¶ 54.

The California statutes relating to each of Plaintiff's claims apply with equal force and effect to the entire Settlement Class. Factually, Mitchell's policies and practices apply class-wide and Mitchell

’s liability can be determined by facts common to all members of the class. The wage and hour issues are both numerous and substantial, and a class action is the most advantageous method of dealing with the claims of the Settlement Class. JCL Dec., ¶ 55.

Plaintiff’s wage and hour claims are typical of the proposed Class because they arise from the same factual basis and are based on the same legal theories applicable to the other Class Members. Likewise, Plaintiff’s interests are entirely coextensive with the interests of the Class. Plaintiff alleges that he was injured by the same company-wide practices to which the proposed Class Members were subject to and seek the same relief. Plaintiff has already demonstrated his ability to advocate for the interests of the Class Members by initiating this litigation, undertaking extensive class discovery, and evaluating the proposed settlement to assure that it is fair. JCL Dec., ¶ 56.

A class action is superior to a multitude of individual lawsuits. Given the size and amount of each individual claim, the Class Members likely have little incentive to litigate their claims on an individual basis because the out-of-pocket expense and personal commitment necessary to litigate each claim outweighs any potential recovery. In sum, class treatment is superior to individual, case-by-case adjudication. JCL Dec., ¶ 57.

Additionally, Plaintiff is represented by competent Class Counsel who have extensive experience in litigating wage and hour class action cases. Class Counsel successfully briefed, argued, certified, and gained state court settlement approval of the same class-wide causes of action that are at issue in this case. Class Counsel’s wage and hour class action experience establishes that they are well qualified to represent the interests of this Class. JCL Dec., ¶¶ 63-67; Declaration of Jean-Claude Lapuyade at ¶¶ 1-8; Declaration of Shani O. Zakay at ¶¶ 1-3.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Parties have negotiated a fair and reasonable settlement of claims. Having appropriately presented the materials and information necessary for preliminarily approval, the Parties request that the Court preliminarily approve the settlement.

Dated: December 23, 2025

JCL LAW FIRM, APC

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